lfg2025/archy

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Dorian 981296e8b0 fix(companion): backup + signer live inside the hub modal, not standalone screens

Field feedback on 0.5.28: the standalone Backup/Signer screens were hard
to read over the synthwave background, back left the app instead of the
menu, and they broke the hub's one-container interaction model. Both are
now hub sub-pages exactly like Nodes/FIPS:

- BackupSection / SignerSection (ui/components) render inside the NESMenu
  panel with the menu's own dark glass surface, scrim, and palette — the
  readability and theming problem disappears with the standalone surface.
- The header back arrow returns to the hub card page (same as Nodes).
- The panel height cap drops from 92% to 70% of the screen — ~15%
  breathing margin top and bottom; content scrolls inside.
- The pairing QR scanner is hosted by NESMenu OUTSIDE the panel
  (QrGlassModal is a full-screen Box, not a Dialog — inside the panel's
  scroll it would clip), and decoded nostrconnect:// URIs funnel into the
  signer section through the same latch as the deep link.
- The nostrconnect:// deep link now routes to the session and pops the
  hub open on the signer sub-page (SignerLaunch singleton) instead of a
  dedicated route; standalone screens and routes removed.
- BunkerManager.refreshState is now a proper suspend fun (was
  runBlocking on the caller's dispatcher).

Docs updated to the new locations. Rebuilt for on-device testing
(v0.5.28-debug/vc48, same signing cert).

2026-08-31 14:23:04 +01:00

4.1 KiB

Raw Blame History

Companion backup & restore — the phone side of a border crossing (#128)

Status: shipped in companion 0.5.28 (vc48). Issue: #128 ("Graphene phone backup/restore — part of the companion app or passport prime combo").

The problem

The companion holds real secrets: node addresses and login passwords, the phone's FIPS mesh identity (which nodes peer with), and — since 0.5.28 — the remote-signer key. Losing the phone, or wiping it to cross a border, loses all of it. On GrapheneOS there is no cloud backup and there should be none here either: the export is a plain file the user saves wherever they choose (USB drive, computer, a folder synced their way), sealed with a passphrase.

The envelope — the node's, not a second format

Backups use the node's ADR-005 encrypted-backup envelope (core/archipelago/src/backup/identity.rs), byte-for-byte:

Argon2id key derivation (RustCrypto argon2, default params — same as the node's Argon2::default()), passphrase in, 16-byte random salt.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD with a 12-byte random nonce.
Envelope JSON: {"version": 1, "kind": "companion", "encrypted": true, "blob": "<base64(salt‖nonce‖ct)>", "timestamp": "<rfc3339>"}
The native code (Android/rust/archy-fips-core/src/backup.rs) is the same crate family as the node's backup code; decrypt ignores unknown envelope fields, so a node identity backup (which carries did/pubkey/kid) also decrypts here — one envelope, two producers.

The encrypted payload is the companion's own JSON:

{
  "app": "archipelago-companion",
  "payloadVersion": 1,
  "appVersion": "0.5.28",
  "createdAt": 1725100000,
  "servers": ["<serialized ServerEntry>", …],
  "active": "<serialized ServerEntry or null>",
  "fips": {"secret","npub","address","peers","partyPeers","partyName","partyListen"},
  "signer": {"secret": "<hex>"},
  "flags": {"introSeen": true}
}

Where the code lives

Crypto: Android/rust/archy-fips-core/src/backup.rs (+ JNI NativeCore.backupEncrypt/Decrypt). Host cargo test covers round-trip, wrong-passphrase, tampered-blob, node-shape envelopes, and salt/nonce freshness.
Payload/merge: BackupManager (Android/app/src/main/java/com/archipelago/app/data/BackupManager.kt).
UI: a hub sub-page (ui/components/BackupSection.kt, opened from the three-finger hub menu like Nodes/FIPS) — SAF file picker (CreateDocument for export, OpenDocument for import), passphrase fields, verified-backup preview, result summary. The suggested export name is archy-companion-backup-YYYYMMDD-HHmmss.json.

Restore semantics — never silently destructive

What	On restore
Servers	Upsert (`ServerPreferences.upsertServer`): same npub merges (even when every address changed), new ones append
Active server	Set only when this phone has none (the fresh-wipe case)
FIPS identity	Restored only when this phone has none; node peers UNION by npub (`FipsPreferences.mergePeersJson`); party peers merge by npub
Signer key	Restored only when this phone has none
introSeen flag	Restored (no re-onboarding after a restore)

The identity rules exist because a phone that already paired has a live mesh identity nodes peer with; swapping it in from a backup would strand the current pairing.

Test checklist (on-device)

Export → file saved, version: 1, kind: companion, base64 blob ≥ 44 chars.
Wrong passphrase on import → "wrong passphrase" error, no state change.
Correct passphrase → preview shows the right server count; restore on a second install (or after clearing app data) reconnects to the node without re-pairing, mesh included.
Re-scan the node's QR after restore → no duplicate entry.
The old phone's password for a node restores (login works on the new phone).

Roadmap notes (node-side, tracked separately)

Node-side storage/quota/scheduling for companion backups ("passport prime combo") is roadmap territory — this issue's scope was the phone side. The envelope is ready to be a drop-in for the node's existing backup RPCs when that lands.

4.1 KiB Raw Blame History