**ADR-009** lists six "non-negotiable" mandatory security defaults. Checked each
against `core/container/src/manifest.rs` and `core/security/src/`:
- `seccomp_profile: Default` — the string `seccomp` appears **nowhere in
`core/`**. Not as code, not as a TODO. This constraint is entirely fictional.
- AppArmor — `container_policies.rs` generates and `apparmor_parser -r`s a
profile, but its own comment reads `TODO: Configure Podman to use the
profile`. `security.apparmor_profile` parses into a manifest field that
nothing ever reads.
- `user` UID > 1000 — no UID validation exists in the runtime parser at all.
- `image_tag` pinned — preflight script only; the parser accepts `:latest`.
- `readonly_root` / `no_new_privileges` — safe defaults when omitted, but
`validate_security()` never rejects an explicit `false`, so the ADR's
"Reject manifests that violate mandatory defaults" step does not exist.
Genuinely enforced: the capability allow-list and bind-mount confinement (the
latter stronger than the ADR describes). Added an Implementation status section
saying so per-row. The decision stands; the claim of enforcement did not, and on
a security ADR that gap is the whole point of writing it down.
**ADR-004** said Tor carries *all* inter-node communication and runs as the
`archy-tor` container. Neither holds: transport priority is mesh → LAN → FIPS →
Tor (`TransportKind` 1-4, Tor as last fallback, largely because of the latency
this ADR itself lists), and Tor is the host Debian service driven by
`archipelago-tor-helper` — `container-doctor.sh` actively removes an `archy-tor`
container if it finds one, and no `apps/tor` manifest exists. Added an amendment
rather than rewriting the record. Worth flagging that both changes landed
without their own ADR.
All 10 ADRs are Status: Accepted; 001-003, 005-008 and 011 verified consistent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
