Files
archy/apps/cuprate/manifest.yml
T
archipelago 7b88ba59b2
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 40s
chore(apps): bump the pins that need no mirroring; curate Cuprate's store entry
Pin bumps (all verified pullable from their public registries before
editing, so none can become an image-not-found on a node):

  strfry           1.1.1 -> 1.1.2              (dockurr/strfry, direct pull)
  btcpay-server    2.4.2 -> 2.4.3             (docker.io/btcpayserver, direct pull)
  netbird (nginx)  1.31.3-alpine -> 1.31.4-alpine
  pine   (nginx)   1.31.3-alpine -> 1.31.4-alpine

image-versions.sh moved in lockstep for BTCPAY_IMAGE — it is the baseline
the update badge compares against. Held back deliberately, per the risk
policy from the Aug-17 pass: gitea (four minors of DB migrations),
portainer (six minors), filebrowser (2.27 -> 2.63), fedimint/gateway
(0.8 -> 0.12, real migrations), lnd (money-critical), netbird-server/
netbird-dashboard (0.x, must move in lockstep), and everything with a
major jump or a data migration.

Cuprate also gets its curated store entry (category money, tier optional,
icon, repo) — same shape as the Alby Hub / phoenixd entries — synced
through generate-app-catalog.py into both store catalogs and the
app-session config. The fips launch-port list is unchanged (Cuprate has
no UI port; the generated file round-trips to the committed bytes after
cargo fmt).

Three further bumps are prepared and parked on the
app-bumps-mirror-pending branch, blocked only on a registry-push token:
vaultwarden 1.37.2-alpine, archy-nbxplorer 2.6.11, home-assistant
2026.8.3 — all mirror-backed, and the push credential on record for the
lfg2025 namespace is dead.

Drift gate: check-app-catalog-drift.py --release --strict clean
(31 store entries, 0 drift, 0 missing). appSessionConfig tests 7/7.
2026-08-30 16:22:26 -04:00

158 lines
7.4 KiB
YAML

app:
id: cuprate
name: Cuprate
# Matches the crate's own Cargo.toml version (binaries/cuprated/Cargo.toml).
# Cuprate has no stable release yet — this is explicitly work-in-progress
# software (see upstream README). The image tag below pins the exact
# commit built, since "0.1.0-preview" alone is not reproducible.
version: 0.1.0-preview
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: Cuprate/cuprate
description: Alternative Monero node implementation in Rust. Independently validates Monero consensus rules, providing a layer of security and redundancy for the network.
category: money
metadata:
icon: /assets/img/app-icons/cuprate.svg
repo: https://github.com/Cuprate/cuprate
tier: optional
container:
# Built from the upstream Dockerfile at the tip of main, 18 commits past
# the cuprated-0.1.0-preview tag (commit 618ff14, 2026-08-19) — there is
# no newer tagged release as of this writing. Re-pin to a tagged release
# once upstream cuts one.
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/cuprate:0.1.0-preview-18-g618ff14
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
# The image's own ENTRYPOINT is ["/usr/local/bin/cuprated"]; these are
# appended as its argv, matching the project's own systemd unit
# (cuprated.service) invocation exactly.
custom_args: ["--config-file", "/home/cuprate/Cuprated.toml"]
# The image (FROM scratch) creates uid:gid 1000:1000 for the `cuprate`
# user at build time and runs as it unconditionally (USER 1000:1000,
# no shell to switch users at runtime) — same pattern as
# apps/phoenixd, apps/electrumx, apps/nostr-rs-relay, apps/portainer,
# apps/barkd. The bind-mounted data dir must be owned by that literal
# uid or cuprated dies on a permission error the first time it writes.
data_uid: "1000:1000"
dependencies:
# Monero mainnet is ~250GiB unpruned as of 2026 and growing a few GB a
# month; cuprated's pruning support is not confirmed stable yet (the
# `pruning` crate exists in the workspace but nothing in this config
# surface toggles it), so this sizes for a full unpruned chain plus
# headroom rather than assuming pruning is available.
- storage: 300Gi
resources:
cpu_limit: 0
memory_limit: 4Gi
disk_limit: 300Gi
security:
# FROM scratch, no package manager/shell, ownership fixed at build time
# — unlike bitcoin-knots this needs no runtime chown/setuid dance, so it
# can run fully read-only with an empty capability set.
capabilities: []
readonly_root: true
no_new_privileges: true
network_policy: isolated
ports:
# P2P. Cuprate's own default listen address is already 0.0.0.0
# (p2p.clear_net.listen_on), so no config override is needed — only the
# host-side port differs from Monero's canonical 18080 because that
# number is already taken on this fleet by lnd's REST port.
- host: 18183
container: 18080
protocol: tcp
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
Monero p2p gossip. Peers are anonymous by design and speak the Monero wire protocol, not HTTP.
# Unrestricted RPC (full node control) is deliberately NOT published.
# cuprated has no RPC authentication, and for a published port to reach
# it the service would have to bind 0.0.0.0 inside the container — at
# which point every other app can reach it directly on 18081, since
# ports[].bind only restricts the HOST side and podman bridges route to
# each other (verified live 2026-08-22: a peer container on archy-net
# got an unauthenticated get_info, from a *different* network). That is
# unlike bitcoin-knots, whose 0.0.0.0 RPC still demands the rpcuser /
# rpcpassword it writes from generated secrets. So unrestricted RPC is
# left at cuprated's own default — container loopback only, reachable by
# nothing — which is also what upstream intends by refusing a non-local
# bind without an explicit i_know_what_im_doing override.
# Restricted RPC: Monero's own purpose-built safe-for-public subset —
# what wallets use when connecting to a "remote node". Disabled by
# cuprated's own default; enabled via files[] below. A dashboard login
# would break wallet clients connecting programmatically, same
# reasoning as electrumx's port. The daemon still uses its canonical
# container port 18089, but Penpot already owns host port 18089, so this
# maps the public host port to the free 18090 instead.
- host: 18090
container: 18089
protocol: tcp
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
Monero restricted RPC — the subset upstream considers safe for public/remote-node use. Wallets (Feather, monero-wallet-rpc, GUI) connect directly over plain HTTP JSON-RPC and cannot hold a dashboard session cookie.
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/cuprate
target: /home/cuprate
options: [rw]
# Settings that need to differ from cuprated's own documented defaults
# (verified against `cuprated --generate-config` and `--dry-run` locally,
# 2026-08-21):
# - target_max_memory: cuprated's own default auto-detects total *host*
# RAM via sysinfo, which inside a memory-limited container would let
# it size caches far past what resources.memory_limit above actually
# grants — same class of problem bitcoin-knots' -dbcache sizing
# comment addresses. Set explicitly, comfortably under the 4Gi limit.
# - rpc.restricted.enable: cuprated ships this off by default; flip on
# so the auth:none host port above actually serves something instead
# of refusing every connection. port stays at its documented default
# (canonical 18089), and advertise stays false — this node is not
# opting in to being listed as a public remote node over the p2p
# network, just reachable if someone points a wallet at it directly.
# - rpc.unrestricted.address + the allow-public flag: cuprated's own
# default (127.0.0.1) looks like the obviously-correct choice for a
# port meant to stay loopback-only, but verified live (2026-08-21)
# that a service bound literally to 127.0.0.1 *inside* the container
# is unreachable through the host's published port — connections
# reset regardless of how long the daemon has been up. Binding
# 0.0.0.0 inside and letting ports[].bind: 127.0.0.1 below be the
# actual restriction is the same pattern apps/bitcoin-knots already
# uses for its own RPC port (-rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 internally, gate
# restricts it externally) — not a new risk, the same one already
# reviewed and accepted for Bitcoin's RPC.
files:
- path: /var/lib/archipelago/cuprate/Cuprated.toml
content: |
network = "Mainnet"
target_max_memory = 3000000000
[rpc.restricted]
enable = true
overwrite: false
health_check:
type: tcp
# Restricted RPC — the only RPC surface published now.
endpoint: localhost:18090
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 5m
metadata:
icon: /assets/img/app-icons/cuprate.svg
category: money
tier: optional
author: Cuprate
repo: https://github.com/Cuprate/cuprate