Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 90ce4bcc46 docs(10): correct F-10a's own overstatement — x3dh sites are identifiers, not key material
The F-10a scope correction committed hours earlier asserted semantics its
evidence did not support. The KEY-05 planner caught it against the code:

- mesh/x3dh.rs:100/:114 are u32 prekey IDENTIFIERS (spk_id, otk_id), not key
  agreement material. The X25519 secrets come from
  crypto::generate_x25519_ephemeral() at :99/:113 and were never in scope.
- session.rs's 16 raw matches read as 16 production token sites; #[cfg(test)]
  begins at :470, so it is 4 production + 12 test.
- wallet/bdhke.rs is 2 production of 4 (#[cfg(test)] at :143) — and those two
  ARE genuine key material: generate_secret() :133 and
  random_blinding_factor() :139.

The Medium rating still holds, on narrower grounds: bdhke's two production
sites plus storage_crypto.rs:39's AEAD nonce. It no longer rests on x3dh.

Struck rather than silently rewritten. F-10 was corrected on the grounds that
understatement misleads the next reader; overstatement does the same, and this
table managed both within a day.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 07:30:43 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 5cf44c9a58 docs(10): correct F-10's scope and add KEY-05 — crate-wide CSPRNG enforcement
The audit recorded F-10 as two call sites in container/secrets.rs. The real
defaulted-RNG surface is 41 sites across 15 files: session.rs (16),
pine_ha.rs (6), wallet/bdhke.rs (4 — ecash key material), mesh/x3dh.rs (2 —
key-agreement material), storage_crypto.rs (1 — AEAD nonce), +10 more.

Nothing is broken today: rand::random()/thread_rng() are ChaCha12 seeded from
getrandom(2). What changes is blast radius — F-10's Low rating rested on
'per-app credentials rather than the master key hierarchy', which does not
survive the true scope. Re-rated Medium as F-10a.

Records why the original audit missed it: F-10 was reached by tracing the
manifest-secrets path, and no step enumerated defaulted-RNG use across the
crate independently of the traced paths.

F-10's original text is left unedited so the correction is auditable rather
than retroactive. R-13 superseded by R-16; tracker item replaced.

Adds KEY-05 to Phase 10: sealed allowlist trait at key-gen seams, clippy
disallowed-methods ban (compile-time, CI-enforced), cargo-deny on duplicate
rand majors, degenerate-entropy runtime check, persisted CSPRNG-readiness
verdict. Also retires the false 'impl CryptoRng for CountingRng' at
seed.rs:656.

Records the user's execution gate: Phase 10 does not start until the
concurrent Phase 1 agent is finished and their changes are synced. KEY-05 is
unplanned — the existing 5 plans predate it and a 6th is required.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 07:01:00 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 5ba80e49b7 docs(quick-260731-upz): entropy-audit remediation backlog + tracker items
- Adds F-13 (High) to the audit: the BIP-84 account PRIVATE key is imported
  into Bitcoin Core (bitcoin.rs:203 disable_private_keys=false, :229-231
  wpkh(xprv/...)), so the spending key is persisted outside the Argon2
  envelope in a wallet with an empty passphrase; the descriptors also carry
  no [fingerprint/derivation] key origin, so no hardware signer could ever
  use them. Found by tracing secret class (1) end-to-end
- Fills the Remediation Backlog: R-00..R-15, prioritised severity x effort,
  each with the finding it closes, files, effort, and hardware gating; plus
  an explicit "not implemented here, and why" section
- Records ARCHY-1 as APPLIED with the exact test evidence and an honest note
  that making the source explicit removes a future failure mode rather than
  repairing a past one
- Wires the resulting open items into docs/UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md in its
  existing tier/checkbox format: Tier 0 (cargo audit/deny CI, ceremony
  mnemonic input, a five-item hygiene batch, secrets.rs OsRng), Tier 1 (ISO
  fail-open first-boot secrets, Argon2 vs ADR-005, the on-node checklist),
  Tier 2 (the Critical unauthenticated seed RPCs, PSBT Phase 1, PSBT phases
  2-7, seed-RPC transport confinement)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-01 06:02:31 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 5faf1a3c5f docs(quick-260731-upz): PSBT-first signing architecture spec
Watch-only descriptor wallets, external signers, multisig, air-gap transport
and honest LND limits — a spec a future /gsd-plan-phase can consume.

- Names the current gap: bitcoin.rs:203 passes disable_private_keys=false and
  bitcoin.rs:229-231 imports wpkh(xprv/...), so Core holds the BIP-84 account
  PRIVATE key today. Closing that is Phase 1 and unblocks everything else
- Full Core RPC loop with wallet- vs node-scoped RPCs; analyzepsbt drives UI
- Tier 1 single-sig with mandatory [fingerprint/derivation] key origin; Tier 2
  wsh(sortedmulti) on BIP-48; taproot/MuSig2 deferred as UNVERIFIED
- BC-UR v2 primary (fountain-coded, degrades gracefully), BBQr for Coldcard,
  file fallback always; animated multi-frame is mandatory, not optional
- LND: channel/revocation/HTLC keys CANNOT be air-gapped; funding tx must
  NEVER be self-broadcast (type-level refusal, not a boolean)
- On-chain (PSBT-protectable) vs lightning (necessarily hot) split, with the
  exact user-facing sentence the UI must use
- Hot wallet kept as explicitly-secondary with server-enforced limits; safe
  path is the DEFAULT, per T1's survivors
- Migration section refuses to over-alarm: the audit found no entropy defect,
  so no Archipelago user needs to rotate a seed
- 7 phases with dependencies, candidate requirements, and hardware gating
- Answers two open items in docs/hardware-signer-design.md
- Flags bitcoin-knots:latest as an unpinned tag vs ADR-009

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 23:09:17 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 f11db4ea1d docs(quick-260731-upz): entropy & seed-generation security audit
Evidence-backed audit of every secret class against the real tree, prompted
by the 2026-07-30 Coinkite COLDCARD entropy incident.

- No Coldcard-class entropy defect exists: no non-cryptographic PRNG, no
  clock-seeded key, no Math.random() in any browser key path
- F-01 (Critical, NOT entropy): seed.generate/seed.restore are unauthenticated,
  unrated, and unconditionally overwrite a live node's Ed25519/Nostr/FIPS keys
- F-02 [ARCHY-1] CONFIRMED: mnemonic entropy source is a bip39 transitive
  default, not a call-site argument — the exact structural shape of T1
- F-03 (High) [ARCHY-3]: first-boot TLS/SSH regeneration is fail-open and its
  completion marker is set even on failure, over a fleet-shared cached rootfs
- ARCHY-2 confirmed good; ARCHY-5 refuted as a present defect (32 | 256)
- Argon2::default() is 19MiB/t=2, not ADR-005's stated 64MB/3
- Corrects the scoping assumption that image-recipe/_archived/ is dead: it is
  the live ISO builder, exec'd by build-debian-iso.sh
- Adds a "What we do right" section and an UNVERIFIED on-node checklist

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 23:03:26 -04:00