172 lines
7.3 KiB
Bash
Executable File
172 lines
7.3 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# build-bitcoin-image.sh — reproducible, verified, rootless Bitcoin image builder
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# (docs/bitcoin-multi-version-design.md §3 Phase 0).
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#
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# Downloads an OFFICIAL upstream release tarball + SHA256SUMS(.asc), verifies the
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# SHA-256 AND the OpenPGP signature (fail-closed), then builds a minimal rootless
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# image and tags/pushes it to our registry as :<version>. Nodes only ever pull
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# from our registry — they never fetch bitcoincore.org / bitcoinknots.org. The
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# DHT Phase-0 catalog signature then carries provenance to the fleet.
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#
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# Usage:
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# scripts/build-bitcoin-image.sh core 31.0
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# scripts/build-bitcoin-image.sh knots 29.3.knots20260508
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# NO_PUSH=1 scripts/build-bitcoin-image.sh core 31.0 # build + verify only
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#
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# Env:
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# NO_PUSH=1 build + verify, do not push
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# ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1 skip the GPG signature check (NOT for production)
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# REQUIRE_PINNED=1 additionally require a signature from a pinned release key
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# ARCHY_REGISTRY overrides the push registry (default from image-versions.sh)
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set -euo pipefail
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IMPL="${1:?usage: build-bitcoin-image.sh <core|knots> <version>}"
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VERSION="${2:?usage: build-bitcoin-image.sh <core|knots> <version>}"
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ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
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# shellcheck disable=SC1091
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source "$ROOT/scripts/image-versions.sh"
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REGISTRY="${ARCHY_REGISTRY:?ARCHY_REGISTRY unset}"
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# Pinned upstream release-signing fingerprints (REQUIRE_PINNED=1 enforces these).
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# Bitcoin Core SHA256SUMS for 25.x–31.x are signed by these maintainers; Knots by
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# Luke Dashjr. Verified against the live signatures at build time.
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# SHA256SUMS is a MULTI-signature file (every Guix builder signs it). We require
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# a valid signature from at least one of these well-known release maintainers —
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# the ones who sign every Bitcoin Core / Knots SHA256SUMS — and ignore builder
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# sigs whose keys we don't hold. Both the primary fpr and the signing-subkey fpr
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# that may appear in VALIDSIG are listed.
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CORE_SIGNERS=(
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"0CCBAAFD76A2ECE2CCD3141DE2FFD5B1D88CA97D" # fanquake (primary)
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"E777299FC265DD04793070EB944D35F9AC3DB76A" # fanquake (subkey)
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"152812300785C96444D3334D17565732E08E5E41" # achow101
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"71A3B16735405025D447E8F274810B012346C9A6" # laanwj (older releases)
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)
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KNOTS_SIGNERS=(
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"1A3E761F19D2CC7785C5502EA291A2C45D0C504A" # Luke Dashjr
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)
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case "$IMPL" in
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core)
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TARBALL="bitcoin-${VERSION}-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz"
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BASEURL="https://bitcoincore.org/bin/bitcoin-core-${VERSION}"
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IMAGE_REPO="bitcoin"
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SIGNERS=("${CORE_SIGNERS[@]}")
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;;
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knots)
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MAJOR="${VERSION%%.*}"
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TARBALL="bitcoin-${VERSION}-x86_64-linux-gnu.tar.gz"
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BASEURL="https://bitcoinknots.org/files/${MAJOR}.x/${VERSION}"
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IMAGE_REPO="bitcoin-knots"
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SIGNERS=("${KNOTS_SIGNERS[@]}")
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;;
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*) echo "impl must be 'core' or 'knots'" >&2; exit 2 ;;
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esac
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TAG="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE_REPO}:${VERSION}"
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WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
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cd "$WORK"
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# podman/skopeo stage image copies under TMPDIR (default /var/tmp). Point it at a
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# writable dir so `podman push` works in sandboxes where /var/tmp is read-only.
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export TMPDIR="$WORK/tmp"; mkdir -p "$TMPDIR"
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echo "==> [$IMPL $VERSION] downloading from $BASEURL"
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curl -fsSL -o "$TARBALL" "${BASEURL}/${TARBALL}"
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curl -fsSL -o SHA256SUMS "${BASEURL}/SHA256SUMS"
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curl -fsSL -o SHA256SUMS.asc "${BASEURL}/SHA256SUMS.asc"
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echo "==> verifying SHA-256"
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# SHA256SUMS lists every platform; check only our tarball line. Fail-closed.
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grep " ${TARBALL}\$" SHA256SUMS | sha256sum -c - \
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|| { echo "FATAL: SHA-256 mismatch for ${TARBALL}" >&2; exit 1; }
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if [[ "${ALLOW_UNSIGNED:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
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echo "==> WARNING: ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1 — skipping GPG verification (NOT production)"
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else
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echo "==> verifying OpenPGP signature on SHA256SUMS"
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# A persistent, pre-seeded keyring (BITCOIN_KEYRING_DIR) makes verification
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# reliable across many builds — keyserver fetches are flaky when each build
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# starts from an empty keyring. Falls back to a per-build keyring + fetch.
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if [[ -n "${BITCOIN_KEYRING_DIR:-}" ]]; then
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export GNUPGHOME="$BITCOIN_KEYRING_DIR"
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else
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export GNUPGHOME="$WORK/gnupg"
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fi
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mkdir -p "$GNUPGHOME"; chmod 700 "$GNUPGHOME"
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# Ensure each pinned maintainer key is present (best-effort fetch).
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for kid in "${SIGNERS[@]}"; do
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gpg --list-keys "$kid" >/dev/null 2>&1 && continue
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for ks in hkps://keys.openpgp.org hkps://keyserver.ubuntu.com hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com; do
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gpg --keyserver "$ks" --recv-keys "$kid" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break || true
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done
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done
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# SHA256SUMS carries many builder signatures; `gpg --verify`'s exit code is
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# unreliable for multi-sig files (one unheld key flips it). Instead collect the
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# VALIDSIG fingerprints via --status-fd and REQUIRE at least one from a pinned
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# maintainer. Fail-closed otherwise.
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# `|| true`: gpg exits non-zero on multi-sig files even with good sigs; we
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# judge trust from VALIDSIG below, not the exit code (and set -e/pipefail would
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# otherwise abort here).
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VALID_FPRS="$(gpg --status-fd=1 --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMS 2>/dev/null \
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| awk '/^\[GNUPG:\] VALIDSIG/ {print $3; print $NF}' | sort -u || true)"
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ok=0; matched=""
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for fpr in $VALID_FPRS; do
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for want in "${SIGNERS[@]}"; do
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[[ "$fpr" == "$want" ]] && { ok=1; matched="$fpr"; }
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done
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done
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if [[ "$ok" != "1" ]]; then
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echo "FATAL: no valid signature from a pinned release maintainer on SHA256SUMS" >&2
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echo " valid signers seen: ${VALID_FPRS:-none}" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo " verified: valid maintainer signature ($matched)"
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fi
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echo "==> extracting binaries"
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tar -xzf "$TARBALL"
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SRC="bitcoin-${VERSION}"
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[[ -x "${SRC}/bin/bitcoind" ]] || { echo "FATAL: bitcoind missing in tarball" >&2; exit 1; }
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mkdir -p ctx/bin
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cp "${SRC}/bin/bitcoind" "${SRC}/bin/bitcoin-cli" ctx/bin/
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echo "==> building rootless image $TAG"
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cat > ctx/Containerfile <<'EOF'
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FROM debian:bookworm-slim
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RUN set -eux; \
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apt-get update; \
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apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates; \
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rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*; \
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useradd -m -u 1000 -s /bin/bash bitcoin; \
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mkdir -p /home/bitcoin/.bitcoin; \
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chown -R bitcoin:bitcoin /home/bitcoin
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COPY bin/bitcoind /usr/local/bin/bitcoind
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COPY bin/bitcoin-cli /usr/local/bin/bitcoin-cli
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RUN chmod 0755 /usr/local/bin/bitcoind /usr/local/bin/bitcoin-cli
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# Run as (container) root, exactly like the legacy hand-built :latest image.
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# Rootless Podman maps container-root to the unprivileged host service user, and
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# the manifest grants CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE so bitcoind can read its data dir — which
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# the orchestrator chowns to the data_uid (host 100101 / container uid 102), NOT
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# to this image's `bitcoin` user. A non-root USER here can't read existing chain
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# data and bitcoind crash-loops with "Error initializing block database".
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WORKDIR /home/bitcoin
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VOLUME ["/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin"]
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EXPOSE 8332 8333
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ENTRYPOINT ["bitcoind"]
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EOF
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podman build -t "$TAG" ctx
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echo "==> smoke test (bitcoind --version)"
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podman run --rm --entrypoint bitcoind "$TAG" --version | head -1
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if [[ "${NO_PUSH:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
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echo "==> NO_PUSH=1 — built + verified $TAG (not pushed)"
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else
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echo "==> pushing $TAG"
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# The lfg2025 registry serves plain HTTP (matches image_uses_insecure_registry
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# in the Rust runtime). PODMAN_PUSH_TLS_VERIFY=true forces TLS for HTTPS regs.
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podman push --tls-verify="${PODMAN_PUSH_TLS_VERIFY:-false}" "$TAG"
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echo "==> pushed $TAG"
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fi
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