merge(13): AIUI source migrated in-repo — supersedes the two-repo split (D-15/D-18)

Brings AIUI's full 230-commit history under aiui/ via git subtree, plus main's
current head. Operator decision 2026-08-03: AIUI moves into this repo rather
than staying at git.tx1138.com. This also lands e30ac1d (13-01 Task 3), which
was stranded local-only while that remote was unreachable.

Plans 13-06, 13-09 and 13-11 still target /home/archipelago/Projects/AIUI paths
and must be re-planned against aiui/ before wave 2 runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
archipelago
2026-08-03 15:11:26 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
407 changed files with 69788 additions and 32 deletions
@@ -51,10 +51,48 @@ impl RpcHandler {
}
}
/// Error prefix the frontend keys on to know it should prompt for the node
/// password and retry, rather than surface the message as a dead end.
pub(in crate::api::rpc) const PASSWORD_REQUIRED_PREFIX: &str = "PASSWORD_REQUIRED";
impl RpcHandler {
/// Re-authenticate the operator before granting `Trusted`.
///
/// A Trusted peer can read node state, be deployed to, and is exempt from
/// the `!= Untrusted` gates federation/DWN/messaging use — so granting it
/// is a privilege escalation and must cost a fresh proof that the person
/// at the keyboard is the operator, not merely that a session cookie
/// exists. This is the same reasoning as `node.rotate-identity` and 2FA
/// setup, both of which already re-verify.
///
/// Only ever called on the way UP. Demotion stays ungated: making
/// something less privileged must never be harder than leaving it alone,
/// or the safe action becomes the inconvenient one.
async fn verify_operator_password(&self, params: Option<&serde_json::Value>) -> Result<()> {
let password = params
.and_then(|p| p.get("password"))
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or("");
if password.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("{PASSWORD_REQUIRED_PREFIX}: node password required to grant Trusted");
}
if !self.auth_manager.verify_password(password).await? {
anyhow::bail!("Password verification failed");
}
Ok(())
}
/// federation.invite — Generate an invite code containing our DID + onion for a peer.
/// Optional param `trust_level`: "trusted" (default, "Link Your Nodes") or
/// "observer" ("Invite a Peer") — the level BOTH sides assign for this invite.
///
/// Minting a **Trusted** invite requires the node password (param
/// `password`): the invite is a bearer grant of Trusted to whoever
/// redeems it, so it is the escalation, not the later redemption.
/// Observer invites are unchanged.
pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_federation_invite(
&self,
params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
@@ -71,6 +109,13 @@ impl RpcHandler {
.transpose()?
.unwrap_or(TrustLevel::Trusted);
// Note this covers the DEFAULT too: "Link Your Nodes" sends no
// `trust_level` and lands on Trusted above, so the gate must key off
// the resolved level rather than an explicit request for Trusted.
if trust_level == TrustLevel::Trusted {
self.verify_operator_password(params.as_ref()).await?;
}
let (data, _) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
let did = identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(&data.server_info.pubkey)?;
let onion = data.server_info.tor_address.clone().unwrap_or_default();
@@ -272,6 +317,15 @@ impl RpcHandler {
if let Some(at) = &n.last_sync_error_at {
obj["last_sync_error_at"] = serde_json::json!(at);
}
// How this peer's trust level came to be. Emitted as an
// explicit null when unknown rather than omitted: "recorded
// before provenance was tracked" is the population the
// operator most needs to review, so the UI must be able to
// distinguish it from a field it simply didn't read.
obj["trust_source"] = match &n.trust_source {
Some(src) => serde_json::to_value(src).unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null),
None => serde_json::Value::Null,
};
obj
})
.collect();
@@ -323,6 +377,10 @@ impl RpcHandler {
}
/// federation.set-trust — Change trust level for a federated node.
///
/// Promoting a node TO `Trusted` requires the node password (param
/// `password`). Demotion and no-op re-sets do not: see
/// `verify_operator_password` for why the gate is one-directional.
pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_federation_set_trust(
&self,
params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
@@ -348,7 +406,32 @@ impl RpcHandler {
),
};
federation::set_trust_level(&self.config.data_dir, did, trust).await?;
// Gate the ESCALATION only. Comparing against the node's current level
// means a re-set of an already-Trusted peer (the dropdown re-emitting
// its own value) doesn't pointlessly demand a password, while every
// path that actually raises a peer to Trusted does.
if trust == TrustLevel::Trusted {
let already_trusted = federation::load_nodes(&self.config.data_dir)
.await?
.iter()
.any(|n| n.did == did && n.trust_level == TrustLevel::Trusted);
if !already_trusted {
self.verify_operator_password(Some(&params)).await?;
}
}
// Stamp Manual: this is the one path where a human chose the level, so
// an audit of `trust_source` can tell it apart from the automatic
// grants that `UninvitedJoin` / `TransitiveMerge` mark.
federation::set_trust_level(
&self.config.data_dir,
did,
trust,
Some(federation::TrustSource::Manual),
)
.await?;
info!(did = %did, trust = %trust, "Operator set federation trust level");
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"updated": true,
@@ -350,10 +350,14 @@ impl RpcHandler {
// lands on Observer; keep this explicit demotion as a
// safety net for legacy Trusted-only invite codes — the
// discovery flow should never auto-trust.
// `None` source: this is an automatic safety-net
// demotion, not an operator decision, so it must
// not overwrite how the peer actually got here.
let _ = crate::federation::set_trust_level(
&self.config.data_dir,
&node.did,
crate::federation::TrustLevel::Observer,
None,
)
.await;