DO NOT MERGE INTO A RELEASE SIGNED WITH THE NEW KEY. See below.
The previous release root (z6Mkkid…q7ur, pinned 2026-07-02) was exposed
in a chat transcript and is treated as compromised. It signs both OTA
manifests and the app catalog, so anyone holding it could sign updates
the fleet would install.
Pins the new key in trust::anchor and moves EXPECTED_DID in all three
signing/publishing scripts.
ORDERING IS CRITICAL — nodes pin the OLD key:
* The release CARRYING this commit must be signed with the OLD key.
That is the only signature a node running the previous binary will
accept, and it is what installs the binary pinning the new key.
* Only the release AFTER that may be signed with the new key.
* Signing this release with the new key makes every node reject it,
ending OTA fleet-wide and requiring hands-on recovery per node.
sign-catalog.sh moves in the same commit, so the app catalog must also be
re-signed with the new key once this ships, or nodes accept the binary
and reject the catalog.
Key verified before pinning: the hex and the did:key are the same
keypair, checked with a base58 decoder round-tripped against the previous
known-good pair. An earlier candidate hex (cb830e13…) was rejected
because it decoded to a different DID than the one supplied — pinning it
would have made every node reject every future update.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pin RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX from the 2026-07-02 release-root signing ceremony
(signer did:key:z6MkkidEnEpo6qHMCNSZoNKWtvQvxq3whnaME9wGgEFhq7ur) so nodes verify
the publisher identity of the app-catalog. Sign releases/app-catalog.json in place.
Fix two floats that made the catalog unsignable: archy-btcpay-db manifest version
-> string, fedimint-clientd cpu_limit 0.25 -> 1 (u32). Add scripts/sign-catalog.sh
helper, the 1.8.0 release-hardening plan/tracker, and the commit-and-push project
rule in CLAUDE.md.
Backward-compatible: old binaries still accept the signed catalog; the pinned-anchor
binary ships in the next build/OTA.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pins RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX from the signing ceremony
(did:key:z6MkkidEnEpo6qHMCNSZoNKWtvQvxq3whnaME9wGgEFhq7ur). The
corresponding mnemonic is held offline by the publisher, never committed
or stored on any node/build host. Nodes built with this binary now verify
the app catalog's signature against this anchor instead of accepting any
signer; unsigned catalogs are still accepted during the migration window
per docs/workstream-b-signing-runbook.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the parked trust module and wires it into the live build:
- main.rs: register `mod trust`
- app_catalog::fetch_one: verify the release-root detached signature when
present (verify against raw JSON so forward-compat fields stay in the
signed preimage); accept unsigned during the migration window, hard-reject
a present-but-bad signature so a tampering mirror can't pass altered bytes
- seed: pin release-root Ed25519 known-answer test (priv+pub) for the
signing ceremony / pinned-anchor / external-verifier cross-check
- signed_doc: drop unused import
20/20 Phase 0 unit tests pass (trust::canonical/did/signed_doc/anchor,
seed release-root, app_catalog). Crate compiles clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moved here so main stays clean for the v1.7.98 release. Contains the trust/
module (canonical.rs, did.rs, signed_doc.rs) + seed::derive_release_root_ed25519.
Not wired into the build yet. Continue this work on this branch.
