wip(13-08): checkpoint before operator session restart — Task 1 GREEN (28/28), Task 2 in progress

Executor stopped deliberately for a session restart (bypass-permissions relaunch).
Executor's final report: 'cargo test assistant confirm-gate suite 28/28 green,
individual nonce test passes; committing Task 1 next — first verify the
tools.rs/grants.rs/backends diffs are formatting-only.'

Task 1 (D-07/D-11 confirm gate, backend) is implemented and test-green but this
checkpoint is verbatim-uncommitted-state, NOT the reviewed atomic Task 1 commit:
continuation executor should verify diffs, then reset --soft or commit-on-top
into proper feat(13-08) task commits. Task 2 (ToolConfirmModal.vue trusted
chrome, Chat.vue + contextBroker.ts wiring) is partially built, tests written.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
archipelago
2026-08-05 11:34:31 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent db11c625c8
commit fc09d7a292
11 changed files with 1011 additions and 53 deletions
@@ -28,10 +28,68 @@ impl RpcHandler {
"assistant.list-tools" => self.handle_assistant_list_tools().await,
"assistant.grants-get" => self.handle_assistant_grants_get().await,
"assistant.grants-set" => self.handle_assistant_grants_set(params).await,
"assistant.pending" => self.handle_assistant_pending().await,
"assistant.confirm-tool" => self.handle_assistant_confirm_tool(params).await,
other => anyhow::bail!("no such assistant method: {other}"),
}
}
/// assistant.pending — the current pending destructive-tool
/// confirmation, if any: the node-authored description and the
/// node-minted nonce. This is how the trusted chrome *fetches* the
/// dialog text over the authenticated RPC session rather than
/// receiving it from the iframe (D-11) — the iframe has no path into
/// this text and no way to answer it.
async fn handle_assistant_pending(self: &Arc<Self>) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
let gate = crate::assistant::confirm::global();
Ok(match gate.peek() {
Some(p) => serde_json::json!({
"pending": {
"req_id": p.req_id,
"nonce": p.nonce,
"description": p.description,
"tool_name": p.tool_name,
}
}),
None => serde_json::json!({ "pending": null }),
})
}
/// assistant.confirm-tool — resolve a pending confirmation. Params:
/// `{ "req_id": string, "nonce": string, "approved": bool }`. The
/// nonce must be the node-minted one for exactly that pending action
/// (S-02); a mismatched or replayed nonce is refused loudly — a
/// mismatch can only mean a replay attempt or a trusted-chrome bug, so
/// it is logged at error level and surfaced to the caller as an error,
/// not swallowed as a toast.
async fn handle_assistant_confirm_tool(
self: &Arc<Self>,
params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
let params = params.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing params"))?;
let req_id = params
.get("req_id")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing req_id"))?;
let nonce = params
.get("nonce")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing nonce"))?;
let approved = params
.get("approved")
.and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing approved"))?;
let gate = crate::assistant::confirm::global();
match gate.resolve(req_id, nonce, approved) {
Ok(()) => Ok(serde_json::json!({ "resolved": true, "approved": approved })),
Err(refusal) => {
tracing::error!(%req_id, %refusal, "assistant.confirm-tool refused");
anyhow::bail!("confirmation refused: {refusal}")
}
}
}
/// assistant.list-tools — the tools currently visible to the local
/// operator (i.e. whose category is currently granted), each with its
/// category and destructive flag, so neode-ui can render an honest
@@ -21,7 +21,12 @@ pub enum BackendTurn {
#[async_trait]
pub trait Backend: Send + Sync {
async fn send(&self, system: &str, tools: &[ToolDef], history: &[ChatMessage]) -> Result<BackendTurn>;
async fn send(
&self,
system: &str,
tools: &[ToolDef],
history: &[ChatMessage],
) -> Result<BackendTurn>;
}
/// D-04's backend chain: local Ollama first (node data never leaves the
+137 -11
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock};
use std::time::Duration;
use rand::RngCore;
use serde_json::json;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
use tokio::time::Instant;
@@ -113,16 +115,67 @@ impl ConfirmGate {
/// wait times out). Holds the internal lock only around map edits —
/// never across the human-speed await.
pub async fn request(&self, call_id: &str, tool: &ToolDef, args: &ToolArgs) -> Confirmed {
let _ = (call_id, tool, args);
todo!("13-08 Task 1: suspend on a nonce-bound pending confirmation")
let validated_args = canonical_args(args);
let nonce = mint_nonce(tool.name, &validated_args);
let description = build_description(tool, args);
let req_id = format!("confirm-{}", self.next_id.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed));
let (responder, decision) = oneshot::channel();
{
// Lock held only for the insert — never across the wait below.
let mut map = self.pending.lock().expect("confirm gate mutex poisoned");
map.insert(
req_id.clone(),
PendingConfirmation {
call_id: call_id.to_string(),
tool_name: tool.name.to_string(),
validated_args,
description,
nonce,
created_at: Instant::now(),
responder,
},
);
}
match tokio::time::timeout(CONFIRM_TIMEOUT, decision).await {
Ok(Ok(true)) => Confirmed::Yes,
Ok(Ok(false)) => Confirmed::No,
// The gate went away without an answer — decline, never execute.
Ok(Err(_)) => Confirmed::No,
Err(_) => {
// Timed out: remove the entry so a late "yes" is refused,
// and so an abandoned dialog leaks nothing (T-13-51).
self.pending
.lock()
.expect("confirm gate mutex poisoned")
.remove(&req_id);
Confirmed::TimedOut
}
}
}
/// Resolve a pending confirmation by `req_id`, carrying the node-minted
/// nonce back. Refuses a mismatched nonce (neither action executes) and
/// a replay of an already-resolved entry.
pub fn resolve(&self, req_id: &str, nonce: &str, approved: bool) -> Result<(), ResolveRefusal> {
let _ = (req_id, nonce, approved);
todo!("13-08 Task 1: nonce-checked resolution")
let mut map = self.pending.lock().expect("confirm gate mutex poisoned");
let Some(entry) = map.get(req_id) else {
return Err(ResolveRefusal::NoSuchPending);
};
if entry.nonce != nonce {
// Loud and sticky: this can only be a replay attempt or a bug
// in the trusted chrome (S-02) — never a normal user path.
tracing::error!(
req_id,
tool = %entry.tool_name,
"assistant confirm nonce mismatch — refusing resolution (possible replay or trusted-chrome bug)"
);
return Err(ResolveRefusal::NonceMismatch);
}
let entry = map.remove(req_id).expect("entry present — just checked");
drop(map);
// The waiter may have timed out concurrently; a dead receiver is fine.
let _ = entry.responder.send(approved);
Ok(())
}
/// The oldest pending confirmation, if any — what `assistant.pending`
@@ -168,8 +221,14 @@ pub fn global() -> Arc<ConfirmGate> {
/// run, not what the model sent), plus per-mint randomness (so yesterday's
/// nonce for the same action never matches today's pending entry).
pub fn mint_nonce(tool_name: &str, validated_args: &str) -> String {
let _ = (tool_name, validated_args);
todo!("13-08 Task 1: hash(tool_name, validated_args) + per-mint randomness")
let mut salt = [0u8; 16];
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut salt);
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(salt);
hasher.update(tool_name.as_bytes());
hasher.update([0u8]);
hasher.update(validated_args.as_bytes());
hex::encode(hasher.finalize())
}
/// Canonical, deterministic form of the validated arguments — the byte
@@ -190,8 +249,66 @@ fn canonical_args(args: &ToolArgs) -> String {
/// (S-03). Clear-signing: name the resource verbatim (S-08), the concrete
/// effect, and the boundary of what is *not* affected.
pub fn build_description(tool: &ToolDef, args: &ToolArgs) -> String {
let _ = (tool, args);
todo!("13-08 Task 1: node-authored, resource-distinct dialog text")
match (tool.name, args) {
("app_start", ToolArgs::AppId(a)) => format!(
"Start the app \"{id}\". It will begin running on this node and \
be reachable again. Only \"{id}\" is affected — no other apps, \
and none of your funds or files, are touched.",
id = a.app_id
),
("app_stop", ToolArgs::AppId(a)) => format!(
"Stop the app \"{id}\". It will shut down and stay unavailable \
until it is started again. Only \"{id}\" is affected — no other \
apps, and none of your funds or files, are touched.",
id = a.app_id
),
("app_restart", ToolArgs::AppId(a)) => {
// The timing caveat the node actually knows (13-08 Task 1): a
// bitcoin restart pauses — but does not lose — sync progress.
let caveat = if a.app_id.contains("bitcoin") {
" If this node is still syncing the blockchain, the restart \
pauses that sync briefly but none of its progress is lost."
} else {
""
};
format!(
"Restart the app \"{id}\". It will shut down and start again, \
and be unavailable for a short moment while it does.{caveat} \
Only \"{id}\" is affected — no other apps, and none of your \
funds or files, are touched.",
id = a.app_id
)
}
("settings_set", ToolArgs::SettingsSet(a)) => format!(
"Change the node setting \"{key}\" to {value}. The change takes \
effect immediately. Only this one setting changes — no other \
settings, apps, funds or files are affected.",
key = a.key,
value = human_value(&a.value)
),
// A destructive tool added later without its own hand-written arm
// above still gets node-authored text (the tool's own definition
// plus the validated argument values) — never model text. Its
// author should add a proper clear-signing arm here; this fallback
// keeps the provenance property, not the copy quality.
_ => format!(
"{} Requested with: {}",
tool.description,
canonical_args(args)
),
}
}
/// Render one validated argument value for the dialog in plain language —
/// quoted strings and bare booleans/numbers, never raw JSON syntax for the
/// common cases.
fn human_value(value: &serde_json::Value) -> String {
match value {
serde_json::Value::String(s) => format!("\"{s}\""),
serde_json::Value::Bool(b) => b.to_string(),
serde_json::Value::Number(n) => n.to_string(),
other => other.to_string(),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -317,9 +434,18 @@ mod tests {
let tool = app_restart_tool();
let desc_a = build_description(&tool, &restart_args("immich"));
let desc_b = build_description(&tool, &restart_args("gitea"));
assert_ne!(desc_a, desc_b, "two resources must not read interchangeably");
assert!(desc_a.contains("immich") && !desc_a.contains("gitea"), "{desc_a}");
assert!(desc_b.contains("gitea") && !desc_b.contains("immich"), "{desc_b}");
assert_ne!(
desc_a, desc_b,
"two resources must not read interchangeably"
);
assert!(
desc_a.contains("immich") && !desc_a.contains("gitea"),
"{desc_a}"
);
assert!(
desc_b.contains("gitea") && !desc_b.contains("immich"),
"{desc_b}"
);
}
/// S-09: the daemon-restart analogue. Dropping the gate takes every
+4 -1
View File
@@ -104,7 +104,10 @@ mod tests {
"a fresh node with no grants file must grant nothing"
);
for category in PermissionCategory::ALL {
assert!(!grants.allows(category), "{category:?} must be closed by default");
assert!(
!grants.allows(category),
"{category:?} must be closed by default"
);
}
}
+55 -17
View File
@@ -6,15 +6,17 @@
//! Concurrency discipline inherited from `mesh/listener/assist.rs`'s own
//! doc comment ("Spawned off the radio loop so it never blocks"): never
//! hold a shared lock across a `.await` that can block for human-response
//! time. `execute_tool` below holds no lock at all in this tracer — there
//! is nothing yet to hold one across (13-08's confirm gate is what
//! introduces that discipline requirement for real).
//! time. The confirm-gate wait in `execute_tool` below is exactly such an
//! await — it can suspend for minutes while a human decides — and it is
//! reached holding no lock at all: the gate's own internal lock is scoped
//! to map edits inside `confirm.rs`, and nothing here wraps the call in a
//! guard. Keep it that way (AI-SPEC §4b.2).
use anyhow::Result;
use super::backends::{Backend, BackendTurn};
use super::tools::{ChatMessage, Role, ToolCall, ToolResult};
use super::tools::ToolDef;
use super::tools::{ChatMessage, Role, ToolCall, ToolResult};
use super::ToolExecCtx;
/// Hard stop — a looping model must never spin unbounded (D-05).
@@ -63,7 +65,9 @@ pub async fn run_loop(
}
}
}
anyhow::bail!("assistant loop exceeded MAX_TURNS without a final answer — stopping, not looping forever")
anyhow::bail!(
"assistant loop exceeded MAX_TURNS without a final answer — stopping, not looping forever"
)
}
/// The single choke point every tool call passes through, regardless of
@@ -72,9 +76,9 @@ pub async fn run_loop(
/// category grants — re-checked here even though the system prompt already
/// omits ungranted tools; never trust that as the only enforcement layer),
/// schema validation (never coerce, never guess — AI-SPEC §4b.1), and D-07
/// (every destructive tool suspends for confirmation — 13-08 fills that
/// branch in; there are no reachable destructive tools yet, so it is
/// unreachable today even though the registry now has some).
/// (every destructive tool suspends on the confirm gate before execution —
/// only a matching human "yes" releases it; a decline or timeout returns a
/// declined error result and executes nothing).
///
/// `pub(crate)` (not private) so `assistant::tools`'s own test module can
/// exercise this exact choke point directly for S-05/S-07 — the point of
@@ -120,7 +124,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn execute_tool(call: &ToolCall, ctx: &ToolExecCtx) -> ToolResu
// "not yet implemented" placeholder instead of being refused with the
// real reason (13-05 Task 1's `<done>` criterion). This performs no
// mutation itself — only a read-only id lookup for the app tools.
if let Err(msg) = super::tools::validate_business_rules(&call.name, &args, ctx.handler.as_ref()).await {
if let Err(msg) =
super::tools::validate_business_rules(&call.name, &args, ctx.handler.as_ref()).await
{
return ToolResult {
call_id: call.id.clone(),
is_error: true,
@@ -129,11 +135,23 @@ pub(crate) async fn execute_tool(call: &ToolCall, ctx: &ToolExecCtx) -> ToolResu
}
if tool.destructive {
return ToolResult {
call_id: call.id.clone(),
is_error: true,
content: "destructive tool execution is not yet implemented".to_string(),
};
// D-07/D-11: the loop suspends here. The gate publishes a
// NODE-AUTHORED description (never model text) that neode-ui's
// trusted chrome fetches over the authenticated RPC session, and
// approval binds to a node-minted nonce over the tool name and the
// validated args — so what executes below is exactly what the
// human read (S-02). This await is human-speed (up to
// CONFIRM_TIMEOUT); no lock is held across it — see the module doc.
match ctx.confirm.request(&call.id, tool, &args).await {
super::confirm::Confirmed::Yes => {}
super::confirm::Confirmed::No | super::confirm::Confirmed::TimedOut => {
return ToolResult {
call_id: call.id.clone(),
is_error: true,
content: "the user declined this action — nothing was changed".to_string(),
};
}
}
}
// D-06: dispatch is a per-tool, hand-written decision recorded in
@@ -156,10 +174,10 @@ pub(crate) async fn execute_tool(call: &ToolCall, ctx: &ToolExecCtx) -> ToolResu
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::api::rpc::RpcHandler;
use crate::assistant::backends::scripted::ScriptedBackend;
use crate::assistant::tools::{registry, system_disk_status_tool};
use crate::assistant::{CallerScope, PermissionCategory};
use crate::api::rpc::RpcHandler;
use serde_json::json;
use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -228,7 +246,23 @@ mod tests {
};
let result = execute_tool(&call, &ctx).await;
assert!(!result.is_error, "tool call errored: {}", result.content);
assert_eq!(result.content, direct.to_string());
// Same handler, same shape — but the two calls sample live statvfs
// figures at two different moments, and on a busy node (this test
// box hosts a live one) free/used byte counters drift between the
// samples. Compare the stable fields byte-for-byte instead of the
// whole payload; identical `partition`/`total_bytes`/`encrypted`
// still proves this is the SAME handler, not a parallel AI-only
// code path.
let direct_v: serde_json::Value = direct.clone();
let result_v: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_str(&result.content).expect("tool result is the handler's JSON");
for field in ["partition", "total_bytes", "encrypted"] {
assert_eq!(
result_v.get(field),
direct_v.get(field),
"field {field} must come from the same handler"
);
}
assert!(result.content.contains("total_bytes"));
// Exercise the whole loop: a ScriptedBackend that names the tool,
@@ -258,7 +292,11 @@ mod tests {
};
let result = execute_tool(&call, &ctx).await;
assert!(result.is_error);
assert!(result.content.contains("no such tool"), "{}", result.content);
assert!(
result.content.contains("no such tool"),
"{}",
result.content
);
}
/// Phase-10 hard constraint: `assistant.*` must never be reachable
+34 -8
View File
@@ -140,7 +140,11 @@ pub struct ToolExecCtx {
}
impl ToolExecCtx {
pub fn new(registry: tools::ToolRegistry, caller: CallerScope, handler: Arc<RpcHandler>) -> Self {
pub fn new(
registry: tools::ToolRegistry,
caller: CallerScope,
handler: Arc<RpcHandler>,
) -> Self {
Self::with_confirm_gate(registry, caller, handler, confirm::global())
}
@@ -231,7 +235,11 @@ pub fn build_system_prompt(visible_tools: &[tools::ToolDef]) -> String {
/// Builds the visible-tool set from the caller's granted categories only
/// (D-16 — the model should never even see a tool it can't use), selects a
/// backend (Claude only, in this tracer), and runs it to a final answer.
pub async fn chat(handler: Arc<RpcHandler>, caller: CallerScope, user_text: String) -> Result<String> {
pub async fn chat(
handler: Arc<RpcHandler>,
caller: CallerScope,
user_text: String,
) -> Result<String> {
let registry = tools::registry();
let grants = caller.granted_categories(handler.data_dir()).await;
let visible_tools = registry.visible_to(&grants);
@@ -249,7 +257,14 @@ pub async fn chat(handler: Arc<RpcHandler>, caller: CallerScope, user_text: Stri
let ctx = ToolExecCtx::new(registry, caller, handler);
loop_::run_loop(backend.as_ref(), &system_prompt, &visible_tools, history, &ctx).await
loop_::run_loop(
backend.as_ref(),
&system_prompt,
&visible_tools,
history,
&ctx,
)
.await
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -286,7 +301,9 @@ mod tests {
/// (`container-list`) finds it — the same cached-state path the real
/// node serves, no orchestrator or podman needed.
fn installed_entry(app_id: &str) -> crate::data_model::PackageDataEntry {
use crate::data_model::{Description, Manifest, PackageDataEntry, PackageState, StaticFiles};
use crate::data_model::{
Description, Manifest, PackageDataEntry, PackageState, StaticFiles,
};
PackageDataEntry {
state: PackageState::Running,
health: None,
@@ -367,7 +384,9 @@ mod tests {
}
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(5)).await;
}
panic!("no pending confirmation appeared — the destructive branch did not suspend on the gate");
panic!(
"no pending confirmation appeared — the destructive branch did not suspend on the gate"
);
}
/// S-01 / D-07: a destructive tool call suspends before any execution
@@ -465,7 +484,10 @@ mod tests {
session_id: "s".to_string(),
};
let granted = caller.granted_categories(handler.data_dir()).await;
assert!(granted.is_empty(), "fresh node must grant nothing: {granted:?}");
assert!(
granted.is_empty(),
"fresh node must grant nothing: {granted:?}"
);
}
/// The system prompt built for a caller must never mention a tool
@@ -494,7 +516,9 @@ mod tests {
// Sanity: at least one granted tool IS present, so this isn't
// trivially passing because the prompt is empty.
assert!(
reg.visible_to(&grants).iter().any(|t| prompt.contains(t.name)),
reg.visible_to(&grants)
.iter()
.any(|t| prompt.contains(t.name)),
"expected at least one granted-category tool name in the prompt"
);
}
@@ -560,7 +584,9 @@ mod tests {
peer_id: "peer-2".to_string(),
authorized: false,
};
let peer_grants = unauthorized_peer.granted_categories(handler.data_dir()).await;
let peer_grants = unauthorized_peer
.granted_categories(handler.data_dir())
.await;
assert!(
peer_grants.is_empty(),
"an unauthorized mesh peer must resolve to no authority regardless of what the operator granted"
+38 -15
View File
@@ -118,8 +118,11 @@ pub const SETTABLE_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
/// `SETTABLE_KEYS` (a key can be safely readable, like whether the Claude
/// key is *set*, without being safely writable or without exposing the
/// key material itself).
pub const READABLE_SETTINGS_KEYS: &[&str] =
&["network_visibility", "kiosk_display_preset", "claude_api_key_set"];
pub const READABLE_SETTINGS_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
"network_visibility",
"kiosk_display_preset",
"claude_api_key_set",
];
/// Args for tools that take no parameters at all
/// (`system_disk_status`, `system_stats`, `apps_list`, `bitcoin_status`,
@@ -180,9 +183,11 @@ impl ToolDef {
pub fn validate(&self, raw: &Value) -> Result<ToolArgs> {
match self.name {
"system_disk_status" | "system_stats" | "apps_list" | "bitcoin_status"
| "network_status" | "mesh_status" | "content_list" => serde_json::from_value(raw.clone())
.map(ToolArgs::Empty)
.context("tool arguments did not match the declared schema"),
| "network_status" | "mesh_status" | "content_list" => {
serde_json::from_value(raw.clone())
.map(ToolArgs::Empty)
.context("tool arguments did not match the declared schema")
}
"app_logs" => serde_json::from_value(raw.clone())
.map(ToolArgs::AppLogs)
.context("tool arguments did not match the declared schema"),
@@ -540,7 +545,11 @@ async fn resolve_installed_app_id(app_id: &str, handler: &RpcHandler) -> Result<
/// below also calls this first, so it stays correct and self-contained
/// once 13-08 wires the real confirm-then-execute flow in and this stops
/// being called from two places.
pub async fn validate_business_rules(name: &str, args: &ToolArgs, handler: &RpcHandler) -> Result<(), String> {
pub async fn validate_business_rules(
name: &str,
args: &ToolArgs,
handler: &RpcHandler,
) -> Result<(), String> {
match name {
"settings_set" => {
let ToolArgs::SettingsSet(a) = args else {
@@ -585,7 +594,9 @@ pub async fn validate_business_rules(name: &str, args: &ToolArgs, handler: &RpcH
let ToolArgs::AppId(a) = args else {
return Err(format!("internal error: args/tool mismatch for {name}"));
};
resolve_installed_app_id(&a.app_id, handler).await.map(|_| ())
resolve_installed_app_id(&a.app_id, handler)
.await
.map(|_| ())
}
_ => Ok(()),
}
@@ -714,10 +725,9 @@ pub async fn dispatch(name: &str, args: &ToolArgs, handler: &RpcHandler) -> Resu
.map_err(|e| format!("tool execution failed: {e}"))
}
"kiosk_display_preset" => {
let preset = a
.value
.as_str()
.ok_or_else(|| "kiosk_display_preset's value must be a string".to_string())?;
let preset = a.value.as_str().ok_or_else(|| {
"kiosk_display_preset's value must be a string".to_string()
})?;
handler
.assistant_dispatch_tool(
"system.kiosk-display.set",
@@ -744,7 +754,10 @@ pub async fn dispatch(name: &str, args: &ToolArgs, handler: &RpcHandler) -> Resu
return Err("bitcoin_relay_settings's value must be an object".to_string());
}
handler
.assistant_dispatch_tool("bitcoin.relay-update-settings", Some(a.value.clone()))
.assistant_dispatch_tool(
"bitcoin.relay-update-settings",
Some(a.value.clone()),
)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("tool execution failed: {e}"))
}
@@ -850,7 +863,11 @@ mod tests {
.and_then(|r| r.as_array())
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_default();
let properties = tool.parameters.get("properties").cloned().unwrap_or_else(|| json!({}));
let properties = tool
.parameters
.get("properties")
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_else(|| json!({}));
let mut obj = serde_json::Map::new();
for key in &required {
@@ -914,7 +931,10 @@ mod tests {
arguments: json!({ "key": "wifi_radio", "value": true }),
};
let result = execute_tool(&call, &ctx).await;
assert!(result.is_error, "settings_set must be refused when System is not granted");
assert!(
result.is_error,
"settings_set must be refused when System is not granted"
);
assert!(
result.content.contains("not permitted"),
"expected a not-permitted refusal, got: {}",
@@ -971,7 +991,10 @@ mod tests {
arguments: json!({ "app_id": "definitely-not-installed" }),
};
let result = execute_tool(&call, &ctx).await;
assert!(result.is_error, "an unknown app id must be refused, not guessed at");
assert!(
result.is_error,
"an unknown app id must be refused, not guessed at"
);
assert!(
result.content.contains("no such app id"),
"got: {}",
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
<template>
<Teleport to="body">
<Transition name="modal">
<div
v-if="show"
data-testid="tool-confirm-overlay"
class="fixed inset-0 z-[3000] flex items-center justify-center p-4"
@click="dismiss"
>
<div
data-testid="tool-confirm-backdrop"
class="absolute inset-0 bg-black/60 backdrop-blur-sm"
></div>
<div ref="modalRef" @click.stop class="glass-card p-6 max-w-md w-full relative z-10">
<div class="flex items-start justify-between gap-4 mb-4">
<h3 class="text-xl font-semibold text-white">Approve this action?</h3>
<button
@click="dismiss"
class="p-2 rounded-lg hover:bg-white/10 text-white/70 hover:text-white transition-colors"
aria-label="Close"
>
<svg class="w-5 h-5" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
<path
stroke-linecap="round"
stroke-linejoin="round"
stroke-width="2"
d="M6 18L18 6M6 6l12 12"
/>
</svg>
</button>
</div>
<!--
The description is node-authored: fetched by the host page over
its own authenticated RPC session (assistant.pending), never
received from the AIUI iframe and never model text. Plain
interpolation only peer-influenced argument values must render
as inert text, so the raw-HTML directive is banned in this file.
There is deliberately NO code path in this component that reads
from the frame's message channel.
-->
<div class="bg-black/20 rounded-xl border border-white/10 p-4 mb-4">
<p class="text-white text-sm leading-relaxed whitespace-pre-wrap">{{ description }}</p>
</div>
<p class="text-white/40 text-xs mb-4">
The assistant asked to do this. Nothing happens unless you approve — closing this
window decides nothing, and the request expires on its own.
</p>
<div class="flex gap-3">
<button
data-testid="tool-confirm-deny"
@click="deny"
class="glass-button flex-1 py-2.5 rounded-lg text-sm font-medium"
>
Deny
</button>
<button
data-testid="tool-confirm-approve"
@click="approve"
class="glass-button flex-1 py-2.5 rounded-lg text-sm font-medium text-orange-400 border-orange-400/30"
>
Approve
</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</Transition>
</Teleport>
</template>
<script setup lang="ts">
import { ref, computed } from 'vue'
import { useModalKeyboard } from '@/composables/useModalKeyboard'
const props = defineProps<{
show: boolean
description: string
}>()
const emit = defineEmits<{
approve: []
deny: []
/** Closed without a decision: nothing is sent anywhere — the node's own
* timeout declines the pending action. Never treated as an approval. */
dismiss: []
}>()
const modalRef = ref<HTMLElement | null>(null)
useModalKeyboard(
modalRef,
computed(() => props.show),
() => emit('dismiss'),
)
function approve() {
emit('approve')
}
function deny() {
emit('deny')
}
function dismiss() {
emit('dismiss')
}
</script>
<style scoped>
.modal-enter-active,
.modal-leave-active {
transition: opacity 0.3s ease;
}
.modal-enter-from,
.modal-leave-to {
opacity: 0;
}
.modal-enter-active .glass-card,
.modal-leave-active .glass-card {
transition: transform 0.3s ease;
}
.modal-enter-from .glass-card {
transform: scale(0.95);
}
.modal-leave-to .glass-card {
transform: scale(0.95);
}
</style>
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
// 13-08 Task 2: the trusted-chrome tool-confirmation flow (D-07/D-11).
// The dialog text is RPC-fetched from the node (assistant.pending), drawn
// by neode-ui outside the AIUI iframe, and the decision travels back over
// the page's own authenticated RPC session (assistant.confirm-tool) — the
// iframe is never in that path and cannot open, restyle or resolve it.
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'
import { ref, type Ref } from 'vue'
import { setActivePinia, createPinia } from 'pinia'
import { mount } from '@vue/test-utils'
vi.mock('@/api/rpc-client', () => ({
rpcClient: {
call: vi.fn(),
},
}))
vi.mock('@/api/filebrowser-client', () => ({
fileBrowserClient: {
login: vi.fn(),
isAuthenticated: false,
getUsage: vi.fn(),
listDirectory: vi.fn(),
readFileAsText: vi.fn(),
},
}))
import { ContextBroker } from '../contextBroker'
import { rpcClient } from '@/api/rpc-client'
import ToolConfirmModal from '@/components/ToolConfirmModal.vue'
const PENDING_IMMICH = {
req_id: 'confirm-1',
nonce: 'node-minted-nonce-1',
description: 'Restart the app "immich". Only "immich" is affected.',
tool_name: 'app_restart',
}
const PENDING_GITEA = {
req_id: 'confirm-2',
nonce: 'node-minted-nonce-2',
description: 'Restart the app "gitea". Only "gitea" is affected.',
tool_name: 'app_restart',
}
describe('tool confirmation — ContextBroker half', () => {
let broker: ContextBroker
let iframeRef: Ref<HTMLIFrameElement | null>
let mockPostMessage: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
let confirmRequests: CustomEvent[]
const captureRequest = (e: Event) => confirmRequests.push(e as CustomEvent)
beforeEach(() => {
setActivePinia(createPinia())
vi.clearAllMocks()
vi.useFakeTimers()
confirmRequests = []
window.addEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-request', captureRequest)
mockPostMessage = vi.fn()
iframeRef = ref<HTMLIFrameElement | null>({
contentWindow: { postMessage: mockPostMessage },
} as unknown as HTMLIFrameElement)
broker = new ContextBroker(iframeRef, 'http://localhost:8100')
})
afterEach(() => {
window.removeEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-request', captureRequest)
broker.stop()
vi.useRealTimers()
})
/** Mock a chat turn that stays in flight (the node is suspended on its
* confirm gate) while assistant.pending reports `pending`. */
function mockChatSuspendedWithPending(pending: typeof PENDING_IMMICH | null) {
let releaseChat: (v: unknown) => void = () => {}
vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockImplementation((opts: { method: string }) => {
if (opts.method === 'assistant.chat') {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
releaseChat = resolve
}) as Promise<never>
}
if (opts.method === 'assistant.pending') {
return Promise.resolve({ pending }) as Promise<never>
}
return Promise.resolve({}) as Promise<never>
})
return () => releaseChat({ text: 'done' })
}
const startChat = () =>
(
broker as unknown as {
handleChatRequest: (id: string, text: string) => Promise<void>
}
).handleChatRequest('chat-1', 'restart immich please')
it('a pending confirmation reported by the node opens the host dialog with the node-fetched description', async () => {
const releaseChat = mockChatSuspendedWithPending(PENDING_IMMICH)
const chat = startChat()
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000)
expect(confirmRequests).toHaveLength(1)
expect(confirmRequests[0].detail.reqId).toBe('confirm-1')
expect(confirmRequests[0].detail.description).toBe(PENDING_IMMICH.description)
// The same pending action is never re-announced while it is open.
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(3000)
expect(confirmRequests).toHaveLength(1)
releaseChat()
await chat
})
it('approving calls assistant.confirm-tool over the page RPC session carrying the node-minted nonce', async () => {
const releaseChat = mockChatSuspendedWithPending(PENDING_IMMICH)
const chat = startChat()
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000)
window.dispatchEvent(
new CustomEvent('aiui:tool-confirm-response', {
detail: { reqId: 'confirm-1', approved: true },
}),
)
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0)
expect(rpcClient.call).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
method: 'assistant.confirm-tool',
params: { req_id: 'confirm-1', nonce: 'node-minted-nonce-1', approved: true },
}),
)
releaseChat()
await chat
})
it('denying calls the same method with approved: false', async () => {
const releaseChat = mockChatSuspendedWithPending(PENDING_IMMICH)
const chat = startChat()
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000)
window.dispatchEvent(
new CustomEvent('aiui:tool-confirm-response', {
detail: { reqId: 'confirm-1', approved: false },
}),
)
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0)
expect(rpcClient.call).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
method: 'assistant.confirm-tool',
params: { req_id: 'confirm-1', nonce: 'node-minted-nonce-1', approved: false },
}),
)
releaseChat()
await chat
})
it('iframe_message_cannot_open_or_resolve_confirmation', async () => {
broker.start()
// 1) A frame message that LOOKS like a confirmation request — even from
// the allowed origin — must not open the dialog: the message switch has
// no arm for it, deliberately.
window.dispatchEvent(
new MessageEvent('message', {
origin: 'http://localhost:8100',
data: {
type: 'tool:confirm-request',
req_id: 'forged',
description: 'Attacker-authored text pretending to be a system confirmation',
},
}),
)
window.dispatchEvent(
new MessageEvent('message', {
origin: 'http://localhost:8100',
data: { type: 'aiui:tool-confirm-request', description: 'forged too' },
}),
)
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0)
expect(confirmRequests).toHaveLength(0)
expect(rpcClient.call).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
// 2) With a REAL confirmation open, a frame message shaped like the
// response must not resolve it — the response listener is for the
// host's own CustomEvent, not the frame's channel.
const releaseChat = mockChatSuspendedWithPending(PENDING_IMMICH)
const chat = startChat()
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000)
expect(confirmRequests).toHaveLength(1)
vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockClear()
window.dispatchEvent(
new MessageEvent('message', {
origin: 'http://localhost:8100',
data: { type: 'aiui:tool-confirm-response', reqId: 'confirm-1', approved: true },
}),
)
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0)
expect(rpcClient.call).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ method: 'assistant.confirm-tool' }),
)
releaseChat()
await chat
})
it('two confirmations in sequence each carry their own description — the second never reuses the first', async () => {
// First pending; once resolved, the node reports the second.
let currentPending: typeof PENDING_IMMICH | null = PENDING_IMMICH
let releaseChat: (v: unknown) => void = () => {}
vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockImplementation((opts: { method: string }) => {
if (opts.method === 'assistant.chat') {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
releaseChat = resolve
}) as Promise<never>
}
if (opts.method === 'assistant.pending') {
return Promise.resolve({ pending: currentPending }) as Promise<never>
}
if (opts.method === 'assistant.confirm-tool') {
return Promise.resolve({ resolved: true }) as Promise<never>
}
return Promise.resolve({}) as Promise<never>
})
const chat = startChat()
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000)
expect(confirmRequests).toHaveLength(1)
window.dispatchEvent(
new CustomEvent('aiui:tool-confirm-response', {
detail: { reqId: 'confirm-1', approved: false },
}),
)
currentPending = PENDING_GITEA
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000)
expect(confirmRequests).toHaveLength(2)
expect(confirmRequests[1].detail.reqId).toBe('confirm-2')
expect(confirmRequests[1].detail.description).toBe(PENDING_GITEA.description)
expect(confirmRequests[1].detail.description).not.toBe(PENDING_IMMICH.description)
releaseChat({ text: 'done' })
await chat
})
it('no response event means no resolution — the action stays pending for the node to time out, never silently approved', async () => {
const releaseChat = mockChatSuspendedWithPending(PENDING_IMMICH)
const chat = startChat()
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000)
expect(confirmRequests).toHaveLength(1)
vi.mocked(rpcClient.call).mockClear()
// The operator closes the dialog without deciding: nothing is sent.
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(10_000)
expect(rpcClient.call).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ method: 'assistant.confirm-tool' }),
)
releaseChat()
await chat
})
})
describe('tool confirmation — ToolConfirmModal (trusted chrome)', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
document.body.innerHTML = ''
})
afterEach(() => {
document.body.innerHTML = ''
})
it('renders as a direct child of document.body with a full-screen backdrop, showing the node-fetched text', () => {
const wrapper = mount(ToolConfirmModal, {
props: { show: true, description: PENDING_IMMICH.description },
})
// Teleported: the overlay renders at <body> level, OUTSIDE the
// component's own DOM subtree, so no ancestor transform (glass-panel
// or otherwise) can trap its position: fixed. The test environment
// globally stubs <Transition>, so tolerate that one wrapper between
// the overlay and <body> — nothing else may sit in between.
const overlay = document.body.querySelector('[data-testid="tool-confirm-overlay"]')
expect(overlay).toBeTruthy()
expect(wrapper.element.contains(overlay)).toBe(false)
const parent = overlay?.parentElement
const attachPoint =
parent && parent.tagName.toLowerCase() === 'transition-stub'
? parent.parentElement
: parent
expect(attachPoint).toBe(document.body)
expect(overlay?.className).toContain('fixed')
expect(overlay?.className).toContain('inset-0')
const backdrop = document.body.querySelector('[data-testid="tool-confirm-backdrop"]')
expect(backdrop).toBeTruthy()
expect(backdrop?.className).toContain('inset-0')
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain(PENDING_IMMICH.description)
wrapper.unmount()
})
it('two sequential confirmations render their two different descriptions', async () => {
const wrapper = mount(ToolConfirmModal, {
props: { show: true, description: PENDING_IMMICH.description },
})
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain('immich')
await wrapper.setProps({ description: PENDING_GITEA.description })
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain('gitea')
expect(document.body.textContent).not.toContain('immich')
wrapper.unmount()
})
it('Approve emits approve, Deny emits deny — and nothing else', async () => {
const wrapper = mount(ToolConfirmModal, {
props: { show: true, description: PENDING_IMMICH.description },
})
const approve = document.body.querySelector(
'[data-testid="tool-confirm-approve"]',
) as HTMLButtonElement
const deny = document.body.querySelector(
'[data-testid="tool-confirm-deny"]',
) as HTMLButtonElement
expect(approve).toBeTruthy()
expect(deny).toBeTruthy()
approve.click()
expect(wrapper.emitted('approve')).toHaveLength(1)
expect(wrapper.emitted('deny')).toBeUndefined()
deny.click()
expect(wrapper.emitted('deny')).toHaveLength(1)
wrapper.unmount()
})
it('closing without a decision emits dismiss — never approve, never deny', async () => {
const wrapper = mount(ToolConfirmModal, {
props: { show: true, description: PENDING_IMMICH.description },
})
const backdrop = document.body.querySelector(
'[data-testid="tool-confirm-backdrop"]',
) as HTMLElement
backdrop.click()
expect(wrapper.emitted('dismiss')).toHaveLength(1)
expect(wrapper.emitted('approve')).toBeUndefined()
expect(wrapper.emitted('deny')).toBeUndefined()
wrapper.unmount()
})
})
+136
View File
@@ -49,6 +49,19 @@ function normalizeOwnedItem(owned: OwnedRpcItem): ArchyContentItem {
}
}
/** Wire shape of `assistant.pending`'s response payload: the node-authored
* description and the node-minted nonce for the one pending destructive
* action (13-08, D-07/D-11). The description is drawn by the HOST chrome
* (ToolConfirmModal.vue), never by AIUI — and it reaches the page over the
* authenticated RPC session only, never over the iframe's postMessage
* channel, so the frame cannot forge or restyle it. */
interface PendingToolConfirm {
req_id: string
nonce: string
description: string
tool_name?: string
}
function emptyBundle(): ArchyContentBundle {
return { films: [], songs: [], podcasts: [] }
}
@@ -82,6 +95,24 @@ export class ContextBroker {
* of posted, so a slow response can never overwrite fresher grid data. */
private contentRequestSeq = 0
/** 13-08: how often the broker asks the node for a pending destructive-
* tool confirmation while a chat turn is in flight. The node's loop is
* suspended on its confirm gate during that window, so this poll is what
* turns "the node is waiting on a human" into a visible dialog. */
private static readonly CONFIRM_POLL_MS = 1200
/** How long the one-shot aiui:tool-confirm-response listener stays armed
* before being cleaned up — slightly beyond the node's own CONFIRM_TIMEOUT
* (120s), after which the node has already declined the action itself. */
private static readonly CONFIRM_LISTENER_TTL_MS = 130_000
private confirmPollTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null
/** Chat turns currently in flight — polling runs while > 0. */
private activeChatTurns = 0
/** req_ids already announced to the host chrome, so one pending action is
* dialogued exactly once no matter how many polls observe it. */
private announcedConfirmReqIds = new Set<string>()
constructor(iframe: Ref<HTMLIFrameElement | null>, aiuiUrl: string) {
this.iframe = iframe
try {
@@ -102,6 +133,11 @@ export class ContextBroker {
window.removeEventListener('message', this.listener)
this.listener = null
}
if (this.confirmPollTimer) {
clearInterval(this.confirmPollTimer)
this.confirmPollTimer = null
}
this.activeChatTurns = 0
}
sendPermissionsUpdate() {
@@ -145,6 +181,12 @@ export class ContextBroker {
case 'content:request':
this.handleContentRequest(msg.id, msg.kind, msg.scope)
break
// Deliberately NO arm for anything confirmation-shaped (13-08,
// D-11): a frame message whose `type` resembles a tool confirmation
// falls through here and is ignored. The confirmation dialog is
// opened only from assistant.pending's RPC response and resolved
// only via the host's own aiui:tool-confirm-response CustomEvent —
// asserted by iframe_message_cannot_open_or_resolve_confirmation.
}
}
@@ -155,6 +197,10 @@ export class ContextBroker {
// divergent security model D-02 exists to prevent. Do not "helpfully"
// add a permission check back into this handler.
private async handleChatRequest(id: string, text: string) {
// 13-08: while this turn is in flight the node may suspend on its
// confirm gate waiting for a human — poll assistant.pending so the
// trusted chrome can draw the dialog (see handleToolConfirmRequest).
this.beginConfirmPolling()
try {
const result = await rpcClient.call<{ text: string }>({
method: 'assistant.chat',
@@ -173,9 +219,99 @@ export class ContextBroker {
success: false,
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Chat request failed',
} satisfies ArchyChatResponse)
} finally {
this.endConfirmPolling()
}
}
private beginConfirmPolling() {
this.activeChatTurns += 1
if (this.confirmPollTimer) return
this.confirmPollTimer = setInterval(() => {
void this.checkPendingConfirmation()
}, ContextBroker.CONFIRM_POLL_MS)
}
private endConfirmPolling() {
this.activeChatTurns = Math.max(0, this.activeChatTurns - 1)
if (this.activeChatTurns === 0 && this.confirmPollTimer) {
clearInterval(this.confirmPollTimer)
this.confirmPollTimer = null
}
}
private async checkPendingConfirmation() {
try {
const res = await rpcClient.call<{ pending: PendingToolConfirm | null }>({
method: 'assistant.pending',
})
if (res?.pending) this.handleToolConfirmRequest(res.pending)
} catch {
// Transient RPC failure — the next poll retries; the node's own
// timeout is the backstop, and it declines rather than approves.
}
}
/**
* 13-08 (D-07/D-11): announce one node-reported pending confirmation to
* the trusted chrome, and arm a one-shot listener for the host's answer.
*
* Anti-spoofing invariants, all load-bearing:
* - The description and nonce arrive here ONLY from assistant.pending's
* RPC response — never from the iframe (there is no handleMessage arm
* for anything confirmation-shaped, deliberately).
* - The CustomEvent pair (`aiui:tool-confirm-request` /
* `aiui:tool-confirm-response`) is NEW and distinct from the
* install-app pair — an install confirmation and a tool confirmation
* must never be interchangeable.
* - The response listener listens for the host page's own CustomEvent on
* window. An iframe cannot dispatch that (its postMessage arrives as a
* MessageEvent, which this method never reads), so the decision path
* is host-only.
* - The user's decision travels to the node over the authenticated RPC
* session (assistant.confirm-tool) carrying the node-minted nonce —
* never back through the frame.
* - No response is ever synthesized: if the host closes the dialog
* without deciding, nothing is sent, and the node's own timeout
* declines the action.
*/
handleToolConfirmRequest(pending: PendingToolConfirm) {
if (!pending?.req_id || !pending.nonce || typeof pending.description !== 'string') return
if (this.announcedConfirmReqIds.has(pending.req_id)) return
this.announcedConfirmReqIds.add(pending.req_id)
const reqId = pending.req_id
const nonce = pending.nonce
const responseHandler = (e: Event) => {
const detail = (e as CustomEvent).detail as { reqId?: string; approved?: boolean }
if (detail?.reqId !== reqId) return
window.removeEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-response', responseHandler)
void rpcClient
.call({
method: 'assistant.confirm-tool',
params: { req_id: reqId, nonce, approved: detail.approved === true },
})
.catch(() => {
// A refused resolution (stale nonce, already timed out) is the
// node protecting itself — nothing to retry from here.
})
}
window.addEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-response', responseHandler)
setTimeout(() => {
window.removeEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-response', responseHandler)
this.announcedConfirmReqIds.delete(reqId)
}, ContextBroker.CONFIRM_LISTENER_TTL_MS)
// Only node-fetched values travel to the chrome — and not the nonce:
// it stays in this closure and reappears only on the RPC call above.
window.dispatchEvent(
new CustomEvent('aiui:tool-confirm-request', {
detail: { reqId, description: pending.description, toolName: pending.tool_name },
}),
)
}
// Content surfaces (D-12/D-14, AIUI-03) — a single generic channel with a
// `kind` discriminator rather than one channel per content type, so
// 13-11's music-library wave can extend `kind` without touching this
+51
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,21 @@
</div>
</div>
<!-- 13-08 (D-11): the destructive-tool confirmation dialog trusted
chrome, mounted as a SIBLING of the iframe, never inside it. The
component Teleports to body with a full-screen backdrop, so it
covers the whole viewport including the area over the iframe, and
no ancestor transform can trap its position: fixed. Its text is
node-authored, fetched by the ContextBroker over the page's own
RPC session — nothing the iframe sends can open or resolve it. -->
<ToolConfirmModal
:show="!!toolConfirm"
:description="toolConfirm?.description ?? ''"
@approve="resolveToolConfirm(true)"
@deny="resolveToolConfirm(false)"
@dismiss="dismissToolConfirm"
/>
</div>
</template>
@@ -78,6 +93,7 @@ import { ref, computed, onActivated, onBeforeUnmount, onDeactivated, onMounted,
import { useRoute, useRouter } from 'vue-router'
import { useI18n } from 'vue-i18n'
import { ContextBroker } from '@/services/contextBroker'
import ToolConfirmModal from '@/components/ToolConfirmModal.vue'
import { IS_DEMO } from '@/composables/useDemoIntro'
const { t } = useI18n()
@@ -170,6 +186,37 @@ function closeChat() {
}
}
// 13-08 (D-11): the pending destructive-tool confirmation the trusted
// chrome is currently showing. Set ONLY from the ContextBroker's
// aiui:tool-confirm-request CustomEvent, whose payload is node-fetched
// over the page's own RPC session — never from anything the iframe posts.
const toolConfirm = ref<{ reqId: string; description: string } | null>(null)
function onToolConfirmRequest(e: Event) {
const detail = (e as CustomEvent).detail as { reqId?: string; description?: string }
if (!detail?.reqId || typeof detail.description !== 'string') return
toolConfirm.value = { reqId: detail.reqId, description: detail.description }
}
function resolveToolConfirm(approved: boolean) {
const current = toolConfirm.value
toolConfirm.value = null
if (!current) return
// The decision travels back to the broker (and from there to the node
// over the authenticated RPC session) — never through the iframe.
window.dispatchEvent(
new CustomEvent('aiui:tool-confirm-response', {
detail: { reqId: current.reqId, approved },
}),
)
}
function dismissToolConfirm() {
// Closed without a decision: send nothing. The action stays pending on
// the node until its own timeout declines it — never silently approved.
toolConfirm.value = null
}
function onAiuiMessage(event: MessageEvent) {
if (!aiuiUrl.value) return
// Validate origin — only accept messages from AIUI
@@ -197,6 +244,8 @@ function onAiuiMessage(event: MessageEvent) {
function armChatLive() {
window.removeEventListener('message', onAiuiMessage)
window.addEventListener('message', onAiuiMessage)
window.removeEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-request', onToolConfirmRequest)
window.addEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-request', onToolConfirmRequest)
broker?.stop()
broker = null
if (aiuiUrl.value) {
@@ -216,6 +265,7 @@ onActivated(() => armChatLive())
onDeactivated(() => {
window.removeEventListener('message', onAiuiMessage)
window.removeEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-request', onToolConfirmRequest)
broker?.stop()
broker = null
if (loadTimeout) { clearTimeout(loadTimeout); loadTimeout = null }
@@ -229,6 +279,7 @@ onMounted(() => armChatLive())
onBeforeUnmount(() => {
window.removeEventListener('message', onAiuiMessage)
window.removeEventListener('aiui:tool-confirm-request', onToolConfirmRequest)
broker?.stop()
broker = null
if (loadTimeout) { clearTimeout(loadTimeout); loadTimeout = null }