Merge branch 'iso-feedback-fixes-2026-07-02' into merge-iso-feedback

# Conflicts:
#	core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/middleware.rs

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/middleware.rs

@@ -77,6 +77,19 @@ pub(super) fn sanitize_error_message(msg: &str) -> String {
         "No wireless radio",
         "WiFi radio enabled but",
         "Missing required field",
+        // seed.reveal / auth flows — user-actionable, no internals to leak.
+        // Without these the sanitizer collapsed every reveal failure into
+        // "Operation failed. Check server logs." (which isn't even a crash).
+        "Incorrect",
+        "This node has no encrypted seed",
+        "A 2FA code is required",
+        "2FA is enabled but",
+        "Could not decrypt the saved seed",
+        "Could not unlock 2FA",
+        "No mnemonic available",
+        "No pending seed generation",
+        "Submitted words",
+        "Already set up",
     ];
     for prefix in &user_facing_prefixes {
         if msg.starts_with(prefix) {
@@ -96,6 +109,43 @@ pub(super) fn sanitize_error_message(msg: &str) -> String {
     "Operation failed. Check server logs for details.".to_string()
 }
 
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod sanitize_tests {
+    use super::sanitize_error_message;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn seed_reveal_errors_pass_through() {
+        // Every user-actionable seed.reveal failure must reach the user —
+        // masking them as "Check server logs" sent a real user hunting a
+        // crash that never happened.
+        for msg in [
+            "Incorrect password",
+            "This node has no encrypted seed backup, so the recovery phrase cannot be shown. It was only displayed once during setup.",
+            "A 2FA code is required to reveal the recovery phrase",
+            "2FA is enabled but no TOTP data found",
+            "Could not decrypt the saved seed. If you set a separate backup passphrase during setup, enter that passphrase.",
+            "Could not unlock 2FA with this password",
+            "No mnemonic available. Generate or restore a seed first.",
+            "Submitted words do not match generated seed",
+            "Already set up. Use auth.changePassword to change.",
+        ] {
+            assert_ne!(
+                sanitize_error_message(msg),
+                "Operation failed. Check server logs for details.",
+                "masked: {msg}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn internal_errors_stay_generic() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            sanitize_error_message("thread panicked at src/foo.rs:42"),
+            "Operation failed. Check server logs for details."
+        );
+    }
+}
+
 /// Derive a CSRF token from the session token via HMAC.
 /// Deterministic: same session token always produces the same CSRF token.
 /// Survives backend restarts because it depends only on the session token