fix: fresh-ISO feedback bug-bash — onboarding, status truthfulness, recovery, kiosk, logs

Fixes from real fresh-install feedback (Framework node .81) + its log bundle:

Backend:
- websocket: subscribe before initial snapshot — broadcasts in the gap were
  silently lost, stranding clients on stale state until a hard refresh
  (the "everything needs ctrl-r" bug: My Apps stuck Loading, App Store
  stuck Checking, containers-scanned never arriving)
- crash recovery: check the crash marker BEFORE writing our own PID —
  recovery had never run on any node (always saw its own PID and skipped);
  PID-reuse guard via /proc cmdline
- boot status: pending-boot-starts registry (recovery, stack recovery,
  reconciler, adoption) — scanner overlays queued-but-down apps as
  Restarting instead of Stopped after a reboot; scanner-authored
  Restarting resolves immediately on a settled scan (no transitional wedge)
- install deps: bounded wait (36x5s) when a dependency is installed but
  still starting ("Waiting for Bitcoin to start…") instead of instant
  rejection; dependency-gate rejections remove the optimistic entry (no
  phantom Stopped tile) and surface as a notification
- seed backup: auth.setup persists the onboarding mnemonic as the
  encrypted seed backup (reveal previously failed on EVERY node — nothing
  ever wrote master_seed.enc); seed.restore stashes too; error sanitizer
  lets seed/2FA errors through instead of "Check server logs"
- lnd: bitcoind.rpchost resolved from the running Bitcoin variant
  (hardcoded bitcoin-knots broke Core nodes); manifest uses derived_env
- bitcoin status: clean human message for connection-reset/startup; raw
  URLs + os-error chains no longer reach the app card
- fedimint-clientd: chown /var/lib/archipelago/fmcd to 1000:1000 (root-
  created dir crash-looped the rootless container, EACCES) — first-boot
  script + pre-start self-heal
- log volume (>1GB/day on a day-old node): journald caps drop-in (ISO +
  bootstrap self-heal), bitcoind -printtoconsole=0 everywhere (90% of the
  journal was IBD UpdateTip spam), tracing default debug→info

Frontend:
- Login: Enter advances to confirm field then submits; submit always
  clickable with inline errors (was silently disabled on mismatch);
  Restart Onboarding needs a confirming second click (the mismatch →
  "onboarding restarted" trap)
- sync store: 30s state reconciliation + refetch on re-entrant connect;
  20s containers-scanned escape hatch so Checking can never show forever;
  fresh empty node reaches the real "no apps yet" state
- intro video: CRF20 re-encode (SSIM 0.988) + faststart — moov was at EOF
  so playback needed the full 15MB first (the intro lag)
- backgrounds: 10 heaviest JPEGs → WebP q90 (9.4MB→6.6MB); 7 stayed JPEG
  (WebP larger on noisy sources)
- Web5ConnectedNodes: drop unused template ref that failed vue-tsc -b

ISO/kiosk:
- nginx: /assets/ 404s no longer cached immutable for a year; HTTPS block
  gained the missing /assets/ location (served index.html as images)
- kiosk: launcher/service spliced from configs/ at ISO build (stale
  heredoc force-disabled GPU); MemoryHigh/Max 1200/1500→2200/2800M (kiosk
  rode the reclaim throttle = the lag); firmware-intel-graphics +
  firmware-amd-graphics (trixie split DMC blobs out of misc-nonfree)

Verified: cargo test 898/898 green, npm run build green with dist
contents confirmed (webp refs, lnd.png, faststart video, new strings).
Handover for ISO build + deploy: docs/HANDOVER-2026-07-02-iso-feedback.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/middleware.rs

@@ -64,6 +64,19 @@ pub(super) fn sanitize_error_message(msg: &str) -> String {
         "Container",
         "Image",
         "Bitcoin address",
+        // seed.reveal / auth flows — user-actionable, no internals to leak.
+        // Without these the sanitizer collapsed every reveal failure into
+        // "Operation failed. Check server logs." (which isn't even a crash).
+        "Incorrect",
+        "This node has no encrypted seed",
+        "A 2FA code is required",
+        "2FA is enabled but",
+        "Could not decrypt the saved seed",
+        "Could not unlock 2FA",
+        "No mnemonic available",
+        "No pending seed generation",
+        "Submitted words",
+        "Already set up",
     ];
     for prefix in &user_facing_prefixes {
         if msg.starts_with(prefix) {
@@ -83,6 +96,43 @@ pub(super) fn sanitize_error_message(msg: &str) -> String {
     "Operation failed. Check server logs for details.".to_string()
 }
 
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod sanitize_tests {
+    use super::sanitize_error_message;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn seed_reveal_errors_pass_through() {
+        // Every user-actionable seed.reveal failure must reach the user —
+        // masking them as "Check server logs" sent a real user hunting a
+        // crash that never happened.
+        for msg in [
+            "Incorrect password",
+            "This node has no encrypted seed backup, so the recovery phrase cannot be shown. It was only displayed once during setup.",
+            "A 2FA code is required to reveal the recovery phrase",
+            "2FA is enabled but no TOTP data found",
+            "Could not decrypt the saved seed. If you set a separate backup passphrase during setup, enter that passphrase.",
+            "Could not unlock 2FA with this password",
+            "No mnemonic available. Generate or restore a seed first.",
+            "Submitted words do not match generated seed",
+            "Already set up. Use auth.changePassword to change.",
+        ] {
+            assert_ne!(
+                sanitize_error_message(msg),
+                "Operation failed. Check server logs for details.",
+                "masked: {msg}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn internal_errors_stay_generic() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            sanitize_error_message("thread panicked at src/foo.rs:42"),
+            "Operation failed. Check server logs for details."
+        );
+    }
+}
+
 /// Derive a CSRF token from the session token via HMAC.
 /// Deterministic: same session token always produces the same CSRF token.
 /// Survives backend restarts because it depends only on the session token