fix(security): Tor onions for gated ports forward to the gate, not the app
Tor carries no session cookie, so HiddenServicePort → 127.0.0.1:<port> reached the app around the gate — the last transport the gate did not cover. The gate now binds 127.0.0.2 (its own loopback, distinct from the app's 127.0.0.1, so no app needs a second port), and regenerate_torrc forwards declared-gated ports there. Undeclared ports keep today's target: absence of the field is not an instruction. The 127.0.0.2 claim deliberately does not count toward the unprotected audit — a port whose only claim is the Tor loopback is still wide open on the LAN and must keep warning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
parent
8210ca0a2a
commit
3760a00ea3
@@ -44,6 +44,15 @@ use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
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/// apps are installed while the daemon runs.
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const SWEEP_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(60);
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/// The gate's own loopback address, distinct from the app's `127.0.0.1`.
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///
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/// Tor cannot present a session cookie, so `HiddenServicePort → 127.0.0.1`
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/// reaches the app around the gate. Instead torrc forwards gated ports to
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/// this address (`api/rpc/tor`), where the gate — not the app — listens. A
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/// second loopback address rather than a second port number, so no app needs
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/// a port it did not declare.
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pub const GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM: IpAddr = IpAddr::V4(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 2));
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/// A port the gate should own but could not claim, and why.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
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pub struct UnprotectedPort {
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@@ -192,6 +201,10 @@ async fn sweep(
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let mut claimed_any = false;
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let mut blocked = false;
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// External addresses first, then the gate's Tor upstream. 127.0.0.2
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// deliberately does NOT count toward `claimed_any`: the warning below
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// is about external exposure, and a port whose only claim is the Tor
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// loopback is still wide open on the LAN.
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for &addr in &addresses {
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let key = (app.port, addr);
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if held.contains_key(&key) {
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@@ -214,6 +227,23 @@ async fn sweep(
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Err(_) => blocked = true,
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}
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}
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let tor_key = (app.port, GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM);
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if held.contains_key(&tor_key) {
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claimed.push((app.port, GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM.to_string()));
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} else {
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match TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::new(GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM, app.port)).await {
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Ok(listener) => {
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held.insert(tor_key, ());
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claimed.push((app.port, GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM.to_string()));
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info!(
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port = app.port, app = %app.app_id,
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"app gate claimed the Tor upstream (127.0.0.2)"
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);
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spawn_accept_loop(listener, gate.clone(), app.clone(), shutdown_rx.clone());
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}
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Err(_) => blocked = true,
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}
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}
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if blocked && !claimed_any {
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warn!(
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