- mint_client: a stub mint shows swap() sends the full v2 keyset id when
given a cashuB short id, and leaves complete v1/v2 ids unchanged.
- fips::dial: the single-delivery decisions are now small functions
(fips_answer_is_final, fips_retryable). Tests cover them and, against a
silent local peer, check that a single-delivery request isn't resent
after a timeout while an ordinary one still is.
- content_server: an unreadable paid file returns Unavailable before the
payment gate runs, and a readable one still returns 402. Also covers
ensure_readable's grant/reopen behaviour. The podman grant is replaced
by a refusal under cfg(test) so results don't depend on the host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After the keyset-id fix, a Minibits paid download still failed and the
buyer lost the sats. What happened, 2026-09-29, amishparadise:
1. The seller redeemed the token, then failed to read the file. It was a
FileBrowser upload owned by the container subuid (100999) with mode
0640. The handler mapped that Err to 404.
2. The buyer's FIPS dial treats 404 as "fall back to Tor" and resent the
request with the same, now spent, token. The seller answered 402, and
the buyer showed "seller doesn't accept your Cashu mint".
Fixes:
- serve_content checks the file is readable before the paid gate. If it
isn't, it grants read with `podman unshare chmod a+r`, which matches
the other shared files. If that also fails it returns Unavailable (503)
without taking payment.
- The content handler returns 500 on internal errors and logs them,
instead of a silent 404.
- New PeerRequest::single_delivery(), used for the paid download: the
FIPS answer is final, FIPS retries only when it never connected, and
there's no Tor replay once the request may have been delivered.
- The buyer shows the seller's error text for non-402 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Paid cloud downloads paid with Minibits ecash were always rejected. The
buyer sends a cashuB token, which carries NUT-02 v2 keyset ids in their
8-byte short form. Minibits rotated its active keyset to a v2 id, and the
seller's verify_and_receive_payment called MintClient::swap directly,
skipping the short->full id repair that only receive_token applied. The
mint answered 422 ("ID length invalid"). The buyer then showed the
misleading "seller doesn't accept your Cashu mint" hint.
Move the repair into swap() so every caller is covered: payment verify,
streaming gate, send change, and cross-mint swaps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
claim_and_redeem retried every redeem failure indefinitely, including a
terminal one: mint error 11001 "Token Already Spent" (a claim replayed by a
relay-watermark edge case, or already redeemed by an earlier run). On
archy-x250-pa3 this pinned pending_claims at 1 forever and hammered
mint.minibits.cash's swap endpoint every ~6s, with the UI permanently
showing "a payment arrived but couldn't be redeemed yet".
- mint_client: expose the NUT error-code-11001 message as
ALREADY_REDEEMED_MSG so callers can recognize it without duplicating the
string.
- minibits: drop (not retry) a redeem failure that matches
is_already_redeemed — the value was already swept, so retrying can never
succeed.
- fetch_relay_dms: query the primary relay.minibits.cash alone first,
falling back to the public relay.damus.io/nos.lol only if it's
unreachable, and page past a 200-DM backlog instead of silently
stranding older DMs behind an un-advanced watermark.
This fix already existed on feat/minibits-lnurl-receive (4e410d7, 489995c,
2026-09-09) but that branch was never merged into main, which has its own
independently-diverged minibits.rs — so the bug shipped again in
1.8.16-alpha. Ported directly onto main's current implementation this time.
Immediate unblock on archy-x250-pa3: cleared the one poisoned
pending_claims entry from wallet/minibits.json by hand (already-redeemed,
zero value at risk) and restarted archipelago.service; confirmed via
journalctl that polling is quiet again.
See docs/incident-2026-09-15-minibits-already-redeemed.md for the full
writeup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
450 existed as two independent Rust constants (RPC gates vs boot
reconciler) linked only by a "keep in lockstep" comment — updating one
would reopen the disk-fill hole. Move it to crate::constants as the
single source of truth both paths import.
Also raise apps/cuprate/manifest.yml storage dependency and disk_limit
from 300Gi to 450Gi so manifest-driven surfaces (store size, pre-checks)
show the number the gate actually enforces — a user provisioning to the
displayed 300 was refused at an unexplained 450. Catalog regenerated
(cuprate entry re-embedded; still unsigned pending sign-catalog.sh).
Restart and update are stop + recreate — a fresh start by another name —
but only start carried the disk gate, so on a disk that shrank below the
floor after install, either action silently resumed the unprunable
Monero sync: the exact failure the gate exists to close.
Both now call check_cuprate_disk_compatibility after validate_app_id and
BEFORE any state mutation (user-stopped clear / Restarting / Updating
flip), matching handle_package_start's fail-clean contract.
Same companion shape as bitcoin-ui/electrs-ui: host-networked nginx
bound to 127.0.0.1:18091 (auth: gated + session_passthrough), serving
a dark glass status page that polls the node's restricted RPC via a
session-gated /cuprate-rpc/ proxy — sync height/target with progress
bar, peers, mempool, chain size and free disk (from get_info), plus a
wallet 'remote node' endpoint. The offline state explains the disk gate
so a refused node says why.
No secret rendering: the restricted RPC is Monero's safe-for-public
subset, so nginx.conf is baked into the image (no pre_start hook, no
bind mount). companion.rs auto-provisions archy-cuprate-ui alongside
cuprate and reaps it when cuprate goes.
Catalog regenerated (cuprate-ui entry + manifest embed, 18091 into the
mesh launch-port list). NOTE: releases/app-catalog.json is UNSIGNED as
committed — run scripts/sign-catalog.sh before publishing.
Cuprate has no pruning — verified against upstream main
(binaries/cuprated/src/config.rs): the 'pruning' crate is Monero's p2p
protocol pruning, not on-disk. Unlike the bitcoin apps, which branch on
DISK_GB in their entrypoint and self-prune, a disk-constrained cuprate
can only sync until the filesystem fills and take Archipelago down.
Translate the bitcoin disk-awareness into the only form cuprate can
honor — refuse rather than prune:
- install (sync + async RPC paths) and package.start fail with an
actionable message below CUPRATE_MIN_DISK_GB (450 GB total: chain
~250 GiB + headroom; allows 500 GB-class, refuses the 250 GB VPS)
- boot reconcile skips an already-installed cuprate on a shrunken disk,
recorded as Left("cuprate-insufficient-disk") before ensure_running
so desired-state recovery can never undo it (same shape as
requires-archival-bitcoin)
- df failure fail-opens at install (never block on an unreadable disk),
fail-closes at boot (never start a doomed sync)
prod_orchestrator also registers cuprate-ui in UI_APP_IDS (its
companion commit follows).
read_tor_address("bitcoin-core") was resolving through tor_service_name to
the shared "bitcoin" alias, but enrollment (install.rs auto-enroll and the
tor.create-service RPC) always names HiddenServiceDir/tor-hostnames entries
using the raw package_id verbatim — never canonicalized. On a real node
that's hidden_service_bitcoin-core, which the aliased lookup never found,
so the per-app UI Tor badge stayed empty even after the previous commit
made bitcoin-core auto-enrollable.
Give bitcoin-core its own identity-mapped arm instead of folding it into
the legacy bitcoin/bitcoin-knots/bitcoind alias, and pin all three lookup
tables (known_service_port, is_protocol_service, tor_service_name) with
regression tests so this alias-drift class of bug can't recur silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WxfWiFfnBkdSxwKUuV2tNy
apps/bitcoin-core/manifest.yml uses id "bitcoin-core", but
known_service_port/is_protocol_service (tor/mod.rs) and
tor_service_name (docker_packages.rs) only matched "bitcoin" and
"bitcoin-knots", so the app silently never got auto-enrolled for a
P2P (8333) hidden service at install time, and the UI's Tor address
lookup for it always returned None.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WxfWiFfnBkdSxwKUuV2tNy
Confirmed live 2026-09-08 against three real Lightning payments to a
registered @minibits.cash address: POST /claim (the only claim source
claim_and_redeem checked) always returned an empty array, no matter
how long or how often it was polled. Independently queried
wss://relay.minibits.cash and found all three payments sitting there
as NIP-04-encrypted kind-4 DMs, #p-tagged to the wallet's own Nostr
pubkey and authored by the Minibits service key — that is the actual
delivery channel for a payment made to the address, and this module
never looked at it.
fetch_relay_dms queries CLAIM_RELAY_URLS (the service's own relay plus
two public fallbacks) for kind-4 events tagged to our pubkey, feeding
matching content into the existing pending_claims retry pipeline
unchanged. A new last_dm_seen_at watermark stops the same (immutable,
never-expiring) relay event from being re-fetched and re-attempted on
every poll. The REST /claim call stays in place alongside it in case
it serves some other payment path — this only adds the missing one.
fix(ecash): trim stray whitespace before parsing a cashuA/cashuB token
Once the relay fix above surfaced the three real payments, all three
failed to redeem with "Invalid base64 in cashuB token" — the decrypted
NIP-04 content had a trailing space after the base64 payload (Minibits'
own encoding), which every base64 alphabet in decode_token_base64
rejects outright. CashuToken::deserialize now trims the whole token
string before touching the "cashuA"/"cashuB" prefix or payload. This is
a general robustness fix, not just a Minibits workaround — the same
stray-whitespace failure could hit a hand-pasted token from a clipboard
copy just as easily.
Both fixes verified end-to-end against production: all three stuck
payments (20 + 5 + 20 = 45 sats) redeemed cleanly on the first poll
after deploying this build to archy-x250-pa3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EawZPP9iidXj6Tvg3EpG3a
archy-x250-pa3's data volume filled to 100% (cuprate at 125G, since
removed) while a client had the ecash receive tab open. save_state's
write landed mid-truncate, leaving wallet/minibits.json at 0 bytes.
load_state then hard-failed every wallet.ecash-lnaddress call with
"EOF while parsing a value", surfaced in the UI as "Lightning address
unavailable" — permanently, since nothing ever cleared the bad file.
Registration is idempotent per pubkey (re-registering returns the same
lud16 Minibits already assigned), so there's no reason a corrupt local
mirror of that state should be fatal. load_state now treats an empty
or unparseable state file the same as a missing one — re-register and
recover the same address — instead of erroring. Manually cleared the
stuck file on archy-x250-pa3 as an immediate fix; this closes the gap
so it self-heals next time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EawZPP9iidXj6Tvg3EpG3a
A Minibits /claim response consumes the payment server-side the instant
it's returned — it can never be re-fetched. claim_and_redeem previously
decrypted/redeemed each claim inline and just warn!-logged any failure,
so a mint-unreachable blip, a stale cached server key, or an operator
who'd edited their accepted-mints list to drop the default mint (via
streaming.configure-mints) could make a real payment vanish with
nothing but a log line to show for it — claimed_count/received_sats
still came back as a clean 0, identical to "nothing arrived."
Now: every fetched claim is persisted to MinibitsState.pending_claims
before decrypt/redeem is attempted, survives failures across polls
instead of being dropped, and claim_and_redeem no longer bails out on a
fetch error without first retrying whatever was already pending.
ensure_mint_accepted self-heals the accepted-mints allow-list so the
Minibits mint (the address is inherently backed by it) can't be
excluded out from under a claim. ClaimOutcome gains failed_count,
threaded through wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim and shown in
ReceiveBitcoinModal so a stuck claim is visible instead of silent.
Also fixes the server_nostur_pubkey field-name typo (no live state to
migrate — this feature hasn't shipped yet).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EawZPP9iidXj6Tvg3EpG3a
The wallet used Minibits only as a Cashu mint, so the node could hold and
swap ecash there but had no addressable name at it. This derives a LUD-16
Lightning address (name@minibits.cash) from the node's own ecash wallet and
surfaces it in the ecash Receive tab above the existing paste-token box.
Identity reuses the NUT-13 ecash phrase, so there is no second secret:
- seedHash = sha256(mnemonic.to_seed("")) — the exact hash the Minibits app
stores, so restoring the same phrase recovers the same address both ways;
- Nostr keys via NIP-06 at m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0 (nostr-sdk Keys::from_mnemonic,
pinned by a unit test against the NIP-06 vector so a bump cannot silently
move the derivation and orphan the profile).
Backend (wallet/minibits.rs) implements the verified live /v3 flow: NIP-42
challenge/verify -> JWT, idempotent /profile registration with collision
retry, and /claim polling that NIP-04-decrypts each token (service pubkey read
from the address's own LUD-16 metadata, constant fallback) and redeems it
through ecash::receive_token. Mainnet-only; state cached 0600 in
wallet/minibits.json.
New RPC: wallet.ecash-lnaddress (register-or-read, idempotent) and
wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim (sweep Lightning payments into ecash). The modal
fetches the address on tab open, renders QR + copy, and sweeps claims while
open; a registration failure is non-fatal so paste-token still works.
Verified end-to-end against production: registered a disposable
@minibits.cash address, confirmed it resolves via /.well-known/lnurlp, and the
claim poll returns cleanly.
Archipelago never touched /etc/tollgate/identities.json — the "owner"
payout identity was whatever the router's TollGate install happened to
default to. Confirmed live against archy-x250-pa3: an unmodified upstream
placeholder (tollgate@minibits.cash), meaning 79% of every customer payment
would auto-payout to an address the operator never chose and doesn't
control.
Adds TollGateConfig.payout_address (opt-in — None leaves the router
untouched), config::apply_payout_identity() to merge it into the "owner"
entry of identities.json without disturbing the merchant keypair or the
other profit-share identities, an RPC param on openwrt.provision-tollgate,
and a status field + reconfigure-form input in the OpenWrt Gateway panel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KTdMfVJChCwCCYF1ZTRQLc
sweep_once() has never actually swept anything: `tollgate wallet drain
cashu` (no flags) blocks on an interactive y/N confirmation that Router::run
can never answer over a non-PTY SSH exec (empty stdin -> EOF -> defaults to
N -> "Operation cancelled." with exit code 0), so the drain_code != 0 check
can't catch it and every tick silently no-ops.
The obvious fix isn't safe either: `--json` skips the prompt, but confirmed
live against archy-x250-pa3 that on a wallet.db with a stale duplicate
per-mint entry (trailing-slash leftover from before the mint_url fix), it
completes a real swap against the good entry, then aborts on the second
(empty, stale) entry and reports "success": false without ever printing or
persisting the resulting token anywhere. 50 sats went from spendable balance
to gone in that one call. Documented so nobody "fixes" this by wiring in
--json before upstream fixes the partial-failure data loss.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KTdMfVJChCwCCYF1ZTRQLc
Two bugs found live against archy-x250-pa3: TollGate-3458 (the upstream
tollgate-module-basic-go installer's own default AP, rebranded from
OpenWrt's factory default wireless.default_radioN sections) was left
bound to `network=lan` — wide open, unmetered, and sharing the router's
admin LAN — because install_ipk() runs the upstream package's own
uci-defaults scripts but nothing reconciled the AP they create with the
separate `tollgate` network/bridge/firewall this project's own
provision_ssid() sets up for the "archipelago" SSID. Fixed by folding any
default_radioN section left on `lan` onto the `tollgate` network right
after it's created.
Separately, a caller-supplied mint_url with a trailing slash
(https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin/) got written byte-for-byte into
accepted_mints[0].url, which tollgate-wrt string-compares exactly against
a token's embedded (slash-less) mint URL — rejecting every otherwise-valid
token as an "untrusted mint". Fixed by trimming trailing slashes before
the value is used anywhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KTdMfVJChCwCCYF1ZTRQLc
opkg_check() and every opkg/apk invocation hardcoded /usr/bin/opkg and
/usr/bin/apk. Official OpenWrt images don't all symlink /bin into
/usr/bin — the glinet_gl-mt3000 24.10.2 build keeps them as separate
real directories with opkg living in /bin — so the check silently
missed a perfectly normal install and TollGate provisioning failed
with "this router's firmware may not support package management".
Switched every call to resolve through the router's own $PATH
(command -v / bare opkg / apk) instead. Reproduced and fixed live
against archy-x250-pa3, 2026-09-05.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0176RpCxFNS9ZaSJjL72W9Z5
v1.8.9's move to Router.SendPaymentV2 shipped without fee_limit_sat,
and the v2 route treats an ABSENT fee limit as zero allowed fees.
Every real route carries a routing fee (the 2-hop route here: 1.5
sats), so the pathfinder rejected them all and the wallet answered
"No route to the recipient" on EVERY send — all day, on healthy
channels with plenty of liquidity both ways.
The router debug log makes it unambiguous:
wallet payment (v1.8.9 backend): fee_limit=0 mSAT -> no route
same payment by hand (lncli --fee_limit=100): fee_limit=100000 mSAT -> settles in 0.65s
My earlier "pipeline verified" claim was wrong — the manual lncli
verification set a fee limit by hand and masked this exact bug. The
400k that succeeded this morning went through the pre-update backend
on the pre-update LND.
Payments now carry lncli's own default budget — the payment amount
(100%), preferring the payer-supplied amount for zero-value invoices
and the invoice's own amount otherwise, with a nominal floor so the
limit can never be zero. Unit-pinned so it cannot regress.
archipelago
ssmithxandClaude Opus 5.5