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archy/core/archipelago/src/container/image_policy.rs
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 44b50a39d4 fix(registry): repair two regressions from the domain migration; port the manifest validator to python
Fixes 4 test failures introduced by 8e814ca0, which I pushed after running
only the container-crate tests while the full suite was still compiling. Both
failures were real defects, not stale assertions.

1. Catalog-driven installs would have failed fleet-wide.
   8e814ca0 dropped the old registry address from TRUSTED_REGISTRIES, but the
   signed catalog still advertises image refs on it — deliberately, since
   rewriting a signed artifact invalidates its signature. Nodes resolve apps
   through the catalog, so every install would have been refused with "not
   from a trusted registry". Reinstated as LEGACY_REGISTRY_HOST, documented
   as transitional and removable only once the catalog is re-signed.

2. The update fallback lost the property it exists for.
   update.rs keeps two mirrors on purpose: the domain as primary, and the
   old IP over plain HTTP as a fallback, because a node whose DNS or clock is
   wrong (both break TLS) must still be able to update itself — the signature,
   not the transport, is what makes either source safe. The bulk rewrite
   pointed both constants at the domain, leaving the escape hatch dependent on
   exactly what it exists to survive. Restored to its original value.

Separately, validate-app-manifest.sh is ported from ruby to python3+PyYAML.

It shelled out to ruby with stderr discarded, so on any machine without ruby
a missing interpreter was reported as "Valid YAML with top-level app block:
FAIL" and every manifest came back REJECTED. This is the first tool an app
developer runs, and it sent them to fix YAML that was never broken. Ruby was
also the odd dependency out — the repo already ships three python scripts.

It now checks for python3 and PyYAML up front and names what is missing, then
parses with PyYAML. Missing keys resolve to an absent-value object that
indexes to itself and prints empty, so call sites lost their per-hop guards:
  (((app["container"] || {})["build"] || {})["context"])
becomes app["container"]["build"]["context"]. Booleans still print as
true/false rather than Python's True/False — call sites compare == "true",
so Python's capitalisation would have silently inverted the readonly_root
and no_new_privileges security checks.

Verified: full rust suite 1148/1148, 0 failed. All 56 app manifests validate
(0 rejected, 0 errored) where previously every one was rejected. No signed
artifact modified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 12:08:39 -04:00

115 lines
4.2 KiB
Rust

//! Trusted-registry policy for container image references — the single
//! source of truth. The RPC boundary (`api::rpc::package::config`) and the
//! orchestrator's pull sites both validate against this, so a catalog- or
//! manifest-supplied ref can't reach `pull_image` unchecked (§A of the
//! 1.8.0 hardening plan).
/// The registry's previous address, before it moved behind a domain.
///
/// TRANSITIONAL — remove once the app catalog has been regenerated and
/// re-signed against `source.archipelago-foundation.org`. The catalog is a
/// signed artifact, so its image refs cannot be rewritten in place without
/// invalidating the signature; until the signing ceremony runs, deployed
/// nodes still resolve every app through a catalog that names this host.
/// Dropping it from the trusted list before then makes each catalog-driven
/// install fail with "not from a trusted registry".
pub const LEGACY_REGISTRY_HOST: &str = "146.59.87.168:3000";
/// Registries images may be pulled from with an explicit host part.
/// (git.tx1138.com was removed 2026-07-10: the host is retired and must
/// never be pulled through again.)
pub const TRUSTED_REGISTRIES: &[&str] = &[
"docker.io",
"ghcr.io",
"localhost",
"source.archipelago-foundation.org",
LEGACY_REGISTRY_HOST,
];
/// Validate a container image reference.
///
/// Accepts:
/// * refs whose explicit registry host is on [`TRUSTED_REGISTRIES`]
/// (`docker.io/grafana/grafana`, `source.archipelago-foundation.org/archy/x:1`), and
/// * registry-less Docker Hub shorthand (`nginx`, `grafana/grafana`) —
/// the first segment has no `.`/`:` so it cannot name an attacker host;
/// resolution follows the host's registries.conf search order.
///
/// Rejects empty/oversized refs, shell metacharacters, and any ref whose
/// explicit registry host is not on the allowlist.
pub fn is_valid_docker_image(image: &str) -> bool {
if image.is_empty() || image.len() > 256 {
return false;
}
// Reject shell metacharacters
let dangerous_chars = [
'&', '|', ';', '`', '$', '(', ')', '<', '>', '\n', '\r', ' ', '\t',
];
if image.chars().any(|c| dangerous_chars.contains(&c)) {
return false;
}
let first_segment = match image.split('/').next() {
Some(r) if !r.is_empty() => r,
_ => return false,
};
if TRUSTED_REGISTRIES.contains(&first_segment) {
return true;
}
// No dot/colon in the first segment ⇒ it's a Docker Hub namespace or a
// bare repo name, not a registry host — allowed. Anything that *looks*
// like a host (has a dot or port) but isn't allowlisted is rejected.
!first_segment.contains('.') && !first_segment.contains(':')
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn accepts_trusted_registries() {
for img in [
"docker.io/library/nginx:1.25",
"ghcr.io/owner/app:latest",
"localhost/archy-dev:1",
"source.archipelago-foundation.org/archy/bitcoin-knots:28.1",
] {
assert!(is_valid_docker_image(img), "{img} should be accepted");
}
}
#[test]
fn rejects_retired_tx1138_registry() {
// Retired 2026-07-10 — refs through the dead host must be refused
// at the pull site, not time out against it.
assert!(!is_valid_docker_image("git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/x:2"));
}
#[test]
fn accepts_docker_hub_shorthand() {
for img in ["nginx", "grafana/grafana:11.2.0", "lightninglabs/lnd:v0.18"] {
assert!(is_valid_docker_image(img), "{img} should be accepted");
}
}
#[test]
fn rejects_untrusted_registry_hosts() {
for img in [
"evil.com/backdoor:latest",
"203.0.113.7:5000/x",
"registry.gitlab.com/x/y",
"quay.io/x/y",
] {
assert!(!is_valid_docker_image(img), "{img} should be rejected");
}
}
#[test]
fn rejects_malformed_refs() {
assert!(!is_valid_docker_image(""));
assert!(!is_valid_docker_image(&"a".repeat(257)));
assert!(!is_valid_docker_image("docker.io/x; rm -rf /"));
assert!(!is_valid_docker_image("docker.io/$(curl evil)"));
assert!(!is_valid_docker_image("/leading-slash"));
}
}