#!/usr/bin/env python3 """Fixed, root-owned image firewall. Never flush a foreign table or ruleset.""" import fcntl import json import os from pathlib import Path import stat import subprocess import sys MARKER = '# Archipelago image firewall v1\n' TABLES = {'archipelago_host': 'Archipelago image firewall v1: host', 'fips': 'Archipelago image firewall v1: fips'} def render(app_ports): if not app_ports or app_ports != sorted(set(app_ports)) or any(type(p) is not int or not 1 <= p <= 65535 for p in app_ports): raise ValueError('invalid reviewed app port inventory') ports = ', '.join(map(str, app_ports)) # A separate FIPS chain preserves the existing publishing/SSH drop-in API. # All includes are behind the interface check, including old unscoped rules. fips = MARKER + '''add table inet fips delete table inet fips table inet fips { comment "Archipelago image firewall v1: fips" chain input { type filter hook input priority -5; policy accept; iifname != "fips0" return ct state invalid drop ct state established,related accept meta l4proto ipv6-icmp accept ip protocol icmp accept udp dport 51820 accept include "/etc/fips/fips.d/*.nft" drop } } ''' host = MARKER + '''# Each replacement is scoped; both tables apply in one nft transaction. include "/etc/fips/fips.nft" add table inet archipelago_host delete table inet archipelago_host table inet archipelago_host { comment "Archipelago image firewall v1: host" chain local_services { # LAN/private mesh app UIs; wallet/RPC ports are not opened wholesale. tcp dport { 22, 7777, APP_PORTS } accept } chain input { type filter hook input priority 10; policy drop; ct state invalid drop iifname "lo" accept ct state established,related accept # fips0 already passed the independently default-denying FIPS chain. iifname "fips0" accept # IP errors/PMTU plus the link-local control traffic needed by IPv6. ip protocol icmp icmp type { destination-unreachable, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept meta l4proto ipv6-icmp icmpv6 type { destination-unreachable, packet-too-big, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept meta l4proto ipv6-icmp ip6 hoplimit 255 icmpv6 type { nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-neighbor-advert } accept meta l4proto ipv6-icmp ip6 saddr fe80::/10 ip6 hoplimit 255 icmpv6 type nd-router-advert accept meta l4proto ipv6-icmp ip6 saddr fe80::/10 ip6 hoplimit 1 icmpv6 type { 130, 131, 132, 143 } accept ip protocol icmp icmp type echo-request limit rate 5/second burst 10 packets accept meta l4proto ipv6-icmp icmpv6 type echo-request limit rate 5/second burst 10 packets accept # DHCP clients, never a host DHCP server or general DNS resolver. udp sport 67 udp dport 68 accept ip6 saddr fe80::/10 udp sport 547 udp dport 546 accept # mDNS is link-local, including FIPS LAN discovery; not an arbitrary UDP port. ip daddr 224.0.0.251 ip ttl 255 udp dport 5353 accept ip6 daddr ff02::fb ip6 hoplimit 255 udp dport 5353 accept # Dashboard, authenticated federation, encrypted FIPS transport, and P2P. tcp dport { 80, 443, 5679, 8443, 8333, 9735 } accept # FIPS published UDP (not upstream 8668), WireGuard, Tailscale transport. udp dport { 2121, 51820, 41641 } accept ip saddr { 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16 } jump local_services ip6 saddr { fc00::/7, fe80::/10 } jump local_services iifname { "wg0", "tailscale0" } jump local_services # The separately owned web_tunnel table must still authorize its peer. iifname "wg-web" tcp dport { 18081, 18443 } accept } chain forward { type filter hook forward priority 10; policy drop; ct state invalid drop ct state established,related accept # Authenticated WireGuard clients retain their existing full-tunnel route. iifname "wg0" ip saddr 10.44.0.0/16 oifname != "wg0" accept # Rootless apps use host sockets. These are rootful Podman/CNI/Docker # compatibility paths; their independent isolation/filter tables still run. iifname "podman*" accept iifname "cni-podman*" accept iifname "docker0" accept ct status dnat oifname "podman*" accept ct status dnat oifname "cni-podman*" accept ct status dnat oifname "docker0" accept # No blanket br-* or LAN/WAN route: br-tollgate must never become free access. } chain output { type filter hook output priority 10; policy accept; } } '''.replace('APP_PORTS', ports) return { 'etc/archipelago/host-firewall.nft': host.encode(), 'etc/fips/fips.nft': fips.encode(), 'etc/fips/fips.d/80-web-ui.nft': (MARKER + 'tcp dport { 80, 443, 8443, 5679 } accept\n').encode(), 'etc/fips/fips.d/85-app-ports.nft': (MARKER + 'tcp dport { ' + ports + ' } accept\n').encode(), 'etc/fips/fips.d/90-ssh.nft': (MARKER + '# SSH over mesh is disabled until explicitly appointed.\n').encode(), } def protected(path, root, directory=False): relative = path.relative_to(root) current = root for part in ('', *relative.parts): if part: current /= part info = current.lstat() is_dir = current != path or directory if (not (stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode) if is_dir else stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) and info.st_nlink == 1) or info.st_uid != os.geteuid() or info.st_mode & 0o022): raise ValueError('unprotected firewall object: ' + str(current)) if not directory and info.st_size > 65536: raise ValueError('firewall input exceeds limit') def run_nft(args, nft='/usr/sbin/nft'): result = subprocess.run([nft, *args], stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, env={'PATH': '/usr/sbin:/usr/bin', 'LC_ALL': 'C'}) if result.returncode or len(result.stdout) > 1048576: raise ValueError('nft check/apply failed; existing kernel rules retained or outcome requires inspection') return result.stdout def apply(root=Path('/'), nft='/usr/sbin/nft'): # The CLI has a fixed root; the parameter exists for disposable namespace tests. base = root / 'etc/archipelago/host-firewall.nft' fips = root / 'etc/fips/fips.nft' dropins = root / 'etc/fips/fips.d' protected(dropins, root, True) files = [base, fips, *sorted(dropins.glob('*.nft'))] if len(files) > 66: raise ValueError('too many firewall drop-ins') total = 0 for path in files: protected(path, root) total += path.stat().st_size if total > 131072 or not base.read_text().startswith(MARKER) or not fips.read_text().startswith(MARKER): raise ValueError('unrecognized image firewall baseline') tables = json.loads(run_nft(['--json', 'list', 'tables'], nft))['nftables'] for row in tables: table = row.get('table', {}) name = table.get('name') if table.get('family') == 'inet' and name in TABLES: observed = json.loads(run_nft(['--json', 'list', 'table', 'inet', name], nft))['nftables'] declarations = [entry['table'] for entry in observed if 'table' in entry] if len(declarations) != 1 or declarations[0].get('comment') != TABLES[name]: raise ValueError('foreign reserved table preserved: ' + name) run_nft(['--check', '--file', str(base)], nft) run_nft(['--file', str(base)], nft) if __name__ == '__main__': if len(sys.argv) != 1 or os.geteuid() != 0: raise SystemExit('fixed root firewall service takes no arguments') fd = os.open('/run/archipelago-host-firewall.lock', os.O_CREAT | os.O_RDWR | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600) try: info = os.fstat(fd) if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != 0 or info.st_nlink != 1 or info.st_mode & 0o077: raise ValueError('unsafe firewall lock') fcntl.flock(fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX) apply() finally: os.close(fd)