**COMMANDS.md** named six CSRF-exempt read-only methods, two of which
(`bitcoin.getinfo`, `monitoring.current`) are not exempt — a client trusting the
doc would send them with the cookie alone and get rejected. The real set is
twelve (`api/rpc/mod.rs:326-340`); listed all of them and said plainly that
everything else needs the header. The rest of the doc verified clean: the 480 /
200 / 160-char caps, the four `assistant_*` config keys, both default model ids,
`is_sender_allowed`, `strip_archy_trigger` / `run_node_cmd`, the three
unauthenticated HTTP endpoints, and `auth.login.totp` all match the code.
**secrets.md** said `secret_env` "sets `<key>` in the container's environment",
which reads as a plain `-e KEY=value` and undersells the design. It isn't:
resolved pairs are registered as podman secrets named
`archy-env-<app-id>-<key>` and referenced by name, precisely so the value stays
out of `podman inspect` and out of plaintext `Environment=` lines in Quadlet
units. Also documented the interpolation-taint rule — a plain `environment`
entry that expands `${SECRET}` (BTCPay's connection strings) is itself treated
as secret-bearing rather than left in the clear, which is what makes it safe to
build connection strings from secrets.
Everything else in secrets.md verified against `container/secrets.rs`: the four
kinds and their file shapes, the bare-filename rule, the every-tick idempotent
`ensure_generated_secrets`, and the atomic 0600 temp-fsync-rename writer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Archipelago documentation
Start here. This index groups the docs by what you're trying to do. The
authoritative behaviour is always the code in core/; where a doc and the code
disagree, the code wins and the doc is a bug.
Getting started
- User Walkthrough — setting up and using a node, from hardware to daily use
- Talking to your node — the conversational command surface
- Seed Verification — independently verify your 24-word backup
- Troubleshooting — common problems and how to resolve them
- Gamepad / Controller Navigation — driving the UI from a controller
Architecture
- Architecture — the system at a glance
- Multi-Node Architecture — how nodes relate across a fleet
- API Reference — the JSON-RPC surface
App development
- App Developer Guide — build and package a containerized app
- App Manifest Specification — the manifest schema, field by field
- Manifest → Quadlet unit — how a manifest compiles to a systemd-owned container unit
- Container lifecycle — the reconciler state machine: install/adopt/start/stop/self-heal
- App secrets — declaring, generating and injecting per-install credentials
- Registry-Distributed Manifests — how manifests reach nodes via the signed catalog
- Decentralized Marketplace Protocol — publishing apps via an external registry
- Bitcoin RPC Relay — letting an external wallet reach the node's Bitcoin RPC
- Companion Pairing QR — the pairing handoff contract
- TV input inside iframe apps — keyboard/gamepad routing into embedded apps
Design docs
These record why a thing is built the way it is. They are design records, not step-by-step guides, and some predate the current implementation.
- Registry-Distributed Manifests
- DHT Distribution
- Bitcoin Multi-Version
- Dual Ecash
- Hardware Signer
- Manifest Hooks
- Meshroller Integration
- Nostr Git Source Hosting
- Nostr Identity Import · Nostr Signer Login (research)
- Streaming Ecash (phase 4)
- App Packaging Migration
Decisions (ADRs)
- ADR-001: Podman over Docker
- ADR-002: DID Key Method for Node Identity
- ADR-003: Nostr Relays for Discovery
- ADR-004: Tor Hidden Services for Peer Communication
- ADR-005: ChaCha20-Poly1305 for Backup Encryption
- ADR-006: Nostr Relays for Marketplace Discovery
- ADR-007: DID-Based Federation Trust
- ADR-008: Dual Key Strategy (Ed25519 + Secp256k1)
- ADR-009: Manifest-Level Container Security
- ADR-011: DWN Deprioritization
Security
- Security Policy — how to report a vulnerability
- PSBT Signing Architecture
- Bitcoin RPC Proxy Exposure
- Entropy Enforcement (KEY-05)