feat(01-04): expose meshed Lightning peers and the send path over RPC (FED-05)
Task 3, completing 01-04. mesh.lightning-peers returns the peers that have advertised a Lightning URI: filtered, deduplicated, deterministically ordered, and an empty array rather than an error when nobody has — "nobody yet" is a normal state on a fresh node, not a fault. mesh.send-lightning-info advertises this node's own URI to ONE chosen peer. There is deliberately no broadcast form: this discloses the node's payment endpoint, and who learns it is the operator's choice rather than a side effect of being in radio range (T-01-13). It refuses to send when LND advertises no URI, instead of sending an empty one a peer would store as an undialable target. The list-building and target-parsing logic is extracted into pure functions because this file has no handler test harness and the handlers need a live mesh service. That keeps the three contracts that actually matter provable rather than merely readable: - dedup is keyed on identity_pubkey_hex() — the AUTHENTICATING key, lowercased — never the firmware routing key, so a radio contact and its federation twin collapse to one entry (T-01-11) - "newest advertisement wins" compares PARSED RFC3339 timestamps, not strings: 09:30-01:00 is later than 10:00Z while sorting earlier as text, and there is a test that fails if that is ever string-compared - ordering is name-then-contact_id and asserted byte-identical across eight rotations of the input, because a HashMap's iteration order is not stable and a picker that reshuffles between reads means an operator can click a different node than the one they aimed at The peer allow-list is untouched: server.rs has an empty diff and is_peer_allowed_path still occurs 13 times (T-01-15). Verified: cargo test -p archipelago 1087 passed / 0 failed; clippy --all-targets clean in every touched module (two useless_format lints in the new test code fixed, not waived). The SUMMARY records one deviation honestly: Task 1's tests were written alongside its implementation rather than before, so no pre-implementation failing output exists. A mutation test was run in its place — disabling the pubkey validation fails 3 of the 5 tests — which proves the assertions bind, and the mutation was reverted and verified gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 5
parent
decb7c713b
commit
666990c684
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
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---
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phase: 01-federation-mesh-hardening
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plan: 04
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subsystem: mesh
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tags: [lightning, mesh, FED-05, typed-envelope, channel-open]
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status: complete
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requires:
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- "01-CONTEXT.md's LOCKED FED-05 scope: the picker's public/other list is meshed peers that have Lightning installed"
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- "RESEARCH.md Pitfall 5 — neither datum existed; PATTERNS.md — peer capability advertisement has no analog"
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provides:
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- "lnd.getinfo carries identity_pubkey + uris (or an honest absence)"
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- "MeshMessageType::LightningInfo = 26 + LightningInfoPayload + is_valid_lightning_uri()"
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- "MeshPeer.lightning_uri, populated only by an explicit advertisement"
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- "mesh.lightning-peers (deduplicated, deterministically ordered) and mesh.send-lightning-info (target required)"
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affects:
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- "core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/decode.rs (unplanned — see Deviations)"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/session.rs (unplanned — see Deviations)"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs (unplanned — see Deviations)"
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- "core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs"
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tech-stack:
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added: []
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patterns:
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- "Extract a pure function at the seam so a contract is testable without a live service (map_identity, build_lightning_peer_list, parse_send_lightning_target) — the same shape Task 1's plan prescribed, reused for Task 3 where no handler test harness exists"
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- "Validate unauthenticated RF input BEFORE touching stored state, so a malformed message cannot destroy a good prior value"
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- "Mutation testing as evidence that tests are load-bearing, where pre-implementation failure output was not captured"
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key-files:
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created: []
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modified:
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- "core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/info.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/message_types.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/types.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/dispatch.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/decode.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/listener/session.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/typed_messages.rs"
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- "core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs"
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decisions:
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- "is_valid_lightning_uri deliberately does NOT resolve or dial the host — that would turn a received advertisement into an outbound connection an attacker chose"
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- "Dedup keys on identity_pubkey_hex() (the authenticating key), lowercased, never the firmware routing key — T-01-11"
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- "last_heard compared as a parsed RFC3339 timestamp, not as a string, so a differing UTC offset cannot misorder 'newest wins'"
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- "Three unplanned files were touched: all three rebuild MeshPeer wholesale and would have silently wiped lightning_uri"
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requirements-completed: []
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metrics:
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duration: "~1h"
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completed: 2026-08-02
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tasks_completed: 3
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tasks_total: 3
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---
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# 01-04 — the two Lightning facts the channel-open picker needs (FED-05)
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## What shipped
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| Task | Delivered |
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|---|---|
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| 1 | `lnd.getinfo` deserializes and returns `identity_pubkey` + `uris`; a pubkey that is not 66 hex chars maps to `None` rather than being forwarded |
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| 2 | `MeshMessageType::LightningInfo = 26`, `LightningInfoPayload { uri, alias? }`, `is_valid_lightning_uri()`, `MeshPeer.lightning_uri`, and a validating inbound dispatch arm |
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| 3 | `mesh.lightning-peers` (filtered, deduplicated, stable-ordered) and `mesh.send-lightning-info` (explicit target required), both registered in the dispatcher |
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## The part that was not in the plan, and mattered most
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`MeshPeer.lightning_uri` was specified as a field addition. It is, but **three separate code
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paths rebuild a `MeshPeer` wholesale**, and every one of them would have silently discarded the
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new field:
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1. **`listener/decode.rs` — the identity-advert path.** A wholesale `peers.insert()` that
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hand-preserves only `advert_name` and `lat`/`lon`. Its own comment records why those two are
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there: Reticulum "re-emits identity adverts every announce tick", which had previously been
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renaming every federated contact once a minute. A stored Lightning URI would have been erased
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on the same schedule.
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2. **`listener/session.rs` — `refresh_contacts`.** Rebuilds the record from the radio snapshot,
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which carries no Lightning datum.
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3. **`mesh/mod.rs` — federation seeding.** Same shape.
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All three now carry the previous value forward. Without this the feature would have appeared to
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work in tests and quietly emptied the picker on a live node — the failure mode is an absence,
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which is exactly the kind that does not announce itself.
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## Security posture
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- **T-01-12 (tampering):** the inbound arm validates the URI *before* the write and returns
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early on failure, so a malformed advertisement from anyone in range cannot blank out a real
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peer's entry. Asserted by test, not just by reading.
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- **T-01-13 (disclosure):** `mesh.send-lightning-info` requires an explicit `contact_id`. There
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is no broadcast form, and the test asserts that `{}`, `{"broadcast": true}` and an
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out-of-range id are all refused rather than treated as "send to everyone".
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- **T-01-11 (spoofing):** dedup keys on the authenticating key, never the firmware routing key.
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- **T-01-15 (EoP):** `server.rs` is untouched — `git diff HEAD` on it is empty, and
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`is_peer_allowed_path` still occurs 13 times. The peer allow-list was not widened.
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- Wire compatibility: discriminant 26 was unused, so a node predating this fails to decode the
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message rather than mis-decoding it as another type. The optional `alias` is
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`skip_serializing_if`, asserted to cost fewer bytes on air when absent — this rides LoRa.
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## Evidence
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- **`cargo test -p archipelago`: 1087 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored.**
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- New tests: 5 (`lnd::info`), 5 (`mesh::message_types`), 6 (`lightning_peer_tests`).
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- `cargo clippy --all-targets`: **no warnings in any touched module** (two `useless_format`
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lints in the new test code were fixed, not waived).
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- Every acceptance-criteria grep met, including the negative one on `server.rs`.
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## Deviation: TDD ordering on Task 1
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The plan required the SUMMARY to record "the pre-implementation failing output of the fixture
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tests". Tests and implementation were written in the same pass, so **that output does not exist
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and is not reproduced here.**
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Rather than drop the requirement's intent — *prove the tests are load-bearing* — a mutation test
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was run in its place. `is_valid_identity_pubkey` was replaced with `true`, and the suite re-run:
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```
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3 failed:
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api::rpc::lnd::info::tests::malformed_pubkey_is_dropped_rather_than_propagated
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api::rpc::lnd::info::tests::a_malformed_pubkey_does_not_discard_the_advertised_uris
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api::rpc::lnd::info::tests::valid_pubkey_shape_matches_the_openchannel_rule
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```
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The mutation was reverted and its absence verified. This is stronger evidence than a
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pre-implementation red run (which only shows the code is absent, not that the assertions bind),
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but it is a deviation from the ordering the plan asked for, and is recorded as one.
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## Open / handed on
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- **Nothing here is exercised on hardware yet.** Two archy nodes with LND and a radio link are
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needed to see a real advertisement traverse the mesh; every claim above is unit-level.
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- `mesh.lightning-peers` is a data source with no consumer until **01-06** builds the picker UI
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(which `depends_on` this plan).
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- `MeshPeer.lightning_uri`'s doc mentions federation seeding as a future source; this plan does
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not implement it, and `mesh/mod.rs` only preserves an existing value.
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@@ -422,6 +422,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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"mesh.send-psbt" => self.handle_mesh_send_psbt(params).await,
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"mesh.broadcast-presence" => self.handle_mesh_broadcast_presence(params).await,
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"mesh.presence-list" => self.handle_mesh_presence_list(params).await,
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"mesh.lightning-peers" => self.handle_mesh_lightning_peers(params).await,
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"mesh.send-lightning-info" => self.handle_mesh_send_lightning_info(params).await,
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"mesh.contacts-list" => self.handle_mesh_contacts_list(params).await,
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"mesh.contacts-save" => self.handle_mesh_contacts_save(params).await,
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"mesh.contacts-block" => self.handle_mesh_contacts_block(params).await,
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@@ -1368,4 +1368,298 @@ impl RpcHandler {
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.await?;
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Ok(serde_json::json!({ "sent": true, "message_id": msg.id, "sender_seq": seq }))
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}
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/// mesh.lightning-peers — the meshed peers that have advertised a Lightning
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/// URI, i.e. the "public/other" side of the channel-open picker (FED-05).
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///
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/// Returns an empty array, never an error, when no peer has advertised —
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/// "nobody yet" is a normal state on a fresh node, not a fault.
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pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_mesh_lightning_peers(
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&self,
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_params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
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) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
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let service = self.mesh_service.read().await;
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let svc = service
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.as_ref()
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.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh service not running"))?;
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let state = svc.shared_state();
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let peer_vec: Vec<_> = state.peers.read().await.values().cloned().collect();
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Ok(serde_json::json!({ "peers": build_lightning_peer_list(&peer_vec) }))
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}
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/// mesh.send-lightning-info — advertise THIS node's Lightning URI to one
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/// chosen peer.
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///
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/// Requires an explicit target. There is deliberately no broadcast form:
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/// this discloses the node's payment endpoint, and who learns it is the
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/// operator's choice, not a side effect of being in radio range (T-01-13).
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pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_mesh_send_lightning_info(
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&self,
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params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
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) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
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let contact_id = parse_send_lightning_target(params.as_ref())?;
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// Read our own URI from the lnd.getinfo path. Refuse rather than send an
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// empty advertisement: a peer that stored "" would show us in its picker
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// as a target it can never dial.
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let info = self
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.handle_lnd_getinfo()
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.await
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.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Cannot read this node's Lightning info: {e}"))?;
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let uri = info
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.get("uris")
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.and_then(|u| u.as_array())
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.and_then(|a| a.first())
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.and_then(|u| u.as_str())
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.map(|s| s.to_string())
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.ok_or_else(|| {
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anyhow::anyhow!(
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"This node has no advertised Lightning URI to share — LND may be down, or \
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configured with no externally reachable address"
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)
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})?;
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if !message_types::is_valid_lightning_uri(&uri) {
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return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
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"This node's own Lightning URI is malformed; refusing to advertise it"
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));
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}
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let alias = info
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.get("alias")
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.and_then(|a| a.as_str())
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.filter(|a| !a.is_empty())
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.map(|a| a.to_string());
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let payload_struct = message_types::LightningInfoPayload { uri, alias };
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let service = self.mesh_service.read().await;
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let svc = service
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.as_ref()
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.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh service not running"))?;
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let seq = svc.next_send_seq(contact_id).await;
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let payload = message_types::encode_payload(&payload_struct)?;
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let envelope = TypedEnvelope::new(MeshMessageType::LightningInfo, payload).with_seq(seq);
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let wire = envelope.to_wire()?;
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let typed_json = serde_json::to_value(&payload_struct).ok();
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let msg = svc
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.send_typed_wire(
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contact_id,
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wire,
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"lightning_info",
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"Shared Lightning connection info",
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typed_json,
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seq,
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)
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.await?;
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info!(contact_id, seq, "Sent lightning_info to a chosen mesh peer");
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Ok(serde_json::json!({ "sent": true, "message_id": msg.id, "sender_seq": seq }))
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}
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}
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/// The required target for `mesh.send-lightning-info`.
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///
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/// Split out so the "a target is mandatory" contract is testable without a mesh
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/// service — that contract is the whole of T-01-13's mitigation, so it should
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/// not be provable only by reading the code.
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fn parse_send_lightning_target(params: Option<&serde_json::Value>) -> Result<u32> {
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let params =
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params.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing params: a target contact_id is required"))?;
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let contact_id = params["contact_id"].as_u64().ok_or_else(|| {
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anyhow::anyhow!(
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"Missing contact_id: mesh.send-lightning-info requires an explicit target and has no \
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broadcast form"
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)
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})?;
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u32::try_from(contact_id).map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("contact_id out of range"))
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}
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/// Build the deduplicated, deterministically ordered Lightning-peer list.
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///
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/// Pure so the dedup and ordering contracts are testable without a mesh
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/// service. Ordering matters for a real reason: the picker must not reshuffle
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/// between reads, or an operator clicking a row can hit a different node than
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/// the one they aimed at.
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fn build_lightning_peer_list(peers: &[crate::mesh::types::MeshPeer]) -> Vec<serde_json::Value> {
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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// Dedup by the AUTHENTICATING key, never the firmware routing key: a radio
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// contact and its federation twin are one node and must not be offered
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// twice (T-01-11). Peers with no key at all fall back to contact_id, which
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// is unique per record.
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let mut best: HashMap<String, &crate::mesh::types::MeshPeer> = HashMap::new();
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for peer in peers.iter().filter(|p| p.lightning_uri.is_some()) {
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let key = peer
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.identity_pubkey_hex()
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.map(|k| k.to_ascii_lowercase())
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.unwrap_or_else(|| format!("contact:{}", peer.contact_id));
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best.entry(key)
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.and_modify(|kept| {
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// Newest advertisement wins. last_heard is RFC3339; parse rather
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// than string-compare so a differing offset can't misorder.
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let kept_at = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(&kept.last_heard).ok();
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let this_at = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(&peer.last_heard).ok();
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if this_at >= kept_at {
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*kept = peer;
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}
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})
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.or_insert(peer);
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}
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let mut out: Vec<&crate::mesh::types::MeshPeer> = best.into_values().collect();
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// Sort by display name, then contact_id as the tiebreak, so two peers
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// sharing a name still have a total order and the list is stable across
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// reads (a HashMap's iteration order is not).
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out.sort_by(|a, b| {
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a.advert_name
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.to_lowercase()
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.cmp(&b.advert_name.to_lowercase())
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.then(a.contact_id.cmp(&b.contact_id))
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});
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out.into_iter()
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.map(|p| {
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serde_json::json!({
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"contact_id": p.contact_id,
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"name": p.advert_name,
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"lightning_uri": p.lightning_uri,
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"last_heard": p.last_heard,
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"reachable": p.reachable,
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"hops": p.hops,
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})
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})
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.collect()
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod lightning_peer_tests {
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use super::*;
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use crate::mesh::types::MeshPeer;
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const URI_A: &str =
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"03a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90a1b2c3d4e5f60718293a4b5c6d7e8f90@1.2.3.4:9735";
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const URI_B: &str =
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"02ffeeddccbbaa998877665544332211ffeeddccbbaa998877665544332211ffee@5.6.7.8:9735";
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fn peer(contact_id: u32, name: &str, arch: Option<&str>) -> MeshPeer {
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MeshPeer {
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contact_id,
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advert_name: name.into(),
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did: None,
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pubkey_hex: Some(format!("routing{contact_id}")),
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arch_pubkey_hex: arch.map(|s| s.into()),
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x25519_pubkey: None,
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rssi: None,
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snr: None,
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last_heard: "2026-08-02T10:00:00+00:00".into(),
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hops: 1,
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last_advert: 0,
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reachable: true,
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pkc_capable: false,
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lat: None,
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lon: None,
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lightning_uri: None,
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn no_advertised_peers_is_an_empty_list_not_an_error() {
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assert!(build_lightning_peer_list(&[]).is_empty());
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// Peers exist, but none has advertised Lightning.
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let quiet = vec![peer(1, "a", None), peer(2, "b", None)];
|
||||
assert!(build_lightning_peer_list(&quiet).is_empty());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn only_peers_that_advertised_are_listed() {
|
||||
let mut with = peer(1, "has-lightning", None);
|
||||
with.lightning_uri = Some(URI_A.into());
|
||||
let list = build_lightning_peer_list(&[with, peer(2, "no-lightning", None)]);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(list.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(list[0]["name"], "has-lightning");
|
||||
assert_eq!(list[0]["lightning_uri"], URI_A);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_peer_that_advertised_twice_appears_once_with_the_newer_uri() {
|
||||
// Same node seen as two records (radio + federation twin) sharing an
|
||||
// authenticating key — the picker must offer it once, not twice.
|
||||
let mut older = peer(1, "twin", Some("ARCHKEY"));
|
||||
older.lightning_uri = Some(URI_A.into());
|
||||
older.last_heard = "2026-08-02T10:00:00+00:00".into();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut newer = peer(2, "twin", Some("archkey")); // case-insensitive match
|
||||
newer.lightning_uri = Some(URI_B.into());
|
||||
newer.last_heard = "2026-08-02T11:30:00+00:00".into();
|
||||
|
||||
let list = build_lightning_peer_list(&[older.clone(), newer.clone()]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(list.len(), 1, "twins must collapse to one entry");
|
||||
assert_eq!(list[0]["lightning_uri"], URI_B, "the newer URI must win");
|
||||
|
||||
// Order of the input must not change the outcome.
|
||||
let reversed = build_lightning_peer_list(&[newer, older]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(reversed[0]["lightning_uri"], URI_B);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn a_differing_offset_cannot_misorder_the_newest_advertisement() {
|
||||
// 09:30-01:00 is 10:30 UTC — LATER than 10:00Z, though it string-sorts
|
||||
// earlier. Parsing rather than string-comparing is what makes this pass.
|
||||
let mut utc = peer(1, "twin", Some("k"));
|
||||
utc.lightning_uri = Some(URI_A.into());
|
||||
utc.last_heard = "2026-08-02T10:00:00+00:00".into();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut offset = peer(2, "twin", Some("k"));
|
||||
offset.lightning_uri = Some(URI_B.into());
|
||||
offset.last_heard = "2026-08-02T09:30:00-01:00".into();
|
||||
|
||||
let list = build_lightning_peer_list(&[utc, offset]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(list.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(list[0]["lightning_uri"], URI_B);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn ordering_is_stable_and_deterministic_across_reads() {
|
||||
let mut peers = Vec::new();
|
||||
for (id, name) in [(3, "Zulu"), (1, "alpha"), (2, "Mike"), (9, "alpha")] {
|
||||
let mut p = peer(id, name, Some(&format!("key{id}")));
|
||||
p.lightning_uri = Some(URI_A.into());
|
||||
peers.push(p);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let first = build_lightning_peer_list(&peers);
|
||||
// A HashMap's iteration order is not stable, so run it repeatedly over a
|
||||
// shuffled input: the output must be byte-identical every time.
|
||||
for _ in 0..8 {
|
||||
peers.rotate_left(1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(build_lightning_peer_list(&peers), first);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let names: Vec<_> = first.iter().map(|e| e["name"].as_str().unwrap()).collect();
|
||||
assert_eq!(names, vec!["alpha", "alpha", "Mike", "Zulu"]);
|
||||
// Same name -> contact_id breaks the tie, ascending.
|
||||
assert_eq!(first[0]["contact_id"], 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(first[1]["contact_id"], 9);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn send_requires_an_explicit_target_and_has_no_broadcast_form() {
|
||||
assert!(parse_send_lightning_target(None).is_err(), "no params");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
parse_send_lightning_target(Some(&serde_json::json!({}))).is_err(),
|
||||
"params without contact_id must be refused, not treated as broadcast"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
parse_send_lightning_target(Some(&serde_json::json!({"broadcast": true}))).is_err(),
|
||||
"there is no broadcast escape hatch"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
parse_send_lightning_target(Some(&serde_json::json!({"contact_id": 1u64 << 40})))
|
||||
.is_err(),
|
||||
"an out-of-range contact_id must error, not silently truncate to another peer"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
parse_send_lightning_target(Some(&serde_json::json!({"contact_id": 42}))).unwrap(),
|
||||
42
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1088,9 +1088,9 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let bad = [
|
||||
"".to_string(),
|
||||
"no-at-sign".to_string(),
|
||||
format!("{LN_PUBKEY}"), // no host at all
|
||||
LN_PUBKEY.to_string(), // no host at all
|
||||
format!("{LN_PUBKEY}@"), // empty host
|
||||
format!("@1.2.3.4:9735"), // no pubkey
|
||||
"@1.2.3.4:9735".to_string(), // no pubkey
|
||||
format!("{}@1.2.3.4:9735", &LN_PUBKEY[..65]), // pubkey too short
|
||||
format!("{}z@1.2.3.4:9735", &LN_PUBKEY[..65]), // pubkey not hex
|
||||
format!("{LN_PUBKEY}@1.2.3.4:99999"), // port out of u16 range
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user