security+feat: v1.3.0 — pentest remediation, container reliability, UI overhaul

Security (33 pentest findings addressed):
- CRITICAL: backend binds 127.0.0.1, path traversal in tor.rs/dwn fixed
- HIGH: federation requires signatures, XSS login redirect, RBAC viewer restricted
- HIGH: tar slip prevention, S3 SSRF validation, backup ID validation
- MEDIUM: remember-me random secret, TOTP session rotation, password re-auth
- LOW: CSP unsafe-inline removed, CORS dev-only, onion/webhook validation

Container reliability:
- Memory limits on all 37 containers (OOM prevention)
- Exited vs stopped state distinction with health-aware status badges
- Crash recovery coordination (no more restart cascade)
- User-stopped tracking survives reboots
- Tiered boot recovery (databases → core → services → apps)

UI:
- Wallet TransactionsModal, health-aware app status badges
- Restart button on containers, exited/crashed red state
- Mesh view overhaul, glass button updates, BaseModal/ToggleSwitch
- Apps sticky header removed, dev faucet, mutable mock wallet

Infrastructure:
- LND REST port 8080 exposed over Tor (LND Connect fix)
- Nginx cookie_session fix, deploy script Tor config updated
- Dev environment: podman auto-start, boot mode simulation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

core/archipelago/src/backup/full.rs

@@ -435,10 +435,46 @@ fn create_tar_gz(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
 fn extract_tar_gz(data_dir: &Path, tar_gz_data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
     let gz = GzDecoder::new(tar_gz_data);
     let mut archive = Archive::new(gz);
+    let canonical_base = data_dir
+        .canonicalize()
+        .context("Failed to canonicalize data_dir")?;
 
-    archive
-        .unpack(data_dir)
-        .context("Failed to extract backup archive")?;
+    for entry_result in archive.entries().context("Failed to read tar entries")? {
+        let mut entry = entry_result.context("Failed to read tar entry")?;
+        let entry_path = entry.path().context("Failed to get entry path")?.to_path_buf();
+
+        // Reject entries with path traversal components
+        for component in entry_path.components() {
+            if matches!(component, std::path::Component::ParentDir) {
+                anyhow::bail!(
+                    "Tar entry contains path traversal: {}",
+                    entry_path.display()
+                );
+            }
+        }
+
+        let target = data_dir.join(&entry_path);
+        // Verify the resolved path stays within data_dir
+        // For new files that don't exist yet, check the parent directory
+        let check_path = if target.exists() {
+            target.canonicalize()?
+        } else if let Some(parent) = target.parent() {
+            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
+            parent.canonicalize()?.join(target.file_name().unwrap_or_default())
+        } else {
+            target.clone()
+        };
+        if !check_path.starts_with(&canonical_base) {
+            anyhow::bail!(
+                "Tar entry escapes target directory: {}",
+                entry_path.display()
+            );
+        }
+
+        entry
+            .unpack(&target)
+            .with_context(|| format!("Failed to extract: {}", entry_path.display()))?;
+    }
 
     debug!("Backup extracted to {:?}", data_dir);
     Ok(())