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archy/core/archipelago/src/device_tokens.rs
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//! Companion device tokens — long-lived bearer credentials minted from an
//! authenticated session, so the pairing QR can log a phone in without
//! carrying the admin password (which the browser never has anyway).
//!
//! Only the SHA-256 of each token is persisted (`device-tokens.json` in the
//! data dir); the plaintext is returned exactly once at mint time and rides
//! the QR as the `tok` param. Verification goes through `auth.login`'s
//! `token` param and is covered by the same login rate limiter as passwords.
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use tokio::fs;
const TOKENS_FILE: &str = "device-tokens.json";
/// Cap on stored tokens; re-pairing the same device name replaces its entry,
/// so this only limits the number of *distinct* device names.
const MAX_TOKENS: usize = 32;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DeviceToken {
pub name: String,
/// Hex SHA-256 of the plaintext token.
pub hash: String,
/// Unix seconds at mint time.
pub created: u64,
/// App ids this token may reach through the app gate.
///
/// `None` means node-wide, which is what every companion pairing token
/// is and what tokens minted before scoping existed remain — the field
/// is absent from their stored JSON and deserialises to `None`. A
/// migration that guessed a scope for them would silently revoke access
/// the operator never asked to revoke.
///
/// `Some(list)` restricts the token to exactly those apps, which is the
/// point of scoping: a token handed to Home Assistant so it can poll one
/// app's API should not also open every other app on the node.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub apps: Option<Vec<String>>,
}
impl DeviceToken {
/// Whether this token may reach `app_id`.
pub fn allows_app(&self, app_id: &str) -> bool {
match &self.apps {
None => true,
Some(apps) => apps.iter().any(|a| a == app_id),
}
}
}
fn tokens_path(data_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
data_dir.join(TOKENS_FILE)
}
async fn load(data_dir: &Path) -> Vec<DeviceToken> {
match fs::read(tokens_path(data_dir)).await {
Ok(bytes) => serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap_or_default(),
Err(_) => Vec::new(),
}
}
async fn save(data_dir: &Path, tokens: &[DeviceToken]) -> Result<()> {
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(tokens)?;
fs::write(tokens_path(data_dir), bytes)
.await
.context("write device-tokens.json")
}
fn hash_hex(token: &str) -> String {
hex::encode(Sha256::digest(token.as_bytes()))
}
fn ct_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
if a.len() != b.len() {
return false;
}
a.iter().zip(b).fold(0u8, |acc, (x, y)| acc | (x ^ y)) == 0
}
/// Mint a new token for `name`. An existing token with the same name is
/// replaced, so re-showing the pairing QR never piles up stale entries.
/// Returns the plaintext token — the only time it ever exists outside the QR.
pub async fn create(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) -> Result<String> {
create_scoped(data_dir, name, None).await
}
/// Mint a token limited to `apps`, for a machine client that needs one app's
/// HTTP API and nothing else. `None` mints the node-wide token `create` does.
pub async fn create_scoped(
data_dir: &Path,
name: &str,
apps: Option<Vec<String>>,
) -> Result<String> {
// An empty list would be indistinguishable from "no restriction" to a
// careless reader while actually authorising nothing — reject it rather
// than mint a token whose behaviour nobody can predict from its record.
if apps.as_ref().is_some_and(|a| a.is_empty()) {
anyhow::bail!("a scoped device token must name at least one app");
}
// KEY-05: a device token is a bearer credential — its unpredictability is
// the whole of its security — so the source is named and the draw guarded.
let mut token_bytes = [0u8; 32];
crate::entropy::draw_key_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut token_bytes).map_err(|e| {
anyhow::anyhow!("Refusing to mint a device token from degenerate entropy: {e}")
})?;
let token = hex::encode(token_bytes);
let mut tokens = load(data_dir).await;
tokens.retain(|t| t.name != name);
if tokens.len() >= MAX_TOKENS {
tokens.remove(0);
}
tokens.push(DeviceToken {
name: name.to_string(),
hash: hash_hex(&token),
created: std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
.unwrap_or(0),
apps,
});
save(data_dir, &tokens).await?;
Ok(token)
}
/// Verify a candidate token. Returns the device name it was minted for.
pub async fn verify(data_dir: &Path, candidate: &str) -> Option<String> {
let candidate_hash = hash_hex(candidate);
load(data_dir)
.await
.iter()
.find(|t| ct_eq(t.hash.as_bytes(), candidate_hash.as_bytes()))
.map(|t| t.name.clone())
}
/// Verify a candidate token **for a specific app**, as the app gate does.
/// Returns the device name when the token is valid *and* in scope.
///
/// Separate from `verify` on purpose: `verify` answers "is this a real
/// token", which is the right question for node login, and would be the
/// wrong question here — a token scoped to one app would otherwise open
/// every app.
pub async fn verify_for_app(data_dir: &Path, candidate: &str, app_id: &str) -> Option<String> {
let candidate_hash = hash_hex(candidate);
load(data_dir)
.await
.iter()
.find(|t| ct_eq(t.hash.as_bytes(), candidate_hash.as_bytes()) && t.allows_app(app_id))
.map(|t| t.name.clone())
}
/// List stored tokens (hashes only — plaintexts are unrecoverable).
pub async fn list(data_dir: &Path) -> Vec<DeviceToken> {
load(data_dir).await
}
/// Remove the token minted for `name`. Returns whether one existed.
pub async fn remove(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) -> Result<bool> {
let mut tokens = load(data_dir).await;
let before = tokens.len();
tokens.retain(|t| t.name != name);
let removed = tokens.len() != before;
if removed {
save(data_dir, &tokens).await?;
}
Ok(removed)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn mint_verify_replace_remove() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let token = create(dir.path(), "phone").await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(verify(dir.path(), &token).await.as_deref(), Some("phone"));
assert!(verify(dir.path(), "not-a-token").await.is_none());
// Re-minting the same name invalidates the old token.
let token2 = create(dir.path(), "phone").await.unwrap();
assert!(verify(dir.path(), &token).await.is_none());
assert_eq!(verify(dir.path(), &token2).await.as_deref(), Some("phone"));
assert_eq!(list(dir.path()).await.len(), 1);
assert!(remove(dir.path(), "phone").await.unwrap());
assert!(verify(dir.path(), &token2).await.is_none());
}
}