This doc is marked "Status: implemented ... shipped end-to-end" and then
describes a cryptographic verification chain that does not exist. On a repo
about to go public, that is the single worst kind of doc bug: it promises a
security property.
`signatures.manifest_hash` / `signatures.did_signature` appear exactly once in
the codebase — as two struct fields at `marketplace.rs:106-107`. Nothing reads
them. There is no hash comparison, no DID resolution, no signature check. The
authenticity actually delivered is the Nostr event's own NIP-01 Schnorr
signature, which proves the publishing key sent the event but says nothing about
the DID the manifest names.
Added a warning at the top, marked the "Manifest Signing (DID Layer)" section
and steps 3-6 of the verification flow as not implemented, and annotated steps
7-8 as advisory (validate_manifest returns scoring issues; it does not block
discovery or install).
The trust model was overstated in the same direction:
- "DID Verification | 30 | Manifest is signed by a valid DID key" is a
`did.starts_with("did:")` string test. Any publisher can claim any DID and
take the 30 points.
- "Relay Consensus | 20" is graduated and never zero (1 relay still scores 5).
- "Version History | 15 | multiple published versions (shows maintenance)" —
nothing counts versions; it's 10 for a 3-part semver plus 5 for a non-empty
repo_url.
Worked the arithmetic through: an unsigned manifest with a plausible DID string
and a pinned image scores 65, landing in the "Community" tier. Said so.
Other corrections:
- `marketplace.unpublish` is documented but was never implemented (the string
appears nowhere); removed it and noted why NIP-33 makes it non-trivial. Added
the two payment methods that do exist (`create-invoice`, `check-payment`).
- The schema section said marketplace manifests "follow the existing
apps/{app-id}/manifest.yml schema", contradicting the header three paragraphs
above. They are separate types.
- The security-enforcement list claimed a capability allow-list, a
host-networking ban and system-path mount restrictions. Those rules are real
but live in the runtime manifest parser for a different schema — marketplace
validation checks four things and gates none of them.
- `run_as_user` documented as "> 1000" in two places while the code checks
`>= 1000` and the doc's own example uses 1000.
- Data-storage tree listed `cache/trust-scores.json` and `config.json`; neither
is ever written.
- The 15-minute cache TTL and 30-minute background refresh don't exist —
discovery is RPC-triggered and the cache has no expiry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
16 KiB
Decentralized App Marketplace Protocol
Status: implemented (updated 2026-07-08). This started as a protocol
proposal; the described subsystem is now shipped end-to-end —
core/archipelago/src/marketplace.rs (discover/publish/trust scoring),
the marketplace.* RPC namespace, and Marketplace.vue. Beyond this doc,
the code also adds marketplace.create-invoice (Lightning BOLT11 app
purchases). What remains is maturation: publishing tooling and trust UX
(see ROADMAP.md). Note: the manifest schema below is the marketplace's
own flatter format, not the runtime apps/*/manifest.yml schema
(app-manifest-spec.md).
⚠️ The DID signature layer is specified here but NOT implemented.
signatures.manifest_hashandsignatures.did_signatureexist as fields on the manifest struct (marketplace.rs:106-107) and nothing anywhere in the codebase reads them — there is no hash comparison and no signature check. The authenticity you actually get today is the Nostr event signature (NIP-01 Schnorr, verified by the client library), which proves the event came from the publishing key. It does not prove the manifest was signed by the DID it names. Sections marked (not implemented) below are design, not behaviour. Treat this as the gap to close before third-party publishing opens.
Overview
Archipelago's community marketplace enables developers to publish app manifests to Nostr relays, where nodes discover and install them without a central app store. Trust is established through DID-signed manifests and community reputation.
Architecture
Developer Node Nostr Relays User Node
│ │ │
│── Publish signed manifest ──► │ │
│ (NIP-78, kind 30078) │ │
│ │ ◄── Query app manifests ── │
│ │ (filter by d-tag) │
│ │ │
│ │── Return signed manifests ──► │
│ │ │
│ │ [Verify DID signature] │
│ │ [Check trust score] │
│ │ [Display in marketplace] │
│ │ │
│ │ [User clicks Install] │
│ │ [Pull container image] │
│ │ [Start container] │
Manifest Schema
App manifests published to Nostr relays use the marketplace's own flatter JSON
schema — the AppManifest type in marketplace.rs, shown below — serialized
into the Nostr event's content. It is not the runtime
apps/{app-id}/manifest.yml schema in
app-manifest-spec.md; the two are separate types that
happen to share a name.
Marketplace Manifest Fields
{
"app_id": "my-bitcoin-tool",
"name": "My Bitcoin Tool",
"version": "1.2.0",
"description": {
"short": "A useful Bitcoin utility",
"long": "Detailed description of what this app does..."
},
"author": {
"name": "Developer Name",
"did": "did:key:z6Mkh...",
"nostr_pubkey": "npub1..."
},
"container": {
"image": "docker.io/developer/my-bitcoin-tool:1.2.0",
"ports": [{ "container": 8080, "host": 8180, "protocol": "tcp" }],
"volumes": [{ "name": "data", "path": "/data" }],
"env": {
"NETWORK": "mainnet"
},
"capabilities": [],
"readonly_root": true,
"no_new_privileges": true,
"run_as_user": 1000
},
"category": "money",
"icon_url": "https://example.com/icon.png",
"repo_url": "https://github.com/developer/my-bitcoin-tool",
"license": "MIT",
"min_archipelago_version": "0.1.0",
"dependencies": [],
"signatures": {
"manifest_hash": "sha256:abc123...",
"did_signature": "base64-encoded-signature"
}
}
Required Fields
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
app_id |
string | Unique identifier, lowercase kebab-case |
name |
string | Human-readable display name |
version |
string | Semantic version (major.minor.patch) |
description.short |
string | One-line description (max 120 chars) |
author.did |
string | Developer's DID (did:key method) |
container.image |
string | Full container image reference with tag (never latest) |
category |
string | One of: money, commerce, data, networking, home, community, other |
Security-Required Fields
| Field | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
container.readonly_root |
true | Container root filesystem is read-only |
container.no_new_privileges |
true | Prevent privilege escalation |
container.run_as_user |
1000 | UID to run as (must be ≥ 1000) |
container.capabilities |
[] | Required Linux capabilities (drop all, add only needed) |
Nostr Event Format
Event Kind
App manifests use NIP-78 application-specific data with event kind 30078 (replaceable parameterized). This matches the existing node discovery pattern in nostr_discovery.rs.
Event Structure
{
"kind": 30078,
"tags": [
["d", "archipelago-app:<app_id>"],
["t", "archipelago-marketplace"],
["t", "category:<category>"],
["version", "<semver>"],
["image", "<container_image>"],
["L", "archipelago"],
["l", "app-manifest", "archipelago"]
],
"content": "<JSON-serialized manifest>",
"created_at": 1710000000,
"pubkey": "<developer's secp256k1 pubkey hex>",
"sig": "<schnorr signature>"
}
Tag Semantics
| Tag | Purpose |
|---|---|
d |
Unique identifier for NIP-33 replaceable events. Format: archipelago-app:<app_id> |
t |
Searchable topic tags for relay filtering |
version |
Allows version-specific queries |
image |
Container image for quick display without parsing content |
L/l |
NIP-32 labeling namespace for structured queries |
Publishing a Manifest
- Developer creates/updates their app manifest
- Serialize manifest as JSON
- Compute SHA-256 hash of the serialized manifest
- Sign the hash with the developer's DID key
- Embed manifest + signature in Nostr event content
- Sign the Nostr event with the node's secp256k1 key
- Publish to all configured Nostr relays
Discovering Manifests
- Node queries configured relays with filter:
{ "kinds": [30078], "limit": 100, "#t": ["archipelago-marketplace"] } - For each returned event: a. Verify Nostr event signature (standard NIP-01) b. Parse manifest JSON from content c. Verify DID signature on manifest hash d. Check manifest against security requirements e. Calculate trust score
- Return manifests sorted by trust score
Trust Model
Trust Score Calculation
Each discovered app receives a trust score (0-100) based on:
This table is calculate_trust_score() in marketplace.rs:258-306, and several
factors are weaker than their names suggest:
| Factor | Max | What is actually checked |
|---|---|---|
| DID present | 30 | author.did is non-empty and starts with did: — a string prefix test, not a signature check. Any publisher can claim any DID and collect these 30 points |
| Relay consensus | 20 | Graduated, and never zero: 1 relay → 5, 2–3 → 12, 4+ → 20 |
| Federation trust | 20 | author.did appears in the user's federated DID list |
| Provenance | 15 | 10 for a 3-part semver version, 5 for a non-empty repo_url. Nothing counts published versions — the old "shows maintenance" reading was wrong |
| Security compliance | 15 | 15 when validate_manifest() returns no issues, 5 when it returns 1–2, 0 otherwise |
Because "DID present" needs no key material, an unsigned manifest with a plausible-looking DID string and a pinned image already scores 30 + 5 + 10 + 5 + 15 = 65 — "Community" tier. Read the tiers below with that in mind until the signature layer lands.
Trust Tiers
| Score | Tier | UI Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| 80-100 | Verified | Green badge, install with one click |
| 50-79 | Community | Yellow badge, install with confirmation |
| 20-49 | Unverified | Orange badge, install with warning dialog |
| 0-19 | Untrusted | Red badge, requires explicit security override |
Federation-Based Trust
When a developer's DID appears in the user's federation network (trusted peer), the app automatically receives +20 trust points. This creates organic trust propagation: if you trust a node operator, you're more likely to trust their published apps.
ADR: Nostr Relays over Centralized Registry
Decision: Use Nostr relays as the app discovery layer instead of a centralized registry.
Context: A centralized app store contradicts Archipelago's sovereignty principles. Nostr relays provide censorship-resistant, decentralized event distribution.
Consequences:
- (+) No single point of failure for app discovery
- (+) Developers publish without permission or review gates
- (+) Multiple relay sources increase availability
- (+) Leverages existing Nostr infrastructure and key management
- (-) No global content moderation (each node decides trust locally)
- (-) Spam is possible (mitigated by DID verification and trust scoring)
- (-) Relay availability varies (mitigated by querying multiple relays)
Signing Protocol
Manifest Signing (DID Layer) — (not implemented)
The steps below are the intended design. Nothing in the codebase produces or
checks a did_signature today; marketplace.publish emits the manifest inside
a Nostr event and relies on the event's own Schnorr signature.
1. Serialize manifest to canonical JSON (sorted keys, no whitespace)
2. Compute: manifest_hash = SHA-256(canonical_json)
3. Sign: did_signature = Ed25519_Sign(did_private_key, manifest_hash)
4. Attach to manifest:
{
"signatures": {
"manifest_hash": "sha256:<hex>",
"did_signature": "<base64>"
}
}
Event Signing (Nostr Layer)
Standard NIP-01 Schnorr signature over the event ID (hash of serialized event fields). This is handled by the Nostr client library.
Verification Flow
Receiving Node:
1. Verify Nostr event signature (NIP-01) → Proves event authenticity [IMPLEMENTED]
2. Extract manifest JSON from event content [IMPLEMENTED]
3. Compute SHA-256 of manifest content [NOT IMPLEMENTED]
4. Compare with manifest.signatures.manifest_hash → content integrity [NOT IMPLEMENTED]
5. Resolve DID document for manifest.author.did [NOT IMPLEMENTED]
6. Verify did_signature with DID public key → developer identity [NOT IMPLEMENTED]
7. Check container.image tag is pinned (not :latest) [ADVISORY ONLY]
8. Validate security fields meet minimums [ADVISORY ONLY]
Steps 3–6 are the unimplemented DID layer from the warning at the top of this
document. Steps 7–8 run, but validate_manifest() returns a list of issues
that feed the trust score — they do not block discovery or installation.
RPC Endpoints
Marketplace Discovery
| Method | Description | Auth |
|---|---|---|
marketplace.discover |
Query relays for app manifests, verify, score, return sorted | Local |
marketplace.publish |
Publish an app manifest to configured relays | Local |
marketplace.get-manifest |
Get full manifest for a specific app by ID | Local |
marketplace.verify |
Verify a manifest's signatures and security compliance | Local |
Manifest Management
| Method | Description | Auth |
|---|---|---|
marketplace.list-published |
List manifests published by this node | Local |
Purchases
| Method | Description | Auth |
|---|---|---|
marketplace.create-invoice |
Create a Lightning BOLT11 invoice for a paid app | Local |
marketplace.check-payment |
Poll whether an invoice has settled | Local |
marketplace.unpublish was specified here but never implemented — the
string appears nowhere in the codebase, and there is no dispatcher entry. NIP-33
replaceable events mean an unpublish would have to be a tombstone/replacement
rather than a delete, which is presumably why it stalled.
Security Requirements
Container Security Enforcement
validate_manifest() checks the following and returns them as a list of issues.
These are score inputs, not gates — a manifest that fails all of them is
still discoverable and installable, it just scores 0 on the security factor:
- No
latesttag: Image must use a specific version tag - Read-only root:
readonly_rootshould be true - No root:
run_as_usermust be ≥ 1000 (the code's bound; the example manifest above uses exactly1000) - No new privileges:
no_new_privilegesshould be true
Items previously listed here — a capability allow-list, a host-networking ban,
and system-path mount restrictions — are not part of marketplace validation.
Those rules exist, but they live in the runtime manifest parser
(core/container/src/manifest.rs, see app-manifest-spec.md)
and apply to apps/*/manifest.yml, which is a different schema from the
marketplace manifest. Closing that gap is part of the pre-third-party-publishing
work.
Image Verification
- Container images are pulled from registries, never transferred between nodes
- Future: Cosign signature verification for container images (leverages
core/security/) - Image digest pinning recommended for production apps
UI: Community Marketplace Tab
Route
Extends existing /dashboard/marketplace page.
Layout
Two tabs at the top of Marketplace.vue:
- Curated (existing): Built-in apps maintained by Archipelago team
- Community (new): Apps discovered from Nostr relays
Community Tab Components
- App Grid: Same card layout as curated tab, with trust score badge
- Search & Filter: Category filter + text search across community apps
- Trust Indicators: Color-coded badges (Verified/Community/Unverified/Untrusted)
- App Detail: Shows full manifest, developer DID, relay sources, version history
- Install Flow: Trust-level-dependent confirmation (one-click for Verified, warning for Untrusted)
Publishing UI
Accessible from Settings or a "Developer" section:
- Select a local app container to publish
- Fill in manifest metadata (description, category, icon)
- Review security compliance
- Sign and publish to relays
- View published manifests and their discovery status
Data Storage
/var/lib/archipelago/marketplace/
├── cache/
│ └── manifests.json # Cached discovered manifests, trust scores included
└── published/
└── <app-id>.json # Manifests published by this node
The earlier version of this tree also listed cache/trust-scores.json and
config.json. Neither is written: scores live on the cached entries themselves
(MarketplaceCache), and there is no marketplace preferences file.
Implementation Notes
Relay Query Strategy
- Query all enabled relays in parallel (from
nostr_relays.rsconfig), with a 10s connect timeout and a 20s fetch timeout per relay - Deduplicate manifests by
app_id+version - If the same manifest is found on multiple relays, boost trust score
- Write results to
cache/manifests.json
Items 4–5 of the original design — a 15-minute cache TTL and a 30-minute
background refresh — are not implemented. The cache has no expiry and
nothing refreshes it on a timer; it is rewritten whenever
marketplace.discover runs.
Version Comparison
- Use semantic versioning for all version comparisons
- When multiple versions exist for the same
app_id, show the latest - Keep version history available in app detail view
- Flag apps with versions older than 6 months as potentially unmaintained