The repo ships an MIT LICENSE and the README carries an MIT badge, but the
crates themselves declared no license, so `cargo metadata`, packaging and any
downstream mirror saw "license: null". Adds [workspace.package] license = "MIT"
and inherits it in all five members via license.workspace = true. Verified with
cargo metadata: all five now report MIT.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
create-release.sh builds the frontend at step 4 and validates the curated
changelog at step 5, then requires the freshly built bundle to contain the new
version. The version reaches the bundle only through the hand-written What's
New list, so on a fresh release that check can only pass if the changelog and
What's New entries are written BEFORE the script runs. Writing them after is
what aborted the first attempt.
Leads with the downgrade bug, since that is the one users saw: an Update button
offering the release withdrawn for an actively exploited 2FA bypass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An app port must answer whatever the browser asks for: an HTTP dashboard
embeds http://host:PORT, an HTTPS one embeds https://host:PORT, and an HTTPS
page cannot embed an HTTP frame at all. So the choice is per-node, not
per-fleet, and a second port number would mean every manifest changes and
torrc doubles.
Instead the gate peeks the first byte. A TLS ClientHello is 0x16; no HTTP
method starts with it. peek() leaves the bytes in the socket buffer, so the
acceptor still sees a complete, untouched ClientHello. TLS and plain share one
generic serve_http(), so authentication, proxying and upgrade handling cannot
drift apart by scheme.
EXISTING NODES ARE UNAFFECTED BY CONSTRUCTION. Anything that is not a TLS
handshake takes the identical path as before, and a node with no certificate
serves plain HTTP exactly as today — TLS is strictly additive.
rustls does NOT verify that a private key matches its certificate. Established
by test, not assumed: with_single_cert accepted a pair from two different keys
and would only have failed mid-handshake in a user's browser — a security
control that reports success and does nothing, the exact shape this module's
own docs warn about. So the pairing is now proven explicitly (sign a fixed
message with the key, verify against the certificate's public key) and a
mismatch refuses to serve.
Also: cert and key mtimes are stamped as a PAIR, because reissuing writes them
separately and keying on one would serve a certificate that no longer matches
its key; a 15s first-byte timeout closes the slowloris window one step earlier
than the existing header-read timeout; PKCS#8 and PKCS#1 keys are both
accepted so a hand-made key does not silently downgrade a working node.
Deps pinned to the rustls 0.21 line reqwest already resolves — no new vendor,
no second rustls major. Test fixtures are throwaway (localhost SANs only), not
any node's identity.
38/38 appgate tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-bumped so the release gate compiles the test profile at the final
version — create-release bumps after the gate, so the gate would otherwise
run on the old version and the bump would invalidate the cache, timing out
cargo-test-weekly on the compile rather than the tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Leads with what changes for the operator: app screens now require the node
password across LAN, Tailscale, mesh and Tor; the wallet/protocol ports that
must stay open stayed open; the mesh leak found during on-node verification;
nodes repairing their own legacy containers; and the signing-key rotation.
Known gaps disclosed, including the eleven still-undeclared ports and that
non-browser clients will now meet the login page.
The new block uses <strong> rather than the literal ** markers in earlier
entries, which render as asterisks in the modal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both sides independently fixed the serial-alias dedup and the ESP32
boot-reset races; kept the branch's defer-to-auto-detect for unpinned
preferred paths (single probe pass per cycle) on top of main's
advert-name threading, Reticulum name propagation and radio-first
routing. Modal keeps main's 'Set Recommended' naming + probe progress
bar alongside the branch's in-app firmware flasher step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bundles all post-115 fixes into an OTA release: boot READY-before-recovery
+ Restart=always (no more 'server starting up'), and the app-install
daemon-kill fix (v6 relay only bridges live app ports; port-cleanup
excludes our own PID).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The companion reaches the node at its fips0 ULA, and the web UI builds app
links as http://[<ULA>]:<direct port> — but rootless-podman published ports
bind 0.0.0.0 only, so every app URL was refused over the mesh (:8334 first).
A reconcile loop in the backend mirrors public IPv4 listeners: any port
>=1024 on 0.0.0.0 without an IPv6 any-listener gets a v6-ONLY [::] forwarder
to 127.0.0.1, following /proc/net/tcp* so install/remove and hardcoded
companion ports are covered without touching a single container. Purely
additive: IPv4/LAN/Tor access paths are untouched, v6only listeners cannot
collide with or intercept v4 traffic, and foreign IPv6 listeners win.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The release gate requires ≥3 curated changelog bullets; the Pine app is
user-facing and deserved one anyway. Carries the version bumps and manifest
from the aborted cut so the tree is clean for the re-run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same kiosk.service conflict resolution as the previous merge (branch carried
rebased duplicates of the kiosk commits): CPUQuota=200% + main's memory tuning.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The reticulum daemon is a PyInstaller one-file binary: a bootloader parent
that forks the real Python process. `kill_on_drop`/`start_kill()` only SIGKILL
the bootloader, orphaning the forked child — which keeps holding the RNode
serial port. Across the listener's 30-min RX-stall reconnects this piled up
(observed 9 concurrent instances on a live node) all clutching /dev/ttyUSB0,
garbling the RNode so it stopped transmitting entirely.
Spawn the daemon as its own process-group leader (`process_group(0)`) and, on
drop, signal the whole group (SIGTERM for a clean RNode/socket release, then
SIGKILL as a hard backstop) so the forked child can never be orphaned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New `archipelago-openwrt` workspace crate provides SSH/UCI-based management
of OpenWrt routers, including automated TollGate installation and configuration
of a pay-as-you-go "archipelago" SSID backed by the local Cashu mint.
Exposes two RPC endpoints:
- `openwrt.scan` — discover OpenWrt routers on the LAN
- `openwrt.provision-tollgate` — install tollgate-module-basic-go, write UCI
config (TIP-01/TIP-02), and create isolated WiFi SSID + firewall zone
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Large peer downloads (~178MB) failed with a generic 'Operation failed', and
the download path had three stacked problems:
- The FIPS reqwest client used a hard-coded 20s total timeout regardless of the
caller's .timeout(), so a big transfer over the mesh aborted at 20s before
the Tor fallback could help. Honor the per-request timeout (client_with_timeout).
- The peer-content proxy buffered the whole file into node memory via
resp.bytes() before sending a byte, and capped the transfer at 60s. Stream
the body through with hyper::Body::wrap_stream (constant memory) and raise the
timeout to 900s; bump the nginx peer-content read timeout to match.
- Free downloads pulled the file as base64 over RPC, doubling it in node memory
and the browser — fatal for large files. Download free files by streaming
from /api/peer-content straight to disk, after a 1-byte Range probe that
surfaces the real reason (peer offline on mesh and Tor) instead of a generic
failure. Paid downloads now return the real error through the {error} channel
the UI already displays.
Adds the reqwest 'stream' feature for bytes_stream().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pulls iroh 1.0 + iroh-blobs 0.103 as OPTIONAL deps under the iroh-swarm
feature and implements a real BlobProvider over them. Verified: the full
iroh QUIC dep tree (260 pkgs) resolves and compiles against the pinned
bitcoin/nostr-sdk/reqwest-rustls stack; the provider compiles against the
0.103/1.0 API.
- swarm/iroh_provider.rs: IrohProvider::new binds a QUIC Endpoint, opens a
persistent FsStore (data_dir/iroh-blobs), and serves blobs via the
iroh-blobs protocol/Router — a node that fetches also SEEDS. try_fetch
maps ContentDigest -> iroh Hash, asks discovery for seed EndpointIds, then
downloader.download(hash, providers) (range-verified) + export to staging.
- ProviderDiscovery trait: the seam Phase 3 (signed Nostr advertisement
events) fills. discovery=None -> no seeds -> origin-only, so enabling the
feature is never worse than today.
- Default build untouched: iroh is optional, the module is cfg-gated, and
providers() stays empty until Phase 3 wires discovery in.
Build: cargo build --features iroh-swarm succeeds (dev). Default build +
44 swarm/update/content_hash/blobs tests unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lands the transport/swarm orchestration layer (the iroh engine attaches
later, behind a flag). The seam is fully exercised today with the origin
HTTP path; with no swarm providers registered the behaviour is byte-for-byte
identical to before.
- swarm/mod.rs: BlobProvider trait + fetch_content_addressed() — tries each
provider in order, VERIFIES peer-sourced bytes against the content digest
before accepting (untrusted seeds can't inject tampered bytes), falls back
to the origin closure if none serve. Returns Swarm|Origin.
- Cargo: iroh-swarm feature (off by default; heavy QUIC dep tree attaches
here). providers() is empty until enabled → every fetch hits origin.
- update.rs: components with a BLAKE3 digest route through the seam, using
the existing resumable HTTP downloader as the origin fallback; a swarm hit
is re-checked against the mandatory SHA-256 manifest gate (re-fetch from
origin on any disagreement). Components without blake3 take the original
path untouched.
44/44 swarm/update/content_hash/blobs tests pass (incl. swarm hit/miss,
tampered-bytes-rejected→origin, fall-through ordering).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the iroh-native, range-verifiable hash next to the incumbent SHA-256
so the swarm can later fetch/verify by BLAKE3 with the registry/origin as
fallback. Non-breaking: SHA-256 stays the mandatory gate; BLAKE3 is verified
only when present.
- content_hash.rs: HashAlg + ContentDigest (parse/verify '<alg>:<hex>'
multihash strings), blake3_hex/sha256_hex; BLAKE3 known-answer test
- update.rs: ComponentUpdate.blake3 (serde-default); verified ALONGSIDE
SHA-256 in the resumable download loop, re-download on mismatch
- blobs.rs: BlobMeta.blake3 computed on put (on-disk path stays
SHA-256-keyed for back-compat; advertises the future swarm address)
Drive-by: fix a pre-existing stale test (test_save_and_load_state_roundtrip)
that never wrote the .download-complete marker #26 requires, so load_state's
self-heal cleared update_in_progress. Unrelated to BLAKE3 — surfaced by
running the full update:: suite.
40/40 content_hash/update/blobs tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ssmithx