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# Decentralized App Marketplace Protocol
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**Status:** implemented (updated 2026-07-08). This started as a protocol
proposal; the described subsystem is now shipped end-to-end —
`core/archipelago/src/marketplace.rs` (discover/publish/trust scoring),
the `marketplace.*` RPC namespace, and `Marketplace.vue` . Beyond this doc,
the code also adds `marketplace.create-invoice` (Lightning BOLT11 app
purchases). What remains is maturation: publishing tooling and trust UX
(see `ROADMAP.md` ). Note: the manifest schema below is the marketplace's
own flatter format, **not** the runtime `apps/*/manifest.yml` schema
(`app-manifest-spec.md` ).
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> ⚠️ **The DID signature layer is specified here but NOT implemented.**
> `signatures.manifest_hash` and `signatures.did_signature` exist as fields on
> the manifest struct (`marketplace.rs:106-107`) and nothing anywhere in the
> codebase reads them — there is no hash comparison and no signature check. The
> authenticity you actually get today is the **Nostr event signature** (NIP-01
> Schnorr, verified by the client library), which proves the event came from the
> publishing key. It does not prove the manifest was signed by the DID it names.
> Sections marked *(not implemented)* below are design, not behaviour. Treat this
> as the gap to close before third-party publishing opens.
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## Overview
Archipelago's community marketplace enables developers to publish app manifests to Nostr relays, where nodes discover and install them without a central app store. Trust is established through DID-signed manifests and community reputation.
## Architecture
```
Developer Node Nostr Relays User Node
│ │ │
│── Publish signed manifest ──► │ │
│ (NIP-78, kind 30078) │ │
│ │ ◄── Query app manifests ── │
│ │ (filter by d-tag) │
│ │ │
│ │── Return signed manifests ──► │
│ │ │
│ │ [Verify DID signature] │
│ │ [Check trust score] │
│ │ [Display in marketplace] │
│ │ │
│ │ [User clicks Install] │
│ │ [Pull container image] │
│ │ [Start container] │
```
## Manifest Schema
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App manifests published to Nostr relays use the marketplace's own flatter JSON
schema — the `AppManifest` type in `marketplace.rs` , shown below — serialized
into the Nostr event's `content` . It is **not** the runtime
`apps/{app-id}/manifest.yml` schema in
[`app-manifest-spec.md` ](app-manifest-spec.md ); the two are separate types that
happen to share a name.
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### Marketplace Manifest Fields
```json
{
"app_id" : "my-bitcoin-tool" ,
"name" : "My Bitcoin Tool" ,
"version" : "1.2.0" ,
"description" : {
"short" : "A useful Bitcoin utility" ,
"long" : "Detailed description of what this app does..."
},
"author" : {
"name" : "Developer Name" ,
"did" : "did:key:z6Mkh..." ,
"nostr_pubkey" : "npub1..."
},
"container" : {
"image" : "docker.io/developer/my-bitcoin-tool:1.2.0" ,
"ports" : [{ "container" : 8080 , "host" : 8180 , "protocol" : "tcp" }],
"volumes" : [{ "name" : "data" , "path" : "/data" }],
"env" : {
"NETWORK" : "mainnet"
},
"capabilities" : [],
"readonly_root" : true ,
"no_new_privileges" : true ,
"run_as_user" : 1000
},
"category" : "money" ,
"icon_url" : "https://example.com/icon.png" ,
"repo_url" : "https://github.com/developer/my-bitcoin-tool" ,
"license" : "MIT" ,
"min_archipelago_version" : "0.1.0" ,
"dependencies" : [],
"signatures" : {
"manifest_hash" : "sha256:abc123..." ,
"did_signature" : "base64-encoded-signature"
}
}
```
### Required Fields
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `app_id` | string | Unique identifier, lowercase kebab-case |
| `name` | string | Human-readable display name |
| `version` | string | Semantic version (major.minor.patch) |
| `description.short` | string | One-line description (max 120 chars) |
| `author.did` | string | Developer's DID (did:key method) |
| `container.image` | string | Full container image reference with tag (never `latest` ) |
| `category` | string | One of: money, commerce, data, networking, home, community, other |
### Security-Required Fields
| Field | Default | Description |
|-------|---------|-------------|
| `container.readonly_root` | true | Container root filesystem is read-only |
| `container.no_new_privileges` | true | Prevent privilege escalation |
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| `container.run_as_user` | 1000 | UID to run as (must be ≥ 1000) |
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| `container.capabilities` | [] | Required Linux capabilities (drop all, add only needed) |
## Nostr Event Format
### Event Kind
App manifests use **NIP-78 application-specific data** with event kind **30078** (replaceable parameterized). This matches the existing node discovery pattern in `nostr_discovery.rs` .
### Event Structure
```json
{
"kind" : 30078 ,
"tags" : [
[ "d" , "archipelago-app:<app_id>" ],
[ "t" , "archipelago-marketplace" ],
[ "t" , "category:<category>" ],
[ "version" , "<semver>" ],
[ "image" , "<container_image>" ],
[ "L" , "archipelago" ],
[ "l" , "app-manifest" , "archipelago" ]
],
"content" : "<JSON-serialized manifest>" ,
"created_at" : 1710000000 ,
"pubkey" : "<developer's secp256k1 pubkey hex>" ,
"sig" : "<schnorr signature>"
}
```
### Tag Semantics
| Tag | Purpose |
|-----|---------|
| `d` | Unique identifier for NIP-33 replaceable events. Format: `archipelago-app:<app_id>` |
| `t` | Searchable topic tags for relay filtering |
| `version` | Allows version-specific queries |
| `image` | Container image for quick display without parsing content |
| `L` /`l` | NIP-32 labeling namespace for structured queries |
### Publishing a Manifest
1. Developer creates/updates their app manifest
2. Serialize manifest as JSON
3. Compute SHA-256 hash of the serialized manifest
4. Sign the hash with the developer's DID key
5. Embed manifest + signature in Nostr event content
6. Sign the Nostr event with the node's secp256k1 key
7. Publish to all configured Nostr relays
### Discovering Manifests
1. Node queries configured relays with filter:
```json
{
"kinds": [30078],
"limit": 100,
"#t": ["archipelago-marketplace"]
}
` ``
2. For each returned event:
a. Verify Nostr event signature (standard NIP-01)
b. Parse manifest JSON from content
c. Verify DID signature on manifest hash
d. Check manifest against security requirements
e. Calculate trust score
3. Return manifests sorted by trust score
## Trust Model
### Trust Score Calculation
Each discovered app receives a trust score (0-100) based on:
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This table is ` calculate_trust_score()` in ` marketplace.rs:258-306`, and several
factors are weaker than their names suggest:
| Factor | Max | What is actually checked |
|--------|-----|--------------------------|
| **DID present** | 30 | ` author.did` is non-empty and starts with ` did:` — a **string prefix test, not a signature check**. Any publisher can claim any DID and collect these 30 points |
| **Relay consensus** | 20 | Graduated, and never zero: 1 relay → 5, 2–
| **Federation trust** | 20 | ` author.did` appears in the user's federated DID list |
| **Provenance** | 15 | 10 for a 3-part semver ` version`, 5 for a non-empty ` repo_url`. Nothing counts published versions — the old "shows maintenance" reading was wrong |
| **Security compliance** | 15 | 15 when ` validate_manifest()` returns no issues, 5 when it returns 1–
Because "DID present" needs no key material, an unsigned manifest with a
plausible-looking DID string and a pinned image already scores 30 + 5 + 10 + 5 +
15 = 65 — **"Community" tier**. Read the tiers below with that in mind until the
signature layer lands.
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### Trust Tiers
| Score | Tier | UI Treatment |
|-------|------|--------------|
| 80-100 | Verified | Green badge, install with one click |
| 50-79 | Community | Yellow badge, install with confirmation |
| 20-49 | Unverified | Orange badge, install with warning dialog |
| 0-19 | Untrusted | Red badge, requires explicit security override |
### Federation-Based Trust
When a developer's DID appears in the user's federation network (trusted peer), the app automatically receives +20 trust points. This creates organic trust propagation: if you trust a node operator, you're more likely to trust their published apps.
### ADR: Nostr Relays over Centralized Registry
**Decision**: Use Nostr relays as the app discovery layer instead of a centralized registry.
**Context**: A centralized app store contradicts Archipelago's sovereignty principles. Nostr relays provide censorship-resistant, decentralized event distribution.
**Consequences**:
- (+) No single point of failure for app discovery
- (+) Developers publish without permission or review gates
- (+) Multiple relay sources increase availability
- (+) Leverages existing Nostr infrastructure and key management
- (-) No global content moderation (each node decides trust locally)
- (-) Spam is possible (mitigated by DID verification and trust scoring)
- (-) Relay availability varies (mitigated by querying multiple relays)
## Signing Protocol
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### Manifest Signing (DID Layer) — *(not implemented)*
The steps below are the intended design. Nothing in the codebase produces or
checks a ` did_signature` today; ` marketplace.publish` emits the manifest inside
a Nostr event and relies on the event's own Schnorr signature.
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` ``
1. Serialize manifest to canonical JSON (sorted keys, no whitespace)
2. Compute: manifest_hash = SHA-256(canonical_json)
3. Sign: did_signature = Ed25519_Sign(did_private_key, manifest_hash)
4. Attach to manifest:
{
"signatures": {
"manifest_hash": "sha256:<hex>",
"did_signature": "<base64>"
}
}
` ``
### Event Signing (Nostr Layer)
Standard NIP-01 Schnorr signature over the event ID (hash of serialized event fields). This is handled by the Nostr client library.
### Verification Flow
` ``
Receiving Node:
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1. Verify Nostr event signature (NIP-01) → Proves event authenticity [IMPLEMENTED]
2. Extract manifest JSON from event content [IMPLEMENTED]
3. Compute SHA-256 of manifest content [NOT IMPLEMENTED]
4. Compare with manifest.signatures.manifest_hash → content integrity [NOT IMPLEMENTED]
5. Resolve DID document for manifest.author.did [NOT IMPLEMENTED]
6. Verify did_signature with DID public key → developer identity [NOT IMPLEMENTED]
7. Check container.image tag is pinned (not :latest) [ADVISORY ONLY]
8. Validate security fields meet minimums [ADVISORY ONLY]
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` ``
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Steps 3–
document. Steps 7– validate_manifest()` returns a list of *issues*
that feed the trust score — they do not block discovery or installation.
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## RPC Endpoints
### Marketplace Discovery
| Method | Description | Auth |
|--------|-------------|------|
| ` marketplace.discover` | Query relays for app manifests, verify, score, return sorted | Local |
| ` marketplace.publish` | Publish an app manifest to configured relays | Local |
| ` marketplace.get-manifest` | Get full manifest for a specific app by ID | Local |
| ` marketplace.verify` | Verify a manifest's signatures and security compliance | Local |
### Manifest Management
| Method | Description | Auth |
|--------|-------------|------|
| ` marketplace.list-published` | List manifests published by this node | Local |
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### Purchases
| Method | Description | Auth |
|--------|-------------|------|
| ` marketplace.create-invoice` | Create a Lightning BOLT11 invoice for a paid app | Local |
| ` marketplace.check-payment` | Poll whether an invoice has settled | Local |
` marketplace.unpublish` was specified here but **never implemented** — the
string appears nowhere in the codebase, and there is no dispatcher entry. NIP-33
replaceable events mean an unpublish would have to be a tombstone/replacement
rather than a delete, which is presumably why it stalled.
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## Security Requirements
### Container Security Enforcement
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` validate_manifest()` checks the following and returns them as a list of issues.
**These are score inputs, not gates** — a manifest that fails all of them is
still discoverable and installable, it just scores 0 on the security factor:
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1. **No ` latest` tag**: Image must use a specific version tag
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2. **Read-only root**: ` readonly_root` should be true
3. **No root**: ` run_as_user` must be **≥ 1000** (the code's bound; the example
manifest above uses exactly ` 1000`)
4. **No new privileges**: ` no_new_privileges` should be true
Items previously listed here — a capability allow-list, a host-networking ban,
and system-path mount restrictions — are **not** part of marketplace validation.
Those rules exist, but they live in the runtime manifest parser
(` core/container/src/manifest.rs`, see [` app-manifest-spec.md`](app-manifest-spec.md))
and apply to ` apps/*/manifest.yml`, which is a different schema from the
marketplace manifest. Closing that gap is part of the pre-third-party-publishing
work.
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### Image Verification
- Container images are pulled from registries, never transferred between nodes
- Future: Cosign signature verification for container images (leverages ` core/security/`)
- Image digest pinning recommended for production apps
## UI: Community Marketplace Tab
### Route
Extends existing ` /dashboard/marketplace` page.
### Layout
Two tabs at the top of Marketplace.vue:
1. **Curated** (existing): Built-in apps maintained by Archipelago team
2. **Community** (new): Apps discovered from Nostr relays
### Community Tab Components
1. **App Grid**: Same card layout as curated tab, with trust score badge
2. **Search & Filter**: Category filter + text search across community apps
3. **Trust Indicators**: Color-coded badges (Verified/Community/Unverified/Untrusted)
4. **App Detail**: Shows full manifest, developer DID, relay sources, version history
5. **Install Flow**: Trust-level-dependent confirmation (one-click for Verified, warning for Untrusted)
### Publishing UI
Accessible from Settings or a "Developer" section:
1. Select a local app container to publish
2. Fill in manifest metadata (description, category, icon)
3. Review security compliance
4. Sign and publish to relays
5. View published manifests and their discovery status
## Data Storage
` ``
/var/lib/archipelago/marketplace/
├── cache/
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│ └── manifests.json # Cached discovered manifests, trust scores included
└── published/
└── <app-id>.json # Manifests published by this node
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` ``
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The earlier version of this tree also listed ` cache/trust-scores.json` and
` config.json`. Neither is written: scores live on the cached entries themselves
(` MarketplaceCache`), and there is no marketplace preferences file.
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## Implementation Notes
### Relay Query Strategy
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1. Query all enabled relays in parallel (from ` nostr_relays.rs` config), with a
10s connect timeout and a 20s fetch timeout per relay
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2. Deduplicate manifests by ` app_id` + ` version`
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3. If the same manifest is found on multiple relays, boost trust score
4. Write results to ` cache/manifests.json`
Items 4–
background refresh — are **not implemented**. The cache has no expiry and
nothing refreshes it on a timer; it is rewritten whenever
` marketplace.discover` runs.
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### Version Comparison
- Use semantic versioning for all version comparisons
- When multiple versions exist for the same ` app_id`, show the latest
- Keep version history available in app detail view
- Flag apps with versions older than 6 months as potentially unmaintained
