Files
archy/apps/netbird-server/manifest.yml
T
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 0c4826f8cc feat(security): declare which app ports may skip authentication
Groundwork for the app gate (item 1): before anything can enforce
authentication on app ports, the node has to know which ports are
*supposed* to be reachable without it.

`PortMapping` grows `auth` (PortAuth::Session | None, defaulting to
Session) and `auth_rationale`. The default is deliberately the protected
one. Every app port on this node answered with no credential at all over
LAN, Tailscale, Tor and the FIPS mesh alike — reproduced 2026-08-03 —
precisely because exposure was what you got by saying nothing. Inverting
the default means a new app is protected unless its manifest argues for
an exemption.

Validation makes the argument mandatory: `auth: none` without a
rationale is rejected, and so is a rationale without `auth: none` (that
combination means the author wrote an exemption and did not get one —
shipping it silently would leave them believing otherwise).

17 ports across 12 apps are declared exempt, each with its reason. They
are the ports that cannot sit behind an HTTP login page at all: Lightning
p2p (BOLT-8 noise), LND gRPC/REST and CLN gRPC (macaroon / mutual TLS —
Zeus and remote wallets dial these directly), Bitcoin p2p gossip,
electrum wire protocol, Wyoming voice streams, git-over-SSH, and the UDP
discovery protocols (mDNS, SSDP, STUN). Everything else — 39 published
ports — now defaults to gated.

Bitcoin's RPC 8332 is deliberately NOT exempted: it is already
`bind: 127.0.0.1`, so the gate never sees it, and claiming an exemption
it does not need would put a line in the audit list that means nothing.
If the loopback bind is ever dropped, it fails closed.

Two corpus tests keep this honest: every shipped manifest must parse
under the new rules, and the exempt set is pinned at 17 so any change to
the node's unauthenticated surface has to be a deliberate edit.

Tests: 73/73 archipelago-container, workspace builds clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 13:51:15 -04:00

126 lines
4.4 KiB
YAML

app:
id: netbird-server
name: NetBird Server
version: "0.71.2"
description: NetBird combined management / signal / relay server with an embedded identity provider and STUN. Backend for the self-hosted NetBird mesh VPN.
category: networking
# Hyphen name matches the runtime references (crash_recovery / dependencies /
# config startup order) + the live container, so on an existing node the
# orchestrator ADOPTS the running server rather than recreating it (data +
# the sqlite store under /var/lib/netbird preserved). Alias `netbird-server`
# is the short hostname the proxy's nginx proxies/grpc-passes to.
container_name: netbird-server
container:
image: docker.io/netbirdio/netbird-server:0.71.2
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: netbird-net
network_aliases: [netbird-server]
# The relay authSecret and the sqlite store encryptionKey are base64 keys
# (the server base64-decodes them to recover raw bytes — hex would decode to
# the wrong value). Generated once and reused: ensure_generated_secrets
# no-ops when the file already exists, so a re-render of config.yaml on an
# adopted node keeps the same keys (regenerating would orphan the store).
generated_secrets:
- name: netbird-relay-auth-secret
kind: base64
- name: netbird-store-encryption-key
kind: base64
# Pass the rendered config explicitly, mirroring the legacy `--config` arg.
custom_args: ["--config", "/etc/netbird/config.yaml"]
dependencies:
- storage: 1Gi
resources:
memory_limit: 1Gi
security:
# cap-drop=ALL is applied by the orchestrator. The server binds :80
# (management/signal/relay HTTP + gRPC) inside the container — a privileged
# port — so it needs NET_BIND_SERVICE. STUN is 3478/udp (unprivileged).
capabilities: [NET_BIND_SERVICE]
readonly_root: false
network_policy: isolated
ports:
- host: 8086
container: 80
protocol: tcp # management API + embedded OIDC issuer (/oauth2)
- host: 3478
container: 3478
protocol: udp # STUN — must be UDP; tcp here breaks relay discovery
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
STUN over UDP for NAT traversal; it must answer unauthenticated probes to do its job at all.
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/netbird/data
target: /var/lib/netbird
options: [rw]
# The rendered config.yaml, read-only. Re-rendered on every reconcile from
# host facts + the base64 secrets; idempotent (stable bytes → no restart).
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/netbird/config.yaml
target: /etc/netbird/config.yaml
options: [ro]
environment: []
# The server's config. {{HOST_IP}} is the node's primary host IP (the proxy's
# public origin is https on 8087 — the dashboard needs a secure context for
# OIDC PKCE, issue #15). {{secret:...}} are read 0600 from the secrets dir.
files:
- path: /var/lib/archipelago/netbird/config.yaml
overwrite: true
content: |
server:
listenAddress: ":80"
exposedAddress: "https://{{HOST_IP}}:8087"
stunPorts:
- 3478
metricsPort: 9090
healthcheckAddress: ":9000"
logLevel: "info"
logFile: "console"
authSecret: "{{secret:netbird-relay-auth-secret}}"
dataDir: "/var/lib/netbird"
auth:
issuer: "https://{{HOST_IP}}:8087/oauth2"
localAuthDisabled: false
signKeyRefreshEnabled: false
dashboardRedirectURIs:
- "https://{{HOST_IP}}:8087/nb-auth"
- "https://{{HOST_IP}}:8087/nb-silent-auth"
dashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs:
- "https://{{HOST_IP}}:8087/"
cliRedirectURIs:
- "http://localhost:53000/"
store:
engine: "sqlite"
encryptionKey: "{{secret:netbird-store-encryption-key}}"
# TCP liveness on the management port. Binds at startup, stays green; an http
# check of /oauth2 would false-fail while the issuer warms up.
health_check:
type: tcp
endpoint: localhost:80
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 10
start_period: 30s
metadata:
author: NetBird
icon: /assets/img/app-icons/netbird.svg
website: https://netbird.io
repo: https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird
license: BSD-3-Clause
tags:
- networking
- vpn
- wireguard
- mesh