Files
archy/core/archipelago/src/device_tokens.rs
T
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 09a1f7621c feat(10-06): name every entropy source and guard key draws (KEY-05 a/d)
Closes F-10a. Nothing here fixes a present defect: on the pinned rand
0.8.5, rand::random() and thread_rng() both resolve to a ChaCha12 CSPRNG
seeded from getrandom(2). What they lack is a STATED backend — it is
fixed by dependency and build configuration rather than by the calling
code, with no compile error if that changes. That is the structural
shape behind the 2026-07-30 COLDCARD entropy defect, and here the blast
radius includes Cashu blinded-key-exchange values, X3DH prekey material,
session bearer tokens and a ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce.

Layer (a) — every production key, nonce and token draw now names
rand::rngs::OsRng at its own call site. The mnemonic seam is bound to
entropy::KeyGenRng, a SEALED allowlist whose supertrait lives in a
private module, so the set of RNGs that can drive the master key
hierarchy is exactly what one file says it is. This retires the false
promise at seed.rs:656: rand::CryptoRng is a marker with no
compiler-checked content, and the crate now contains zero impls of it.

Layer (d) — key material and AEAD nonces of >=12 bytes run a
degenerate-entropy predicate that refuses all-zero, all-identical and
wrapping +/-1 counter draws. Nothing heuristic: no entropy estimator, no
chi-squared. Each of the three shapes has a false-positive probability
computable in closed form (3 * 2^-88 at 12 bytes, 3 * 2^-248 at 32), and
a predicate whose false-positive rate cannot be computed cannot be
argued safe on a key-generation path. There is deliberately no retry — a
retry would paper over the broken RNG this exists to surface.

Layer (e) — the kernel-CSPRNG readiness verdict at master-seed
generation is now durable (backlog R-09). It was previously computed,
logged and thrown away, so a node could never answer after the fact
whether its keys were born from a seeded pool. The record holds a schema
version, timestamp, verdict and event name — no entropy, no key bytes.

Formats and wire shapes are proven unchanged rather than asserted:
storage_crypto and the credential store each open a HARDCODED
pre-migration ciphertext vector (a same-process round trip would pass
even if the envelope had changed), the vector was produced by an
independent RFC 8439 implementation so it pins the documented
nonce||ciphertext format rather than this implementation's output, and
the x3dh prekey bundle and bdhke values keep their field set and order.

totp.rs migrates its SOURCE only: the % charset.len() reduction and the
32-char charset are untouched. The bias there is presently zero (32
divides 256) and fixing the latent bias is R-12, which stays deferred.

Verified: cargo build clean; cargo test -p archipelago 1068 passed,
2 failed. Both failures are container::boot_reconciler timing tests
(second_pass_fires_after_interval, shutdown_terminates_loop) in a file
this change does not touch — pre-existing, not caused here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-02 16:27:34 -04:00

137 lines
4.7 KiB
Rust

//! Companion device tokens — long-lived bearer credentials minted from an
//! authenticated session, so the pairing QR can log a phone in without
//! carrying the admin password (which the browser never has anyway).
//!
//! Only the SHA-256 of each token is persisted (`device-tokens.json` in the
//! data dir); the plaintext is returned exactly once at mint time and rides
//! the QR as the `tok` param. Verification goes through `auth.login`'s
//! `token` param and is covered by the same login rate limiter as passwords.
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use tokio::fs;
const TOKENS_FILE: &str = "device-tokens.json";
/// Cap on stored tokens; re-pairing the same device name replaces its entry,
/// so this only limits the number of *distinct* device names.
const MAX_TOKENS: usize = 32;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DeviceToken {
pub name: String,
/// Hex SHA-256 of the plaintext token.
pub hash: String,
/// Unix seconds at mint time.
pub created: u64,
}
fn tokens_path(data_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
data_dir.join(TOKENS_FILE)
}
async fn load(data_dir: &Path) -> Vec<DeviceToken> {
match fs::read(tokens_path(data_dir)).await {
Ok(bytes) => serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap_or_default(),
Err(_) => Vec::new(),
}
}
async fn save(data_dir: &Path, tokens: &[DeviceToken]) -> Result<()> {
let bytes = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(tokens)?;
fs::write(tokens_path(data_dir), bytes)
.await
.context("write device-tokens.json")
}
fn hash_hex(token: &str) -> String {
hex::encode(Sha256::digest(token.as_bytes()))
}
fn ct_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
if a.len() != b.len() {
return false;
}
a.iter().zip(b).fold(0u8, |acc, (x, y)| acc | (x ^ y)) == 0
}
/// Mint a new token for `name`. An existing token with the same name is
/// replaced, so re-showing the pairing QR never piles up stale entries.
/// Returns the plaintext token — the only time it ever exists outside the QR.
pub async fn create(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) -> Result<String> {
// KEY-05: a device token is a bearer credential — its unpredictability is
// the whole of its security — so the source is named and the draw guarded.
let mut token_bytes = [0u8; 32];
crate::entropy::draw_key_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut token_bytes).map_err(|e| {
anyhow::anyhow!("Refusing to mint a device token from degenerate entropy: {e}")
})?;
let token = hex::encode(token_bytes);
let mut tokens = load(data_dir).await;
tokens.retain(|t| t.name != name);
if tokens.len() >= MAX_TOKENS {
tokens.remove(0);
}
tokens.push(DeviceToken {
name: name.to_string(),
hash: hash_hex(&token),
created: std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
.unwrap_or(0),
});
save(data_dir, &tokens).await?;
Ok(token)
}
/// Verify a candidate token. Returns the device name it was minted for.
pub async fn verify(data_dir: &Path, candidate: &str) -> Option<String> {
let candidate_hash = hash_hex(candidate);
load(data_dir)
.await
.iter()
.find(|t| ct_eq(t.hash.as_bytes(), candidate_hash.as_bytes()))
.map(|t| t.name.clone())
}
/// List stored tokens (hashes only — plaintexts are unrecoverable).
pub async fn list(data_dir: &Path) -> Vec<DeviceToken> {
load(data_dir).await
}
/// Remove the token minted for `name`. Returns whether one existed.
pub async fn remove(data_dir: &Path, name: &str) -> Result<bool> {
let mut tokens = load(data_dir).await;
let before = tokens.len();
tokens.retain(|t| t.name != name);
let removed = tokens.len() != before;
if removed {
save(data_dir, &tokens).await?;
}
Ok(removed)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn mint_verify_replace_remove() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let token = create(dir.path(), "phone").await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(verify(dir.path(), &token).await.as_deref(), Some("phone"));
assert!(verify(dir.path(), "not-a-token").await.is_none());
// Re-minting the same name invalidates the old token.
let token2 = create(dir.path(), "phone").await.unwrap();
assert!(verify(dir.path(), &token).await.is_none());
assert_eq!(verify(dir.path(), &token2).await.as_deref(), Some("phone"));
assert_eq!(list(dir.path()).await.len(), 1);
assert!(remove(dir.path(), "phone").await.unwrap());
assert!(verify(dir.path(), &token2).await.is_none());
}
}