fix(ecash): reduce Minibits relay churn/privacy leak and page past a 200-DM claim backlog

fetch_relay_dms connected to all three CLAIM_RELAY_URLS (the Minibits relay
plus the two public fallbacks, relay.damus.io and nos.lol) on every 8s poll,
even though the module's own docs already described RELAY_URL as the
primary with the public relays meant only as a fallback. In practice this
meant 3 fresh WebSocket connections every poll and broadcasting the wallet's
derived Nostr pubkey's DM activity to two public relays it didn't need to
touch.

- Query RELAY_URL alone first; only add and query the public fallbacks when
  it's unreachable (via try_connect_relay). Happy path is now one connection
  per poll instead of three, and the public relays only see this pubkey's
  traffic when the primary is actually down.
- Page through the DM filter instead of a single limit(200) fetch: a relay
  returns the newest `limit` events for a filter, so a backlog of more than
  200 DMs since the last poll (e.g. a long-offline node) silently skipped the
  older ones forever, since `since` never advanced past them. Capped at 5
  pages so a relay that never stops returning full pages can't hang the poll.
- Moved the ensure_mint_accepted doc comment back above its own function —
  it had been glued onto fetch_relay_dms by an earlier edit.
- Timestamp::as_u64() -> as_secs() to clear the deprecation warning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EZnFgeUBKY5UAfyJFsYccS
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-09 03:57:49 +00:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent 4e410d7c98
commit 489995ced0
+82 -29
View File
@@ -625,53 +625,106 @@ const NO_CLAIMS: ClaimOutcome = ClaimOutcome {
/// three real payments that `/claim` never surfaced. Best-effort: a relay
/// error here must not abort the poll, since `pending_claims` may still hold
/// earlier fetches worth retrying.
///
/// Queries `RELAY_URL` (the service's own relay) alone first — the happy
/// path for a 8s poll is one WebSocket connection, not three, and the
/// wallet's derived Nostr pubkey isn't broadcast to the public fallback
/// relays unless it's actually needed. Only when that relay is unreachable
/// does it fall back to all of `CLAIM_RELAY_URLS`.
async fn fetch_relay_dms(
our_pubkey: nostr_sdk::PublicKey,
since: u64,
) -> Vec<(String, u64, String)> {
let client = Client::default();
for url in CLAIM_RELAY_URLS {
if let Err(e) = client.add_relay(*url).await {
warn!("Minibits: could not add relay {url}: {e}");
if let Err(e) = client.add_relay(RELAY_URL).await {
warn!("Minibits: could not add relay {RELAY_URL}: {e}");
}
let primary_reachable = client
.try_connect_relay(RELAY_URL, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3))
.await
.is_ok();
if !primary_reachable {
warn!("Minibits: primary relay {RELAY_URL} unreachable, falling back to public relays too");
for url in &CLAIM_RELAY_URLS[1..] {
if let Err(e) = client.add_relay(*url).await {
warn!("Minibits: could not add relay {url}: {e}");
}
}
client.connect().await;
}
client.connect().await;
// Give relays a moment to finish the WebSocket handshake before the
// fetch's own timeout starts consuming that time.
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(800)).await;
// `since` is inclusive in NIP-01, and `since` here is the `created_at` of
// the newest event we've already queued — so filter strictly after it,
// or the same event gets re-fetched (and its already-spent token
// re-attempted) every poll forever.
let filter = Filter::new()
.pubkey(our_pubkey)
.kind(Kind::from(4u16))
.since(Timestamp::from(since.saturating_add(1)))
.limit(200);
// Page through results instead of a single `limit(200)` fetch: relays
// return the *newest* `limit` events for a filter, so a backlog of more
// than 200 DMs since the last poll (a node offline a long time) would
// otherwise silently skip the older ones forever — `since` never moves
// past them because they're never fetched. Capped at `MAX_PAGES` so a
// relay that never stops returning full pages can't hang the poll.
const PAGE_LIMIT: usize = 200;
const MAX_PAGES: usize = 5;
let mut watermark = since;
let mut out: Vec<(String, u64, String)> = Vec::new();
for page in 0..MAX_PAGES {
// `since` is inclusive in NIP-01, and `watermark` is the `created_at`
// of the newest event we've already queued — so filter strictly
// after it, or the same event gets re-fetched (and its already-spent
// token re-attempted) every poll forever.
let filter = Filter::new()
.pubkey(our_pubkey)
.kind(Kind::from(4u16))
.since(Timestamp::from(watermark.saturating_add(1)))
.limit(PAGE_LIMIT);
let result = match client
.fetch_events(filter, std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
.await
{
Ok(events) => {
let mut out: Vec<(String, u64, String)> = events
.into_iter()
.map(|e| (e.content, e.created_at.as_u64(), e.pubkey.to_hex()))
.collect();
out.sort_by_key(|(_, created_at, _)| *created_at);
out
let events = match client
.fetch_events(filter, std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
.await
{
Ok(events) => events,
Err(e) => {
warn!("Minibits: relay fetch for claim DMs failed: {e}");
break;
}
};
let got = events.len();
let mut page_events: Vec<(String, u64, String)> = events
.into_iter()
.map(|e| (e.content, e.created_at.as_secs(), e.pubkey.to_hex()))
.collect();
page_events.sort_by_key(|(_, created_at, _)| *created_at);
if let Some((_, newest, _)) = page_events.last() {
watermark = watermark.max(*newest);
}
Err(e) => {
warn!("Minibits: relay fetch for claim DMs failed: {e}");
Vec::new()
out.extend(page_events);
if got < PAGE_LIMIT {
break;
}
};
if page == MAX_PAGES - 1 {
warn!(
"Minibits: hit the {MAX_PAGES}-page claim DM pagination cap; \
some older DMs may remain unfetched until the next poll"
);
}
}
client.shutdown().await;
result
out
}
/// Make sure the Minibits mint is on the accepted-mints allow-list.
///
/// `ecash::receive_token` checks the raw accepted-mints file directly (not
/// the more lenient `ecash::is_mint_trusted`, which always trusts the default
/// mint) — so an operator who edited their accepted-mints list (e.g. via the
/// `streaming.configure-mints` RPC) and dropped the default mint would
/// otherwise cause every Minibits claim to fail *after* the claim was already
/// consumed server-side, permanently losing those coins with nothing but a
/// log line to show for it. The Minibits Lightning address is inherently
/// backed by this one mint — registering it already implies trusting the
/// mint — so self-heal the allow-list here rather than let that combination
/// silently strand funds.
async fn ensure_mint_accepted(data_dir: &Path, mint_url: &str) -> Result<()> {
let mut accepted = ecash::load_accepted_mints(data_dir).await?;
if !accepted.mints.iter().any(|m| m == mint_url) {