feat(ui): mobile mesh tabs, AIUI-style audio player, cloud grid + map fixes

UI (this session):
- Global audio player now scales the whole interface into the space above it
  on desktop (sidebar + main) and docks directly above the tab bar on mobile;
  it stays visible while navigating.
- Mesh mobile redesign: floating Chat / BTC / Dead Man / AI / Map tab strip
  with a single fixed, internally-scrolling pane (page no longer scrolls);
  tabs hide while a conversation is open; floating back button; collapsible
  Device panel (starts collapsed); keyboard-aware conversation sizing via
  VisualViewport so the chat sits just above the keyboard.
- Cloud file grid: uniform 4/3 card heights (folders + images match).
- Swipe left/right switches tabs on the Apps and Web5 screens.
- Map tool fills its pane (no bottom gap); fix skewed Share Location toggle
  on mobile (global min-height rule was deforming the switch).
- Trim redundant helper copy from the mesh AI tab.

Also bundles pre-existing in-progress work that was already in the tree:
mesh listener/session + wallet + container + bitcoin-status backend changes,
docker UI updates, and assorted other UI tweaks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

core/archipelago/src/api/handler/content.rs

@@ -146,7 +146,9 @@ impl ApiHandler {
             Ok(content_server::ServeResult::Forbidden) => Ok(build_response(
                 StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
                 "application/json",
-                hyper::Body::from(r#"{"error":"Access denied — federation peer required"}"#),
+                hyper::Body::from(
+                    r#"{"error":"This file is shared with the host's federation peers only. Federate with that node (exchange invites) so it recognizes you, then try again."}"#,
+                ),
             )),
             Ok(content_server::ServeResult::NotFound) | Err(_) => Ok(build_response(
                 StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/content.rs

@@ -260,6 +260,20 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             }));
         }
 
+        // A 403 carries an actionable reason in its JSON body (e.g. "shared with
+        // the host's federation peers only — federate first"). Surface that to
+        // the user instead of a bare "Peer returned: 403 Forbidden".
+        if response.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::FORBIDDEN {
+            let status = response.status();
+            let body: serde_json::Value = response.json().await.unwrap_or_default();
+            let msg = body
+                .get("error")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                .map(|s| s.to_string())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| format!("Peer returned: {status}"));
+            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(msg));
+        }
+
         if !response.status().is_success() {
             return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Peer returned: {}", response.status()));
         }
@@ -463,12 +477,16 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         let local_did = crate::identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(&data.server_info.pubkey)?;
         let fips_npub = crate::federation::fips_npub_for_onion(&self.config.data_dir, onion).await;
 
+        // Minting a bolt11 is a tiny request/response — keep it snappy. Cap the
+        // FIPS attempt hard so a cold overlay can't burn the whole budget, and
+        // give Tor a short-but-real window (onion circuits need a few seconds).
         let path = format!("/content/{}/invoice", content_id);
         let (response, _transport) =
             match crate::fips::dial::PeerRequest::new(fips_npub.as_deref(), onion, &path)
                 .service(crate::settings::transport::PeerService::PeerFiles)
                 .header("X-Federation-DID", local_did)
-                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(60))
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(25))
+                .fips_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(6))
                 .send_get()
                 .await
             {
@@ -524,11 +542,15 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         }
 
         let fips_npub = crate::federation::fips_npub_for_onion(&self.config.data_dir, onion).await;
+        // Settlement poll — runs repeatedly, so each call must be quick. Fast-fail
+        // FIPS and keep a short Tor window; an unreachable peer just reads as
+        // "not yet paid" and the UI polls again.
         let path = format!("/content/{}/invoice-status/{}", content_id, payment_hash);
         let (response, _transport) =
             match crate::fips::dial::PeerRequest::new(fips_npub.as_deref(), onion, &path)
                 .service(crate::settings::transport::PeerService::PeerFiles)
-                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15))
+                .fips_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(6))
                 .send_get()
                 .await
             {
@@ -652,12 +674,15 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         let local_did = crate::identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(&data.server_info.pubkey)?;
         let fips_npub = crate::federation::fips_npub_for_onion(&self.config.data_dir, onion).await;
 
+        // Issuing an address is a tiny request/response — fast-fail FIPS, short
+        // Tor window (same budget shape as the invoice path, #6).
         let path = format!("/content/{}/onchain", content_id);
         let (response, _transport) =
             match crate::fips::dial::PeerRequest::new(fips_npub.as_deref(), onion, &path)
                 .service(crate::settings::transport::PeerService::PeerFiles)
                 .header("X-Federation-DID", local_did)
-                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(60))
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(25))
+                .fips_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(6))
                 .send_get()
                 .await
             {
@@ -715,7 +740,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         let (response, _transport) =
             match crate::fips::dial::PeerRequest::new(fips_npub.as_deref(), onion, &path)
                 .service(crate::settings::transport::PeerService::PeerFiles)
-                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15))
+                .fips_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(6))
                 .send_get()
                 .await
             {

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/wallet.rs

@@ -156,6 +156,35 @@ impl RpcHandler {
     /// Shared helper used by both the `lnd.createinvoice` RPC and the seller-side
     /// peer-file invoice flow (#46). LND returns `r_hash` as base64; we re-encode
     /// it as hex so it can be used as a stable lookup key and passed in URLs.
+    /// Whether LND reports it's synced to its Bitcoin chain backend. Used to
+    /// fail invoice minting FAST with a clear reason while the node's Bitcoin
+    /// backend is still in initial block download — otherwise the `/v1/invoices`
+    /// POST hangs for the full client timeout (×3 retries ≈ 45s) and surfaces as
+    /// an opaque failure. `getinfo` answers in ~2s even mid-IBD. Returns
+    /// `Some(false)` only when LND is reachable AND explicitly not synced;
+    /// `None` when we couldn't tell (let the mint attempt proceed and report its
+    /// own error rather than guess "syncing").
+    pub(crate) async fn lnd_chain_synced(&self) -> Option<bool> {
+        let (client, macaroon_hex) = self.lnd_client().await.ok()?;
+        let resp = client
+            .get(format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/getinfo"))
+            .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", &macaroon_hex)
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .ok()?;
+        let body: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.ok()?;
+        body.get("synced_to_chain").and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
+    }
+
+    /// Error returned when the node can't mint a Lightning invoice because its
+    /// Bitcoin backend is still syncing. Kept as one string so every invoice
+    /// entry point surfaces the same clear, user-facing reason.
+    fn syncing_invoice_err() -> anyhow::Error {
+        anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "Your Bitcoin node is still syncing — Lightning invoices are unavailable until it finishes. Try again once the node is fully synced."
+        )
+    }
+
     pub(crate) async fn create_invoice(
         &self,
         amount_sats: i64,
@@ -175,9 +204,12 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         });
         // LND's REST endpoint can briefly drop/reset connections under load
         // (swap pressure, just-restarted, TLS handshake races), which used to
-        // hard-fail the buy-file invoice with an opaque 503. Retry the send a
-        // few times with short backoff so a transient blip doesn't surface as
-        // a payment failure. The surrounding error now carries the real cause.
+        // hard-fail the buy-file invoice with an opaque 503. Retry on a
+        // CONNECTION error with short backoff so a transient blip doesn't
+        // surface as a payment failure. A *timeout* is NOT retried: it means LND
+        // accepted the connection but isn't answering the mint (e.g. a degraded
+        // node), and retrying just multiplies the wait (3×15s ≈ 45s) — fail
+        // after the first hang and let the caller surface the real reason.
         let mut last_err: Option<anyhow::Error> = None;
         let mut resp = None;
         for attempt in 0..3u32 {
@@ -193,10 +225,14 @@ impl RpcHandler {
                     break;
                 }
                 Err(e) => {
+                    let timed_out = e.is_timeout();
                     last_err = Some(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                        "LND REST connect failed (attempt {}): {e}",
+                        "LND REST send failed (attempt {}): {e}",
                         attempt + 1
                     ));
+                    if timed_out {
+                        break;
+                    }
                     tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(400)).await;
                 }
             }
@@ -204,9 +240,15 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         let resp = match resp {
             Some(r) => r,
             None => {
+                // If LND is reachable but explicitly not synced to chain, say so —
+                // it's the most common reason a just-restored/syncing node can't
+                // mint. Otherwise surface the underlying transport error.
+                if self.lnd_chain_synced().await == Some(false) {
+                    return Err(Self::syncing_invoice_err());
+                }
                 return Err(last_err.unwrap_or_else(|| {
                     anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to reach LND REST to create invoice")
-                }))
+                }));
             }
         };
 
@@ -385,13 +427,23 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             "memo": memo,
         });
 
-        let resp = client
+        let resp = match client
             .post(format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/invoices"))
             .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", &macaroon_hex)
             .json(&invoice_body)
             .send()
             .await
-            .context("Failed to create invoice")?;
+        {
+            Ok(r) => r,
+            Err(e) => {
+                // A hung/failed mint while LND is explicitly not synced to chain
+                // gets a clear, user-facing reason instead of an opaque error.
+                if self.lnd_chain_synced().await == Some(false) {
+                    return Err(Self::syncing_invoice_err());
+                }
+                return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(e).context("Failed to create invoice"));
+            }
+        };
 
         let status = resp.status();
         let body: serde_json::Value = resp

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/assistant.rs

@@ -14,12 +14,12 @@ impl RpcHandler {
     pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_mesh_assistant_status(
         &self,
     ) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
-        let cfg = {
+        let (cfg, denied_askers) = {
             let service = self.mesh_service.read().await;
             let svc = service
                 .as_ref()
                 .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh service not running"))?;
-            svc.assistant_config().await
+            (svc.assistant_config().await, svc.assistant_denied_askers().await)
         };
 
         let (ollama_detected, models) = detect_ollama().await;
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             "ollama_detected": ollama_detected,
             "claude_available": claude_available,
             "models": models,
+            "denied_askers": denied_askers,
         }))
     }
 

core/archipelago/src/bitcoin_status.rs

@@ -22,11 +22,23 @@ use tracing::{debug, warn};
 const CACHE_REFRESH_SECS: u64 = 5;
 const CACHE_ERROR_BACKOFF_SECS: u64 = 5;
 
+// Grace window before a failing poll marks the snapshot "stale" for the UI.
+// On a busy / swap-thrashing node (e.g. .198) getblockchaininfo intermittently
+// exceeds the RPC timeout, so a single missed poll is normal and must NOT flip
+// the UI to "reconnecting…". Only after the cached snapshot is genuinely old —
+// several polls failed in a row — do we surface the banner.
+const STALE_GRACE_MS: u64 = 20_000;
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
 pub struct BitcoinNodeStatus {
     pub ok: bool,
     pub stale: bool,
     pub updated_at_ms: u64,
+    // Server-computed age of the snapshot, filled in at serve time. The browser
+    // must not derive this itself (Date.now() - updated_at_ms) because that
+    // compares the browser clock against this node's clock — any skew made a
+    // fresh snapshot look stale and the "reconnecting…" banner never cleared.
+    pub age_ms: u64,
     pub error: Option<String>,
     pub blockchain_info: Option<serde_json::Value>,
     pub network_info: Option<serde_json::Value>,
@@ -40,6 +52,7 @@ impl Default for BitcoinNodeStatus {
             ok: false,
             stale: false,
             updated_at_ms: 0,
+            age_ms: 0,
             error: Some("Connecting to Bitcoin node...".to_string()),
             blockchain_info: None,
             network_info: None,
@@ -128,7 +141,11 @@ pub fn spawn_status_cache() {
 
                     if cached.blockchain_info.is_some() {
                         cached.ok = false;
-                        cached.stale = true;
+                        // Only flip to "stale" once the last good snapshot is older
+                        // than the grace window. A brief RPC gap on a busy node keeps
+                        // showing last-known state silently instead of a banner flicker.
+                        let snapshot_age_ms = now_ms().saturating_sub(cached.updated_at_ms);
+                        cached.stale = snapshot_age_ms > STALE_GRACE_MS;
                         cached.error = Some(friendly_transient_error(true, &err_msg));
                     } else {
                         *cached = BitcoinNodeStatus {
@@ -148,12 +165,22 @@ pub fn spawn_status_cache() {
 }
 
 pub async fn get_bitcoin_status() -> BitcoinNodeStatus {
-    cache().read().await.clone()
+    let mut status = cache().read().await.clone();
+    // Compute age here (server clock only) so the browser never has to subtract
+    // across clocks. A successful snapshot serves age_ms ≈ 0 → the UI clears the
+    // "reconnecting…" banner on its very next poll regardless of browser-clock skew.
+    if status.updated_at_ms > 0 {
+        status.age_ms = now_ms().saturating_sub(status.updated_at_ms);
+    }
+    status
 }
 
 async fn fetch_bitcoin_status() -> Result<BitcoinNodeStatus> {
+    // 12s (not 8s): on a swap-thrashing node getblockchaininfo can answer slowly
+    // but correctly; too tight a timeout turned working-but-slow polls into
+    // failures and tripped the "reconnecting…" banner. Stays under STALE_GRACE_MS.
     let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
-        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(8))
+        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(12))
         .build()
         .context("build Bitcoin status HTTP client")?;
 
@@ -172,6 +199,7 @@ async fn fetch_bitcoin_status() -> Result<BitcoinNodeStatus> {
         ok: true,
         stale: false,
         updated_at_ms: now_ms(),
+        age_ms: 0,
         error: None,
         blockchain_info: Some(blockchain_info),
         network_info: network_info.ok(),

core/archipelago/src/container/companion.rs

@@ -102,8 +102,15 @@ const LND_UI: &[CompanionSpec] = &[CompanionSpec {
     ],
     pre_start: None,
     bind_mounts: &[],
-    ports: &[(18083, 80)],
-    host_network: false,
+    // Host networking so the app's own nginx can proxy the archipelago backend
+    // same-origin (127.0.0.1:5678), exactly like fips-ui / electrs-ui. The
+    // previous bridge + 18083→80 mapping forced the browser to fetch the
+    // backend cross-origin from the app's port, which depended on the host
+    // nginx route + a CORS Origin/Host match and broke on http-only nodes
+    // (e.g. .116: blank fields, QR "failed to fetch"). The app's nginx now
+    // listens on 18083 directly (NOT 80 — that would collide with host nginx).
+    ports: &[],
+    host_network: true,
 }];
 
 const ELECTRS_UI: &[CompanionSpec] = &[CompanionSpec {
@@ -439,12 +446,15 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn lnd_ui_uses_port_mapping_not_host_port_80() {
+    fn lnd_ui_uses_host_network_for_same_origin_backend_proxy() {
+        // lnd-ui is host-networked (its nginx listens on 18083 directly) so the
+        // app can proxy the archipelago backend same-origin instead of fetching
+        // it cross-origin from its app port — see the spec comment for why.
         let spec = &LND_UI[0];
         let u = build_unit(spec, "localhost/lnd-ui:latest");
         assert_eq!(u.name, "archy-lnd-ui");
-        assert!(matches!(u.network, NetworkMode::Bridge(ref n) if n == "bridge"));
-        assert_eq!(u.ports, vec![(18083, 80, "tcp".into())]);
+        assert!(matches!(u.network, NetworkMode::Host));
+        assert!(u.ports.is_empty());
     }
 
     #[test]

core/archipelago/src/container/docker_packages.rs

@@ -365,6 +365,13 @@ fn get_app_metadata(app_id: &str) -> AppMetadata {
             repo: "https://github.com/fedimint/fedimint".to_string(),
             tier: "",
         },
+        "fedimint-clientd" | "fmcd" => AppMetadata {
+            title: "Fedimint Client".to_string(),
+            description: "Fedimint ecash client daemon (fmcd) — lets your node hold Fedimint ecash and join federations".to_string(),
+            icon: "/assets/img/app-icons/fedimint.png".to_string(),
+            repo: "https://github.com/minmoto/fmcd".to_string(),
+            tier: "",
+        },
         "morphos" | "morphos-server" => AppMetadata {
             title: "Morphos".to_string(),
             description: "Self-hosted file converter".to_string(),

core/archipelago/src/fips/dial.rs

@@ -308,6 +308,14 @@ pub struct PeerRequest<'a> {
     pub path: &'a str,
     pub headers: Vec<(&'a str, String)>,
     pub timeout: std::time::Duration,
+    /// Optional shorter cap on the FIPS *attempt* only. When set, a cold or hung
+    /// FIPS overlay fails fast within this budget so the Tor fallback still gets
+    /// its full `timeout` — without it, a stuck FIPS dial can consume the whole
+    /// caller budget (e.g. a 60s frontend RPC) and the request "times out" even
+    /// though Tor would have answered (#6, the Pay-with-QR invoice request).
+    /// `None` keeps the legacy behavior (FIPS uses the full `timeout`), which a
+    /// large content download needs so its long FIPS transfer isn't truncated.
+    pub fips_timeout: Option<std::time::Duration>,
     pub service: Option<crate::settings::transport::PeerService>,
 }
 
@@ -319,10 +327,26 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
             path,
             headers: Vec::new(),
             timeout: std::time::Duration::from_secs(30),
+            fips_timeout: None,
             service: None,
         }
     }
 
+    /// Cap the FIPS attempt to a shorter budget than the overall `timeout`, so a
+    /// cold/hung overlay path fails fast and the Tor fallback keeps its full
+    /// budget. Use on short request/response calls (invoice, status); leave
+    /// unset for large downloads that legitimately need a long FIPS transfer.
+    pub fn fips_timeout(mut self, t: std::time::Duration) -> Self {
+        self.fips_timeout = Some(t);
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Timeout to apply to the FIPS attempt — the explicit cap if set, else the
+    /// overall request timeout.
+    fn fips_attempt_timeout(&self) -> std::time::Duration {
+        self.fips_timeout.unwrap_or(self.timeout)
+    }
+
     /// Tie this request to a user-configurable service preference. If
     /// the user has set that service to `Fips` or `Tor`, the builder
     /// respects it.
@@ -423,7 +447,7 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
             }
         };
         let url = format!("{}{}", base, self.path);
-        let c = client_with_timeout(self.timeout);
+        let c = client_with_timeout(self.fips_attempt_timeout());
         let mut rb = c.post(&url).json(body);
         for (k, v) in &self.headers {
             rb = rb.header(*k, v);
@@ -456,7 +480,7 @@ impl<'a> PeerRequest<'a> {
             }
         };
         let url = format!("{}{}", base, self.path);
-        let c = client_with_timeout(self.timeout);
+        let c = client_with_timeout(self.fips_attempt_timeout());
         let mut rb = c.get(&url);
         for (k, v) in &self.headers {
             rb = rb.header(*k, v);

core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/assist.rs

@@ -57,24 +57,32 @@ pub(super) enum AssistReply {
 
 /// Entry point: gate the query, run the model, send the answer back via the
 /// requested reply path. Spawned off the radio loop so it never blocks.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub(super) async fn run_assist(
     prompt: String,
     model_override: Option<String>,
     req_id: u64,
     asker_contact_id: u32,
     sender_name: String,
+    // Whether the asker's message was cryptographically authenticated (a
+    // verified signature, or arrival over the federation transport). Required
+    // for any identity-based allow under `trusted_only`/the allowlist.
+    authenticated: bool,
     reply: AssistReply,
     state: Arc<MeshState>,
 ) {
     let asker = asker_contact_id;
 
     // Trust + block gate.
-    if !is_sender_allowed(&state, asker).await {
+    if !is_sender_allowed(&state, asker, authenticated).await {
         warn!(
             from = asker,
             name = %sender_name,
             "AssistQuery denied — sender not permitted by assistant policy"
         );
+        // Record who was turned away so the operator can find + allow them from
+        // the UI (the silent-on-wire denial otherwise only shows in the journal).
+        record_denied(&state, asker, &sender_name).await;
         // Silent on the wire (no airtime spent on denials); surface to the UI.
         let _ = state
             .event_tx
@@ -155,13 +163,25 @@ pub(super) async fn run_assist(
 }
 
 /// Whether `sender_contact_id` may invoke the assistant under the node's policy.
-/// Always denies user-blocked contacts. With `trusted_only`, requires a
-/// federation-Trusted match on the peer's pubkey or DID.
-async fn is_sender_allowed(state: &Arc<MeshState>, sender_contact_id: u32) -> bool {
+///
+/// Always denies user-blocked contacts. Identity-based allows (the per-contact
+/// allowlist and the federation-Trusted match) require `authenticated == true` —
+/// i.e. the asker's message carried a signature that verified against its known
+/// key (or it arrived over the federation transport, which verifies upstream).
+/// A bare radio packet can CLAIM any key or DID, so without that proof the
+/// allowlist and trust list are spoofable; only the explicit "anyone on the
+/// mesh" policy (`trusted_only == false`) admits an unauthenticated asker.
+async fn is_sender_allowed(
+    state: &Arc<MeshState>,
+    sender_contact_id: u32,
+    authenticated: bool,
+) -> bool {
     let (pubkey_hex, did) = {
         let peers = state.peers.read().await;
         match peers.get(&sender_contact_id) {
-            Some(p) => (p.pubkey_hex.clone(), p.did.clone()),
+            // Match identity on the bound archipelago key (stable, advert/
+            // federation-verified), not the firmware routing key.
+            Some(p) => (p.identity_pubkey_hex().map(|s| s.to_string()), p.did.clone()),
             None => (None, None),
         }
     };
@@ -180,12 +200,15 @@ async fn is_sender_allowed(state: &Arc<MeshState>, sender_contact_id: u32) -> bo
         }
     }
 
-    // Explicit per-contact allowlist: a listed pubkey may ask regardless of
-    // the trusted_only policy (block check above still wins).
-    if let Some(ref pk) = pubkey_hex {
-        let allowed = state.assistant.read().await.allowed_contacts.clone();
-        if allowed.iter().any(|a| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(pk)) {
-            return true;
+    // Explicit per-contact allowlist: a listed pubkey may ask regardless of the
+    // trusted_only policy — but only when the message is authenticated, so a
+    // spoofed packet claiming an allowlisted key can't slip through.
+    if authenticated {
+        if let Some(ref pk) = pubkey_hex {
+            let allowed = state.assistant.read().await.allowed_contacts.clone();
+            if allowed.iter().any(|a| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(pk)) {
+                return true;
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -193,7 +216,14 @@ async fn is_sender_allowed(state: &Arc<MeshState>, sender_contact_id: u32) -> bo
         return true;
     }
 
-    // Trusted-only: match against the federation trust list.
+    // Trusted-only from here: an unauthenticated asker can never match the trust
+    // list (it could otherwise just claim a trusted node's public key/DID).
+    if !authenticated {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // Match against the federation trust list by the asker's verified archipelago
+    // pubkey or DID (a radio peer gets these from its signed identity advert).
     let nodes = crate::federation::load_nodes(&state.data_dir)
         .await
         .unwrap_or_default();
@@ -203,6 +233,36 @@ async fn is_sender_allowed(state: &Arc<MeshState>, sender_contact_id: u32) -> bo
     })
 }
 
+/// Newest-first cap on the denied-asker buffer — enough to surface the people
+/// who recently tried, without unbounded growth from a spammer.
+const MAX_DENIED_ASKERS: usize = 25;
+
+/// Record a turned-away `!ai` asker so the UI can offer a one-click "Allow".
+/// Dedupes by contact id (moves an existing entry to the front and refreshes its
+/// timestamp/name) so repeated denials from one device don't flood the list.
+async fn record_denied(state: &Arc<MeshState>, asker_contact_id: u32, sender_name: &str) {
+    // Capture the bound archipelago identity key (NOT the firmware routing key):
+    // one-click "Allow" adds this to the allowlist, which the gate matches on the
+    // archipelago key. A peer with no advert has no arch key → None → the UI shows
+    // "no key" (only the "anyone on the mesh" policy can admit it).
+    let pubkey_hex = {
+        let peers = state.peers.read().await;
+        peers
+            .get(&asker_contact_id)
+            .and_then(|p| p.arch_pubkey_hex.clone())
+    };
+    let entry = super::DeniedAsker {
+        contact_id: asker_contact_id,
+        name: sender_name.to_string(),
+        pubkey_hex,
+        at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+    };
+    let mut denied = state.assist_denied.write().await;
+    denied.retain(|d| d.contact_id != asker_contact_id);
+    denied.push_front(entry);
+    denied.truncate(MAX_DENIED_ASKERS);
+}
+
 /// Cap the answer to `MAX_REPLY_CHARS`, appending a marker when truncated.
 /// Returns (text_to_send, was_truncated).
 fn cap_reply(answer: &str) -> (String, bool) {

core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/decode.rs

@@ -382,8 +382,13 @@ pub(super) async fn store_plain_message(
                 let name = peer_name.to_string();
                 let st = Arc::clone(state);
                 tokio::spawn(async move {
-                    super::assist::run_assist(prompt, None, req_id, contact_id, name, reply, st)
-                        .await;
+                    // A bare plain-text channel `!ai` carries no signature, so it
+                    // is NOT authenticated — under trusted_only it'll be denied,
+                    // and it can only be answered under the "anyone" policy.
+                    super::assist::run_assist(
+                        prompt, None, req_id, contact_id, name, false, reply, st,
+                    )
+                    .await;
                 });
             }
         }
@@ -484,6 +489,10 @@ pub(super) async fn handle_identity_received(
         advert_name: format!("Archy-{}", &did[8..16.min(did.len())]),
         did: Some(did.to_string()),
         pubkey_hex: Some(ed_pubkey_hex.to_string()),
+        // The advert signature was verified above, so this is an authenticated
+        // archipelago identity. Bind it separately so a later refresh_contacts
+        // (which rewrites pubkey_hex to the firmware routing key) can't drop it.
+        arch_pubkey_hex: Some(ed_pubkey_hex.to_string()),
         x25519_pubkey: Some(x25519_bytes),
         rssi: Some(rssi),
         snr: None,

core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs

@@ -83,14 +83,22 @@ pub(crate) async fn handle_typed_envelope_direct(
     sender_name: &str,
     envelope: TypedEnvelope,
 ) {
-    // Verify envelope signature if present, using the sender's known Ed25519 key
+    // Verify the envelope signature (if present) against the sender's known
+    // Ed25519 key, and record whether the sender is cryptographically
+    // authenticated. A federation peer (synthetic high-half contact_id) arrived
+    // over the Tor relay, which verifies the sender signature upstream before
+    // injecting here, so it counts as authenticated. This flag gates the
+    // identity-based `!ai` allows (allowlist / federation-trust) downstream.
+    let mut authenticated = sender_contact_id >= crate::mesh::FEDERATION_CONTACT_ID_BASE;
     if envelope.sig.is_some() {
         let peer_pubkey = state
             .peers
             .read()
             .await
             .get(&sender_contact_id)
-            .and_then(|p| p.pubkey_hex.as_ref())
+            // Verify against the bound archipelago identity key, not the
+            // firmware routing key — only the former is what the peer signs with.
+            .and_then(|p| p.identity_pubkey_hex())
             .and_then(|hex_str| hex::decode(hex_str).ok())
             .and_then(|bytes| {
                 if bytes.len() == 32 {
@@ -103,7 +111,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn handle_typed_envelope_direct(
             });
         if let Some(vk) = peer_pubkey {
             match envelope.verify_signature(&vk) {
-                Ok(true) => {}
+                Ok(true) => {
+                    authenticated = true;
+                }
                 Ok(false) => {
                     warn!(
                         peer = sender_contact_id,
@@ -701,6 +711,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn handle_typed_envelope_direct(
                                 req_id,
                                 cid,
                                 name,
+                                authenticated,
                                 super::assist::AssistReply::ChatText { contact_id: cid },
                                 st,
                             )
@@ -748,6 +759,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn handle_typed_envelope_direct(
                             query.req_id,
                             sender_contact_id,
                             name,
+                            authenticated,
                             super::assist::AssistReply::Typed {
                                 contact_id: sender_contact_id,
                             },

core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/mod.rs

@@ -153,6 +153,28 @@ pub struct MeshState {
     /// Contact-ids with an AI query currently being answered. Caps each asker to
     /// one in-flight query so a peer can't flood the node's compute / airtime.
     pub assist_inflight: RwLock<HashSet<u32>>,
+    /// Recently-denied `!ai` askers (newest first, capped). When `trusted_only`
+    /// rejects a sender — typically a radio (meshcore) device that presents a
+    /// firmware key rather than an archipelago DID — we record who tried so the
+    /// UI can surface them and let the operator one-click allow their key.
+    /// Silent on the wire (no airtime spent), visible to the operator here.
+    pub assist_denied: RwLock<VecDeque<DeniedAsker>>,
+}
+
+/// A `!ai` asker that the assistant policy turned away. Surfaced to the UI so
+/// the operator can add their key to the allowlist without hunting the journal.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
+pub struct DeniedAsker {
+    /// Meshcore contact id of the asker.
+    pub contact_id: u32,
+    /// Best-known display name (advert name) at denial time.
+    pub name: String,
+    /// The asker's ed25519 pubkey hex, if known. `None` for a raw radio device
+    /// that hasn't advertised an archipelago key — such a sender can only be
+    /// admitted by switching the policy to "anyone", not via the allowlist.
+    pub pubkey_hex: Option<String>,
+    /// ISO-8601 timestamp of the (most recent) denial.
+    pub at: String,
 }
 
 /// Mesh-AI assistant configuration, snapshotted from `MeshConfig` at startup.
@@ -248,6 +270,7 @@ impl MeshState {
             assistant: RwLock::new(assistant),
             data_dir,
             assist_inflight: RwLock::new(HashSet::new()),
+            assist_denied: RwLock::new(VecDeque::new()),
         });
         (state, rx, cmd_rx)
     }

core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/session.rs

@@ -380,6 +380,11 @@ async fn refresh_contacts(device: &mut MeshRadioDevice, state: &Arc<MeshState>)
                     advert_name: contact.advert_name.clone(),
                     did: existing.and_then(|p| p.did.clone()),
                     pubkey_hex: Some(contact.public_key_hex.clone()),
+                    // Preserve any archipelago identity bound by an earlier
+                    // identity advert — NEVER overwrite it with the firmware
+                    // contact key, or a signed `!ai` query from this peer would
+                    // fail authentication after the next contact refresh.
+                    arch_pubkey_hex: existing.and_then(|p| p.arch_pubkey_hex.clone()),
                     x25519_pubkey: existing.and_then(|p| p.x25519_pubkey),
                     rssi: None,
                     snr: None,

core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs

@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ const MESH_CONTACTS_FILE: &str = "mesh-contacts.json";
 /// high half of u32 space to avoid collision. Both the receive path
 /// (`inject_typed_from_federation`) and the startup pre-seed use this
 /// formula so they always produce the same id for the same peer.
+/// Mesh contacts at or above this id are synthetic federation peers (the high
+/// half of the u32 space). Meshcore radio contacts use the firmware's low-int id
+/// space, so this bit cleanly distinguishes "arrived over the authenticated
+/// federation transport" from "heard over the radio".
+pub(crate) const FEDERATION_CONTACT_ID_BASE: u32 = 0x8000_0000;
+
 pub(crate) fn federation_peer_contact_id(archipelago_pubkey_hex: &str) -> u32 {
     let bytes = hex::decode(archipelago_pubkey_hex).unwrap_or_default();
     if bytes.len() < 4 {
@@ -77,6 +83,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn upsert_federation_peer(
         advert_name: display_name,
         did: Some(did.to_string()),
         pubkey_hex: Some(archipelago_pubkey_hex.to_string()),
+        // Federation peers are authenticated by the Tor relay upstream; their
+        // archipelago key is known, so bind it as the identity key too.
+        arch_pubkey_hex: Some(archipelago_pubkey_hex.to_string()),
         x25519_pubkey: existing.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.x25519_pubkey),
         rssi: existing.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.rssi),
         snr: existing.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.snr),
@@ -1433,6 +1442,12 @@ impl MeshService {
         self.state.assistant.read().await.clone()
     }
 
+    /// Recently-denied `!ai` askers (newest first) so the UI can offer to allow
+    /// them. Cleared implicitly as new denials rotate older ones out.
+    pub async fn assistant_denied_askers(&self) -> Vec<listener::DeniedAsker> {
+        self.state.assist_denied.read().await.iter().cloned().collect()
+    }
+
     /// Update the mesh-AI assistant settings live (no listener restart) and
     /// persist them to the mesh config. `model: Some(None)` clears the override
     /// (falls back to the built-in default); `None` leaves a field unchanged.

core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs

@@ -32,8 +32,18 @@ pub struct MeshPeer {
     pub advert_name: String,
     /// Archipelago DID (did:key:z...) if identity was received.
     pub did: Option<String>,
-    /// Ed25519 public key hex if identity was received.
+    /// Routing key hex. For a radio (meshcore) peer this is the firmware
+    /// contact public key used to address outbound DMs; for a federation-
+    /// seeded peer it is the archipelago ed25519 key. Used for delivery, NOT
+    /// for authentication — see `arch_pubkey_hex`.
     pub pubkey_hex: Option<String>,
+    /// Verified archipelago ed25519 identity key hex, bound from a signed
+    /// identity advert (`handle_identity_received`) or federation seeding.
+    /// Unlike `pubkey_hex`, this is NEVER overwritten by `refresh_contacts`
+    /// with the firmware routing key, so it stays stable for the `!ai` auth
+    /// gate, envelope signature verification, and federation-trust matching.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub arch_pubkey_hex: Option<String>,
     /// X25519 public key (32 bytes) for key agreement.
     #[serde(skip)]
     pub x25519_pubkey: Option<[u8; 32]>,
@@ -56,6 +66,19 @@ pub struct MeshPeer {
     pub reachable: bool,
 }
 
+impl MeshPeer {
+    /// The key to use when AUTHENTICATING this peer (`!ai` trust/allowlist,
+    /// envelope signature verification): the verified archipelago identity key
+    /// if one is bound, otherwise the routing key. Never use the firmware
+    /// routing key for auth when an archipelago identity is known — a radio
+    /// peer's firmware key won't match its `nodes.json` archipelago key.
+    pub fn identity_pubkey_hex(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        self.arch_pubkey_hex
+            .as_deref()
+            .or(self.pubkey_hex.as_deref())
+    }
+}
+
 /// Direction of a mesh message.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
@@ -191,3 +214,51 @@ pub enum MeshEvent {
         text: String,
     },
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn peer(arch: Option<&str>, routing: Option<&str>) -> MeshPeer {
+        MeshPeer {
+            contact_id: 1,
+            advert_name: "Test".into(),
+            did: None,
+            pubkey_hex: routing.map(|s| s.to_string()),
+            arch_pubkey_hex: arch.map(|s| s.to_string()),
+            x25519_pubkey: None,
+            rssi: None,
+            snr: None,
+            last_heard: String::new(),
+            hops: 0,
+            last_advert: 0,
+            reachable: false,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn identity_prefers_bound_archipelago_key_over_firmware_routing_key() {
+        // A radio peer that sent an identity advert: routing key is the firmware
+        // contact key, but auth must use the bound archipelago key.
+        let p = peer(Some("archkey"), Some("firmwarekey"));
+        assert_eq!(p.identity_pubkey_hex(), Some("archkey"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn identity_falls_back_to_routing_key_when_no_advert() {
+        // A plain peer with no archipelago identity bound: fall back to whatever
+        // key we have (federation peers carry the arch key in pubkey_hex).
+        let p = peer(None, Some("firmwarekey"));
+        assert_eq!(p.identity_pubkey_hex(), Some("firmwarekey"));
+        assert_eq!(peer(None, None).identity_pubkey_hex(), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refresh_style_routing_update_does_not_change_identity() {
+        // Simulates refresh_contacts: pubkey_hex (routing) is rewritten to a new
+        // firmware key while arch_pubkey_hex (identity) is preserved.
+        let mut p = peer(Some("archkey"), Some("firmware-old"));
+        p.pubkey_hex = Some("firmware-new".into());
+        assert_eq!(p.identity_pubkey_hex(), Some("archkey"));
+    }
+}