feat(security): enforce trusted-registry image policy at the orchestrator pull sites
Catalog- and manifest-supplied image refs reached pull_image without ever passing the RPC boundary's validator — a malicious catalog entry or manifest could pull from an arbitrary registry. The allowlist now lives in container::image_policy (the RPC check delegates to it) and both orchestrator pull sites (install_fresh and ensure_resolved_source_available) refuse refs that fail it. The shared policy accepts trusted-registry refs and registry-less Docker Hub shorthand (grafana/grafana etc., used by 8 shipped manifests — a registry-less ref cannot name an attacker host), and rejects explicit non-allowlisted hosts, shell metacharacters, and malformed refs. §A of the 1.8.0 hardening plan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
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4b4a1f88fb
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ pub mod dev_orchestrator;
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pub mod docker_packages;
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pub mod filebrowser;
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pub mod hooks;
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pub mod image_policy;
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pub mod image_versions;
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pub mod lnd;
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pub mod prod_orchestrator;
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