chore: add security pentest reports and remediation plan
Overnight pentest run produced recon, analysis, exploitation reports, and a full security assessment. Plan.md updated with 22 prioritized fix items for auth, SSRF, injection, XSS, and hardening. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Claude Opus 4.6
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# Nmap 7.98 scan initiated Fri Mar 6 01:40:27 2026 as: nmap -sV -sC --top-ports 1000 -oN /Users/dorian/Projects/archy/loop/pentest/recon/nmap.txt 192.168.1.228
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Not critical — those app proxy paths were already confirmed through other probes. The full attack surface analysis is complete above.
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**Summary of critical findings:**
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1. **Zero authentication on the entire RPC API** — every method callable by anyone on the network
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2. **Arbitrary container image execution** — `package.install` pulls and runs any Docker image
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3. **Cryptographic key abuse** — `node.signChallenge` signs arbitrary data without auth (confirmed with live signature)
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4. **FileBrowser full access via default credentials** — `admin/admin` confirmed working with admin JWT
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5. **Unauthenticated Claude API proxy** — free API usage at owner's expense (confirmed)
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6. **P2P message injection** — spoofed messages already present in the message store
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7. **CORS wildcard** on all endpoints enables drive-by attacks from any website
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8. **Backend runs as root** with dev mode enabled in production
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The most urgent remediation is wiring authentication middleware into the `core/archipelago` handler — the session infrastructure exists in `core/startos/` but is **not connected** to the active backend's request pipeline.
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