Files
archy/apps/lnd/manifest.yml
T
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 0c4826f8cc feat(security): declare which app ports may skip authentication
Groundwork for the app gate (item 1): before anything can enforce
authentication on app ports, the node has to know which ports are
*supposed* to be reachable without it.

`PortMapping` grows `auth` (PortAuth::Session | None, defaulting to
Session) and `auth_rationale`. The default is deliberately the protected
one. Every app port on this node answered with no credential at all over
LAN, Tailscale, Tor and the FIPS mesh alike — reproduced 2026-08-03 —
precisely because exposure was what you got by saying nothing. Inverting
the default means a new app is protected unless its manifest argues for
an exemption.

Validation makes the argument mandatory: `auth: none` without a
rationale is rejected, and so is a rationale without `auth: none` (that
combination means the author wrote an exemption and did not get one —
shipping it silently would leave them believing otherwise).

17 ports across 12 apps are declared exempt, each with its reason. They
are the ports that cannot sit behind an HTTP login page at all: Lightning
p2p (BOLT-8 noise), LND gRPC/REST and CLN gRPC (macaroon / mutual TLS —
Zeus and remote wallets dial these directly), Bitcoin p2p gossip,
electrum wire protocol, Wyoming voice streams, git-over-SSH, and the UDP
discovery protocols (mDNS, SSDP, STUN). Everything else — 39 published
ports — now defaults to gated.

Bitcoin's RPC 8332 is deliberately NOT exempted: it is already
`bind: 127.0.0.1`, so the gate never sees it, and claiming an exemption
it does not need would put a line in the audit list that means nothing.
If the loopback bind is ever dropped, it fails closed.

Two corpus tests keep this honest: every shipped manifest must parse
under the new rules, and the exempt set is pinned at 17 so any change to
the node's unauthenticated surface has to be a deliberate edit.

Tests: 73/73 archipelago-container, workspace builds clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 13:51:15 -04:00

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YAML

app:
id: lnd
name: LND
version: 0.18.4
description: Lightning Network implementation by Lightning Labs. Enables instant, low-cost Bitcoin payments.
container:
image: 146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/lnd:v0.18.4-beta
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
# BITCOIND_HOST must follow the node's actual Bitcoin container — Knots or
# Core — resolved at apply time from host facts. Hardcoding either breaks
# LND's chain backend connection on the other (lnd.conf is likewise
# resolved in lnd::ensure_config).
derived_env:
- key: BITCOIND_HOST
template: "{{BITCOIN_HOST}}"
secret_env:
- key: BITCOIND_RPCPASS
secret_file: bitcoin-rpc-password
data_uid: "100000:100000"
dependencies:
- app_id: bitcoin-core
version: ">=26.0"
resources:
cpu_limit: 2
memory_limit: 1Gi
disk_limit: 10Gi
security:
capabilities: [CHOWN, FOWNER, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE, NET_RAW]
readonly_root: false
network_policy: isolated
ports:
- host: 9735
container: 9735
protocol: tcp
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
Lightning p2p. The BOLT-8 noise handshake authenticates and encrypts the channel itself.
- host: 10009
container: 10009
protocol: tcp
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
LND gRPC, authenticated by macaroon over TLS. Zeus and other remote wallets depend on reaching this directly.
- host: 18080
container: 8080
protocol: tcp
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
LND REST, authenticated by macaroon over TLS. A browser login page would break Zeus and every non-browser wallet client.
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/lnd
target: /root/.lnd
options: [rw]
environment:
- BITCOIND_RPCUSER=archipelago
- NETWORK=mainnet
health_check:
type: tcp
endpoint: localhost:10009
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
bitcoin_integration:
rpc_access: admin
sync_required: true
lightning_integration:
channel_management: true
payment_routing: true