Closes the three exploitable findings from the 2026-07-31 entropy/seed audit.
Wave 1 (parallel):
- 10-01 KEY-01: shared onboarding gate refuses seed.generate/seed.restore/
seed.save-encrypted/backup.restore-identity/auth.setup on a provisioned node,
plus an auth.onboardingComplete guard and retry-budget-derived rate limits.
Independently shippable (D-11): no depends_on, no shared files.
- 10-03 KEY-02: first-boot secret regeneration retries with backoff then fails
closed; rootfs tar ships identity-free so failure degrades to "no key".
- 10-05 KEY-03: delete the uncalled bitcoin.init-wallet-from-seed xprv-import
path (D-07b); make LND's PSBT round trip first-class with a key-origin report.
Wave 2:
- 10-02 (deps 10-01) KEY-01/KEY-04: on-node C-6 exposure measurement, live
refusal proof, fresh-node onboarding non-regression.
- 10-04 (deps 10-03) KEY-02/KEY-04: fleet detection of image-baked host secrets,
guarded rotation behind a D-06 decision checkpoint, C-3 two-node verification.
Planning-time scoping correction recorded in 10-01: D-03 names
NodeIdentity::key_exists as the on-disk "onboarded" signal, but server.rs:63-71
writes a temporary node_key on every boot, so that signal is true on fresh nodes
and would brick first-boot onboarding. D-03's dual-signal intent is preserved
with is_setup / is_onboarding_complete / seed_exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
