A guide a third-party security auditor can use to verify Phase 10's claims
without trusting our test harness — and that we use ourselves.
Every claim carries four parts, all required: the claim stated falsifiably;
how to REPRODUCE THE DEFECT on the parent commit; how to verify the fix; and a
negative control that must go red on exactly that defect and nothing else. A
test passing on both fixed and unfixed code proves nothing, and reproduce-first
is the step most often omitted in security theatre.
Prefers external checks (curl from another host, tar listing, cross-node file
comparison) over our own tests wherever a claim can be checked from outside.
Tiered by hardware needed: Tier 0 any checkout, Tier 1 running node, Tier 2 ISO
build host, Tier 3 two physical nodes, Tier 4 pre-release gate. Status marked
per claim — verifiable now, pending a plan, or hardware-gated — so an unmarked
absence is never read as a pass.
States what is explicitly NOT claimed (Lightning custody is not air-gappable;
no claim against a compromised kernel CSPRNG or supply chain; KEY-05 is
structural not exploitable), the known-accepted risks with where each was
decided, and carries the C-6 warning that probing with seed.status reports the
surface closed while the real door stands open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 3 of 10-03 is a blocking checkpoint: proving the shipped rootfs tar is
identity-free needs a real ISO build host with podman/docker and disk for a
full rootfs rebuild. This commits the prepared evidence document with the exact
command sequence, marked UNVERIFIED, rather than claiming the check passed.
The document states the inverted expectation explicitly. The audit's C-4 entry
expected SSH host keys and the TLS key to be PRESENT — that described the
broken state it was measuring. After the strip layer those must be ABSENT, so
the audit's stated expectation is now the failure condition. A future reader
comparing the two would otherwise conclude the check regressed.
Also records two things the operator would otherwise get wrong:
- RECIPE_HASH must be read from the stamp file, not computed from the repo
file. build-debian-iso.sh rewrites the builder's relative paths into a temp
copy before exec, and the hash covers "$0"; the hashed region has 35 such
rewritten expressions plus an absolutised SCRIPT_DIR, so the value is
specific to the build host and checkout path.
- C-4 is a build-host check only. Two-node key divergence is C-3 and stays
separately UNVERIFIED; the note explains why SSH host keys are the sharper
signal there than TLS, given the installer's per-install TLS fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The F-10a scope correction committed hours earlier asserted semantics its
evidence did not support. The KEY-05 planner caught it against the code:
- mesh/x3dh.rs:100/:114 are u32 prekey IDENTIFIERS (spk_id, otk_id), not key
agreement material. The X25519 secrets come from
crypto::generate_x25519_ephemeral() at :99/:113 and were never in scope.
- session.rs's 16 raw matches read as 16 production token sites; #[cfg(test)]
begins at :470, so it is 4 production + 12 test.
- wallet/bdhke.rs is 2 production of 4 (#[cfg(test)] at :143) — and those two
ARE genuine key material: generate_secret() :133 and
random_blinding_factor() :139.
The Medium rating still holds, on narrower grounds: bdhke's two production
sites plus storage_crypto.rs:39's AEAD nonce. It no longer rests on x3dh.
Struck rather than silently rewritten. F-10 was corrected on the grounds that
understatement misleads the next reader; overstatement does the same, and this
table managed both within a day.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The audit recorded F-10 as two call sites in container/secrets.rs. The real
defaulted-RNG surface is 41 sites across 15 files: session.rs (16),
pine_ha.rs (6), wallet/bdhke.rs (4 — ecash key material), mesh/x3dh.rs (2 —
key-agreement material), storage_crypto.rs (1 — AEAD nonce), +10 more.
Nothing is broken today: rand::random()/thread_rng() are ChaCha12 seeded from
getrandom(2). What changes is blast radius — F-10's Low rating rested on
'per-app credentials rather than the master key hierarchy', which does not
survive the true scope. Re-rated Medium as F-10a.
Records why the original audit missed it: F-10 was reached by tracing the
manifest-secrets path, and no step enumerated defaulted-RNG use across the
crate independently of the traced paths.
F-10's original text is left unedited so the correction is auditable rather
than retroactive. R-13 superseded by R-16; tracker item replaced.
Adds KEY-05 to Phase 10: sealed allowlist trait at key-gen seams, clippy
disallowed-methods ban (compile-time, CI-enforced), cargo-deny on duplicate
rand majors, degenerate-entropy runtime check, persisted CSPRNG-readiness
verdict. Also retires the false 'impl CryptoRng for CountingRng' at
seed.rs:656.
Records the user's execution gate: Phase 10 does not start until the
concurrent Phase 1 agent is finished and their changes are synced. KEY-05 is
unplanned — the existing 5 plans predate it and a 6th is required.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Adds F-13 (High) to the audit: the BIP-84 account PRIVATE key is imported
into Bitcoin Core (bitcoin.rs:203 disable_private_keys=false, :229-231
wpkh(xprv/...)), so the spending key is persisted outside the Argon2
envelope in a wallet with an empty passphrase; the descriptors also carry
no [fingerprint/derivation] key origin, so no hardware signer could ever
use them. Found by tracing secret class (1) end-to-end
- Fills the Remediation Backlog: R-00..R-15, prioritised severity x effort,
each with the finding it closes, files, effort, and hardware gating; plus
an explicit "not implemented here, and why" section
- Records ARCHY-1 as APPLIED with the exact test evidence and an honest note
that making the source explicit removes a future failure mode rather than
repairing a past one
- Wires the resulting open items into docs/UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md in its
existing tier/checkbox format: Tier 0 (cargo audit/deny CI, ceremony
mnemonic input, a five-item hygiene batch, secrets.rs OsRng), Tier 1 (ISO
fail-open first-boot secrets, Argon2 vs ADR-005, the on-node checklist),
Tier 2 (the Critical unauthenticated seed RPCs, PSBT Phase 1, PSBT phases
2-7, seed-RPC transport confinement)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Watch-only descriptor wallets, external signers, multisig, air-gap transport
and honest LND limits — a spec a future /gsd-plan-phase can consume.
- Names the current gap: bitcoin.rs:203 passes disable_private_keys=false and
bitcoin.rs:229-231 imports wpkh(xprv/...), so Core holds the BIP-84 account
PRIVATE key today. Closing that is Phase 1 and unblocks everything else
- Full Core RPC loop with wallet- vs node-scoped RPCs; analyzepsbt drives UI
- Tier 1 single-sig with mandatory [fingerprint/derivation] key origin; Tier 2
wsh(sortedmulti) on BIP-48; taproot/MuSig2 deferred as UNVERIFIED
- BC-UR v2 primary (fountain-coded, degrades gracefully), BBQr for Coldcard,
file fallback always; animated multi-frame is mandatory, not optional
- LND: channel/revocation/HTLC keys CANNOT be air-gapped; funding tx must
NEVER be self-broadcast (type-level refusal, not a boolean)
- On-chain (PSBT-protectable) vs lightning (necessarily hot) split, with the
exact user-facing sentence the UI must use
- Hot wallet kept as explicitly-secondary with server-enforced limits; safe
path is the DEFAULT, per T1's survivors
- Migration section refuses to over-alarm: the audit found no entropy defect,
so no Archipelago user needs to rotate a seed
- 7 phases with dependencies, candidate requirements, and hardware gating
- Answers two open items in docs/hardware-signer-design.md
- Flags bitcoin-knots:latest as an unpinned tag vs ADR-009
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Evidence-backed audit of every secret class against the real tree, prompted
by the 2026-07-30 Coinkite COLDCARD entropy incident.
- No Coldcard-class entropy defect exists: no non-cryptographic PRNG, no
clock-seeded key, no Math.random() in any browser key path
- F-01 (Critical, NOT entropy): seed.generate/seed.restore are unauthenticated,
unrated, and unconditionally overwrite a live node's Ed25519/Nostr/FIPS keys
- F-02 [ARCHY-1] CONFIRMED: mnemonic entropy source is a bip39 transitive
default, not a call-site argument — the exact structural shape of T1
- F-03 (High) [ARCHY-3]: first-boot TLS/SSH regeneration is fail-open and its
completion marker is set even on failure, over a fleet-shared cached rootfs
- ARCHY-2 confirmed good; ARCHY-5 refuted as a present defect (32 | 256)
- Argon2::default() is 19MiB/t=2, not ADR-005's stated 64MB/3
- Corrects the scoping assumption that image-recipe/_archived/ is dead: it is
the live ISO builder, exec'd by build-debian-iso.sh
- Adds a "What we do right" section and an UNVERIFIED on-node checklist
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
