Lets an app grant the node's users owner rights, e.g. a Blossom server's
allowed uploaders. The value is the Nostr keys of the identities the app
identity picker offers for NIP-07 signing, chosen by the same rule as
NostrIdentityPicker.vue, so the node's own appliance identity is never
included. It is resolved only for manifests that template it, and an
empty set is an error rather than an empty owner list.
identity.list now shares its is_node test with the new helper.
Every paid download logged "filing into filebrowser/Music/... failed
(non-fatal): Permission denied". The purchase played in-app but never
appeared in Files. FileBrowser's folders belong to its rootless container
range (host uid 100000, mode 755). This service is host uid 1000, outside
that range, so it can read them but not create files in them.
New container::filebrowser::save_new_file:
- Writes directly when the folder allows it.
- Otherwise writes through `podman unshare`, where that uid range is
ours: to a temp file, then chowned to the folder's owner, set to 0644,
and hard-linked into place. FileBrowser never sees a partial file and an
existing file is never replaced. A missing folder is created and given
its parent's owner. No sudo.
- Keeps the "name (2).ext" de-duplication the RPC did inline.
Checked the unshare script on amishparadise in a scratch folder owned
like FileBrowser's: new folder + file OK, owner/mode right, no clobber,
no temp file left, and the service can read the result.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After the keyset-id fix, a Minibits paid download still failed and the
buyer lost the sats. What happened, 2026-09-29, amishparadise:
1. The seller redeemed the token, then failed to read the file. It was a
FileBrowser upload owned by the container subuid (100999) with mode
0640. The handler mapped that Err to 404.
2. The buyer's FIPS dial treats 404 as "fall back to Tor" and resent the
request with the same, now spent, token. The seller answered 402, and
the buyer showed "seller doesn't accept your Cashu mint".
Fixes:
- serve_content checks the file is readable before the paid gate. If it
isn't, it grants read with `podman unshare chmod a+r`, which matches
the other shared files. If that also fails it returns Unavailable (503)
without taking payment.
- The content handler returns 500 on internal errors and logs them,
instead of a silent 404.
- New PeerRequest::single_delivery(), used for the paid download: the
FIPS answer is final, FIPS retries only when it never connected, and
there's no Tor replay once the request may have been delivered.
- The buyer shows the seller's error text for non-402 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
450 existed as two independent Rust constants (RPC gates vs boot
reconciler) linked only by a "keep in lockstep" comment — updating one
would reopen the disk-fill hole. Move it to crate::constants as the
single source of truth both paths import.
Also raise apps/cuprate/manifest.yml storage dependency and disk_limit
from 300Gi to 450Gi so manifest-driven surfaces (store size, pre-checks)
show the number the gate actually enforces — a user provisioning to the
displayed 300 was refused at an unexplained 450. Catalog regenerated
(cuprate entry re-embedded; still unsigned pending sign-catalog.sh).
Restart and update are stop + recreate — a fresh start by another name —
but only start carried the disk gate, so on a disk that shrank below the
floor after install, either action silently resumed the unprunable
Monero sync: the exact failure the gate exists to close.
Both now call check_cuprate_disk_compatibility after validate_app_id and
BEFORE any state mutation (user-stopped clear / Restarting / Updating
flip), matching handle_package_start's fail-clean contract.
Cuprate has no pruning — verified against upstream main
(binaries/cuprated/src/config.rs): the 'pruning' crate is Monero's p2p
protocol pruning, not on-disk. Unlike the bitcoin apps, which branch on
DISK_GB in their entrypoint and self-prune, a disk-constrained cuprate
can only sync until the filesystem fills and take Archipelago down.
Translate the bitcoin disk-awareness into the only form cuprate can
honor — refuse rather than prune:
- install (sync + async RPC paths) and package.start fail with an
actionable message below CUPRATE_MIN_DISK_GB (450 GB total: chain
~250 GiB + headroom; allows 500 GB-class, refuses the 250 GB VPS)
- boot reconcile skips an already-installed cuprate on a shrunken disk,
recorded as Left("cuprate-insufficient-disk") before ensure_running
so desired-state recovery can never undo it (same shape as
requires-archival-bitcoin)
- df failure fail-opens at install (never block on an unreadable disk),
fail-closes at boot (never start a doomed sync)
prod_orchestrator also registers cuprate-ui in UI_APP_IDS (its
companion commit follows).
read_tor_address("bitcoin-core") was resolving through tor_service_name to
the shared "bitcoin" alias, but enrollment (install.rs auto-enroll and the
tor.create-service RPC) always names HiddenServiceDir/tor-hostnames entries
using the raw package_id verbatim — never canonicalized. On a real node
that's hidden_service_bitcoin-core, which the aliased lookup never found,
so the per-app UI Tor badge stayed empty even after the previous commit
made bitcoin-core auto-enrollable.
Give bitcoin-core its own identity-mapped arm instead of folding it into
the legacy bitcoin/bitcoin-knots/bitcoind alias, and pin all three lookup
tables (known_service_port, is_protocol_service, tor_service_name) with
regression tests so this alias-drift class of bug can't recur silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WxfWiFfnBkdSxwKUuV2tNy
apps/bitcoin-core/manifest.yml uses id "bitcoin-core", but
known_service_port/is_protocol_service (tor/mod.rs) and
tor_service_name (docker_packages.rs) only matched "bitcoin" and
"bitcoin-knots", so the app silently never got auto-enrolled for a
P2P (8333) hidden service at install time, and the UI's Tor address
lookup for it always returned None.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WxfWiFfnBkdSxwKUuV2tNy
A Minibits /claim response consumes the payment server-side the instant
it's returned — it can never be re-fetched. claim_and_redeem previously
decrypted/redeemed each claim inline and just warn!-logged any failure,
so a mint-unreachable blip, a stale cached server key, or an operator
who'd edited their accepted-mints list to drop the default mint (via
streaming.configure-mints) could make a real payment vanish with
nothing but a log line to show for it — claimed_count/received_sats
still came back as a clean 0, identical to "nothing arrived."
Now: every fetched claim is persisted to MinibitsState.pending_claims
before decrypt/redeem is attempted, survives failures across polls
instead of being dropped, and claim_and_redeem no longer bails out on a
fetch error without first retrying whatever was already pending.
ensure_mint_accepted self-heals the accepted-mints allow-list so the
Minibits mint (the address is inherently backed by it) can't be
excluded out from under a claim. ClaimOutcome gains failed_count,
threaded through wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim and shown in
ReceiveBitcoinModal so a stuck claim is visible instead of silent.
Also fixes the server_nostur_pubkey field-name typo (no live state to
migrate — this feature hasn't shipped yet).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EawZPP9iidXj6Tvg3EpG3a
The wallet used Minibits only as a Cashu mint, so the node could hold and
swap ecash there but had no addressable name at it. This derives a LUD-16
Lightning address (name@minibits.cash) from the node's own ecash wallet and
surfaces it in the ecash Receive tab above the existing paste-token box.
Identity reuses the NUT-13 ecash phrase, so there is no second secret:
- seedHash = sha256(mnemonic.to_seed("")) — the exact hash the Minibits app
stores, so restoring the same phrase recovers the same address both ways;
- Nostr keys via NIP-06 at m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0 (nostr-sdk Keys::from_mnemonic,
pinned by a unit test against the NIP-06 vector so a bump cannot silently
move the derivation and orphan the profile).
Backend (wallet/minibits.rs) implements the verified live /v3 flow: NIP-42
challenge/verify -> JWT, idempotent /profile registration with collision
retry, and /claim polling that NIP-04-decrypts each token (service pubkey read
from the address's own LUD-16 metadata, constant fallback) and redeems it
through ecash::receive_token. Mainnet-only; state cached 0600 in
wallet/minibits.json.
New RPC: wallet.ecash-lnaddress (register-or-read, idempotent) and
wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim (sweep Lightning payments into ecash). The modal
fetches the address on tab open, renders QR + copy, and sweeps claims while
open; a registration failure is non-fatal so paste-token still works.
Verified end-to-end against production: registered a disposable
@minibits.cash address, confirmed it resolves via /.well-known/lnurlp, and the
claim poll returns cleanly.
Archipelago never touched /etc/tollgate/identities.json — the "owner"
payout identity was whatever the router's TollGate install happened to
default to. Confirmed live against archy-x250-pa3: an unmodified upstream
placeholder (tollgate@minibits.cash), meaning 79% of every customer payment
would auto-payout to an address the operator never chose and doesn't
control.
Adds TollGateConfig.payout_address (opt-in — None leaves the router
untouched), config::apply_payout_identity() to merge it into the "owner"
entry of identities.json without disturbing the merchant keypair or the
other profit-share identities, an RPC param on openwrt.provision-tollgate,
and a status field + reconfigure-form input in the OpenWrt Gateway panel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KTdMfVJChCwCCYF1ZTRQLc
Two bugs found live against archy-x250-pa3: TollGate-3458 (the upstream
tollgate-module-basic-go installer's own default AP, rebranded from
OpenWrt's factory default wireless.default_radioN sections) was left
bound to `network=lan` — wide open, unmetered, and sharing the router's
admin LAN — because install_ipk() runs the upstream package's own
uci-defaults scripts but nothing reconciled the AP they create with the
separate `tollgate` network/bridge/firewall this project's own
provision_ssid() sets up for the "archipelago" SSID. Fixed by folding any
default_radioN section left on `lan` onto the `tollgate` network right
after it's created.
Separately, a caller-supplied mint_url with a trailing slash
(https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin/) got written byte-for-byte into
accepted_mints[0].url, which tollgate-wrt string-compares exactly against
a token's embedded (slash-less) mint URL — rejecting every otherwise-valid
token as an "untrusted mint". Fixed by trimming trailing slashes before
the value is used anywhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KTdMfVJChCwCCYF1ZTRQLc
opkg_check() and every opkg/apk invocation hardcoded /usr/bin/opkg and
/usr/bin/apk. Official OpenWrt images don't all symlink /bin into
/usr/bin — the glinet_gl-mt3000 24.10.2 build keeps them as separate
real directories with opkg living in /bin — so the check silently
missed a perfectly normal install and TollGate provisioning failed
with "this router's firmware may not support package management".
Switched every call to resolve through the router's own $PATH
(command -v / bare opkg / apk) instead. Reproduced and fixed live
against archy-x250-pa3, 2026-09-05.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0176RpCxFNS9ZaSJjL72W9Z5
v1.8.9's move to Router.SendPaymentV2 shipped without fee_limit_sat,
and the v2 route treats an ABSENT fee limit as zero allowed fees.
Every real route carries a routing fee (the 2-hop route here: 1.5
sats), so the pathfinder rejected them all and the wallet answered
"No route to the recipient" on EVERY send — all day, on healthy
channels with plenty of liquidity both ways.
The router debug log makes it unambiguous:
wallet payment (v1.8.9 backend): fee_limit=0 mSAT -> no route
same payment by hand (lncli --fee_limit=100): fee_limit=100000 mSAT -> settles in 0.65s
My earlier "pipeline verified" claim was wrong — the manual lncli
verification set a fee limit by hand and masked this exact bug. The
400k that succeeded this morning went through the pre-update backend
on the pre-update LND.
Payments now carry lncli's own default budget — the payment amount
(100%), preferring the payer-supplied amount for zero-value invoices
and the invoice's own amount otherwise, with a nominal floor so the
limit can never be zero. Unit-pinned so it cannot regress.
Portainer >=2.21 no longer lets whoever loads the page first claim the
admin account: on a fresh install it mints a one-time setup token and
prints it ONLY to the server logs. On an appliance that is a dead end —
'check the Portainer server logs' is exactly what a user cannot follow,
and after the 2.45.0 update it made a freshly restarted Portainer look
broken ('disappeared', then demands a token nobody can find).
package.credentials — the same RPC that powers the login-credentials
card on the app page — now extracts the setup_token line from
portainer's recent container logs and hands it over with the existing
copy-button treatment, titled and explained for a first-time user. The
token stops being printed once setup completes, and any container
recreate drops the log line, so the card disappears on its own and no
dead token lingers. Parsing is a pure, unit-tested scan against the
live-captured 2.45.0 log shape (64 hex chars after setup_token=).
LND 0.21.2 removed the deprecated Lightning.SendPaymentSync REST route
(/v1/channels/transactions). The backend still called it, so every
Lightning send answered literal HTTP 404 and the wallet UI reported
'Payment failed: Not Found' fleet-wide right after the pin bump —
receive worked, which made it look intermittent.
Pay through the supported Router.SendPaymentV2 route (/v2/router/send)
instead, keeping the existing contract with the UI:
- single-record responses (no_inflight_updates) unwrapped from the
grpc-gateway result envelope, transport errors from the nested error
- a slow multi-hop payment still resolves as pending + payment hash
(only LND may declare failure), never a false 'Payment failed'
- LND's failure_reason codes translated to the same plain-language
advice, invoice-expiry still says 'ask for a fresh invoice'
Guard it at the gate: tests/lifecycle/bats/lnd-api-compat.bats POSTs a
deliberately-invalid invoice to /v2/router/send on the RUNNING LND and
fails if the route answers 404 — the image/backend skew that shipped
silently last time because no test ever spoke the payment endpoint.
Also bumps the stale lnd image expectation in remote-lifecycle.sh.
fips/ssh_mesh.rs owns the 90-ssh.nft drop-in lifecycle: off by default,
any-peer scope behind the UI's danger confirmation or an explicit mesh
address list, reconciled on every daemon config install. The scanner now
takes installed apps' icons from their real manifest metadata (Cuprate's
Services tile) and classifies manifest-declared UI apps as launchable
even when the address probe misses (Alby Hub).
archipelago
chaum
ssmithxandClaude Opus 5.5