fix(federation): end the perpetual peer-joined "Invalid signature" storm
Root cause observed live 2026-08-16: onboarding/seed-restore rewrite identity/node_key on disk but server_info.pubkey is only seeded at boot, so until the next restart every peer-joined advertised the stale boot key while signing with the new seed-derived key — deterministically rejected by every receiver, once per 90s heal tick, forever. - seed.generate / seed.restore now refresh server_info.pubkey in the live snapshot immediately (mirrors the DID-rotation handler). - The 90s heal loop advertises the SAME key it signs with (disk identity, like federation sync already did) instead of the boot snapshot. - notify_join no longer logs "delivered" for an HTTP-200 JSON-RPC rejection; in-band errors are terminal (identical signed bytes can never succeed on retry). - The heal loop backs off per peer (doubling toward a daily re-assert) instead of re-notifying every 90s forever — Observer-held peers never appear in Trusted-only exported hints, so they_list_us could never become true for them. - Receiver now binds the DID to the advertised pubkey (the old check was self-referential) and logs malformed signatures distinctly from genuine mismatches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
parent
809f7649a4
commit
519fa68c72
@@ -696,6 +696,22 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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anyhow::bail!("Refusing to peer with self");
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}
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// Bind the DID to the advertised pubkey. Without this the signature
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// check below is self-referential (the caller signs over a pubkey it
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// also supplies), so a consistent-but-unrelated keypair would pass.
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// The DID-rotation handler already enforces the same invariant.
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match identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(pubkey) {
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Ok(derived) if derived == did => {}
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Ok(derived) => {
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tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, derived_did = %derived, "Rejected peer-joined: DID does not match pubkey");
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anyhow::bail!("DID does not match pubkey");
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}
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Err(e) => {
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tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, error = %e, "Rejected peer-joined: invalid pubkey");
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid pubkey");
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}
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}
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// Verify ed25519 signature to prevent federation spoofing (H2 security fix)
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let signature = params.get("signature").and_then(|v| v.as_str());
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match signature {
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@@ -703,10 +719,16 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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let sign_data = format!("peer-joined:{}:{}:{}", did, onion, pubkey);
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match identity::NodeIdentity::verify(pubkey, sign_data.as_bytes(), sig) {
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Ok(true) => {}
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_ => {
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Ok(false) => {
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tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, "Rejected peer-joined: invalid signature");
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid signature");
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}
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Err(e) => {
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// Malformed hex / wrong length — distinguish from a
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// genuine mismatch so the log tells us which it was.
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tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, error = %e, "Rejected peer-joined: malformed signature");
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid signature");
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}
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}
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}
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None => {
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@@ -176,6 +176,29 @@ pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn restore_node_identity_from_words(
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}
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impl RpcHandler {
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/// Push the on-disk node identity's pubkey into the live `server_info`
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/// snapshot. `seed.generate` / `seed.restore` rewrite `identity/node_key`,
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/// but `server_info.pubkey` was only seeded at boot — until the next
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/// restart every federation peer-joined advertised the stale boot key
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/// while signing with the new seed-derived key, so receivers rejected it
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/// ("Invalid signature") on every 90s heal tick (2026-08-16). Mirrors the
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/// DID-rotation handler, which already does this refresh.
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async fn refresh_server_pubkey_from_disk(&self) {
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let identity_dir = self.config.data_dir.join("identity");
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let identity = match crate::identity::NodeIdentity::load_or_create(&identity_dir).await {
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Ok(id) => id,
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Err(e) => {
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tracing::warn!(error = %e, "Could not reload node identity after seed write — server_info.pubkey stays stale until restart");
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return;
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}
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};
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let (mut data, _) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
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if data.server_info.pubkey != identity.pubkey_hex() {
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data.server_info.pubkey = identity.pubkey_hex();
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self.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
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}
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}
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/// Generate a new 24-word BIP-39 mnemonic, derive and persist node keys.
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/// Returns the words for the user to write down.
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pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_seed_generate(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
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@@ -242,6 +265,10 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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// Initialize identity index at 0.
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crate::seed::save_identity_index(&self.config.data_dir, 0).await?;
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// The node key on disk just changed — keep the live snapshot's pubkey
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// in lockstep (see refresh_server_pubkey_from_disk for why).
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self.refresh_server_pubkey_from_disk().await;
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// fips_key is now on disk — auto-activate FIPS so the user doesn't
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// have to hit a manual Start button. Detached task;
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// the onboarding RPC returns immediately.
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@@ -350,7 +377,11 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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)
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.context("Invalid words array")?;
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restore_node_identity_from_words(&self.config.data_dir, &self.auth_manager, &words).await
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let result =
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restore_node_identity_from_words(&self.config.data_dir, &self.auth_manager, &words)
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.await?;
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self.refresh_server_pubkey_from_disk().await;
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Ok(result)
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}
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/// Encrypt and save the mnemonic to disk for convenience backup.
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