fix(app): restore PromptIndex component functionality and update launch configuration

.claude/hooks/block-risky-bash.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# PreToolUse Bash guard: block dangerous shell commands.
+# Denies: rm -rf, git reset --hard, git push -f, git clean -fd, chmod -R 777,
+# fork bombs, block device overwrites, mkfs, paths escaping project root.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+INPUT=$(cat)
+CMD=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty')
+BASE="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-}"
+[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.cwd // empty')
+[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE="$(pwd)"
+
+# Normalize: collapse whitespace, strip leading/trailing
+CMD_NORM=$(echo "$CMD" | tr -s '[:space:]' ' ' | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//;s/[[:space:]]*$//')
+
+deny() {
+  local reason="$1"
+  jq -n --arg r "$reason" '{
+    hookSpecificOutput: {
+      hookEventName: "PreToolUse",
+      permissionDecision: "deny",
+      permissionDecisionReason: $r
+    }
+  }'
+  exit 0
+}
+
+# Dangerous patterns (case-insensitive where sensible)
+case "$CMD_NORM" in
+  *"rm -rf"*|*"rm -fr"*|*"rm -f -r"*|*"rm -r -f"*)  deny "Destructive rm -rf blocked by security hook" ;;
+  *"git reset --hard"*)                               deny "git reset --hard would lose uncommitted work" ;;
+  *"git push --force"*|*"git push -f"*|*"git push -f "*) deny "git push --force would rewrite history" ;;
+  *"git clean -fd"*|*"git clean -f -d"*)             deny "git clean -fd deletes untracked files" ;;
+  *"chmod -R 777"*|*"chmod -R 0777"*)                deny "chmod -R 777 is a security risk" ;;
+  *":(){ :"*"};:"*)                                   deny "Fork bomb pattern blocked" ;;
+  *"> /dev/sd"*|*">/dev/sd"*)                        deny "Block device overwrite blocked" ;;
+  *"mkfs "*|*"mkfs."*)                               deny "Disk format command blocked" ;;
+esac
+
+# Check for path traversal escaping project root (../ outside project)
+# Only if we have a sensible base
+if [[ -n "$BASE" ]] && [[ -d "$BASE" ]]; then
+  ABS_BASE=$(cd "$BASE" && pwd)
+  # Simple heuristic: command contains .. and would resolve outside project
+  if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '\.\./|/\.\.'; then
+    # Extract plausible paths and check - allow ../ within project
+    if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '(rm|mv|cp|cat|chmod|chown)\s+.*\.\.'; then
+      # Could be risky; be conservative for rm/mv/cp
+      if echo "$CMD_NORM" | grep -qE '\brm\b.*\.\.'; then
+        deny "Path traversal with rm blocked"
+      fi
+    fi
+  fi
+fi
+
+exit 0

.claude/hooks/protect-files.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# PreToolUse Edit|Write guard: block edits outside project and to protected paths.
+# Denies: paths outside project, .git/, .env*, lockfiles, node_modules/
+set -euo pipefail
+
+INPUT=$(cat)
+FILE_PATH=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // empty')
+BASE="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-}"
+[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.cwd // empty')
+[[ -z "$BASE" ]] && BASE="$(pwd)"
+
+# Resolve to absolute path
+if [[ -z "$FILE_PATH" ]]; then
+  exit 0
+fi
+ABS_BASE=$(cd "$BASE" 2>/dev/null && pwd) || true
+[[ -z "$ABS_BASE" ]] && ABS_BASE=$(python3 -c "import os,sys; print(os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(sys.argv[1])))" "$BASE" 2>/dev/null) || true
+[[ -z "$ABS_BASE" ]] && ABS_BASE="$BASE"
+# Ensure base has trailing slash for prefix check
+[[ "$ABS_BASE" != */ ]] && ABS_BASE="${ABS_BASE}/"
+if [[ "$FILE_PATH" != /* ]]; then
+  ABS_PATH="$ABS_BASE${FILE_PATH#./}"
+else
+  ABS_PATH="$FILE_PATH"
+fi
+# Normalize path (collapse .. and ., no symlink resolution needed)
+ABS_PATH=$(python3 -c "import os,sys; print(os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(sys.argv[1])))" "$ABS_PATH" 2>/dev/null) || true
+[[ -z "$ABS_PATH" ]] && ABS_PATH="$ABS_BASE${FILE_PATH#./}"
+
+# Protected patterns (path contains or equals)
+PROTECTED_PATTERNS=(
+  ".git/"
+  ".env"
+  ".env.local"
+  "node_modules/"
+  "package-lock.json"
+  "pnpm-lock.yaml"
+)
+
+for pattern in "${PROTECTED_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
+  if [[ "$ABS_PATH" == *"$pattern"* ]] || [[ "$ABS_PATH" == *"/$pattern" ]]; then
+    echo "Blocked: $ABS_PATH matches protected pattern '$pattern'" >&2
+    jq -n --arg r "Edit blocked: path matches protected pattern ($pattern)" '{
+      hookSpecificOutput: {
+        hookEventName: "PreToolUse",
+        permissionDecision: "deny",
+        permissionDecisionReason: $r
+      }
+    }'
+    exit 0
+  fi
+done
+
+# .env.*.local
+if [[ "$ABS_PATH" =~ \.env\..*\.local$ ]]; then
+  echo "Blocked: $ABS_PATH is an env secrets file" >&2
+  jq -n '{
+    hookSpecificOutput: {
+      hookEventName: "PreToolUse",
+      permissionDecision: "deny",
+      permissionDecisionReason: "Edit blocked: .env.*.local files contain secrets"
+    }
+  }'
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+# Ensure path is under project root (ABS_BASE has trailing /)
+if [[ "$ABS_PATH" != "$ABS_BASE"* ]] && [[ "$ABS_PATH" != "$BASE"* ]]; then
+  echo "Blocked: $ABS_PATH is outside project ($ABS_BASE)" >&2
+  jq -n --arg r "Edit blocked: path is outside project directory" '{
+    hookSpecificOutput: {
+      hookEventName: "PreToolUse",
+      permissionDecision: "deny",
+      permissionDecisionReason: $r
+    }
+  }'
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+exit 0

.claude/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+{
+  "hooks": {
+    "PreToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "Bash",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "\"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR\"/.claude/hooks/block-risky-bash.sh"
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "matcher": "Edit|Write",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "\"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR\"/.claude/hooks/protect-files.sh"
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}