This doc is marked "Status: implemented ... shipped end-to-end" and then
describes a cryptographic verification chain that does not exist. On a repo
about to go public, that is the single worst kind of doc bug: it promises a
security property.
`signatures.manifest_hash` / `signatures.did_signature` appear exactly once in
the codebase — as two struct fields at `marketplace.rs:106-107`. Nothing reads
them. There is no hash comparison, no DID resolution, no signature check. The
authenticity actually delivered is the Nostr event's own NIP-01 Schnorr
signature, which proves the publishing key sent the event but says nothing about
the DID the manifest names.
Added a warning at the top, marked the "Manifest Signing (DID Layer)" section
and steps 3-6 of the verification flow as not implemented, and annotated steps
7-8 as advisory (validate_manifest returns scoring issues; it does not block
discovery or install).
The trust model was overstated in the same direction:
- "DID Verification | 30 | Manifest is signed by a valid DID key" is a
`did.starts_with("did:")` string test. Any publisher can claim any DID and
take the 30 points.
- "Relay Consensus | 20" is graduated and never zero (1 relay still scores 5).
- "Version History | 15 | multiple published versions (shows maintenance)" —
nothing counts versions; it's 10 for a 3-part semver plus 5 for a non-empty
repo_url.
Worked the arithmetic through: an unsigned manifest with a plausible DID string
and a pinned image scores 65, landing in the "Community" tier. Said so.
Other corrections:
- `marketplace.unpublish` is documented but was never implemented (the string
appears nowhere); removed it and noted why NIP-33 makes it non-trivial. Added
the two payment methods that do exist (`create-invoice`, `check-payment`).
- The schema section said marketplace manifests "follow the existing
apps/{app-id}/manifest.yml schema", contradicting the header three paragraphs
above. They are separate types.
- The security-enforcement list claimed a capability allow-list, a
host-networking ban and system-path mount restrictions. Those rules are real
but live in the runtime manifest parser for a different schema — marketplace
validation checks four things and gates none of them.
- `run_as_user` documented as "> 1000" in two places while the code checks
`>= 1000` and the doc's own example uses 1000.
- Data-storage tree listed `cache/trust-scores.json` and `config.json`; neither
is ever written.
- The 15-minute cache TTL and 30-minute background refresh don't exist —
discovery is RPC-triggered and the cache has no expiry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Archipelago documentation
Start here. This index groups the docs by what you're trying to do. The
authoritative behaviour is always the code in core/; where a doc and the code
disagree, the code wins and the doc is a bug.
Getting started
- User Walkthrough — setting up and using a node, from hardware to daily use
- Talking to your node — the conversational command surface
- Seed Verification — independently verify your 24-word backup
- Troubleshooting — common problems and how to resolve them
- Gamepad / Controller Navigation — driving the UI from a controller
- Pine voice commands — the voice-satellite phrase surface
Architecture
- Architecture — the system at a glance
- Multi-Node Architecture — how nodes relate across a fleet
- API Reference — the JSON-RPC surface
Contributing to Archipelago itself
- Developer Guide — building the workspace, the frontend, and an ISO
- Contributor guide (
CLAUDE.md) — invariants, build/verify, the production test gate - Bulletproof containers — why the reconciler is level-triggered
- Release signing runbook — the ceremony and key handling
- 1.8.0 Release Hardening Plan — the release-blocking checklist
- Third-party license audit — dependency licensing posture
- Demo build info — operating the public demo sandbox
App development
- App Developer Guide — build and package a containerized app
- App Manifest Specification — the manifest schema, field by field
- Manifest → Quadlet unit — how a manifest compiles to a systemd-owned container unit
- Container lifecycle — the reconciler state machine: install/adopt/start/stop/self-heal
- App secrets — declaring, generating and injecting per-install credentials
- Registry-Distributed Manifests — how manifests reach nodes via the signed catalog
- Decentralized Marketplace Protocol — publishing apps via an external registry
- Bitcoin RPC Relay — letting an external wallet reach the node's Bitcoin RPC
- Companion Pairing QR — the pairing handoff contract
- TV input inside iframe apps — keyboard/gamepad routing into embedded apps
Design docs
These record why a thing is built the way it is. They are design records, not step-by-step guides, and some predate the current implementation.
- Registry-Distributed Manifests
- DHT Distribution
- Bitcoin Multi-Version
- Dual Ecash
- Hardware Signer
- Manifest Hooks
- Meshroller Integration
- Nostr Git Source Hosting
- Nostr Identity Import · Nostr Signer Login (research)
- Streaming Ecash (phase 4)
- App Packaging Migration
Decisions (ADRs)
- ADR-001: Podman over Docker
- ADR-002: DID Key Method for Node Identity
- ADR-003: Nostr Relays for Discovery
- ADR-004: Tor Hidden Services for Peer Communication
- ADR-005: ChaCha20-Poly1305 for Backup Encryption
- ADR-006: Nostr Relays for Marketplace Discovery
- ADR-007: DID-Based Federation Trust
- ADR-008: Dual Key Strategy (Ed25519 + Secp256k1)
- ADR-009: Manifest-Level Container Security
- ADR-011: DWN Deprioritization
There is no ADR-010 — the number was never issued, so the gap is not a missing file.
Security
- Security Policy — how to report a vulnerability
- PSBT Signing Architecture
- Bitcoin RPC Proxy Exposure
- Entropy Enforcement (KEY-05)