docs(1.7.122): curate release notes and add the in-app What's New block
Leads with what changes for the operator: app screens now require the node password across LAN, Tailscale, mesh and Tor; the wallet/protocol ports that must stay open stayed open; the mesh leak found during on-node verification; nodes repairing their own legacy containers; and the signing-key rotation. Known gaps disclosed, including the eleven still-undeclared ports and that non-browser clients will now meet the login page. The new block uses <strong> rather than the literal ** markers in earlier entries, which render as asterisks in the modal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelago
co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
Claude Fable 5
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# Changelog
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## v1.7.122-alpha (2026-08-04)
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- **Your apps now ask for your node password before they open — over your home network, Tailscale, the mesh and Tor alike.** Until now anyone who could reach your node could open Immich, Nextcloud, Vaultwarden, Jellyfin, Grafana and the rest simply by typing the address and port, with no login at all. Twenty app screens now sit behind the same login you use for the node, showing you which app you are opening, and honouring two-factor if you have it switched on. Logging in at an app address logs you into the dashboard too, so it is one password, not one per app. This completes the groundwork disclosed in v1.7.121.
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- **The things that must stay open stayed open.** Zeus and other remote wallets still reach your Lightning node directly, Electrum wallets still connect, and Bitcoin still talks to its peers — those connections carry their own proof of identity and a login page would simply break them. Every one of these seventeen exceptions now has to state in writing why it is safe to leave open, so the list is something you can read rather than something you have to discover.
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- **A private address on your node was answering the mesh without a password.** One app's port was marked as being for this machine only, and the part of the node that carries mesh traffic did not know that — it forwarded requests from the whole mesh straight to it. Found while verifying the work above on a real node, not in testing. That path now refuses anything marked machine-only, and the app is reachable only from the node itself, as intended.
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- **Tor addresses no longer skip the login.** An app published as a .onion address was handed straight to the app, because a Tor visitor carries no session cookie to check. The login gate now takes those addresses first, closing the last of the four routes that went around it.
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- Nodes fix themselves after this update. Apps installed before this system used its current container setup kept their old wide-open address even after the signed list told them to move, and each would otherwise have needed hand-holding on every node. Your node now notices the difference and rebuilds those apps itself, keeping their data, within about half a minute of starting. Verified by putting a node back into the old state deliberately and watching it repair.
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- The node had been reading two different sets of instructions about its own apps — the signed list it downloads, and older copies on disk — which is how a port meant to stay private was briefly opened on a test node. Both now come from the signed list, and a port withdrawn from the login gate is released without needing a restart.
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- **The key that signs these updates has been replaced.** The previous signing key was exposed where it should not have been, so it is treated as compromised and this release installs its replacement. This update is the last one signed with the old key, by necessity — it is the one that teaches your node the new one.
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- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: eleven app ports still have no stated policy — BotFights, the Fedimint gateway, NetBird, the voice assistant's own screens and the router screen — and remain reachable without a login until each is decided deliberately; the node reports them rather than guessing, because guessing at an unstated setting caused both incidents behind this work. Three voice-assistant ports are still open without authentication; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant. Non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — will now meet the login page and need an access token. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
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## v1.7.121-alpha (2026-08-04)
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- **Making another node "Trusted" now asks for your node password.** Trust was being handed out by machines rather than by you: any node able to reach yours could join and mark itself Trusted, because the check proved only that the caller owned the key it had just presented — never that you had approved it. Trust also spread on its own, since every peer a Trusted node advertised was added as Trusted too, so one grant quietly propagated across the whole federation. Uninvited joins are now capped at Observer, advertised peers arrive as Observers, and raising anyone to Trusted — whether by generating an invite or by changing the dropdown on a node — requires your password. Lowering trust deliberately does not, because the safe action must never be the inconvenient one. Existing peers are left exactly as they are rather than silently demoted, and each one now records how its trust was granted so you can review them.
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@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ dependencies = [
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[[package]]
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name = "archipelago"
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version = "1.7.121-alpha"
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version = "1.7.122-alpha"
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dependencies = [
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"anyhow",
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"archipelago-container",
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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[package]
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name = "archipelago"
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version = "1.7.121-alpha"
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version = "1.7.122-alpha"
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edition = "2021"
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description = "Archipelago Bitcoin Node OS - Native backend"
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authors = ["Archipelago Team"]
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@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
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{
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"name": "neode-ui",
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"version": "1.7.121-alpha",
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"version": "1.7.122-alpha",
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"lockfileVersion": 3,
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"requires": true,
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"packages": {
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"": {
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"name": "neode-ui",
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"version": "1.7.121-alpha",
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"version": "1.7.122-alpha",
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"dependencies": {
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"@scure/bip39": "^2.2.0",
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"@types/dompurify": "^3.0.5",
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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{
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"name": "neode-ui",
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"private": true,
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"version": "1.7.121-alpha",
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"version": "1.7.122-alpha",
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"type": "module",
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"scripts": {
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"start": "./start-dev.sh",
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@@ -362,6 +362,23 @@ init()
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</button>
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</div>
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<div class="overflow-y-auto flex-1 min-h-0 space-y-6 pr-1">
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<!-- v1.7.122-alpha -->
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<div>
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<div class="flex items-center gap-2 mb-3">
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<span class="text-xs font-mono px-2 py-0.5 rounded bg-orange-500/20 text-orange-300">v1.7.122-alpha</span>
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<span class="text-xs text-white/40">August 4, 2026</span>
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</div>
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<div class="space-y-3 text-sm text-white/80 pl-3 border-l border-white/10">
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<p><strong>Your apps now ask for your node password before they open — over your home network, Tailscale, the mesh and Tor alike.</strong> Until now anyone who could reach your node could open Immich, Nextcloud, Vaultwarden, Jellyfin, Grafana and the rest simply by typing the address and port, with no login at all. Twenty app screens now sit behind the same login you use for the node, showing you which app you are opening, and honouring two-factor if you have it switched on. Logging in at an app address logs you into the dashboard too, so it is one password, not one per app.</p>
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<p><strong>The things that must stay open stayed open.</strong> Zeus and other remote wallets still reach your Lightning node directly, Electrum wallets still connect, and Bitcoin still talks to its peers — those connections carry their own proof of identity and a login page would simply break them. Every one of these exceptions now has to state in writing why it is safe to leave open, so the list is something you can read rather than something you have to discover.</p>
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<p><strong>A private address on your node was answering the mesh without a password.</strong> One app's port was marked as being for this machine only, and the part of the node that carries mesh traffic did not know that — it forwarded requests from the whole mesh straight to it. Found while checking the work above on a real node, not in testing. That path now refuses anything marked machine-only, and the app is reachable only from the node itself, as intended.</p>
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<p><strong>Tor addresses no longer skip the login.</strong> An app published as a .onion address was handed straight to the app, because a Tor visitor carries no session. Those addresses now arrive at the login gate first, closing the last route that went around it.</p>
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<p>Nodes fix themselves after this update. Apps installed before this system used its current container setup kept their old wide-open address even after being told to move, and each would have needed hand-holding on every node. Your node now notices the difference and rebuilds those apps itself, keeping their data, within about half a minute of starting.</p>
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<p>The node had been reading two different sets of instructions about its own apps — the signed list it downloads, and older copies on disk — which is how a port meant to stay private was briefly opened. Both now come from the signed list.</p>
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<p><strong>The key that signs these updates has been replaced.</strong> The previous signing key was exposed where it should not have been, so it is treated as compromised and this release installs its replacement. This update is the last one signed with the old key, by necessity — it is the one that teaches your node the new one.</p>
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<p>Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: eleven app ports still have no stated policy — BotFights, the Fedimint gateway, NetBird, the voice assistant's own screens and the router screen — and remain reachable without a login until each is decided deliberately; the node reports them rather than guessing, because guessing at an unstated setting is what caused two incidents this week. Three voice-assistant ports are still open without authentication; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant. Non-browser apps — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — will meet the login page and need an access token; say the word if you use one and it can be exempted. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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<!-- v1.7.121-alpha -->
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<div>
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<div class="flex items-center gap-2 mb-3">
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