merge(13): AIUI source migrated in-repo — supersedes the two-repo split (D-15/D-18)
Brings AIUI's full 230-commit history under aiui/ via git subtree, plus main's
current head. Operator decision 2026-08-03: AIUI moves into this repo rather
than staying at git.tx1138.com. This also lands e30ac1d (13-01 Task 3), which
was stranded local-only while that remote was unreachable.
Plans 13-06, 13-09 and 13-11 still target /home/archipelago/Projects/AIUI paths
and must be re-planned against aiui/ before wave 2 runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -51,10 +51,48 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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}
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}
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/// Error prefix the frontend keys on to know it should prompt for the node
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/// password and retry, rather than surface the message as a dead end.
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pub(in crate::api::rpc) const PASSWORD_REQUIRED_PREFIX: &str = "PASSWORD_REQUIRED";
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impl RpcHandler {
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/// Re-authenticate the operator before granting `Trusted`.
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///
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/// A Trusted peer can read node state, be deployed to, and is exempt from
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/// the `!= Untrusted` gates federation/DWN/messaging use — so granting it
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/// is a privilege escalation and must cost a fresh proof that the person
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/// at the keyboard is the operator, not merely that a session cookie
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/// exists. This is the same reasoning as `node.rotate-identity` and 2FA
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/// setup, both of which already re-verify.
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///
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/// Only ever called on the way UP. Demotion stays ungated: making
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/// something less privileged must never be harder than leaving it alone,
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/// or the safe action becomes the inconvenient one.
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async fn verify_operator_password(&self, params: Option<&serde_json::Value>) -> Result<()> {
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let password = params
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.and_then(|p| p.get("password"))
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.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
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.unwrap_or("");
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if password.is_empty() {
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anyhow::bail!("{PASSWORD_REQUIRED_PREFIX}: node password required to grant Trusted");
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}
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if !self.auth_manager.verify_password(password).await? {
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anyhow::bail!("Password verification failed");
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// federation.invite — Generate an invite code containing our DID + onion for a peer.
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/// Optional param `trust_level`: "trusted" (default, "Link Your Nodes") or
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/// "observer" ("Invite a Peer") — the level BOTH sides assign for this invite.
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///
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/// Minting a **Trusted** invite requires the node password (param
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/// `password`): the invite is a bearer grant of Trusted to whoever
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/// redeems it, so it is the escalation, not the later redemption.
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/// Observer invites are unchanged.
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pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_federation_invite(
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&self,
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params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
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@@ -71,6 +109,13 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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.transpose()?
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.unwrap_or(TrustLevel::Trusted);
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// Note this covers the DEFAULT too: "Link Your Nodes" sends no
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// `trust_level` and lands on Trusted above, so the gate must key off
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// the resolved level rather than an explicit request for Trusted.
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if trust_level == TrustLevel::Trusted {
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self.verify_operator_password(params.as_ref()).await?;
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}
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let (data, _) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
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let did = identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(&data.server_info.pubkey)?;
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let onion = data.server_info.tor_address.clone().unwrap_or_default();
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@@ -272,6 +317,15 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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if let Some(at) = &n.last_sync_error_at {
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obj["last_sync_error_at"] = serde_json::json!(at);
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}
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// How this peer's trust level came to be. Emitted as an
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// explicit null when unknown rather than omitted: "recorded
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// before provenance was tracked" is the population the
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// operator most needs to review, so the UI must be able to
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// distinguish it from a field it simply didn't read.
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obj["trust_source"] = match &n.trust_source {
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Some(src) => serde_json::to_value(src).unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null),
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None => serde_json::Value::Null,
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};
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obj
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})
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.collect();
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@@ -323,6 +377,10 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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}
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/// federation.set-trust — Change trust level for a federated node.
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///
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/// Promoting a node TO `Trusted` requires the node password (param
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/// `password`). Demotion and no-op re-sets do not: see
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/// `verify_operator_password` for why the gate is one-directional.
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pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_federation_set_trust(
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&self,
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params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
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@@ -348,7 +406,32 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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),
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};
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federation::set_trust_level(&self.config.data_dir, did, trust).await?;
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// Gate the ESCALATION only. Comparing against the node's current level
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// means a re-set of an already-Trusted peer (the dropdown re-emitting
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// its own value) doesn't pointlessly demand a password, while every
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// path that actually raises a peer to Trusted does.
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if trust == TrustLevel::Trusted {
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let already_trusted = federation::load_nodes(&self.config.data_dir)
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.await?
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.iter()
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.any(|n| n.did == did && n.trust_level == TrustLevel::Trusted);
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if !already_trusted {
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self.verify_operator_password(Some(¶ms)).await?;
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}
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}
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// Stamp Manual: this is the one path where a human chose the level, so
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// an audit of `trust_source` can tell it apart from the automatic
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// grants that `UninvitedJoin` / `TransitiveMerge` mark.
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federation::set_trust_level(
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&self.config.data_dir,
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did,
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trust,
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Some(federation::TrustSource::Manual),
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)
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.await?;
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info!(did = %did, trust = %trust, "Operator set federation trust level");
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Ok(serde_json::json!({
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"updated": true,
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@@ -350,10 +350,14 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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// lands on Observer; keep this explicit demotion as a
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// safety net for legacy Trusted-only invite codes — the
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// discovery flow should never auto-trust.
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// `None` source: this is an automatic safety-net
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// demotion, not an operator decision, so it must
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// not overwrite how the peer actually got here.
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let _ = crate::federation::set_trust_level(
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&self.config.data_dir,
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&node.did,
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crate::federation::TrustLevel::Observer,
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None,
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)
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.await;
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