fix(lnd-ui): pin the image and host-network it so OTA actually updates it
Reported: Framework PT took the OTA and got the new bitcoin-ui but not lnd-ui. Two causes, both in the update path rather than the app. 1. LND_UI_IMAGE was "lnd-ui:latest" while BITCOIN_UI_IMAGE was pinned to 1.7.119-alpha. Podman does not re-pull a tag it already holds locally, so a node that ever pulled lnd-ui:latest keeps that copy forever and every subsequent release silently no-ops. Pinned to 1.7.119-alpha, so a version change is what triggers the pull — the same mechanism that made bitcoin-ui update correctly. 2. first-boot-containers.sh declared lnd-ui as bridge with -p 18083:80. docker/lnd-ui/nginx.conf listens on 18083 DIRECTLY (it must, to proxy the backend on 127.0.0.1:5678 same-origin), so that maps a host port onto a container port nothing serves — reproduced on-node as HTTP 000. This is the THIRD copy of the same declaration: container-specs.sh and apps/lnd-ui/manifest.yml were both already corrected, this one was missed, and it is the copy fresh installs use. Now host-networked with no published ports, matching its siblings and the other two copies. The underlying hazard is that one container spec lives in three files that can disagree; recorded as a follow-up rather than refactored here. Also opens .planning/RELEASE-1.7.121-TASKS.md — every outstanding item for the next release with its evidence, so nothing in a fast-moving queue gets lost between sessions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
archipelago
co-authored by
Claude Opus 5
Claude Opus 5
parent
c0cfc72a05
commit
5088aef556
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# Release 1.7.121 — task list
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Opened 2026-08-03, immediately after v1.7.120-alpha shipped. Everything the operator has
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asked for since, plus the items v1.7.120 deliberately left open. Ordered by severity.
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Status key: **DONE** (committed) · **READY** (written, not yet committed/tested) ·
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**OPEN** (not started) · **BLOCKED** (needs an operator decision)
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---
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## P0 — Security
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### 1. App ports are reachable with no login, on every transport — **OPEN**
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> "if I'm logged out I can reach every app port on tailscale and LAN, this can not be
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> allowed… it must present the login to access the app with an app icon of what you're
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> accessing to confirm, and 2FA if present" — operator, 2026-08-03
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- Applies to **Tailscale, LAN, Tor, FIPS** alike, and to "ssh access to that port or whatever".
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- Required behaviour: an unauthenticated request to any app port serves a **login page
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naming and showing the icon of the app being accessed**, then honours **2FA when set**.
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- **Research first:** how umbrelOS and StartOS gate app access (operator asked explicitly).
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Both are open source — `getumbrel/umbrel` and `Start9Labs/start-os`. Do not guess at
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their model; read it.
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- This is the same class as the v1.7.120 `/lnd-connect-info` + `/bitcoin-rpc/` leaks, but
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**fleet-wide across every app port** rather than two endpoints. Those two were closed by
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moving authorisation to the resource; this needs a general gate.
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- Scope note: `fips/app_ports.rs` holds the mesh allowlist; `is_peer_allowed_path` in
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`server.rs` holds the peer HTTP allowlist. Neither currently authenticates app ports.
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### 2. Filebrowser ships an insecure default login — **OPEN**
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- Change the default credential **without breaking the dashboard's Cloud view**, which
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authenticates to filebrowser on the user's behalf.
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- Related prior art: FED-07 rotated the shipped Fedimint gateway credential and had to
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recreate the running container for it to take effect (`06e0e695`) — the same trap
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applies here.
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### 3. Federation trust escalation — **READY** (compiles; tests running)
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Two independent fail-open paths granted `Trusted` without any operator decision:
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- `federation.peer-joined` is **unauthenticated** (middleware no-session list) and
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peer-reachable on `/rpc/v1`. Its ed25519 check verifies the caller against **the pubkey
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the caller supplied**, so it proves key possession, never authorisation. A join with no
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`invite_token` fell through to `TrustLevel::Trusted.min(claimed_trust)`, and
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`claimed_trust` defaults to `Trusted` — so anyone able to reach the node could
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self-grant Trusted. **Now capped at `Observer`.**
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- `merge_transitive_peers` added every peer advertised by a Trusted source as `Trusted`,
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making trust viral across the whole federation graph. **Now `Observer`** — which is what
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`NodeStateSnapshot.federated_peers`' own doc comment always said it should be
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("adds them as Observers on her side… doesn't auto-promote to Trusted"). The code
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contradicted its own spec.
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- Added `FederatedNode.trust_source` (`invite` | `uninvited-join` | `transitive-merge` |
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`manual`, `None` = pre-existing/unknown) so existing grants are **auditable**. Per
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operator decision: existing peers are **left alone, not auto-demoted**.
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- **Still to do:** surface `trust_source` in `federation.list-nodes` + the UI so the
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operator can actually review the `None`/`uninvited-join` population.
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### 3b. Granting Trusted must require the node password — **OPEN**
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> "to make someone trusted must require the node password to generate the code or change
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> in the modal dropdown when you click a node" — operator, 2026-08-03
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Re-authentication on privilege escalation. Two entry points, both must be covered:
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- **Minting a Trusted invite** (`federation.invite` with `trust_level: "trusted"`) —
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"Link Your Nodes" mints Trusted today with no re-auth.
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- **Changing a node's level in the UI dropdown** (`federation.set-trust-level` /
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`handlers.rs:342`) — promoting Observer → Trusted.
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Demotion must NOT require the password: making something less privileged should never be
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harder than leaving it. Grant `TrustSource::Manual` on the operator path so the audit
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trail distinguishes it from the capped automatic ones.
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---
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## P1 — Correctness the operator hit directly
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### 4. LND UI never updates over OTA — **READY** (uncommitted)
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- `LND_UI_IMAGE` was `lnd-ui:latest` while `BITCOIN_UI_IMAGE` was pinned to
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`1.7.119-alpha`. Podman will not re-pull a tag it already holds locally, so nodes kept a
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stale lnd-ui forever. **Now pinned to `1.7.119-alpha`.**
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- `scripts/first-boot-containers.sh` declared lnd-ui as bridge `-p 18083:80`. That is the
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**third copy** of the declaration the UI agent already corrected in
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`scripts/container-specs.sh` and `apps/lnd-ui/manifest.yml` — so **fresh installs** still
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produced the reproduced `HTTP 000`. **Now `--network host`, ports empty.**
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- Root cause worth fixing separately: the same container spec is declared in three places.
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### 5. Federated/peered nodes must message without a LoRa hop first — **OPEN**
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> "make it so federated/peered nodes can message without needing to connect on Lora first
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> once connected"
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- Investigate the split contact model (radio contact vs federation peer) — there is prior
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art in memory: `project_archy_lora_e2e_rootcause` ("split contact model; don't touch
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federation") and `mesh::seed_federation_peers_into_mesh` /
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`upsert_federation_peer`, which already mirror federation peers into the mesh table.
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- Likely the gap is addressing/route selection rather than transport availability.
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### 6. In-app app updates, independent of OTA — **OPEN**
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> "we need app update to see updates in the registry, whether UI or not… show the update
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> mechanism in the app… a modal and update now / cancel… same in the detail page… the
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> update button should show 'see update' and a different graphic for just ui, app, or both
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> together. All pushed through the signed-catalog flow." … "This has to show independent of
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> OTA updates as a separate pipeline, I think we've done a lot of work on it."
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- **Operator says much of this already exists — research the codebase before building.**
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Known groundwork: the signed catalog (`releases/app-catalog.json`, `sign-catalog.sh`),
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catalog→manifest runtime reload, `package.update` RPC, `check-app-catalog-drift.py`,
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and `scripts/image-versions.sh` pinning.
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- Needs: registry-version awareness per app, a diff of what changed (UI vs app vs both),
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the modal + detail-page affordance, and distinct iconography for the three cases.
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---
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## P2 — Carried over from v1.7.120
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### 7. `create-release.sh` commits the manifest BEFORE signing — **OPEN**
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Release commit always carries an **unsigned** manifest; nodes fetch it from branch `main`
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and refuse to auto-apply. Caught manually this cycle. Fix the ordering so it cannot ship.
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### 8. `gitea-vps2` remote is dead, and is the same server as `gitea-ai` — **OPEN**
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Stored token fails auth. `source.archipelago-foundation.org` == `146.59.87.168`, so
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`git push gitea-ai` already publishes to the "primary" OTA host. Ties into the existing
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"migrate VPS2 IP to domain" todo.
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### 9. Fleet SSH host-key rotation — **BLOCKED** (operator decision)
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`archipelago-1`, `archy-x250-beta`, `archipelago` share all three SSH host keys; two also
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share a TLS private key. Detection shipped; rotation deliberately not performed.
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### 10. 5× lifecycle gate — **OPEN**
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Not run for v1.7.120 (disclosed in its changelog). Needs repeated reboots of a live node.
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### 11. `prod_orchestrator.rs:3181` unreachable code — **OPEN**
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`bitcoin_host()` returns unconditionally at :3171, so the podman container-name lookup
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below is dead on every path. Pre-existing; spotted in the v1.7.120 build warnings.
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---
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## Notes for whoever picks this up
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- A separate agent is doing **AIUI planning with GSD** — do not touch AIUI.
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- AIUI must always be built `VITE_BASE_PATH=/aiui/` (see the memory note); a hand-built
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bundle renders a black page.
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- Verify security claims on the node, not from the source. v1.7.120's headline bug was a
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fix that shipped in the binary and silently never reached the running container.
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@@ -1386,7 +1386,13 @@ for ui in bitcoin-ui lnd-ui electrs-ui; do
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# UI containers use --network host so they can proxy to localhost services
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# Internal nginx ports: bitcoin-ui=8334, electrs-ui=50002, lnd-ui=80 (host 18083)
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bitcoin-ui) PORT_ARG=""; NET_ARG="--network host"; REG_IMG="${BITCOIN_UI_IMAGE}" ;;
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lnd-ui) PORT_ARG="-p 18083:80"; NET_ARG=""; REG_IMG="${LND_UI_IMAGE}" ;;
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# Host-networked like its siblings, NOT bridge with -p 18083:80.
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# docker/lnd-ui/nginx.conf listens on 18083 directly (it must, to proxy the
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# backend on 127.0.0.1:5678 same-origin), so publishing 18083->80 maps the
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# host port at a container port nothing serves: reproduced as HTTP 000.
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# container-specs.sh and apps/lnd-ui/manifest.yml were corrected; this was
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# the third copy of the same declaration and still broke FRESH installs.
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lnd-ui) PORT_ARG=""; NET_ARG="--network host"; REG_IMG="${LND_UI_IMAGE}" ;;
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electrs-ui) PORT_ARG=""; NET_ARG="--network host"; REG_IMG="${ELECTRS_UI_IMAGE}" ;;
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esac
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CONTAINER_NAME="archy-$ui"
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@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ PENPOT_FRONTEND_IMAGE="$ARCHY_REGISTRY/penpot-frontend:2.4"
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# Custom UI containers (built from docker/ dirs, pushed to registry)
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BITCOIN_UI_IMAGE="$ARCHY_REGISTRY/bitcoin-ui:1.7.119-alpha"
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LND_UI_IMAGE="$ARCHY_REGISTRY/lnd-ui:latest"
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LND_UI_IMAGE="$ARCHY_REGISTRY/lnd-ui:1.7.119-alpha"
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ELECTRS_UI_IMAGE="$ARCHY_REGISTRY/electrs-ui:latest"
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# Base images
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