fix(federation): end the perpetual peer-joined "Invalid signature" storm
Root cause observed live 2026-08-16: onboarding/seed-restore rewrite identity/node_key on disk but server_info.pubkey is only seeded at boot, so until the next restart every peer-joined advertised the stale boot key while signing with the new seed-derived key — deterministically rejected by every receiver, once per 90s heal tick, forever. - seed.generate / seed.restore now refresh server_info.pubkey in the live snapshot immediately (mirrors the DID-rotation handler). - The 90s heal loop advertises the SAME key it signs with (disk identity, like federation sync already did) instead of the boot snapshot. - notify_join no longer logs "delivered" for an HTTP-200 JSON-RPC rejection; in-band errors are terminal (identical signed bytes can never succeed on retry). - The heal loop backs off per peer (doubling toward a daily re-assert) instead of re-notifying every 90s forever — Observer-held peers never appear in Trusted-only exported hints, so they_list_us could never become true for them. - Receiver now binds the DID to the advertised pubkey (the old check was self-referential) and logs malformed signatures distinctly from genuine mismatches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
parent
809f7649a4
commit
519fa68c72
@@ -696,6 +696,22 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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anyhow::bail!("Refusing to peer with self");
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}
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// Bind the DID to the advertised pubkey. Without this the signature
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// check below is self-referential (the caller signs over a pubkey it
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// also supplies), so a consistent-but-unrelated keypair would pass.
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// The DID-rotation handler already enforces the same invariant.
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match identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(pubkey) {
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Ok(derived) if derived == did => {}
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Ok(derived) => {
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tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, derived_did = %derived, "Rejected peer-joined: DID does not match pubkey");
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anyhow::bail!("DID does not match pubkey");
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}
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Err(e) => {
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tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, error = %e, "Rejected peer-joined: invalid pubkey");
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid pubkey");
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}
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}
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// Verify ed25519 signature to prevent federation spoofing (H2 security fix)
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let signature = params.get("signature").and_then(|v| v.as_str());
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match signature {
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@@ -703,10 +719,16 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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let sign_data = format!("peer-joined:{}:{}:{}", did, onion, pubkey);
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match identity::NodeIdentity::verify(pubkey, sign_data.as_bytes(), sig) {
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Ok(true) => {}
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_ => {
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Ok(false) => {
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tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, "Rejected peer-joined: invalid signature");
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid signature");
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}
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Err(e) => {
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// Malformed hex / wrong length — distinguish from a
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// genuine mismatch so the log tells us which it was.
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tracing::warn!(peer_did = %did, error = %e, "Rejected peer-joined: malformed signature");
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anyhow::bail!("Invalid signature");
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}
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}
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}
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None => {
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@@ -176,6 +176,29 @@ pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn restore_node_identity_from_words(
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}
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impl RpcHandler {
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/// Push the on-disk node identity's pubkey into the live `server_info`
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/// snapshot. `seed.generate` / `seed.restore` rewrite `identity/node_key`,
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/// but `server_info.pubkey` was only seeded at boot — until the next
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/// restart every federation peer-joined advertised the stale boot key
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/// while signing with the new seed-derived key, so receivers rejected it
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/// ("Invalid signature") on every 90s heal tick (2026-08-16). Mirrors the
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/// DID-rotation handler, which already does this refresh.
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async fn refresh_server_pubkey_from_disk(&self) {
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let identity_dir = self.config.data_dir.join("identity");
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let identity = match crate::identity::NodeIdentity::load_or_create(&identity_dir).await {
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Ok(id) => id,
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Err(e) => {
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tracing::warn!(error = %e, "Could not reload node identity after seed write — server_info.pubkey stays stale until restart");
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return;
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}
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};
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let (mut data, _) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
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if data.server_info.pubkey != identity.pubkey_hex() {
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data.server_info.pubkey = identity.pubkey_hex();
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self.state_manager.update_data(data).await;
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}
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}
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/// Generate a new 24-word BIP-39 mnemonic, derive and persist node keys.
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/// Returns the words for the user to write down.
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pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_seed_generate(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
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@@ -242,6 +265,10 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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// Initialize identity index at 0.
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crate::seed::save_identity_index(&self.config.data_dir, 0).await?;
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// The node key on disk just changed — keep the live snapshot's pubkey
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// in lockstep (see refresh_server_pubkey_from_disk for why).
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self.refresh_server_pubkey_from_disk().await;
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// fips_key is now on disk — auto-activate FIPS so the user doesn't
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// have to hit a manual Start button. Detached task;
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// the onboarding RPC returns immediately.
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@@ -350,7 +377,11 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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)
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.context("Invalid words array")?;
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restore_node_identity_from_words(&self.config.data_dir, &self.auth_manager, &words).await
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let result =
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restore_node_identity_from_words(&self.config.data_dir, &self.auth_manager, &words)
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.await?;
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self.refresh_server_pubkey_from_disk().await;
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Ok(result)
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}
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/// Encrypt and save the mnemonic to disk for convenience backup.
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@@ -326,6 +326,26 @@ pub(crate) async fn notify_join(
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.await;
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match res {
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Ok((resp, transport)) if resp.status().is_success() => {
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// A JSON-RPC-level rejection still arrives as HTTP 200
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// (the RPC layer returns errors in-band), so checking the
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// status alone logged "delivered" for calls the peer had
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// just rejected. Read the body: an in-band error is
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// terminal — the signed payload is deterministic, so
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// retrying identical bytes can never succeed.
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let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
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let rpc_err = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&body)
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.ok()
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.and_then(|v| v.get("error").cloned())
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.filter(|e| !e.is_null());
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if let Some(err) = rpc_err {
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tracing::warn!(
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attempt,
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transport = %transport,
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error = %err,
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"peer-joined notification rejected by peer — giving up (retrying identical payload cannot succeed)"
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);
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return;
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}
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tracing::info!(
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attempt,
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transport = %transport,
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@@ -553,6 +553,15 @@ impl Server {
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// heavy load) don't fire a burst of catch-up ticks back-to-back,
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// just resume the cadence from now.
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interval.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
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// Peers that never list us back would otherwise be re-notified
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// every 90s forever (e.g. they hold us at Observer and their
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// exported hints are Trusted-only, so `they_list_us` can never
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// become true). Back off per peer, doubling toward a daily
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// re-assert; reset the moment they do list us.
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let mut notify_backoff: std::collections::HashMap<
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String,
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(u32, tokio::time::Instant),
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> = std::collections::HashMap::new();
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loop {
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interval.tick().await;
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// Zero federated nodes is a clean no-op: nothing is read
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@@ -568,21 +577,27 @@ impl Server {
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}
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};
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let (snap, _) = state.get_snapshot().await;
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let local_did =
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match crate::identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(&snap.server_info.pubkey) {
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Ok(d) => d,
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Err(_) => continue,
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};
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let identity_dir = data_dir.join("identity");
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let node_identity =
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match crate::identity::NodeIdentity::load_or_create(&identity_dir).await {
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Ok(id) => id,
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Err(_) => continue,
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};
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// Advertise the SAME key we sign with. server_info.pubkey
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// is only seeded at boot; onboarding/seed-restore rewrite
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// identity/node_key on disk without touching the snapshot,
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// and a peer-joined that advertises the stale boot key
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// while signing with the new seed-derived key is
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// deterministically rejected ("Invalid signature") by
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// every receiver, once per tick, forever (2026-08-16).
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let local_pubkey = node_identity.pubkey_hex();
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let local_did = match crate::identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(&local_pubkey) {
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Ok(d) => d,
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Err(_) => continue,
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};
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// Our own identity, for re-asserting membership to any peer
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// that doesn't list us back (asymmetry self-heal, below).
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let local_onion = snap.server_info.tor_address.clone().unwrap_or_default();
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let local_pubkey = snap.server_info.pubkey.clone();
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let local_name = snap.server_info.name.clone();
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let local_fips_npub = crate::identity::fips_npub(&identity_dir)
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.await
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@@ -618,24 +633,44 @@ impl Server {
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// re-add (the "peer missing everywhere" case).
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let they_list_us =
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state.federated_peers.iter().any(|h| h.did == local_did);
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if !they_list_us && !local_onion.is_empty() {
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crate::federation::notify_join(
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&node.onion,
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node.fips_npub.as_deref(),
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&local_did,
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&local_onion,
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&local_pubkey,
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local_fips_npub.as_deref(),
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local_name.as_deref(),
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// Re-assert at the level WE hold for
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// this peer; no invite token on heal.
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None,
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node.trust_level,
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|b| node_identity.sign(b),
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)
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.await
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.ok();
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healed += 1;
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if they_list_us {
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notify_backoff.remove(&node.did);
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} else if !local_onion.is_empty() {
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let now = tokio::time::Instant::now();
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let due = notify_backoff
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.get(&node.did)
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.map(|(_, next)| *next <= now)
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.unwrap_or(true);
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if due {
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crate::federation::notify_join(
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&node.onion,
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node.fips_npub.as_deref(),
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&local_did,
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&local_onion,
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&local_pubkey,
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local_fips_npub.as_deref(),
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local_name.as_deref(),
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// Re-assert at the level WE hold for
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// this peer; no invite token on heal.
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None,
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node.trust_level,
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|b| node_identity.sign(b),
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)
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.await
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.ok();
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healed += 1;
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let attempts = notify_backoff
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.get(&node.did)
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.map(|(a, _)| *a)
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.unwrap_or(0)
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+ 1;
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let delay =
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(90u64 << attempts.min(10)).min(86_400);
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notify_backoff.insert(
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node.did.clone(),
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(attempts, now + Duration::from_secs(delay)),
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);
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}
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}
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}
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Err(e) => {
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