chore(trust): rotate the release root to z6Mkfu5LT…DLWT

DO NOT MERGE INTO A RELEASE SIGNED WITH THE NEW KEY. See below.

The previous release root (z6Mkkid…q7ur, pinned 2026-07-02) was exposed
in a chat transcript and is treated as compromised. It signs both OTA
manifests and the app catalog, so anyone holding it could sign updates
the fleet would install.

Pins the new key in trust::anchor and moves EXPECTED_DID in all three
signing/publishing scripts.

ORDERING IS CRITICAL — nodes pin the OLD key:

  * The release CARRYING this commit must be signed with the OLD key.
    That is the only signature a node running the previous binary will
    accept, and it is what installs the binary pinning the new key.
  * Only the release AFTER that may be signed with the new key.
  * Signing this release with the new key makes every node reject it,
    ending OTA fleet-wide and requiring hands-on recovery per node.

sign-catalog.sh moves in the same commit, so the app catalog must also be
re-signed with the new key once this ships, or nodes accept the binary
and reject the catalog.

Key verified before pinning: the hex and the did:key are the same
keypair, checked with a base58 decoder round-tripped against the previous
known-good pair. An earlier candidate hex (cb830e13…) was rejected
because it decoded to a different DID than the one supplied — pinning it
would have made every node reject every future update.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

core/archipelago/src/trust/anchor.rs

@@ -16,13 +16,28 @@ use ed25519_dalek::VerifyingKey;
 
 /// Hex of the pinned Ed25519 release-root public key (32 bytes / 64 hex chars).
 ///
-/// Pinned 2026-07-02 from the release-root signing ceremony
+/// ROTATED 2026-08-04 to did:key:z6Mkfu5LT8d4DjETtrkATvHh9Dvcbnr7zBCUwfau8Sw7DLWT.
-/// (signer did:key:z6MkkidEnEpo6qHMCNSZoNKWtvQvxq3whnaME9wGgEFhq7ur). The
+///
+/// The previous root (z6Mkkid…q7ur, pinned 2026-07-02) was exposed in a chat
+/// transcript and is treated as compromised.
+///
+/// Rotation is ORDERING-CRITICAL. Nodes pin the OLD key, so the release that
+/// carries this change must itself be signed with the OLD key — that is the
+/// only signature a node running the previous binary will accept. Only the
+/// release AFTER it may be signed with the new key. Signing the rotation
+/// release with the new key makes every node reject it and ends OTA
+/// fleet-wide, recoverable only by touching each node by hand.
+///
+/// Verified before pinning: this hex and the did:key above are the same
+/// keypair (the did:key encodes exactly these 32 bytes), checked with a
+/// decoder round-tripped against the previous known-good pair. An earlier
+/// candidate hex was rejected because it did not match the stated DID.
+/// The
 /// corresponding mnemonic is held offline by the publisher — see
 /// `docs/workstream-b-signing-runbook.md`. Regenerate/verify with:
 /// `RELEASE_MASTER_MNEMONIC=… archipelago ceremony pubkey`.
 pub const RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX: Option<&str> =
-    Some("5d15cbee8a108f7dd288c02d29a1d9d71f198acc99186aad8008b4f28d469951");
+    Some("1578adccf137024159dd936f44a56e8869ac7775785962f7e92e2faf2c034418");
 
 const ENV_OVERRIDE: &str = "ARCHY_RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY";
 

scripts/create-release.sh

@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ install -m 0644 "$FRONTEND_ARCHIVE" "$VERSION_DIR/archipelago-frontend-${VERSION
 # warning and falls through — and the commit then happened anyway. A release
 # commit carrying a manifest no node will accept has no valid use, so refuse
 # to create one rather than leave a tag that has to be re-cut.
-EXPECTED_DID="did:key:z6MkkidEnEpo6qHMCNSZoNKWtvQvxq3whnaME9wGgEFhq7ur"
+EXPECTED_DID="did:key:z6Mkfu5LT8d4DjETtrkATvHh9Dvcbnr7zBCUwfau8Sw7DLWT"
 if ! grep -q '"signature":' "$PROJECT_ROOT/releases/manifest.json" \
     || ! grep -q "\"signed_by\": \"$EXPECTED_DID\"" "$PROJECT_ROOT/releases/manifest.json"; then
     echo "" >&2

scripts/publish-release-assets.sh

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ fail() { echo "Error: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
 # with the pinned release-root anchor refuse to auto-apply unsigned manifests,
 # and enforcement will tighten to hard-reject — an unsigned publish would
 # strand them. Grep proves presence; ceremony verify proves the crypto.
-EXPECTED_DID="did:key:z6MkkidEnEpo6qHMCNSZoNKWtvQvxq3whnaME9wGgEFhq7ur"
+EXPECTED_DID="did:key:z6Mkfu5LT8d4DjETtrkATvHh9Dvcbnr7zBCUwfau8Sw7DLWT"
 grep -q '"signature":' "$PROJECT_ROOT/releases/manifest.json" \
     && grep -q "\"signed_by\": \"$EXPECTED_DID\"" "$PROJECT_ROOT/releases/manifest.json" \
     || fail "releases/manifest.json is not signed by the release root — run: bash scripts/sign-manifest.sh"

scripts/sign-catalog.sh

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ set -euo pipefail
 
 REPO="/home/archipelago/Projects/archy"
 CATALOG="$REPO/releases/app-catalog.json"
-EXPECTED_DID="did:key:z6MkkidEnEpo6qHMCNSZoNKWtvQvxq3whnaME9wGgEFhq7ur"
+EXPECTED_DID="did:key:z6Mkfu5LT8d4DjETtrkATvHh9Dvcbnr7zBCUwfau8Sw7DLWT"
 
 # Use ONLY the prebuilt signer. If it isn't ready, stop cleanly — never compile
 # here (compiling caused the earlier hangs). Claude builds it in the background.