fix(ecash): fetch Minibits claims from Nostr relays, not the dead /claim REST poll

Confirmed live 2026-09-08 against three real Lightning payments to a
registered @minibits.cash address: POST /claim (the only claim source
claim_and_redeem checked) always returned an empty array, no matter
how long or how often it was polled. Independently queried
wss://relay.minibits.cash and found all three payments sitting there
as NIP-04-encrypted kind-4 DMs, #p-tagged to the wallet's own Nostr
pubkey and authored by the Minibits service key — that is the actual
delivery channel for a payment made to the address, and this module
never looked at it.

fetch_relay_dms queries CLAIM_RELAY_URLS (the service's own relay plus
two public fallbacks) for kind-4 events tagged to our pubkey, feeding
matching content into the existing pending_claims retry pipeline
unchanged. A new last_dm_seen_at watermark stops the same (immutable,
never-expiring) relay event from being re-fetched and re-attempted on
every poll. The REST /claim call stays in place alongside it in case
it serves some other payment path — this only adds the missing one.

fix(ecash): trim stray whitespace before parsing a cashuA/cashuB token

Once the relay fix above surfaced the three real payments, all three
failed to redeem with "Invalid base64 in cashuB token" — the decrypted
NIP-04 content had a trailing space after the base64 payload (Minibits'
own encoding), which every base64 alphabet in decode_token_base64
rejects outright. CashuToken::deserialize now trims the whole token
string before touching the "cashuA"/"cashuB" prefix or payload. This is
a general robustness fix, not just a Minibits workaround — the same
stray-whitespace failure could hit a hand-pasted token from a clipboard
copy just as easily.

Both fixes verified end-to-end against production: all three stuck
payments (20 + 5 + 20 = 45 sats) redeemed cleanly on the first poll
after deploying this build to archy-x250-pa3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EawZPP9iidXj6Tvg3EpG3a

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## v1.8.11-alpha (2026-09-07)
+
+- **Cuprate now syncs without burning a core for days.** The app's shipped config now enables Cuprate's checkpoint-backed `fast_sync` path, raises the database cache to 8 GiB, and gives the container a 10 GiB memory limit so the cache has real headroom. A live comparison that motivated the change saw the affected node sit around 45% CPU while the corrected config held near low single digits at the same chain height and block rate. The restricted RPC remains fronted through the safe app gate/Tor path.
+
+- **OpenWrt Gateway setup is documented from a real install, and two setup bugs are fixed.** The new guide walks a node operator through flashing a GL.iNet AX3000 to stock OpenWrt, pairing it with Archipelago, and installing TollGate pay-as-you-go WiFi. The installer now finds `opkg`/`apk` through the router's actual `PATH` instead of assuming `/usr/bin`, the UI no longer sends an empty password over a saved router connection, and the pinned TollGate package moves to `v0.5.0` with a native `.apk` install path where upstream provides one.
+
+- **Release publishing now checks the public Gitea download links before a manifest goes live.** The publisher already fetched every artifact back and verified its size and SHA-256; this release adds a second guard for the release page itself, so a bad Gitea `ROOT_URL` or proxy setting cannot publish working files behind broken public HTTPS download links.
+
 ## v1.8.10-alpha (2026-09-02)
 
 - **Lightning sends work again — v1.8.9's payment switch lost the fee budget.** Moving payments to LND 0.21's supported route (Router.SendPaymentV2) shipped without a fee limit, and the v2 API treats an absent limit as **zero allowed fees**: every real route carries a routing fee, so the pathfinder rejected them all and the wallet answered "No route to the recipient" on every send — all day, on healthy channels with plenty of liquidity. The router debug log made it unambiguous (`fee_limit=0 mSAT` on every failing wallet payment; the same payment succeeded by hand the moment a fee limit was set). Payments now carry lncli's default budget (the payment amount), the wallet's amount handling for zero-value invoices is preserved, and a unit test pins the limit can never be zero again.

apps/cuprate/manifest.yml

@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ app:
 
   resources:
     cpu_limit: 0
-    memory_limit: 4Gi
+    # Raised from 4Gi alongside target_max_memory below (see files[] comment)
+    # — 2026-09-03 incident: a 4Gi/3GB-cache config starved
+    # cuprated's DB cache into constant eviction/flush, driving 45% sustained
+    # CPU and ~595GB/24h of block I/O on a fully-synced node. 10Gi leaves
+    # headroom above the 8GiB cache for the process itself.
+    memory_limit: 10Gi
     disk_limit: 300Gi
 
   security:
@@ -82,17 +87,21 @@ app:
     # bind without an explicit i_know_what_im_doing override.
     # Restricted RPC: Monero's own purpose-built safe-for-public subset —
     # what wallets use when connecting to a "remote node". Disabled by
-    # cuprated's own default; enabled via files[] below. A dashboard login
+    # cuprated's own default; enabled via files[] below. `open`, not `gated`:
-    # would break wallet clients connecting programmatically, same
+    # the gate still takes the port over (loopback pin, external binds,
-    # reasoning as electrumx's port. The daemon still uses its canonical
+    # fronts the Tor onion) but skips the dashboard login challenge, same
-    # container port 18089, but Penpot already owns host port 18089, so this
+    # reasoning as electrumx's port — wallet clients (Feather,
-    # maps the public host port to the free 18090 instead.
+    # monero-wallet-rpc, GUI) speak plain HTTP JSON-RPC programmatically and
+    # cannot complete a browser login or hold a session cookie. The daemon
+    # still uses its canonical container port 18089, but Penpot already owns
+    # host port 18089, so this maps the public host port to the free 18090
+    # instead.
     - host: 18090
       container: 18089
       protocol: tcp
-      auth: none
+      auth: open
       auth_rationale: >-
-        Monero restricted RPC — the subset upstream considers safe for public/remote-node use. Wallets (Feather, monero-wallet-rpc, GUI) connect directly over plain HTTP JSON-RPC and cannot hold a dashboard session cookie.
+        Monero restricted RPC — the subset upstream considers safe for public/remote-node use. Wallets (Feather, monero-wallet-rpc, GUI) connect directly over plain HTTP JSON-RPC and cannot complete a browser login or hold a dashboard session cookie.
 
   volumes:
     - type: bind
@@ -103,11 +112,23 @@ app:
   # Settings that need to differ from cuprated's own documented defaults
   # (verified against `cuprated --generate-config` and `--dry-run` locally,
   # 2026-08-21):
+  #   - fast_sync: cuprated's own default is false, which performs full
+  #     cryptographic verification (ring signatures + RandomX PoW) on every
+  #     incoming block instead of trusting checkpointed history. Root-caused
+  #     2026-09-03 as the dominant cause of a sustained 45% CPU node,
+  #     vs. 2.8% on a reference node with fast_sync = true — same chain height, same
+  #     block rate. Set explicitly rather than relying on the binary
+  #     default so fresh deploys don't silently regress into full-verify.
   #   - target_max_memory: cuprated's own default auto-detects total *host*
   #     RAM via sysinfo, which inside a memory-limited container would let
   #     it size caches far past what resources.memory_limit above actually
   #     grants — same class of problem bitcoin-knots' -dbcache sizing
-  #     comment addresses. Set explicitly, comfortably under the 4Gi limit.
+  #     comment addresses. Set explicitly, comfortably under the 10Gi limit.
+  #     Previously 3000000000 (~2.8GiB); that starved the DB cache and
+  #     forced constant eviction/flush (595GB/24h block I/O on a node just
+  #     appending ~2MB blocks every 2 minutes) — raised to 8GiB, matching
+  #     the healthy reference node, and
+  #     resources.memory_limit above raised in step to keep headroom above it.
   #   - rpc.restricted.enable: cuprated ships this off by default; flip on
   #     so the auth:none host port above actually serves something instead
   #     of refusing every connection. port stays at its documented default
@@ -128,21 +149,21 @@ app:
   #   - tracing.stdout.level / tracing.file.{level,max_log_files}: an
   #     operator reading Cuprated.toml on disk should be able to see and
   #     tune the log level directly instead of the file silently omitting
-  #     the whole [tracing] table (verified live on amishparadise
+  #     the whole [tracing] table (verified live on the affected node
   #     2026-09-01: the deployed file had no [tracing] section at all, and
   #     the level was only discoverable by running `cuprated
   #     --generate-config` and diffing). file.level is set to "info", NOT
   #     cuprated's own raw default of "debug" — matches the reference dev
-  #     config this app was built and tested against
+  #     config this app was built and tested against (verified 2026-09-01),
-  #     (ssmithx@archy-dev-pa:/home/ssmithx/cuprate/Cuprated.toml,
+  #     which deliberately runs file logging quieter
-  #     verified 2026-09-01), which deliberately runs file logging quieter
   #     than the binary default. max_log_files similarly follows that
   #     reference (14, not the binary default of 7).
   files:
     - path: /var/lib/archipelago/cuprate/Cuprated.toml
       content: |
         network = "Mainnet"
-        target_max_memory = 3000000000
+        fast_sync = true
+        target_max_memory = 8589934592
 
         [rpc.restricted]
         enable = true

core/Cargo.lock

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "archipelago"
-version = "1.8.10-alpha"
+version = "1.8.11-alpha"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "archipelago-container",

core/archipelago/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "archipelago"
-version = "1.8.10-alpha"
+version = "1.8.11-alpha"
 edition = "2021"
 license.workspace = true
 description = "Archipelago Bitcoin Node OS - Native backend"
@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ rustls-pemfile = "1.0"
 webpki = { package = "rustls-webpki", version = "0.101" }
 reqwest = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["json", "socks", "rustls-tls", "stream"] }
 
-# Nostr (node discovery + NIP-44 encrypted peer handshake)
+# Nostr (node discovery + NIP-44 encrypted peer handshake).
-nostr-sdk = { version = "0.44", features = ["nip04", "nip44"] }
+# nip06: NIP-06 key derivation for the Minibits @minibits.cash profile flow.
+nostr-sdk = { version = "0.44", features = ["nip04", "nip06", "nip44"] }
 
 # Backup encryption (DID identity export) + TOTP 2FA encryption
 argon2 = "0.5.3"

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs

@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             "wallet.ecash-network" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_network().await,
             "wallet.ecash-set-network" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_set_network(params).await,
             "wallet.ecash-seed-status" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_seed_status().await,
+            "wallet.ecash-lnaddress" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_lnaddress().await,
+            "wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_lnaddress_claim().await,
             "wallet.ecash-seed-reveal" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_seed_reveal(params).await,
             "wallet.ecash-restore" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_restore(params).await,
             "wallet.ecash-seed-import" => self.handle_wallet_ecash_seed_import(params).await,

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/wallet.rs

@@ -421,6 +421,30 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         }))
     }
 
+    /// `wallet.ecash-lnaddress` — the node's Minibits Lightning address
+    /// (`<name>@minibits.cash`, LUD-16), derived from and authenticated by the
+    /// ecash wallet's own seed. Registers the profile on first use; safe to call
+    /// on every open of the Cashu receive screen (it is idempotent).
+    pub(super) async fn handle_wallet_ecash_lnaddress(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        crate::wallet::minibits::lnaddress(&self.config.data_dir).await
+    }
+
+    /// `wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim` — redeem any Lightning payments that
+    /// arrived on the node's Minibits address as ecash. Returns the sats swept in
+    /// (0 when nothing was waiting), so the UI can refresh its balance.
+    /// `failed_count` is non-zero when a payment was fetched (and so already
+    /// consumed server-side) but couldn't be redeemed yet — it stays queued
+    /// and is retried automatically, but the UI should tell the operator
+    /// rather than let it be a silent, unbounded wait.
+    pub(super) async fn handle_wallet_ecash_lnaddress_claim(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        let outcome = crate::wallet::minibits::claim_and_redeem(&self.config.data_dir).await?;
+        Ok(serde_json::json!({
+            "claimed_count": outcome.claimed_count,
+            "received_sats": outcome.received_sats,
+            "failed_count": outcome.failed_count,
+        }))
+    }
+
     pub(super) async fn handle_wallet_networking_profits(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
         let summary = profits::get_networking_profits(&self.config.data_dir).await?;
         Ok(serde_json::json!({

core/archipelago/src/wallet/cashu.rs

@@ -207,7 +207,15 @@ impl CashuToken {
     }
 
     /// Decode a cashuA (V3 JSON) or cashuB (V4 CBOR) token string.
+    ///
+    /// Trims surrounding whitespace first: a token can arrive with stray
+    /// leading/trailing whitespace from a clipboard paste, or (confirmed
+    /// live, 2026-09-08) from Minibits' own NIP-04 claim-DM content, which
+    /// has a trailing space after the base64 — none of the base64 alphabets
+    /// in `decode_token_base64` tolerate that, so an otherwise-valid token
+    /// would hard-fail with "Invalid base64" instead of parsing.
     pub fn deserialize(token_str: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+        let token_str = token_str.trim();
         if let Some(payload) = token_str.strip_prefix(CASHU_B_PREFIX) {
             return Self::deserialize_v4(payload);
         }
@@ -508,6 +516,45 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(decoded.memo, Some("test token".to_string()));
     }
 
+    /// Regression guard (2026-09-08): a real Minibits claim DM decrypted to
+    /// a cashuB token with a trailing space after the base64 payload, which
+    /// made every base64 alphabet in `decode_token_base64` reject it as
+    /// invalid — three real payments got stuck retrying forever with
+    /// "Invalid base64 in cashuB token" until `deserialize` started
+    /// trimming the whole string first. Whitespace can show up around a
+    /// token from more than one source (clipboard paste included), so this
+    /// covers cashuA too, and leading as well as trailing.
+    #[test]
+    fn deserialize_trims_stray_whitespace() {
+        let token = CashuToken {
+            token: vec![TokenEntry {
+                mint: "http://127.0.0.1:8175".to_string(),
+                proofs: vec![Proof {
+                    amount: 8,
+                    id: "009a1f293253e41e".to_string(),
+                    secret: "abcdef1234567890".to_string(),
+                    c: "02a9acc1e48c25eeeb9289b5031cc57da9fe72f3fe2861d94ec4da0e7f6c2b4e24"
+                        .to_string(),
+                }],
+            }],
+            memo: None,
+            unit: Some("sat".to_string()),
+        };
+        let encoded = token.serialize().unwrap();
+        assert!(encoded.starts_with("cashuA"));
+
+        for wrapped in [
+            format!("{encoded} "),
+            format!(" {encoded}"),
+            format!(" {encoded}\n"),
+            format!("{encoded}\t"),
+        ] {
+            let decoded = CashuToken::deserialize(&wrapped)
+                .unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("failed on {wrapped:?}: {e}"));
+            assert_eq!(decoded.total_amount(), 8);
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_total_amount_multi_proof() {
         let token = CashuToken {

core/archipelago/src/wallet/minibits.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,902 @@
+//! The Minibits `@minibits.cash` Lightning address (LUD-16) for the node's
+//! ecash wallet.
+//!
+//! ## Why this exists next to the mint client
+//!
+//! The ecash wallet already talks to `mint.minibits.cash` as a plain Cashu
+//! mint (`wallet::mint_client`): mint/melt quotes, swap, receive. That gives the
+//! node ecash *from* Minibits, but not a *name* at Minibits. A human-readable
+//! Lightning address like `braveharbor42@minibits.cash` is a separate service —
+//! the Minibits profile API at `api.minibits.cash/v3` — and it is what lets any
+//! Lightning wallet pay this node by typing an address, with the payment landing
+//! as ecash.
+//!
+//! ## Identity: the ecash wallet *is* the Minibits wallet
+//!
+//! Minibits ties an address to a wallet by `seedHash`, and authenticates the
+//! wallet with a NIP-06 Nostr keypair. Both come from the *existing* NUT-13
+//! ecash phrase (`wallet::nut13`), so there is no second secret to back up:
+//!
+//! - `seedHash = sha256(mnemonic.to_seed(""))` — the exact bytes the Minibits
+//!   app hashes, so restoring the same phrase in the Minibits app recovers the
+//!   same address (and vice-versa).
+//! - Nostr keys via NIP-06 at `m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0`. `nostr_sdk::Keys::from_mnemonic`
+//!   uses that path with an empty BIP-39 passphrase — byte-for-byte the derivation
+//!   the Minibits app (nostr-tools `accountFromSeedWords`) does, verified against
+//!   the crate's own NIP-06 test vector.
+//!
+//! ## Flow (all verified against the live v3 API)
+//!
+//! 1. `POST /auth/challenge {pubkey}` → `{challenge, createdAt}`.
+//! 2. Sign a NIP-42 kind-22242 event (`relay` + `challenge` tags, server's
+//!    `createdAt`) with the Nostr key.
+//! 3. `POST /auth/verify {pubkey, challenge, signature}` → JWT access token.
+//! 4. `POST /profile {walletId, seedHash}` → the assigned `lud16`/`nip05`.
+//!    Idempotent per pubkey: re-registering returns the existing address.
+//! 5. `POST /claim {seedHash}` → NIP-04-encrypted Cashu tokens for Lightning
+//!    payments sent to the address; decrypt with the Nostr key + the server's
+//!    Nostr pubkey, then redeem through `ecash::receive_token`.
+//!
+//! Only runs on the mainnet ecash network — Minibits is a mainnet service, and a
+//! testnet node must not register a profile or hit the production API.
+//!
+//! ## A claim can't be re-fetched — so nothing gets dropped
+//!
+//! `/claim` consumes a payment server-side the instant it's returned. A local
+//! failure after that point (mint briefly unreachable, a stale cached server
+//! key, a crash mid-loop) must not silently lose the coins, so every fetched
+//! token is persisted to `MinibitsState::pending_claims` *before* decrypt/
+//! redeem is attempted, and stays there — retried on every later poll — until
+//! it succeeds. `ClaimOutcome::failed_count` reports how many are still
+//! stuck so the caller can surface it instead of it being a log-only event.
+//! Separately, `ensure_mint_accepted` keeps the Minibits mint on the node's
+//! accepted-mints allow-list: the address is inherently backed by that one
+//! mint, so an operator-edited allow-list must never be able to cause this
+//! same kind of loss via `receive_token`'s mint check.
+
+use super::ecash::{self, EcashNetwork};
+use super::nut13;
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use base64::Engine;
+use nostr_sdk::nips::{nip04, nip06::FromMnemonic};
+use nostr_sdk::{Client, EventBuilder, Filter, Kind, RelayUrl, Tag, TagKind, Timestamp, ToBech32};
+use rand::seq::SliceRandom;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::path::Path;
+use tokio::fs;
+use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
+
+/// Minibits profile/LNURL API. Confirmed live: `/v3/auth/challenge`,
+/// `/v3/profile`, `/v3/claim` (the older `/v2` host no longer serves profiles).
+const API_BASE: &str = "https://api.minibits.cash/v3";
+/// The relay named in the NIP-42 auth event. Matches the value the Minibits app
+/// sends and the relay the service publishes in its NIP-05 record.
+const RELAY_URL: &str = "wss://relay.minibits.cash";
+/// Relays to check for incoming claim DMs (see `fetch_relay_dms`). Confirmed
+/// live 2026-09-08: real Lightning payments to a `@minibits.cash` address are
+/// delivered as a NIP-04 DM (kind 4, `#p`-tagged to the wallet's pubkey)
+/// published to relays — *not* surfaced by `POST /claim`, which was the only
+/// source this module fetched from until that gap stranded three real
+/// payments. `RELAY_URL` first (it's the service's own relay and the one
+/// most likely to have them), plus two large public relays as a fallback in
+/// case that relay is ever unreachable or Minibits adds others.
+const CLAIM_RELAY_URLS: &[&str] = &[RELAY_URL, "wss://relay.damus.io", "wss://nos.lol"];
+/// NIP-42 client authentication event kind.
+const AUTH_KIND: u16 = 22242;
+/// The Minibits service Nostr pubkey that NIP-04-encrypts claimed tokens. Used
+/// only as a fallback: the authoritative value is read from the address's own
+/// LUD-16 metadata (`nostrPubkey`) at claim time, so a Minibits key rotation
+/// does not strand claims.
+const FALLBACK_SERVER_NOSTR_PUBKEY: &str =
+    "beeb48407a6f087ea8f76dc384a5d88c67ced9bd9fb0cdba90930210df3d92e7";
+/// Re-authenticate this long before the JWT actually expires, so a claim poll
+/// never races the expiry boundary.
+const TOKEN_EXPIRY_SKEP_SECS: i64 = 120;
+
+const STATE_FILE: &str = "wallet/minibits.json";
+
+/// Small word lists for the generated address name. Uniqueness comes from the
+/// numeric suffix plus the retry-on-collision below — the Minibits server rejects
+/// a name already taken by another wallet and we simply draw another, so these do
+/// not need to be exhaustive (the Minibits app ships lists hundreds long).
+const ADJECTIVES: &[&str] = &[
+    "calm", "brave", "quiet", "solar", "rapid", "noble", "lunar", "vivid", "amber", "crisp",
+    "eager", "fancy", "gentle", "happy", "jolly", "keen", "lucky", "mellow", "nimble", "proud",
+    "quick", "rusty", "sunny", "tidy", "urban", "vital", "warm", "zesty", "bold", "clever",
+    "daring", "epic", "fiery", "grand", "humble", "iron", "merry", "polar", "sleek", "wild",
+];
+const NOUNS: &[&str] = &[
+    "harbor", "meadow", "canyon", "summit", "river", "forest", "island", "comet", "nebula",
+    "orbit", "quartz", "maple", "willow", "falcon", "otter", "badger", "salmon", "crane",
+    "ridge", "creek", "glade", "grove", "prairie", "delta", "cobalt", "onyx", "topaz", "ember",
+    "anchor", "lantern", "beacon", "cabin", "drift", "signal", "thunder", "zephyr", "marble",
+    "pebble", "sequoia", "tundra",
+];
+
+/// Persistent state for the node's Minibits address.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct MinibitsState {
+    /// The chosen wallet name (the `name` in `name@minibits.cash`).
+    pub wallet_id: String,
+    /// The full LUD-16 Lightning address, e.g. `braveharbor42@minibits.cash`.
+    pub lud16: String,
+    /// NIP-05 address (Minibits sets this equal to `lud16`).
+    pub nip05: String,
+    /// This node's NIP-06 Nostr pubkey (hex) the profile is bound to.
+    pub nostr_pubkey: String,
+    /// `sha256(seed)` — the wallet identifier Minibits keys claims on.
+    pub seed_hash: String,
+    /// Cached JWT access token.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub access_token: String,
+    /// Access-token expiry (unix seconds); 0 when unknown/expired.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub access_expires: i64,
+    /// Server Nostr pubkey used to decrypt claims, discovered from LUD-16.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub server_nostr_pubkey: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub created_at: String,
+    /// Raw NIP-04-encrypted claim tokens fetched from `/claim` but not yet
+    /// successfully redeemed. A claim is consumed server-side the instant
+    /// `/claim` returns it, so it is stashed here *before* decrypt/redeem is
+    /// attempted — a local failure (mint briefly down, bad cached server key,
+    /// process crash mid-loop) then retries next poll instead of losing the
+    /// coins outright.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub pending_claims: Vec<String>,
+    /// Unix timestamp of the newest Nostr DM we've already pulled into
+    /// `pending_claims` (see `fetch_relay_dms`). Nostr events never expire
+    /// from relays, so without this watermark every poll would re-fetch and
+    /// re-attempt every claim ever sent — harmless (the mint rejects an
+    /// already-spent token) but wasteful and noisy.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub last_dm_seen_at: u64,
+}
+
+/// A fresh Nostr keypair + seedHash derived from the node's ecash phrase.
+struct MinibitsIdentity {
+    keys: nostr_sdk::Keys,
+    seed_hash: String,
+}
+
+/// Derive the Minibits identity (NIP-06 Nostr keys + seedHash) from the node's
+/// ecash mnemonic. Both are deterministic, so the address and claims are
+/// recoverable from the same 24 words the ecash already lives on.
+fn derive_identity(phrase: &str, seed: &[u8; 64]) -> Result<MinibitsIdentity> {
+    let keys = nostr_sdk::Keys::from_mnemonic(phrase, None::<&str>)
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("NIP-06 derivation failed: {e}"))?;
+    let seed_hash = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(seed));
+    Ok(MinibitsIdentity { keys, seed_hash })
+}
+
+/// A Minibits profile record — the fields we read off every profile response.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+struct ProfileRecord {
+    #[serde(rename = "walletId")]
+    wallet_id: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    nip05: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    lud16: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pubkey: String,
+}
+
+/// Turn a non-2xx Minibits response into a readable error, surfacing the
+/// server's `error.name`/`error.message` when present.
+fn minibits_error(status: reqwest::StatusCode, body: &str) -> anyhow::Error {
+    if let Ok(v) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(body) {
+        if let Some(err) = v.get("error") {
+            let name = err.get("name").and_then(|n| n.as_str()).unwrap_or("ERROR");
+            let msg = err.get("message").and_then(|m| m.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
+            return anyhow!("Minibits API error {status}: {name} {msg}");
+        }
+    }
+    anyhow!(
+        "Minibits API error {status}: {}",
+        &body[..body.len().min(180)]
+    )
+}
+
+fn state_path(data_dir: &Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
+    data_dir.join(STATE_FILE)
+}
+
+async fn load_state(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<Option<MinibitsState>> {
+    let path = state_path(data_dir);
+    match fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
+        Ok(s) if s.trim().is_empty() => Ok(None),
+        Ok(s) => match serde_json::from_str::<MinibitsState>(&s) {
+            Ok(st) if st.wallet_id.is_empty() => Ok(None),
+            Ok(st) => Ok(Some(st)),
+            // Unlike the accepted-mints file, nothing here is a user-editable
+            // security setting — it's a pure mirror of state Minibits already
+            // holds server-side, and registration is idempotent per pubkey
+            // (§ module docs), so re-registering after a corrupt/truncated
+            // read always recovers the *same* address. A node whose disk
+            // filled up mid-write (observed on archy-x250-pa3, 2026-09-08:
+            // this file truncated to 0 bytes) must self-heal on the next open
+            // rather than permanently show "Lightning address unavailable".
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(
+                    "Minibits: {} is corrupt/unreadable ({e}); treating as no profile yet and re-registering",
+                    path.display()
+                );
+                Ok(None)
+            }
+        },
+        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(None),
+        Err(e) => Err(e).with_context(|| format!("Failed to read {}", path.display())),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Write the state file 0600 — it holds a bearer JWT. Same sensitivity class as
+/// the ecash files it sits beside, so it gets the same owner-only mode.
+async fn save_state(data_dir: &Path, state: &MinibitsState) -> Result<()> {
+    let path = state_path(data_dir);
+    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
+        fs::create_dir_all(parent)
+            .await
+            .context("Failed to create the wallet directory")?;
+    }
+    let content = serde_json::to_string_pretty(state)
+        .context("Failed to serialize the Minibits profile")?;
+    fs::write(&path, content)
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("Failed to write {}", path.display()))?;
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| format!("Failed to chmod 0600 {}", path.display()))?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Read the `exp` claim (unix seconds) from a JWT without verifying it — the
+/// token comes straight from Minibits over TLS; we only use the expiry to decide
+/// when to refresh.
+fn jwt_expiry(token: &str) -> Option<i64> {
+    let payload = token.split('.').nth(1)?;
+    let bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
+        .decode(payload)
+        .ok()?;
+    let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).ok()?;
+    v.get("exp")?.as_i64()
+}
+
+/// Run the NIP-42 challenge/verify dance and return the access token plus its
+/// expiry. Idempotent and cheap enough to redo whenever the cached token lapses.
+async fn authenticate(
+    client: &reqwest::Client,
+    keys: &nostr_sdk::Keys,
+) -> Result<(String, i64)> {
+    let ch: serde_json::Value = client
+        .post(format!("{API_BASE}/auth/challenge"))
+        .json(&serde_json::json!({ "pubkey": keys.public_key().to_hex() }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .context("Minibits auth challenge request failed")?
+        .error_for_status()
+        .context("Minibits auth challenge rejected")?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("Minibits auth challenge was not JSON")?;
+
+    let challenge = ch["challenge"]
+        .as_str()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Minibits challenge response missing 'challenge'"))?
+        .to_string();
+    let created_at = ch["createdAt"]
+        .as_u64()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Minibits challenge response missing 'createdAt'"))?;
+
+    // Sign a NIP-42 auth event, stamping the server's own createdAt so the
+    // signature lines up with the challenge it was issued for.
+    let unsigned = EventBuilder::new(Kind::from(AUTH_KIND), "")
+        .tag(Tag::relay(
+            RelayUrl::parse(RELAY_URL).context("Invalid Minibits relay URL")?,
+        ))
+        .tag(Tag::custom(
+            TagKind::custom("challenge"),
+            vec![challenge.clone()],
+        ))
+        .custom_created_at(Timestamp::from(created_at))
+        .build(keys.public_key());
+    let signed = unsigned
+        .sign_with_keys(keys)
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("Failed to sign the Minibits auth challenge: {e}"))?;
+
+    let tok: serde_json::Value = client
+        .post(format!("{API_BASE}/auth/verify"))
+        .json(&serde_json::json!({
+            "pubkey": keys.public_key().to_hex(),
+            "challenge": challenge,
+            "signature": hex::encode(signed.sig.serialize()),
+        }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .context("Minibits auth verify request failed")?
+        .error_for_status()
+        .context("Minibits auth verify rejected (bad challenge signature)")?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("Minibits auth verify was not JSON")?;
+
+    let access = tok["accessToken"]
+        .as_str()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Minibits verify response missing 'accessToken'"))?
+        .to_string();
+    let expires = jwt_expiry(&access).unwrap_or_else(|| {
+        chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() + 3600 // conservative fallback
+    });
+    Ok((access, expires))
+}
+
+/// True when the cached access token is missing or about to lapse.
+fn token_is_stale(state: &MinibitsState) -> bool {
+    let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
+    state.access_token.is_empty() || now + TOKEN_EXPIRY_SKEP_SECS >= state.access_expires
+}
+
+/// Ensure we hold a valid access token, re-authenticating as needed and folding
+/// the fresh token back into `state` (which the caller persists).
+async fn ensure_token(
+    client: &reqwest::Client,
+    state: &mut MinibitsState,
+    keys: &nostr_sdk::Keys,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    if token_is_stale(state) {
+        let (access, expires) = authenticate(client, keys).await?;
+        state.access_token = access;
+        state.access_expires = expires;
+        debug!("Minibits: authenticated (token valid to {})", expires);
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Draw a fresh readable wallet name, Minibits-style: adjective + noun + number.
+fn generate_wallet_id() -> String {
+    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+    let adj = ADJECTIVES.choose(&mut rng).copied().unwrap_or("quiet");
+    let noun = NOUNS.choose(&mut rng).copied().unwrap_or("harbor");
+    let num = rand::Rng::gen_range(&mut rng, 1..=999);
+    format!("{adj}{noun}{num}")
+}
+
+/// Register the profile, returning the assigned address. Retries with a new name
+/// a handful of times if the generated name is already taken by another wallet.
+async fn register_profile(
+    client: &reqwest::Client,
+    access: &str,
+    seed_hash: &str,
+) -> Result<ProfileRecord> {
+    let mut last_err = None;
+    for attempt in 0..6 {
+        let wallet_id = generate_wallet_id();
+        let resp = client
+            .post(format!("{API_BASE}/profile"))
+            .bearer_auth(access)
+            .json(&serde_json::json!({ "walletId": wallet_id, "seedHash": seed_hash }))
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .context("Minibits profile registration request failed")?;
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let body = resp
+            .text()
+            .await
+            .context("Minibits profile response body read failed")?;
+        if status.is_success() {
+            let rec: ProfileRecord = serde_json::from_str(&body)
+                .context("Minibits profile response was not the expected shape")?;
+            return Ok(rec);
+        }
+        // Name collision → draw another. Anything else is fatal.
+        let is_taken = body.contains("ALREADY_EXISTS") || body.contains("already");
+        if is_taken {
+            warn!("Minibits name '{wallet_id}' taken, retrying (attempt {attempt})");
+            last_err = Some(minibits_error(status, &body));
+            continue;
+        }
+        return Err(minibits_error(status, &body));
+    }
+    Err(last_err.unwrap_or_else(|| anyhow!("Could not register a free Minibits name")))
+}
+
+/// Fetch the LUD-16 metadata for our own address and read the service's
+/// `nostrPubkey` — the key that NIP-04-encrypts claimed tokens.
+async fn discover_server_nostr_pubkey(
+    client: &reqwest::Client,
+    lud16: &str,
+) -> Result<String> {
+    let (name, domain) = lud16
+        .split_once('@')
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Malformed Minibits address '{lud16}'"))?;
+    let url = format!("https://{domain}/.well-known/lnurlp/{name}");
+    let md: serde_json::Value = client
+        .get(&url)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .context("Minibits LUD-16 metadata request failed")?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("Minibits LUD-16 metadata was not JSON")?;
+    md.get("nostrPubkey")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+        .map(|s| s.to_string())
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("Minibits LUD-16 metadata missing 'nostrPubkey'"))
+}
+
+/// Load the ecash phrase, or establish it from the node master seed when this
+/// node has not materialised one yet — but never fail an address request just
+/// because a phrase is not on disk; report that clearly instead.
+async fn ecash_phrase(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<(String, [u8; 64])> {
+    let seed = nut13::load_seed(data_dir)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("The ecash wallet has no seed yet — restore or reveal it first"))?;
+    Ok((seed.phrase(), seed.seed_bytes()))
+}
+
+/// Get (registering on first use) the node's Minibits Lightning address.
+///
+/// On mainnet this registers a profile with the Minibits server the first time
+/// and caches it in `wallet/minibits.json`; later calls return the cached address
+/// and refresh the access token as needed. Registration is idempotent per pubkey,
+/// so a node that restores the same ecash phrase recovers the same address.
+pub async fn lnaddress(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+    let network = ecash::load_network(data_dir).await;
+    if network == EcashNetwork::Testnet {
+        return Err(anyhow!(
+            "Minibits Lightning addresses are mainnet-only — switch the ecash network to mainnet to set one up"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(20))
+        .build()
+        .context("Failed to build the Minibits HTTP client")?;
+
+    let (phrase, seed) = ecash_phrase(data_dir).await?;
+    let identity = derive_identity(&phrase, &seed)?;
+
+    let mut state = match load_state(data_dir).await? {
+        Some(st) => st,
+        None => {
+            info!("Minibits: no profile yet, registering a new @minibits.cash address");
+            let (access, expires) = authenticate(&client, &identity.keys).await?;
+            let rec = register_profile(&client, &access, &identity.seed_hash).await?;
+            MinibitsState {
+                wallet_id: rec.wallet_id.clone(),
+                lud16: rec
+                    .lud16
+                    .clone()
+                    .unwrap_or_else(|| format!("{}@minibits.cash", rec.wallet_id)),
+                nip05: rec.nip05.clone(),
+                nostr_pubkey: rec.pubkey.clone(),
+                seed_hash: identity.seed_hash.clone(),
+                access_token: access,
+                access_expires: expires,
+                server_nostr_pubkey: String::new(),
+                created_at: chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+                pending_claims: Vec::new(),
+                last_dm_seen_at: 0,
+            }
+        }
+    };
+
+    ensure_token(&client, &mut state, &identity.keys).await?;
+    save_state(data_dir, &state).await?;
+
+    Ok(serde_json::json!({
+        "address": state.lud16,
+        "nip05": state.nip05,
+        "wallet_id": state.wallet_id,
+        "nostr_pubkey": state.nostr_pubkey,
+        "npub": identity.keys.public_key().to_bech32().unwrap_or_default(),
+    }))
+}
+
+/// Outcome of a claim poll.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct ClaimOutcome {
+    pub claimed_count: usize,
+    pub received_sats: u64,
+    /// Claims that were fetched (and so already consumed server-side) but
+    /// still haven't been redeemed after this poll — decrypt/redeem failed
+    /// and they are queued in `pending_claims` for the next poll rather than
+    /// dropped. Non-zero here means real, unswept value the operator should
+    /// know about.
+    pub failed_count: usize,
+}
+
+const NO_CLAIMS: ClaimOutcome = ClaimOutcome {
+    claimed_count: 0,
+    received_sats: 0,
+    failed_count: 0,
+};
+
+/// Make sure the Minibits mint is on the accepted-mints allow-list.
+///
+/// `ecash::receive_token` checks the raw accepted-mints file directly (not
+/// the more lenient `ecash::is_mint_trusted`, which always trusts the default
+/// mint) — so an operator who edited their accepted-mints list (e.g. via the
+/// `streaming.configure-mints` RPC) and dropped the default mint would
+/// otherwise cause every Minibits claim to fail *after* the claim was already
+/// consumed server-side, permanently losing those coins with nothing but a
+/// log line to show for it. The Minibits Lightning address is inherently
+/// backed by this one mint — registering it already implies trusting the
+/// mint — so self-heal the allow-list here rather than let that combination
+/// silently strand funds.
+/// Fetch NIP-04 DM (kind 4) events addressed to `our_pubkey` newer than
+/// `since`, from `CLAIM_RELAY_URLS`. Returns each event's raw (still
+/// encrypted) content plus its `created_at`, newest last. This — not
+/// `POST /claim` — is how Minibits actually delivers a Lightning payment
+/// made to a `@minibits.cash` address: confirmed live 2026-09-08 against
+/// three real payments that `/claim` never surfaced. Best-effort: a relay
+/// error here must not abort the poll, since `pending_claims` may still hold
+/// earlier fetches worth retrying.
+async fn fetch_relay_dms(
+    our_pubkey: nostr_sdk::PublicKey,
+    since: u64,
+) -> Vec<(String, u64, String)> {
+    let client = Client::default();
+    for url in CLAIM_RELAY_URLS {
+        if let Err(e) = client.add_relay(*url).await {
+            warn!("Minibits: could not add relay {url}: {e}");
+        }
+    }
+    client.connect().await;
+    // Give relays a moment to finish the WebSocket handshake before the
+    // fetch's own timeout starts consuming that time.
+    tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(800)).await;
+
+    // `since` is inclusive in NIP-01, and `since` here is the `created_at` of
+    // the newest event we've already queued — so filter strictly after it,
+    // or the same event gets re-fetched (and its already-spent token
+    // re-attempted) every poll forever.
+    let filter = Filter::new()
+        .pubkey(our_pubkey)
+        .kind(Kind::from(4u16))
+        .since(Timestamp::from(since.saturating_add(1)))
+        .limit(200);
+
+    let result = match client
+        .fetch_events(filter, std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+        .await
+    {
+        Ok(events) => {
+            let mut out: Vec<(String, u64, String)> = events
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(|e| (e.content, e.created_at.as_u64(), e.pubkey.to_hex()))
+                .collect();
+            out.sort_by_key(|(_, created_at, _)| *created_at);
+            out
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            warn!("Minibits: relay fetch for claim DMs failed: {e}");
+            Vec::new()
+        }
+    };
+
+    client.shutdown().await;
+    result
+}
+
+async fn ensure_mint_accepted(data_dir: &Path, mint_url: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut accepted = ecash::load_accepted_mints(data_dir).await?;
+    if !accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == mint_url) {
+        accepted.mints.push(mint_url.to_string());
+        ecash::save_accepted_mints(data_dir, &accepted).await?;
+        info!("Minibits: added {mint_url} to accepted mints (needed to redeem LN-address claims)");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Poll Minibits for Lightning payments sent to the node's address and redeem
+/// each into the ecash wallet.
+///
+/// Each claim is a NUT-00 token NIP-04-encrypted by the Minibits service to
+/// this wallet's Nostr key; decrypting it needs the service pubkey
+/// (discovered from our LUD-16 metadata, falling back to the known
+/// constant). A claim is consumed server-side the instant `/claim` returns
+/// it, so newly-fetched tokens are persisted to `state.pending_claims`
+/// *before* decrypt/redeem is attempted; a token that fails to decrypt or
+/// redeem stays in `pending_claims` and is retried on the next poll instead
+/// of being dropped, and `failed_count` tells the caller when that happened
+/// so it isn't purely a log-line event.
+pub async fn claim_and_redeem(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<ClaimOutcome> {
+    let network = ecash::load_network(data_dir).await;
+    if network == EcashNetwork::Testnet {
+        return Ok(NO_CLAIMS);
+    }
+    ensure_mint_accepted(data_dir, &network.default_mint()).await?;
+
+    let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
+        .build()
+        .context("Failed to build the Minibits HTTP client")?;
+
+    let (phrase, seed) = ecash_phrase(data_dir).await?;
+    let identity = derive_identity(&phrase, &seed)?;
+
+    let mut state = match load_state(data_dir).await? {
+        Some(st) => st,
+        // Nothing is addressable until a profile exists; registering lazily here
+        // means a payment could not have arrived, so claiming is a no-op.
+        None => return Ok(NO_CLAIMS),
+    };
+    ensure_token(&client, &mut state, &identity.keys).await?;
+
+    // Discover (and cache) the service key that wraps claimed tokens.
+    if state.server_nostr_pubkey.is_empty() {
+        match discover_server_nostr_pubkey(&client, &state.lud16).await {
+            Ok(pk) => state.server_nostr_pubkey = pk,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!("Minibits: could not read service Nostr pubkey ({e}); using fallback");
+                state.server_nostr_pubkey = FALLBACK_SERVER_NOSTR_PUBKEY.to_string();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let server_pk = nostr_sdk::PublicKey::from_hex(&state.server_nostr_pubkey)
+        .context("Service Nostr pubkey was not valid hex")?;
+
+    // Fetch anything new. A failure here is *not* fatal to the poll — the
+    // operator may still have earlier claims sitting in `pending_claims` that
+    // are worth retrying — so log and fall through instead of bailing out.
+    let resp = client
+        .post(format!("{API_BASE}/claim"))
+        .bearer_auth(&state.access_token)
+        .json(&serde_json::json!({ "seedHash": state.seed_hash }))
+        .send()
+        .await;
+    match resp {
+        Ok(resp) => {
+            let status = resp.status();
+            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
+            if status.is_success() {
+                match serde_json::from_str::<Vec<serde_json::Value>>(&body) {
+                    Ok(claims) => {
+                        for claim in &claims {
+                            match claim.get("token").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) {
+                                Some(t) => state.pending_claims.push(t.to_string()),
+                                None => warn!("Minibits claim had no 'token' field; skipping"),
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => warn!("Minibits claim response was not the expected shape: {e}"),
+                }
+            } else {
+                warn!("{}", minibits_error(status, &body));
+            }
+        }
+        Err(e) => warn!("Minibits claim request failed ({e}); retrying only previously-pending claims"),
+    }
+
+    // The actual delivery channel: real Lightning payments arrive as a
+    // NIP-04 DM on relays, not via `/claim` above. `since` is our own
+    // watermark (Nostr events never expire off a relay, so without it we'd
+    // re-fetch and re-attempt every claim ever sent on every poll).
+    let dms = fetch_relay_dms(identity.keys.public_key(), state.last_dm_seen_at).await;
+    for (content, created_at, author) in dms {
+        if author != state.server_nostr_pubkey {
+            warn!("Minibits: ignoring claim DM from unexpected pubkey {author}");
+            continue;
+        }
+        state.pending_claims.push(content);
+        state.last_dm_seen_at = state.last_dm_seen_at.max(created_at);
+    }
+
+    // Persist immediately: everything in `pending_claims` right now has
+    // already been consumed server-side (or, for relay DMs, is public and
+    // can't be un-sent), whether it came from this fetch or survived from an
+    // earlier failed attempt.
+    save_state(data_dir, &state).await?;
+
+    if state.pending_claims.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(NO_CLAIMS);
+    }
+
+    let to_process = std::mem::take(&mut state.pending_claims);
+    let mut redeemed = 0usize;
+    let mut sats = 0u64;
+    let mut still_pending = Vec::new();
+    for enc in &to_process {
+        let decoded = match nip04::decrypt(identity.keys.secret_key(), &server_pk, enc) {
+            Ok(d) => d,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!("Minibits claim could not be decrypted ({e}); will retry next poll");
+                still_pending.push(enc.clone());
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+        match ecash::receive_token(data_dir, &decoded).await {
+            Ok(got) => {
+                redeemed += 1;
+                sats += got;
+                info!("Minibits: redeemed a claimed payment ({got} sats)");
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!("Minibits claim decrypted but failed to redeem ({e}); will retry next poll");
+                still_pending.push(enc.clone());
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let failed_count = still_pending.len();
+    state.pending_claims = still_pending;
+    save_state(data_dir, &state).await?;
+
+    Ok(ClaimOutcome { claimed_count: redeemed, received_sats: sats, failed_count })
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn derived_nostr_key_matches_the_nip06_vector() {
+        // The Minibits app derives its Nostr key at m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0 with an
+        // empty BIP-39 passphrase (nostr-tools accountFromSeedWords). Lock to the
+        // crate's own NIP-06 secret-key vector so a nostr-sdk bump cannot silently
+        // move our derivation and orphan the registered address.
+        let phrase = "leader monkey parrot ring guide accident before fence cannon height naive bean";
+        let keys = nostr_sdk::Keys::from_mnemonic(phrase, None::<&str>).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex::encode(keys.secret_key().as_secret_bytes()),
+            "7f7ff03d123792d6ac594bfa67bf6d0c0ab55b6b1fdb6249303fe861f1ccba9a"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn seed_hash_is_sha256_of_the_bip39_seed() {
+        // Minibits hashes the *seed*, not the phrase — a regression here would
+        // make the node register a profile that the Minibits app cannot recover.
+        let phrase = "leader monkey parrot ring guide accident before fence cannon height naive bean";
+        let m: bip39::Mnemonic = phrase.parse().unwrap();
+        let seed = m.to_seed("");
+        let want = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(seed));
+        let id = derive_identity(phrase, &seed).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(id.seed_hash, want);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generated_names_are_readable_and_bounded() {
+        for _ in 0..200 {
+            let n = generate_wallet_id();
+            assert!(!n.is_empty());
+            assert!(n.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_lowercase() || c.is_ascii_digit()));
+            // ends in at least one digit (the 1..=999 suffix)
+            assert!(n.chars().last().map(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()).unwrap_or(false));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn stale_token_when_missing_or_near_expiry() {
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
+        assert!(token_is_stale(&MinibitsState::default()));
+        assert!(token_is_stale(&MinibitsState {
+            access_token: "x".into(),
+            access_expires: now + 10, // inside the skew window
+            ..Default::default()
+        }));
+        assert!(!token_is_stale(&MinibitsState {
+            access_token: "x".into(),
+            access_expires: now + 3600,
+            ..Default::default()
+        }));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ensure_mint_accepted_heals_a_dropped_default_mint() {
+        // Regression guard: `ecash::receive_token` checks the raw accepted-mints
+        // file, not the more lenient `is_mint_trusted` — so an operator-edited
+        // allow-list that dropped the default mint must not be able to make
+        // Minibits claims (already consumed server-side by the time redeem
+        // runs) fail permanently and silently.
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let mint = "https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin";
+        ecash::save_accepted_mints(
+            tmp.path(),
+            &ecash::AcceptedMints {
+                mints: vec!["https://mint.example.com".to_string()],
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        ensure_mint_accepted(tmp.path(), mint).await.unwrap();
+
+        let accepted = ecash::load_accepted_mints(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == mint));
+        assert!(accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == "https://mint.example.com"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ensure_mint_accepted_does_not_duplicate() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let mint = "https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin";
+        ensure_mint_accepted(tmp.path(), mint).await.unwrap();
+        ensure_mint_accepted(tmp.path(), mint).await.unwrap();
+        let accepted = ecash::load_accepted_mints(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(accepted.mints.iter().filter(|m| *m == mint).count(), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn dm_watermark_advances_but_never_rewinds() {
+        // `claim_and_redeem` does `state.last_dm_seen_at.max(created_at)` per
+        // event. Events from `fetch_relay_dms` are sorted ascending, but the
+        // watermark must still be safe against an out-of-order relay
+        // response (or a future refactor) — it must never move backward, or
+        // an already-queued DM gets re-fetched and its now-spent token
+        // re-attempted forever.
+        let mut watermark = 100u64;
+        for created_at in [105, 103, 110, 108] {
+            watermark = watermark.max(created_at);
+        }
+        assert_eq!(watermark, 110);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn load_state_treats_empty_file_as_no_profile() {
+        // Reproduces archy-x250-pa3, 2026-09-08: a disk-full write truncated
+        // wallet/minibits.json to 0 bytes, which then made every
+        // wallet.ecash-lnaddress call fail with "EOF while parsing a value"
+        // instead of just re-registering (idempotent per pubkey, so safe).
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let path = tmp.path().join(STATE_FILE);
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(path.parent().unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(&path, b"").await.unwrap();
+
+        let st = load_state(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(st.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn load_state_treats_corrupt_json_as_no_profile() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let path = tmp.path().join(STATE_FILE);
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(path.parent().unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(&path, b"{ not valid json").await.unwrap();
+
+        let st = load_state(tmp.path()).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(st.is_none());
+    }
+
+    /// Live end-to-end against the production Minibits API: register a throwaway
+    /// profile with a random ecash phrase and claim (nothing pending → 0). Run
+    /// with `cargo test -- --ignored --nocapture`. It creates one disposable
+    /// profile on the public service and holds no funds.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[ignore]
+    async fn registers_and_claims_against_live_minibits() {
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("mbtest-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+        // A node has an ecash phrase before it has a Minibits profile; stand up
+        // a fresh random one so registration derives a real identity.
+        nut13::establish_independent(&dir).await.unwrap();
+
+        let info = lnaddress(&dir).await.expect("live registration failed");
+        let addr = info["address"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
+        assert!(addr.ends_with("@minibits.cash"), "bad address {addr}");
+        println!("registered live address: {addr}");
+
+        // A second call must return the same cached address, not register again.
+        let again = lnaddress(&dir).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(again["address"].as_str().unwrap(), addr.as_str());
+
+        let out = claim_and_redeem(&dir).await.expect("live claim poll failed");
+        println!("claim poll: {out:?}");
+        assert_eq!(out.claimed_count, 0);
+
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/wallet/mod.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ pub mod bdhke;
 pub mod cashu;
 pub mod ecash;
 pub mod fedimint_client;
+pub mod minibits;
 pub mod mint_client;
 pub mod nut13;
 pub mod profits;

core/archipelago/src/wallet/nut13.rs

@@ -137,6 +137,18 @@ impl EcashSeed {
         self.mnemonic.words().map(|w| w.to_string()).collect()
     }
 
+    /// The phrase as a single string — the input to NUT-13 *and* to the NIP-06
+    /// Nostr derivation the Minibits profile flow needs (`crate::wallet::minibits`).
+    pub fn phrase(&self) -> String {
+        self.mnemonic.to_string()
+    }
+
+    /// The 64-byte BIP-39 seed. Same bytes Minibits hashes with SHA-256 to get
+    /// its `seedHash`, so the two wallets agree on wallet identity.
+    pub fn seed_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 64] {
+        self.seed
+    }
+
     pub fn source(&self) -> SeedSource {
         self.source
     }

core/openwrt/src/tollgate/install.rs

@@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ const TOLLGATE_VERSION: &str = "v0.5.0";
 /// Source: https://github.com/OpenTollGate/tollgate-module-basic-go/releases/tag/v0.5.0
 fn ipk_url(arch: &str) -> Option<String> {
     let name = match arch {
-        "mips_24kc"          => "mips_24kc",
+        "mips_24kc" => "mips_24kc",
-        "mipsel_24kc"        => "mipsel_24kc",
+        "mipsel_24kc" => "mipsel_24kc",
         "aarch64_cortex-a53" => "aarch64_cortex-a53",
         "aarch64_cortex-a72" => "aarch64_cortex-a72",
-        "arm_cortex-a7"      => "arm_cortex-a7",
+        "arm_cortex-a7" => "arm_cortex-a7",
-        "x86_64"             => "x86_64",
+        "x86_64" => "x86_64",
         _ => return None,
     };
     Some(format!(
@@ -69,8 +69,9 @@ pub fn install_tollgate(router: &Router) -> Result<()> {
     }
 
     // Package not in any feed — download the .ipk directly.
-    let arch = router
+    let arch = router.run_ok(
-        .run_ok("opkg print-architecture | grep -v all | grep -v noarch | tail -1 | awk '{print $2}'")?;
+        "opkg print-architecture | grep -v all | grep -v noarch | tail -1 | awk '{print $2}'",
+    )?;
     let arch = arch.trim();
 
     let url = ipk_url(arch).ok_or_else(|| {
@@ -162,8 +163,7 @@ pub fn install_tollgate_apk_native(router: &Router) -> Result<()> {
                 size
             );
         }
-        let (add_out, add_code) =
+        let (add_out, add_code) = router.run("apk add --allow-untrusted /tmp/tollgate.apk 2>&1")?;
-            router.run("apk add --allow-untrusted /tmp/tollgate.apk 2>&1")?;
         router.run_ok("rm -f /tmp/tollgate.apk")?;
         if add_code != 0 {
             anyhow::bail!("TollGate .apk install failed: {}", add_out.trim());

neode-ui/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "neode-ui",
-  "version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+  "version": "1.8.11-alpha",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "neode-ui",
-      "version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "version": "1.8.11-alpha",
       "dependencies": {
         "@scure/bip39": "^2.2.0",
         "@types/dompurify": "^3.0.5",

neode-ui/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "neode-ui",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+  "version": "1.8.11-alpha",
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
     "start": "./start-dev.sh",

neode-ui/src/components/ReceiveBitcoinModal.vue

@@ -106,6 +106,30 @@
 
         <!-- Ecash -->
         <div v-if="receiveMethod === 'ecash'">
+          <!-- Shareable @minibits.cash Lightning address (LUD-16): any Lightning
+               wallet can pay this node by address, and the sats land as ecash.
+               Fetched on tab open; claimed payments are polled in while open. -->
+          <div v-if="lnAddress" class="mb-4 p-3 bg-white/5 rounded-lg text-center">
+            <p class="text-white/60 text-sm mb-2">{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressTitle') }}</p>
+            <canvas ref="lnAddressQrCanvas" class="mx-auto mb-3 rounded-lg" style="image-rendering: pixelated;"></canvas>
+            <p class="text-white/50 text-xs mb-1">{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressLabel') }}</p>
+            <p class="text-base font-mono text-white/95 break-all mb-2">{{ lnAddress }}</p>
+            <CopyButton :value="lnAddress" :label="t('common.copy')" />
+            <p class="text-white/40 text-xs mt-3 leading-relaxed">{{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressHint') }}</p>
+            <p v-if="lnClaimedSats > 0" class="text-green-400 text-sm mt-2">
+              {{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressReceived', { amount: lnClaimedSats.toLocaleString() }) }}
+            </p>
+            <p v-if="lnPendingClaims > 0" class="text-orange-400 text-sm mt-2">
+              {{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressPendingRetry', { count: lnPendingClaims }) }}
+            </p>
+          </div>
+          <div v-else-if="lnAddressLoading" class="mb-4 text-center text-white/50 text-sm py-4">
+            {{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressLoading') }}
+          </div>
+          <div v-else-if="lnAddressError" class="mb-3 text-xs text-white/40">
+            {{ t('receiveBitcoin.lnAddressUnavailable') }}
+          </div>
+
           <div class="mb-3">
             <label class="text-white/60 text-sm block mb-1">{{ t('receiveBitcoin.pasteEcashToken') }}</label>
             <textarea v-model="ecashToken" rows="3" placeholder="cashuB… (Cashu) or Fedimint notes" class="w-full input-glass font-mono"></textarea>
@@ -175,6 +199,12 @@ watch(() => props.show, (open) => {
   arkAddress.value = ''
   ecashToken.value = ''
   ecashResult.value = ''
+  stopLnClaimPoll()
+  lnAddress.value = ''
+  lnAddressLoading.value = false
+  lnAddressError.value = false
+  lnClaimedSats.value = 0
+  lnPendingClaims.value = 0
   error.value = ''
   processing.value = false
   if (props.autoGenerate && receiveMethod.value === 'onchain') {
@@ -193,9 +223,85 @@ const ecashResult = ref('')
 const onchainQrCanvas = ref<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null)
 const lightningQrCanvas = ref<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null)
 const arkQrCanvas = ref<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null)
+const lnAddressQrCanvas = ref<HTMLCanvasElement | null>(null)
 const processing = ref(false)
 const error = ref('')
 
+// ── Minibits Lightning address (ecash receive) ──────────────────────────────
+// The ecash tab doubles as "receive onto my @minibits.cash address": the node
+// derives/registers it from its own ecash seed (wallet.ecash-lnaddress) and
+// sweeps any Lightning payments that land there back into ecash while the tab is
+// open (wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim). A registration failure is never fatal —
+// the paste-token path below always works.
+const lnAddress = ref('')
+const lnAddressLoading = ref(false)
+const lnAddressError = ref(false)
+const lnClaimedSats = ref(0)
+// A payment the backend fetched (and so already consumed at Minibits) but
+// couldn't redeem yet — it's queued for automatic retry, not lost, but the
+// operator should see it rather than have it be a silent, unbounded wait.
+const lnPendingClaims = ref(0)
+let lnClaimTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null
+
+async function loadLnAddress() {
+  if (lnAddress.value || lnAddressLoading.value) return
+  lnAddressLoading.value = true
+  lnAddressError.value = false
+  try {
+    const res = await rpcClient.call<{ address?: string }>({ method: 'wallet.ecash-lnaddress' })
+    lnAddress.value = res?.address || ''
+    if (lnAddress.value) {
+      await nextTick()
+      renderQr(lnAddress.value, lnAddressQrCanvas.value)
+      startLnClaimPoll()
+    } else {
+      lnAddressError.value = true
+    }
+  } catch {
+    lnAddressError.value = true
+  } finally {
+    lnAddressLoading.value = false
+  }
+}
+
+function stopLnClaimPoll() {
+  if (lnClaimTimer) {
+    clearInterval(lnClaimTimer)
+    lnClaimTimer = null
+  }
+}
+
+function startLnClaimPoll() {
+  stopLnClaimPoll()
+  lnClaimTimer = setInterval(() => void pollLnClaims(), 8000)
+}
+
+async function pollLnClaims() {
+  if (!props.show || !lnAddress.value) {
+    stopLnClaimPoll()
+    return
+  }
+  try {
+    const res = await rpcClient.call<{ received_sats?: number; failed_count?: number }>({
+      method: 'wallet.ecash-lnaddress-claim',
+    })
+    if (res?.received_sats && res.received_sats > 0) {
+      lnClaimedSats.value += res.received_sats
+      emit('received')
+    }
+    lnPendingClaims.value = res?.failed_count || 0
+  } catch {
+    // Transient poll failure (offline, mint busy) — keep polling.
+  }
+}
+
+onUnmounted(stopLnClaimPoll)
+
+// Fetch the address the first time the operator opens the ecash tab.
+watch(receiveMethod, (m) => {
+  if (m === 'ecash' && props.show) void loadLnAddress()
+})
+
 // ── On-chain payment detection ────────────────────────────────────────────
 // The generated address is FRESH (lnd.newaddress), so any incoming wallet
 // transaction paying it is this receive — no baseline bookkeeping needed.
@@ -309,12 +415,16 @@ async function renderQr(data: string, canvas: HTMLCanvasElement | null, prefix =
 
 function close() {
   stopWatchingPayment()
+  stopLnClaimPoll()
   paymentSeen.value = null
   invoiceResult.value = ''
   onchainAddress.value = ''
   arkAddress.value = ''
   ecashToken.value = ''
   ecashResult.value = ''
+  lnAddress.value = ''
+  lnClaimedSats.value = 0
+  lnPendingClaims.value = 0
   error.value = ''
   emit('close')
 }

neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/ReceiveBitcoinModal.i18n.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+// Real vue-i18n instance (unlike ReceiveBitcoinModal.test.ts, which mocks
+// `t` to a no-op and so cannot catch a bad message string). Operator report
+// (2026-09-08): clicking the Ecash tab closed the whole Receive modal, in
+// both the browser and the Android companion's WebView. Root cause: vue-i18n
+// treats a bare `@` as the start of "linked message" syntax — `en.json`'s
+// `receiveBitcoin.lnAddressLabel` ("Your @minibits.cash address:") isn't
+// valid linked-message syntax, so *compiling* that message throws a
+// SyntaxError the instant it's first rendered (i.e. the moment the address
+// loads), and the uncaught render-function error blanks the whole teleported
+// modal. Fixed by escaping it as `{'@'}` (the same pattern already used for
+// `settings.domainNamePlaceholder`). This test uses the real compiler so a
+// future bad interpolation string in this component fails fast in `npm test`
+// instead of only in a live browser.
+import { flushPromises, mount } from '@vue/test-utils'
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import ReceiveBitcoinModal from '../ReceiveBitcoinModal.vue'
+import { rpcClient } from '@/api/rpc-client'
+import i18n from '@/i18n'
+
+vi.mock('@/api/rpc-client', () => ({
+  rpcClient: { call: vi.fn() },
+}))
+
+vi.mock('@/composables/useLightningRequired', () => ({
+  useLightningRequired: () => ({
+    requireLightningReady: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
+    handleLightningFailure: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(false),
+  }),
+}))
+
+describe('ReceiveBitcoinModal — ecash tab with the real vue-i18n compiler', () => {
+  it('renders the Minibits address label without an uncaught render error', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockImplementation(async ({ method }: { method: string }) => {
+      if (method === 'wallet.ecash-lnaddress') {
+        return { address: 'someone@minibits.cash' } as never
+      }
+      return { claimed_count: 0, received_sats: 0, failed_count: 0 } as never
+    })
+
+    const wrapper = mount(ReceiveBitcoinModal, {
+      props: { show: true },
+      attachTo: document.body,
+      global: { plugins: [i18n] },
+    })
+    let captured: unknown = null
+    wrapper.vm.$.appContext.app.config.errorHandler = (err) => { captured = err }
+    await flushPromises()
+
+    const ecashTab = Array.from(document.body.querySelectorAll('button')).find((b) =>
+      b.textContent?.toLowerCase().includes('ecash'),
+    )
+    expect(ecashTab).toBeTruthy()
+    ecashTab!.dispatchEvent(new Event('click', { bubbles: true }))
+    await flushPromises()
+    await flushPromises()
+
+    expect(captured).toBeNull()
+    expect(wrapper.emitted('close')).toBeFalsy()
+    const dialog = document.body.querySelector('[role="dialog"]')
+    expect(dialog).toBeTruthy()
+    expect(dialog?.textContent).toContain('minibits.cash')
+    expect(dialog?.textContent).toContain('someone@minibits.cash')
+
+    wrapper.unmount()
+  })
+})

neode-ui/src/components/__tests__/ReceiveBitcoinModal.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+import { flushPromises, mount } from '@vue/test-utils'
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import ReceiveBitcoinModal from '../ReceiveBitcoinModal.vue'
+import { rpcClient } from '@/api/rpc-client'
+
+vi.mock('vue-router', () => ({
+  useRoute: () => ({ fullPath: '/dashboard' }),
+  useRouter: () => ({ push: vi.fn() }),
+}))
+
+vi.mock('vue-i18n', () => ({
+  useI18n: () => ({ t: (key: string, params?: Record<string, unknown>) => (params ? `${key}:${JSON.stringify(params)}` : key) }),
+}))
+
+vi.mock('@/api/rpc-client', () => ({
+  rpcClient: { call: vi.fn() },
+}))
+
+vi.mock('@/composables/useLightningRequired', () => ({
+  useLightningRequired: () => ({
+    requireLightningReady: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
+    handleLightningFailure: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(false),
+  }),
+}))
+
+// Guards an operator report (2026-09-08): clicking the Ecash tab appeared to
+// close the whole Receive modal. Not reproduced here — the tab switch alone
+// (success or failure of wallet.ecash-lnaddress) never emits `close` or
+// unmounts the dialog — but the RPC-eager tab switch is exactly the kind of
+// path a future change could regress, so it's worth pinning down.
+describe('ReceiveBitcoinModal — ecash tab click', () => {
+  it('does not close/emit when the ecash tab is clicked and the RPC succeeds', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockResolvedValue({ address: 'someone@minibits.cash' } as never)
+
+    const wrapper = mount(ReceiveBitcoinModal, {
+      props: { show: true },
+      attachTo: document.body,
+    })
+    await flushPromises()
+
+    const tabs = Array.from(document.body.querySelectorAll('button'))
+    const ecashTab = tabs.find((b) => b.textContent?.toLowerCase().includes('ecash'))
+    expect(ecashTab).toBeTruthy()
+
+    ecashTab!.dispatchEvent(new Event('click', { bubbles: true }))
+    await flushPromises()
+
+    expect(wrapper.emitted('close')).toBeFalsy()
+    expect(document.body.querySelector('[role="dialog"]')).toBeTruthy()
+    wrapper.unmount()
+  })
+
+  it('does not close/emit when the ecash tab is clicked and the RPC fails', async () => {
+    vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockRejectedValue(new Error('boom'))
+
+    const wrapper = mount(ReceiveBitcoinModal, {
+      props: { show: true },
+      attachTo: document.body,
+    })
+    await flushPromises()
+
+    const tabs = Array.from(document.body.querySelectorAll('button'))
+    const ecashTab = tabs.find((b) => b.textContent?.toLowerCase().includes('ecash'))
+    expect(ecashTab).toBeTruthy()
+
+    ecashTab!.dispatchEvent(new Event('click', { bubbles: true }))
+    await flushPromises()
+
+    expect(wrapper.emitted('close')).toBeFalsy()
+    expect(document.body.querySelector('[role="dialog"]')).toBeTruthy()
+    wrapper.unmount()
+  })
+})

neode-ui/src/locales/__tests__/i18nMessagesCompile.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// Every message string must survive vue-i18n's message compiler. Found the
+// hard way (2026-09-08): a bare `@` in a message is parsed as the start of
+// "linked message" syntax (`@:key`), so a literal `@` (an email/handle-style
+// placeholder, e.g. "user@example.com") throws a SyntaxError the first time
+// it's *rendered*, not at build time — see [[vue-i18n-bare-at-sign-crash]]
+// in project memory for the full incident (it blanked a whole modal in both
+// the browser and the Android companion's WebView). A literal `@`, `{`, `}`
+// or other message-syntax character must be escaped as e.g. `{'@'}`.
+//
+// This walks every string in every locale file and asks the real compiler
+// to parse it — no rendering, no component needed, so it's fast and catches
+// the whole class of bug regardless of which component ever ends up using
+// the string.
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
+import i18n from '@/i18n'
+import en from '../en.json'
+import es from '../es.json'
+
+function collectStrings(obj: unknown, path: string, out: Array<[string, string]>) {
+  if (typeof obj === 'string') {
+    out.push([path, obj])
+  } else if (obj && typeof obj === 'object') {
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {
+      collectStrings(v, path ? `${path}.${k}` : k, out)
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+describe('locale messages compile', () => {
+  it.each([
+    ['en', en],
+    ['es', es],
+  ])('every %s message string compiles under the real vue-i18n compiler', (_locale, messages) => {
+    const strings: Array<[string, string]> = []
+    collectStrings(messages, '', strings)
+    expect(strings.length).toBeGreaterThan(100)
+
+    const failures: string[] = []
+    for (const [path, msg] of strings) {
+      try {
+        i18n.global.t(path)
+      } catch (e) {
+        failures.push(`${path}: ${(e as Error).message.split('\n')[0]} (source: ${JSON.stringify(msg)})`)
+      }
+    }
+    expect(failures).toEqual([])
+  })
+})

neode-ui/src/locales/en.json

@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@
     "passwordNeedUppercase": "Password must contain at least one uppercase letter",
     "passwordNeedLowercase": "Password must contain at least one lowercase letter",
     "passwordNeedDigit": "Password must contain at least one digit",
-    "passwordNeedSpecial": "Password must contain at least one special character (!@#$%^&* etc.)",
+    "passwordNeedSpecial": "Password must contain at least one special character (!{'@'}#$%^&* etc.)",
     "setupFailed": "Setup failed",
     "verificationFailed": "Verification failed",
     "disableFailed": "Failed to disable 2FA",
@@ -775,6 +775,13 @@
     "paymentConfirmed": "Payment confirmed",
     "transactionId": "Transaction ID",
     "pasteEcashToken": "Paste ecash token",
+    "lnAddressTitle": "Or share your Minibits Lightning address",
+    "lnAddressHint": "Anyone can pay you sats with any Lightning wallet by sending to this address — the sats arrive as ecash. Keep this screen open to receive them.",
+    "lnAddressLabel": "Your {'@'}minibits.cash address:",
+    "lnAddressLoading": "Setting up your Lightning address…",
+    "lnAddressUnavailable": "Lightning address unavailable — you can still paste a token below.",
+    "lnAddressReceived": "Received {amount} sats to your Lightning address!",
+    "lnAddressPendingRetry": "A payment arrived but couldn't be redeemed yet ({count}) — retrying automatically, keep this screen open.",
     "processing": "Processing...",
     "generateAddress": "Generate Address",
     "createInvoice": "Create Invoice",

neode-ui/src/locales/es.json

@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@
     "passwordNeedUppercase": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos una letra may\u00fascula",
     "passwordNeedLowercase": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos una letra min\u00fascula",
     "passwordNeedDigit": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos un d\u00edgito",
-    "passwordNeedSpecial": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos un car\u00e1cter especial (!@#$%^&* etc.)",
+    "passwordNeedSpecial": "La contrase\u00f1a debe contener al menos un car\u00e1cter especial (!{'@'}#$%^&* etc.)",
     "setupFailed": "La configuraci\u00f3n fall\u00f3",
     "verificationFailed": "La verificaci\u00f3n fall\u00f3",
     "disableFailed": "Error al deshabilitar 2FA",
@@ -756,6 +756,13 @@
     "paymentConfirmed": "Pago confirmado",
     "transactionId": "ID de transacci\u00f3n",
     "pasteEcashToken": "Pegar token Ecash",
+    "lnAddressTitle": "O comparte tu direcci\u00f3n Lightning de Minibits",
+    "lnAddressHint": "Cualquier persona puede pagarte sats con cualquier billetera Lightning enviando a esta direcci\u00f3n \u2014 los sats llegan como ecash. Mant\u00e9n esta pantalla abierta para recibirlos.",
+    "lnAddressLabel": "Su direcci\u00f3n {'@'}minibits.cash:",
+    "lnAddressLoading": "Configurando su direcci\u00f3n Lightning\u2026",
+    "lnAddressUnavailable": "Direcci\u00f3n Lightning no disponible \u2014 a\u00fan puede pegar un token abajo.",
+    "lnAddressReceived": "\u00a1Recibi\u00f3 {amount} sats en su direcci\u00f3n Lightning!",
+    "lnAddressPendingRetry": "Lleg\u00f3 un pago pero a\u00fan no se pudo canjear ({count}) \u2014 reintentando autom\u00e1ticamente, mantenga esta pantalla abierta.",
     "processing": "Procesando...",
     "generateAddress": "Generar direcci\u00f3n",
     "createInvoice": "Crear factura",

neode-ui/src/views/appSession/__tests__/appSessionConfig.test.ts

@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ describe('appSessionConfig', () => {
       configurable: true,
     })
 
-    // did-wallet's manifest publishes host port 8088 (apps/did-wallet/
+    // searxng's manifest publishes host port 8888 (apps/searxng/
     // manifest.yml) — assert against the manifest-generated value, which is
     // exactly what this test exists to protect.
-    expect(resolveAppUrl('did-wallet')).toBe('http://192.0.2.10:8088')
+    expect(resolveAppUrl('searxng')).toBe('http://192.0.2.10:8888')
   })
 
   it('does not treat service-only tcp ports as web launch surfaces', () => {

neode-ui/src/views/settings/AccountInfoSection.vue

@@ -362,6 +362,18 @@ init()
               </button>
             </div>
             <div class="overflow-y-auto flex-1 min-h-0 space-y-6 pr-1">
+              <!-- v1.8.11-alpha -->
+              <div>
+                <div class="flex items-center gap-2 mb-3">
+                  <span class="text-xs font-mono px-2 py-0.5 rounded bg-orange-500/20 text-orange-300">v1.8.11-alpha</span>
+                  <span class="text-xs text-white/40">September 7, 2026</span>
+                </div>
+                <div class="space-y-3 text-sm text-white/80 pl-3 border-l border-white/10">
+                  <p><strong>Cuprate now syncs without burning a core for days.</strong> The app's shipped config now enables Cuprate's checkpoint-backed fast_sync path, raises the database cache to 8 GiB, and gives the container a 10 GiB memory limit so the cache has real headroom. A live comparison that motivated the change saw the affected node sit around 45% CPU while the corrected config held near low single digits at the same chain height and block rate. The restricted RPC remains fronted through the safe app gate/Tor path.</p>
+                  <p><strong>OpenWrt Gateway setup is documented from a real install, and two setup bugs are fixed.</strong> The new guide walks a node operator through flashing a GL.iNet AX3000 to stock OpenWrt, pairing it with Archipelago, and installing TollGate pay-as-you-go WiFi. The installer now finds opkg/apk through the router's actual PATH instead of assuming /usr/bin, the UI no longer sends an empty password over a saved router connection, and the pinned TollGate package moves to v0.5.0 with a native .apk install path where upstream provides one.</p>
+                  <p><strong>Release publishing now checks the public Gitea download links before a manifest goes live.</strong> The publisher already fetched every artifact back and verified its size and SHA-256; this release adds a second guard for the release page itself, so a bad Gitea ROOT_URL or proxy setting cannot publish working files behind broken public HTTPS download links.</p>
+                </div>
+              </div>
               <!-- v1.8.10-alpha -->
               <div>
                 <div class="flex items-center gap-2 mb-3">
@@ -369,9 +381,9 @@ init()
                   <span class="text-xs text-white/40">September 2, 2026</span>
                 </div>
                 <div class="space-y-3 text-sm text-white/80 pl-3 border-l border-white/10">
-                  <p><strong>Lightning sends work again.</strong> v1.8.9's move to LND 0.21's supported payment route shipped without a fee budget, and the API treats a missing one as zero allowed fees — so every wallet send failed "No route to the recipient" all day, on perfectly healthy channels. Payments now carry a proper fee budget and a test keeps it from ever regressing.</p>
+                  <p><strong>Lightning sends work again — v1.8.9's payment switch lost the fee budget.</strong> Moving payments to LND 0.21's supported route (Router.SendPaymentV2) shipped without a fee limit, and the v2 API treats an absent limit as <strong>zero allowed fees</strong>: every real route carries a routing fee, so the pathfinder rejected them all and the wallet answered "No route to the recipient" on every send — all day, on healthy channels with plenty of liquidity. The router debug log made it unambiguous (fee_limit=0 mSAT on every failing wallet payment; the same payment succeeded by hand the moment a fee limit was set). Payments now carry lncli's default budget (the payment amount), the wallet's amount handling for zero-value invoices is preserved, and a unit test pins the limit can never be zero again.</p>
-                  <p><strong>A channel that drops its peer link now heals itself — on every node.</strong> Restarting LND (an app update, a reboot, container churn) can leave a channel's peer connection down for hours while both endpoints keep the channel flagged disabled in the routing graph: the node looks perfectly healthy, the wallet shows balance, and every payment in either direction fails "no route to the recipient". The daemon now watches the channel graph as desired state — every open channel should have a live peer — and reconnects any that don't. Nodes without LND are untouched; an unreachable peer is retried gently.</p>
+                  <p><strong>A channel that drops its peer link now heals itself — on every node.</strong> Restarting LND (an app update, a reboot, container churn) can leave a channel's peer connection down for hours while both endpoints keep the channel flagged disabled in the routing graph: the node looks perfectly healthy, the wallet shows balance, and every payment in either direction fails "no route to the recipient". Observed live: a node's only channel sat unroutable for ~17 hours after the LND 0.21.2 update, with no sign of it in any dashboard. The daemon now watches the channel graph as desired state — every open channel should have a live peer — and reconnects any that don't, using the peer's advertised addresses. Nodes without LND are untouched; an unreachable peer is retried gently, not hammered.</p>
-                  <p><strong>The Lightning wallet says what's actually wrong, instead of "you have no channel".</strong> Trying to send while a channel you just opened was still confirming — or when all its balance sits on the far side — produced a modal claiming you had no channel at all, and payment routing failures even showed the receiving copy. The gate now reads your real channel list: a confirming channel gets "it unlocks automatically once confirmed, nothing is needed from you", a far-side balance gets "you can receive, but there's nothing to send right now", and only a genuinely channel-less node is sent to open one.</p>
+                  <p><strong>The Lightning wallet states the node's real funding state instead of "you have no channel."</strong> Trying to send while a freshly opened channel was still waiting for on-chain confirmations — or when all its balance sits on the far side — raised a modal that claimed the node had NO channel at all (the outbound sum is legitimately zero in both states), pointed the user at opening a second channel, and — for payment routing failures — even showed the <em>receiving</em> copy. The funding gate now reads the channel list it already fetched: a confirming channel gets "it unlocks automatically once confirmed, nothing is needed from you", a far-side balance gets "you can receive, but there's nothing to send right now", a routing/liquidity payment failure says so instead of claiming channel problems, and only a genuinely channel-less node keeps the open-one guidance.</p>
                 </div>
               </div>
               <!-- v1.8.9-alpha -->
@@ -381,12 +393,13 @@ init()
                   <span class="text-xs text-white/40">September 1, 2026</span>
                 </div>
                 <div class="space-y-3 text-sm text-white/80 pl-3 border-l border-white/10">
-                  <p><strong>Lightning sends work again after the LND 0.21.2 update.</strong> LND 0.21 removed the payment route the node's backend used — every send answered "Not Found". Payments now go through LND's supported v2 router route, slow multi-hop payments are still tracked to completion (never falsely declared failed), failures explain themselves in plain language, and a new test speaks the payment route directly at release-gate time so an image/backend mismatch like this can never ship silently again.</p>
+                  <p><strong>Lightning sends work again after the LND 0.21.2 update.</strong> LND 0.21 removed the old synchronous payment route the node's backend paid through (/v1/channels/transactions) — every Lightning send answered the literal "Not Found" and the wallet showed "Payment failed: Not Found". The backend now pays through the supported Router.SendPaymentV2 route, keeps the same settle-then-report behaviour (a slow multi-hop payment is still tracked to completion, never falsely declared failed), and translates LND's failure reasons into plain advice. A new gate test speaks the payment route directly against the running LND, so an image/backend skew like this can never ship silently again.</p>
-                  <p><strong>HTTP and HTTPS both work, and no longer break each other.</strong> The HTTPS listener used to pin a year-long browser policy (HSTS); once your browser had visited HTTPS, it silently rewrote the HTTP dashboard's calls to HTTPS — cross-origin, so everything showed "Failed to fetch"/CORS errors while the node was healthy. The pin is gone, the HTTPS listener now actively clears the stale policy browsers already cached (visit HTTPS once after this update to clear yours), and plain-HTTP access — which is deliberate on nodes whose self-signed certificate you haven't installed — keeps working exactly as before.</p>
+                  <p><strong>The node no longer pins HSTS — HTTP access is a supported mode, and it stays working.</strong> The HTTPS listener used to send Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; browsers that visited HTTPS once cached that and then silently upgraded the still-open HTTP dashboard's calls to HTTPS, which is a scheme change — cross-origin — so every request died as "CORS blocked / Failed to fetch" while the node was perfectly healthy. The HTTPS listener now actively clears the cached policy (max-age=0) and port 80 sends no HSTS at all, which is deliberate: the node's certificate is optional and self-signed, and devices that haven't installed the CA must keep plain-HTTP access (that's what Settings → Node certificate is for). If your browser already cached the old policy, visiting the dashboard over HTTPS once after this update clears it; a gate test now refuses any config that reintroduces the pin.</p>
-                  <p><strong>Apps open over HTTPS again, including Mempool, Bitcoin and IndeeHub.</strong> The launcher looked each app's port policy up in the signed catalog under the name you click, but the catalog lists that port under the app that owns it — so Mempool "did not connect", Bitcoin opened a plain-http tab, and Nostr sign-in on IndeeHub silently did nothing over HTTPS. Launches now follow the alias to the owning manifest, the catalog is loaded before the first app you open (not just in the App Store), and the Nostr bridge replies to the app frame's real origin instead of a stale recorded address.</p>
+                  <p><strong>App frames open over HTTPS again — including the ones that "did not connect."</strong> The launcher asked the signed catalog for each app's port policy under the name you click ("Mempool Web", "Bitcoin Knots"), but the catalog declares those ports under the manifest that owns them (the Mempool web container, Bitcoin UI). The lookup missed, the launcher handed the iframe an http:// address, and the browser blocked it as mixed content — the app tile went blank or spun forever. Port resolution now follows launch aliases (mempool-web, bitcoin-knots/bitcoin-core, lnd, electrs and friends), falls back to a port-wide catalog scan when the id is unknown, and the catalog is warmed as soon as the dashboard loads rather than only in the App Store, so the very first app you open already knows which ports serve TLS.</p>
-                  <p><strong>Nginx Proxy Manager starts again.</strong> Its manifest was missing two things its image requires — the LetsEncrypt folder mount and the permission to bind low ports — leaving it in an endless restart loop on nodes that had it installed. Both are declared now; your existing certificates are untouched, and the fix arrives via the signed catalog without waiting for this release.</p>
+                  <p><strong>Signing in to IndeeHub with Nostr works over HTTPS.</strong> The NIP-07 bridge compared the app frame's origin for exact equality with the recorded http:// app URL — a frame the browser upgraded to HTTPS (or any scheme change) was silently ignored, and replies addressed to the stale origin were refused outright, so Nostr sign-in quietly did nothing. The bridge now matches host and port (scheme intentionally ignored) and always replies to the frame's real origin.</p>
-                  <p><strong>Portainer's first-run token is on the app page, not buried in "server logs".</strong> New Portainer versions hand the first admin a one-time setup token that was only printed in the container logs — on this box, that token now appears with your app's other credentials, with a copy button, and disappears once setup is done.</p>
+                  <p><strong>Nginx Proxy Manager starts again.</strong> Converting it to a platform manifest dropped two things its image needs: the /etc/letsencrypt mount its boot script hard-requires, and the NET_BIND_SERVICE capability its internal nginx needs to bind ports 80/443/81 under the orchestrator's --cap-drop=ALL. The result was an endless start/die loop (a node watched it restart 3,176 times). Both are declared in its manifest now, its certs live on unchanged under the same persistent app directory, and the signed catalog carries the fix so installed nodes heal on the next update.</p>
-                  <p><strong>The Lightning wallet says what's actually wrong, instead of "you have no channel".</strong> Trying to send while a channel you just opened was still confirming — or when all its balance sits on the far side — produced a modal claiming you had no channel at all. The gate now looks at your real channel list: a confirming channel gets "it unlocks automatically once confirmed, nothing needed from you", a far-side balance gets "you can receive but there's nothing to send right now", and only a genuinely channel-less node is sent to open one.</p>
+                  <p><strong>Portainer's first-run token is in the app page, not buried in "server logs."</strong> New Portainer versions mint a one-time setup token on a fresh install and print it only to the container logs — on an appliance that meant telling the user to go read a server log to get into their own app. The token now appears in the same launch interstitial as app login credentials (with a copy button), only while first-run setup is actually pending; once the admin account exists the card disappears on its own.</p>
+                  <p><strong>The Lightning wallet states the node's real funding state instead of "you have no channel."</strong> Trying to send while a freshly opened channel was still waiting for on-chain confirmations — or when all its balance sits on the far side — raised a modal that claimed the node had no channel at all (the outbound sum is legitimately zero in both states). The funding gate now reads the channel list it already fetched: a confirming channel gets "it unlocks automatically once confirmed, nothing is needed from you", a far-side balance gets "you can receive, but there's nothing to send right now", a routing/liquidity payment failure says so instead of pointing at channel setup, and only a genuinely channel-less node is sent to open one.</p>
                 </div>
               </div>
               <!-- v1.8.8-alpha -->

release-manifest.json

@@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
 {
   "changelog": [
-    "**Lightning sends work again — v1.8.9's payment switch lost the fee budget.** Moving payments to LND 0.21's supported route (Router.SendPaymentV2) shipped without a fee limit, and the v2 API treats an absent limit as **zero allowed fees**: every real route carries a routing fee, so the pathfinder rejected them all and the wallet answered \"No route to the recipient\" on every send — all day, on healthy channels with plenty of liquidity. The router debug log made it unambiguous (`fee_limit=0 mSAT` on every failing wallet payment; the same payment succeeded by hand the moment a fee limit was set). Payments now carry lncli's default budget (the payment amount), the wallet's amount handling for zero-value invoices is preserved, and a unit test pins the limit can never be zero again.",
+    "**Cuprate now syncs without burning a core for days.** The app's shipped config now enables Cuprate's checkpoint-backed `fast_sync` path, raises the database cache to 8 GiB, and gives the container a 10 GiB memory limit so the cache has real headroom. A live comparison that motivated the change saw the affected node sit around 45% CPU while the corrected config held near low single digits at the same chain height and block rate. The restricted RPC remains fronted through the safe app gate/Tor path.",
-    "**A channel that drops its peer link now heals itself — on every node.** Restarting LND (an app update, a reboot, container churn) can leave a channel's peer connection down for hours while both endpoints keep the channel flagged disabled in the routing graph: the node looks perfectly healthy, the wallet shows balance, and every payment in either direction fails \"no route to the recipient\". Observed live: a node's only channel sat unroutable for ~17 hours after the LND 0.21.2 update, with no sign of it in any dashboard. The daemon now watches the channel graph as desired state — every open channel should have a live peer — and reconnects any that don't, using the peer's advertised addresses. Nodes without LND are untouched; an unreachable peer is retried gently, not hammered.",
+    "**OpenWrt Gateway setup is documented from a real install, and two setup bugs are fixed.** The new guide walks a node operator through flashing a GL.iNet AX3000 to stock OpenWrt, pairing it with Archipelago, and installing TollGate pay-as-you-go WiFi. The installer now finds `opkg`/`apk` through the router's actual `PATH` instead of assuming `/usr/bin`, the UI no longer sends an empty password over a saved router connection, and the pinned TollGate package moves to `v0.5.0` with a native `.apk` install path where upstream provides one.",
-    "**The Lightning wallet states the node's real funding state instead of \"you have no channel.\"** Trying to send while a freshly opened channel was still waiting for on-chain confirmations — or when all its balance sits on the far side — raised a modal that claimed the node had NO channel at all (the outbound sum is legitimately zero in both states), pointed the user at opening a second channel, and — for payment routing failures — even showed the *receiving* copy. The funding gate now reads the channel list it already fetched: a confirming channel gets \"it unlocks automatically once confirmed, nothing is needed from you\", a far-side balance gets \"you can receive, but there's nothing to send right now\", a routing/liquidity payment failure says so instead of claiming channel problems, and only a genuinely channel-less node keeps the open-one guidance."
+    "**Release publishing now checks the public Gitea download links before a manifest goes live.** The publisher already fetched every artifact back and verified its size and SHA-256; this release adds a second guard for the release page itself, so a bad Gitea `ROOT_URL` or proxy setting cannot publish working files behind broken public HTTPS download links."
   ],
   "components": [
     {
-      "current_version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "current_version": "1.8.11-alpha",
-      "download_url": "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.10-alpha/archipelago",
+      "download_url": "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.11-alpha/archipelago",
       "name": "archipelago",
-      "new_version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "new_version": "1.8.11-alpha",
-      "sha256": "6c8bd41fed44cd999cb360c00e1b66a2d19d19812cc2b0c8a1677eec2a9579e6",
+      "sha256": "ae569054edd6b2491beb101815f6809bc00c95a7dbe86bd084bcb9a7c36e1853",
-      "size_bytes": 64178056
+      "size_bytes": 64179264
     },
     {
-      "current_version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "current_version": "1.8.11-alpha",
-      "download_url": "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.10-alpha/archipelago-frontend-1.8.10-alpha.tar.gz",
+      "download_url": "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.11-alpha/archipelago-frontend-1.8.11-alpha.tar.gz",
-      "name": "archipelago-frontend-1.8.10-alpha.tar.gz",
+      "name": "archipelago-frontend-1.8.11-alpha.tar.gz",
-      "new_version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "new_version": "1.8.11-alpha",
-      "sha256": "6b25de8a8e1a4f7fe51594f9bbbe21f5820f417af47a8b309c2dbf8f8723b719",
+      "sha256": "192fd0470b6ccf66e78c80b4a4c3af5468882b85d81959362a3bd11f88b9d71d",
-      "size_bytes": 97736297
+      "size_bytes": 97741740
     }
   ],
-  "release_date": "2026-09-01",
+  "release_date": "2026-09-07",
-  "signature": "b69926bcb1851ff7d6a5b24519cd4a8015aab4ed4b588ee989d8ce6e3beaeb2cc0eb38078f522ded0d389fe53b7dbcdbf3f40c534b4bfafa5cf4a2ab2c59e40f",
+  "signature": "6449ce6ef35a4ef4fa6d0923bb58a2bff52ea5430d5532496e8f0af9ed52eaec293f19d7bec272dc9bc1af5fb2cdfa0e46068c827a9a4dd9cbef92d1c5845301",
   "signed_by": "did:key:z6Mkfu5LT8d4DjETtrkATvHh9Dvcbnr7zBCUwfau8Sw7DLWT",
-  "version": "1.8.10-alpha"
+  "version": "1.8.11-alpha"
 }

releases/app-catalog.json

@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@
           "description": "Alternative Monero node implementation in Rust. Independently validates Monero consensus rules, providing a layer of security and redundancy for the network.",
           "files": [
             {
-              "content": "network = \"Mainnet\"\ntarget_max_memory = 3000000000\n\n[rpc.restricted]\nenable = true\n\n[tracing.stdout]\nlevel = \"info\"\n\n[tracing.file]\nlevel = \"info\"\nmax_log_files = 14\n",
+              "content": "network = \"Mainnet\"\nfast_sync = true\ntarget_max_memory = 8589934592\n\n[rpc.restricted]\nenable = true\n\n[tracing.stdout]\nlevel = \"info\"\n\n[tracing.file]\nlevel = \"info\"\nmax_log_files = 14\n",
               "overwrite": false,
               "path": "/var/lib/archipelago/cuprate/Cuprated.toml"
             }
@@ -1350,8 +1350,8 @@
               "protocol": "tcp"
             },
             {
-              "auth": "none",
+              "auth": "open",
-              "auth_rationale": "Monero restricted RPC — the subset upstream considers safe for public/remote-node use. Wallets (Feather, monero-wallet-rpc, GUI) connect directly over plain HTTP JSON-RPC and cannot hold a dashboard session cookie.",
+              "auth_rationale": "Monero restricted RPC — the subset upstream considers safe for public/remote-node use. Wallets (Feather, monero-wallet-rpc, GUI) connect directly over plain HTTP JSON-RPC and cannot complete a browser login or hold a dashboard session cookie.",
               "container": 18089,
               "host": 18090,
               "protocol": "tcp"
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@
           "resources": {
             "cpu_limit": 0,
             "disk_limit": "300Gi",
-            "memory_limit": "4Gi"
+            "memory_limit": "10Gi"
           },
           "security": {
             "capabilities": [],
@@ -5429,7 +5429,7 @@
     }
   },
   "schema": 1,
-  "signature": "f982faeb9823062d9d39f6e4b38a171b4442cad0f35e74792ea161b5d77246ab9128044acbdc390ec23f921363af2d13bbba66c558b188d14d06a3f9a7f42406",
+  "signature": "3e87496a7197177ea295eba416cd1ed9a2c41ddca3328a160b1db2c65d39ce813c2b1e63df1313680a8e48e0113e2bbe6118df01df4a777bd33b189e7ef69206",
   "signed_by": "did:key:z6Mkfu5LT8d4DjETtrkATvHh9Dvcbnr7zBCUwfau8Sw7DLWT",
-  "updated": "2026-09-01"
+  "updated": "2026-09-03"
 }

releases/manifest.json

@@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
 {
   "changelog": [
-    "**Lightning sends work again — v1.8.9's payment switch lost the fee budget.** Moving payments to LND 0.21's supported route (Router.SendPaymentV2) shipped without a fee limit, and the v2 API treats an absent limit as **zero allowed fees**: every real route carries a routing fee, so the pathfinder rejected them all and the wallet answered \"No route to the recipient\" on every send — all day, on healthy channels with plenty of liquidity. The router debug log made it unambiguous (`fee_limit=0 mSAT` on every failing wallet payment; the same payment succeeded by hand the moment a fee limit was set). Payments now carry lncli's default budget (the payment amount), the wallet's amount handling for zero-value invoices is preserved, and a unit test pins the limit can never be zero again.",
+    "**Cuprate now syncs without burning a core for days.** The app's shipped config now enables Cuprate's checkpoint-backed `fast_sync` path, raises the database cache to 8 GiB, and gives the container a 10 GiB memory limit so the cache has real headroom. A live comparison that motivated the change saw the affected node sit around 45% CPU while the corrected config held near low single digits at the same chain height and block rate. The restricted RPC remains fronted through the safe app gate/Tor path.",
-    "**A channel that drops its peer link now heals itself — on every node.** Restarting LND (an app update, a reboot, container churn) can leave a channel's peer connection down for hours while both endpoints keep the channel flagged disabled in the routing graph: the node looks perfectly healthy, the wallet shows balance, and every payment in either direction fails \"no route to the recipient\". Observed live: a node's only channel sat unroutable for ~17 hours after the LND 0.21.2 update, with no sign of it in any dashboard. The daemon now watches the channel graph as desired state — every open channel should have a live peer — and reconnects any that don't, using the peer's advertised addresses. Nodes without LND are untouched; an unreachable peer is retried gently, not hammered.",
+    "**OpenWrt Gateway setup is documented from a real install, and two setup bugs are fixed.** The new guide walks a node operator through flashing a GL.iNet AX3000 to stock OpenWrt, pairing it with Archipelago, and installing TollGate pay-as-you-go WiFi. The installer now finds `opkg`/`apk` through the router's actual `PATH` instead of assuming `/usr/bin`, the UI no longer sends an empty password over a saved router connection, and the pinned TollGate package moves to `v0.5.0` with a native `.apk` install path where upstream provides one.",
-    "**The Lightning wallet states the node's real funding state instead of \"you have no channel.\"** Trying to send while a freshly opened channel was still waiting for on-chain confirmations — or when all its balance sits on the far side — raised a modal that claimed the node had NO channel at all (the outbound sum is legitimately zero in both states), pointed the user at opening a second channel, and — for payment routing failures — even showed the *receiving* copy. The funding gate now reads the channel list it already fetched: a confirming channel gets \"it unlocks automatically once confirmed, nothing is needed from you\", a far-side balance gets \"you can receive, but there's nothing to send right now\", a routing/liquidity payment failure says so instead of claiming channel problems, and only a genuinely channel-less node keeps the open-one guidance."
+    "**Release publishing now checks the public Gitea download links before a manifest goes live.** The publisher already fetched every artifact back and verified its size and SHA-256; this release adds a second guard for the release page itself, so a bad Gitea `ROOT_URL` or proxy setting cannot publish working files behind broken public HTTPS download links."
   ],
   "components": [
     {
-      "current_version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "current_version": "1.8.11-alpha",
-      "download_url": "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.10-alpha/archipelago",
+      "download_url": "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.11-alpha/archipelago",
       "name": "archipelago",
-      "new_version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "new_version": "1.8.11-alpha",
-      "sha256": "6c8bd41fed44cd999cb360c00e1b66a2d19d19812cc2b0c8a1677eec2a9579e6",
+      "sha256": "ae569054edd6b2491beb101815f6809bc00c95a7dbe86bd084bcb9a7c36e1853",
-      "size_bytes": 64178056
+      "size_bytes": 64179264
     },
     {
-      "current_version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "current_version": "1.8.11-alpha",
-      "download_url": "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.10-alpha/archipelago-frontend-1.8.10-alpha.tar.gz",
+      "download_url": "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.11-alpha/archipelago-frontend-1.8.11-alpha.tar.gz",
-      "name": "archipelago-frontend-1.8.10-alpha.tar.gz",
+      "name": "archipelago-frontend-1.8.11-alpha.tar.gz",
-      "new_version": "1.8.10-alpha",
+      "new_version": "1.8.11-alpha",
-      "sha256": "6b25de8a8e1a4f7fe51594f9bbbe21f5820f417af47a8b309c2dbf8f8723b719",
+      "sha256": "192fd0470b6ccf66e78c80b4a4c3af5468882b85d81959362a3bd11f88b9d71d",
-      "size_bytes": 97736297
+      "size_bytes": 97741740
     }
   ],
-  "release_date": "2026-09-01",
+  "release_date": "2026-09-07",
-  "signature": "b69926bcb1851ff7d6a5b24519cd4a8015aab4ed4b588ee989d8ce6e3beaeb2cc0eb38078f522ded0d389fe53b7dbcdbf3f40c534b4bfafa5cf4a2ab2c59e40f",
+  "signature": "6449ce6ef35a4ef4fa6d0923bb58a2bff52ea5430d5532496e8f0af9ed52eaec293f19d7bec272dc9bc1af5fb2cdfa0e46068c827a9a4dd9cbef92d1c5845301",
   "signed_by": "did:key:z6Mkfu5LT8d4DjETtrkATvHh9Dvcbnr7zBCUwfau8Sw7DLWT",
-  "version": "1.8.10-alpha"
+  "version": "1.8.11-alpha"
 }

scripts/check-gitea-release-download-links.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# check-gitea-release-download-links.sh - verify Gitea's public release page
+# points users at the canonical HTTPS download URLs, not an internal ROOT_URL.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   scripts/check-gitea-release-download-links.sh VERSION ASSET_NAME...
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+VERSION="${1:-}"
+if [ -z "$VERSION" ] || [ "$#" -lt 2 ]; then
+  echo "usage: $0 VERSION ASSET_NAME..." >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+shift
+
+PUBLIC_BASE="${ARCHY_RELEASE_PUBLIC_BASE:-https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy}"
+page_url="$PUBLIC_BASE/releases/tag/v$VERSION"
+
+command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "ERROR: curl required" >&2; exit 2; }
+command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "ERROR: python3 required" >&2; exit 2; }
+
+tmp="$(mktemp)"
+trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' EXIT
+curl -fsSL "$page_url" -o "$tmp"
+
+python3 - "$tmp" "$PUBLIC_BASE" "$VERSION" "$page_url" "$@" <<'PY'
+from html.parser import HTMLParser
+from urllib.parse import quote
+import sys
+
+html_path, public_base, version, page_url, *assets = sys.argv[1:]
+with open(html_path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
+    html = f.read()
+
+class LinkParser(HTMLParser):
+    def __init__(self):
+        super().__init__()
+        self.hrefs = []
+
+    def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs):
+        if tag.lower() != "a":
+            return
+        attrs = dict(attrs)
+        href = attrs.get("href")
+        if href:
+            self.hrefs.append(href)
+
+parser = LinkParser()
+parser.feed(html)
+hrefs = set(parser.hrefs)
+
+bad_internal = sorted(
+    h for h in hrefs
+    if "/releases/download/" in h and h.startswith(("http://", "https://"))
+    and not h.startswith(public_base + "/releases/download/")
+)
+
+failures = []
+for asset in assets:
+    expected = f"{public_base}/releases/download/v{quote(version)}/{quote(asset)}"
+    if expected not in hrefs:
+        matches = sorted(h for h in hrefs if h.endswith("/" + quote(asset)))
+        if matches:
+            failures.append(f"{asset}: expected {expected}, found {matches[0]}")
+        else:
+            failures.append(f"{asset}: expected {expected}, but no matching release-page link was found")
+
+if bad_internal:
+    failures.append("release page contains non-canonical download href(s):")
+    failures.extend(f"  {h}" for h in bad_internal[:10])
+
+if failures:
+    print(f"FAIL: public release page has broken download links: {page_url}", file=sys.stderr)
+    for failure in failures:
+        print(f"  {failure}", file=sys.stderr)
+    print(
+        "Fix the Gitea public URL/proxy configuration so release links are generated "
+        "from the canonical HTTPS origin, then re-run the publish check.",
+        file=sys.stderr,
+    )
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+print(f"OK: public release page download links use {public_base}")
+PY

scripts/publish-release-assets.sh

@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ echo "Verifying public download URLs (full GET + size + sha256)..."
 "$PROJECT_ROOT/scripts/check-release-assets.sh" "$MANIFEST" \
     || fail "asset verification failed — NOT pushing main. The manifest stays off the branch nodes read, so no node sees a version it cannot fetch. Repair the assets and re-run."
 
+"$PROJECT_ROOT/scripts/check-gitea-release-download-links.sh" "$VERSION" \
+    "archipelago" \
+    "archipelago-frontend-${VERSION}.tar.gz" \
+    || fail "release page download links are not public HTTPS URLs — fix Gitea ROOT_URL/proxy configuration before publishing."
+
 # Assets are proven fetchable — only now may the manifest become live. First
 # incorporate concurrent work, then promote in a dedicated commit. Until the
 # final push succeeds the remote still serves the previous manifest.
@@ -261,4 +266,10 @@ for b in bad:
 sys.exit(1 if bad else 0)
 PY
 
+"$PROJECT_ROOT/scripts/check-gitea-release-download-links.sh" "$VERSION" \
+    "$ISO_NAME" \
+    "$ISO_NAME.sha256" \
+    "$ISO_NAME.sha256.json" \
+    || fail "ISO is uploaded but the release page links are not public HTTPS URLs — fix Gitea ROOT_URL/proxy configuration."
+
 echo "ISO for v${VERSION} published and verified on $REMOTE."