archy/docs/marketplace-protocol.md

Decentralized App Marketplace Protocol

Status: implemented (updated 2026-07-08). This started as a protocol proposal; the described subsystem is now shipped end-to-end — core/archipelago/src/marketplace.rs (discover/publish/trust scoring), the marketplace.* RPC namespace, and Marketplace.vue. Beyond this doc, the code also adds marketplace.create-invoice (Lightning BOLT11 app purchases). What remains is maturation: publishing tooling and trust UX (see ROADMAP.md). Note: the manifest schema below is the marketplace's own flatter format, not the runtime apps/*/manifest.yml schema (app-manifest-spec.md).

The DID signature layer is implemented as of 2026-08-08. publish signs with the node's Ed25519 identity key, discover verifies every manifest before caching it, and a manifest whose signature is present but wrong is dropped rather than listed at a lower score. See Signing Protocol for the exact preimage rules — they are normative, and an implementation that canonicalises differently will produce signatures this node rejects.

Overview

Archipelago's community marketplace enables developers to publish app manifests to Nostr relays, where nodes discover and install them without a central app store. Trust is established through DID-signed manifests and community reputation.

Architecture

Developer Node                    Nostr Relays                    User Node
     │                                │                               │
     │── Publish signed manifest ──►  │                               │
     │   (NIP-78, kind 30078)         │                               │
     │                                │  ◄── Query app manifests ──   │
     │                                │      (filter by d-tag)        │
     │                                │                               │
     │                                │── Return signed manifests ──► │
     │                                │                               │
     │                                │      [Verify DID signature]   │
     │                                │      [Check trust score]      │
     │                                │      [Display in marketplace] │
     │                                │                               │
     │                                │      [User clicks Install]    │
     │                                │      [Pull container image]   │
     │                                │      [Start container]        │

Manifest Schema

App manifests published to Nostr relays use the marketplace's own flatter JSON schema — the AppManifest type in marketplace.rs, shown below — serialized into the Nostr event's content. It is not the runtime apps/{app-id}/manifest.yml schema in app-manifest-spec.md; the two are separate types that happen to share a name.

Marketplace Manifest Fields

{
  "app_id": "my-bitcoin-tool",
  "name": "My Bitcoin Tool",
  "version": "1.2.0",
  "description": {
    "short": "A useful Bitcoin utility",
    "long": "Detailed description of what this app does..."
  },
  "author": {
    "name": "Developer Name",
    "did": "did:key:z6Mkh...",
    "nostr_pubkey": "npub1..."
  },
  "container": {
    "image": "docker.io/developer/my-bitcoin-tool:1.2.0",
    "ports": [{ "container": 8080, "host": 8180, "protocol": "tcp" }],
    "volumes": [{ "name": "data", "path": "/data" }],
    "env": {
      "NETWORK": "mainnet"
    },
    "capabilities": [],
    "readonly_root": true,
    "no_new_privileges": true,
    "run_as_user": 1000
  },
  "category": "money",
  "icon_url": "https://example.com/icon.png",
  "repo_url": "https://github.com/developer/my-bitcoin-tool",
  "license": "MIT",
  "min_archipelago_version": "0.1.0",
  "dependencies": [],
  "signatures": {
    "manifest_hash": "sha256:abc123...",
    "did_signature": "base64-encoded-signature"
  }
}

Required Fields

Field	Type	Description
app_id	string	Unique identifier, lowercase kebab-case
name	string	Human-readable display name
version	string	Semantic version (major.minor.patch)
description.short	string	One-line description (max 120 chars)
author.did	string	Developer's DID (did:key method)
container.image	string	Full container image reference with tag (never latest)
category	string	One of: money, commerce, data, networking, home, community, other

Security-Required Fields

Field	Default	Description
container.readonly_root	true	Container root filesystem is read-only
container.no_new_privileges	true	Prevent privilege escalation
container.run_as_user	1000	UID to run as (must be ≥ 1000)
container.capabilities	[]	Required Linux capabilities (drop all, add only needed)

Nostr Event Format

Event Kind

App manifests use NIP-78 application-specific data with event kind 30078 (replaceable parameterized). This matches the existing node discovery pattern in nostr_discovery.rs.

Event Structure

{
  "kind": 30078,
  "tags": [
    ["d", "archipelago-app:<app_id>"],
    ["t", "archipelago-marketplace"],
    ["t", "category:<category>"],
    ["version", "<semver>"],
    ["image", "<container_image>"],
    ["L", "archipelago"],
    ["l", "app-manifest", "archipelago"]
  ],
  "content": "<JSON-serialized manifest>",
  "created_at": 1710000000,
  "pubkey": "<developer's secp256k1 pubkey hex>",
  "sig": "<schnorr signature>"
}

Tag Semantics

Tag	Purpose
d	Unique identifier for NIP-33 replaceable events. Format: archipelago-app:<app_id>
t	Searchable topic tags for relay filtering
version	Allows version-specific queries
image	Container image for quick display without parsing content
L/l	NIP-32 labeling namespace for structured queries

Publishing a Manifest

1. Developer creates/updates their app manifest
2. author.did is filled in with the node's own did:key if empty. If it is set to a different DID, publishing is refused — the node can only sign as itself, and broadcasting a manifest every verifier will reject helps nobody
3. Canonicalise the manifest without signatures and SHA-256 it (see Signing Protocol)
4. Sign the digest with the node's Ed25519 identity key and attach signatures
5. Embed the signed manifest as the Nostr event content
6. Sign the Nostr event with the node's secp256k1 Nostr key
7. Publish to all configured Nostr relays

Note the two distinct keys: the Ed25519 identity key proves authorship of the manifest and is what author.did names; the secp256k1 Nostr key proves who sent this event. They are separate on purpose — relaying is not authorship, and only the first survives being copied between relays.

Discovering Manifests

1. Node queries configured relays with filter:

   {
     "kinds": [30078],
     "limit": 100,
     "#t": ["archipelago-marketplace"]
   }
   

2. For each returned event: a. Verify Nostr event signature (standard NIP-01) b. Parse manifest JSON from content c. Verify DID signature on manifest hash d. Check manifest against security requirements e. Calculate trust score
3. Return manifests sorted by trust score

Trust Model

Trust Score Calculation

Each discovered app receives a trust score (0-100) based on:

This table is calculate_trust_score() in marketplace.rs. What each factor actually checks:

Factor	Max	What is checked
Identity proven	30	The manifest carries a valid DID signature — the author demonstrated control of the key author.did encodes. Requires key material; cannot be faked by choosing a string
Relay consensus	20	Graduated, and never zero: 1 relay → 5, 2–3 → 12, 4+ → 20
Federation trust	20	author.did is in the user's federated DID list and identity is proven. Both halves are required — see below
Provenance	15	10 for a 3-part semver version, 5 for a non-empty repo_url. Nothing counts published versions
Security compliance	15	15 when validate_manifest() returns no issues, 5 when it returns 1–2, 0 otherwise

Both identity-derived factors hang off the signature, which is the point:

• Before, "DID present" was did.starts_with("did:"), so an unsigned manifest with a plausible-looking DID string and a pinned image scored 65 — Community tier — on no cryptography whatsoever. It now scores 35, Unverified.
• Federation trust is gated too. An unverified author.did is just a string the publisher chose, so an attacker could otherwise copy the DID of a peer the user federates with and collect 20 points for impersonating precisely the party the user trusts most.

An unsigned publisher is not punished beyond losing those points: missing is a normal state, and such apps still appear.

Trust Tiers

Score	Tier	UI Treatment
80-100	Verified	Green badge, install with one click
50-79	Community	Yellow badge, install with confirmation
20-49	Unverified	Orange badge, install with warning dialog
0-19	Untrusted	Red badge, requires explicit security override

Federation-Based Trust

When a developer's DID appears in the user's federation network (trusted peer), the app automatically receives +20 trust points. This creates organic trust propagation: if you trust a node operator, you're more likely to trust their published apps.

ADR: Nostr Relays over Centralized Registry

Decision: Use Nostr relays as the app discovery layer instead of a centralized registry.

Context: A centralized app store contradicts Archipelago's sovereignty principles. Nostr relays provide censorship-resistant, decentralized event distribution.

Consequences:

• (+) No single point of failure for app discovery
• (+) Developers publish without permission or review gates
• (+) Multiple relay sources increase availability
• (+) Leverages existing Nostr infrastructure and key management
• (-) No global content moderation (each node decides trust locally)
• (-) Spam is possible (mitigated by DID verification and trust scoring)
• (-) Relay availability varies (mitigated by querying multiple relays)

Signing Protocol

Manifest Signing (DID Layer)

Normative. These rules define the signed preimage byte-for-byte. An implementation that canonicalises differently will produce signatures this node rejects, so they are worth following exactly.

1. Take the manifest with `signatures` REMOVED (a signature cannot cover the
   field that holds it; omit the key entirely rather than setting it null).
2. Canonicalise to JSON:
     - every object's keys sorted lexicographically, recursively;
     - no insignificant whitespace;
     - arrays keep their order.
3. manifest_hash = SHA-256(canonical_json_bytes)
4. did_signature = Ed25519_Sign(author_private_key, manifest_hash)
      ^ the signature covers the 32 RAW DIGEST BYTES, not the "sha256:..."
        string and not the JSON itself.
5. Attach:
   {
     "signatures": {
       "manifest_hash": "sha256:<64 lowercase hex chars>",
       "did_signature": "<standard base64, RFC 4648 §4, with padding>"
     }
   }

The signing key MUST be the Ed25519 key that author.did encodes — author.did is a did:key whose multibase body is 0xed01 || <32-byte public key>. A publisher signing with any other key produces a manifest that verifies as invalid and is dropped.

Why canonicalisation is required and not cosmetic. container.env is a map, and map iteration order is not stable across processes or implementations. Sign the serialiser's natural output and the same manifest hashes differently between runs, so signatures fail at random rather than never — much harder to diagnose than a clean rejection. Sorting keys removes the ambiguity.

archipelago implements this in marketplace::canonical_signing_bytes / sign_manifest / verify_manifest_signature.

Event Signing (Nostr Layer)

Standard NIP-01 Schnorr signature over the event ID (hash of serialized event fields). This is handled by the Nostr client library.

Verification Flow

Receiving Node:
  1. Verify Nostr event signature (NIP-01)       → event authenticity   [IMPLEMENTED]
  2. Extract manifest JSON from event content                           [IMPLEMENTED]
  3. Canonicalise the manifest without `signatures`, SHA-256 it         [IMPLEMENTED]
  4. Compare with manifest.signatures.manifest_hash → content integrity [IMPLEMENTED]
  5. Resolve author.did (did:key) to its Ed25519 public key             [IMPLEMENTED]
  6. Verify did_signature over the digest         → author identity     [IMPLEMENTED]
  7. Check container.image tag is pinned (not :latest)                  [ADVISORY]
  8. Validate security fields meet minimums                             [ADVISORY]

Steps 3–6 are verify_manifest_signature(), which returns one of three verdicts rather than a boolean:

Verdict	Meaning	What discovery does
valid	Hash matches the content and the key named by author.did signed it	Listed; earns the identity-derived trust points
missing	No signatures block	Listed, but scores zero on identity and federation. An unsigned publisher is unproven, not hostile
invalid	A signatures block is present and wrong — tampered, corrupt, or signed by another key	Dropped entirely, with the reason logged. Never cached, never installable

That invalid handling is deliberate: a broken signature is not a low-quality manifest, it is a forged or corrupted one, so it fails closed rather than appearing with a scary badge someone can click past.

Steps 7–8 still run, but validate_manifest() returns a list of issues that feed the trust score — they do not block discovery or installation.

RPC Endpoints

Marketplace Discovery

Method	Description	Auth
marketplace.discover	Query relays for app manifests, verify, score, return sorted	Local
marketplace.publish	Sign the manifest with this node's identity key, then publish to configured relays	Local
marketplace.get-manifest	Get full manifest for a specific app by ID	Local
marketplace.verify	Check a manifest's DID signature and security compliance without publishing it	Local

marketplace.verify returns the signature verdict separately from the advisory policy issues, because they mean different things:

{
  "signature": { "status": "invalid", "reason": "did_signature does not verify against author.did" },
  "signature_valid": false,
  "valid": true,          // ← policy compliance only; NOT authenticity
  "issues": [],
  "trust_score": 35,
  "trust_tier": "unverified"
}

valid has always meant "passes the advisory security checks". Read signature_valid for authenticity. Discovered apps carry the same verdict in their signature field.

Manifest Management

Method	Description	Auth
marketplace.list-published	List manifests published by this node	Local

Purchases

Method	Description	Auth
marketplace.create-invoice	Create a Lightning BOLT11 invoice for a paid app	Local
marketplace.check-payment	Poll whether an invoice has settled	Local

marketplace.unpublish was specified here but never implemented — the string appears nowhere in the codebase, and there is no dispatcher entry. NIP-33 replaceable events mean an unpublish would have to be a tombstone/replacement rather than a delete, which is presumably why it stalled.

Security Requirements

Container Security Enforcement

validate_manifest() checks the following and returns them as a list of issues. These are score inputs, not gates — a manifest that fails all of them is still discoverable and installable, it just scores 0 on the security factor:

1. No latest tag: Image must use a specific version tag
2. Read-only root: readonly_root should be true
3. No root: run_as_user must be ≥ 1000 (the code's bound; the example manifest above uses exactly 1000)
4. No new privileges: no_new_privileges should be true

Items previously listed here — a capability allow-list, a host-networking ban, and system-path mount restrictions — are not part of marketplace validation. Those rules exist, but they live in the runtime manifest parser (core/container/src/manifest.rs, see app-manifest-spec.md) and apply to apps/*/manifest.yml, which is a different schema from the marketplace manifest. Closing that gap is part of the pre-third-party-publishing work.

Image Verification

• Container images are pulled from registries, never transferred between nodes
• Future: Cosign signature verification for container images (leverages core/security/)
• Image digest pinning recommended for production apps

UI: Community Marketplace Tab

Route

Extends existing /dashboard/marketplace page.

Layout

Two tabs at the top of Marketplace.vue:

1. Curated (existing): Built-in apps maintained by Archipelago team
2. Community (new): Apps discovered from Nostr relays

Community Tab Components

1. App Grid: Same card layout as curated tab, with trust score badge
2. Search & Filter: Category filter + text search across community apps
3. Trust Indicators: Color-coded badges (Verified/Community/Unverified/Untrusted)
4. App Detail: Shows full manifest, developer DID, relay sources, version history
5. Install Flow: Trust-level-dependent confirmation (one-click for Verified, warning for Untrusted)

Publishing UI

Accessible from Settings or a "Developer" section:

1. Select a local app container to publish
2. Fill in manifest metadata (description, category, icon)
3. Review security compliance
4. Sign and publish to relays
5. View published manifests and their discovery status

Data Storage

/var/lib/archipelago/marketplace/
  ├── cache/
  │   └── manifests.json      # Cached discovered manifests, trust scores included
  └── published/
      └── <app-id>.json       # Manifests published by this node

The earlier version of this tree also listed cache/trust-scores.json and config.json. Neither is written: scores live on the cached entries themselves (MarketplaceCache), and there is no marketplace preferences file.

Implementation Notes

Relay Query Strategy

1. Query all enabled relays in parallel (from nostr_relays.rs config), with a 10s connect timeout and a 20s fetch timeout per relay
2. Deduplicate manifests by app_id + version
3. If the same manifest is found on multiple relays, boost trust score
4. Write results to cache/manifests.json

Items 4–5 of the original design — a 15-minute cache TTL and a 30-minute background refresh — are not implemented. The cache has no expiry and nothing refreshes it on a timer; it is rewritten whenever marketplace.discover runs.

Version Comparison

• Use semantic versioning for all version comparisons
• When multiple versions exist for the same app_id, show the latest
• Keep version history available in app detail view
• Flag apps with versions older than 6 months as potentially unmaintained