feat(appgate): apps with their own login can skip the node login
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Some apps carry a complete account system and are broken by an upstream
challenge: git clients speak basic-auth (not browser cookies), and a
BTCPay checkout link handed to a customer must open for that customer.
Both were behind the gate's login page — the "non-browser clients need an
access token" gap disclosed in five consecutive releases.

- New manifest port policy `auth: open`: the daemon still fronts the port
  exactly like `gated` (loopback pin, external binds, frame-header fixes,
  app-down retry page, Tor upstream) but serves it without the login
  challenge. Requires auth_rationale, same burden of proof as `none`.
  Gitea 3001 and BTCPay 23000 declare it.
- Runtime operator override per app (security.set-app-gate → app-configs/
  <id>.json "gateEnabled"), surfaced as Settings → app → Access control.
  Wins over the manifest in both directions and applies on the next
  request — no restart, and it works today on catalog-covered apps whose
  signed manifest still says `gated`.
- The gate resolves policy per-request from the live port map, so a
  toggle takes effect without waiting for the 60s rebind sweep. "Off"
  never releases the port: gated apps are loopback-pinned, so releasing
  would strand them, not open them.
- security.app-gate-status now reports gate_enabled + any override.
- New guard test pins the `auth: open` set (both entries reviewed); the
  `auth: none` count moves 25 → 26, absorbing pre-existing drift from the
  phoenixd onboarding (loopback JSON API with its own generated password).
- Docs: the manifest spec's ports row documented only host/container/
  protocol — bind, auth, auth_rationale and session_passthrough were
  undocumented. Added a full "Ports & the app gate" section plus a
  developer-guide entry telling app authors to enforce their own auth
  regardless, since the operator can flip the gate either way.

Verified live on archi-dev-box from an external address: gated → 401 gate
page; override off → Gitea 200 own page, BTCPay 302 to its own login,
git-over-HTTP info/refs 200; override on → 401 again; clear → default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
archipelago
2026-08-16 11:40:07 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 9b789a64ad
commit 58cdea5e79
15 changed files with 537 additions and 7 deletions
+62
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ impl RpcHandler {
"port": g.port,
"app_id": g.app_id,
"app_name": g.app_name,
// Is the login challenge active on this port right now
// (manifest default + operator override, resolved)?
"gate_enabled": g.auth_enabled,
// Whether an operator override is recorded, and what the
// manifest would do without it — the UI needs all three
// to render a meaningful toggle.
"override": crate::container::app_gate_config::gate_override(&g.app_id),
})
})
.collect();
@@ -56,4 +63,59 @@ impl RpcHandler {
"exempt": exempt,
}))
}
/// `security.set-app-gate` — the operator's per-app gate toggle.
///
/// Params: `{ id: "<app_id>", enabled: true | false | null }`.
/// `enabled: null` clears the override so the manifest default applies
/// again. Takes effect on the next request (the gate resolves per-request
/// policy from the live port map) — no rebind, no restart.
pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_set_app_gate(
&self,
params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
let params = params.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing params"))?;
let app_id = params
.get("id")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing id"))?
.to_string();
let enabled = match params.get("enabled") {
None | Some(serde_json::Value::Null) => None,
Some(serde_json::Value::Bool(b)) => Some(*b),
Some(other) => anyhow::bail!("enabled must be true, false or null, got {other}"),
};
// Only apps the gate actually fronts have a challenge to toggle.
// Writing an override for anything else would sit silently in the
// config doing nothing — reject instead so a typo'd id is loud.
let port_map = self.app_gate.port_map().await;
if !port_map.gated_ports().any(|g| g.app_id == app_id) {
anyhow::bail!(
"'{app_id}' has no gate-fronted ports — nothing to toggle \
(auth: none/local ports are manifest-declared, not runtime-toggled)"
);
}
crate::container::app_gate_config::write_gate_override(&app_id, enabled)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to persist gate override: {e}"))?;
// Rebuild the port map now so the change is live on the next request
// instead of after the next 60s sweep.
self.app_gate.refresh().await;
let effective: Vec<serde_json::Value> = self
.app_gate
.port_map()
.await
.gated_ports()
.filter(|g| g.app_id == app_id)
.map(|g| serde_json::json!({ "port": g.port, "gate_enabled": g.auth_enabled }))
.collect();
tracing::info!(
app = %app_id,
override_ = ?enabled,
"app gate override updated by operator"
);
Ok(serde_json::json!({ "id": app_id, "override": enabled, "ports": effective }))
}
}
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
// System monitoring
"security.app-gate-status" => self.handle_app_gate_status().await,
"security.set-app-gate" => self.handle_set_app_gate(params).await,
"system.get-hostname" => self.handle_system_get_hostname().await,
"system.stats" => self.handle_system_stats().await,
"system.processes" => self.handle_system_processes().await,
+30 -1
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,15 @@ pub struct GatedPort {
/// companion UIs proxy that cookie to the daemon's authenticated
/// endpoints; for every other app the gate strips its own credential.
pub session_passthrough: bool,
/// Does the gate challenge for the dashboard login on this port?
///
/// Default comes from the manifest (`auth: gated`/undeclared → true,
/// `auth: open` → false); the operator's runtime override
/// (`app_gate_config`, Settings → app → App gate) wins over both.
/// False does NOT release the port — the gate keeps binding and
/// proxying (frame-header fixes, app-down page, Tor upstream); it just
/// forwards every request to the app's own authentication.
pub auth_enabled: bool,
}
/// A port deliberately left unauthenticated, and the manifest's stated reason.
@@ -187,6 +196,18 @@ pub fn build_port_map() -> PortMap {
}
}
// The operator's runtime override wins over the manifest default, in
// both directions: un-gate an app that fronts its own login, or force
// the challenge back onto an `auth: open` port. Overrides only toggle
// the challenge on gate-fronted ports — they never bind or release
// anything, so a stale override cannot expose or strand a port.
let overrides = crate::container::app_gate_config::all_gate_overrides();
for gp in map.gated.values_mut() {
if let Some(enabled) = overrides.get(&gp.app_id) {
gp.auth_enabled = *enabled;
}
}
map.exempt.sort_by_key(|e| e.port);
map
}
@@ -229,7 +250,10 @@ fn classify_manifest(manifest: &AppManifest, map: &mut PortMap) {
// Explicit opt-in: the app is on loopback and the daemon
// owns the external addresses. This is the ONLY way a
// port gets bound by the gate, regardless of `bind`.
PortAuth::Gated => {
// `open` is the same takeover with the login challenge
// defaulted off — the app fronts its own authentication
// (rationale-required, see PortAuth::Open).
PortAuth::Gated | PortAuth::Open => {
map.gated.insert(
port.host,
GatedPort {
@@ -239,6 +263,7 @@ fn classify_manifest(manifest: &AppManifest, map: &mut PortMap) {
icon: icon.clone(),
declared: true,
session_passthrough: port.session_passthrough,
auth_enabled: port.auth_policy() == PortAuth::Gated,
},
);
}
@@ -289,6 +314,10 @@ fn classify_manifest(manifest: &AppManifest, map: &mut PortMap) {
// An undeclared port never gets the node session —
// passthrough is an explicit manifest opt-in only.
session_passthrough: false,
// Undeclared ports are challenged wherever the gate
// can stand: reporting-and-protecting is the safe
// default (operator override still applies below).
auth_enabled: true,
},
);
}
+20
View File
@@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ impl AppGate {
app: &GatedPort,
client_ip: IpAddr,
) -> Response<Body> {
// The accept loop captured its GatedPort at bind time; per-request
// policy (the operator's gate on/off toggle, session_passthrough)
// must come from the live map or a Settings change would only apply
// to ports (re)bound after the next sweep. Falls back to the bound
// snapshot when the port momentarily leaves the map mid-refresh.
let live = self.port_map.read().await.gated(app.port).cloned();
let app = live.as_ref().unwrap_or(app);
let path = req.uri().path().to_string();
if let Some(action) = path.strip_prefix(GATE_PREFIX) {
@@ -169,6 +177,17 @@ impl AppGate {
return proxy_to_app(req, app, true).await;
}
// Gate challenge disabled for this app (manifest `auth: open`, or
// the operator's Settings toggle): forward everything to the app's
// own authentication. The Authorization header passes through
// untouched — git clients speak basic-auth to Gitea, API clients
// carry the app's own tokens. Gate cookies are still stripped in
// proxy_to_app (an ungated app must never see the node session),
// and the frame fixes / app-down page still apply.
if !app.auth_enabled {
return proxy_to_app(req, app, false).await;
}
match self.authorize(req.headers(), &app.app_id).await {
// The credential was a cookie (or none was needed): the
// Authorization header, if any, belongs to the app. Forward it.
@@ -1164,6 +1183,7 @@ mod tests {
icon: None,
declared: true,
session_passthrough: false,
auth_enabled: true,
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
//! Per-app operator override for the app gate's login requirement.
//!
//! The manifest declares each port's *default* policy (`auth: gated` = the
//! gate challenges, the new `auth: open` = the gate fronts the port but does
//! not challenge). This store holds the operator's runtime override — set
//! from Settings → app details — so a node owner can un-gate an app that
//! carries its own login (Gitea, BTCPay) or force the gate back onto an
//! `open` app, without editing manifests or waiting for a catalog re-sign.
//!
//! Lives in the same merge-preserving per-app JSON files as the version
//! preferences (`/var/lib/archipelago/app-configs/<app_id>.json`, key
//! `"gateEnabled"`). Absent key = follow the manifest default.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use serde_json::{Map, Value};
fn config_dir() -> PathBuf {
let base = std::env::var("ARCHIPELAGO_DATA_DIR")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "/var/lib/archipelago".to_string());
PathBuf::from(base).join("app-configs")
}
fn config_path(app_id: &str) -> PathBuf {
config_dir().join(format!("{app_id}.json"))
}
fn read_raw(app_id: &str) -> Map<String, Value> {
match std::fs::read_to_string(config_path(app_id)) {
Ok(s) => serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&s)
.ok()
.and_then(|v| v.as_object().cloned())
.unwrap_or_default(),
Err(_) => Map::new(),
}
}
/// The operator's gate override for one app. `None` = no override recorded —
/// the manifest default applies.
pub fn gate_override(app_id: &str) -> Option<bool> {
read_raw(app_id).get("gateEnabled").and_then(Value::as_bool)
}
/// Every recorded override, keyed by app id (the config file stem). Used by
/// the gate's port-map build so one directory scan covers all apps.
pub fn all_gate_overrides() -> HashMap<String, bool> {
let mut out = HashMap::new();
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(config_dir()) else {
return out;
};
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
if path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) != Some("json") {
continue;
}
let Some(app_id) = path.file_stem().and_then(|s| s.to_str()) else {
continue;
};
if let Some(v) = gate_override(app_id) {
out.insert(app_id.to_string(), v);
}
}
out
}
/// Set (`Some`) or clear (`None`) the override, preserving every other key in
/// the app's config file. Temp+rename so a crash mid-write can't truncate.
pub fn write_gate_override(app_id: &str, enabled: Option<bool>) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let path = config_path(app_id);
let mut obj = read_raw(app_id);
match enabled {
Some(v) => {
obj.insert("gateEnabled".to_string(), Value::Bool(v));
}
None => {
obj.remove("gateEnabled");
}
}
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
let serialized = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&Value::Object(obj))
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e))?;
let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
std::fs::write(&tmp, serialized.as_bytes())?;
std::fs::rename(&tmp, &path)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn with_tmp_data_dir<T>(f: impl FnOnce() -> T) -> T {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
// Serialize env mutation across tests in this module.
static LOCK: std::sync::Mutex<()> = std::sync::Mutex::new(());
let _guard = LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
std::env::set_var("ARCHIPELAGO_DATA_DIR", dir.path());
let out = f();
std::env::remove_var("ARCHIPELAGO_DATA_DIR");
out
}
#[test]
fn absent_file_means_no_override() {
with_tmp_data_dir(|| {
assert_eq!(gate_override("gitea"), None);
assert!(all_gate_overrides().is_empty());
});
}
#[test]
fn write_read_clear_roundtrip_preserves_other_keys() {
with_tmp_data_dir(|| {
// Seed an existing config with an unrelated key.
std::fs::create_dir_all(config_dir()).unwrap();
std::fs::write(config_path("gitea"), r#"{"autoUpdate": true}"#).unwrap();
write_gate_override("gitea", Some(false)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(gate_override("gitea"), Some(false));
assert_eq!(all_gate_overrides().get("gitea"), Some(&false));
// The unrelated key survives.
let raw = std::fs::read_to_string(config_path("gitea")).unwrap();
let v: Value = serde_json::from_str(&raw).unwrap();
assert_eq!(v.get("autoUpdate"), Some(&Value::Bool(true)));
write_gate_override("gitea", None).unwrap();
assert_eq!(gate_override("gitea"), None);
let raw = std::fs::read_to_string(config_path("gitea")).unwrap();
let v: Value = serde_json::from_str(&raw).unwrap();
assert_eq!(v.get("autoUpdate"), Some(&Value::Bool(true)));
});
}
}
+1
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
pub mod app_catalog;
pub mod app_gate_config;
pub mod bitcoin_ui;
pub mod boot_reconciler;
pub mod companion;
+75 -1
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@@ -561,6 +561,21 @@ pub enum PortAuth {
/// manifest to say so means the loopback pin and the daemon takeover
/// ship together, atomically, and a stale manifest fails safe.
Gated,
/// Like `gated` — loopback-pinned app, daemon owns the external
/// addresses — but the gate does NOT require the dashboard login.
///
/// For apps that carry a complete login of their own and are broken by
/// an upstream challenge: Gitea (git clients speak basic-auth, not
/// cookies), BTCPay (checkout pages must be reachable by anonymous
/// payers). The gate still fronts the port — frame-header neutralising,
/// the app-down retry page, the Tor upstream — it just lets every
/// request through to the app's own authentication. Requires
/// `auth_rationale`, exactly like `none`: an unchallenged surface nobody
/// can explain is one nobody reviewed. The operator can flip any
/// gate-fronted app between `gated` and `open` behaviour at runtime
/// (Settings → app → App gate; stored node-side, manifest sets the
/// default).
Open,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -1154,6 +1169,20 @@ fn validate_ports(ports: &[PortMapping]) -> Result<(), ManifestError> {
"ports[{i}].auth_rationale cannot be empty"
)));
}
// `open` serves the app without the gate's login challenge, so it
// carries the same burden of proof as `none`.
(PortAuth::Open, None) => {
return Err(ManifestError::Invalid(format!(
"ports[{i}] sets auth: open but no auth_rationale — a port served \
without the gate's login must state why (typically: the app \
enforces its own authentication)"
)));
}
(PortAuth::Open, Some(rationale)) if rationale.trim().is_empty() => {
return Err(ManifestError::Invalid(format!(
"ports[{i}].auth_rationale cannot be empty"
)));
}
// A rationale on a gated port means the author wrote an
// exemption and did not get one. Silently keeping the port
// protected would be safe but misleading, so say so.
@@ -1717,6 +1746,12 @@ app:
}
}
exempt.sort();
// 26 as of 2026-08-16: the 25 below plus phoenixd 9740, a
// loopback-only JSON API whose own generated http password
// authenticates every request (added with the phoenixd onboarding,
// which did not update this count — exactly the drift this test
// exists to catch).
//
// 25 as of the v1.7.123 port-policy round: bitcoin p2p (8333 ×2),
// core-lightning 9736/9835, electrumx 50001, fedimint 8173/8174,
// fedimint-gateway 8176/9737, gitea ssh 2222, lightning-stack
@@ -1727,11 +1762,50 @@ app:
// stage timed out that cycle, so the count here lagged at 17.
assert_eq!(
exempt.len(),
25,
26,
"unauthenticated port set changed — review before updating this count: {exempt:?}"
);
}
/// `auth: open` ports are served by the gate WITHOUT its login challenge,
/// so they are the second unauthenticated-by-the-gate surface and get the
/// same review guard as `auth: none`. Each one must be an app that
/// enforces a real login of its own.
#[test]
fn gate_open_ports_are_all_accounted_for() {
let apps = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("../../apps");
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(&apps) else {
return;
};
let mut open: Vec<(String, u16)> = Vec::new();
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let manifest = entry.path().join("manifest.yml");
if !manifest.is_file() {
continue;
}
let yaml = std::fs::read_to_string(&manifest).expect("manifest readable");
let parsed = AppManifest::parse(&yaml).expect("manifest valid");
for port in &parsed.app.ports {
if port.auth_policy() == PortAuth::Open {
open.push((parsed.app.id.clone(), port.host));
}
}
}
open.sort();
// Gitea 3001 (git clients speak basic-auth, not browser cookies) and
// BTCPay 23000 (checkout/invoice/webhook endpoints must be reachable
// by anonymous payers). Both enforce their own account login, and an
// operator can re-gate either from Settings → Access control.
assert_eq!(
open,
vec![
("btcpay-server".to_string(), 23000u16),
("gitea".to_string(), 3001u16)
],
"gate-open port set changed — every entry must be an app with its own login"
);
}
#[test]
fn an_undeclared_port_classifies_as_session_but_is_not_declared() {
// Two different questions, and conflating them caused both gate