security+feat: v1.3.0 — pentest remediation, container reliability, UI overhaul

Security (33 pentest findings addressed):
- CRITICAL: backend binds 127.0.0.1, path traversal in tor.rs/dwn fixed
- HIGH: federation requires signatures, XSS login redirect, RBAC viewer restricted
- HIGH: tar slip prevention, S3 SSRF validation, backup ID validation
- MEDIUM: remember-me random secret, TOTP session rotation, password re-auth
- LOW: CSP unsafe-inline removed, CORS dev-only, onion/webhook validation

Container reliability:
- Memory limits on all 37 containers (OOM prevention)
- Exited vs stopped state distinction with health-aware status badges
- Crash recovery coordination (no more restart cascade)
- User-stopped tracking survives reboots
- Tiered boot recovery (databases → core → services → apps)

UI:
- Wallet TransactionsModal, health-aware app status badges
- Restart button on containers, exited/crashed red state
- Mesh view overhaul, glass button updates, BaseModal/ToggleSwitch
- Apps sticky header removed, dev faucet, mutable mock wallet

Infrastructure:
- LND REST port 8080 exposed over Tor (LND Connect fix)
- Nginx cookie_session fix, deploy script Tor config updated
- Dev environment: podman auto-start, boot mode simulation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dorian
2026-03-19 12:44:31 +00:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.6
parent 28763c4f09
commit 84a56c80de
77 changed files with 2485 additions and 966 deletions
+17
View File
@@ -121,8 +121,24 @@ impl DwnStore {
Ok(message)
}
/// Validate a record ID to prevent path traversal.
fn validate_record_id(record_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
if record_id.is_empty()
|| record_id.len() > 128
|| !record_id
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_')
{
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"Invalid record ID (alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores only)"
));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Read a message by record ID.
pub async fn read_message(&self, record_id: &str) -> Result<Option<DwnMessage>> {
Self::validate_record_id(record_id)?;
let path = self.messages_dir.join(format!("{}.json", record_id));
if !path.exists() {
return Ok(None);
@@ -137,6 +153,7 @@ impl DwnStore {
/// Delete a message by record ID.
pub async fn delete_message(&self, record_id: &str) -> Result<bool> {
Self::validate_record_id(record_id)?;
let path = self.messages_dir.join(format!("{}.json", record_id));
if !path.exists() {
return Ok(false);
+26
View File
@@ -322,11 +322,37 @@ pub async fn save_router_config(data_dir: &Path, config: &RouterConfig) -> Resul
fs::write(&path, data).await.context("Writing router config")
}
/// Validate that an IP string is a private/LAN address (not public, not localhost).
fn is_valid_private_ip(ip_str: &str) -> bool {
let ip: std::net::IpAddr = match ip_str.parse() {
Ok(ip) => ip,
Err(_) => return false, // Reject hostnames
};
match ip {
std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
// Allow only RFC1918 private ranges, reject localhost and public
let octets = v4.octets();
let is_10 = octets[0] == 10;
let is_172_private = octets[0] == 172 && (16..=31).contains(&octets[1]);
let is_192_168 = octets[0] == 192 && octets[1] == 168;
is_10 || is_172_private || is_192_168
}
std::net::IpAddr::V6(_) => false, // Reject IPv6 for gateway detection
}
}
/// Detect router type by probing common endpoints on the gateway.
pub async fn detect_router_type(gateway_ip: &str) -> RouterType {
// Validate that gateway is a private IP — prevent SSRF to arbitrary hosts
if !is_valid_private_ip(gateway_ip) {
tracing::warn!(gateway = gateway_ip, "Rejected non-private gateway IP");
return RouterType::Unknown;
}
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
.redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
.build()
.unwrap_or_default();