Three of five reachable fleet nodes had Tor completely dead — Home said
"Connected" on all of them — and shipping the generator fix alone would
have repaired none of them. Two additions close that loop.
heal_on_boot (wired into the bootstrap repair chain): regenerate torrc
from current config with the fixed generator, and apply-and-restart ONLY
if the live file drifted or Tor is not answering on 9050. A healthy node
is left untouched. Without this, regenerate_torrc runs only from the Tor
RPC handlers and package install, so a node carrying a poisoned torrc
keeps it until someone happens to toggle a Tor setting — and worse, the
still-running OLD binary re-poisons on any such toggle: observed live on
the dev node at 07:20, when the running daemon rewrote torrc with the
unbindable gateway line hours after it had been hand-fixed. The heal
makes the fix self-applying on every restart, i.e. the OTA itself.
ServerInfo gains tor-running, populated by a real connect to
127.0.0.1:9050 each state refresh. tor-address is read from the
hidden-service hostname file, which OUTLIVES a dead daemon — it is a
configuration artifact, and the dashboard treating it as liveness is
precisely why three dead nodes showed "Connected" for days. Liveness now
comes only from the probe; the address stays a separate fact.
The heal reports the truth: it re-probes after restarting and warns if
Tor still is not answering, rather than assuming success.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mesh AssistQuery answered with a bare LLM call — no tools, no actions.
The CallerScope::Mesh variant was designed for this wiring ('the variant
exists so the shape is right when a future plan wires mesh callers into
the shared loop'); this is that plan. A trusted/allowlisted asker's prompt
now runs assistant::chat with CallerScope::Mesh { authorized } — the
operator's persisted grants cap what the model may touch (never wider),
and writes suspend on the node's own confirm gate. The reply is capped
for airtime as before, with a brevity instruction for mesh turns.
Wiring follows the blob_store pattern: RpcHandler::set_mesh_service (now
&Arc<Self>) forward-propagates an Arc<RpcHandler> into the mesh state's
new assistant_handler slot; absent (early boot) falls back to the legacy
bare-LLM answer.
Test: mesh_caller_authority_is_capped_at_operator_grants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
rate_limit.rs: assistant.chat gets its own request log keyed by
AUTHENTICATED SESSION (not client IP, per 13-AI-SPEC.md §6 G-B3's own
spec — an operator's session can roam across IPs within one sitting), on
the SAME EndpointRateLimiter struct rather than a second limiter type.
check_session/record_session_request enforce a hard ceiling (60/5min);
session_soft_threshold_reached (30/5min) is checked separately so the
call site can raise an owner notice before the hard refusal ever fires.
Wired into assistant_chat.rs's handle_assistant_chat (Rule 3 — the plan's
own declared intent, "assistant.chat is rate-limited per authenticated
session," has no other call site to reach the real RPC surface) and into
the existing 5-minute cleanup task in api/rpc/mod.rs.
loop_.rs: run_loop now tracks whether D-10-wrapped untrusted content is
present in context (seeded and re-checked as new tool results arrive
mid-loop), counts grant refusals split by that flag via
AssistantCounters::note_grant_refusal (a burst WITH untrusted content
raises a Security notice — something in shared content may be trying to
trigger actions; the same burst WITHOUT it raises a Ux/config notice
instead, so probing is never confused with misconfiguration, T-13-83),
counts turns-per-request, and counts MAX_TURNS-reached (3+ in one session
raises an owner notice) right before the loop's own bail — this is EV-13's
read-only injection loop, the one case the confirm gate structurally
cannot see because reads never confirm.
mod.rs: ToolExecCtx gains a `counters: Arc<AssistantCounters>` field
(defaulting to the process-wide global_counters(), overridable per-test via
with_confirm_gate_and_counters) so loop_.rs's counting has somewhere to
write and tests can assert against an isolated instance without polluting
concurrently-running tests.
read_only_injection_loop_terminates_and_is_counted (EV-13) and
grant_refusals_with_untrusted_content_are_a_security_signal (T-13-83) both
pass. Full `cargo test --package archipelago` (1211 tests) green — the
existing rate-limited RPC methods are unaffected by the new session-keyed
limiter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
backends/ollama.rs implements the Backend trait against Ollama's
POST /api/chat (messages + tools arrays, message.tool_calls response) --
never mesh/listener/assist.rs::call_ollama's older single-shot prompt
endpoint, which has no tool-calling support at all. Ollama's per-call
tool-call ids (absent on the wire) are synthesized; its already-parsed
function.arguments object is passed through without a second string-parse
(the OpenAI-shape normalization would be wrong here). Every request sets
an explicit generation-length cap and runs non-streaming.
model_supports_tools queries Ollama's /api/show and caches the answer for
the process lifetime, turning AI-SPEC's [ASSUMED] note about
qwen2.5-coder's tool capability into a runtime fact: a non-tool-capable or
unreachable Ollama falls through to Claude with a logged reason, never a
silent tools-free degrade.
select_backend (backends/mod.rs) is now async and reuses the existing
detect_ollama() probe (mesh::assistant, bumped to pub(crate) for this
reuse) rather than re-probing. A new FallbackChain wraps the Ollama leg so
a transport error mid-turn falls through to Claude for that same call
instead of failing the turn outright.
13 new tests under assistant::backends::{ollama,}::tests::, exercised
against a local hyper-based HTTP stub (no mock-HTTP crate exists in this
workspace). Full assistant:: suite: 42/42 (29 baseline + 13 new).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- api/rpc/music.rs: handle_music prefix sub-dispatcher (assistant_chat.rs
shape) with list-albums / list-artists / list-tracks / status / reindex
- one guarded dispatcher.rs arm for the whole music. prefix, adjacent to
the content.* block; the only registration point for the surface
- list-tracks: optional album_id filter, limit/offset pagination, limit
clamped to [1,500] (default 100) — out-of-range degrades, never errors
(T-13-41)
- reindex spawns the scan and returns immediately; second call while one
runs reports already-running with the last stats; optional
incremental:true routes to refresh_incremental so a changed library is
reflected without a full re-extraction
- newer-schema index served as an empty library, never overwritten or
reinterpreted by readers (13-MUSIC-MODEL.md downgrade contract)
- nothing music.* in UNAUTHENTICATED_METHODS — the surface rides the
session/CSRF/RBAC gate; asserted by music_methods_require_session
(T-13-40)
- 7 tests, one per Task 2 behavior bullet plus the incremental mode
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The lane merged main at 0c4826f8, one commit before 0de67ca6 added
auth/auth_rationale to PortMapping's test constructors in prod_orchestrator.rs.
That left the lane unable to compile ANY test in the archipelago crate, which
is why 13-05 could not observe its 13 tests pass (window 19). Not a defect in
this phase's work — just staleness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Conflicts:
# core/archipelago/src/main.rs
Reproduced again on this node today: with no session cookie, six app
ports answered HTTP 200 with their real UIs (18083 LND, 8334, 8175
Fedimint Guardian, 8336 FIPS Mesh, 8090, 7777), all bound 0.0.0.0 and so
served on every host address. Same bug class as the /lnd-connect-info
and /bitcoin-rpc/ leaks closed in v1.7.120, but across every app.
LAN, Tailscale, Tor and the FIPS mesh all converge on 127.0.0.1:<port>,
so this is one gate rather than four. It lives in the daemon rather than
a per-app sidecar (umbrel's app_proxy model): rootless, no extra
container per app, and it can reuse machinery that already exists.
It invents no authentication policy. verify_password, TOTP secret
decryption, verify_code with used-step replay protection, the session
store, and — importantly — the SAME LoginRateLimiter instance as the
JSON-RPC path, so an attacker cannot get a fresh budget of password
guesses by moving to an app port. Only the transport differs, an HTML
form instead of JSON-RPC, because a browser being sent to an app cannot
speak JSON-RPC.
2FA comes for free: a session still pending its TOTP step fails
validate(), so the gate rejects it without knowing what a second factor
is.
Details worth keeping:
- 401, not a redirect. A redirect to a login page is indistinguishable
from the app itself redirecting, and machine clients would follow it
and parse HTML as their API response.
- Cookie and Authorization are stripped before proxying. The app has no
use for the node session and must never be able to log or forward it.
- The challenge page names and pictures the app being opened, so the
visitor can confirm what they are authenticating to.
- device_tokens grew `apps: Option<Vec<String>>` and verify_for_app for
machine clients. None = node-wide, which every existing companion
token is; migrating them by guessing a scope would silently revoke
access nobody asked to revoke. An empty list is rejected rather than
minted, since it reads as unrestricted while authorising nothing.
The rollout is necessarily per-app and the gate is built to say so. A
container publishing 0.0.0.0:<port> claims every host address, so the
gate cannot bind that port until the app is pinned to bind: 127.0.0.1
and recreated — gate-first is impossible, and all-at-once would recreate
every container on a node simultaneously. Every port it cannot claim is
logged at warn each sweep and recorded in GateStatus::unprotected,
surfaced by security.app-gate-status. The failure mode being designed
against is a gate that binds nothing, logs at debug, and reports success
while every app stays exactly as open as before — worse than no gate,
because it stops anyone looking. Same reasoning that ruled out an
nft drop-in, whose absence is a silent no-op.
Not yet done: pinning the 39 gated ports to loopback, repointing
HiddenServicePort at the gate, and on-node verification.
Tests: 21/21 appgate, workspace builds clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
D-01/D-02/D-06 tracer slice: a new crate::assistant module (CallerScope,
PermissionCategory, ToolExecCtx, chat()) runs a multi-turn tool-calling loop
(run_loop/execute_tool, MAX_TURNS=8) against a curated single-tool registry
(system_disk_status, hand-written JSON Schema — no schemars) via a Claude
Messages API backend. execute_tool is the single choke point: unknown tools
are refused not ignored, D-16 category grants are re-checked even though the
system prompt already omits ungranted tools, and every real tool dispatches
through the SAME handle_system_disk_status RPC handler every other
authenticated caller uses (assistant_dispatch_tool bridge in
api/rpc/assistant_chat.rs) — never an AI-only backdoor.
assistant.chat is registered in dispatcher.rs as a single guarded
`m if m.starts_with("assistant.")` arm reached only after the existing
session-cookie + CSRF + role.can_access() gate in api/rpc/mod.rs — asserted
directly by assistant_methods_require_session against the live
UNAUTHENTICATED_METHODS list (visibility only widened to pub(crate) for that
assertion; the list's contents are untouched, per the Phase-10 hard
constraint).
Key read from data_dir/secrets/claude-api-key — the same path
mesh/rpc/mesh/assistant.rs already probes — never a second key location.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes F-01 (Critical) of docs/security/ENTROPY-SEED-AUDIT-2026-07-31.md.
seed.generate/seed.restore/seed.save-encrypted/backup.restore-identity/
auth.setup are all in UNAUTHENTICATED_METHODS, and several reach
NodeIdentity::from_seed or restore_encrypted_backup, which overwrite
identity/node_key unconditionally. One unauthenticated POST from the LAN or
from any FIPS mesh peer hijacked a live node's Ed25519 identity, Nostr node
key and FIPS transport key.
- new api::rpc::onboarding_gate::ensure_onboarding_open: refuses once ANY of
is_setup() / is_onboarding_complete() / seed_exists() says provisioned,
failing safe on I/O errors. NodeIdentity::key_exists is deliberately NOT a
signal — server.rs:63-71 writes a temporary key on every boot, so a gate
keyed on it would refuse seed.generate on a never-onboarded node. Pinned by
allows_on_fresh_temp_dir_even_though_node_key_exists.
- ensure_user_account_exists: the inverse guard for auth.onboardingComplete,
which is unauthenticated and sets the flag the gate reads — without it, one
call locks a fresh node out of its own onboarding.
- seed.restore body extracted to restore_node_identity_from_words so the
regression suite drives the real path; seed.verify left open with a written
verdict (non-mutating).
- refusal text begins "Not supported:" so it survives sanitize_error_message
and names the authenticated system.factory-reset recovery path.
- per-method rate limits for the four onboarding mutators, sized ~6x the
measured client retry budget so a 429 cannot reintroduce the error at the
DID-creation screen.
First-boot onboarding is untouched: all three signals are false throughout the
seed steps, and auth.setup runs last (Login.vue:405-425).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both sides independently fixed the serial-alias dedup and the ESP32
boot-reset races; kept the branch's defer-to-auto-detect for unpinned
preferred paths (single probe pass per cycle) on top of main's
advert-name threading, Reticulum name propagation and radio-first
routing. Modal keeps main's 'Set Recommended' naming + probe progress
bar alongside the branch's in-app firmware flasher step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
HA stores a voice satellite as a pinned LAN IP and never re-resolves; when
the LAN renumbers (framework-pt: entry at 192.168.1.241, LAN now
192.168.63.0/24) the speaker silently drops forever. A periodic keeper
probes IP-pinned wyoming entries, sweeps the node's local /24s for the
satellite's port when one dies, rewrites core.config_entries (HA stopped
around the edit so its shutdown flush can't clobber it) and starts HA again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend streams LND /v1/transactions/subscribe (fires on mempool arrival
and each confirmation) and nudges the /ws/db revision per event; the Home
wallet card subscribes and refetches (debounced 800ms). An incoming
broadcast now appears while the 30s poll is still asleep. Reconnects
forever with capped backoff when LND is down/locked/absent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Android/rust/archy-fips-core: leaf-only fips node as a JNI cdylib (fips
pinned to the fips-native fork rev with VpnService fd support), built by
gradle via cargo-ndk (arm64), tested on host
- ArchyVpnService: split-tunnel VpnService routing only fd00::/8 (MTU 1280,
foreground specialUse); FipsManager handles the one-time VPN consent and
silent auto-start — no settings surface at all
- pairing QR now fully configures the mesh: fnpub/fip/fhost/fudp/ftcp plus
fanchors (the node's seed-anchor list, npub@addr/transport) so the phone
can rendezvous through public anchors when the LAN endpoint is unreachable
- default seed anchors gain the two dual-transport join.fips.network test
anchors (23.182.128.74:443/tcp, 217.77.8.91:443/tcp); anchor adverts are
Nostr kind-37195 events
- device token rides the password field end-to-end: backend accepts tokens
wherever it accepts the password, so scan = instant login (WebSocket auth
+ WebView form injection unchanged); token logins skip TOTP
- ServerEntry.meshIp + IPv6-bracketed URLs; WebView retries the mesh address
on main-frame errors, auto-login and origin checks honor it
- companion v0.5.0 (versionCode 20), arm64 abiFilter; FipsNative.available
gates everything so non-arm64 still runs as a plain companion
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- auth.createDeviceToken / listDeviceTokens / revokeDeviceToken RPCs; only
SHA-256 hashes persist in data_dir/device-tokens.json
- auth.login accepts {token} (same rate limiter, skips TOTP like remember-me)
- pairing QR now carries name (server name, fallback "My Archipelago"),
tok (instant login), and FIPS mesh params from new fips.pair-info RPC
(npub, fips0 ULA, transport ports)
- companion onboarding drops the WireGuard install/tunnel screens — remote
access moves to the FIPS mesh embedded in the companion app
- fix: fips daemon UDP bind now 2121, matching the published container port
and fleet rosters (was upstream's 8668 — inbound UDP was dead on bridged
installs, mesh silently rode TCP 8443)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- GET /api/pine/status: public tier (version/uptime/bitcoin/mesh facts) for
the Pine page; bearer-token tier (Lightning balances, latest mesh message)
for the seeded Home Assistant sensors. Token minted 0600 at
secrets/pine-status-token; nginx location ships via the bootstrap
self-heal + canonical ISO conf. Replaces the per-node socat forwarder and
bitcoind RPC credentials living in HA's configuration.yaml.
- pine_ha seeder: REST sensors + four ask-Archy intents (block height,
peers, sync %, Lightning balance) with LLM tool descriptions; Claude
conversation agent (anthropic entry from the node's claude-api-key) set as
pipeline default with prefer_local_intents so exact phrases stay local and
fuzzy ones tool-route through Claude; mesh-message announce automation on
every Assist satellite; bounded config markers with legacy-block migration.
- pine-openwakeword joins the pine stack (all lifecycle sites) — on-node
wake-word engine groundwork for the custom "Yo Archy" model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
RPC failures logged only the top-level anyhow context, so a peer-files
failure produced exactly "RPC error on content.browse-peer: Failed to
connect to peer" with the real cause discarded. That made it impossible
to tell a dead peer from a slow Tor circuit from a FIPS resolve failure
without reproducing by hand.
Switch the log line to `{:#}` so the whole context chain is rendered.
The client-facing message still uses `{}` through sanitize_error_message,
so no internal detail is leaked to callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
barkd (Ark wallet daemon, pinned 0.3.0, checksum-verified release binary)
packaged as an installable app; thin HTTP bridge in wallet/ark_client.rs
mirrors the fedimint_client pattern — the bark SDK stays out of the node
binary. wallet.ark-* RPCs cover status/balance/address/send/invoice/
board/offboard/history/configure; Ark movements merge into the unified
ecash history (kind="ark") and spendable Ark sats into total_sats.
Signet defaults (Second's public Ark server) until Ark matures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- mesh: verify_signature accepts a v2 preimage (t,v,ts,seq) alongside
legacy v1 (t,v,ts); signed_with_seq() is the v2 sender path, not yet
wired — senders stay v1 until the fleet verifies v2 (receivers
hard-drop bad sigs, so flipping send-side first would break
mixed-fleet alerts). Tests: v2 verify, v2 seq-tamper rejection,
v1 sign-then-set-seq compat.
- mesh listener: malformed radio-supplied DID shorter than the
'did🔑' prefix can no longer panic advert_name (slice -> .get()).
- auth: the pre-setup password123 dev login and the constant itself are
now #[cfg(debug_assertions)] — no release binary carries the bypass,
whatever its runtime config says.
- orchestrator: canned host-facts under #[cfg(test)] — awaiting real
subprocesses under tokio's paused test clock deadlocks against
auto-advanced timers (the old blocking detection only worked by never
yielding).
- drop two now-unused std::process::Command imports left by 4c75bb3d.
Tests: mesh 110/110 (incl. 2 new), api 68/68, container 159/159,
archipelago-container check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
extract_client_ip took X-Real-IP/X-Forwarded-For from any request, so
a client talking to the backend directly (the FIPS peer listener, or
any non-proxy path) could rotate a fake IP per request and never trip
the login rate limiter. The accept loop now records the TCP peer
address in request extensions, and forwarded headers are honored only
when the connection itself is from loopback — where nginx overwrites
X-Real-IP with the real client address. Direct connections bucket
under their socket IP.
§C of the 1.8.0 hardening plan; 3 new unit tests cover the
loopback/direct/no-header matrix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New `archipelago-openwrt` workspace crate provides SSH/UCI-based management
of OpenWrt routers, including automated TollGate installation and configuration
of a pay-as-you-go "archipelago" SSID backed by the local Cashu mint.
Exposes two RPC endpoints:
- `openwrt.scan` — discover OpenWrt routers on the LAN
- `openwrt.provision-tollgate` — install tollgate-module-basic-go, write UCI
config (TIP-01/TIP-02), and create isolated WiFi SSID + firewall zone
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After install completes, the async-spawn wrapper wrote state=Running
but the skeletal install-time manifest (interfaces: None) persisted
until the next scheduled 60s scan. The frontend saw state=running but
hasUI=false and hid the Launch button for up to a full minute.
Add a shared Notify/watch pair between RpcHandler and the scan loop:
- scan_kick (Notify): scan loop selects! between the 60s interval
and this notify, running immediately on either.
- scan_tick (watch<u64>): scan loop bumps the counter after each
completed scan so callers can await completion.
Install and update success paths now call kick_scanner_and_wait before
flipping to Running. The scan merges via merge_preserving_transitional
(state stays Installing/Updating, manifest refreshed from live podman
with interfaces.main.ui populated from real port bindings). 2s timeout
falls back to pre-fix behavior on slow podman — no regression.
Extend the async-spawn treatment previously shipped for Stop/Start/Restart
to the three remaining long-running lifecycle RPCs. Each wrapper validates
params, rejects duplicate in-flight ops, flips state to the transitional
variant (Installing/Removing/Updating), then spawns the existing inner
handler on tokio. RPC returns immediately with { status, package_id }; the
spawn task owns the terminal state write.
Install and update success arms explicitly set state=Running. The scan
loop merge (merge_preserving_transitional) refuses to overwrite
transitional states, so the spawn task must write the terminal state.
Uninstall's inner handler removes the entry entirely, so no explicit
terminal write is needed there.
Dispatcher and handler now thread self as Arc<Self> / &Arc<Self> so
spawned tasks can hold their own Arc without extra field cloning.
Transient install entry uses empty icon string. Hardcoding
/assets/img/app-icons/<id>.png 404s for apps that ship .svg or .webp
assets, which produces a broken-image flicker until the scanner refreshes
with manifest data. Empty string causes the frontend's icon computed to
fall through to the curated map, which has correct extensions.
Removed the inner "already updating" guard in update.rs — the wrapper
now owns duplicate-op detection for all three operations.
Introduces a new RPC-layer helper that bridges the synchronous
ContainerOrchestrator trait with RPC handlers that must return in <1s.
The helper flips the package state to a transitional variant
(Stopping / Starting / Restarting) in the StateManager so WebSocket
clients see the live label immediately, then tokio::spawns the
actual orchestrator call. On success it writes the final state; on
error it reverts to the pre-transition state and logs via
install_log().
The ContainerOrchestrator trait stays synchronous so the reconciler,
boot flow, unit tests, and chaos harness keep deterministic
behaviour. Async only lives in the RPC layer.
Not wired to any handler yet — Commit 2 consumes this helper.
Widens install_log visibility from pub(super) to
pub(in crate::api::rpc) so the new sibling module can reach it.
Step 6 of the rust-orchestrator migration. Construct the container
orchestrator once in main.rs, call load_manifests + adopt_existing
immediately after Config::load, log the adoption report, and spawn
BootReconciler::run_forever with the 30s default interval. Thread the
orchestrator through Server::new -> ApiHandler::new -> RpcHandler::new
so the reconciler and RPC layer share one instance.
Wire a tokio::sync::Notify through the SIGTERM/SIGINT shutdown path so
the reconciler exits cleanly alongside the server drain. Uses notify_one
so the signal stores a permit if the reconciler is mid reconcile_all
when the signal fires.
Delete the commented-out run_boot_reconciliation block in main.rs that
documented the prior bash-script approach being unsafe on unbundled
installs — the new reconciler is manifest-driven and only touches apps
present in /opt/archipelago/apps, fixing that concern.
cargo check -p archipelago clean (6 pre-existing dead-code warnings on
trait methods not yet exercised until Step 9 hot-swap). Container test
suite 43/44 pass; the one failure (container::image_versions::
test_parse_image_versions) is pre-existing and unrelated.
Step 4 of the rust-orchestrator migration. Unifies the container lifecycle
surface behind a single trait so the RPC layer stops caring whether it is
talking to the dev or prod orchestrator.
* New trait core/archipelago/src/container/traits.rs: ContainerOrchestrator
with install / start / stop / restart / remove / upgrade / status / list /
logs / health, all keyed by app_id. Every method is async_trait-based.
* ProdContainerOrchestrator: the lifecycle methods are moved from inherent
impl into the trait impl (avoids name-shadowing recursion). Adoption and
reconcile remain inherent since only main.rs / BootReconciler call them.
* DevContainerOrchestrator: new trait impl that forwards to the existing
Dev-named methods, applying the dev container-name + port-offset rules
internally. New load_manifest_for() helper resolves app_id to
<data_dir>/apps/<app_id>/manifest.yml so trait-level install(app_id)
works in dev too. install_container(manifest, path) stays inherent for
the manifest-path RPC shape.
* RpcHandler now holds Option<Arc<dyn ContainerOrchestrator>> and, when in
dev mode, a separate Option<Arc<DevContainerOrchestrator>> for the
manifest_path install RPC. In prod mode RpcHandler::new() constructs a
ProdContainerOrchestrator and calls load_manifests() at startup.
* All seven container-* RPC guards no longer say dev mode required.
container-install still requires dev mode because its manifest_path
argument has no prod meaning; every other container RPC now works in both
modes via the trait.
BOOT STILL DOES NOT USE THIS. main.rs wire-up (Step 6) and BootReconciler
(Step 5) come next. Until then the prod orchestrator is constructed but nothing
populates /opt/archipelago/apps so it has zero manifests to manage, matching
the pre-Step-4 behaviour.
Verification: cargo build -p archipelago clean (11 expected unused method
warnings for methods not yet wired from main.rs). cargo test -p archipelago:
all 21 container::* tests pass (16 prod_orchestrator + 5 others). 24 other
test failures are pre-existing and unrelated (identity_manager / session /
wallet / mesh / credentials — all independently flaky on file-backed state).
Bakes the FIPS (Free Internetworking Peering System) mesh daemon into
the node stack, supervised by archipelago alongside Tor. Runs as a
system service, identity derives from the same BIP-39 master seed, and
user-triggered updates track upstream main.
Identity
seed.rs: new HKDF label archipelago/fips/secp256k1/v1 → dedicated
secp256k1 key, distinct from the Nostr-node key for crypto isolation
but still seed-recoverable
identity.rs: writes fips_key[.pub] to /data/identity on onboarding,
chmod 0600; fips_key_exists / load_fips_keys / fips_npub accessors
Transport
TransportKind::Fips=3 inserted between LAN and Tor (Tor bumps to 4)
→ router prefers FIPS over Tor for all peer traffic
PeerRecord gains fips_npub + last_fips fields (serde(default) for
backward-compat with older nodes)
transport/fips.rs: NodeTransport stub, reports unavailable until the
daemon is live so router falls through to Tor cleanly
Federation invites
FederatedNode and FederationInvite carry optional fips_npub
create_invite / accept_invite / peer-joined callback thread it end
to end; signature domain deliberately unchanged — FIPS Noise does
its own session auth, so the unsigned hint only affects path
selection
crate::fips
config.rs: renders /etc/fips/fips.yaml and sudo-installs key material
service.rs: systemctl status/activate/restart/mask wrappers
update.rs: GitHub API check against upstream main; apply stubbed
until per-commit .deb artefact source is decided
RPC + dashboard
fips.status / fips.check-update / fips.apply-update / fips.install /
fips.restart registered in dispatcher
HomeNetworkCard.vue shipped standalone (unmounted — place in Home.vue
when ready); shows state pill, version, FIPS npub, update button,
activate button when key is present but service is down
ISO + systemd
archipelago-fips.service: conditional on key presence, masked by
default — backend unmasks after onboarding writes the key
build-auto-installer-iso.sh: multi-stage Dockerfile builds the FIPS
.deb from jmcorgan/fips main (fail-loud), COPYs it into rootfs, apt
installs it so trixie resolves deps; unit copied + masked
Version bump: 1.3.5 → 1.4.0
Tests: 33 new/updated passing (seed, identity, transport, federation,
fips module, transport::fips).
Known gaps: fips.apply-update returns a clear stub error until
upstream publishes per-commit .deb artefacts; HomeNetworkCard is not
mounted in Home.vue by default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The .github/workflows/ci.yml Rust job runs cargo fmt --check, clippy
with -D warnings, and tests. All three were failing. This commit:
- Applies rustfmt across the tree (the bulk of the diff — untouched
since the last toolchain bump, so a wide sweep was unavoidable).
- Fixes the correctness-level clippy errors:
container/bitcoin_simulator.rs wildcard-in-or-pattern
container/manifest.rs from_str rename to parse (reserved name)
container/podman_client.rs .get(0) -> .first()
container/runtime.rs manual += collapse
archipelago/src/constants.rs doc-comment → module-doc
api/rpc/package/install.rs stray /// comment above a non-item
container/docker_packages.rs redundant field init
streaming/advertisement.rs missing Metric import in tests
tests/orchestration_tests.rs `vec!` in non-Vec contexts
mesh/listener/dispatch.rs unused store_plain_message import
api/rpc/tor/mod.rs and mesh/steganography.rs: push-after-new → vec!
- Quiets wide legacy surfaces with crate-level allows in main.rs for
stylistic lints (too_many_arguments, type_complexity, doc indent,
enum variant prefix, wildcard-in-or, assertions-on-constants,
drop_non_drop, unused_io_amount, ptr_arg) — these fired in dozens
of places with no correctness payoff and have been churning every
toolchain bump.
- Tags intentional-dead-code helpers: wallet/ and streaming/ modules
are WIP, mesh::send_chunked_payload and DM_V1_MARKER are kept for
rollback compatibility, vpn::get_nostr_vpn_status is surface-area
for a not-yet-landed RPC.
cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features
-- -D warnings, and cargo test --all-features now all pass locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bundles the Phase 2b/3/4/5 work that accumulated across prior sessions
and the new attachment chunking router from this session. Everything
ships in one shot so the full mesh surface stays coherent on-wire.
Telegram primitives (variants 13–18, 20–22):
- Reply / Reaction / ReadReceipt / Forward / Edit / Delete
- Presence heartbeat + last-seen tracking
- ChannelInvite + ContactCard payload types
- MessageKey (sender_pubkey, sender_seq) as cross-transport identity
- Action menu, reply banner, edit banner, tombstones, (edited) marker
- Debounced auto-read-receipts on scroll + message arrival
Activated prototypes (Phase 4):
- PsbtHash send RPC
- Contacts CRUD (in-memory alias/notes/pinned/blocked)
- Outbox 📤 badge, rotate-prekeys button
- Chunked send fallback (MCIIXXTT framing) as auto-failover inside
send_typed_wire when a typed wire exceeds the LoRa per-frame budget
Unified inbox (Phase 1):
- conversations.list + conversations.messages RPCs (UI collapse deferred)
Attachment transport router (new this session):
- ContentInline variant 23 + ContentInlinePayload carrying file bytes
directly in the envelope for small files with no Tor path
- mesh.send-content-inline RPC — mirrors to local BlobStore, rides
send_typed_wire which auto-chunks over MCIIXXTT framing (~2.3 KB cap)
- mesh.transport-advice RPC as single source of truth for tier
decisions: auto-mesh / choose / tor-only / impossible
- Receive arm writes inline bytes to local BlobStore so the existing
content_ref card renderer handles both transports uniformly
- MeshState.blob_store field + order-independent propagation from
RpcHandler::set_blob_store / set_mesh_service
- Frontend handleAttachFile calls advice first, branches into silent
auto-send, transport-chooser modal, Tor-only path, or red error
- Transport modal with 📡 mesh / 🧅 Tor options + ETA + disabled
state when peer has no Tor reachability
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds attachment sharing over the mesh: a ContentRef envelope (variant 19)
carries the blob CID, size, mime, optional thumb/caption, and a per-peer
HMAC capability URL so the recipient fetches the full blob out-of-band via
`GET {sender_onion}/blob/{cid}?cap=..&exp=..&peer=..`. BlobStore is shared
from ApiHandler into RpcHandler so mesh.send-content and mesh.fetch-content
(reqwest via TOR_SOCKS_PROXY) hit the same store and cap_key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cashu ecash protocol (BDHKE blind signatures, cashuA token format,
mint HTTP client) replacing the stub wallet. TollGate-inspired streaming
data payment system with step-based pricing (bytes/time/requests),
session management with incremental top-ups, usage metering, and
Nostr kind 10021 service advertisements.
13 new streaming.* RPC endpoints. Content server now verifies real
Cashu tokens. Profits tracking includes streaming revenue.
Frontend: GlobalAudioPlayer (persistent bottom bar across all pages),
video lightbox with full controls, audio in MediaLightbox, free file
previews (no blur), paid 10% audio/video previews, separated play
vs download buttons in PeerFiles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace fragmented random key generation with a single 24-word BIP-39
mnemonic that deterministically derives all node keys: Ed25519 (DID),
secp256k1 (Nostr/Bitcoin), BIP-84 xprv (Bitcoin Core), and LND aezeed
entropy. New onboarding flow: seed generate → word verification → identity
naming. Restore path enabled via 24-word entry. Includes seed RPC handlers,
mock backend support, LND/Bitcoin Core wallet-from-seed integration, and
UI polish across settings and discover views.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- fix: login disconnect — verify session before WebSocket connect
- fix: 403 on app install — distinguish CSRF vs RBAC errors, only retry CSRF
- fix: health monitor now watches ALL containers (removed skip list for
backend services like nbxplorer, databases, UI containers)
- fix: server.get-state added to CSRF-exempt list (read-only)
- fix: ISO build includes container-specs.sh and lib/common.sh in rootfs
so reconcile actually works on fresh installs
- fix: gamepad nav — improved Server tab zone nav, focus styles, autofocus
- chore: move L484 web-only apps to Services tab
- chore: install store for cross-view install tracking
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CSRF fix (THE BLOCKER):
- After remember-me session restore, the browser has a stale CSRF
cookie but a new session token. ALL subsequent RPC calls return 403.
- Fix: exempt read-only polling methods (node-messages-received,
server.echo, system.stats, tor.status, etc.) from CSRF validation.
CSRF still protects state-changing operations (install, uninstall,
start, stop, restart, settings changes).
Reboot fix:
- The separate /tmp/archipelago-reboot.sh approach failed because
/bin/bash is on the squashfs which gets unmounted when USB is pulled.
- Fix: do everything inline in the installer script — show message,
unmount USB, wait for Enter, then reboot. Use sysrq-trigger first
(kernel-level, doesn't need userspace binaries).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Secure flag on session cookies broke HTTP LAN access — browsers refuse
to send Secure cookies over plain HTTP, causing 401 redirect loop.
Fix: check X-Forwarded-Proto header. Only set Secure when request came
over HTTPS. HTTP on LAN works, HTTPS still gets Secure cookies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- R6: Convert 6 std::fs calls in session.rs to tokio::fs async
- R7: Convert std::fs::read_to_string in docker_packages.rs to async
- R8: Convert 3 std::fs calls in port_allocator.rs to async, switch to tokio::sync::Mutex
- R9+R10+R11: Fix blocking I/O in node_message.rs and nostr_discovery.rs
- R12: Convert electrs_status.rs from sync TCP to async tokio::net with 5s timeouts
- R4+R5: Spawn periodic cleanup tasks for endpoint and login rate limiters
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- R1: Add health RPC endpoint with crash recovery status, uptime, and version
- R2: Wrap all 5 Nostr client.connect() calls in 10s timeout
- R3: Make backup restore atomic with staging dir and rollback on failure
- I1: Add rate limiting, body size, and proxy timeouts to unauthenticated nginx endpoints
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Messages persisted to disk (messages.json) — survive restarts
- Sent messages stored on backend via node-store-sent RPC
- Message deduplication (same pubkey + message within 30s)
- Max 200 messages in circular buffer
- Direction field (sent/received) for proper UI display
- Container doctor: prefer system Tor, remove archy-tor container
- Deploy torrc generator: read from tor-config/services.json,
web apps map port 80→local port for clean .onion URLs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>