docs: record corrected signed OTA reboot acceptance

nevent1qqs9d76qm6f5xj2vrtjfnkqz5exrc8r0s9zev4f672kqyd0wjh7wwvqpz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn8d96zuer9wcx2tvaw

.dockerignore

@@ -4,7 +4,13 @@
 # Allow neode-ui (frontend + mock backend + docker configs)
 !neode-ui/
 
-# Allow demo assets (AIUI pre-built dist)
+!aiui/
+aiui/**/node_modules
+aiui/**/dist
+aiui/**/.turbo
+aiui/**/.build-aiui-last-*
+
+# Allow curated demo assets
 !demo/
 
 # Allow the Bitcoin UI + ElectrumX UI mock shells (served from /docker/*)

.gitea/workflows/demo-images.yml

@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ on:
     branches: [main]
     paths:
       - 'neode-ui/**'
+      - 'aiui/**'
+      - 'scripts/build-aiui.sh'
+      - '.dockerignore'
       - 'docker-compose.demo.yml'
       - '.gitea/workflows/demo-images.yml'
   workflow_dispatch:
@@ -65,10 +68,12 @@ jobs:
           push: true
           build-args: |
             VITE_DEMO=1
+            SOURCE_REVISION=${{ github.sha }}
           tags: |
             ${{ vars.DEMO_REGISTRY }}/archy-demo-web:demo
             ${{ vars.DEMO_REGISTRY }}/archy-demo-web:${{ github.sha }}
 
       - name: Trigger Portainer redeploy
-        if: ${{ success() && secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK != '' }}
+        # Source pushes prepare images; public deployment is an explicit post-release action.
+        if: ${{ success() && github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK != '' }}
         run: curl -fsS -X POST "${{ secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK }}"

.github/workflows/demo-images.yml

@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ on:
     branches: [main]
     paths:
       - 'neode-ui/**'
+      - 'aiui/**'
+      - 'scripts/build-aiui.sh'
+      - '.dockerignore'
       - 'docker-compose.demo.yml'
       - '.github/workflows/demo-images.yml'
   workflow_dispatch:
@@ -65,10 +68,12 @@ jobs:
           push: true
           build-args: |
             VITE_DEMO=1
+            SOURCE_REVISION=${{ github.sha }}
           tags: |
             ${{ vars.DEMO_REGISTRY }}/archy-demo-web:demo
             ${{ vars.DEMO_REGISTRY }}/archy-demo-web:${{ github.sha }}
 
       - name: Trigger Portainer redeploy
-        if: ${{ success() && secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK != '' }}
+        # Source pushes prepare images; public deployment is an explicit post-release action.
+        if: ${{ success() && github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK != '' }}
         run: curl -fsS -X POST "${{ secrets.PORTAINER_WEBHOOK }}"

AGENTS.md

@@ -29,3 +29,45 @@ unrestricted `cargo test` on a node with installed apps: older mocked-runtime
 tests still reached real service commands. The runner isolates wallet data,
 service buses, container storage, networking, and process IDs. Compilation with
 `cargo test --no-run` is safe. Keep separately authorized live checks explicit.
+
+## Active release regression checklist
+
+Before resuming release work, read
+`docs/post-1.8.22-regressions-20261001.md` and retain its unfinished tasks.
+The operator requested that every reported issue be tracked, fixed and tested
+before another OTA/ISO. Keep source/unit-test results separate from actual-node
+acceptance. In particular, paid-file recovery must not send another payment,
+and app cleanup must preserve wallets, persistent data and uninstall decisions.
+Do not mark the new paid-file incident resolved merely because the earlier
+Framework LND startup incident was closed.
+
+## Gitea and ngit mirror parity
+
+Nostr Git (`ngit`) is the canonical contribution and review platform. Gitea
+(`origin`) mirrors accepted code on `main` and release tags. Both are required
+publication mirrors; duplicate PRs and proposal branches on Gitea are not required.
+For every change, including fixes and release preparation:
+
+- Review and merge once. Push the exact same resulting commits to both mirrors;
+  never independently squash, rebase or merge the same change on each platform.
+- Open new contributions and PRs on ngit; review and merge there, then mirror the
+  exact accepted main commits to Gitea. Record the ngit proposal and resulting
+  merge commit in the release ledger. Existing Gitea PRs must be reviewed and
+  explicitly linked to their ngit replacement or accepted result before closing;
+  do not abandon contributions or mark unmerged changes as merged. PR numbers,
+  reviews and discussions remain platform-specific; matching Git refs does not
+  prove their synchronization.
+- Push main and release tags to both mirrors. Preserve commit history
+  and annotated tag objects/signatures. Do not resolve drift by force pushing,
+  deleting remote refs, or rewriting published history without explicit approval.
+- After publishing source, run `python3 scripts/check-git-mirrors.py --local`.
+  Include each additional shared branch or release tag with repeated `--ref`
+  arguments (full `refs/heads/...` or `refs/tags/...` names).
+- Before OTA, catalog or ISO publication, require matching reviewed local and
+  remote main and release tag refs, and record ngit PR dispositions in the
+  release acceptance ledger. A failed push, unavailable mirror, missing ref or
+  mismatch blocks publication; never describe a partial push as synchronized.
+  Run `--all` for a complete advertised branch/tag audit; a main-only pass must
+  never be described as full historical mirror parity. Proposal-only branches
+  may intentionally differ. Existing unrelated drift
+  must be inventoried explicitly rather than silently overwritten.

Android/app/build.gradle.kts

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ android {
         applicationId = "com.archipelago.app"
         minSdk = 26
         targetSdk = 35
-        versionCode = 52
-        versionName = "0.5.32"
+        versionCode = 54
+        versionName = "0.5.34"
 
         vectorDrawables {
             useSupportLibrary = true
@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ tasks.matching {
 }.configureEach { dependsOn("buildRustArm64") }
 
 dependencies {
+    testImplementation("junit:junit:4.13.2")
+    testImplementation("com.squareup.okhttp3:mockwebserver:4.12.0")
+    testImplementation("org.robolectric:robolectric:4.14.1")
     val composeBom = platform("androidx.compose:compose-bom:2024.05.00")
     implementation(composeBom)
 

Android/app/src/main/java/com/archipelago/app/ui/screens/WebViewDownloads.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+package com.archipelago.app.ui.screens
+
+import android.app.Activity
+import android.content.Intent
+import android.net.Uri
+import android.provider.DocumentsContract
+import android.webkit.CookieManager
+import android.webkit.DownloadListener
+import android.webkit.URLUtil
+import android.widget.Toast
+import androidx.activity.compose.rememberLauncherForActivityResult
+import androidx.activity.result.contract.ActivityResultContracts
+import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
+import androidx.compose.material3.AlertDialog
+import androidx.compose.material3.LinearProgressIndicator
+import androidx.compose.material3.Text
+import androidx.compose.material3.TextButton
+import androidx.compose.runtime.*
+import androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalContext
+import kotlinx.coroutines.*
+import okhttp3.Call
+import okhttp3.HttpUrl.Companion.toHttpUrlOrNull
+import okhttp3.OkHttpClient
+import okhttp3.Request
+import java.io.IOException
+import java.io.OutputStream
+import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit
+
+internal data class WebDownload(val url: String, val userAgent: String, val cookies: String, val name: String, val mime: String)
+
+/** Only the starting origin receives its WebView cookies, even across redirects. */
+internal fun streamWebDownload(
+    download: WebDownload,
+    output: OutputStream,
+    client: OkHttpClient,
+    onCall: (Call) -> Unit = {},
+    checkCancelled: () -> Unit = {},
+    onProgress: (Long, Long) -> Unit = { _, _ -> },
+): Long {
+    val transport = client.newBuilder().followRedirects(false).followSslRedirects(false).build()
+    val original = download.url.toHttpUrlOrNull() ?: throw IOException("Unsupported download link")
+    var url = original
+    var redirects = 0
+    while (true) {
+        checkCancelled()
+        if (url.username.isNotEmpty() || url.password.isNotEmpty()) throw IOException("Unsupported download link")
+        val request = Request.Builder().url(url).header("User-Agent", download.userAgent)
+        if (url.scheme == original.scheme && url.host == original.host && url.port == original.port && download.cookies.isNotBlank()) {
+            request.header("Cookie", download.cookies)
+        }
+        val call = transport.newCall(request.build())
+        onCall(call)
+        call.execute().use { response ->
+            if (response.code in listOf(301, 302, 303, 307, 308)) {
+                if (++redirects > 5) throw IOException("Too many download redirects")
+                val next = response.header("Location")?.let { url.resolve(it) } ?: throw IOException("Invalid download redirect")
+                if (url.isHttps && !next.isHttps) throw IOException("Insecure download redirect blocked")
+                url = next
+            } else {
+                if (response.code == 401 || response.code == 403) throw IOException("Sign in to the node again, then retry the download")
+                if (!response.isSuccessful) throw IOException("Download failed (HTTP ${response.code})")
+                if (response.header("Content-Type")?.substringBefore(';')?.trim()?.lowercase() == "text/html" &&
+                    download.mime != "text/html" && !download.name.endsWith(".html", true) && !download.name.endsWith(".htm", true)) {
+                    throw IOException("Sign in to the node again, then retry the download")
+                }
+                val body = response.body ?: throw IOException("The download was empty")
+                val total = body.contentLength()
+                var written = 0L
+                body.byteStream().use { input ->
+                    val buffer = ByteArray(64 * 1024)
+                    var lastUpdate = 0L
+                    while (true) {
+                        checkCancelled()
+                        val count = input.read(buffer)
+                        if (count == -1) break
+                        output.write(buffer, 0, count)
+                        written += count
+                        val now = System.nanoTime()
+                        if (now - lastUpdate > 100_000_000L) { onProgress(written, total); lastUpdate = now }
+                    }
+                }
+                if (total >= 0 && written != total) throw IOException("Download interrupted; please retry")
+                onProgress(written, total)
+                return written
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/** Uses the system Save dialog: no broad storage permission and no external browser login. */
+@Composable
+internal fun rememberWebViewDownloads(): DownloadListener {
+    val context = LocalContext.current
+    val scope = rememberCoroutineScope()
+    var pending by remember { mutableStateOf<WebDownload?>(null) }
+    var active by remember { mutableStateOf<WebDownload?>(null) }
+    var progress by remember { mutableStateOf<Pair<Long, Long>>(0L to -1L) }
+    var failure by remember { mutableStateOf<String?>(null) }
+    var job by remember { mutableStateOf<Job?>(null) }
+    val currentCall = remember { java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference<Call?>(null) }
+    val client = remember {
+        OkHttpClient.Builder().followRedirects(false).followSslRedirects(false)
+            .connectTimeout(20, TimeUnit.SECONDS).readTimeout(60, TimeUnit.SECONDS).build()
+    }
+    fun cancel() { job?.cancel(); currentCall.getAndSet(null)?.cancel() }
+    DisposableEffect(Unit) { onDispose { currentCall.getAndSet(null)?.cancel() } }
+    val save = rememberLauncherForActivityResult(ActivityResultContracts.StartActivityForResult()) { result ->
+        val download = pending
+        pending = null
+        val uri = result.data?.data
+        if (result.resultCode != Activity.RESULT_OK || uri == null || download == null) return@rememberLauncherForActivityResult
+        job = scope.launch {
+            active = download
+            progress = 0L to -1L
+            var complete = false
+            try {
+                withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
+                    val task = currentCoroutineContext()
+                    context.contentResolver.openOutputStream(uri, "w")?.use { output ->
+                        streamWebDownload(download, output, client,
+                            onCall = { call -> currentCall.set(call); if (!task.isActive) call.cancel() },
+                            checkCancelled = { task.ensureActive() },
+                            onProgress = { done, total -> scope.launch { progress = done to total } })
+                    } ?: throw IOException("Unable to open the selected destination")
+                }
+                complete = true
+                Toast.makeText(context, "Download complete: ${download.name}", Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show()
+            } catch (error: CancellationException) {
+                throw error
+            } catch (error: Exception) {
+                if (currentCoroutineContext().isActive) {
+                    // Do not expose authenticated URLs or request headers in UI/logs.
+                    failure = when {
+                        error is javax.net.ssl.SSLException -> "The server certificate could not be verified."
+                        error is IOException && error.message?.startsWith("Sign in") == true -> error.message
+                        else -> "Download failed. Check your connection and available storage, then try again."
+                    }
+                }
+            } finally {
+                currentCall.getAndSet(null)?.cancel()
+                if (!complete) withContext(NonCancellable + Dispatchers.IO) {
+                    // This URI was newly created by ACTION_CREATE_DOCUMENT; never remove an existing user file.
+                    runCatching { DocumentsContract.deleteDocument(context.contentResolver, uri) }
+                }
+                active = null
+                job = null
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (active != null) {
+        AlertDialog(onDismissRequest = {}, title = { Text("Downloading") }, text = {
+            Column {
+                Text(active!!.name)
+                if (progress.second > 0) LinearProgressIndicator(progress = (progress.first.toFloat() / progress.second).coerceIn(0f, 1f))
+                else LinearProgressIndicator()
+            }
+        }, confirmButton = {}, dismissButton = { TextButton(onClick = { cancel() }) { Text("Cancel") } })
+    }
+    failure?.let { message ->
+        AlertDialog(onDismissRequest = { failure = null }, title = { Text("Download unavailable") },
+            text = { Text(message) }, confirmButton = { TextButton(onClick = { failure = null }) { Text("OK") } })
+    }
+    return DownloadListener { url, userAgent, disposition, mimeType, _ ->
+        if (active != null || pending != null) {
+            Toast.makeText(context, "Finish or cancel the current download first", Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show()
+        } else if (url.toHttpUrlOrNull() == null) {
+            failure = "This download link is not supported. Open the file from Cloud and try again."
+        } else {
+            val mime = mimeType?.substringBefore(';')?.takeIf { it.contains('/') } ?: "application/octet-stream"
+            val name = URLUtil.guessFileName(url, disposition, mime).replace(Regex("[\\\\/\\p{Cntrl}]"), "_").take(180).ifBlank { "download" }
+            pending = WebDownload(url, userAgent ?: "Archipelago Companion", CookieManager.getInstance().getCookie(url).orEmpty(), name, mime)
+            try {
+                save.launch(Intent(Intent.ACTION_CREATE_DOCUMENT).apply {
+                    addCategory(Intent.CATEGORY_OPENABLE); type = mime; putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_TITLE, name)
+                })
+            } catch (_: Exception) { pending = null; failure = "No file-saving app is available on this device." }
+        }
+    }
+}

Android/app/src/main/java/com/archipelago/app/ui/screens/WebViewFullscreen.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package com.archipelago.app.ui.screens
+
+import android.content.Context
+import android.content.ContextWrapper
+import android.graphics.Color
+import android.view.View
+import android.view.ViewGroup
+import android.webkit.WebChromeClient
+import android.widget.FrameLayout
+import androidx.activity.ComponentActivity
+import androidx.activity.OnBackPressedCallback
+import androidx.compose.runtime.Composable
+import androidx.compose.runtime.DisposableEffect
+import androidx.compose.runtime.remember
+import androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalContext
+import androidx.core.view.ViewCompat
+import androidx.core.view.WindowCompat
+import androidx.core.view.WindowInsetsCompat
+import androidx.core.view.WindowInsetsControllerCompat
+
+private fun Context.fullscreenActivity(): ComponentActivity? = when (this) {
+    is ComponentActivity -> this
+    is ContextWrapper -> baseContext.takeIf { it !== this }?.fullscreenActivity()
+    else -> null
+}
+
+/** Hosts Chromium's custom fullscreen view without replacing or reloading its WebView. */
+internal class WebViewFullscreen(private val activity: ComponentActivity?) {
+    private var overlay: FrameLayout? = null
+    private var callback: WebChromeClient.CustomViewCallback? = null
+    private var back: OnBackPressedCallback? = null
+    private var visibleBars = 0
+    private var originalBehavior = 0
+
+    fun show(view: View?, onHidden: WebChromeClient.CustomViewCallback?) {
+        val owner = activity
+        // A second enter must not detach the active video or strand its callback.
+        if (owner == null || owner.isFinishing || owner.isDestroyed || view == null ||
+            view.parent != null || overlay != null
+        ) {
+            onHidden?.onCustomViewHidden()
+            return
+        }
+        val decor = owner.window.decorView as? ViewGroup
+        if (decor == null) { onHidden?.onCustomViewHidden(); return }
+        val controller = WindowCompat.getInsetsController(owner.window, decor)
+        val insets = ViewCompat.getRootWindowInsets(decor)
+        visibleBars = 0
+        if (insets?.isVisible(WindowInsetsCompat.Type.statusBars()) != false) {
+            visibleBars = visibleBars or WindowInsetsCompat.Type.statusBars()
+        }
+        if (insets?.isVisible(WindowInsetsCompat.Type.navigationBars()) != false) {
+            visibleBars = visibleBars or WindowInsetsCompat.Type.navigationBars()
+        }
+        originalBehavior = controller.systemBarsBehavior
+        val host = FrameLayout(owner).apply {
+            setBackgroundColor(Color.BLACK)
+            keepScreenOn = true
+            addView(view, FrameLayout.LayoutParams(-1, -1))
+        }
+        overlay = host
+        callback = onHidden
+        decor.addView(host, ViewGroup.LayoutParams(-1, -1))
+        controller.systemBarsBehavior = WindowInsetsControllerCompat.BEHAVIOR_SHOW_TRANSIENT_BARS_BY_SWIPE
+        controller.hide(WindowInsetsCompat.Type.systemBars())
+        back = object : OnBackPressedCallback(true) {
+            override fun handleOnBackPressed() = hide()
+        }.also { owner.onBackPressedDispatcher.addCallback(it) }
+        view.requestFocus()
+    }
+
+    fun hide() {
+        val host = overlay ?: return
+        // Clear first: Chromium may synchronously call onHideCustomView again.
+        overlay = null
+        val notify = callback
+        callback = null
+        back?.remove()
+        back = null
+        host.keepScreenOn = false
+        host.removeAllViews()
+        (host.parent as? ViewGroup)?.removeView(host)
+        activity?.let { owner ->
+            val controller = WindowCompat.getInsetsController(owner.window, owner.window.decorView)
+            controller.systemBarsBehavior = originalBehavior
+            controller.hide(WindowInsetsCompat.Type.systemBars())
+            if (visibleBars != 0) controller.show(visibleBars)
+        }
+        notify?.onCustomViewHidden()
+    }
+}
+
+@Composable
+internal fun rememberWebViewFullscreen(): WebViewFullscreen {
+    val context = LocalContext.current
+    val fullscreen = remember(context) { WebViewFullscreen(context.fullscreenActivity()) }
+    DisposableEffect(fullscreen) { onDispose { fullscreen.hide() } }
+    return fullscreen
+}

Android/app/src/main/java/com/archipelago/app/ui/screens/WebViewScreen.kt

@@ -611,6 +611,8 @@ fun WebViewScreen(
     // before surfacing the error page: the mesh tunnel works from anywhere.
     meshFallbackUrl: String? = null,
 ) {
+    val fullscreen = rememberWebViewFullscreen()
+    val downloads = rememberWebViewDownloads()
     var isLoading by remember { mutableStateOf(true) }
     // First kiosk load (often over the FIPS mesh) gets the full branded
     // loader; later navigations keep just the slim top progress bar.
@@ -913,6 +915,7 @@ fun WebViewScreen(
                         cookieManager.setAcceptThirdPartyCookies(this, true)
 
                         applyArchipelagoSettings()
+                        setDownloadListener(downloads)
                         settings.apply {
                             setSupportMultipleWindows(true)  // enables onCreateWindow for window.open
                             // Let JS open windows without a synchronous user-gesture
@@ -1181,6 +1184,12 @@ fun WebViewScreen(
                         }
 
                         webChromeClient = object : WebChromeClient() {
+                            override fun onShowCustomView(view: android.view.View?, callback: CustomViewCallback?) {
+                                fullscreen.show(view, callback)
+                            }
+
+                            override fun onHideCustomView() = fullscreen.hide()
+
                             override fun onProgressChanged(view: WebView?, newProgress: Int) {
                                 loadProgress = newProgress
                             }
@@ -1546,6 +1555,8 @@ private fun InAppBrowser(
     appName: String? = null,
     onClose: () -> Unit,
 ) {
+    val fullscreen = rememberWebViewFullscreen()
+    val downloads = rememberWebViewDownloads()
     val context = LocalContext.current
     // Same-node check across BOTH node addresses (LAN + mesh ULA) — see the
     // kiosk's isSameNode; a mismatch here bounced app links to the browser.
@@ -1643,6 +1654,7 @@ private fun InAppBrowser(
 
                         CookieManager.getInstance().setAcceptThirdPartyCookies(this, true)
                         applyArchipelagoSettings()
+                        setDownloadListener(downloads)
                         // Node apps (BTCPay invoices, LND, Portainer tokens) are
                         // served over plain HTTP too — same dead-clipboard trap.
                         addClipboardBridge()
@@ -1662,6 +1674,12 @@ private fun InAppBrowser(
                         )
 
                         webChromeClient = object : WebChromeClient() {
+                            override fun onShowCustomView(view: android.view.View?, callback: CustomViewCallback?) {
+                                fullscreen.show(view, callback)
+                            }
+
+                            override fun onHideCustomView() = fullscreen.hide()
+
                             override fun onProgressChanged(view: WebView?, newProgress: Int) {
                                 progress = newProgress
                             }

Android/app/src/test/java/com/archipelago/app/ui/screens/WebViewDownloadsTest.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+package com.archipelago.app.ui.screens
+
+import okhttp3.OkHttpClient
+import okhttp3.ResponseBody.Companion.toResponseBody
+import okhttp3.mockwebserver.MockResponse
+import okhttp3.mockwebserver.MockWebServer
+import okio.Buffer
+import org.junit.Assert.*
+import org.junit.Test
+import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
+import java.io.IOException
+import java.util.concurrent.CancellationException
+
+class WebViewDownloadsTest {
+    private fun spec(url: String) = WebDownload(url, "test-agent", "session=test-only", "file.bin", "application/octet-stream")
+    @Test fun authenticatedDownloadWritesExactBytesAndReportsCompletion() {
+        MockWebServer().use { server ->
+            val bytes = ByteArray(256 * 1024 + 13) { (it % 251).toByte() }
+            server.enqueue(MockResponse().setBody(Buffer().write(bytes)))
+            val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
+            var progress = 0L to 0L
+            assertEquals(bytes.size.toLong(), streamWebDownload(spec(server.url("/file").toString()), out, OkHttpClient(), onProgress = { done, total -> progress = done to total }))
+            assertArrayEquals(bytes, out.toByteArray())
+            assertEquals(bytes.size.toLong() to bytes.size.toLong(), progress)
+            assertEquals("session=test-only", server.takeRequest().getHeader("Cookie"))
+        }
+    }
+    @Test fun sameOriginRedirectKeepsSessionButCrossOriginNeverReceivesIt() {
+        MockWebServer().use { first -> MockWebServer().use { second ->
+            second.enqueue(MockResponse().setBody("final"))
+            first.enqueue(MockResponse().setResponseCode(302).addHeader("Location", "/relative"))
+            first.enqueue(MockResponse().setResponseCode(307).addHeader("Location", second.url("/target")))
+            val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
+            streamWebDownload(spec(first.url("/start").toString()), out, OkHttpClient())
+            assertEquals("final", out.toString())
+            assertEquals("session=test-only", first.takeRequest().getHeader("Cookie"))
+            assertEquals("session=test-only", first.takeRequest().getHeader("Cookie"))
+            assertNull(second.takeRequest().getHeader("Cookie"))
+        } }
+    }
+    @Test fun authenticationFailureDoesNotSaveErrorBody() {
+        MockWebServer().use { server ->
+            server.enqueue(MockResponse().setResponseCode(401).setBody("login required"))
+            val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
+            val error = assertThrows(IOException::class.java) { streamWebDownload(spec(server.url("/").toString()), out, OkHttpClient()) }
+            assertTrue(error.message!!.startsWith("Sign in"))
+            assertEquals(0, out.size())
+        }
+    }
+    @Test fun redirectsAreBoundedAndUnsafeSchemesAreRejected() {
+        MockWebServer().use { server ->
+            repeat(6) { server.enqueue(MockResponse().setResponseCode(302).addHeader("Location", "/loop")) }
+            assertThrows(IOException::class.java) { streamWebDownload(spec(server.url("/loop").toString()), ByteArrayOutputStream(), OkHttpClient()) }
+            assertEquals(6, server.requestCount)
+        }
+        for (url in listOf("file:///etc/passwd", "data:text/plain,test", "blob:test")) {
+            assertThrows(IOException::class.java) { streamWebDownload(spec(url), ByteArrayOutputStream(), OkHttpClient()) }
+        }
+    }
+    @Test fun cancellationAndDestinationFailureAreNotReportedAsComplete() {
+        MockWebServer().use { server ->
+            server.enqueue(MockResponse().setBody("bytes"))
+            assertThrows(CancellationException::class.java) { streamWebDownload(spec(server.url("/").toString()), ByteArrayOutputStream(), OkHttpClient(), checkCancelled = { throw CancellationException() }) }
+            assertEquals(0, server.requestCount)
+            var progressCalled = false
+            val out = object : java.io.OutputStream() { override fun write(b: Int) { throw IOException("disk full") } }
+            assertThrows(IOException::class.java) { streamWebDownload(spec(server.url("/").toString()), out, OkHttpClient(), onProgress = { _, _ -> progressCalled = true }) }
+            assertFalse(progressCalled)
+        }
+    }
+    @Test fun tlsDowngradeAndLoginHtmlAreRejected() {
+        var requests = 0
+        val client = OkHttpClient.Builder().addInterceptor { chain ->
+            requests++
+            okhttp3.Response.Builder().request(chain.request()).protocol(okhttp3.Protocol.HTTP_1_1)
+                .code(302).message("redirect").header("Location", "http://example.test/file").body("".toResponseBody(null)).build()
+        }.build()
+        assertThrows(IOException::class.java) { streamWebDownload(spec("https://example.test/file"), ByteArrayOutputStream(), client) }
+        assertEquals(1, requests)
+        MockWebServer().use { server ->
+            server.enqueue(MockResponse().addHeader("Content-Type", "Text/HTML; charset=utf-8").setBody("<html>Sign in</html>"))
+            val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
+            assertThrows(IOException::class.java) { streamWebDownload(spec(server.url("/file").toString()), out, OkHttpClient()) }
+            assertEquals(0, out.size())
+        }
+    }
+
+}

Android/app/src/test/java/com/archipelago/app/ui/screens/WebViewFullscreenTest.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+package com.archipelago.app.ui.screens
+
+import android.view.View
+import android.widget.FrameLayout
+import androidx.activity.ComponentActivity
+import org.junit.Assert.*
+import org.junit.Test
+import org.junit.runner.RunWith
+import org.robolectric.Robolectric
+import org.robolectric.RobolectricTestRunner
+import org.robolectric.annotation.Config
+
+@RunWith(RobolectricTestRunner::class)
+@Config(manifest = Config.NONE, sdk = [28, 35])
+class WebViewFullscreenTest {
+    @Test fun backExitsFullscreenWithoutFinishingActivityAndNotifiesOnce() {
+        val lifecycle = Robolectric.buildActivity(ComponentActivity::class.java).setup()
+        try {
+            val activity = lifecycle.get()
+            val fullscreen = WebViewFullscreen(activity)
+            val video = View(activity)
+            var hidden = 0
+            fullscreen.show(video) { hidden++ }
+            assertNotNull(video.parent)
+            activity.onBackPressedDispatcher.onBackPressed()
+            assertNull(video.parent)
+            assertFalse(activity.isFinishing)
+            assertEquals(1, hidden)
+            fullscreen.hide()
+            assertEquals(1, hidden)
+        } finally { lifecycle.pause().stop().destroy() }
+    }
+
+    @Test fun duplicateRequestPreservesActiveViewAndCanReenterAfterExit() {
+        val lifecycle = Robolectric.buildActivity(ComponentActivity::class.java).setup()
+        try {
+            val activity = lifecycle.get()
+            val fullscreen = WebViewFullscreen(activity)
+            val first = View(activity)
+            val second = View(activity)
+            var firstHidden = 0
+            var secondHidden = 0
+            fullscreen.show(first) { firstHidden++ }
+            fullscreen.show(second) { secondHidden++ }
+            assertNotNull(first.parent)
+            assertNull(second.parent)
+            assertEquals(0, firstHidden)
+            assertEquals(1, secondHidden)
+            fullscreen.hide()
+            fullscreen.show(second) { secondHidden++ }
+            assertNotNull(second.parent)
+            fullscreen.hide()
+            assertEquals(1, firstHidden)
+            assertEquals(2, secondHidden)
+        } finally { lifecycle.pause().stop().destroy() }
+    }
+
+    @Test fun rejectsOwnedViewWithoutReparentingAndHandlesUnavailableActivity() {
+        val lifecycle = Robolectric.buildActivity(ComponentActivity::class.java).setup()
+        try {
+            val activity = lifecycle.get()
+            val video = View(activity)
+            val owner = FrameLayout(activity).apply { addView(video) }
+            var hidden = 0
+            WebViewFullscreen(activity).show(video) { hidden++ }
+            assertSame(owner, video.parent)
+            WebViewFullscreen(null).show(null) { hidden++ }
+            assertEquals(2, hidden)
+        } finally { lifecycle.pause().stop().destroy() }
+    }
+}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,7 +1,38 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## v1.9.0-alpha (2026-10-05)
+
+Unpublished release candidate; qualification is still in progress.
+
+- Keep Cuprate and NetBird supporting components out of app listings and consolidate BTCPay Server under Commerce.
+- Default on-chain sends, channel opens and cooperative closes to a dynamic next-block fee target, preserving explicit slower and custom choices.
+- Add reviewed fee-bump quotes, explicit budgets and durable operation tracking for supported wallet transactions.
+- Preserve Nginx Proxy Manager storage, same-node upstream connectivity, certificates and access controls through managed migrations.
+- Restrict public management access while retaining configured public apps and ACME certificate validation.
+- Serve the Mempool explorer on the Angor indexer origin alongside its API.
+- Include the self-contained LoRa flashing tool and explicit board selection in update and installer payloads.
+- Preserve paid-file Lightning entitlements across restarts and recover settled invoices from LND. Retry delivery without paying again and retain purchased files in the owned cache.
+- Return explicit payment-status errors with safe retry guidance when verification is unavailable.
+- Keep upload progress on its original screen, show completion there or notify on other screens, and cancel active and queued uploads.
+- Resume interrupted uploads while the app remains open, preserve the original destination, and verify saved file contents before reporting completion.
+- Provision a unique private File Browser login on each node while keeping Cloud sign-in automatic and preserving existing accounts and files.
+- Update Nostr dependencies to reject forged relay events and oversized encrypted messages; preserve native signing and encryption compatibility.
+- Allow apps to opt in to a validated public-key list of user identities without granting signing access.
+- Make transaction filters transparent and horizontally scrollable on mobile.
+- Keep Immich internal services out of My Apps, avoid false recovery states for healthy stacks, and allow removal of retired catalog apps.
+- Repair the redundant managed Portainer network override that can prevent startup, preserving custom overrides and persistent state.
+- Offer Standard, Medium, Fast and custom fees when cooperatively closing Lightning channels.
+- Add a clear-search icon to My Apps, Services and the App Store on desktop and mobile.
+- Keep Angor Indexer and the optional Angor Relay in the signed app catalog. Full indexing requires a synced, unpruned Bitcoin node and its indexing dependencies.
+
 ## v1.8.22-alpha (2026-09-30)
 
+- Fixed Nginx Proxy Manager launch readiness choosing a proxy listener instead of its admin port after container recreation.
+
+- Network diagnostic failures no longer stop all apps or rebuild shared container networking.
+- Prevented orphaned companion dashboards from repeatedly reinstalling themselves after their backend app was removed.
+- Fixed companion dashboard builds still referencing a retired image registry.
+
 - Fixed Angor Indexer health checks choosing IPv6 localhost for an IPv4 listener and unnecessarily restarting the working service.
 
 - Prevented false app restarts by probing each published port at its actual bind address; Nginx Proxy Manager now checks its internal admin API.

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -64,12 +64,49 @@ App submissions must:
 
 ## Pull requests
 
-1. Open one focused PR per behavior or documentation change.
+Contributions, PRs and reviews live on **ngit**. Clone the canonical repository:
+
+```text
+nostr://npub1w3sqdkrhn0gyuvsex32effzgnfpyde6qrrc4u467flg5e9txh4wsfn5vjg/relay.ngit.dev/archy
+```
+
+Gitea is a conventional Git mirror of accepted `main` commits and release tags.
+You do not need to open a duplicate Gitea PR. Existing Gitea contributions will
+be reviewed and linked to their ngit replacement or accepted result before
+closure.
+
+1. Open one focused ngit PR per behavior or documentation change.
 2. Explain what changed, why it changed, and how it was verified.
 3. Include screenshots for UI changes.
 4. Link relevant issues or docs.
 5. Keep generated catalog changes in sync with manifest changes.
 
+### Maintainer publication gate
+
+Merge once through the ngit contribution workflow, then push the exact same
+accepted commits to Gitea. Do not independently merge or squash on each mirror.
+Publish identical release tag objects, including annotations and signatures.
+After pushing main, verify:
+
+```bash
+python3 scripts/check-git-mirrors.py --local
+```
+
+Before publishing release artifacts, also check the actual release tag:
+
+```bash
+python3 scripts/check-git-mirrors.py --local --ref refs/tags/v1.9.0-alpha
+```
+
+Use the release's actual tag name. Missing refs, inaccessible mirrors or differing
+object IDs block publication. Record the ngit PR disposition and resulting merge
+commit in the release acceptance ledger. Resolve drift deliberately; do not
+force-push or delete published history without explicit approval.
+
+The checker is read-only. `--all` audits every advertised branch and tag; ngit
+proposal branches may intentionally differ from Gitea. A main-only pass proves
+only main parity, and no Git ref check verifies PR discussions or review state.
+
 Suggested commit format:
 
 ```text

README.md

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 # Archipelago
 
+> **Alpha testing:** Archipelago is experimental software. Any funds you put on it are at your own risk.
+
 > Self-sovereign Bitcoin node OS and manifest-driven app platform.
 
 Archipelago is a bootable personal server OS for Bitcoin infrastructure,

app-catalog/catalog.json

@@ -436,13 +436,13 @@
     {
       "id": "nginx-proxy-manager",
       "title": "Nginx Proxy Manager",
-      "version": "2.12.1",
-      "description": "Reverse proxy with SSL. Beautiful web interface for managing proxies. On a node, this manages its admin UI and upstream configuration — the proxy's own :80/:443 listeners are not published (the node's web server owns those ports).",
+      "version": "2.14.0",
+      "description": "Reverse proxy with SSL. Beautiful web interface for managing proxies. The node's public web server forwards configured domains through this service, preserving its access lists, certificates and custom routes.",
       "icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/nginx.svg",
       "author": "Nginx Proxy Manager",
       "category": "networking",
       "tier": "optional",
-      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx-proxy-manager:latest",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx-proxy-manager@sha256:8b91afcca90f5f2a7b2b8937999824f623c8a8748ae8013a1c9bf94f62177f08",
       "repoUrl": "https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager"
     },
     {
@@ -648,9 +648,9 @@
     {
       "id": "angor-indexer",
       "title": "Angor Indexer",
-      "version": "1.0.1",
-      "description": "Headless Bitcoin indexer endpoint for Angor. Reuses this node’s Mempool and Electrum index; requires a synced, unpruned Bitcoin node. Add this service’s address as the custom indexer in Angor settings. A relay is optional and installed separately.",
-      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.1",
+      "version": "1.0.2",
+      "description": "Bitcoin indexer endpoint for Angor with the existing Mempool explorer. Reuses this node’s Mempool and Electrum index; requires a synced, unpruned Bitcoin node. Add this service’s address as the custom indexer in Angor settings. A relay is optional and installed separately.",
+      "dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.2",
       "author": "Angor / Archipelago",
       "requires": [
         "Mempool API",

apps/angor-indexer/README.md

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 # Angor Indexer
 
-Headless mainnet API endpoint for Angor. The service reuses this node's Mempool
-backend and Electrum index instead of creating a second blockchain database.
+Mainnet indexer endpoint for Angor, serving the existing Mempool explorer at
+the same origin. The service reuses this node's Mempool frontend/backend and
+Electrum index instead of creating another explorer or blockchain database.
 An unpruned, fully synced Bitcoin node is required. Installing against a pruned
 node must show the existing archival-node requirement; it must never silently
 unprune or replace its Bitcoin data.
@@ -32,12 +33,45 @@ Install **Angor Relay** separately to host project metadata locally, then add
 clients. Its storage and configuration are separate from the node's internal
 relay; installing or uninstalling it does not change the internal relay.
 
+## Verify the complete client flow
+
+The root URL opens the Mempool explorer. `/health` and fee
+estimates establish API availability; they do not prove that project discovery,
+address history, or browser CORS works. Test a known funded project's address
+history, its original Nostr announcement, the Explore page, and project details
+in the actual Angor client. A certificate alone does not establish public routing.
+
+Keep existing discovery relays when adding a new relay. A new relay has no
+historical project data and does not automatically replicate other relays.
+Even with existing relays, an empty Explore page can be a client discovery
+failure: Angor Hub v2.0.0 was observed to stop after a batch whose announcements
+all failed on-chain validation. The same failure reproduced with our indexer
+and Angor's public indexer. Do not bypass the funding transaction's event-ID
+commitment or substitute an unsigned announcement to make a project appear.
+
+For opt-in read-only browser acceptance, install the frontend test dependencies
+and Playwright Chromium, then run:
+
+```sh
+ANGOR_TEST_INDEXER=https://indexer.example.com/ \
+ANGOR_TEST_RELAY=wss://relay.example.com/ \
+ANGOR_TEST_RELAYS='["wss://relay.angor.io","wss://relay.example.com/"]' \
+node tests/lifecycle/angor-public-browser.cjs
+```
+
+The relay under test must already contain the known original public project
+announcement documented in the test. The test does not import events, send
+funds, change your browser profile, or disable TLS verification. It checks the
+funding transaction/event commitment and real browser discovery and details.
+Relay signed writes, invalid-signature rejection, persistence, full node sync,
+and proxy upgrade/renewal tests remain separate acceptance requirements.
+
 ## Packaging
 
 Build the pinned image with:
 
 ```
-podman build -t source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.1 apps/angor-indexer/container
+podman build -t source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.2 apps/angor-indexer/container
 ```
 
 The image runs as UID 101 with a read-only root filesystem and no capabilities.
@@ -55,3 +89,21 @@ address query is indexed at the latest Bitcoin tip.
 Install Mempool Explorer first. The declarative `install_prerequisites` check
 refuses a new adapter installation if its Mempool API component is absent, before
 creating an installed-app record. It does not install or resync Bitcoin for you.
+
+## Explorer on the public indexer origin
+
+The linked official deployment guide exposes **Mempool frontend and API together**
+on the public indexer URL. It uses standard Mempool images and requires no custom
+Angor fork or `ANGOR_ENABLED` flag.
+
+The operator now requires that same browser experience: opening the configured
+indexer domain must show the existing Mempool explorer, while Angor API requests
+continue working on that origin. Reuse the existing Mempool stack, including its
+live WebSocket feed; do not install a second explorer or blockchain database.
+
+**Candidate 1.0.2:** `/` and frontend paths proxy to the existing Mempool
+frontend; `/api/`, `/api/v1/`, `/health` and the WebSocket feed retain their
+indexer routes. Version 1.0.1 served only service JSON at `/`. The candidate
+remains pending deployment/release acceptance, which must cover assets and deep links,
+desktop/mobile rendering, WebSocket updates, API/CORS/broadcast, trusted HTTPS,
+restart/upgrade and management-access isolation before documenting it as shipped.

apps/angor-indexer/container/nginx.conf

@@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ http {
         zone mempool_backend 64k;
         server mempool-api:8999 resolve;
     }
+    upstream mempool_frontend {
+        zone mempool_frontend 64k;
+        server mempool:8080 resolve;
+    }
+    map $http_upgrade $angor_connection_upgrade {
+        default upgrade;
+        '' close;
+    }
     server {
         listen 8080;
         client_max_body_size 4m;
@@ -23,7 +31,8 @@ http {
         proxy_send_timeout 30s;
         proxy_http_version 1.1;
         proxy_set_header Host $host;
-        proxy_set_header Connection "";
+        proxy_set_header Connection $angor_connection_upgrade;
+        proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
         proxy_set_header Authorization "";
         proxy_set_header Cookie "";
         proxy_hide_header Access-Control-Allow-Origin;
@@ -35,10 +44,6 @@ http {
         # Mempool's backend uses /api/v1. Match its frontend's shorter /api
         # surface too, without doubling already-versioned Angor URLs.
         rewrite ^/api/(?!v1/)(.*)$ /api/v1/$1 last;
-        location = / {
-            default_type application/json;
-            return 200 '{"service":"Angor Indexer","network":"mainnet","api":"/api/v1","health":"/health"}\n';
-        }
         # Readiness checks the indexing backend, not this gateway's process.
         location = /health {
             limit_except GET { deny all; }
@@ -54,10 +59,23 @@ http {
             limit_except GET POST { deny all; }
             proxy_pass http://mempool_backend;
         }
+        location = /api/v1/ws {
+            limit_except GET { deny all; }
+            proxy_read_timeout 600s;
+            proxy_send_timeout 600s;
+            proxy_pass http://mempool_backend;
+        }
         location /api/ {
             limit_except GET { deny all; }
             proxy_pass http://mempool_backend;
         }
-        location / { return 404; }
+        # Share the already-installed explorer; no second frontend or index DB.
+        # Its SPA handles transaction/block deep links and static assets.
+        location / {
+            limit_except GET { deny all; }
+            proxy_pass http://mempool_frontend;
+            proxy_intercept_errors on;
+            error_page 500 502 503 504 =503 @waiting;
+        }
     }
 }

apps/angor-indexer/manifest.yml

@@ -1,22 +1,26 @@
 app:
   id: angor-indexer
   name: Angor Indexer
-  version: 1.0.1
-  description: Headless Bitcoin indexer endpoint for Angor. Reuses this node’s Mempool
+  version: 1.0.2
+  description: Bitcoin indexer endpoint for Angor with the existing Mempool explorer.
+    Reuses this node’s Mempool
     and Electrum index; requires a synced, unpruned Bitcoin node. Add this service’s
     address as the custom indexer in Angor settings. A relay is optional and installed
     separately.
   category: money
   install_prerequisites:
+  - mempool
   - mempool-api
   upstream:
     kind: github
     repo: block-core/angor
   container:
-    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.1
+    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/chaum/angor-indexer:1.0.2
     pull_policy: if-not-present
     network: archy-net
   dependencies:
+  - app_id: mempool
+    version: '>=3.0.0'
   - app_id: mempool-api
     version: '>=3.0.0'
   - bitcoin:archival
@@ -40,8 +44,8 @@ app:
   interfaces:
     main:
       name: Angor Indexer API
-      description: Use this origin as Angor’s custom mainnet indexer URL. HTTPS is
-        required for browser clients.
+      description: Use this origin as Angor’s custom mainnet indexer URL, or open it
+        to view the existing Mempool explorer. HTTPS is required for browser clients.
       type: api
       port: 8998
       protocol: http
@@ -63,6 +67,7 @@ app:
     repo: https://github.com/block-core/angor
     features:
     - Angor mainnet API
+    - Mempool explorer on the same origin
     - Reuses existing Mempool indexing
     - No separate blockchain database
     - Optional independent relay

apps/angor-relay/README.md

@@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ this is a public relay, not a private messaging archive. It mounts only
 `/var/lib/archipelago/angor-relay` and its separate configuration directory.
 It never opens, reconfigures or shares the node's internal strfry database.
 
+For a public domain, proxy HTTPS to node port **8091**, enable WebSocket upgrade,
+and add `wss://your-relay-domain/` in Angor. Test both NIP-11 metadata (send
+`Accept: application/nostr+json`) and a real Nostr subscription over WSS. An
+Archipelago login page at this domain is a routing failure, not relay readiness.
+
+New relays start without project history. Keep existing discovery relays alongside
+yours until the needed original signed announcements and metadata are available
+locally. Relays do not automatically synchronize. Any history import must retain
+the original event IDs and signatures; verify funded projects against their
+on-chain commitments. A working WebSocket with zero stored events is not proof
+that the client's project discovery works. See the indexer README's browser test.
+
 The configuration is seeded only when absent, preserving operator changes.
 Stop the service before making a consistent backup of its event database.
 Ordinary start/restart/recreation preserves both mounts. Use the standard app

apps/nginx-proxy-manager/manifest.yml

@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
 app:
   id: nginx-proxy-manager
   name: Nginx Proxy Manager
-  version: 2.12.1
+  version: 2.14.0
   upstream:
     kind: github
     repo: NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager
   description: >-
     Reverse proxy with SSL. Beautiful web interface for managing proxies.
-    On a node, this manages its admin UI and upstream configuration — the
-    proxy's own :80/:443 listeners are not published (the node's web server
-    owns those ports).
+    The node's public web server forwards configured domains through this
+    service, preserving its access lists, certificates and custom routes.
+  backup_before_runtime_change: true
 
   container:
-    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx-proxy-manager:latest
+    image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx-proxy-manager@sha256:8b91afcca90f5f2a7b2b8937999824f623c8a8748ae8013a1c9bf94f62177f08
     pull_policy: if-not-present
-    network: pasta
+    # Rootless pasta copies the LAN IP, preventing requests back to this node.
+    # Retain the old pasta host gateway used by saved NPM upstreams, plus
+    # host.containers.internal. This subnet stays inside the private rootless namespace.
+    network: slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24
 
   dependencies:
     - storage: 1Gi
@@ -49,6 +52,17 @@ app:
         Nginx Proxy Manager enforces its own admin account on every page;
         the initial setup wizard also has to answer before any account exists.
 
+    - host: 8088
+      container: 80
+      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: local
+    - host: 8444
+      container: 443
+      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: local
+
   volumes:
     - type: bind
       source: /var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager

core/Cargo.lock

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "archipelago"
-version = "1.8.22-alpha"
+version = "1.9.0-alpha"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "archipelago-container",
@@ -3636,9 +3636,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "nostr"
-version = "0.44.2"
+version = "0.44.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3aa5e3b6a278ed061835fe1ee293b71641e6bf8b401cfe4e1834bbf4ef0a34e1"
+checksum = "c7d3d987ea7078dc36947cde532637c472a229426702e4331dd7667325378bd9"
 dependencies = [
  "aes",
  "base64 0.22.1",
@@ -3681,9 +3681,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "nostr-relay-pool"
-version = "0.44.0"
+version = "0.44.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4b1073ccfbaea5549fb914a9d52c68dab2aecda61535e5143dd73e95445a804b"
+checksum = "c85c54d6ca9aae4ae2bf19a7663ba9db5f45f783f1d24aff55f006386b8b99a1"
 dependencies = [
  "async-utility",
  "async-wsocket",

core/archipelago/Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "archipelago"
-version = "1.8.22-alpha"
+version = "1.9.0-alpha"
 edition = "2021"
 license.workspace = true
 description = "Archipelago Bitcoin Node OS - Native backend"

core/archipelago/src/api/handler/content.rs

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ impl ApiHandler {
         let invoice_hash = headers
             .get("x-invoice-hash")
             .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
-            .map(|s| s.to_string())
+            .map(|s| s.to_ascii_lowercase())
             .or_else(|| {
                 headers
                     .get("x-onchain-address")
@@ -98,6 +98,46 @@ impl ApiHandler {
             None => false,
         };
 
+        // Payment settlement is verified on the seller even when no status
+        // poll preceded this download (e.g. direct payment from another node).
+        let requires_payment = if !owner_session && headers.contains_key("x-invoice-hash") {
+            content_server::load_catalog(&config.data_dir)
+                .await?
+                .items
+                .iter()
+                .any(|item| {
+                    item.id == content_id
+                        && matches!(item.access, content_server::AccessControl::Paid { .. })
+                })
+        } else {
+            false
+        };
+        if requires_payment {
+            if let Some(hash) = headers.get("x-invoice-hash").and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()) {
+                if hash.len() != 64 || !hash.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
+                    return Ok(build_response(
+                        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+                        "text/plain",
+                        hyper::Body::from("Invalid payment hash"),
+                    ));
+                }
+                if let Err(error) = self
+                    .rpc_handler
+                    .settle_content_invoice(hash, content_id)
+                    .await
+                {
+                    tracing::warn!("Cannot verify peer-file invoice settlement: {error:#}");
+                    return Ok(build_response(
+                        StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                        "application/json",
+                        hyper::Body::from(
+                            r#"{"error":"Payment verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry the download without paying again."}"#,
+                        ),
+                    ));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
         // Parse Range header for streaming support
         let range = headers
             .get("range")
@@ -249,7 +289,13 @@ impl ApiHandler {
             .await
         {
             Ok((bolt11, payment_hash)) if !payment_hash.is_empty() => {
-                crate::content_invoice::record_pending(&payment_hash, content_id, price_sats).await;
+                crate::content_invoice::record_pending(
+                    &self.config.data_dir,
+                    &payment_hash,
+                    content_id,
+                    price_sats,
+                )
+                .await?;
                 let body = serde_json::json!({
                     "bolt11": bolt11,
                     "payment_hash": payment_hash,
@@ -290,52 +336,10 @@ impl ApiHandler {
         &self,
         path: &str,
     ) -> Result<Response<hyper::Body>> {
-        let rest = path.strip_prefix("/content/").unwrap_or("");
-        let (content_id, payment_hash) = match rest.split_once("/invoice-status/") {
-            Some((id, hash)) => (id, hash),
-            None => {
-                return Ok(build_response(
-                    StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
-                    "text/plain",
-                    hyper::Body::from("Invalid request"),
-                ))
-            }
-        };
-        if content_id.is_empty() || !is_valid_app_id(content_id) || payment_hash.is_empty() {
-            return Ok(build_response(
-                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
-                "text/plain",
-                hyper::Body::from("Invalid request"),
-            ));
-        }
-
-        // The hash must be one we issued for exactly this content item.
-        match crate::content_invoice::lookup(payment_hash).await {
-            Some((cid, _)) if cid == content_id => {}
-            _ => {
-                return Ok(build_response(
-                    StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
-                    "application/json",
-                    hyper::Body::from(r#"{"error":"Unknown invoice"}"#),
-                ))
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Already paid? Otherwise ask our LND and persist the result.
-        let mut paid = crate::content_invoice::is_paid_for(payment_hash, content_id).await;
-        if !paid {
-            if let Ok(true) = self.rpc_handler.invoice_is_settled(payment_hash).await {
-                crate::content_invoice::mark_paid(payment_hash).await;
-                paid = true;
-            }
-        }
-
-        let body = serde_json::json!({ "paid": paid });
-        Ok(build_response(
-            StatusCode::OK,
-            "application/json",
-            hyper::Body::from(serde_json::to_vec(&body).unwrap_or_default()),
-        ))
+        Ok(invoice_status_response(path, |hash, id| async move {
+            self.rpc_handler.settle_content_invoice(&hash, &id).await
+        })
+        .await)
     }
 
     /// Seller side (#46): issue a fresh on-chain address for a paid catalog item
@@ -389,7 +393,13 @@ impl ApiHandler {
 
         match self.rpc_handler.new_onchain_address().await {
             Ok(address) if !address.is_empty() => {
-                crate::content_invoice::record_pending(&address, content_id, price_sats).await;
+                crate::content_invoice::record_pending(
+                    &self.config.data_dir,
+                    &address,
+                    content_id,
+                    price_sats,
+                )
+                .await?;
                 let body = serde_json::json!({
                     "address": address,
                     "amount_sats": price_sats,
@@ -439,7 +449,7 @@ impl ApiHandler {
             ));
         }
         // The address must be one we issued for exactly this content item.
-        let price = match crate::content_invoice::lookup(address).await {
+        let price = match crate::content_invoice::lookup(&self.config.data_dir, address).await? {
             Some((cid, price)) if cid == content_id => price,
             _ => {
                 return Ok(build_response(
@@ -450,10 +460,11 @@ impl ApiHandler {
             }
         };
 
-        let mut paid = crate::content_invoice::is_paid_for(address, content_id).await;
+        let mut paid =
+            crate::content_invoice::is_paid_for(&self.config.data_dir, address, content_id).await;
         if !paid {
             if let Ok(true) = self.rpc_handler.onchain_received(address, price).await {
-                crate::content_invoice::mark_paid(address).await;
+                crate::content_invoice::mark_paid(&self.config.data_dir, address).await?;
                 paid = true;
             }
         }
@@ -531,3 +542,109 @@ impl ApiHandler {
         }
     }
 }
+
+/// Keep invalid input and an unavailable wallet inside the HTTP protocol so
+/// buyers can retry delivery without treating a dropped socket as lost payment.
+async fn invoice_status_response<F, Fut>(path: &str, settle: F) -> Response<hyper::Body>
+where
+    F: FnOnce(String, String) -> Fut,
+    Fut: std::future::Future<Output = Result<bool>>,
+{
+    let parsed = path
+        .strip_prefix("/content/")
+        .and_then(|rest| rest.split_once("/invoice-status/"))
+        .filter(|(id, hash)| {
+            !id.is_empty()
+                && is_valid_app_id(id)
+                && hash.len() == 64
+                && hash.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+        });
+    let Some((id, hash)) = parsed else {
+        return build_response(
+            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+            "application/json",
+            hyper::Body::from(r#"{"error":"Invalid content ID or payment hash"}"#),
+        );
+    };
+    match settle(hash.to_ascii_lowercase(), id.to_owned()).await {
+        Ok(paid) => build_response(
+            StatusCode::OK,
+            "application/json",
+            hyper::Body::from(serde_json::json!({"paid": paid}).to_string()),
+        ),
+        Err(_) => {
+            tracing::warn!("Peer-file payment status verification is temporarily unavailable");
+            let mut response = build_response(
+                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                "application/json",
+                hyper::Body::from(
+                    r#"{"error":"Payment verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry without paying again."}"#,
+                ),
+            );
+            response.headers_mut().insert(
+                hyper::header::RETRY_AFTER,
+                hyper::header::HeaderValue::from_static("5"),
+            );
+            response
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod invoice_status_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn malformed_requests_do_not_query_the_wallet() {
+        for path in [
+            "/bad",
+            "/content//invoice-status/aa",
+            "/content/file/invoice-status/aa",
+            "/content/file/invoice-status/",
+            "/content/file/invoice-status/not-a-hash",
+        ] {
+            let response = invoice_status_response(path, |_, _| async {
+                panic!("Invalid request reached wallet");
+                #[allow(unreachable_code)]
+                Ok(false)
+            })
+            .await;
+            assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+            assert_eq!(response.headers()["content-type"], "application/json");
+            let body = hyper::body::to_bytes(response.into_body()).await.unwrap();
+            assert!(
+                serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&body).unwrap()["error"].is_string()
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn settlement_results_and_failures_have_explicit_http_responses() {
+        let hash = "AB".repeat(32);
+        let path = format!("/content/file/invoice-status/{hash}");
+        for paid in [false, true] {
+            let response = invoice_status_response(&path, |hash, id| async move {
+                assert_eq!(hash, "ab".repeat(32));
+                assert_eq!(id, "file");
+                Ok(paid)
+            })
+            .await;
+            assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+            let body = hyper::body::to_bytes(response.into_body()).await.unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&body).unwrap()["paid"],
+                paid
+            );
+        }
+        let response = invoice_status_response(&path, |_, _| async {
+            anyhow::bail!("private wallet details must not escape")
+        })
+        .await;
+        assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
+        assert_eq!(response.headers()["retry-after"], "5");
+        let body = hyper::body::to_bytes(response.into_body()).await.unwrap();
+        let text = String::from_utf8(body.to_vec()).unwrap();
+        assert!(text.contains("without paying again"));
+        assert!(!text.contains("private wallet"));
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/bitcoin.rs

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
     /// ~30% of UI calls error out even though the node is perfectly healthy.
     /// With retry + backoff, the UI sees a uniform slow-but-successful
     /// response instead of intermittent failures.
-    async fn bitcoin_rpc_call<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
+    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn bitcoin_rpc_call<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
         &self,
         client: &reqwest::Client,
         method: &str,

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/content.rs

@@ -73,6 +73,45 @@ fn paid_content_response(bytes: &[u8], mime: &str, paid_sats: u64) -> serde_json
     })
 }
 
+// Resolve known purchases BEFORE any mint/spend. Missing bytes or an unreadable
+// index require recovery; neither is authorization to charge the buyer again.
+async fn existing_paid_content(
+    data_dir: &std::path::Path,
+    onion: &str,
+    content_id: &str,
+    filename: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<Option<serde_json::Value>> {
+    let owned = crate::content_owned::list_owned_checked(data_dir)
+        .await
+        .context("Could not verify previous purchases; no new payment was sent")?;
+    let Some(item) = owned.iter().find(|o| {
+        o.onion == onion
+            && (o.content_id == content_id
+                || filename.is_some_and(|f| {
+                    !f.is_empty() && o.filename.trim_start_matches('/') == f.trim_start_matches('/')
+                }))
+    }) else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    let (mime, bytes) = crate::content_owned::read_owned(data_dir, &item.onion, &item.content_id)
+        .await.context("This purchase is recorded, but its cached file is unavailable. No new payment was sent. Restore the cached file or contact the seller.")?;
+    let mut response = paid_content_response(&bytes, &mime, 0);
+    response["already_owned"] = serde_json::json!(true);
+    response["filename"] = serde_json::json!(item.filename);
+    Ok(Some(response))
+}
+
+// Updated clients open the persisted file through the Range-capable HTTP
+// endpoint. Avoid putting two base64 copies of a large video in a JSON reply.
+// Keep older clients compatible until both sides have upgraded.
+fn invoice_download_response(bytes: &[u8], mime: &str, cache_only: bool) -> serde_json::Value {
+    if cache_only {
+        serde_json::json!({ "owned": true, "mime_type": mime, "size_bytes": bytes.len() })
+    } else {
+        paid_content_response(bytes, mime, 0)
+    }
+}
+
 /// File purchases through an atomic no-clobber write in Files' own namespace.
 async fn file_purchase_in_files(
     data_dir: &std::path::Path,
@@ -506,36 +545,15 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         // by exact (onion, content_id) and by (onion, filename) — the latter
         // catches duplicate ids pointing at the same file on the same
         // seller. The owned copy is served from the local cache instead.
+        if let Some(cached) = existing_paid_content(
+            &self.config.data_dir,
+            onion,
+            content_id,
+            params.get("filename").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
+        )
+        .await?
         {
-            let filename = params.get("filename").and_then(|v| v.as_str());
-            let owned = crate::content_owned::list_owned(&self.config.data_dir).await;
-            let already = owned.iter().find(|o| {
-                o.onion == onion
-                    && (o.content_id == content_id
-                        || filename.is_some_and(|f| {
-                            !f.is_empty()
-                                && o.filename.trim_start_matches('/') == f.trim_start_matches('/')
-                        }))
-            });
-            if let Some(o) = already {
-                tracing::info!(
-                    onion,
-                    content_id,
-                    owned_as = %o.content_id,
-                    "paid download: already owned — serving cached copy, NOT paying again"
-                );
-                if let Some((mime, bytes)) =
-                    crate::content_owned::read_owned(&self.config.data_dir, &o.onion, &o.content_id)
-                        .await
-                {
-                    let mut result = paid_content_response(&bytes, &mime, 0);
-                    result["already_owned"] = serde_json::json!(true);
-                    result["filename"] = serde_json::json!(o.filename);
-                    return Ok(result);
-                }
-                // Cache record exists but bytes are gone — fall through and
-                // repurchase rather than stranding the user.
-            }
+            return Ok(cached);
         }
 
         // `method` pins the backend the user confirmed in the UI ("cashu" |
@@ -870,10 +888,29 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         if !is_valid_v3_onion(onion) {
             return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid v3 onion address"));
         }
-        if payment_hash.is_empty() || !payment_hash.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
+        if payment_hash.len() != 64 || !payment_hash.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
             return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid payment_hash"));
         }
 
+        let cache_only = params
+            .get("cache_only")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
+            .unwrap_or(false);
+        if let Some((mime, bytes)) =
+            crate::content_owned::read_owned(&self.config.data_dir, onion, content_id).await
+        {
+            return Ok(invoice_download_response(&bytes, &mime, cache_only));
+        }
+        // Older sellers only mark settlement during status polling. Always
+        // perform that handshake before requesting bytes; retries never pay.
+        // The download gate remains authoritative: a file may have become
+        // free, and newer sellers verify directly if status polling fails.
+        let _ = self
+            .handle_content_invoice_status(Some(serde_json::json!({
+                "onion": onion, "content_id": content_id, "payment_hash": payment_hash,
+            })))
+            .await;
+
         let (data, _) = self.state_manager.get_snapshot().await;
         let local_did = crate::identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(&data.server_info.pubkey)?;
         let fips_npub = crate::federation::fips_npub_for_onion(&self.config.data_dir, onion).await;
@@ -912,7 +949,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
 
         if response.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED {
             return Ok(serde_json::json!({
-                "error": "Seller has not registered this payment yet — wait for settlement and retry."
+                "error": "The seller has not confirmed access yet. Retry the download without paying again."
             }));
         }
         if !response.status().is_success() {
@@ -921,16 +958,45 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             }));
         }
 
+        let mime = response
+            .headers()
+            .get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .unwrap_or("application/octet-stream")
+            .split(';')
+            .next()
+            .unwrap_or("application/octet-stream")
+            .to_string();
         let bytes = response
             .bytes()
             .await
-            .context("Failed to read response body")?;
-        use base64::Engine;
-        let encoded = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&bytes);
-        Ok(serde_json::json!({
-            "data": encoded,
-            "size": bytes.len(),
-        }))
+            .context("Paid file transfer interrupted; retry the download without paying again")?;
+        let filename = params
+            .get("filename")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+            .unwrap_or(content_id);
+        crate::content_owned::record_purchase(
+            &self.config.data_dir,
+            onion,
+            content_id,
+            filename,
+            &mime,
+            &bytes,
+            params
+                .get("price_sats")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
+                .unwrap_or(0),
+            "lightning",
+            &chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .context("Paid file could not be saved; retry the download without paying again")?;
+        if let Err(error) =
+            file_purchase_in_files(&self.config.data_dir, filename, &mime, &bytes).await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!("Lightning purchase cached; optional Files copy failed: {error:#}");
+        }
+        Ok(invoice_download_response(&bytes, &mime, cache_only))
     }
 
     /// Buyer side (#46): ask the seller for a fresh on-chain address to pay.
@@ -1405,3 +1471,19 @@ impl RpcHandler {
 #[cfg(test)]
 #[path = "content_tests.rs"]
 mod tests;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod invoice_delivery_response_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[test]
+    fn cached_delivery_avoids_base64_but_keeps_old_clients_compatible() {
+        let cached = invoice_download_response(b"paid bytes", "video/mp4", true);
+        assert_eq!(cached["owned"], true);
+        assert_eq!(cached["size_bytes"], 10);
+        assert!(cached.get("data").is_none());
+        assert!(cached.get("data_base64").is_none());
+        let legacy = invoice_download_response(b"paid bytes", "video/mp4", false);
+        assert_eq!(legacy["data"], "cGFpZCBieXRlcw==");
+        assert_eq!(legacy["data"], legacy["data_base64"]);
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/content_tests.rs

@@ -71,3 +71,68 @@ fn seller_errors_are_bounded_printable_and_identified_as_peer_text() {
         );
     }
 }
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn known_purchase_never_becomes_a_new_spend_when_cache_or_index_is_unavailable() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        existing_paid_content(dir.path(), "seller.onion", "id", None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_none()
+    );
+    crate::content_owned::record_purchase(
+        dir.path(),
+        "seller.onion",
+        "id",
+        "file.txt",
+        "text/plain",
+        b"paid",
+        1,
+        "cashu",
+        "now",
+    )
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+    for (id, filename) in [("id", None), ("duplicate-id", Some("/file.txt"))] {
+        let cached = existing_paid_content(dir.path(), "seller.onion", id, filename)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cached["paid_sats"], 0);
+        assert_eq!(cached["already_owned"], true);
+        assert_eq!(cached["data"], "cGFpZA==");
+    }
+    assert!(
+        existing_paid_content(dir.path(), "different.onion", "id", None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_none()
+    );
+    tokio::fs::remove_file(dir.path().join("purchased-content/seller.onion/id"))
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        existing_paid_content(dir.path(), "seller.onion", "id", None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string()
+            .contains("No new payment")
+    );
+    tokio::fs::write(dir.path().join("purchased-content/owned.json"), b"damaged")
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        existing_paid_content(dir.path(), "seller.onion", "other-id", None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string()
+            .contains("no new payment")
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        tokio::fs::read(dir.path().join("purchased-content/owned.json"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap(),
+        b"damaged"
+    );
+}

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/dispatcher.rs

@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             "lnd.newaddress" => self.handle_lnd_newaddress().await,
             "lnd.sendcoins" => self.handle_lnd_sendcoins(params).await,
             "lnd.estimatefee" => self.handle_lnd_estimatefee(params).await,
+            "lnd.bump-quote" => self.handle_lnd_bump_quote(params).await,
+            "lnd.bump-submit" => self.handle_lnd_bump_submit(params).await,
+            "lnd.bump-status" => self.handle_lnd_bump_status(params).await,
             "lnd.createinvoice" => self.handle_lnd_createinvoice(params).await,
             "lnd.invoicestatus" => self.handle_lnd_invoicestatus(params).await,
             "lnd.payinvoice" => self.handle_lnd_payinvoice(params).await,

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/identity/handlers.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 use super::*;
 use crate::api::rpc::RpcHandler;
-use crate::identity_manager::{IdentityManager, IdentityProfile, IdentityPurpose};
+use crate::identity_manager::{
+    is_node_identity, IdentityManager, IdentityProfile, IdentityPurpose,
+};
 use crate::network::did_dht;
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use nostr_sdk::ToBech32;
@@ -38,7 +40,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             .into_iter()
             .map(|id| {
                 let is_default = default_id.as_deref() == Some(&id.id);
-                let is_node = !node_pubkey_hex.is_empty() && id.pubkey_hex == node_pubkey_hex;
+                let is_node = is_node_identity(&id, &node_pubkey_hex);
                 let (nostr_pubkey, nostr_npub) = if is_node {
                     (
                         node_nostr_hex.clone().or(id.nostr_pubkey),

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/channels.rs

@@ -272,28 +272,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
             .unwrap_or(false);
 
-        // Fee control: either a confirmation target or an explicit fee rate
-        let target_conf = params.get("target_conf").and_then(|v| v.as_i64());
-        let sat_per_vbyte = params.get("sat_per_vbyte").and_then(|v| v.as_i64());
-        if target_conf.is_some() && sat_per_vbyte.is_some() {
-            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                "Invalid fee parameters: specify either target_conf or sat_per_vbyte, not both"
-            ));
-        }
-        if let Some(tc) = target_conf {
-            if !(1..=1008).contains(&tc) {
-                return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                    "Invalid target_conf: must be between 1 and 1008 blocks"
-                ));
-            }
-        }
-        if let Some(rate) = sat_per_vbyte {
-            if !(1..=5000).contains(&rate) {
-                return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                    "Invalid sat_per_vbyte: must be between 1 and 5000"
-                ));
-            }
-        }
+        // Omitted fees target the next block; explicit slower/custom choices win.
+        let (target_conf, sat_per_vbyte) = super::fee_policy::fee_options(&params)?;
 
         info!(
             peer = pubkey,
@@ -473,6 +453,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             ));
         }
 
+        let fee_query = close_channel_fee_query(&params)?;
         let force = params
             .get("force")
             .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
@@ -498,13 +479,11 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             .build()
             .context("Failed to create streaming HTTP client")?;
 
-        let url = format!(
-            "{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/channels/{}/{}?force={}",
-            parts[0], parts[1], force
-        );
+        let url = format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/channels/{}/{}", parts[0], parts[1]);
 
         let mut resp = client
             .delete(&url)
+            .query(&fee_query)
             .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", &macaroon_hex)
             .send()
             .await
@@ -572,3 +551,106 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         }
     }
 }
+
+/// LND's CloseChannel REST endpoint takes fee selection as query parameters.
+/// With neither parameter LND uses a lax target; keep legacy clients on our
+/// explicit next-block target rather than silently accepting that default.
+fn close_channel_fee_query(params: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<Vec<(&'static str, String)>> {
+    let force = match params.get("force") {
+        None | Some(serde_json::Value::Null) => false,
+        Some(value) => value
+            .as_bool()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("force must be a boolean"))?,
+    };
+    let integer = |key: &str, max: u64| -> Result<Option<u64>> {
+        match params.get(key) {
+            None | Some(serde_json::Value::Null) => Ok(None),
+            Some(value) => {
+                let n = value
+                    .as_u64()
+                    .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("{key} must be a positive whole number"))?;
+                anyhow::ensure!((1..=max).contains(&n), "{key} must be between 1 and {max}");
+                Ok(Some(n))
+            }
+        }
+    };
+    let target = integer("target_conf", 1008)?;
+    let rate = integer("sat_per_vbyte", 5000)?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        target.is_none() || rate.is_none(),
+        "Specify either target_conf or sat_per_vbyte, not both"
+    );
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        !force || (target.is_none() && rate.is_none()),
+        "Closing fee selection requires a cooperative close"
+    );
+    let mut query = vec![("force", force.to_string())];
+    if !force {
+        if let Some(rate) = rate {
+            query.push(("sat_per_vbyte", rate.to_string()));
+        } else {
+            query.push((
+                "target_conf",
+                target
+                    .unwrap_or(super::fee_policy::DEFAULT_TARGET as u64)
+                    .to_string(),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(query)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod close_fee_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[test]
+    fn close_fee_query_forwards_presets_custom_and_legacy_default() {
+        for target in [1, 3, 6, 1008] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                close_channel_fee_query(&serde_json::json!({"target_conf":target})).unwrap(),
+                vec![
+                    ("force", "false".into()),
+                    ("target_conf", target.to_string())
+                ]
+            );
+        }
+        for rate in [1, 25, 5000] {
+            let query =
+                close_channel_fee_query(&serde_json::json!({"sat_per_vbyte":rate})).unwrap();
+            let request = reqwest::Client::new()
+                .delete("http://localhost/v1/channels/test/0")
+                .query(&query)
+                .build()
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(request.method(), reqwest::Method::DELETE);
+            assert_eq!(
+                request.url().query(),
+                Some(format!("force=false&sat_per_vbyte={rate}").as_str())
+            );
+        }
+        assert_eq!(
+            close_channel_fee_query(&serde_json::json!({})).unwrap(),
+            vec![("force", "false".into()), ("target_conf", "1".into())]
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            close_channel_fee_query(&serde_json::json!({"force":true})).unwrap(),
+            vec![("force", "true".into())]
+        );
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_or_conflicting_close_fees_fail_before_wallet_access() {
+        for params in [
+            serde_json::json!({"target_conf":1,"sat_per_vbyte":2}),
+            serde_json::json!({"force":true,"target_conf":1}),
+            serde_json::json!({"force":"false"}),
+            serde_json::json!({"target_conf":0}),
+            serde_json::json!({"target_conf":1009}),
+            serde_json::json!({"sat_per_vbyte":5001}),
+            serde_json::json!({"sat_per_vbyte":-1}),
+            serde_json::json!({"sat_per_vbyte":1.5}),
+            serde_json::json!({"sat_per_vbyte":"25"}),
+        ] {
+            assert!(close_channel_fee_query(&params).is_err(), "{params}");
+        }
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/fee_bump.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,835 @@
+//! WalletKit BumpFee is CPFP for new wallet outputs, RBF only for sweeper inputs.
+//! Never feed an ordinary payment input to it and call that a replacement.
+use super::LND_REST_BASE_URL;
+use crate::api::rpc::RpcHandler;
+use anyhow::{bail, ensure, Context, Result};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::{collections::HashMap, path::Path, sync::LazyLock};
+use tokio::{io::AsyncWriteExt, sync::Mutex};
+
+static QUOTES: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, Quote>>> = LazyLock::new(Default::default);
+// Serialize check/register/persist across dashboard clients. The create_new receipt
+// additionally survives process restarts and prevents retries of ambiguous results.
+static SUBMIT: Mutex<()> = Mutex::const_new(());
+const QUOTE_SECONDS: u64 = 60;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+struct Plan {
+    txid: String,
+    method: String,
+    input_txid: String,
+    input_index: u32,
+    parent_txid: String,
+    recipient_sats: u64,
+    rate_sat_vb: u64,
+    current_fee_sats: u64,
+    additional_fee_sats: u64,
+    total_fee_sats: u64,
+    budget_sats: u64,
+    input_sats: u64,
+    parent_vsize: u64,
+    sweep_vsize_bound: u64,
+    tip: String,
+}
+#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct Quote {
+    quote_id: String,
+    expires_at: u64,
+    custom_rate: Option<u64>,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    plan: Plan,
+}
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct Operation {
+    quote: Quote,
+    status: String,
+    message: String,
+}
+fn now() -> u64 {
+    std::time::SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+        .as_secs()
+}
+fn number(v: &Value) -> Result<u64> {
+    v.as_u64()
+        .or_else(|| v.as_str().and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()))
+        .context("Missing or invalid wallet amount")
+}
+fn txid_param(p: &Value) -> Result<String> {
+    let s = p["txid"].as_str().context("Missing transaction ID")?;
+    ensure!(
+        s.len() == 64 && s.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
+        "Invalid transaction ID"
+    );
+    Ok(s.to_ascii_lowercase())
+}
+fn btc_sats(v: &Value) -> Result<u64> {
+    let n = v.as_f64().context("Missing Bitcoin fee")? * 100_000_000.0;
+    ensure!(
+        n.is_finite() && n >= 0.0 && n <= 2_100_000_000_000_000.0,
+        "Invalid Bitcoin fee"
+    );
+    Ok(n.round() as u64)
+}
+fn outpoint_matches(v: &Value, txid: &str, index: u32) -> bool {
+    v["txid_str"].as_str() == Some(txid) && v["output_index"].as_u64() == Some(index as u64)
+}
+fn array<'a>(v: &'a Value, key: &str) -> Result<&'a Vec<Value>> {
+    v[key]
+        .as_array()
+        .with_context(|| format!("Missing wallet field: {key}"))
+}
+fn sweep_size(output: &Value) -> Result<u64> {
+    // One native input, one wallet taproot output, including signature rounding.
+    match output["output_type"].as_str() {
+        Some("SCRIPT_TYPE_WITNESS_V1_TAPROOT") => Ok(112),
+        Some("SCRIPT_TYPE_WITNESS_V0_PUBKEY_HASH") => Ok(123),
+        _ => bail!("This output type is not supported for fee bumping yet"),
+    }
+}
+fn fee_budget(
+    rate: u64,
+    parent_size: u64,
+    parent_fee: u64,
+    size: u64,
+    old_fee: u64,
+    relay: u64,
+    input: u64,
+) -> Result<u64> {
+    ensure!(
+        (1..=5000).contains(&rate),
+        "Fee rate must be a whole number from 1 to 5000 sat/vB"
+    );
+    ensure!(
+        parent_size <= 100_000 && size <= 100_000 && relay <= 5000,
+        "Unsupported package size or relay fee"
+    );
+    let required = rate * (parent_size + size);
+    let mut budget = required.saturating_sub(parent_fee).max(relay * size);
+    if old_fee > 0 {
+        budget = budget.max(old_fee + relay * size + 1);
+    }
+    ensure!(budget > old_fee, "Choose a higher fee rate");
+    // Conservative dust buffer; never attach unrelated wallet inputs to fund fees.
+    ensure!(
+        budget.checked_add(1000).is_some_and(|v| v <= input),
+        "Not enough wallet change for this fee; choose a lower rate"
+    );
+    Ok(budget)
+}
+
+async fn lnd(
+    client: &reqwest::Client,
+    macaroon: &str,
+    path: &str,
+    body: Option<Value>,
+) -> Result<Value> {
+    let url = format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}{path}");
+    let req = match body {
+        Some(v) => client.post(url).json(&v),
+        None => client.get(url),
+    };
+    let response = req
+        .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", macaroon)
+        .send()
+        .await?;
+    let status = response.status();
+    let value: Value = response.json().await.context("Invalid LND response")?;
+    ensure!(
+        status.is_success() && value.get("code").is_none(),
+        "{}",
+        value["message"].as_str().unwrap_or("LND request failed")
+    );
+    Ok(value)
+}
+
+fn validate_quote(quote: &Quote, fresh: &Plan, timestamp: u64) -> Result<()> {
+    ensure!(
+        quote.expires_at > timestamp && quote.plan == *fresh,
+        "Transaction or fees changed; review a fresh quote"
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+fn bump_body(plan: &Plan) -> Value {
+    json!({"outpoint":{"txid_str":plan.input_txid,"output_index":plan.input_index},
+        "sat_per_vbyte":plan.rate_sat_vb.to_string(), "budget":plan.budget_sats.to_string(),
+        "deadline_delta":1, "immediate":true})
+}
+
+async fn reserve(path: &Path, op: &Operation) -> Result<()> {
+    let parent = path.parent().context("Invalid operation path")?;
+    tokio::fs::create_dir_all(parent).await?;
+    let mut f = tokio::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+        .write(true)
+        .create_new(true)
+        .mode(0o600)
+        .open(path)
+        .await
+        .context("A bump already exists for this transaction; check its status")?;
+    f.write_all(&serde_json::to_vec(op)?).await?;
+    f.sync_all().await?;
+    // Sync directory entry too: a crash must not make a submitted operation vanish.
+    tokio::fs::File::open(parent).await?.sync_all().await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+// Only a recorded Archy CPFP with one owned input and no external outputs may
+// be folded into a payment. Labels and a fee-sized delta alone are not evidence.
+fn fee_child_matches(tx: &Value, plan: &Plan) -> bool {
+    let input = format!("{}:{}", plan.input_txid, plan.input_index);
+    let amount = tx["amount"]
+        .as_i64()
+        .or_else(|| tx["amount"].as_str()?.parse().ok());
+    let fee = number(&tx["total_fees"])
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|n| i64::try_from(n).ok());
+    tx["tx_hash"]
+        .as_str()
+        .is_some_and(|id| id.len() == 64 && id.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()))
+        && amount
+            .zip(fee)
+            .is_some_and(|(amount, fee)| fee > 0 && amount == -fee)
+        && tx["previous_outpoints"].as_array().is_some_and(|inputs| {
+            inputs.len() == 1
+                && inputs[0]["outpoint"] == input
+                && inputs[0]["is_our_output"] == true
+        })
+        && tx["output_details"].as_array().is_some_and(|outputs| {
+            !outputs.is_empty() && outputs.iter().all(|o| o["is_our_address"] == true)
+        })
+}
+
+impl RpcHandler {
+    pub(super) async fn group_fee_bump_history(
+        &self,
+        raw: &[Value],
+        normalized: &mut Vec<Value>,
+        client: &reqwest::Client,
+    ) {
+        let mut hidden = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+        for parent in normalized.iter_mut() {
+            if parent["direction"] != "outgoing" {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let Some(id) = parent["tx_hash"].as_str().map(str::to_owned) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            if id.len() != 64 || !id.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let path = self
+                .config
+                .data_dir
+                .join("wallet/fee-bumps")
+                .join(format!("{id}.json"));
+            let Ok(bytes) = tokio::fs::read(path).await else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let Ok(op) = serde_json::from_slice::<Operation>(&bytes) else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let plan = &op.quote.plan;
+            if plan.method != "cpfp"
+                || plan.txid != id
+                || plan.parent_txid != id
+                || plan.input_txid != id
+            {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let candidates: Vec<_> = raw
+                .iter()
+                .filter(|tx| fee_child_matches(tx, plan))
+                .collect();
+            let mut active = Vec::new();
+            for child in &candidates {
+                let child_id = child["tx_hash"].as_str().unwrap();
+                if child["num_confirmations"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0) > 0
+                    || self
+                        .bitcoin_rpc_call::<Value>(client, "getmempoolentry", &[json!(child_id)])
+                        .await
+                        .is_ok()
+                {
+                    active.push(*child);
+                }
+            }
+            // Ambiguous or unavailable chain state must not hide wallet history.
+            if active.len() != 1 {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let current = active[0];
+            parent["bump_fee_sats"] = json!(number(&current["total_fees"]).unwrap());
+            parent["fee_bump_txid"] = current["tx_hash"].clone();
+            parent["fee_bump_confirmations"] = current["num_confirmations"].clone();
+            parent["fee_bump_history"] = json!(candidates.iter().map(|child| {
+                let child_id = child["tx_hash"].as_str().unwrap();
+                hidden.insert(child_id.to_owned());
+                json!({"tx_hash":child_id,"fee_sats":number(&child["total_fees"]).unwrap(),
+                    "status":if child["tx_hash"] != current["tx_hash"] { "replaced" }
+                    else if child["num_confirmations"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0) > 0 { "confirmed" } else { "mempool" }})
+            }).collect::<Vec<_>>());
+        }
+        normalized.retain(|tx| !tx["tx_hash"].as_str().is_some_and(|id| hidden.contains(id)));
+    }
+
+    async fn bump_plan(&self, txid: &str, custom_rate: Option<u64>) -> Result<Plan> {
+        let (client, macaroon) = self.lnd_client().await?;
+        let info = lnd(&client, &macaroon, "/v1/getinfo", None).await?;
+        ensure!(
+            info["synced_to_chain"] == true,
+            "Wait for the wallet to finish syncing"
+        );
+        let version = info["version"]
+            .as_str()
+            .context("LND version is unavailable")?;
+        let mut parts = version.trim_start_matches('v').split('.');
+        let major: u32 = parts
+            .next()
+            .unwrap_or("")
+            .parse()
+            .context("Invalid LND version")?;
+        let minor: u32 = parts
+            .next()
+            .unwrap_or("")
+            .parse()
+            .context("Invalid LND version")?;
+        ensure!(
+            major > 0 || minor >= 21,
+            "This fee-bump interface requires LND 0.21 or newer"
+        );
+        let history = lnd(&client, &macaroon, "/v1/transactions", None).await?;
+        let txs = array(&history, "transactions")?;
+        let tx = txs
+            .iter()
+            .find(|t| t["tx_hash"] == txid)
+            .context("Transaction is not in this wallet")?;
+        ensure!(
+            tx["num_confirmations"].as_i64() == Some(0),
+            "This transaction is no longer pending"
+        );
+        let entry: Value = self
+            .bitcoin_rpc_call(&client, "getmempoolentry", &[json!(txid)])
+            .await
+            .context("Transaction is not currently in the node's mempool")?;
+        ensure!(
+            number(&entry["descendantcount"])? == 1,
+            "This transaction already has a child; open the child's Bump options instead"
+        );
+        let pending = lnd(&client, &macaroon, "/v2/wallet/sweeps/pending", None).await?;
+        let sweeps = array(&pending, "pending_sweeps")?;
+        let published = lnd(
+            &client,
+            &macaroon,
+            "/v2/wallet/sweeps?verbose=false&start_height=-1",
+            None,
+        )
+        .await?;
+        let is_sweep = published["transaction_ids"]["transaction_ids"]
+            .as_array()
+            .is_some_and(|ids| ids.iter().any(|id| id == txid));
+        let outputs = array(tx, "output_details")?;
+        ensure!(
+            tx["amount"]
+                .as_str()
+                .and_then(|v| v.parse::<i64>().ok())
+                .or_else(|| tx["amount"].as_i64())
+                .is_some_and(|v| v < 0),
+            "Bump is available for outgoing payments and wallet fee sweeps"
+        );
+        let (
+            method,
+            input_txid,
+            input_index,
+            input_sats,
+            parent_txid,
+            parent_size,
+            parent_fee,
+            old_fee,
+            size,
+            recipient_sats,
+        ) = if is_sweep {
+            // Only a simple wallet CPFP sweep is replaceable here. Anchor/HTLC,
+            // batched sweeps and arbitrary signed payments need different previews.
+            let raw: Value = self
+                .bitcoin_rpc_call(&client, "getrawtransaction", &[json!(txid), json!(true)])
+                .await?;
+            let inputs = array(&raw, "vin")?;
+            ensure!(
+                inputs.len() == 1 && outputs.len() == 1 && outputs[0]["is_our_address"] == true,
+                "RBF for batched or channel sweeps is not supported here yet"
+            );
+            let input_txid = inputs[0]["txid"]
+                .as_str()
+                .context("Missing sweep input")?
+                .to_string();
+            let index = u32::try_from(number(&inputs[0]["vout"])?)?;
+            ensure!(
+                sweeps.len() == 1 && outpoint_matches(&sweeps[0]["outpoint"], &input_txid, index),
+                "RBF is unavailable while other wallet sweeps are active"
+            );
+            let parent = txs
+                .iter()
+                .find(|t| t["tx_hash"] == input_txid)
+                .context("Sweep parent is unavailable")?;
+            let parent_output = array(parent, "output_details")?
+                .iter()
+                .find(|o| {
+                    number(&o["output_index"]).ok() == Some(index as u64)
+                        && o["is_our_address"] == true
+                })
+                .context("RBF requires a wallet-owned change input")?;
+            let parent_entry: Value = self
+                .bitcoin_rpc_call(&client, "getmempoolentry", &[json!(input_txid)])
+                .await
+                .context("Only unconfirmed CPFP sweep replacements are supported here")?;
+            ensure!(
+                number(&parent_entry["ancestorcount"])? == 1
+                    && number(&parent_entry["descendantcount"])? == 2,
+                "Complex sweep package cannot be quoted safely"
+            );
+            let recipients = recipient_amount(parent)?;
+            (
+                "rbf",
+                input_txid.clone(),
+                index,
+                number(&parent_output["amount"])?,
+                input_txid,
+                number(&parent_entry["vsize"])?,
+                btc_sats(&parent_entry["fees"]["base"])?,
+                btc_sats(&entry["fees"]["base"])?,
+                sweep_size(parent_output)?.max(number(&entry["vsize"])?),
+                recipients,
+            )
+        } else {
+            ensure!(
+                sweeps.is_empty(),
+                "Another wallet sweep is active; wait for it before creating a CPFP bump"
+            );
+            ensure!(
+                number(&entry["ancestorcount"])? == 1,
+                "Fee bumping a chain of unconfirmed payments is not supported yet"
+            );
+            let unspent = lnd(
+                &client,
+                &macaroon,
+                "/v2/wallet/utxos",
+                Some(json!({"unconfirmed_only":true})),
+            )
+            .await?;
+            let utxos = array(&unspent, "utxos")?;
+            let leases = lnd(
+                &client,
+                &macaroon,
+                "/v2/wallet/utxos/leases",
+                Some(json!({})),
+            )
+            .await?;
+            let locked = array(&leases, "locked_utxos")?;
+            let output = outputs
+                .iter()
+                .filter(|o| o["is_our_address"] == true && sweep_size(o).is_ok())
+                .filter(|o| {
+                    number(&o["output_index"]).ok().is_some_and(|i| {
+                        utxos
+                            .iter()
+                            .any(|u| outpoint_matches(&u["outpoint"], txid, i as u32))
+                            && !locked
+                                .iter()
+                                .any(|u| outpoint_matches(&u["outpoint"], txid, i as u32))
+                    })
+                })
+                .max_by_key(|o| number(&o["amount"]).unwrap_or(0))
+                .context(
+                    "RBF is unavailable for this payment. CPFP needs spendable wallet-owned change",
+                )?;
+            let index = u32::try_from(number(&output["output_index"])?)?;
+            let available: Value = self
+                .bitcoin_rpc_call(
+                    &client,
+                    "gettxout",
+                    &[json!(txid), json!(index), json!(true)],
+                )
+                .await?;
+            ensure!(
+                available.is_object()
+                    && number(&available["confirmations"])? == 0
+                    && btc_sats(&available["value"])? == number(&output["amount"])?,
+                "Change is no longer available"
+            );
+            (
+                "cpfp",
+                txid.to_string(),
+                index,
+                number(&output["amount"])?,
+                txid.to_string(),
+                number(&entry["vsize"])?,
+                btc_sats(&entry["fees"]["base"])?,
+                0,
+                sweep_size(output)?,
+                recipient_amount(tx)?,
+            )
+        };
+        let mempool: Value = self
+            .bitcoin_rpc_call(&client, "getmempoolinfo", &[])
+            .await?;
+        let relay = btc_sats(&mempool["incrementalrelayfee"])?
+            .div_ceil(1000)
+            .max(1);
+        let floor = btc_sats(&mempool["mempoolminfee"])?
+            .max(btc_sats(&mempool["minrelaytxfee"])?)
+            .div_ceil(1000)
+            .max(1);
+        let rate = match custom_rate {
+            Some(rate) => {
+                ensure!(
+                    rate >= floor,
+                    "Custom rate is below the current mempool minimum"
+                );
+                rate
+            }
+            None => {
+                let estimate = lnd(&client, &macaroon, "/v2/wallet/estimatefee/1", None).await?;
+                number(&estimate["sat_per_kw"])?.div_ceil(250).max(floor)
+            }
+        };
+        let budget = fee_budget(
+            rate,
+            parent_size,
+            parent_fee,
+            size,
+            old_fee,
+            relay.max(floor),
+            input_sats,
+        )?;
+        let tip: String = self
+            .bitcoin_rpc_call(&client, "getbestblockhash", &[])
+            .await?;
+        Ok(Plan {
+            txid: txid.to_string(),
+            method: method.into(),
+            input_txid,
+            input_index,
+            parent_txid,
+            recipient_sats,
+            rate_sat_vb: rate,
+            current_fee_sats: parent_fee + old_fee,
+            additional_fee_sats: budget - old_fee,
+            total_fee_sats: parent_fee + budget,
+            budget_sats: budget,
+            input_sats,
+            parent_vsize: parent_size,
+            sweep_vsize_bound: size,
+            tip,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_lnd_bump_quote(
+        &self,
+        params: Option<Value>,
+    ) -> Result<Value> {
+        let p = params.unwrap_or_default();
+        let txid = txid_param(&p)?;
+        let path = self
+            .config
+            .data_dir
+            .join("wallet/fee-bumps")
+            .join(format!("{txid}.json"));
+        ensure!(
+            !path.try_exists()?,
+            "A bump was already submitted for this transaction. Check its status"
+        );
+        let custom = p
+            .get("sat_per_vbyte")
+            .map(|v| v.as_u64().context("Custom rate must be a whole number"))
+            .transpose()?;
+        if let Some(rate) = custom {
+            ensure!(
+                (1..=5000).contains(&rate),
+                "Custom rate must be 1–5000 sat/vB"
+            );
+        }
+        let plan = self.bump_plan(&txid, custom).await?;
+        let quote = Quote {
+            quote_id: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
+            expires_at: now() + QUOTE_SECONDS,
+            custom_rate: custom,
+            plan,
+        };
+        let mut quotes = QUOTES.lock().await;
+        quotes.retain(|_, q| q.expires_at > now());
+        ensure!(quotes.len() < 128, "Too many fee quotes; try again shortly");
+        quotes.insert(quote.quote_id.clone(), quote.clone());
+        Ok(serde_json::to_value(quote)?)
+    }
+
+    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_lnd_bump_submit(
+        &self,
+        params: Option<Value>,
+    ) -> Result<Value> {
+        let p = params.unwrap_or_default();
+        let txid = txid_param(&p)?;
+        let _guard = SUBMIT.lock().await;
+        let path = self
+            .config
+            .data_dir
+            .join("wallet/fee-bumps")
+            .join(format!("{txid}.json"));
+        if path.try_exists()? {
+            return self
+                .handle_lnd_bump_status(Some(json!({"txid":txid})))
+                .await;
+        }
+        let id = p["quote_id"]
+            .as_str()
+            .context("A reviewed fee quote is required")?;
+        let quote = QUOTES
+            .lock()
+            .await
+            .get(id)
+            .cloned()
+            .context("Quote expired; review the fee again")?;
+        ensure!(
+            quote.plan.txid == txid && quote.expires_at > now(),
+            "Quote expired; review the fee again"
+        );
+        let fresh = self.bump_plan(&txid, quote.custom_rate).await?;
+        validate_quote(&quote, &fresh, now())?;
+        let op = Operation {
+            quote: quote.clone(),
+            status: "unknown".into(),
+            message: "Submission recorded; checking the wallet. Do not submit another bump.".into(),
+        };
+        reserve(&path, &op).await?;
+        QUOTES.lock().await.remove(id);
+        let (client, macaroon) = self.lnd_client().await?;
+        // At a one-block deadline LND may spend ALL this explicitly previewed
+        // budget. It is always below input value, so no extra funding is requested.
+        let result = lnd(
+            &client,
+            &macaroon,
+            "/v2/wallet/bumpfee",
+            Some(bump_body(&fresh)),
+        )
+        .await;
+        // Keep the write-ahead record even for an RPC error: a lost response can
+        // conceal an accepted bump. Status reconciles from wallet/mempool evidence.
+        match result {
+            Ok(_) => Ok(
+                json!({"status":"registered", "message":"Bump registered with the wallet. Waiting for broadcast.", "quote":quote}),
+            ),
+            Err(_) => Ok(
+                json!({"status":"unknown", "message":"The wallet response was not confirmed. Check status; do not submit again.", "quote":quote}),
+            ),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_lnd_bump_status(
+        &self,
+        params: Option<Value>,
+    ) -> Result<Value> {
+        let txid = txid_param(&params.unwrap_or_default())?;
+        let path = self
+            .config
+            .data_dir
+            .join("wallet/fee-bumps")
+            .join(format!("{txid}.json"));
+        let bytes = match tokio::fs::read(path).await {
+            Ok(b) => b,
+            Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
+                return Ok(json!({"status":"none"}))
+            }
+            Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
+        };
+        let op: Operation = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes)
+            .context("Bump receipt needs recovery; do not resubmit")?;
+        let (client, macaroon) = self.lnd_client().await?;
+        let history = lnd(&client, &macaroon, "/v1/transactions", None).await?;
+        let plan = &op.quote.plan;
+        let input = format!("{}:{}", plan.input_txid, plan.input_index);
+        let mut candidates: Vec<&Value> = array(&history, "transactions")?
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|t| {
+                t["tx_hash"] != txid
+                    && t["output_details"].as_array().is_some_and(|outputs| {
+                        !outputs.is_empty() && outputs.iter().all(|o| o["is_our_address"] == true)
+                    })
+                    && t["previous_outpoints"]
+                        .as_array()
+                        .is_some_and(|inputs| inputs.iter().any(|i| i["outpoint"] == input))
+            })
+            .collect();
+        candidates.sort_by_key(|t| std::cmp::Reverse(number(&t["time_stamp"]).unwrap_or(0)));
+        for t in candidates {
+            let id = t["tx_hash"]
+                .as_str()
+                .context("Missing bump transaction ID")?;
+            let confirmed = t["num_confirmations"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0) > 0;
+            let accepted = if confirmed {
+                false
+            } else {
+                self.bitcoin_rpc_call::<Value>(&client, "getmempoolentry", &[json!(id)])
+                    .await
+                    .is_ok()
+            };
+            if confirmed || accepted {
+                return Ok(json!({"status":if confirmed {"confirmed"} else {"mempool"},
+                    "message":if confirmed {"Fee bump confirmed."} else {"Fee bump accepted in the node's mempool; awaiting confirmation."},
+                    "bump_txid":id,"confirmations":t["num_confirmations"],"actual_sweep_fee_sats":number(&t["total_fees"])?,"quote":op.quote}));
+            }
+        }
+        let pending = lnd(&client, &macaroon, "/v2/wallet/sweeps/pending", None).await?;
+        let registered = array(&pending, "pending_sweeps")?.iter().any(|s| {
+            outpoint_matches(&s["outpoint"], &plan.input_txid, plan.input_index)
+                && number(&s["budget"]).ok() == Some(plan.budget_sats)
+                && number(&s["requested_sat_per_vbyte"]).ok() == Some(plan.rate_sat_vb)
+        });
+        Ok(
+            json!({"status":if registered {"registered"} else {"unknown"},
+            "message":if registered {"Bump registered; waiting for a verified broadcast."} else {"Submission outcome is unknown. Do not submit again; check wallet status."}, "quote":op.quote}),
+        )
+    }
+}
+fn recipient_amount(tx: &Value) -> Result<u64> {
+    array(tx, "output_details")?
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|o| o["is_our_address"] == false)
+        .try_fold(0u64, |sum, o| {
+            sum.checked_add(number(&o["amount"])?)
+                .context("Recipient amount overflow")
+        })
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    fn sample_plan() -> Plan {
+        serde_json::from_value(json!({"txid":"a","method":"cpfp","input_txid":"a","input_index":0,"parent_txid":"a","recipient_sats":161650,"rate_sat_vb":3,"current_fee_sats":144,"additional_fee_sats":618,"total_fee_sats":762,"budget_sats":618,"input_sats":21126,"parent_vsize":142,"sweep_vsize_bound":112,"tip":"tip"})).unwrap()
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn history_requires_owned_simple_fee_only_child() {
+        let plan = sample_plan();
+        let tx = json!({"tx_hash":"b".repeat(64),"amount":"-200","total_fees":"200",
+            "previous_outpoints":[{"outpoint":"a:0","is_our_output":true}],
+            "output_details":[{"is_our_address":true}]});
+        assert!(fee_child_matches(&tx, &plan));
+        for bad in [
+            json!({"amount":"-201"}),
+            json!({"amount":"200"}),
+            json!({"total_fees":"0"}),
+            json!({"previous_outpoints":[{"outpoint":"a:1","is_our_output":true}]}),
+            json!({"previous_outpoints":[{"outpoint":"a:0","is_our_output":false}]}),
+            json!({"previous_outpoints":[{"outpoint":"a:0","is_our_output":true},{"outpoint":"c:0","is_our_output":true}]}),
+            json!({"output_details":[{"is_our_address":false}]}),
+            json!({"output_details":[]}),
+            json!({"tx_hash":"../../invalid"}),
+        ] {
+            let mut changed = tx.clone();
+            for (key, value) in bad.as_object().unwrap() {
+                changed[key] = value.clone();
+            }
+            assert!(!fee_child_matches(&changed, &plan), "{bad}");
+        }
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn stale_quotes_cannot_silently_change_approved_fee_or_transaction() {
+        let plan = sample_plan();
+        let q = Quote {
+            quote_id: "q".into(),
+            expires_at: 100,
+            custom_rate: None,
+            plan: plan.clone(),
+        };
+        assert!(validate_quote(&q, &plan, 99).is_ok());
+        assert!(validate_quote(&q, &plan, 100).is_err());
+        let mut changed = plan.clone();
+        changed.budget_sats += 1;
+        assert!(validate_quote(&q, &changed, 99).is_err());
+        changed = plan.clone();
+        changed.input_index += 1;
+        assert!(validate_quote(&q, &changed, 99).is_err());
+        changed = plan.clone();
+        changed.recipient_sats -= 1;
+        assert!(validate_quote(&q, &changed, 99).is_err());
+        changed = plan.clone();
+        changed.tip = "new block".into();
+        assert!(validate_quote(&q, &changed, 99).is_err());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn mutation_always_has_explicit_budget_and_does_not_send_a_second_payment() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            bump_body(&sample_plan()),
+            json!({"outpoint":{"txid_str":"a","output_index":0},"sat_per_vbyte":"3","budget":"618","deadline_delta":1,"immediate":true})
+        );
+        let mut rbf = sample_plan();
+        rbf.method = "rbf".into();
+        rbf.txid = "child".into();
+        // RBF uses the already-registered input, not the child's output.
+        assert_eq!(bump_body(&rbf)["outpoint"]["txid_str"], "a");
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn outpoint_ownership_and_recipient_exclude_wallet_change() {
+        assert!(outpoint_matches(
+            &json!({"txid_str":"a","output_index":2}),
+            "a",
+            2
+        ));
+        assert!(!outpoint_matches(
+            &json!({"txid_str":"b","output_index":2}),
+            "a",
+            2
+        ));
+        assert!(!outpoint_matches(
+            &json!({"txid_str":"a","output_index":3}),
+            "a",
+            2
+        ));
+        assert_eq!(recipient_amount(&json!({"output_details":[{"is_our_address":true,"amount":"21126"},{"is_our_address":false,"amount":"161650"}]})).unwrap(), 161650);
+        assert!(recipient_amount(
+            &json!({"output_details":[{"is_our_address":false,"amount":"bad"}]})
+        )
+        .is_err());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn cpfp_budget_covers_parent_and_preserves_change() {
+        assert_eq!(fee_budget(3, 142, 144, 112, 0, 1, 21126).unwrap(), 618);
+        assert!(fee_budget(5000, 142, 144, 112, 0, 1, 21126).is_err());
+        assert!(fee_budget(0, 142, 144, 112, 0, 1, 21126).is_err());
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn rbf_pays_incremental_relay_cost_and_counts_only_extra_cost() {
+        let fee = fee_budget(3, 142, 144, 112, 650, 1, 21126).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(fee, 763);
+        assert_eq!(fee - 650, 113);
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn unsupported_outputs_and_malformed_ids_fail_closed() {
+        assert!(sweep_size(&json!({"output_type":"SCRIPT_TYPE_WITNESS_V0_SCRIPT_HASH"})).is_err());
+        assert!(txid_param(&json!({"txid":"../../file"})).is_err());
+        assert!(number(&json!(-1)).is_err());
+        assert!(btc_sats(&json!(-0.1)).is_err());
+        assert_eq!(btc_sats(&json!(0.00000650)).unwrap(), 650);
+    }
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn receipt_prevents_duplicate_submission_after_restart() {
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string());
+        let path = dir.join("receipt.json");
+        let plan: Plan = serde_json::from_value(json!({"txid":"a","method":"cpfp","input_txid":"a","input_index":0,"parent_txid":"a","recipient_sats":1000,"rate_sat_vb":3,"current_fee_sats":144,"additional_fee_sats":618,"total_fee_sats":762,"budget_sats":618,"input_sats":21126,"parent_vsize":142,"sweep_vsize_bound":112,"tip":"tip"})).unwrap();
+        let op = Operation {
+            quote: Quote {
+                quote_id: "q".into(),
+                expires_at: now() + 60,
+                custom_rate: None,
+                plan,
+            },
+            status: "unknown".into(),
+            message: "pending".into(),
+        };
+        reserve(&path, &op).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(reserve(&path, &op).await.is_err());
+        let restored: Operation =
+            serde_json::from_slice(&tokio::fs::read(&path).await.unwrap()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(restored.quote.plan.budget_sats, 618);
+        tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(dir).await.unwrap();
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/fee_policy.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+//! Explicit on-chain fee choices retain priority; omitted choices target the next block.
+use anyhow::{ensure, Context, Result};
+use serde_json::Value;
+
+pub(super) const DEFAULT_TARGET: i64 = 1;
+
+pub(super) fn estimated_sat_per_vbyte(value: &Value) -> Result<u64> {
+    let per_kw = value["sat_per_kw"]
+        .as_u64()
+        .or_else(|| value["sat_per_kw"].as_str().and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()))
+        .context("Next-block fee estimate is unavailable")?;
+    let rate = per_kw.div_ceil(250);
+    ensure!(
+        (1..=5000).contains(&rate),
+        "Next-block fee estimate is outside supported bounds; choose an explicit fee"
+    );
+    Ok(rate)
+}
+
+pub(super) fn fee_options(params: &Value) -> Result<(Option<i64>, Option<i64>)> {
+    let integer = |key: &str, max: i64| -> Result<Option<i64>> {
+        match params.get(key) {
+            None | Some(Value::Null) => Ok(None),
+            Some(value) => {
+                let n = value
+                    .as_i64()
+                    .with_context(|| format!("{key} must be a positive whole number"))?;
+                ensure!((1..=max).contains(&n), "{key} must be between 1 and {max}");
+                Ok(Some(n))
+            }
+        }
+    };
+    let target = integer("target_conf", 1008)?;
+    let rate = integer("sat_per_vbyte", 5000)?;
+    ensure!(
+        target.is_none() || rate.is_none(),
+        "Specify either target_conf or sat_per_vbyte, not both"
+    );
+    Ok((
+        if rate.is_none() {
+            Some(target.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_TARGET))
+        } else {
+            None
+        },
+        rate,
+    ))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn estimates_round_up_and_missing_or_extreme_estimates_fail_closed() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            estimated_sat_per_vbyte(&json!({"sat_per_kw":"501"})).unwrap(),
+            3
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            estimated_sat_per_vbyte(&json!({"sat_per_kw":250})).unwrap(),
+            1
+        );
+        for v in [
+            json!({}),
+            json!({"sat_per_kw":0}),
+            json!({"sat_per_kw":-1}),
+            json!({"sat_per_kw":1250001}),
+        ] {
+            assert!(estimated_sat_per_vbyte(&v).is_err());
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn next_block_default_preserves_explicit_slower_and_custom_choices() {
+        assert_eq!(fee_options(&json!({})).unwrap(), (Some(1), None));
+        assert_eq!(
+            fee_options(&json!({"target_conf":null})).unwrap(),
+            (Some(1), None)
+        );
+        for target in [1, 3, 6, 144, 1008] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                fee_options(&json!({"target_conf":target})).unwrap(),
+                (Some(target), None)
+            );
+        }
+        for rate in [1, 17, 5000] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                fee_options(&json!({"sat_per_vbyte":rate})).unwrap(),
+                (None, Some(rate))
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_explicit_fees_never_silently_become_fast() {
+        for value in [
+            json!(0),
+            json!(-1),
+            json!(1.5),
+            json!("6"),
+            json!(true),
+            json!({}),
+            json!(1009),
+        ] {
+            assert!(fee_options(&json!({"target_conf":value})).is_err());
+        }
+        for value in [
+            json!(0),
+            json!(-1),
+            json!(1.5),
+            json!("6"),
+            json!(true),
+            json!(5001),
+        ] {
+            assert!(fee_options(&json!({"sat_per_vbyte":value})).is_err());
+        }
+        assert!(fee_options(&json!({"target_conf":1,"sat_per_vbyte":2})).is_err());
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/mod.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 mod channels;
+mod fee_bump;
+mod fee_policy;
 mod info;
 mod macaroons;
 mod payments;

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/payments.rs

@@ -402,6 +402,9 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             }));
         }
 
+        self.group_fee_bump_history(raw_txs, &mut transactions, &client)
+            .await;
+
         // Sort by timestamp descending (most recent first)
         transactions.sort_by(|a, b| {
             let ta = a.get("time_stamp").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()).unwrap_or(0);

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/lnd/wallet.rs

@@ -124,28 +124,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid Bitcoin address format"));
         }
 
-        // Fee control: either a confirmation target or an explicit fee rate
-        let target_conf = params.get("target_conf").and_then(|v| v.as_i64());
-        let sat_per_vbyte = params.get("sat_per_vbyte").and_then(|v| v.as_i64());
-        if target_conf.is_some() && sat_per_vbyte.is_some() {
-            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                "Invalid fee parameters: specify either target_conf or sat_per_vbyte, not both"
-            ));
-        }
-        if let Some(tc) = target_conf {
-            if !(1..=1008).contains(&tc) {
-                return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                    "Invalid target_conf: must be between 1 and 1008 blocks"
-                ));
-            }
-        }
-        if let Some(rate) = sat_per_vbyte {
-            if !(1..=5000).contains(&rate) {
-                return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                    "Invalid sat_per_vbyte: must be between 1 and 5000"
-                ));
-            }
-        }
+        // Omitted fees target the next block; explicit slower/custom choices win.
+        let (target_conf, sat_per_vbyte) = super::fee_policy::fee_options(&params)?;
 
         info!(
             addr = addr,
@@ -238,15 +218,12 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         if !(546..=21_000_000 * 100_000_000).contains(&amount) {
             return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid amount"));
         }
-        let target_conf = params
-            .get("target_conf")
-            .and_then(|v| v.as_i64())
-            .unwrap_or(6);
-        if !(1..=1008).contains(&target_conf) {
-            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                "Invalid target_conf: must be between 1 and 1008 blocks"
-            ));
-        }
+        let (target_conf, custom_rate) = super::fee_policy::fee_options(&params)?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            custom_rate.is_none(),
+            "Fee estimation requires a confirmation target"
+        );
+        let target_conf = target_conf.unwrap_or(super::fee_policy::DEFAULT_TARGET);
 
         let (client, macaroon_hex) = self.lnd_client().await?;
 
@@ -453,6 +430,56 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         Ok(settled)
     }
 
+    /// Verify against LND at download time, rather than relying on a browser
+    /// having polled first. The memo/amount also recover pre-upgrade in-memory
+    /// entitlements after restart; unrelated invoices never unlock a file.
+    pub(crate) async fn settle_content_invoice(
+        &self,
+        hash: &str,
+        content_id: &str,
+    ) -> Result<bool> {
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            hash.len() == 64 && hash.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
+            "Invalid payment hash"
+        );
+        let hash = hash.to_ascii_lowercase();
+        let existing = crate::content_invoice::lookup(&self.config.data_dir, &hash).await?;
+        if let Some((id, _)) = &existing {
+            if id != content_id {
+                return Ok(false);
+            }
+        }
+        if crate::content_invoice::is_paid_for(&self.config.data_dir, &hash, content_id).await {
+            return Ok(true);
+        }
+        let (client, macaroon_hex) = self.lnd_client().await?;
+        let response = client
+            .get(format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v1/invoice/{hash}"))
+            .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", &macaroon_hex)
+            .send()
+            .await?;
+        if response.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+        let body: serde_json::Value = response.error_for_status()?.json().await?;
+        let Some(price) = content_invoice_amount(&body, content_id) else {
+            return Ok(false);
+        };
+        if existing
+            .as_ref()
+            .is_some_and(|(_, expected)| *expected != price)
+        {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+        crate::content_invoice::record_pending(&self.config.data_dir, &hash, content_id, price)
+            .await?;
+        let settled = content_invoice_fully_settled(&body, price);
+        if settled {
+            crate::content_invoice::mark_paid(&self.config.data_dir, &hash).await?;
+        }
+        Ok(settled)
+    }
+
     /// Generate a fresh on-chain receive address (seller side, #46).
     pub(crate) async fn new_onchain_address(&self) -> Result<String> {
         let (client, macaroon_hex) = self.lnd_client().await?;
@@ -732,10 +759,24 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             total_amount += amount;
         }
 
-        let sat_per_vbyte = params
-            .get("fee_rate_sat_per_vbyte")
-            .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
-            .unwrap_or(10);
+        let (_, explicit_rate) = super::fee_policy::fee_options(&serde_json::json!({
+            "sat_per_vbyte": params.get("fee_rate_sat_per_vbyte")
+        }))?;
+        let (client, macaroon_hex) = self.lnd_client().await?;
+        let sat_per_vbyte = if let Some(rate) = explicit_rate {
+            rate as u64
+        } else {
+            let response = client
+                .get(format!("{LND_REST_BASE_URL}/v2/wallet/estimatefee/1"))
+                .header("Grpc-Metadata-macaroon", &macaroon_hex)
+                .send()
+                .await
+                .context("Cannot estimate the next-block fee")?
+                .error_for_status()
+                .context("Next-block fee estimate rejected")?;
+            let estimate: serde_json::Value = response.json().await?;
+            super::fee_policy::estimated_sat_per_vbyte(&estimate)?
+        };
 
         info!(
             total_amount = total_amount,
@@ -743,8 +784,6 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             "Creating PSBT for hardware wallet signing"
         );
 
-        let (client, macaroon_hex) = self.lnd_client().await?;
-
         let fund_body = serde_json::json!({
             "raw": {
                 "outputs": lnd_outputs,
@@ -1444,3 +1483,81 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(s.contains("[LND_REST_UNREACHABLE]"), "got: {s}");
     }
 }
+
+// LND REST uses decimal strings for int64 fields. Match the complete seller
+// memo, not a substring supplied by a buyer or an arbitrary settled invoice.
+fn json_u64(value: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<u64> {
+    value.as_u64().or_else(|| value.as_str()?.parse().ok())
+}
+fn content_invoice_fully_settled(body: &serde_json::Value, price: u64) -> bool {
+    let settled = match body.get("state").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
+        Some(state) => state == "SETTLED",
+        None => body.get("settled").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()) == Some(true),
+    };
+    settled
+        && price > 0
+        && body
+            .get("amt_paid_sat")
+            .and_then(json_u64)
+            .is_some_and(|paid| paid >= price)
+}
+fn content_invoice_amount(body: &serde_json::Value, content_id: &str) -> Option<u64> {
+    if body.get("memo")?.as_str()? != format!("Archipelago peer file {content_id}") {
+        return None;
+    }
+    body.get("value").and_then(json_u64).filter(|v| *v > 0)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod peer_file_invoice_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[test]
+    fn settlement_requires_terminal_state_and_full_amount() {
+        for state in ["OPEN", "ACCEPTED", "CANCELED", "unknown"] {
+            assert!(!content_invoice_fully_settled(
+                &serde_json::json!({"state":state,"settled":true,"amt_paid_sat":"100"}),
+                7
+            ));
+        }
+        for amount in [
+            serde_json::json!(6),
+            serde_json::json!("-1"),
+            serde_json::json!(null),
+            serde_json::json!("bad"),
+        ] {
+            assert!(!content_invoice_fully_settled(
+                &serde_json::json!({"state":"SETTLED","amt_paid_sat":amount}),
+                7
+            ));
+        }
+        for amount in [serde_json::json!(7), serde_json::json!("8")] {
+            assert!(content_invoice_fully_settled(
+                &serde_json::json!({"state":"SETTLED","amt_paid_sat":amount}),
+                7
+            ));
+        }
+        assert!(content_invoice_fully_settled(
+            &serde_json::json!({"settled":true,"amt_paid_sat":"7"}),
+            7
+        ));
+        assert!(!content_invoice_fully_settled(
+            &serde_json::json!({"state":"SETTLED","amt_paid_sat":"7"}),
+            0
+        ));
+    }
+    #[test]
+    fn legacy_recovery_requires_exact_file_memo_and_positive_amount() {
+        let invoice = serde_json::json!({"memo":"Archipelago peer file file-1", "value":"7"});
+        assert_eq!(content_invoice_amount(&invoice, "file-1"), Some(7));
+        assert_eq!(content_invoice_amount(&invoice, "file-2"), None);
+        for value in [
+            serde_json::json!("-1"),
+            serde_json::json!(0),
+            serde_json::json!("bad"),
+        ] {
+            let mut invalid = invoice.clone();
+            invalid["value"] = value;
+            assert_eq!(content_invoice_amount(&invalid, "file-1"), None);
+        }
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/messaging.rs

@@ -221,6 +221,10 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
     ) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
         let params = params.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing params"))?;
+        if let Some(job) = self.flash_job.read().await.as_ref() {
+            anyhow::ensure!(job.snapshot().await.done,
+                "A firmware flash is in progress; wait before reconnecting or changing radio settings");
+        }
 
         let mut config = mesh::load_config(&self.config.data_dir).await?;
 
@@ -325,7 +329,16 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         {
             let service_arc = Arc::clone(&self.mesh_service);
             let config_for_apply = config.clone();
+            let flash_jobs = Arc::clone(&self.flash_job);
             tokio::spawn(async move {
+                // Serialize against flash registration. If a flash started
+                // after this RPC saved settings, its completion applies them.
+                let flash_guard = flash_jobs.read().await;
+                if let Some(job) = flash_guard.as_ref() {
+                    if !job.snapshot().await.done {
+                        return;
+                    }
+                }
                 let mut service = service_arc.write().await;
                 if let Some(svc) = service.as_mut() {
                     if let Err(e) = svc.configure(config_for_apply).await {

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/mesh/status.rs

@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
         // `mesh.probe-device` call (e.g. the hot-swap modal's own re-probe)
         // from opening the identical port at the same time and corrupting
         // both operations' handshakes.
-        if let Some(job) = self.flash_job.read().await.as_ref() {
+        let flash_guard = self.flash_job.read().await;
+        if let Some(job) = flash_guard.as_ref() {
             anyhow::ensure!(
                 job.snapshot().await.done,
                 "A firmware flash is in progress — refusing to probe the serial port until it finishes"
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             }
         }
         let probe = mesh::listener::probe_device(&path).await?;
+        drop(flash_guard);
         Ok(serde_json::to_value(probe)?)
     }
 

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/config.rs

@@ -985,28 +985,26 @@ pub(super) async fn get_app_config(
             )
         }
         "nginx-proxy-manager" => {
+            let storage = crate::container::npm::resolve_storage().await?;
             let admin_port = allocator
                 .allocate_or_get(app_id, 8081, 81)
                 .await
                 .unwrap_or(8081);
             let http_port = allocator
-                .allocate_or_get("nginx-proxy-manager-http", 8084, 80)
+                .allocate_or_get("nginx-proxy-manager-http", 8088, 80)
                 .await
-                .unwrap_or(8084);
+                .unwrap_or(8088);
             let https_port = allocator
                 .allocate_or_get("nginx-proxy-manager-https", 8444, 443)
                 .await
                 .unwrap_or(8444);
             (
                 vec![
-                    format!("{}:81", admin_port),
-                    format!("{}:80", http_port),
-                    format!("{}:443", https_port),
-                ],
-                vec![
-                    "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/data:/data".to_string(),
-                    "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/letsencrypt:/etc/letsencrypt".to_string(),
+                    format!("127.0.0.1:{}:81", admin_port),
+                    format!("127.0.0.1:{}:80", http_port),
+                    format!("127.0.0.1:{}:443", https_port),
                 ],
+                storage.bind_mounts(),
                 vec![],
                 None,
                 None,

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/install.rs

@@ -693,7 +693,11 @@ impl RpcHandler {
             // These standalone web UIs have repeatedly lost host listeners
             // under Podman's rootless pasta backend while staying healthy internally.
             // Use slirp4netns/rootlessport for this standalone web UI.
-            run_args.push("--network=slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true");
+            run_args.push(if package_id == "nginx-proxy-manager" {
+                "--network=slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"
+            } else {
+                "--network=slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+            });
         } else if needs_archy_net(package_id) {
             // Create archy-net if it doesn't exist (idempotent — "already exists" is fine)
             match tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
@@ -1568,88 +1572,8 @@ autopilot.active=false\n",
                 super::pine_ha::restart_home_assistant_if_running().await;
             }
         }
-        if package_id == "filebrowser" {
-            // Generate a random password (32 bytes, hex-encoded)
-            let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
-            rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut buf);
-            let password = hex::encode(buf);
-
-            let client = match reqwest::Client::builder()
-                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
-                .build()
-            {
-                Ok(c) => c,
-                Err(e) => {
-                    tracing::warn!("Failed to create HTTP client for FileBrowser hook: {}", e);
-                    return;
-                }
-            };
-
-            // Retry loop: FileBrowser may take time to initialize its SQLite database
-            let mut password_changed = false;
-            for attempt in 0..6u32 {
-                let delay = if attempt == 0 { 5 } else { 10 };
-                tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(delay)).await;
-
-                // Try to log in with default credentials
-                let login_res = client
-                    .post("http://127.0.0.1:8083/api/login")
-                    .json(&serde_json::json!({"username": "admin", "password": "admin"}))
-                    .send()
-                    .await;
-
-                let token = match login_res {
-                    Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => match resp.text().await {
-                        Ok(t) => t.trim_matches('"').to_string(),
-                        Err(_) => continue,
-                    },
-                    _ => {
-                        debug!("FileBrowser not ready (attempt {}/6)", attempt + 1);
-                        continue;
-                    }
-                };
-
-                // Change admin password
-                let change_res = client
-                    .put("http://127.0.0.1:8083/api/users/1")
-                    .header("X-Auth", &token)
-                    .json(&serde_json::json!({"password": password}))
-                    .send()
-                    .await;
-
-                match change_res {
-                    Ok(resp) if resp.status().is_success() => {
-                        let secret_dir = "/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/filebrowser";
-                        if let Err(e) = tokio::fs::create_dir_all(secret_dir).await {
-                            tracing::warn!("Failed to create filebrowser secrets dir: {}", e);
-                        }
-                        let pw_path = format!("{}/password", secret_dir);
-                        if let Err(e) = tokio::fs::write(&pw_path, &password).await {
-                            tracing::warn!("Failed to write filebrowser password: {}", e);
-                        }
-                        // Set restrictive permissions on the password file
-                        #[cfg(unix)]
-                        {
-                            use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-                            let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(
-                                &pw_path,
-                                std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600),
-                            );
-                        }
-                        info!("FileBrowser admin password secured (default credentials replaced)");
-                        password_changed = true;
-                        break;
-                    }
-                    _ => continue,
-                }
-            }
-            if !password_changed {
-                tracing::warn!(
-                    "FileBrowser password could not be changed after 6 attempts — \
-                     default credentials (admin/admin) remain active"
-                );
-            }
-        }
+        // File Browser credentials are provisioned and verified before the
+        // server starts. Never attempt a default-password change after launch.
 
         // Auto-configure Tor hidden service for protocol services (LND, ElectrumX, Bitcoin)
         {
@@ -1912,10 +1836,10 @@ autopilot.active=false\n",
     }
 
     pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_filebrowser_token(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
-        let secret_path = "/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/filebrowser/password";
-        let password = tokio::fs::read_to_string(secret_path)
-            .await
-            .unwrap_or_else(|_| "admin".to_string());
+        let credentials = crate::container::filebrowser::cloud_credentials(std::path::Path::new(
+            "/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/filebrowser",
+        ))
+        .await?;
 
         let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
             .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
@@ -1924,7 +1848,7 @@ autopilot.active=false\n",
 
         let resp = client
             .post("http://127.0.0.1:8083/api/login")
-            .json(&serde_json::json!({"username": "admin", "password": password}))
+            .json(&serde_json::json!({"username": credentials.username, "password": credentials.password}))
             .send()
             .await
             .context("Failed to connect to FileBrowser")?;
@@ -1954,17 +1878,16 @@ autopilot.active=false\n",
         super::validation::validate_app_id(app_id)?;
 
         if app_id == "filebrowser" {
-            let password =
-                tokio::fs::read_to_string("/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/filebrowser/password")
-                    .await
-                    .map(|p| p.trim().to_string())
-                    .unwrap_or_else(|_| "admin".to_string());
+            let credentials = crate::container::filebrowser::cloud_credentials(
+                std::path::Path::new("/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/filebrowser"),
+            )
+            .await?;
             return Ok(serde_json::json!({
                 "title": "File Browser credentials",
                 "description": "Use these credentials when File Browser asks you to sign in.",
                 "credentials": [
-                    { "label": "Username", "value": "admin" },
-                    { "label": "Password", "value": password, "sensitive": true }
+                    { "label": "Username", "value": credentials.username },
+                    { "label": "Password", "value": credentials.password, "sensitive": true }
                 ]
             }));
         }

core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/runtime.rs

@@ -1576,41 +1576,110 @@ async fn repair_netbird_network() {
 }
 
 async fn repair_nginx_proxy_manager_container() {
-    repair_nginx_proxy_manager_dirs().await;
+    // Quadlet owns managed containers; its backed-up reconciliation applies
+    // port and mount changes. Never remove a systemd-owned container here.
+    if crate::container::quadlet::unit_exists("nginx-proxy-manager").await {
+        return;
+    }
+    // Serialize repair so a second caller cannot overlap a replacement.
+    static REPAIR: tokio::sync::Mutex<()> = tokio::sync::Mutex::const_new(());
+    let _repair = REPAIR.lock().await;
     if !nginx_proxy_manager_has_legacy_admin_port().await {
         return;
     }
-
-    install_log(
-        "START REPAIR: nginx-proxy-manager - recreating stale container using host port 8081",
-    )
-    .await;
-    let _ = podman_control(&["rm", "-f", "nginx-proxy-manager"]).await;
-    crate::container::ghost_reaper::reap_for_app("nginx-proxy-manager").await;
-    if let Err(err) = recreate_nginx_proxy_manager_container().await {
-        tracing::warn!(error = %err, "failed to recreate stale nginx-proxy-manager container");
+    if let Err(error) = repair_legacy_nginx_proxy_manager().await {
+        tracing::warn!(error = %error, "NPM legacy repair failed; persistent state preserved");
     }
 }
 
-async fn repair_nginx_proxy_manager_dirs() {
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("sudo")
-        .args([
-            "mkdir",
-            "-p",
-            "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/data/letsencrypt-acme-challenge/.well-known/acme-challenge",
-            "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/letsencrypt",
-        ])
-        .output()
-        .await;
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("sudo")
-        .args([
-            "chown",
-            "-R",
-            "1000:1000",
-            "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager",
-        ])
-        .output()
-        .await;
+const NPM_PREVIOUS_CONTAINER: &str = "archy-npm-upgrade-previous";
+
+async fn restore_failed_npm_repair() -> Result<()> {
+    let removed = podman_control(&["rm", "-f", "--ignore", "nginx-proxy-manager"]).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        removed.status.success(),
+        "cannot remove failed NPM replacement; previous container retained"
+    );
+    let renamed =
+        podman_control(&["rename", NPM_PREVIOUS_CONTAINER, "nginx-proxy-manager"]).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        renamed.status.success(),
+        "cannot restore previous NPM container name"
+    );
+    let started = podman_control(&["start", "nginx-proxy-manager"]).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        started.status.success(),
+        "previous NPM container restored but failed to start"
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn repair_legacy_nginx_proxy_manager() -> Result<()> {
+    let previous = podman_control(&["container", "exists", NPM_PREVIOUS_CONTAINER]).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(previous.status.code() == Some(1),
+        "NPM previous-container slot is occupied or cannot be inspected; preserve it and review interrupted repair before proceeding");
+    let inspection = podman_control(&[
+        "inspect",
+        "nginx-proxy-manager",
+        "--format",
+        "{{json .Config.Env}}",
+    ])
+    .await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        inspection.status.success(),
+        "cannot preserve NPM environment before repair"
+    );
+    let environment: Vec<String> =
+        serde_json::from_slice(&inspection.stdout).context("invalid original NPM environment")?;
+    let environment = npm_repair_environment(&environment)?;
+    let storage = crate::container::npm::resolve_storage().await?;
+    let mut manifest: archipelago_container::AppManifest = serde_yaml::from_str(include_str!(
+        "../../../../../../apps/nginx-proxy-manager/manifest.yml"
+    ))?;
+    storage.apply(&mut manifest)?;
+    let stopped = podman_control(&["stop", "--time", "30", "nginx-proxy-manager"]).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        stopped.status.success(),
+        "could not stop NPM for a consistent backup"
+    );
+    if let Err(error) = crate::container::migration_backup::snapshot(
+        &manifest,
+        std::path::Path::new("/var/lib/archipelago"),
+        None,
+    )
+    .await
+    {
+        let _ = podman_control(&["start", "nginx-proxy-manager"]).await;
+        return Err(error);
+    }
+    // Keep the original runtime definition for rollback, including its operator
+    // options. Never delete it before the replacement has become ready.
+    let renamed = podman_control(&["rename", "nginx-proxy-manager", NPM_PREVIOUS_CONTAINER]).await;
+    if !renamed.as_ref().is_ok_and(|out| out.status.success()) {
+        let _ = podman_control(&["start", "nginx-proxy-manager"]).await;
+        anyhow::bail!("could not retain legacy NPM runtime; state backup preserved, inspect both container names before retrying");
+    }
+    let replacement = async {
+        recreate_nginx_proxy_manager_container(&storage, &environment).await?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            wait_for_runtime_host_port("nginx-proxy-manager", 8081, 180).await,
+            "replacement NPM admin listener did not become ready"
+        );
+        Ok::<_, anyhow::Error>(())
+    }
+    .await;
+    if let Err(error) = replacement {
+        restore_failed_npm_repair()
+            .await
+            .context("restoring previous NPM after replacement failure")?;
+        return Err(error);
+    }
+    let removed = podman_control(&["rm", NPM_PREVIOUS_CONTAINER]).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        removed.status.success(),
+        "replacement ready but previous NPM cleanup failed; rollback container retained"
+    );
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 async fn nginx_proxy_manager_has_legacy_admin_port() -> bool {
@@ -1645,36 +1714,75 @@ async fn nginx_proxy_manager_has_legacy_admin_port() -> bool {
     ports.contains(":81->81/tcp") || ports.contains(":8443->443/tcp")
 }
 
-async fn recreate_nginx_proxy_manager_container() -> Result<()> {
-    tokio::process::Command::new("sudo")
-        .args([
-            "mkdir",
-            "-p",
-            "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/data/letsencrypt-acme-challenge/.well-known/acme-challenge",
-            "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/letsencrypt",
-        ])
-        .output()
-        .await
-        .context("failed to create nginx-proxy-manager data directories")?;
-    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("sudo")
-        .args([
-            "chown",
-            "-R",
-            "1000:1000",
-            "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager",
-        ])
-        .output()
-        .await;
+fn npm_repair_environment(values: &[String]) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>> {
+    values.iter().map(|value| {
+        let (key, value) = value.split_once('=').context("invalid NPM environment entry")?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(!key.is_empty() && key.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_'),
+            "unsupported NPM environment name; original container preserved");
+        anyhow::ensure!(!value.contains(['\n', '\r', '\0']),
+            "NPM environment requires explicit migration of a multiline value; original container preserved");
+        Ok((key.to_owned(), value.to_owned()))
+    }).collect()
+}
 
-    let image = crate::container::image_versions::pinned_image_for_app("nginx-proxy-manager")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| "docker.io/jc21/nginx-proxy-manager:latest".to_string());
+struct NpmRepairEnvironmentFile(std::path::PathBuf);
+
+impl NpmRepairEnvironmentFile {
+    fn create(environment: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<Self> {
+        use std::io::Write;
+        use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
+        let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(".archy-npm-env-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
+        let mut file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create_new(true)
+            .mode(0o600)
+            .open(&path)?;
+        let guard = Self(path);
+        for (key, value) in environment {
+            writeln!(file, "{key}={value}")?;
+        }
+        file.sync_all()?;
+        Ok(guard)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for NpmRepairEnvironmentFile {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&self.0);
+    }
+}
+
+async fn recreate_nginx_proxy_manager_container(
+    storage: &crate::container::npm::Storage,
+    environment: &[(String, String)],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    // Existing directories and ownership came from the active runtime. Never
+    // create a second database tree or recursively rewrite data permissions.
+    for directory in [&storage.data, &storage.certificates] {
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            std::path::Path::new(directory).is_dir(),
+            "NPM persistent directory is missing"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // This repair changes connectivity, not NPM's application version. Keep
+    // the exact old image so rollback never starts an older binary against a
+    // database that an incidental mutable-tag update may have migrated.
+    let image_output =
+        podman_control(&["inspect", NPM_PREVIOUS_CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.Image}}"]).await?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        image_output.status.success(),
+        "cannot resolve original NPM image for repair"
+    );
+    let image = String::from_utf8(image_output.stdout)?.trim().to_string();
+    anyhow::ensure!(!image.is_empty(), "original NPM image is missing");
     let mut args = vec![
         "run".to_string(),
         "-d".to_string(),
         "--name".to_string(),
         "nginx-proxy-manager".to_string(),
         "--restart=unless-stopped".to_string(),
-        "--network=slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true".to_string(),
+        "--network=slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24".to_string(),
         "--cap-drop=ALL".to_string(),
         "--security-opt=no-new-privileges:true".to_string(),
         "--pids-limit=4096".to_string(),
@@ -1682,24 +1790,32 @@ async fn recreate_nginx_proxy_manager_container() -> Result<()> {
     args.extend(get_app_capabilities("nginx-proxy-manager"));
     args.extend([
         "-p".to_string(),
-        "8081:81".to_string(),
+        "127.0.0.1:8081:81".to_string(),
         "-p".to_string(),
-        "8084:80".to_string(),
+        "127.0.0.1:8088:80".to_string(),
         "-p".to_string(),
-        "8444:443".to_string(),
+        "127.0.0.1:8444:443".to_string(),
         "-v".to_string(),
-        "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/data:/data".to_string(),
+        format!("{}:/data", storage.data),
         "-v".to_string(),
-        "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/letsencrypt:/etc/letsencrypt".to_string(),
+        format!("{}:/etc/letsencrypt", storage.certificates),
         "--memory".to_string(),
         get_memory_limit("nginx-proxy-manager").to_string(),
         "--cpus=2".to_string(),
     ]);
     args.extend(get_health_check_args("nginx-proxy-manager", ""));
+    // Keep values out of argv/logs AND out of Podman's host environment
+    // (a container's PATH or LD_PRELOAD must never alter the host command).
+    let env_file = NpmRepairEnvironmentFile::create(environment)?;
+    args.extend([
+        "--env-file".to_string(),
+        env_file.0.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
+    ]);
     args.push(image);
 
-    let refs = args.iter().map(String::as_str).collect::<Vec<_>>();
-    let output = podman_control(&refs).await?;
+    let mut command = tokio::process::Command::new("podman");
+    command.args(&args);
+    let output = command_with_timeout(command, Duration::from_secs(120), "NPM replacement").await?;
     if !output.status.success() {
         anyhow::bail!(
             "podman run nginx-proxy-manager failed: {}",
@@ -1767,7 +1883,7 @@ fn runtime_host_ports(container_name: &str) -> Vec<u16> {
         "vaultwarden" => vec![8082],
         "gitea" => vec![3001, 2222, 3000],
         "nextcloud" => vec![8085],
-        "nginx-proxy-manager" => vec![8081, 8084, 8444],
+        "nginx-proxy-manager" => vec![8081, 8088, 8444],
         _ => Vec::new(),
     };
     ports
@@ -1778,7 +1894,7 @@ fn with_legacy_extra_ports(container_name: &str, mut ports: Vec<u16>) -> Vec<u16
         ports.push(3000);
     }
     if container_name == "nginx-proxy-manager" {
-        for port in [8084, 8444] {
+        for port in [8088, 8444] {
             if !ports.contains(&port) {
                 ports.push(port);
             }
@@ -1843,6 +1959,7 @@ async fn wait_for_runtime_host_port(container_name: &str, port: u16, timeout_sec
     loop {
         let ready = match container_name {
             "uptime-kuma" => http_host_port_ready(port, "/").await,
+            "nginx-proxy-manager" => http_host_port_ready(port, "/api/").await,
             _ => tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(("127.0.0.1", port))
                 .await
                 .is_ok(),
@@ -2151,6 +2268,38 @@ pub(super) fn orchestrator_uninstall_app_ids(package_id: &str) -> Vec<String> {
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_environment_backup_is_private_exact_and_removed_on_drop() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let values = vec![
+            "DB_PASSWORD=fixture=a b".to_string(),
+            "PATH=/container/only".to_string(),
+        ];
+        let parsed = super::npm_repair_environment(&values).unwrap();
+        let host_path = std::env::var_os("PATH");
+        let path = {
+            let file = super::NpmRepairEnvironmentFile::create(&parsed).unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                std::fs::metadata(&file.0).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+                0o600
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                std::fs::read_to_string(&file.0).unwrap(),
+                "DB_PASSWORD=fixture=a b\nPATH=/container/only\n"
+            );
+            assert_eq!(std::env::var_os("PATH"), host_path);
+            file.0.clone()
+        };
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        for value in [
+            "INVALID",
+            "=empty key",
+            "KEY=value\nINJECTED=true",
+            "--env=value",
+        ] {
+            assert!(super::npm_repair_environment(&[value.to_string()]).is_err());
+        }
+    }
     use super::*;
 
     #[tokio::test]

core/archipelago/src/bootstrap.rs

@@ -142,11 +142,40 @@ const NGINX_FEDIMINT_SNIPPET_INSERT: &str = "proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8175/;\
 /// catalog refresh/reconciliation. Replacing the app tree in the background
 /// could let a reload observe its temporary empty state and forget disk-only apps.
 pub async fn ensure_runtime_assets_ready() {
+    // Install the guard before any startup path can reload an older dashboard
+    // vhost. The canonical OTA/ISO config contains the same guard inline.
+    if Path::new(NGINX_CONF_PATH).exists() || Path::new(NGINX_ENABLED_CONF_PATH).exists() {
+        match host_sudo(&[
+            "python3",
+            "-c",
+            include_str!("../../../scripts/dashboard-public-guard.py"),
+        ])
+        .await
+        {
+            Ok(status) if status.success() => debug!("Dashboard public source guard verified"),
+            Ok(status) => warn!("Dashboard public source guard needs attention: {status}"),
+            Err(error) => warn!("Dashboard public source guard could not run: {error}"),
+        }
+    }
     match run_runtime_assets().await {
         Ok(changed) if changed => info!("Runtime assets synchronized from OTA payload"),
         Ok(_) => debug!("No OTA runtime payload to synchronize"),
         Err(e) => warn!("Runtime asset bootstrap failed (non-fatal): {:#}", e),
     }
+    // A binary-only qualification or OTA rollback can precede the matching
+    // script payload. Install the exact embedded helper before Quadlet
+    // reconciliation can introduce its required ExecStartPre command.
+    if let Err(error) = write_root_if_needed(
+        "/opt/archipelago/scripts/filebrowser-credentials.py",
+        include_str!("../../../scripts/filebrowser-credentials.py"),
+    )
+    .await
+    {
+        warn!("File Browser credential helper installation failed: {error:#}");
+    }
+    if let Err(error) = run_npm_bridge_bootstrap().await {
+        warn!("NPM public routing bootstrap needs attention: {error:#}");
+    }
     // Repair the narrowly recognized legacy NPM tunnel override before app
     // reconciliation. The embedded script ships in both OTA and ISO binaries.
     // It preserves native wallet services and refuses unknown custom routing.
@@ -176,6 +205,52 @@ pub async fn ensure_runtime_assets_ready() {
     }
 }
 
+async fn run_npm_bridge_bootstrap() -> Result<()> {
+    if !Path::new("/opt/archipelago/scripts").is_dir() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let mut units_changed = false;
+    for (path, content) in [
+        (
+            "/opt/archipelago/scripts/npm-public-bridge.py",
+            include_str!("../../../scripts/npm-public-bridge.py"),
+        ),
+        (
+            "/opt/archipelago/scripts/dashboard-public-guard.py",
+            include_str!("../../../scripts/dashboard-public-guard.py"),
+        ),
+        (
+            "/etc/systemd/system/archipelago-npm-bridge.service",
+            include_str!("../../../image-recipe/configs/archipelago-npm-bridge.service"),
+        ),
+        (
+            "/etc/systemd/system/archipelago-npm-bridge.timer",
+            include_str!("../../../image-recipe/configs/archipelago-npm-bridge.timer"),
+        ),
+    ] {
+        let changed = write_root_if_needed(path, content).await?;
+        units_changed |= changed && (path.ends_with(".service") || path.ends_with(".timer"));
+    }
+    if units_changed {
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            host_sudo(&["systemctl", "daemon-reload"]).await?.success(),
+            "NPM bridge daemon reload failed"
+        );
+    }
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        host_sudo(&[
+            "systemctl",
+            "enable",
+            "--now",
+            "archipelago-npm-bridge.timer"
+        ])
+        .await?
+        .success(),
+        "NPM bridge timer could not start"
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// Entry point called from main startup. Never returns an error to the caller —
 /// failing to bootstrap host artifacts must not prevent the backend from serving.
 pub async fn ensure_doctor_installed() {
@@ -421,17 +496,28 @@ async fn run_runtime_assets() -> Result<bool> {
     if nginx_src.exists() {
         let src_s = nginx_src.to_string_lossy().to_string();
         let status = host_sudo(&[
-            "install",
-            "-m",
-            "644",
+            "python3",
+            "-c",
+            include_str!("../../../scripts/dashboard-public-guard.py"),
+            "--install",
             &src_s,
-            "/etc/nginx/sites-available/archipelago",
         ])
         .await
-        .context("install nginx-archipelago.conf")?;
+        .context("install guarded nginx-archipelago.conf")?;
         if !status.success() {
             anyhow::bail!("install nginx-archipelago.conf exited with {}", status);
         }
+        let acme_status = host_sudo(&[
+            "python3",
+            "-c",
+            include_str!("../../../scripts/npm-public-bridge.py"),
+            "--acme-only",
+        ])
+        .await?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            acme_status.success(),
+            "active NPM ACME root migration failed"
+        );
         changed = true;
     }
 
@@ -448,6 +534,8 @@ async fn run_runtime_assets() -> Result<bool> {
         "archipelago-doctor.service",
         "archipelago-doctor.timer",
         "archipelago-host-secrets-audit.service",
+        "archipelago-npm-bridge.service",
+        "archipelago-npm-bridge.timer",
     ] {
         let src = configs.join(unit);
         if src.exists() {
@@ -475,7 +563,7 @@ async fn run_runtime_assets() -> Result<bool> {
     // or directory"). Skipped when byte-identical; a running daemon is
     // unaffected (install replaces the inode) and picks the new binary up
     // on its next spawn.
-    for tool in ["archy-reticulum-daemon", "archy-rnodeconf"] {
+    for tool in ["archy-reticulum-daemon", "archy-rnodeconf", "archy-esptool"] {
         let src = runtime_dir.join("radio-tools").join(tool);
         if !src.exists() {
             continue;

core/archipelago/src/container/app_catalog.rs

@@ -118,10 +118,12 @@ fn selected_manifest(entry: AppCatalogEntry) -> Option<serde_json::Value> {
     // Never let an unknown future requirement become an unsafe partial match.
     for variant in entry.manifest_variants.into_iter().rev() {
         if !variant.requires.is_empty()
-            && variant
-                .requires
-                .iter()
-                .all(|capability| capability == "runtime-migration-backup-v1")
+            && variant.requires.iter().all(|capability| {
+                matches!(
+                    capability.as_str(),
+                    "runtime-migration-backup-v1" | "npm-legacy-host-gateway-v1"
+                )
+            })
         {
             return Some(variant.manifest);
         }
@@ -468,6 +470,12 @@ pub struct CatalogRefresh {
 /// changed. Best-effort: a fetch failure leaves the existing cache untouched
 /// (origin-always-wins; updates simply aren't refreshed this cycle).
 pub async fn refresh_catalog(data_dir: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<CatalogRefresh> {
+    // Explicit operator-only qualification of a signed candidate on selected
+    // nodes. Never change fleet mirrors or fall back to an older public catalog
+    // while a candidate is selected. Normal signature enforcement still applies.
+    if let Some(path) = std::env::var_os("ARCHY_APP_CATALOG_CANDIDATE") {
+        return refresh_candidate_catalog(data_dir, Path::new(&path)).await;
+    }
     let mirrors = crate::update::load_mirrors(data_dir)
         .await
         .unwrap_or_default();
@@ -514,6 +522,49 @@ pub async fn refresh_catalog(data_dir: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<CatalogRefresh>
     Err(last_err.unwrap_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("no catalog mirrors reachable")))
 }
 
+async fn refresh_candidate_catalog(data_dir: &Path, path: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<CatalogRefresh> {
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        path.is_absolute(),
+        "candidate catalog path must be absolute"
+    );
+    let metadata = tokio::fs::metadata(path)
+        .await
+        .context("inspect candidate catalog")?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        metadata.is_file() && metadata.len() <= 4 * 1024 * 1024,
+        "candidate catalog must be a file no larger than 4 MiB"
+    );
+    let body = tokio::fs::read_to_string(path)
+        .await
+        .context("read candidate catalog")?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        body.len() <= 4 * 1024 * 1024,
+        "candidate catalog exceeds 4 MiB"
+    );
+    let raw: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&body)?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        matches!(
+            crate::trust::verify_detached(&raw)?,
+            crate::trust::SignatureStatus::Verified { anchored: true, .. }
+        ),
+        "candidate catalog requires a signature anchored to the release root"
+    );
+    let catalog: AppCatalog = serde_json::from_value(raw)?;
+    let changed = write_cache(data_dir, &body)?;
+    if changed {
+        *CACHE.lock().unwrap() = None;
+    }
+    info!(
+        apps = catalog.apps.len(),
+        changed,
+        "app-catalog: using explicitly selected signed candidate; public catalog refresh paused"
+    );
+    Ok(CatalogRefresh {
+        apps: catalog.apps.len(),
+        changed,
+    })
+}
+
 async fn fetch_one(client: &reqwest::Client, url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<(AppCatalog, String)> {
     let resp = client.get(url).send().await?;
     if !resp.status().is_success() {
@@ -582,6 +633,77 @@ fn write_cache(data_dir: &Path, body: &str) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    fn signed_candidate(key_byte: u8) -> serde_json::Value {
+        // Same test anchor as trust::signed_doc tests; never a production key.
+        let anchor = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
+        std::env::set_var(
+            "ARCHY_RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY",
+            hex::encode(anchor.verifying_key().to_bytes()),
+        );
+        let key = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&[key_byte; 32]);
+        let mut value = serde_json::json!({"schema":1,"apps":{"demo":{"version":"2"}},"future_field":{"retain":true}});
+        let (sig, did) = crate::trust::signed_doc::sign_detached(&key, &value).unwrap();
+        value["signature"] = sig.into();
+        value["signed_by"] = did.into();
+        value
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn candidate_catalog_preserves_signed_bytes_and_is_idempotent() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("candidate.json");
+        let body = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&signed_candidate(7)).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(&path, &body).unwrap();
+        let first = refresh_candidate_catalog(dir.path(), &path).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(first.changed);
+        assert_eq!(first.apps, 1);
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join(APP_CATALOG_FILE)).unwrap(),
+            body
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !refresh_candidate_catalog(dir.path(), &path)
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .changed
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn rejected_candidate_never_replaces_previous_catalog() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("candidate.json");
+        let previous = "previous cached bytes";
+        write_cache(dir.path(), previous).unwrap();
+        let mut tampered = signed_candidate(7);
+        tampered["apps"]["demo"]["version"] = "tampered".into();
+        for body in [
+            "malformed".into(),
+            r#"{"schema":1,"apps":{}}"#.into(),
+            signed_candidate(11).to_string(),
+            tampered.to_string(),
+            " ".repeat(4 * 1024 * 1024 + 1),
+        ] {
+            std::fs::write(&path, body).unwrap();
+            assert!(refresh_candidate_catalog(dir.path(), &path).await.is_err());
+            assert_eq!(
+                std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join(APP_CATALOG_FILE)).unwrap(),
+                previous
+            );
+        }
+        std::fs::remove_file(&path).unwrap();
+        assert!(refresh_candidate_catalog(dir.path(), &path).await.is_err());
+        assert!(
+            refresh_candidate_catalog(dir.path(), Path::new("relative.json"))
+                .await
+                .is_err()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join(APP_CATALOG_FILE)).unwrap(),
+            previous
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn catalog_migration_variant_is_compatible_with_old_and_future_daemons() {
         let raw = serde_json::json!({
@@ -608,6 +730,25 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(chosen["app"]["container"].get("network").is_none());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_gateway_variant_requires_explicit_runtime_support() {
+        let mut raw = serde_json::json!({
+            "version": "2.12.1", "manifest": {"network":"pasta"},
+            "manifest_variants": [{"requires":["runtime-migration-backup-v1", "npm-legacy-host-gateway-v1"],
+                "manifest":{"network":"slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"}}]
+        });
+        assert_eq!(
+            selected_manifest(serde_json::from_value(raw.clone()).unwrap()).unwrap()["network"],
+            "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"
+        );
+        // A runtime missing any required capability must retain the base.
+        raw["manifest_variants"][0]["requires"][1] = serde_json::json!("unknown-gateway-v2");
+        assert_eq!(
+            selected_manifest(serde_json::from_value(raw).unwrap()).unwrap()["network"],
+            "pasta"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn parses_and_ignores_unknown_fields() {
         let json = r#"{

core/archipelago/src/container/companion.rs

@@ -103,6 +103,15 @@ pub fn companions_for(package_id: &str) -> &'static [CompanionSpec] {
     }
 }
 
+/// Missing companion UIs are provisioned here, never by snapshot recovery.
+/// A stale running-container snapshot must not resurrect an orphaned UI.
+pub fn is_companion_app(app_id: &str) -> bool {
+    ALL_COMPANIONS
+        .iter()
+        .flat_map(|specs| specs.iter())
+        .any(|spec| spec.image_base == app_id)
+}
+
 /// Every companion this build knows how to provision. Kept beside
 /// `companions_for` — a new companion must be added to both, or the reaper
 /// will not recognise it as one of ours and will leave it running forever.

core/archipelago/src/container/docker_packages.rs

@@ -20,8 +20,11 @@ use crate::data_model::{
 /// stopped-app restoration path in agreement with live-container discovery.
 fn canonical_package_id(name: &str) -> &str {
     match name.strip_prefix("archy-").unwrap_or(name) {
-        "immich_server" => "immich",
+        "immich_server" | "immich-server" => "immich",
+        "immich-postgres" => "immich_postgres",
+        "immich-redis" => "immich_redis",
         "mempool-web" | "mempool-frontend" => "mempool",
+        "btcpay" | "btcpayserver" => "btcpay-server",
         name => name,
     }
 }
@@ -443,6 +446,28 @@ mod lifecycle_regression_tests {
     use super::*;
     use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
 
+    #[test]
+    fn btcpay_aliases_share_one_package_without_promoting_dependencies() {
+        for name in ["btcpay", "btcpayserver", "btcpay-server", "archy-btcpay"] {
+            assert_eq!(canonical_package_id(name), "btcpay-server");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(canonical_package_id("archy-btcpay-db"), "btcpay-db");
+        assert_eq!(canonical_package_id("archy-nbxplorer"), "nbxplorer");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn immich_dependency_aliases_share_the_hidden_component_ids() {
+        for id in [
+            "immich-postgres",
+            "immich_postgres",
+            "archy-immich-postgres",
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(canonical_package_id(id), "immich_postgres");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(canonical_package_id("immich-redis"), "immich_redis");
+        assert_eq!(canonical_package_id("immich-server"), "immich");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn registry_survives_empty_runtime_and_deduplicates_aliases() {
         let installed = ["archy-gitea", "gitea", "immich_server", "archy-removed"]
@@ -978,14 +1003,20 @@ fn extract_lan_address(ports: &[String]) -> Option<String> {
     let mut first_candidate = None;
     for port_str in ports {
         // Parse port strings like "0.0.0.0:18443->18443/tcp" or "0.0.0.0:18443-18444->18443-18444/tcp"
-        let Some(public_part) = port_str.split("->").next() else {
+        let Some((public_part, _)) = port_str.split_once("->") else {
             continue;
         };
-        let Some(port_part) = public_part.split(':').nth(1) else {
+        let Some((_, port_part)) = public_part.rsplit_once(':') else {
             continue;
         };
         // Extract just the first port if it's a range (e.g., "18443-18444" -> "18443")
         let host_port = port_part.split('-').next().unwrap_or(port_part);
+        let Ok(host_port) = host_port.parse::<u16>() else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        if host_port == 0 {
+            continue;
+        }
         let candidate = format!("http://localhost:{}", host_port);
         if first_candidate.is_none() {
             first_candidate = Some(candidate.clone());
@@ -1113,6 +1144,29 @@ fn package_launch_candidate(
     if let Some(companion) = companion_lan_address(app_id) {
         return Some(companion);
     }
+    if app_id == "nginx-proxy-manager" {
+        // 80/443 serve users' proxy hosts; only container port 81 serves the
+        // admin UI. Podman's binding order is unstable across recreation.
+        // Resolve its actual host allocation rather than guessing the first
+        // HTTP port or hardcoding the default host port 8081.
+        let admin_ports: Vec<String> = ports
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|port| {
+                port.split_once("->")
+                    .is_some_and(|(_, target)| target == "81/tcp")
+            })
+            .cloned()
+            .collect();
+        // With published bindings, a missing admin mapping is not evidence
+        // that some unrelated service on the default host port is this UI.
+        return extract_lan_address(&admin_ports).or_else(|| {
+            if ports.is_empty() {
+                known
+            } else {
+                None
+            }
+        });
+    }
     if uses_allocated_launch_port(app_id) {
         extract_lan_address(ports).or(known)
     } else {
@@ -1241,6 +1295,98 @@ mod extract_lan_address_tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_admin_launch_is_independent_of_proxy_binding_order() {
+        let mappings = [
+            "10.77.0.2:18081->80/tcp",
+            "10.77.0.2:18443->443/tcp",
+            "127.0.0.1:8081->81/tcp",
+        ];
+        for order in [
+            [0, 1, 2],
+            [0, 2, 1],
+            [1, 0, 2],
+            [1, 2, 0],
+            [2, 0, 1],
+            [2, 1, 0],
+        ] {
+            let ports: Vec<String> = order.iter().map(|&i| mappings[i].into()).collect();
+            assert_eq!(
+                package_launch_candidate(
+                    "nginx-proxy-manager",
+                    &ports,
+                    Some("http://localhost:8081/".into())
+                )
+                .as_deref(),
+                Some("http://localhost:8081")
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_admin_launch_respects_host_allocation_and_ipv6_bindings() {
+        for binding in ["127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "[::1]", "[::]"] {
+            let ports = vec![
+                "10.77.0.2:18081->80/tcp".into(),
+                format!("{binding}:28081->81/tcp"),
+            ];
+            assert_eq!(
+                package_launch_candidate(
+                    "nginx-proxy-manager",
+                    &ports,
+                    Some("http://localhost:8081/".into())
+                )
+                .as_deref(),
+                Some("http://localhost:28081")
+            );
+        }
+        let proxies = vec![
+            "10.77.0.2:18081->80/tcp".into(),
+            "10.77.0.2:18443->443/tcp".into(),
+        ];
+        assert_eq!(
+            package_launch_candidate("nginx-proxy-manager", &proxies, None),
+            None
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            package_launch_candidate(
+                "nginx-proxy-manager",
+                &proxies,
+                Some("http://localhost:8081/".into())
+            ),
+            None
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_without_port_information_uses_declared_admin_url() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            package_launch_candidate(
+                "nginx-proxy-manager",
+                &[],
+                Some("http://localhost:8081/".into())
+            )
+            .as_deref(),
+            Some("http://localhost:8081/")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_published_ports_do_not_become_launch_urls() {
+        for port in [
+            "81/tcp",
+            "127.0.0.1:bad->81/tcp",
+            "[::1]:0->81/tcp",
+            "[::]:65536->81/tcp",
+            "127.0.0.1:8081->81/udp",
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                package_launch_candidate("nginx-proxy-manager", &[port.into()], None),
+                None
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn skips_ssh_port_when_web_port_is_published() {
         // gitea: SSH published before the web port, in podman's list order.

core/archipelago/src/container/filebrowser.rs

@@ -17,6 +17,84 @@ pub const DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH: &str = "/var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser-data/.fi
 const DEFAULT_CONFIG_JSON: &str =
     "{\"port\":80,\"baseURL\":\"\",\"address\":\"0.0.0.0\",\"database\":\"/data/filebrowser.db\",\"root\":\"/srv\",\"log\":\"stdout\"}\n";
 
+/// One atomically published record shared by setup, Cloud and credentials UI.
+/// Deliberately has no Debug implementation: the password must never be logged.
+#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
+pub struct CloudCredentials {
+    pub schema: u32,
+    pub username: String,
+    pub password: String,
+}
+
+pub async fn cloud_credentials(directory: &Path) -> Result<CloudCredentials> {
+    let path = directory.join("credentials.json");
+    match fs::read(&path).await {
+        Ok(bytes) => {
+            let value: CloudCredentials = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes)
+                .context("Invalid private File Browser credential record")?;
+            let suffix = value.username.strip_prefix("archy-").unwrap_or("");
+            anyhow::ensure!(
+                value.schema == 1
+                    && suffix.len() == 32
+                    && suffix.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+                    && value.password.len() == 64
+                    && value.password.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
+                "Invalid managed File Browser credentials"
+            );
+            Ok(value)
+        }
+        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
+            // Compatibility during staged upgrades only. Never invent admin/admin
+            // when a secret is missing; the pre-start provisioner repairs legacy DBs.
+            let password = fs::read_to_string(directory.join("password"))
+                .await
+                .context("File Browser secure Cloud login has not been provisioned")?;
+            let password = password.trim().to_owned();
+            anyhow::ensure!(
+                !password.is_empty() && password != "admin",
+                "File Browser default credentials must be migrated before Cloud login"
+            );
+            Ok(CloudCredentials {
+                schema: 0,
+                username: "admin".into(),
+                password,
+            })
+        }
+        Err(error) => Err(error).context("Cannot read private File Browser credentials"),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Prepare a stopped server using the same helper used by Quadlet and the ISO.
+pub async fn prepare_credentials(
+    paths: &EnsurePaths,
+    secret_dir: &Path,
+    image: &str,
+    runtime: &str,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let output = tokio::process::Command::new("python3")
+        .args([
+            "-c",
+            include_str!("../../../../scripts/filebrowser-credentials.py"),
+            "--image",
+            image,
+            "--runtime",
+            runtime,
+            "--data-dir",
+            &paths.data_dir.to_string_lossy(),
+            "--srv-root",
+            &paths.srv_root.to_string_lossy(),
+            "--secrets-dir",
+            &secret_dir.to_string_lossy(),
+        ])
+        .kill_on_drop(true)
+        .output()
+        .await
+        .context("Running File Browser credential setup")?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(output.status.success(),
+        "File Browser secure login setup failed; existing state and private rollback backup retained");
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct EnsurePaths {
     pub srv_root: PathBuf,
@@ -82,7 +160,18 @@ async fn create_dir_all_or_sudo(path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<()> {
 
 async fn write_config_atomically(paths: &EnsurePaths) -> Result<()> {
     let tmp = paths.config_path.with_extension("tmp");
-    match fs::write(&tmp, DEFAULT_CONFIG_JSON).await {
+    let legacy = paths.data_dir.join("database.db").exists();
+    let canonical = paths.data_dir.join("filebrowser.db").exists();
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        !(legacy && canonical),
+        "Multiple File Browser databases need explicit config selection"
+    );
+    let config = if legacy {
+        DEFAULT_CONFIG_JSON.replace("/data/filebrowser.db", "/data/database.db")
+    } else {
+        DEFAULT_CONFIG_JSON.to_string()
+    };
+    match fs::write(&tmp, &config).await {
         Ok(()) => {
             fs::rename(&tmp, &paths.config_path)
                 .await
@@ -99,7 +188,7 @@ async fn write_config_atomically(paths: &EnsurePaths) -> Result<()> {
             let script = format!(
                 "set -eu\ncat > '{}' <<'FILEBROWSERCONF'\n{}FILEBROWSERCONF\n",
                 shell_quote(&paths.config_path.to_string_lossy()),
-                DEFAULT_CONFIG_JSON
+                config
             );
             let status = host_sudo(&["sh", "-lc", &script])
                 .await
@@ -312,6 +401,62 @@ async fn write_via_userns(dir: PathBuf, name: String, bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Result<
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cloud_credentials_use_unique_record_and_never_default_password() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        assert!(cloud_credentials(dir.path()).await.is_err());
+        fs::write(dir.path().join("password"), "admin")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(cloud_credentials(dir.path()).await.is_err());
+        fs::write(dir.path().join("password"), "legacy-unique-password")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cloud_credentials(dir.path()).await.unwrap().schema, 0);
+        let value = serde_json::json!({"schema":1,"username":format!("archy-{}", "a".repeat(32)),"password":"b".repeat(64)});
+        fs::write(dir.path().join("credentials.json"), value.to_string())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let loaded = cloud_credentials(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(loaded.username, value["username"].as_str().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(loaded.password, value["password"].as_str().unwrap());
+        fs::write(dir.path().join("credentials.json"), "{}")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            cloud_credentials(dir.path()).await.is_err(),
+            "damaged managed record must not fall back to old credentials"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn missing_config_preserves_legacy_database_and_refuses_ambiguity() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let paths = EnsurePaths {
+            srv_root: tmp.path().join("srv"),
+            data_dir: tmp.path().join("data"),
+            config_path: tmp.path().join("data/.filebrowser.json"),
+        };
+        fs::create_dir_all(&paths.data_dir).await.unwrap();
+        fs::write(paths.data_dir.join("database.db"), b"legacy fixture")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        ensure_config(&paths).await.unwrap();
+        let config: serde_json::Value =
+            serde_json::from_slice(&fs::read(&paths.config_path).await.unwrap()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(config["database"], "/data/database.db");
+        fs::remove_file(&paths.config_path).await.unwrap();
+        fs::write(paths.data_dir.join("filebrowser.db"), b"other fixture")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(ensure_config(&paths).await.is_err());
+        assert!(!paths.config_path.exists());
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::read(paths.data_dir.join("database.db")).await.unwrap(),
+            b"legacy fixture"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn ensure_config_creates_dirs_and_file() {
         let tmp = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();

core/archipelago/src/container/mod.rs

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ pub mod image_policy;
 pub mod image_versions;
 pub mod lnd;
 pub mod migration_backup;
+pub mod npm;
 pub mod prod_orchestrator;
 pub mod quadlet;
 pub mod registry;

core/archipelago/src/container/npm.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+//! Preserve NPM's active persistent mounts across installer and runtime paths.
+use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
+use archipelago_container::AppManifest;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Storage {
+    pub data: String,
+    pub certificates: String,
+}
+
+impl Storage {
+    pub fn bind_mounts(&self) -> Vec<String> {
+        vec![
+            format!("{}:/data", self.data),
+            format!("{}:/etc/letsencrypt", self.certificates),
+        ]
+    }
+
+    pub fn apply(&self, manifest: &mut AppManifest) -> Result<()> {
+        for (target, source) in [
+            ("/data", &self.data),
+            ("/etc/letsencrypt", &self.certificates),
+        ] {
+            let matching: Vec<_> = manifest
+                .app
+                .volumes
+                .iter_mut()
+                .filter(|volume| volume.target == target)
+                .collect();
+            if matching.len() != 1 {
+                bail!("NPM requires one persistent mount per storage target");
+            }
+            let volume = matching.into_iter().next().unwrap();
+            if volume.volume_type != "bind" {
+                bail!("NPM persistent state requires bind mounts");
+            }
+            volume.source.clone_from(source);
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+fn parse_storage(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Storage> {
+    let storage: Storage =
+        serde_json::from_slice(bytes).context("invalid NPM storage resolution")?;
+    for value in [&storage.data, &storage.certificates] {
+        if !Path::new(value).is_absolute() || value.chars().any(|c| c.is_control() || c == ':') {
+            bail!("invalid NPM persistent storage path");
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(storage)
+}
+
+pub async fn resolve_storage() -> Result<Storage> {
+    // Verify live mounts/database before any caller can stop or recreate NPM.
+    // Remember only validated mount paths so later recreation, after the inspect
+    // record is removed, still uses the operator's original storage.
+    let mut command = tokio::process::Command::new("python3");
+    command
+        .args([
+            "-c",
+            include_str!("../../../../scripts/npm-public-bridge.py"),
+            "--resolve",
+            "--remember",
+            "--prepare-realip",
+        ])
+        .kill_on_drop(true);
+    let output = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(75), command.output())
+        .await
+        .context("NPM storage resolution timed out; existing state preserved")??;
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        bail!("NPM storage resolution failed; inspect mount/database ambiguity or permissions before migration");
+    }
+    parse_storage(&output.stdout)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolved_mounts_preserve_custom_and_legacy_paths() {
+        for data in [
+            "/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/data",
+            "/srv/operator npm",
+        ] {
+            let bytes = serde_json::to_vec(
+                &serde_json::json!({"data": data, "certificates": "/srv/certificates"}),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+            let storage = parse_storage(&bytes).unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                storage.bind_mounts(),
+                [
+                    format!("{data}:/data"),
+                    "/srv/certificates:/etc/letsencrypt".into(),
+                ]
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn invalid_resolution_cannot_become_a_container_mount() {
+        for data in ["relative", "/srv/data:ro", "/srv/data\nother"] {
+            let bytes =
+                serde_json::to_vec(&serde_json::json!({"data": data, "certificates": "/certs"}))
+                    .unwrap();
+            assert!(parse_storage(&bytes).is_err());
+        }
+        assert!(parse_storage(b"{}").is_err());
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/container/prod_orchestrator.rs

@@ -92,16 +92,71 @@ fn is_restart_sensitive_app(app_id: &str) -> bool {
 fn is_builtin_network_mode(network: &str) -> bool {
     matches!(
         network,
-        "host" | "bridge" | "none" | "slirp4netns" | "pasta"
+        "host"
+            | "bridge"
+            | "none"
+            | "slirp4netns"
+            | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+            | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"
+            | "pasta"
     )
 }
 
 // Only an explicitly selected rootless mode establishes drift. An omitted
 // network delegates to Podman and must not recreate unrelated installed apps.
 fn rootless_network_mode_drifted(expected: Option<&str>, actual: &str) -> bool {
-    matches!(expected, Some("slirp4netns" | "pasta"))
-        && !actual.trim().is_empty()
-        && actual.trim().split(':').next() != expected
+    let actual = actual.trim();
+    if actual.is_empty() {
+        return false;
+    }
+    match expected {
+        Some(
+            expected @ ("slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+            | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"),
+        ) => {
+            let (mode, options) = actual.split_once(':').unwrap_or((actual, ""));
+            let required = expected.split_once(':').unwrap().1;
+            mode != "slirp4netns"
+                || required.split(',').any(|wanted| {
+                    let key = wanted.split_once('=').unwrap().0;
+                    !options.split(',').any(|option| option == wanted)
+                        || options.split(',').any(|option| {
+                            option.split_once('=').is_some_and(|(name, _)| name == key)
+                                && option != wanted
+                        })
+                })
+        }
+        Some(mode @ ("slirp4netns" | "pasta")) => actual.split(':').next() != Some(mode),
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
+
+// API-created containers may omit rootless options from HostConfig.NetworkMode.
+// generate spec retains them; inspect alone would cause an endless repair loop.
+fn rootless_network_from_spec(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
+    let spec: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(bytes).ok()?;
+    let mode = spec.get("netns")?.get("nsmode")?.as_str()?;
+    if !matches!(mode, "slirp4netns" | "pasta") {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let options = spec
+        .get("network_options")
+        .and_then(|options| options.get(mode));
+    match options {
+        None => Some(mode.to_string()),
+        Some(options) => {
+            let options = options
+                .as_array()?
+                .iter()
+                .map(|value| value.as_str())
+                .collect::<Option<Vec<_>>>()?;
+            if options.is_empty() {
+                Some(mode.to_string())
+            } else {
+                Some(format!("{mode}:{}", options.join(",")))
+            }
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 fn missing_declared_capability(expected: &[String], actual: &[String]) -> bool {
@@ -175,6 +230,11 @@ fn manifest_dependency_app_ids(manifest: &AppManifest) -> Vec<String> {
 }
 
 fn host_port_wait_timeout_secs(manifest: &AppManifest) -> u64 {
+    // First NPM initialization generates keys and migrates its database before
+    // exposing nginx. Its readiness budget must not depend on the network driver.
+    if manifest.app.id == "nginx-proxy-manager" {
+        return 180;
+    }
     if manifest.app.id == "uptime-kuma" {
         return 420;
     }
@@ -2071,6 +2131,10 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                 Ok(ReconcileAction::Left(reason))
                     if mode == ReconcileMode::ExistingOnly
                         && reason == "absent"
+                        // companion.rs owns missing UI provisioning/removal.
+                        // Never resurrect an orphan from a stale snapshot.
+                        // Existing UIs still pass through security config repair.
+                        && !super::companion::is_companion_app(&app_id)
                         && (was_running.contains(&compute_container_name(&lm.manifest))
                             // The durable answer, and the one that does not
                             // erode. `was_running` only records what was
@@ -2421,6 +2485,49 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                 }
                 match status.state {
                     ContainerState::Running => {
+                        // Legacy runtime path: migrate credentials once without
+                        // recreating accounts or changing operator passwords.
+                        // Quadlet installations receive the same helper through
+                        // the required ExecStartPre drift/restart above.
+                        if app_id == "filebrowser" && !self.use_quadlet_backends && !cfg!(test) {
+                            let secrets = self.secrets_dir.join("filebrowser");
+                            let managed = filebrowser::cloud_credentials(&secrets)
+                                .await
+                                .map(|value| value.schema == 1)
+                                .unwrap_or(false);
+                            if !managed {
+                                if !self.should_attempt_repair(&name).await {
+                                    return Ok(ReconcileAction::Left(
+                                        "filebrowser-credential-repair-budget-exhausted".into(),
+                                    ));
+                                }
+                                let unit_managed = self.runtime.cli_name() == "podman"
+                                    && quadlet::unit_exists(&name).await;
+                                let service = format!("{name}.service");
+                                if unit_managed {
+                                    quadlet::stop_service(&service).await?;
+                                } else {
+                                    self.runtime.stop_container(&name).await?;
+                                }
+                                let prepared = filebrowser::prepare_credentials(
+                                    &self.filebrowser_paths,
+                                    &secrets,
+                                    &status.image,
+                                    self.runtime.cli_name(),
+                                )
+                                .await;
+                                // Restore service availability even when setup
+                                // rolled back. Preserve the setup failure itself.
+                                let started = if unit_managed {
+                                    quadlet::restart_service(&service).await
+                                } else {
+                                    self.runtime.start_container(&name).await
+                                };
+                                prepared?;
+                                started?;
+                                return Ok(ReconcileAction::Started);
+                            }
+                        }
                         // Zombie guard: podman can report a container "running"
                         // after its process has died (conmon SIGKILLed in a
                         // cgroup cascade on archipelago restart, etc.). Such a
@@ -2967,6 +3074,18 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
         self.ensure_manifest_files(manifest).await?;
         self.apply_data_uid(manifest).await?;
         self.run_post_data_uid_hooks(&manifest.app.id).await?;
+        if manifest.app.id == "filebrowser" && !self.use_quadlet_backends && !cfg!(test) {
+            let image = manifest.app.container.image.as_deref().ok_or_else(|| {
+                anyhow::anyhow!("File Browser needs a pinned image for credential setup")
+            })?;
+            filebrowser::prepare_credentials(
+                &self.filebrowser_paths,
+                &self.secrets_dir.join("filebrowser"),
+                image,
+                self.runtime.cli_name(),
+            )
+            .await?;
+        }
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -3064,6 +3183,11 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
             container = %name,
             "Phase 3.3 migration: replacing pre-Quadlet container with systemd-managed unit"
         );
+        // Resolve active persistent mounts before the old inspect record is
+        // removed. NPM may use a legacy or operator-selected data directory.
+        let mut resolved = lm.manifest.clone();
+        self.resolve_dynamic_env(&mut resolved).await?;
+        self.backup_runtime_change(name, &resolved).await?;
         // Stop+remove the old container record. Volumes survive (host
         // bind mounts are not touched by podman rm).
         self.runtime
@@ -3073,8 +3197,6 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
 
         // Re-render the manifest with dynamic env baked in, then go
         // through the same install path a fresh install would.
-        let mut resolved = lm.manifest.clone();
-        self.resolve_dynamic_env(&mut resolved).await?;
         self.install_via_quadlet(&resolved, name)
             .await
             .with_context(|| format!("Phase 3.3: re-install {name} via Quadlet"))?;
@@ -3149,7 +3271,12 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
         let restart_for_exec_change = quadlet::exec_changed(&old_body, &new_body);
         let restart_for_health_change = quadlet::health_cmd_changed(&old_body, &new_body);
         let restart_for_security_change = quadlet::security_changed(&old_body, &new_body);
+        let restart_for_managed_override =
+            quadlet::redundant_managed_network_override(&unit, &unit_dir)
+                .await?
+                .is_some();
         let needs_restart = restart_required
+            || restart_for_managed_override
             || restart_for_port_change
             || restart_for_network_alias_change
             || restart_for_exec_change
@@ -3525,6 +3652,7 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                 host_mdns: "test.local".to_string(),
                 disk_gb: self.test_disk_gb.unwrap_or(1000),
                 bitcoin_host: "bitcoin-knots".to_string(),
+                node_identity_pubkeys: String::new(),
             };
         }
         #[allow(unreachable_code)]
@@ -3542,10 +3670,53 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                 // demand (it costs a podman call) only for manifests that use
                 // {{BITCOIN_HOST}}, rather than every app on every reconcile.
                 bitcoin_host: "bitcoin-knots".to_string(),
+                // Likewise filled on demand, only for manifests that use
+                // {{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}.
+                node_identity_pubkeys: String::new(),
             }
         }
     }
 
+    /// Nostr public keys of the identities the app identity picker offers, for
+    /// the `{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}` derived-env placeholder. The node
+    /// identity is recognised the way `identity.list` marks `is_node`: by the
+    /// node's ed25519 public key, read here from `identity/node_key.pub`
+    /// (the file `server_info.pubkey` is derived from at startup). The record
+    /// mirrored from the node key has a `node-` id, so the picker's prefix rule
+    /// hides it either way. The key is only read, never created: a missing or
+    /// malformed file is an error. An empty set is an error too, so an app is
+    /// never handed an empty owner list.
+    async fn node_identity_pubkeys(&self) -> Result<String> {
+        let node_pubkey_hex = self.node_pubkey_hex().await?;
+        let pubkeys = crate::identity_manager::IdentityManager::new(&self.data_dir)
+            .await?
+            .app_signable_nostr_pubkeys(&node_pubkey_hex)
+            .await?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            !pubkeys.is_empty(),
+            "no user identity with a Nostr key is available for apps to sign with; \
+             create one under Web5 \u{2192} Identities"
+        );
+        Ok(pubkeys)
+    }
+
+    /// The node's ed25519 public key as lowercase hex, read from
+    /// `identity/node_key.pub` (raw 32 bytes, as `NodeIdentity` writes it)
+    /// without the logging or key creation of `NodeIdentity::load_or_create`.
+    async fn node_pubkey_hex(&self) -> Result<String> {
+        let path = self.data_dir.join("identity").join("node_key.pub");
+        let bytes = tokio::fs::read(&path)
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| format!("reading the node public key {}", path.display()))?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            bytes.len() == 32,
+            "node public key {} is {} bytes, expected 32",
+            path.display(),
+            bytes.len()
+        );
+        Ok(hex::encode(bytes))
+    }
+
     /// Container name of the running Bitcoin node (`bitcoin-knots` or
     /// `bitcoin-core`) for the `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}` derived-env placeholder.
     /// Defaults to `bitcoin-knots` when none is running (B12).
@@ -3744,6 +3915,11 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
     }
 
     async fn resolve_dynamic_env(&self, manifest: &mut AppManifest) -> Result<()> {
+        if manifest.app.id == "nginx-proxy-manager" {
+            crate::container::npm::resolve_storage()
+                .await?
+                .apply(manifest)?;
+        }
         // Idempotency guard: partitioning already ran on this instance.
         // Re-running would re-taint against an environment that no longer
         // contains the composite entries and silently drop them. Callers
@@ -3813,6 +3989,22 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
         {
             facts.bitcoin_host = self.bitcoin_host().await;
         }
+        // The identities' keys are read only for manifests that template them.
+        if manifest
+            .app
+            .container
+            .derived_env
+            .iter()
+            .any(|e| e.template.contains("{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}"))
+        {
+            facts.node_identity_pubkeys =
+                self.node_identity_pubkeys().await.with_context(|| {
+                    format!(
+                        "resolving {{{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}}} for {}",
+                        manifest.app.id
+                    )
+                })?;
+        }
         let mut env = manifest.app.environment.clone();
         env.extend(manifest.app.container.resolve_derived_env(&facts));
         if matches!(manifest.app.id.as_str(), "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots") {
@@ -3999,7 +4191,12 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
         if unmanaged
             && matches!(
                 manifest.app.container.network.as_deref(),
-                Some("slirp4netns" | "pasta")
+                Some(
+                    "slirp4netns"
+                        | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+                        | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"
+                        | "pasta"
+                )
             )
         {
             if let Ok(output) = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
@@ -4007,13 +4204,36 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                 .output()
                 .await
             {
-                if output.status.success()
-                    && rootless_network_mode_drifted(
+                if output.status.success() {
+                    let mut actual = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string();
+                    if matches!(
                         manifest.app.container.network.as_deref(),
-                        &String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout),
-                    )
-                {
-                    return true;
+                        Some(
+                            "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+                                | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"
+                        )
+                    ) && actual == "slirp4netns"
+                    {
+                        let spec = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+                            .args(["generate", "spec", name])
+                            .output()
+                            .await;
+                        actual = match spec {
+                            Ok(spec) if spec.status.success() => {
+                                rootless_network_from_spec(&spec.stdout).unwrap_or_default()
+                            }
+                            _ => String::new(),
+                        };
+                        if actual.is_empty() {
+                            tracing::warn!(app = %name, "Could not verify rootless network options; retaining the existing container");
+                        }
+                    }
+                    if rootless_network_mode_drifted(
+                        manifest.app.container.network.as_deref(),
+                        &actual,
+                    ) {
+                        return true;
+                    }
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -4877,6 +5097,26 @@ impl ContainerOrchestrator for ProdContainerOrchestrator {
     /// here (production volumes live under `/var/lib/archipelago` — removal is a
     /// separate operation owned by the data layer, not this orchestrator).
     async fn remove(&self, app_id: &str, _preserve_data: bool) -> Result<()> {
+        // A removed catalog entry must remain uninstallable. The RPC caller
+        // still removes legacy containers and persists uninstall intent after
+        // confirming they are gone; do not block it on a missing manifest.
+        if !self.state.read().await.manifests.contains_key(app_id) {
+            anyhow::ensure!(
+                !app_id.is_empty()
+                    && app_id.len() <= 128
+                    && app_id
+                        .bytes()
+                        .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, b'-' | b'_')),
+                "Invalid app id"
+            );
+            let lock = self.app_lock(app_id).await;
+            let _guard = lock.lock().await;
+            for name in [app_id.to_string(), format!("archy-{app_id}")] {
+                self.remove_quadlet_unit_if_present(&name).await?;
+            }
+            self.state.write().await.disabled.insert(app_id.to_string());
+            return Ok(());
+        }
         let lm = self.loaded(app_id).await?;
         let lock = self.app_lock(app_id).await;
         let _guard = lock.lock().await;
@@ -5153,8 +5393,68 @@ mod tests {
         ));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_legacy_gateway_converges_and_rejects_conflicting_network_options() {
+        let expected = Some("slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24");
+        assert!(is_builtin_network_mode(expected.unwrap()));
+        for actual in [
+            "pasta",
+            "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true",
+            "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=10.0.2.0/24",
+            "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24,cidr=10.0.2.0/24",
+        ] {
+            assert!(rootless_network_mode_drifted(expected, actual), "{actual}");
+        }
+        let actual = "slirp4netns:cidr=169.254.1.0/24,allow_host_loopback=true,mtu=65520";
+        assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(expected, actual));
+        let spec = br#"{"netns":{"nsmode":"slirp4netns"},"network_options":{"slirp4netns":["cidr=169.254.1.0/24","allow_host_loopback=true"]}}"#;
+        assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(
+            expected,
+            &rootless_network_from_spec(spec).unwrap()
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_initialization_budget_survives_network_migration() {
+        let mut manifest = AppManifest::parse(include_str!(
+            "../../../../apps/nginx-proxy-manager/manifest.yml"
+        ))
+        .unwrap();
+        for network in ["pasta", "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"] {
+            manifest.app.container.network = Some(network.to_string());
+            assert_eq!(host_port_wait_timeout_secs(&manifest), 180);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn api_created_rootless_options_do_not_cause_repeated_recreation() {
+        let expected = Some("slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true");
+        let spec = br#"{"netns":{"nsmode":"slirp4netns"},"network_options":{"slirp4netns":["allow_host_loopback=true"]}}"#;
+        let actual = rootless_network_from_spec(spec).unwrap();
+        assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(expected, &actual));
+        let plain = rootless_network_from_spec(br#"{"netns":{"nsmode":"slirp4netns"}}"#).unwrap();
+        assert!(rootless_network_mode_drifted(expected, &plain));
+        assert!(rootless_network_from_spec(b"invalid").is_none());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn explicit_rootless_network_change_converges_without_guessing_defaults() {
+        let npm = Some("slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true");
+        assert!(is_builtin_network_mode(npm.unwrap()));
+        for actual in [
+            "pasta",
+            "bridge",
+            "slirp4netns",
+            "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=false",
+        ] {
+            assert!(rootless_network_mode_drifted(npm, actual), "{actual}");
+        }
+        for actual in [
+            "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true",
+            "slirp4netns:mtu=65520,allow_host_loopback=true",
+        ] {
+            assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(npm, actual), "{actual}");
+        }
         assert!(rootless_network_mode_drifted(Some("slirp4netns"), "pasta"));
         assert!(rootless_network_mode_drifted(Some("slirp4netns"), "bridge"));
         assert!(!rootless_network_mode_drifted(
@@ -6122,6 +6422,143 @@ app:
         }
     }
 
+    const NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS_YAML: &str = "app:\n  id: wildbloom-node\n  name: wildbloom-node\n  version: 1.0.0\n  container:\n    image: x:1\n    derived_env:\n      - key: WILDBLOOM_ALLOW_PUBKEYS\n        template: \"{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}\"\n";
+
+    /// Writes `pubkey_hex` as the node public key, in `NodeIdentity`'s format.
+    async fn write_node_pubkey(orch: &ProdContainerOrchestrator, pubkey_hex: &str) {
+        let dir = orch.data_dir().join("identity");
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(dir.join("node_key.pub"), hex::decode(pubkey_hex).unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn node_identity_pubkeys_placeholder_renders_the_signable_identities() {
+        // The owners must be exactly the identities the app signer offers:
+        // the user identities, never the node's own identity.
+        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+        let orch = orch_with(rt).await;
+        let mgr = crate::identity_manager::IdentityManager::new(orch.data_dir())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut expected = Vec::new();
+        for name in ["Personal", "Business"] {
+            let r = mgr
+                .create(
+                    name.to_string(),
+                    crate::identity_manager::IdentityPurpose::Personal,
+                )
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            expected.push(r.nostr_pubkey.unwrap().to_ascii_lowercase());
+        }
+        expected.sort();
+        // The node key is held by an identity with a uuid id and an ordinary
+        // name, so only the `is_node` match, through the key read from
+        // node_key.pub, can keep it out.
+        let laptop = mgr
+            .create(
+                "Laptop".to_string(),
+                crate::identity_manager::IdentityPurpose::Personal,
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(!laptop.id.starts_with("node-"));
+        let laptop_nostr = laptop.nostr_pubkey.clone().unwrap();
+        write_node_pubkey(&orch, &laptop.pubkey_hex).await;
+
+        let mut manifest = AppManifest::parse(NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS_YAML).unwrap();
+        orch.resolve_dynamic_env(&mut manifest).await.unwrap();
+
+        let env = &manifest.app.environment;
+        let want = format!("WILDBLOOM_ALLOW_PUBKEYS={}", expected.join(","));
+        assert!(env.iter().any(|e| e == &want), "env was {env:?}");
+        assert!(
+            !env.iter().any(|e| e.contains(&laptop_nostr)),
+            "node identity leaked into {env:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn node_identity_pubkeys_placeholder_refuses_an_empty_set() {
+        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+        let orch = orch_with(rt).await;
+        // A node key with only the node's own identity: nothing is signable.
+        let node = crate::identity::NodeIdentity::load_or_create(&orch.data_dir().join("identity"))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        crate::identity_manager::IdentityManager::new(orch.data_dir())
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .create_from_signing_key(
+                "Node".to_string(),
+                crate::identity_manager::IdentityPurpose::Personal,
+                node.signing_key().clone(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut manifest = AppManifest::parse(NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS_YAML).unwrap();
+        let err = orch.resolve_dynamic_env(&mut manifest).await.unwrap_err();
+        let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS"),
+            "unexpected error: {msg}"
+        );
+        assert!(msg.contains("no user identity"), "unexpected error: {msg}");
+        assert!(
+            !manifest
+                .app
+                .environment
+                .iter()
+                .any(|e| e.starts_with("WILDBLOOM_ALLOW_PUBKEYS=")),
+            "an empty owner list must never render"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn node_identity_pubkeys_placeholder_needs_the_node_key_and_never_creates_it() {
+        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+        let orch = orch_with(rt).await;
+        crate::identity_manager::IdentityManager::new(orch.data_dir())
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .create(
+                "Personal".to_string(),
+                crate::identity_manager::IdentityPurpose::Personal,
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let identity_dir = orch.data_dir().join("identity");
+        let mut manifest = AppManifest::parse(NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS_YAML).unwrap();
+        let err = orch.resolve_dynamic_env(&mut manifest).await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            format!("{err:#}").contains("node public key"),
+            "unexpected error: {err:#}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !identity_dir.join("node_key").exists(),
+            "a node key was created"
+        );
+        assert!(!identity_dir.join("node_key.pub").exists());
+
+        // A malformed key file is refused, not reinterpreted.
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&identity_dir).await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(identity_dir.join("node_key.pub"), "ab".repeat(32))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let err = orch.resolve_dynamic_env(&mut manifest).await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            format!("{err:#}").contains("expected 32"),
+            "unexpected error: {err:#}"
+        );
+        assert!(!manifest
+            .app
+            .environment
+            .iter()
+            .any(|e| e.starts_with("WILDBLOOM_ALLOW_PUBKEYS=")));
+    }
+
     /// A fedimint-gateway manifest shaped like the real one: a bcrypt
     /// generated secret plus a secret_env that reads it, which is what makes
     /// the credential participate in secret_env_hash.
@@ -7225,6 +7662,52 @@ app:
         assert!(!calls.iter().any(|c| c.starts_with("start_container:")));
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn reconcile_existing_does_not_resurrect_orphaned_companions() {
+        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+        let mut orch = orch_with(rt.clone()).await;
+        orch.set_disk_gb_for_test(500);
+        let companions = [
+            "bitcoin-ui",
+            "electrs-ui",
+            "lnd-ui",
+            "fedimint-ui",
+            "cuprate-ui",
+        ];
+        let mut names = Vec::new();
+        for id in companions {
+            let manifest = pull_manifest(id, "localhost/companion:local");
+            names.push(compute_container_name(&manifest));
+            orch.insert_manifest_for_test(manifest, PathBuf::from("/tmp/companion"))
+                .await;
+        }
+        let refs: Vec<&str> = names.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
+        crate::crash_recovery::save_container_snapshot_for_test(&orch.data_dir, &refs).await;
+        // Repeated passes must leave lifecycle ownership with companion.rs.
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            let report = orch.reconcile_existing().await;
+            assert_eq!(report.actions.len(), companions.len());
+            assert!(report
+                .actions
+                .iter()
+                .all(|(_, action)| *action == ReconcileAction::Left("absent".into())));
+            assert!(report.failures.is_empty());
+        }
+        let calls = rt.calls();
+        for operation in [
+            "pull_image:",
+            "create_container:",
+            "start_container:",
+            "stop_container:",
+            "remove_container:",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !calls.iter().any(|call| call.starts_with(operation)),
+                "{calls:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn reconcile_existing_self_heals_missing_optional_installed_app() {
         // A non-baseline app (gitea) self-heals ONLY with installation
@@ -7385,6 +7868,19 @@ app:
         );
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn removed_catalog_entry_does_not_block_legacy_uninstall() {
+        let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());
+        let orch = orch_with(rt.clone()).await;
+        orch.remove("cryptpad", true).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(orch.state.read().await.disabled.contains("cryptpad"));
+        assert!(
+            rt.calls().is_empty(),
+            "legacy RPC teardown owns the actual containers"
+        );
+        assert!(orch.remove("../other", true).await.is_err());
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn remove_disables_manifest_so_reconcile_does_not_reinstall() {
         let rt = Arc::new(MockRuntime::default());

core/archipelago/src/container/quadlet.rs

@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ pub enum NetworkMode {
     /// Rootless slirp4netns networking. Podman rejects network aliases with
     /// this mode, so render only Network=slirp4netns.
     Slirp4netns,
+    /// Permit explicit host aliases as well as LAN upstreams for NPM.
+    Slirp4netnsHostLoopback,
+    /// Preserve existing NPM upstreams using pasta's former host gateway.
+    Slirp4netnsLegacyGateway,
     /// Rootless pasta networking. This is more reliable than slirp4netns for
     /// host port forwarding on long-running web apps.
     Pasta,
@@ -229,6 +233,15 @@ impl QuadletUnit {
             NetworkMode::Host => {
                 let _ = writeln!(s, "Network=host");
             }
+            NetworkMode::Slirp4netnsHostLoopback => {
+                let _ = writeln!(s, "Network=slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true");
+            }
+            NetworkMode::Slirp4netnsLegacyGateway => {
+                let _ = writeln!(
+                    s,
+                    "Network=slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"
+                );
+            }
             NetworkMode::Slirp4netns => {
                 let _ = writeln!(s, "Network=slirp4netns");
             }
@@ -348,6 +361,26 @@ impl QuadletUnit {
         }
         let _ = writeln!(s);
         let _ = writeln!(s, "[Service]");
+        if self.name == "filebrowser" {
+            // Runs while the managed server is stopped, before it can expose
+            // a default account. The helper verifies real login and root access.
+            let mut argv = vec![
+                "/usr/bin/python3".to_string(),
+                "/opt/archipelago/scripts/filebrowser-credentials.py".to_string(),
+                "--image".to_string(),
+                self.image.clone(),
+            ];
+            for (target, flag) in [("/data", "--data-dir"), ("/srv", "--srv-root")] {
+                if let Some(mount) = self
+                    .bind_mounts
+                    .iter()
+                    .find(|m| m.container == Path::new(target))
+                {
+                    argv.extend([flag.to_string(), mount.host.display().to_string()]);
+                }
+            }
+            let _ = writeln!(s, "ExecStartPre={}", shell_join(&argv));
+        }
         // Dependency-gated apps may legitimately keep their container entrypoint
         // in a wait loop before the actual daemon binds ports. Fedimint waits
         // for Bitcoin IBD to finish before execing fedimintd; systemd's default
@@ -447,6 +480,12 @@ impl QuadletUnit {
             other if !other.is_empty() && other != "isolated" => NetworkMode::Bridge(other.into()),
             _ => match app.container.network.as_deref() {
                 Some("slirp4netns") => NetworkMode::Slirp4netns,
+                Some("slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true") => {
+                    NetworkMode::Slirp4netnsHostLoopback
+                }
+                Some("slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24") => {
+                    NetworkMode::Slirp4netnsLegacyGateway
+                }
                 Some("pasta") => NetworkMode::Pasta,
                 Some(n) if !n.is_empty() && n != "host" => NetworkMode::Bridge(n.into()),
                 _ => NetworkMode::Default,
@@ -713,29 +752,76 @@ pub async fn unit_dir() -> Result<PathBuf> {
     Ok(dir)
 }
 
-/// Atomically write `unit` into `dir/<name>.container` if the bytes
-/// differ from what's already there. Returns true if the file changed.
+/// The early same-node Portainer repair used a managed Quadlet drop-in. Once
+/// the manifest supplies slirp, the two Network= entries are additive and
+/// Podman rejects startup. Retire only that exact redundant managed override;
+/// arbitrary operator settings must survive reconciliation.
+pub async fn redundant_managed_network_override(
+    unit: &QuadletUnit,
+    dir: &Path,
+) -> Result<Option<PathBuf>> {
+    if unit.name != "portainer" || !matches!(unit.network, NetworkMode::Slirp4netns) {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let path = dir.join("portainer.container.d/archy-same-node-network.conf");
+    let body = match fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
+        Ok(body) => body,
+        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
+        Err(error) => return Err(error).context("read managed Portainer network override"),
+    };
+    let lines: Vec<&str> = body
+        .lines()
+        .map(str::trim)
+        .filter(|line| !line.is_empty() && !line.starts_with(['#', ';']))
+        .collect();
+    Ok((lines == ["[Container]", "Network=slirp4netns"]).then_some(path))
+}
+
+async fn retire_managed_network_override(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    let backup = path.with_extension("conf.retired");
+    match fs::hard_link(path, &backup).await {
+        Ok(()) => {}
+        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists => {
+            anyhow::ensure!(
+                fs::read(path).await? == fs::read(&backup).await?,
+                "Existing Portainer override backup differs; preserve both for operator review"
+            );
+        }
+        Err(error) => return Err(error).context("back up managed Portainer network override"),
+    }
+    fs::remove_file(path)
+        .await
+        .context("retire redundant Portainer network override")?;
+    tracing::info!("Retired redundant managed Portainer network override; backup retained");
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Atomically write the manifest unit and retire known redundant managed
+/// overrides. Returns true whenever systemd needs a daemon-reload.
 pub async fn write_if_changed(unit: &QuadletUnit, dir: &Path) -> Result<bool> {
     let path = dir.join(unit.unit_filename());
     let new_bytes = unit.render();
-
-    if let Ok(old) = fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
-        if old == new_bytes {
-            return Ok(false);
-        }
+    let redundant = redundant_managed_network_override(unit, dir).await?;
+    let changed = fs::read_to_string(&path)
+        .await
+        .map(|old| old != new_bytes)
+        .unwrap_or(true);
+    if changed {
+        fs::create_dir_all(dir)
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| format!("create_dir_all {}", dir.display()))?;
+        let tmp = path.with_extension("container.tmp");
+        fs::write(&tmp, new_bytes.as_bytes())
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| format!("write tmp {}", tmp.display()))?;
+        fs::rename(&tmp, &path)
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| format!("rename {} -> {}", tmp.display(), path.display()))?;
     }
-
-    fs::create_dir_all(dir)
-        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("create_dir_all {}", dir.display()))?;
-    let tmp = path.with_extension("container.tmp");
-    fs::write(&tmp, new_bytes.as_bytes())
-        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("write tmp {}", tmp.display()))?;
-    fs::rename(&tmp, &path)
-        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("rename {} -> {}", tmp.display(), path.display()))?;
-    Ok(true)
+    if let Some(override_path) = &redundant {
+        retire_managed_network_override(override_path).await?;
+    }
+    Ok(changed || redundant.is_some())
 }
 
 /// Reload the user systemd manager. Required after any quadlet write
@@ -1024,7 +1110,8 @@ pub fn exec_changed(old_body: &str, new_body: &str) -> bool {
     // Entrypoint= and Exec= together define what the container runs, so a drift
     // in either must recreate the container (e.g. when this renderer first
     // splits a folded `Exec=sh -lc ...` into `Entrypoint=sh` + `Exec=-lc ...`).
-    directive_values(old_body, "Exec=") != directive_values(new_body, "Exec=")
+    directive_values(old_body, "ExecStartPre=") != directive_values(new_body, "ExecStartPre=")
+        || directive_values(old_body, "Exec=") != directive_values(new_body, "Exec=")
         || directive_values(old_body, "Entrypoint=") != directive_values(new_body, "Entrypoint=")
 }
 
@@ -1095,6 +1182,28 @@ pub async fn is_active(service: &str) -> bool {
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
+    #[test]
+    fn filebrowser_prestart_credentials_are_a_required_runtime_change() {
+        let unit = super::QuadletUnit {
+            name: "filebrowser".into(),
+            image: "registry.example/filebrowser:v2.63.23".into(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let rendered = unit.render();
+        assert!(rendered.contains("ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/archipelago/scripts/filebrowser-credentials.py --image registry.example/filebrowser:v2.63.23"));
+        let old = rendered
+            .lines()
+            .filter(|line| !line.starts_with("ExecStartPre="))
+            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            .join("\n");
+        assert!(super::exec_changed(&old, &rendered));
+        assert!(!super::exec_changed(&rendered, &rendered));
+        let other = super::QuadletUnit {
+            name: "other-app".into(),
+            ..unit
+        };
+        assert!(!other.render().contains("filebrowser-credentials.py"));
+    }
     use super::*;
     use tempfile::tempdir;
 
@@ -1662,6 +1771,24 @@ app:
         assert!(!s.contains("--network-alias"));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_network_preserves_same_node_upstreams_without_aliases() {
+        let m = AppManifest::parse(include_str!(
+            "../../../../apps/nginx-proxy-manager/manifest.yml"
+        ))
+        .unwrap();
+        let rendered = QuadletUnit::from_manifest(&m, "nginx-proxy-manager").render();
+        assert_eq!(
+            rendered
+                .lines()
+                .filter(|line| line.starts_with("Network="))
+                .collect::<Vec<_>>(),
+            vec!["Network=slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"]
+        );
+        assert!(!rendered.contains("NetworkAlias="));
+        assert!(!rendered.contains("--network-alias"));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn from_manifest_pasta_omits_network_alias() {
         let yaml = r#"
@@ -1991,6 +2118,80 @@ app:
         assert!(!network_aliases_changed(new, new));
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn redundant_portainer_override_is_backed_up_and_retired_even_when_base_matches() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let manifest =
+            AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../../apps/portainer/manifest.yml")).unwrap();
+        let unit = QuadletUnit::from_manifest(&manifest, "portainer");
+        assert!(write_if_changed(&unit, dir.path()).await.unwrap());
+        let path = dir
+            .path()
+            .join("portainer.container.d/archy-same-node-network.conf");
+        fs::create_dir_all(path.parent().unwrap()).await.unwrap();
+        let old = "[Container]\nNetwork=slirp4netns\n";
+        fs::write(&path, old).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(redundant_managed_network_override(&unit, dir.path())
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_some());
+        assert!(write_if_changed(&unit, dir.path()).await.unwrap());
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::read_to_string(path.with_extension("conf.retired"))
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            old
+        );
+        assert!(!write_if_changed(&unit, dir.path()).await.unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("portainer.container"))
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .matches("Network=slirp4netns")
+                .count(),
+            1
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn network_override_migration_preserves_operator_customizations_and_failed_backups() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let manifest =
+            AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../../apps/portainer/manifest.yml")).unwrap();
+        let mut unit = QuadletUnit::from_manifest(&manifest, "portainer");
+        let path = dir
+            .path()
+            .join("portainer.container.d/archy-same-node-network.conf");
+        fs::create_dir_all(path.parent().unwrap()).await.unwrap();
+        for custom in [
+            "[Container]\nNetwork=custom-net\n",
+            "[Container]\nNetwork=slirp4netns\nEnvironment=OPERATOR_SETTING=1\n",
+        ] {
+            fs::write(&path, custom).await.unwrap();
+            assert!(redundant_managed_network_override(&unit, dir.path())
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .is_none());
+            write_if_changed(&unit, dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&path).await.unwrap(), custom);
+        }
+        fs::write(&path, "[Container]\nNetwork=slirp4netns\n")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        unit.network = NetworkMode::Pasta;
+        assert!(redundant_managed_network_override(&unit, dir.path())
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_none());
+        unit.network = NetworkMode::Slirp4netns;
+        fs::write(path.with_extension("conf.retired"), "different backup")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(write_if_changed(&unit, dir.path()).await.is_err());
+        assert!(path.exists(), "failure must preserve the active override");
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn failed_runtime_change_remains_pending_when_unit_already_matches() {
         let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();

core/archipelago/src/content_invoice.rs

@@ -1,80 +1,155 @@
-//! Seller-side pending entitlements for Lightning-invoice peer-file sales (#46).
-//!
-//! When a buyer asks to pay for a paid catalog item with an external wallet (as
-//! opposed to the local-ecash fast path), the *selling* node mints a Lightning
-//! invoice on its own LND and records a pending entitlement here, keyed by the
-//! invoice's payment hash. The buyer pays the invoice from any wallet and polls
-//! for settlement; once the seller's LND confirms the invoice is settled we mark
-//! the entitlement paid, and the content gate (`content_server::serve_content`)
-//! then releases the file to anyone presenting that payment hash.
-//!
-//! State is in-memory and bounded by a TTL. If the seller restarts before the
-//! buyer pays, the buyer simply requests a fresh invoice — no value is lost
-//! because an unpaid invoice represents no money.
+//! Durable seller-side entitlements for peer-file invoices and on-chain sales.
+//! Payment records must outlive browser polling, process restarts and invoice
+//! expiry: an invoice can settle while the buyer is disconnected.
 
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::sync::LazyLock;
-use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
-use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use tokio::{fs, io::AsyncWriteExt, sync::Mutex};
 
-/// How long a pending/paid entitlement is retained. Generous enough for a human
-/// to pay an invoice and download, short enough to keep the map small.
-const ENTITLEMENT_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(3600); // 1 hour
+static WRITES: Mutex<()> = Mutex::const_new(());
 
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 struct Entitlement {
     content_id: String,
     price_sats: u64,
     paid: bool,
-    created_at: Instant,
 }
 
-static ENTITLEMENTS: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, Entitlement>>> =
-    LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
-
-/// Drop expired entries. Caller must hold the lock.
-fn prune(map: &mut HashMap<String, Entitlement>) {
-    map.retain(|_, e| e.created_at.elapsed() < ENTITLEMENT_TTL);
+fn path(data_dir: &Path, token: &str) -> PathBuf {
+    data_dir.join("content-entitlements").join(format!(
+        "{}.json",
+        hex::encode(Sha256::digest(token.as_bytes()))
+    ))
 }
 
-/// Record a freshly-minted invoice as a pending (unpaid) entitlement.
-pub async fn record_pending(payment_hash: &str, content_id: &str, price_sats: u64) {
-    let mut map = ENTITLEMENTS.lock().await;
-    prune(&mut map);
-    map.insert(
-        payment_hash.to_string(),
-        Entitlement {
-            content_id: content_id.to_string(),
-            price_sats,
-            paid: false,
-            created_at: Instant::now(),
-        },
-    );
-}
-
-/// Mark the entitlement for `payment_hash` paid. No-op if unknown/expired.
-pub async fn mark_paid(payment_hash: &str) {
-    let mut map = ENTITLEMENTS.lock().await;
-    prune(&mut map);
-    if let Some(e) = map.get_mut(payment_hash) {
-        e.paid = true;
+async fn read(data_dir: &Path, token: &str) -> Result<Option<Entitlement>> {
+    match fs::read(path(data_dir, token)).await {
+        Ok(bytes) => Ok(Some(
+            serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).context("Invalid payment entitlement")?,
+        )),
+        Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(None),
+        Err(e) => Err(e).context("Reading payment entitlement"),
     }
 }
 
-/// The content_id + price an entitlement was issued for, if still live.
-pub async fn lookup(payment_hash: &str) -> Option<(String, u64)> {
-    let mut map = ENTITLEMENTS.lock().await;
-    prune(&mut map);
-    map.get(payment_hash)
-        .map(|e| (e.content_id.clone(), e.price_sats))
+async fn write(data_dir: &Path, token: &str, entry: &Entitlement) -> Result<()> {
+    let target = path(data_dir, token);
+    let dir = target.parent().unwrap();
+    fs::create_dir_all(dir).await?;
+    let tmp = target.with_extension("tmp");
+    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+        .write(true)
+        .create(true)
+        .truncate(true)
+        .mode(0o600)
+        .open(&tmp)
+        .await?;
+    file.write_all(&serde_json::to_vec(entry)?).await?;
+    file.sync_all().await?;
+    drop(file);
+    fs::rename(&tmp, &target).await?;
+    fs::File::open(dir).await?.sync_all().await?;
+    Ok(())
 }
 
-/// True if `payment_hash` is a paid entitlement for exactly `content_id`.
-/// This is the gate the content server consults to release a file.
-pub async fn is_paid_for(payment_hash: &str, content_id: &str) -> bool {
-    let mut map = ENTITLEMENTS.lock().await;
-    prune(&mut map);
-    map.get(payment_hash)
+/// Save before exposing an invoice/address to the buyer. Never overwrite an
+/// existing payment or silently rebind its token to another item or price.
+pub async fn record_pending(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    token: &str,
+    content_id: &str,
+    price_sats: u64,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let _lock = WRITES.lock().await;
+    if let Some(existing) = read(data_dir, token).await? {
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            existing.content_id == content_id && existing.price_sats == price_sats,
+            "Payment entitlement mismatch"
+        );
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    write(
+        data_dir,
+        token,
+        &Entitlement {
+            content_id: content_id.into(),
+            price_sats,
+            paid: false,
+        },
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+pub async fn mark_paid(data_dir: &Path, token: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let _lock = WRITES.lock().await;
+    let mut entry = read(data_dir, token)
+        .await?
+        .context("Unknown payment entitlement")?;
+    entry.paid = true;
+    write(data_dir, token, &entry).await
+}
+
+pub async fn lookup(data_dir: &Path, token: &str) -> Result<Option<(String, u64)>> {
+    Ok(read(data_dir, token)
+        .await?
+        .map(|e| (e.content_id, e.price_sats)))
+}
+
+pub async fn is_paid_for(data_dir: &Path, token: &str, content_id: &str) -> bool {
+    read(data_dir, token)
+        .await
+        .ok()
+        .flatten()
         .map(|e| e.paid && e.content_id == content_id)
         .unwrap_or(false)
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn paid_entitlement_survives_reload_and_cannot_be_rebound() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        record_pending(dir.path(), "hash", "file", 12)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(!is_paid_for(dir.path(), "hash", "file").await);
+        mark_paid(dir.path(), "hash").await.unwrap();
+        // All reads reopen disk; no process-local entitlement map exists.
+        assert!(is_paid_for(dir.path(), "hash", "file").await);
+        assert!(!is_paid_for(dir.path(), "hash", "other").await);
+        record_pending(dir.path(), "hash", "file", 12)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(is_paid_for(dir.path(), "hash", "file").await);
+        assert!(record_pending(dir.path(), "hash", "other", 12)
+            .await
+            .is_err());
+        assert!(record_pending(dir.path(), "hash", "file", 13)
+            .await
+            .is_err());
+        let other = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        assert!(!is_paid_for(other.path(), "hash", "file").await);
+        assert!(mark_paid(dir.path(), "unknown").await.is_err());
+    }
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn corrupt_or_unwritable_records_fail_closed() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        record_pending(dir.path(), "../../token", "file", 1)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        fs::write(path(dir.path(), "../../token"), b"broken")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(lookup(dir.path(), "../../token").await.is_err());
+        assert!(!is_paid_for(dir.path(), "../../token", "file").await);
+        assert!(record_pending(dir.path(), "../../token", "file", 1)
+            .await
+            .is_err());
+        let file = dir.path().join("not-directory");
+        fs::write(&file, b"x").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(record_pending(&file, "hash", "file", 1).await.is_err());
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/content_owned.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-use tokio::fs;
+use tokio::{fs, io::AsyncWriteExt, sync::Mutex};
+
+static PURCHASE_WRITES: Mutex<()> = Mutex::const_new(());
 
 const OWNED_DIR: &str = "purchased-content";
 const OWNED_INDEX: &str = "owned.json";
@@ -66,20 +68,51 @@ fn bytes_path(data_dir: &Path, onion: &str, content_id: &str) -> PathBuf {
         .join(sanitize(content_id))
 }
 
-async fn load_index(data_dir: &Path) -> OwnedIndex {
+async fn load_index_checked(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<OwnedIndex> {
     match fs::read_to_string(index_path(data_dir)).await {
-        Ok(s) => serde_json::from_str(&s).unwrap_or_default(),
-        Err(_) => OwnedIndex::default(),
+        Ok(s) => serde_json::from_str(&s)
+            .context("Invalid purchase index; existing records were preserved"),
+        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(OwnedIndex::default()),
+        Err(error) => Err(error).context("Reading purchase index"),
     }
 }
 
+async fn load_index(data_dir: &Path) -> OwnedIndex {
+    load_index_checked(data_dir).await.unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
+async fn atomic_write(path: &Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    let parent = path.parent().context("Purchase path has no parent")?;
+    fs::create_dir_all(parent).await?;
+    let temp = parent.join(format!(".purchase-{}.tmp", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
+    let result = async {
+        let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .write(true)
+            .create_new(true)
+            .mode(0o600)
+            .open(&temp)
+            .await?;
+        file.write_all(bytes).await?;
+        file.sync_all().await?;
+        drop(file);
+        fs::rename(&temp, path).await?;
+        fs::File::open(parent).await?.sync_all().await?;
+        Ok::<_, anyhow::Error>(())
+    }
+    .await;
+    if result.is_err() {
+        let _ = fs::remove_file(&temp).await;
+    }
+    result
+}
+
 async fn save_index(data_dir: &Path, index: &OwnedIndex) -> Result<()> {
     let root = owned_root(data_dir);
     fs::create_dir_all(&root)
         .await
         .with_context(|| format!("creating {}", root.display()))?;
     let content = serde_json::to_string_pretty(index).context("serializing owned index")?;
-    fs::write(index_path(data_dir), content)
+    atomic_write(&index_path(data_dir), content.as_bytes())
         .await
         .context("writing owned index")
 }
@@ -98,17 +131,15 @@ pub async fn record_purchase(
     ecash_backend: &str,
     purchased_at: &str,
 ) -> Result<()> {
+    // Read-modify-write must be one serialized transaction. Never replace a
+    // damaged index with an empty one, and never expose partially written bytes.
+    let _lock = PURCHASE_WRITES.lock().await;
+    let mut index = load_index_checked(data_dir).await?;
     let path = bytes_path(data_dir, onion, content_id);
-    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
-        fs::create_dir_all(parent)
-            .await
-            .with_context(|| format!("creating {}", parent.display()))?;
-    }
-    fs::write(&path, bytes)
+    atomic_write(&path, bytes)
         .await
         .with_context(|| format!("writing purchased bytes to {}", path.display()))?;
 
-    let mut index = load_index(data_dir).await;
     let entry = OwnedItem {
         onion: onion.to_string(),
         content_id: content_id.to_string(),
@@ -131,6 +162,11 @@ pub async fn record_purchase(
     save_index(data_dir, &index).await
 }
 
+/// Payment decisions must not interpret an unreadable index as no purchases.
+pub async fn list_owned_checked(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<Vec<OwnedItem>> {
+    Ok(load_index_checked(data_dir).await?.items)
+}
+
 /// Every item this node owns.
 pub async fn list_owned(data_dir: &Path) -> Vec<OwnedItem> {
     load_index(data_dir).await.items
@@ -165,3 +201,90 @@ pub async fn read_owned(
         .unwrap_or_else(|| "application/octet-stream".to_string());
     Some((mime, bytes))
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn concurrent_purchases_preserve_every_item_and_exact_bytes() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let mut jobs = tokio::task::JoinSet::new();
+        for n in 0..24 {
+            let root = dir.path().to_path_buf();
+            jobs.spawn(async move {
+                let id = format!("file-{n}");
+                record_purchase(
+                    &root,
+                    "seller.onion",
+                    &id,
+                    &id,
+                    "text/plain",
+                    id.as_bytes(),
+                    5,
+                    "lightning",
+                    "now",
+                )
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            });
+        }
+        while let Some(result) = jobs.join_next().await {
+            result.unwrap();
+        }
+        assert_eq!(list_owned(dir.path()).await.len(), 24);
+        for n in 0..24 {
+            let id = format!("file-{n}");
+            assert!(is_owned(dir.path(), "seller.onion", &id).await);
+            let (mime, bytes) = read_owned(dir.path(), "seller.onion", &id).await.unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(mime, "text/plain");
+            assert_eq!(bytes, id.as_bytes());
+        }
+        record_purchase(
+            dir.path(),
+            "seller.onion",
+            "file-0",
+            "file-0",
+            "text/plain",
+            b"updated",
+            5,
+            "lightning",
+            "later",
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(list_owned(dir.path()).await.len(), 24);
+        assert_eq!(
+            read_owned(dir.path(), "seller.onion", "file-0")
+                .await
+                .unwrap()
+                .1,
+            b"updated"
+        );
+    }
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn damaged_index_is_preserved_instead_of_erasing_prior_ownership() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        fs::create_dir_all(owned_root(dir.path())).await.unwrap();
+        fs::write(index_path(dir.path()), b"damaged but preserve me")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(record_purchase(
+            dir.path(),
+            "seller.onion",
+            "new",
+            "new",
+            "text/plain",
+            b"bytes",
+            5,
+            "lightning",
+            "now"
+        )
+        .await
+        .is_err());
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::read(index_path(dir.path())).await.unwrap(),
+            b"damaged but preserve me"
+        );
+        assert!(!bytes_path(dir.path(), "seller.onion", "new").exists());
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/content_server.rs

@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ where
                 if !authorized {
                     if let Some(hash) = invoice_hash {
                         if method_accepted(&item.access, "lightning")
-                            && crate::content_invoice::is_paid_for(hash, id).await
+                            && crate::content_invoice::is_paid_for(data_dir, hash, id).await
                         {
                             authorized = true;
                         }

core/archipelago/src/crash_recovery.rs

@@ -664,6 +664,10 @@ pub async fn start_stopped_stack_containers(data_dir: &Path) -> RecoveryReport {
     start_stopped_app_stacks(data_dir).await
 }
 
+fn stack_member_needs_recovery(state: Option<&str>, user_stopped: bool) -> bool {
+    !user_stopped && matches!(state, Some("exited" | "stopped" | "created" | "configured"))
+}
+
 async fn start_stopped_app_stacks(data_dir: &Path) -> RecoveryReport {
     let user_stopped = load_user_stopped(data_dir).await;
     let mut report = RecoveryReport {
@@ -677,24 +681,27 @@ async fn start_stopped_app_stacks(data_dir: &Path) -> RecoveryReport {
             continue;
         }
 
-        info!(
-            "Recovering stopped {} stack containers after boot",
-            stack.name
-        );
+        // Healthy members must never acquire a restarting overlay merely
+        // because the periodic recovery scan ran. Queue existing stopped
+        // members only; recheck each immediately before starting below.
+        let mut pending = Vec::new();
+        for container in stack.containers {
+            let state = container_state(container).await;
+            if stack_member_needs_recovery(state.as_deref(), user_stopped.contains(*container)) {
+                pending.push((*container).to_string());
+            }
+        }
+        if pending.is_empty() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        info!("Recovering stopped {} stack containers", stack.name);
         repair_stack_network_aliases(stack).await;
-
-        // Register the whole stack up front: the per-member dependency waits
-        // below can take minutes, and the UI should say "Restarting", not
-        // "Stopped", for members still queued behind them.
-        pending_boot_starts_add(
-            stack
-                .containers
-                .iter()
-                .filter(|c| !user_stopped.contains(**c))
-                .map(|c| (*c).to_string()),
-        );
+        pending_boot_starts_add(pending.iter().cloned());
 
         for container in stack.containers {
+            if !pending.iter().any(|name| name.as_str() == *container) {
+                continue;
+            }
             if user_stopped.contains(*container) {
                 info!("Skipping user-stopped container: {}", container);
                 continue;
@@ -706,8 +713,8 @@ async fn start_stopped_app_stacks(data_dir: &Path) -> RecoveryReport {
                     pending_boot_start_done(container);
                     continue;
                 }
-                Some(_) => {}
-                None => {
+                Some(state) if stack_member_needs_recovery(Some(&state), false) => {}
+                _ => {
                     pending_boot_start_done(container);
                     continue;
                 }
@@ -1534,3 +1541,24 @@ mod installed_concurrency_tests {
         assert!(!dir.path().join("installed-apps.json.tmp").exists());
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod stack_recovery_overlay_tests {
+    use super::stack_member_needs_recovery;
+    #[test]
+    fn only_existing_stopped_members_receive_recovery_overlay() {
+        for state in [
+            None,
+            Some("running"),
+            Some("paused"),
+            Some("restarting"),
+            Some("removing"),
+        ] {
+            assert!(!stack_member_needs_recovery(state, false));
+        }
+        for state in ["exited", "stopped", "created", "configured"] {
+            assert!(stack_member_needs_recovery(Some(state), false));
+            assert!(!stack_member_needs_recovery(Some(state), true));
+        }
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/identity_manager.rs

@@ -115,6 +115,30 @@ fn relay_url_matches(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
     norm(a) == norm(b)
 }
 
+/// True when `record` is the node's own identity: the one whose ed25519 key
+/// is the node key (`server_info.pubkey`). `identity.list` reports this as
+/// `is_node`, and clients must never offer it as an app signer.
+pub fn is_node_identity(record: &IdentityRecord, node_pubkey_hex: &str) -> bool {
+    !node_pubkey_hex.is_empty() && record.pubkey_hex == node_pubkey_hex
+}
+
+/// True when the app identity picker hides `record`, mirroring
+/// `NostrIdentityPicker.vue`'s filter exactly: the node identity
+/// (`is_node`), any `node-*` id and any identity named "Node".
+pub(crate) fn is_hidden_from_app_signer(record: &IdentityRecord, node_pubkey_hex: &str) -> bool {
+    // Match ECMAScript trim exactly: Rust includes U+0085 and excludes U+FEFF.
+    let trim_js = |value: &str| value.trim_matches(is_js_whitespace).to_lowercase();
+    is_node_identity(record, node_pubkey_hex)
+        || trim_js(&record.id).starts_with("node-")
+        || trim_js(&record.name) == "node"
+}
+
+fn is_js_whitespace(c: char) -> bool {
+    matches!(c, '\u{0009}'..='\u{000D}' | '\u{0020}' | '\u{00A0}' | '\u{1680}'
+        | '\u{2000}'..='\u{200A}' | '\u{2028}' | '\u{2029}' | '\u{202F}'
+        | '\u{205F}' | '\u{3000}' | '\u{FEFF}')
+}
+
 impl IdentityManager {
     pub async fn new(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<Self> {
         let identities_dir = data_dir.join(IDENTITIES_DIR);
@@ -150,6 +174,30 @@ impl IdentityManager {
         Ok((identities, default_id))
     }
 
+    /// Nostr public keys of the identities an app may sign with through the
+    /// NIP-07 bridge, as sorted, de-duplicated, comma-joined lowercase hex.
+    ///
+    /// Leaves out what the identity picker hides (`is_hidden_from_app_signer`)
+    /// and identities without a Nostr key (they cannot sign). Empty when no
+    /// identity qualifies.
+    pub async fn app_signable_nostr_pubkeys(&self, node_pubkey_hex: &str) -> Result<String> {
+        let (identities, _) = self.list().await?;
+        let mut pubkeys: Vec<String> = identities
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|r| !is_hidden_from_app_signer(r, node_pubkey_hex))
+            .filter_map(|r| r.nostr_pubkey.as_deref())
+            .map(|key| {
+                anyhow::ensure!(key.len() == 64, "invalid app owner Nostr public key");
+                nostr_sdk::PublicKey::from_hex(key)
+                    .map(|key| key.to_hex())
+                    .context("invalid app owner Nostr public key")
+            })
+            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
+        pubkeys.sort();
+        pubkeys.dedup();
+        Ok(pubkeys.join(","))
+    }
+
     /// Create a new identity.
     pub async fn create(&self, name: String, purpose: IdentityPurpose) -> Result<IdentityRecord> {
         let signing_key = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
@@ -966,6 +1014,167 @@ mod tests {
         assert_ne!(default_id, Some(r1.id));
     }
 
+    fn record(id: &str, name: &str, pubkey_hex: &str) -> IdentityRecord {
+        IdentityRecord {
+            id: id.to_string(),
+            name: name.to_string(),
+            purpose: IdentityPurpose::Personal,
+            pubkey_hex: pubkey_hex.to_string(),
+            did: String::new(),
+            dht_did: None,
+            created_at: String::new(),
+            nostr_pubkey: None,
+            nostr_npub: None,
+            profile: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_node_identity_matches_only_the_node_pubkey() {
+        let node = "ab".repeat(32);
+        let other = "cd".repeat(32);
+        assert!(is_node_identity(&record("uuid-1", "Laptop", &node), &node));
+        assert!(!is_node_identity(
+            &record("uuid-1", "Laptop", &other),
+            &node
+        ));
+        // An unknown node key matches nothing, not the records without a key.
+        assert!(!is_node_identity(&record("uuid-1", "Laptop", ""), ""));
+        // The id and name rules belong to the picker filter, not to `is_node`.
+        assert!(!is_node_identity(
+            &record("node-abc", "Node", &other),
+            &node
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn is_hidden_from_app_signer_mirrors_the_picker_rules() {
+        let node = "ab".repeat(32);
+        let other = "cd".repeat(32);
+        let hidden = |id: &str, name: &str, pk: &str| {
+            is_hidden_from_app_signer(&record(id, name, pk), &node)
+        };
+        // is_node: matched by key alone, whatever the id and name.
+        assert!(hidden("uuid-1", "Laptop", &node));
+        // node-* id, any case, surrounding whitespace ignored.
+        assert!(hidden("node-0123456789abcdef", "Laptop", &other));
+        assert!(hidden("  NODE-x ", "Laptop", &other));
+        assert!(hidden("Node-x", "Laptop", &other));
+        // The name "Node", any case, surrounding whitespace ignored.
+        assert!(hidden("uuid-1", "Node", &other));
+        assert!(hidden("uuid-1", " nODe\t", &other));
+        assert!(hidden("\u{FEFF}NODE-x\u{FEFF}", "Laptop", &other));
+        assert!(hidden("uuid-1", "\u{FEFF}Node\u{FEFF}", &other));
+        // ECMAScript keeps U+0085; do not add owners that the picker hides,
+        // or hide identities that it offers.
+        assert!(!hidden("uuid-1", "\u{0085}Node\u{0085}", &other));
+        // Near misses stay visible.
+        assert!(!hidden("uuid-1", "Laptop", &other));
+        assert!(!hidden("my-node-1", "Node 2", &other));
+        assert!(!hidden("nodes", "Nodes", &other));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn app_signable_nostr_pubkeys_mirror_the_identity_picker() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let mgr = IdentityManager::new(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+        let personal = mgr
+            .create("Personal".to_string(), IdentityPurpose::Personal)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let business = mgr
+            .create("Business".to_string(), IdentityPurpose::Business)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // The node identity as mirrored at startup: a `node-` id named
+        // "Node", given a Nostr key so only the id and name rules hide it.
+        let mirrored_key = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
+        let mirrored = mgr
+            .create_from_signing_key("Node".to_string(), IdentityPurpose::Personal, mirrored_key)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(mirrored.id.starts_with("node-"));
+        mgr.create_nostr_key(&mirrored.id).await.unwrap();
+        // A user-created identity named "Node" is hidden by the picker too.
+        let named_node = mgr
+            .create(" node ".to_string(), IdentityPurpose::Anonymous)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // The node key belongs to an identity with a uuid id and an ordinary
+        // name, so only the `is_node` match can hide it.
+        let laptop = mgr
+            .create("Laptop".to_string(), IdentityPurpose::Personal)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(!laptop.id.starts_with("node-"));
+
+        let (all, _) = mgr.list().await.unwrap();
+        assert!(all
+            .iter()
+            .any(|r| r.id == mirrored.id && r.nostr_pubkey.is_some()));
+        assert!(all.iter().any(|r| r.id == named_node.id));
+        assert!(all
+            .iter()
+            .any(|r| r.id == laptop.id && r.nostr_pubkey.is_some()));
+
+        let mut expected = vec![
+            personal.nostr_pubkey.unwrap().to_ascii_lowercase(),
+            business.nostr_pubkey.unwrap().to_ascii_lowercase(),
+        ];
+        expected.sort();
+        assert_eq!(
+            mgr.app_signable_nostr_pubkeys(&laptop.pubkey_hex)
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            expected.join(",")
+        );
+        // Without the node key, the same identity is offered like any other.
+        let mut with_laptop = expected.clone();
+        with_laptop.push(laptop.nostr_pubkey.unwrap().to_ascii_lowercase());
+        with_laptop.sort();
+        assert_eq!(
+            mgr.app_signable_nostr_pubkeys("").await.unwrap(),
+            with_laptop.join(",")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn app_owner_pubkeys_reject_malformed_key_material() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let mgr = IdentityManager::new(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+        let identity = mgr
+            .create("Owner".into(), IdentityPurpose::Personal)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let path = mgr.identities_dir.join(format!("{}.json", identity.id));
+        let original = fs::read(&path).await.unwrap();
+        for invalid in ["", "not-a-key", "owner,another-owner", "\nINJECTED=true"] {
+            let mut data: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&original).unwrap();
+            data["nostr_pubkey_hex"] = serde_json::json!(invalid);
+            fs::write(&path, serde_json::to_vec(&data).unwrap())
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert!(mgr.app_signable_nostr_pubkeys("").await.is_err());
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn app_signable_nostr_pubkeys_is_empty_with_only_the_node_identity() {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        let mgr = IdentityManager::new(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+        let node_key = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
+        let node_pubkey_hex = hex::encode(node_key.verifying_key().as_bytes());
+        mgr.create_from_signing_key("Node".to_string(), IdentityPurpose::Personal, node_key)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            mgr.app_signable_nostr_pubkeys(&node_pubkey_hex)
+                .await
+                .unwrap(),
+            ""
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_delete_default_shifts() {
         let dir = tempdir().unwrap();

core/archipelago/src/main.rs

@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ mod node_message;
 mod nostr_discovery;
 mod nostr_handshake;
 mod nostr_relays;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod nostr_security_tests;
 mod peers;
 mod port_allocator;
 mod rate_limit;

core/archipelago/src/mesh/flash.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
 //! to a full chip erase before write.
 //!
 //! MeshCore and Meshtastic are flashed the same way: download a released
-//! image, `esptool erase_flash`, then `esptool write_flash 0x0 <image>`.
+//! image, verify it, then run `write_flash --erase-all 0x0 <image>` with
+//! the packaged esptool executable.
 //! Reticulum/RNode is different: `archy-rnodeconf --autoinstall` owns the
 //! whole fetch+erase+flash+EEPROM-bootstrap sequence itself (confirmed live
 //! via `archy-rnodeconf --help` — there is no raw esptool path exposed for
@@ -49,32 +50,18 @@ impl FlashBoard {
     }
 }
 
-/// Map a detected USB vid:pid to a known flashable board, using the same
-/// table as `image-recipe/configs/99-mesh-radio.rules`. CP2102 (10c4:ea60)
-/// is confirmed there as Heltec V3's USB-UART bridge chip, and is safe to
-/// auto-match since that vid:pid is bridge-chip-specific.
-///
-/// Heltec V4 is NOT auto-matchable and deliberately has no entry here: it
-/// was confirmed live (real hardware, 2026-07-23) to use the ESP32-S3's
-/// built-in native-USB JTAG/serial peripheral, reporting vid:pid 303a:1001
-/// with product string "USB JTAG/serial debug unit" — that descriptor is
-/// baked into the chip's ROM and is IDENTICAL across every ESP32-S3 board
-/// with native USB enabled, not just Heltec V4. Adding `303a:1001 =>
-/// HeltecV4` here would silently misidentify any other native-USB ESP32-S3
-/// board (a T3-S3, a bare devkit, etc.) as a V4 and risk writing the wrong
-/// board's image. Callers (the RPC layer / frontend) must let the user pick
-/// the board manually whenever this returns `None`.
-pub fn resolve_flash_board(info: &DetectedDeviceInfo) -> Option<FlashBoard> {
-    match (info.vid.as_deref(), info.pid.as_deref()) {
-        (Some("10c4"), Some("ea60")) => Some(FlashBoard::HeltecV3),
-        _ => None,
-    }
+/// Generic CP2102 and native ESP32-S3 USB IDs identify adapters/chips, not
+/// board wiring. Require an explicit board until a board-specific identity is
+/// available; guessing a Heltec model can write incompatible firmware.
+pub fn resolve_flash_board(_info: &DetectedDeviceInfo) -> Option<FlashBoard> {
+    None
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
 pub enum FlashStage {
     Downloading,
+    Preparing,
     Erasing,
     Writing,
     Autoinstalling,
@@ -101,11 +88,10 @@ const LOG_TAIL_MAX: usize = 200;
 /// start opening the port (which itself toggles DTR/RTS) again.
 const POST_FLASH_SETTLE_DELAY: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);
 
-/// Absolute ceiling on a whole flash job (download + erase + write, or
-/// autoinstall), regardless of what it's doing internally. Last-resort
-/// safety net so a hang anywhere can't wedge the single-flash-job guard
-/// forever — generous enough to never trigger on a legitimately slow
-/// multi-hundred-MB transfer.
+/// Deadline for preparation and warning threshold for the active flasher.
+/// A download can be cancelled safely. An active write retains ownership until
+/// its subprocess exits, even after this threshold: reporting an aborted job
+/// while a detached writer continues would let a retry corrupt the device.
 const MAX_JOB_DURATION: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(15 * 60);
 
 /// How long to wait for MeshService::stop() to release the serial port
@@ -247,6 +233,16 @@ fn firmware_cache_dir(data_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
     data_dir.join("mesh").join("firmware-cache")
 }
 
+async fn invalidate_radio_settings_marker(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    // A full-chip flash erased the device's preferences. A previous host-side
+    // marker is no longer evidence that this radio has the requested settings.
+    match tokio::fs::remove_file(data_dir.join("meshcore-radio-params.json")).await {
+        Ok(()) => Ok(()),
+        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Ok(()),
+        Err(error) => Err(error).context("Firmware written, but old radio-settings marker could not be cleared; reconnect is paused"),
+    }
+}
+
 /// No blanket `.timeout()` here on purpose: reqwest's request timeout covers
 /// the *entire* request including streaming the response body, which would
 /// kill a legitimate large download partway through (Meshtastic's esp32s3
@@ -314,6 +310,10 @@ pub async fn list_firmware(family: DeviceType) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
 struct GithubAsset {
     name: String,
     browser_download_url: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    size: Option<u64>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    digest: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
@@ -322,8 +322,24 @@ struct GithubRelease {
     assets: Vec<GithubAsset>,
 }
 
+async fn register_flash_job(handle: &FlashJobHandle, job: &Arc<FlashJob>) -> Result<()> {
+    // Keep checking and registering under one lock: concurrent RPCs must
+    // never start two writers on the same device.
+    let mut existing = handle.try_write().map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "The radio is being inspected or reconfigured; wait for that operation to finish before flashing"
+        ))?;
+    if let Some(current) = existing.as_ref() {
+        if !current.snapshot().await.done {
+            anyhow::bail!("A firmware flash is already in progress on this node");
+        }
+    }
+    *existing = Some(Arc::clone(job));
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// Start a flash job in the background. Returns as soon as the job has been
-/// registered and the listener released — callers poll `FlashJobHandle` via
+/// registered — preparation and listener shutdown run in the background.
+/// Callers poll `FlashJobHandle` via
 /// `mesh.flash-status` for progress. Only one job may be in flight at a time.
 pub async fn start_flash_job(
     handle: &FlashJobHandle,
@@ -333,21 +349,44 @@ pub async fn start_flash_job(
     board: FlashBoard,
     family: DeviceType,
 ) -> Result<()> {
-    {
-        let existing = handle.read().await;
-        if let Some(job) = existing.as_ref() {
-            if !job.snapshot().await.done {
-                anyhow::bail!("A firmware flash is already in progress on this node");
-            }
-        }
+    // Missing/corrupt tooling must fail before stopping a working radio or
+    // registering a job that can never reach the serial device.
+    if matches!(family, DeviceType::Meshtastic | DeviceType::Meshcore) {
+        preflight_esptool().await?;
     }
-
     let job = FlashJob::new(board, family, path.clone());
-    *handle.write().await = Some(Arc::clone(&job));
+    register_flash_job(handle, &job).await?;
 
     let bg_job = Arc::clone(&job);
     let bg_service = Arc::clone(mesh_service);
     let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+        // Downloads and checksum checks do not need exclusive serial access.
+        // Keep a working listener alive if upstream/download verification fails.
+        let prepared_image = if matches!(family, DeviceType::Meshcore | DeviceType::Meshtastic) {
+            match tokio::time::timeout(
+                MAX_JOB_DURATION,
+                fetch_esptool_image(board, family, &data_dir, &bg_job),
+            )
+            .await
+            {
+                Ok(Ok(image)) => Some(image),
+                result => {
+                    let error = match result {
+                        Ok(Err(error)) => error,
+                        _ => anyhow::anyhow!(
+                            "Firmware download exceeded the time limit; radio was not changed"
+                        ),
+                    };
+                    bg_job.fail(&error).await;
+                    return;
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            None
+        };
+        // Cancellation is safe during download. Once listener shutdown starts,
+        // allow that bounded operation to finish instead of orphaning its task.
+        bg_job.set_stage(FlashStage::Preparing).await;
         // esptool/archy-rnodeconf need exclusive serial access — release
         // the listener's hold on the port before touching it. This USED
         // TO run synchronously in start_flash_job before the job was even
@@ -404,17 +443,31 @@ pub async fn start_flash_job(
         // subsequent mesh.flash-device call failed with "already in
         // progress" until the service was restarted). Generous enough that
         // a legitimately slow multi-hundred-MB transfer still completes.
-        let result = match tokio::time::timeout(
-            MAX_JOB_DURATION,
-            run_flash(board, family, &data_dir, &path, &bg_job),
-        )
-        .await
-        {
+        let flash = run_flash(
+            board,
+            family,
+            &data_dir,
+            &path,
+            prepared_image.as_deref(),
+            &bg_job,
+        );
+        tokio::pin!(flash);
+        let result = match tokio::time::timeout(MAX_JOB_DURATION, &mut flash).await {
             Ok(inner) => inner,
-            Err(_) => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                "Flash job exceeded the {}-minute ceiling — aborted",
-                MAX_JOB_DURATION.as_secs() / 60
-            )),
+            Err(_) if bg_job.snapshot().await.stage == FlashStage::Downloading => Err(
+                anyhow::anyhow!("Firmware download exceeded the time limit; radio was not written"),
+            ),
+            Err(_) => {
+                // Dropping this future does NOT stop its flash subprocess.
+                // Keep the job busy until it exits, rather than allowing a
+                // second writer while the first one still owns the device.
+                bg_job.push_log("Flashing is taking longer than expected; waiting for the active tool to exit before allowing another operation").await;
+                flash.await
+            }
+        };
+        let result = match result {
+            Ok(()) => invalidate_radio_settings_marker(&data_dir).await,
+            error => error,
         };
         let succeeded = result.is_ok();
 
@@ -423,7 +476,6 @@ pub async fn start_flash_job(
                 bg_job
                     .push_log("Flash completed successfully".to_string())
                     .await;
-                bg_job.finish().await;
                 info!(path = %path, board = ?board, family = %family, "LoRa firmware flash succeeded");
             }
             Err(e) => {
@@ -434,7 +486,6 @@ pub async fn start_flash_job(
                 // erase_flash failed", no actual esptool stderr).
                 warn!(path = %path, error = %format!("{e:#}"), "LoRa firmware flash failed");
                 bg_job.push_log(format!("ERROR: {e:#}")).await;
-                bg_job.fail(e).await;
             }
         }
 
@@ -450,6 +501,9 @@ pub async fn start_flash_job(
         }
 
         if !succeeded {
+            if let Err(error) = &result {
+                bg_job.fail(error).await;
+            }
             // Deliberately do NOT auto-restart the listener here. A failed
             // flash means we can't vouch for the board's state — reopening
             // the port immediately (esptool/rnodeconf's own reset sequence
@@ -499,6 +553,7 @@ pub async fn start_flash_job(
                 Err(e) => warn!(error = %e, "Failed to load mesh config after flash"),
             }
         }
+        bg_job.finish().await;
     });
     *job.abort_handle.write().await = Some(task.abort_handle());
 
@@ -510,12 +565,13 @@ async fn run_flash(
     family: DeviceType,
     data_dir: &Path,
     path: &str,
+    prepared_image: Option<&Path>,
     job: &Arc<FlashJob>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     match family {
         DeviceType::Meshtastic | DeviceType::Meshcore => {
-            let image = fetch_esptool_image(board, family, data_dir, job).await?;
-            esptool_erase_and_write(path, &image, job).await
+            let image = prepared_image.context("Firmware was not prepared before serial access")?;
+            esptool_erase_and_write(path, image, job).await
         }
         DeviceType::Reticulum => {
             let lora_region = super::load_config(data_dir)
@@ -664,15 +720,65 @@ async fn fetch_meshcore_image(
             anyhow::anyhow!("No matching MeshCore image in release {}", release.tag_name)
         })?;
 
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        Path::new(&asset.name)
+            .file_name()
+            .and_then(|name| name.to_str())
+            == Some(asset.name.as_str()),
+        "Invalid firmware asset filename"
+    );
     let out_path = cache.join(&asset.name);
     if tokio::fs::metadata(&out_path).await.is_ok() {
-        job.push_log(format!("Using cached {}", asset.name)).await;
-        return Ok(out_path);
+        if verify_meshcore_asset(&out_path, asset).await.is_ok() {
+            job.push_log(format!("Using verified cached {}", asset.name))
+                .await;
+            return Ok(out_path);
+        }
+        tokio::fs::remove_file(&out_path)
+            .await
+            .context("Removing invalid cached firmware")?;
+        job.push_log("Cached firmware failed verification; downloading a fresh copy")
+            .await;
     }
     download_to_file(client, &asset.browser_download_url, &out_path, job).await?;
+    if let Err(error) = verify_meshcore_asset(&out_path, asset).await {
+        // A partial/unverified download must not become next attempt's cache.
+        let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&out_path).await;
+        return Err(error);
+    }
     Ok(out_path)
 }
 
+async fn verify_meshcore_asset(path: &Path, asset: &GithubAsset) -> Result<()> {
+    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+    let size = asset
+        .size
+        .context("MeshCore release did not provide firmware size")?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        (1..=16 * 1024 * 1024).contains(&size),
+        "Invalid MeshCore firmware size"
+    );
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        tokio::fs::metadata(path).await?.len() == size,
+        "Firmware size mismatch; radio was not written"
+    );
+    let expected = asset
+        .digest
+        .as_deref()
+        .and_then(|value| value.strip_prefix("sha256:"))
+        .context("MeshCore release did not provide a SHA-256 checksum")?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        expected.len() == 64 && expected.bytes().all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_hexdigit()),
+        "Invalid MeshCore release checksum"
+    );
+    let actual = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(tokio::fs::read(path).await?));
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        actual.eq_ignore_ascii_case(expected),
+        "Firmware checksum mismatch; radio was not written"
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 async fn download_to_file(
     client: &reqwest::Client,
     url: &str,
@@ -722,7 +828,8 @@ async fn download_to_file(
             }
         }
     }
-    file.flush().await.ok();
+    file.flush().await.context("Flushing firmware download")?;
+    file.sync_all().await.context("Saving firmware download")?;
     tokio::fs::rename(&tmp, dest)
         .await
         .context("Finalizing firmware download")?;
@@ -773,19 +880,10 @@ async fn esptool_erase_and_write(path: &str, image: &Path, job: &Arc<FlashJob>)
 /// Building global args separately from subcommand args keeps this correct
 /// by construction instead of relying on call-site ordering.
 ///
-/// Normal stub-loader mode (no --no-stub) needs the esp32s3 stub flasher
-/// blob at /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/esptool/targets/stub_flasher/
-/// stub_flasher_32s3.json — Debian's `esptool` package (4.7.0+dfsg-0.1)
-/// ships without it (stripped for DFSG compliance: the prebuilt blob has no
-/// buildable-from-source path Debian could verify), so scripts/self-update.sh
-/// fetches the exact same file from the matching upstream esptool release
-/// tag and installs it alongside the apt package (see the esptool install
-/// step there). --no-stub (talk directly to the ROM bootloader, skip the
-/// stub) was tried first and works for connecting, but the ROM bootloader
-/// doesn't implement a full-chip-erase opcode at all — only the stub does —
-/// so --no-stub broke our "always erase before write" default outright
-/// rather than just being slower. Restoring the real stub file is the
-/// correct fix, not routing around its absence.
+/// Normal stub-loader mode is required for full-chip erase. The packaged
+/// archy-esptool includes and self-tests Espressif's ESP32-S3 stub. Debian's
+/// stripped esptool package alone did not provide that resource, so changing
+/// flags to --no-stub cannot repair this operation.
 fn esptool_global_args<'a>(path: &'a str, baud: Option<&'a str>) -> Vec<&'a str> {
     let mut args = vec!["--chip", ESPTOOL_CHIP, "--port", path];
     if let Some(b) = baud {
@@ -795,24 +893,96 @@ fn esptool_global_args<'a>(path: &'a str, baud: Option<&'a str>) -> Vec<&'a str>
     args
 }
 
+fn esptool_executable() -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let mut candidates = vec![PathBuf::from("/usr/local/bin/archy-esptool")];
+    if let Some(paths) = std::env::var_os("PATH") {
+        for directory in std::env::split_paths(&paths) {
+            for name in ["esptool", "esptool.py"] {
+                candidates.push(directory.join(name));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    executable_from_candidates(candidates)
+}
+
+fn executable_from_candidates(candidates: impl IntoIterator<Item = PathBuf>) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+    candidates.into_iter().find(|path| {
+        path.is_file() && path.metadata().is_ok_and(|metadata| metadata.permissions().mode() & 0o111 != 0)
+    }).ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!(
+        "Radio flashing tools are missing. Install the complete Archipelago update and retry; the radio has not been changed."
+    ))
+}
+
+async fn preflight_esptool() -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let executable = esptool_executable()?;
+    check_esptool(&executable).await?;
+    Ok(executable)
+}
+
+async fn check_esptool(executable: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut command = Command::new(executable);
+    command
+        .arg(
+            if executable
+                .file_name()
+                .is_some_and(|name| name == "archy-esptool")
+            {
+                "--archy-self-test"
+            } else {
+                "version"
+            },
+        )
+        .kill_on_drop(true);
+    let output = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(20), command.output())
+        .await
+        .context("Radio flashing tool did not respond; the radio has not been changed")?
+        .context("Radio flashing tool could not start; check its installation and permissions")?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        output.status.success(),
+        "Radio flashing tool self-check failed; reinstall the complete update before retrying"
+    );
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn retryable_flash_error(error: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
+    if error
+        .chain()
+        .any(|cause| cause.downcast_ref::<std::io::Error>().is_some())
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+    let detail = format!("{error:#}").to_lowercase();
+    [
+        "failed to connect",
+        "timed out waiting",
+        "invalid head of packet",
+        "serial data stream stopped",
+    ]
+    .iter()
+    .any(|message| detail.contains(message))
+}
+
 async fn esptool_with_retry(path: &str, subcommand: &[&str], job: &Arc<FlashJob>) -> Result<()> {
-    let mut cmd = Command::new("esptool");
+    let executable = preflight_esptool().await?;
+    let mut cmd = Command::new(&executable);
     cmd.args(esptool_global_args(path, None));
     cmd.args(subcommand);
     match run_streamed(cmd, None, job).await {
         Ok(()) => Ok(()),
-        Err(first_err) => {
+        Err(first_err) if retryable_flash_error(&first_err) => {
             job.push_log(format!(
                 "First attempt failed ({first_err:#}); retrying once at {ESPTOOL_FALLBACK_BAUD} baud"
             ))
             .await;
-            let mut retry = Command::new("esptool");
+            let mut retry = Command::new(&executable);
             retry.args(esptool_global_args(path, Some(ESPTOOL_FALLBACK_BAUD)));
             retry.args(subcommand);
             run_streamed(retry, None, job)
                 .await
                 .context(format!("retry also failed (first attempt: {first_err:#})"))
         }
+        Err(error) => Err(error),
     }
 }
 
@@ -990,3 +1160,159 @@ async fn run_streamed(mut cmd: Command, stdin: Option<Vec<u8>>, job: &Arc<FlashJ
     }
     Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod flashing_regression_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn full_flash_invalidates_only_radio_settings_marker() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let marker = dir.path().join("meshcore-radio-params.json");
+        tokio::fs::write(&marker, b"old settings").await.unwrap();
+        let other = dir.path().join("mesh-config.json");
+        tokio::fs::write(&other, b"preserved").await.unwrap();
+        invalidate_radio_settings_marker(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(!marker.exists());
+        assert_eq!(tokio::fs::read(&other).await.unwrap(), b"preserved");
+        invalidate_radio_settings_marker(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::create_dir(&marker).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(invalidate_radio_settings_marker(dir.path()).await.is_err());
+    }
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn meshcore_cache_requires_release_size_and_checksum() {
+        use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let file = dir.path().join("fixture.bin");
+        tokio::fs::write(&file, b"firmware fixture").await.unwrap();
+        let mut asset = GithubAsset {
+            name: "fixture.bin".into(),
+            browser_download_url: "https://example.invalid/fixture.bin".into(),
+            size: Some(16),
+            digest: Some(format!(
+                "sha256:{}",
+                hex::encode(Sha256::digest(b"firmware fixture"))
+            )),
+        };
+        assert!(verify_meshcore_asset(&file, &asset).await.is_ok());
+        tokio::fs::write(&file, b"tampered fixture").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(verify_meshcore_asset(&file, &asset).await.is_err());
+        tokio::fs::write(&file, b"short").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(verify_meshcore_asset(&file, &asset).await.is_err());
+        tokio::fs::write(&file, b"firmware fixture").await.unwrap();
+        asset.digest = None;
+        assert!(verify_meshcore_asset(&file, &asset).await.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generic_usb_ids_do_not_select_firmware() {
+        for (vid, pid) in [("10c4", "ea60"), ("303a", "1001")] {
+            let info = DetectedDeviceInfo {
+                path: "/dev/fixture".into(),
+                vid: Some(vid.into()),
+                pid: Some(pid.into()),
+                product: None,
+                manufacturer: None,
+                plugged_at: None,
+            };
+            assert_eq!(resolve_flash_board(&info), None);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn absent_nonexecutable_and_directory_candidates_are_rejected() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let file = dir.path().join("flasher");
+        std::fs::write(&file, "#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n").unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&file, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
+        assert!(executable_from_candidates([
+            dir.path().join("absent"),
+            file.clone(),
+            dir.path().to_path_buf()
+        ])
+        .is_err());
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&file, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(executable_from_candidates([file.clone()]).unwrap(), file);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn flasher_preflight_reports_missing_interpreter_and_failed_self_check() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let file = dir.path().join("archy-esptool");
+        for script in ["#!/missing/python\n", "#!/bin/sh\nexit 7\n"] {
+            std::fs::write(&file, script).unwrap();
+            std::fs::set_permissions(&file, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
+            assert!(check_esptool(&file).await.is_err());
+        }
+        std::fs::write(&file, "#!/bin/sh\n[ \"$1\" = --archy-self-test ]\n").unwrap();
+        assert!(check_esptool(&file).await.is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn flash_registration_excludes_other_writers_and_active_probes() {
+        let handle = new_job_handle();
+        let first = FlashJob::new(
+            FlashBoard::HeltecV3,
+            DeviceType::Meshcore,
+            "/dev/fixture".into(),
+        );
+        let second = FlashJob::new(
+            FlashBoard::HeltecV3,
+            DeviceType::Meshcore,
+            "/dev/fixture".into(),
+        );
+        let probe = handle.read().await;
+        assert!(register_flash_job(&handle, &first).await.is_err());
+        drop(probe);
+        let (a, b) = tokio::join!(
+            register_flash_job(&handle, &first),
+            register_flash_job(&handle, &second)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(usize::from(a.is_ok()) + usize::from(b.is_ok()), 1);
+        handle.read().await.as_ref().unwrap().finish().await;
+        let next = FlashJob::new(
+            FlashBoard::HeltecV3,
+            DeviceType::Meshcore,
+            "/dev/fixture".into(),
+        );
+        assert!(register_flash_job(&handle, &next).await.is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn retries_only_known_serial_transport_failures() {
+        for kind in [
+            std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound,
+            std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
+        ] {
+            assert!(!retryable_flash_error(
+                &anyhow::Error::from(std::io::Error::from(kind))
+                    .context("Failed to start subprocess")
+            ));
+        }
+        for message in [
+            "Wrong chip",
+            "Invalid image",
+            "module missing",
+            "permission denied",
+            "port is busy",
+        ] {
+            assert!(!retryable_flash_error(&anyhow::anyhow!(message)));
+        }
+        assert!(retryable_flash_error(&anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "Failed to connect to ESP32-S3: timed out waiting for packet header"
+        )));
+        assert_eq!(
+            esptool_global_args("/dev/fixture", Some("115200")),
+            [
+                "--chip",
+                "esp32s3",
+                "--port",
+                "/dev/fixture",
+                "--baud",
+                "115200"
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/mesh/mod.rs

@@ -1092,6 +1092,14 @@ impl MeshService {
         let (new_tx, new_rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(32);
         *self.state.cmd_tx.write().await = new_tx;
         self.cmd_rx = Some(new_rx);
+        {
+            let mut status = self.state.status.write().await;
+            status.device_connected = false;
+            status.device_path = None;
+            status.firmware_version = None;
+            status.self_node_id = None;
+            status.peer_count = 0;
+        }
         info!("Mesh service stopped");
     }
 
@@ -2321,7 +2329,10 @@ impl MeshService {
             }
         }
 
-        let was_enabled = self.config.enabled;
+        let listener_running = self
+            .listener_handle
+            .as_ref()
+            .is_some_and(|handle| !handle.is_finished());
         let needs_session_restart = session_config_changed(&self.config, &config);
         self.config = config.clone();
 
@@ -2335,10 +2346,13 @@ impl MeshService {
                 .unwrap_or_else(|| "archipelago".to_string());
         }
 
-        // If enabled state changed, start/stop the listener
-        if config.enabled && !was_enabled {
+        // Reconcile desired state with the actual task, not the old enabled
+        // flag. A failed flash can stop the task while keeping enabled=true;
+        // explicitly reconnecting with the same settings must restart it.
+        if config.enabled && !listener_running {
+            self.stop().await;
             self.start()?;
-        } else if !config.enabled && was_enabled {
+        } else if !config.enabled {
             self.stop().await;
             // Clear connected state
             let mut status = self.state.status.write().await;
@@ -2347,7 +2361,7 @@ impl MeshService {
             status.firmware_version = None;
             status.self_node_id = None;
             status.peer_count = 0;
-        } else if config.enabled && was_enabled && needs_session_restart {
+        } else if needs_session_restart {
             info!("Mesh session config changed — restarting listener to apply");
             self.stop().await;
             self.start()?;
@@ -2537,6 +2551,41 @@ mod tests {
     }
     use super::*;
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn reconnect_with_unchanged_enabled_config_restarts_stopped_listener() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7; 32]);
+        let public = hex::encode(key.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+        let did = crate::identity::did_key_from_pubkey_hex(&public).unwrap();
+        let config = MeshConfig {
+            enabled: true,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        save_config(dir.path(), &config).await.unwrap();
+        let mut service = MeshService::new(dir.path(), &key, &did, &public)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(service.listener_handle.is_none());
+        service.configure(config.clone()).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(service.listener_handle.is_some());
+        service.stop().await;
+        assert!(service.config.enabled);
+        service.configure(config.clone()).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(service.listener_handle.is_some());
+        service.stop().await;
+        service.listener_handle = Some(tokio::spawn(async {}));
+        tokio::task::yield_now().await;
+        service.configure(config).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(!service.listener_handle.as_ref().unwrap().is_finished());
+        service.stop().await;
+        let disabled = MeshConfig {
+            enabled: false,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        service.configure(disabled).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(service.listener_handle.is_none());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn session_config_change_detection() {
         let base = MeshConfig::default();

core/archipelago/src/mesh/protocol.rs

@@ -378,6 +378,19 @@ fn decode_mesh_name(bytes: &[u8], fallback: &str) -> String {
 /// Parse RESP_DEVICE_INFO (0x0D) response.
 /// Returns firmware version string and device capabilities.
 pub fn parse_device_info(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(String, u16)> {
+    // Official companion v3+ binary layout: protocol, half-capacity,
+    // channels, PIN (4), build date (12), model (40), version (20).
+    // Verified against companion-v1.17.1 MyMesh.cpp and Heltec V3 readback.
+    if data
+        .first()
+        .is_some_and(|version| (3..=31).contains(version))
+    {
+        anyhow::ensure!(data.len() >= 79, "Truncated MeshCore device info");
+        return Ok((
+            decode_mesh_name(&data[59..79], "unknown"),
+            u16::from(data[1]) * 2,
+        ));
+    }
     // Device info format varies by firmware version.
     // Minimum: firmware version string (null-terminated) + max_contacts (u16 LE)
     if data.is_empty() {
@@ -404,6 +417,15 @@ pub fn parse_self_info(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(u32, String)> {
         anyhow::bail!("Self info response too short: {} bytes", data.len());
     }
 
+    // Current companions send type/power/max-power, public key (32),
+    // position (8), four preference bytes, RF parameters (10), then name.
+    if data.len() >= 57 {
+        let node_id = u32::from_le_bytes(data[3..7].try_into().unwrap());
+        return Ok((
+            node_id,
+            decode_mesh_name(&data[57..], &format!("node-{node_id:08x}")),
+        ));
+    }
     let node_id = u32::from_le_bytes([data[0], data[1], data[2], data[3]]);
 
     // Name follows after fixed fields. A firmware whose fixed-field layout
@@ -966,4 +988,24 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_parse_self_info_too_short() {
         assert!(parse_self_info(&[0x01, 0x02]).is_err());
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn current_companion_binary_metadata_is_not_a_name_or_version() {
+        let mut info = vec![0u8; 81];
+        info[0] = 13;
+        info[1] = 150;
+        info[19..28].copy_from_slice(b"Heltec V3");
+        info[59..74].copy_from_slice(b"v1.17.1-d929643");
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_device_info(&info).unwrap(),
+            ("v1.17.1-d929643".into(), 300)
+        );
+        assert!(parse_device_info(&info[..78]).is_err());
+        let mut own = vec![0u8; 57];
+        own[0..3].copy_from_slice(&[1, 22, 22]);
+        own[3..7].copy_from_slice(&42u32.to_le_bytes());
+        own[47..51].copy_from_slice(&869618u32.to_le_bytes());
+        own.extend_from_slice(b"My radio");
+        assert_eq!(parse_self_info(&own).unwrap(), (42, "My radio".into()));
+    }
 }

core/archipelago/src/mesh/reticulum.rs

@@ -277,6 +277,19 @@ fn terminate_group(child: &Child) {
     }
 }
 
+/// Own the daemon during its asynchronous handshake too. Cancellation drops
+/// the future without executing an error branch; a bare Child would survive
+/// and keep the serial port open even though the listener had stopped.
+struct StartingDaemon(Option<Child>);
+
+impl Drop for StartingDaemon {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        if let Some(child) = self.0.as_ref() {
+            terminate_group(child);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// One peer learned via an RNS announce (LXMF delivery destination).
 #[derive(Clone)]
 struct ReticulumPeer {
@@ -517,10 +530,10 @@ impl ReticulumLink {
         let child = cmd
             .spawn()
             .context("Failed to spawn reticulum-daemon — is it installed/packaged?")?;
+        let mut starting = StartingDaemon(Some(child));
 
         // Wait for the socket to appear, then for the daemon's "ready" event.
-        // Runs as a block so every failure path tears the just-spawned daemon
-        // group down via `terminate_group` (the child has no `kill_on_drop`).
+        // StartingDaemon tears the group down on errors AND cancellation.
         let init = async {
             let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(15);
             let stream = loop {
@@ -560,20 +573,17 @@ impl ReticulumLink {
                 dest_hash = %dest_hash_hex,
                 "Reticulum daemon ready"
             );
-            Ok((write_half, reader, dest_hash, display_name))
-        };
-        let (write_half, reader, dest_hash, display_name) = match init.await {
-            Ok(parts) => parts,
-            Err(e) => {
-                terminate_group(&child);
-                return Err(e);
-            }
+            Ok::<_, anyhow::Error>((write_half, reader, dest_hash, display_name))
         };
+        let (write_half, reader, dest_hash, display_name) = init.await?;
 
         let mut link = Self {
             device_path: label,
             socket_path,
-            child,
+            child: starting
+                .0
+                .take()
+                .expect("starting daemon is owned until ready"),
             writer: write_half,
             reader,
             dest_hash,
@@ -1557,6 +1567,33 @@ impl Drop for ReticulumLink {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cancelled_daemon_handshake_terminates_child() {
+        let (started, ready) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
+        let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let child = Command::new("sleep")
+                .arg("60")
+                .process_group(0)
+                .spawn()
+                .unwrap();
+            let pid = child.id().unwrap();
+            let _starting = StartingDaemon(Some(child));
+            started.send(pid).unwrap();
+            std::future::pending::<()>().await;
+        });
+        let pid = ready.await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(unsafe { libc::kill(pid as i32, 0) }, 0);
+        task.abort();
+        assert!(task.await.unwrap_err().is_cancelled());
+        tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(3), async {
+            while unsafe { libc::kill(pid as i32, 0) } == 0 {
+                tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)).await;
+            }
+        })
+        .await
+        .expect("cancelled handshake left its child alive");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn announced_name_precedence() {
         // Daemon-decoded LXMF name always wins.

core/archipelago/src/mesh/serial.rs

@@ -146,12 +146,16 @@ impl MeshcoreDevice {
             }
         }
 
-        let info = DeviceInfo {
-            firmware_version: name.clone(),
+        let mut info = DeviceInfo {
+            firmware_version: "unknown".to_string(),
             node_id,
             max_contacts: 100,
             device_type: super::types::DeviceType::Meshcore,
         };
+        if let Some((version, capacity)) = self.query_device_info().await {
+            info.firmware_version = version;
+            info.max_contacts = capacity;
+        }
         self.device_info = Some(info.clone());
 
         info!("Meshcore initialization complete on {}", self.device_path);

core/archipelago/src/nostr_security_tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+//! Compatibility and hostile-relay regression tests for the 0.44 security update.
+//! Loopback sockets run only through scripts/test-backend-isolated.sh.
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::*;
+
+#[test]
+fn native_signer_encryption_remains_compatible_and_rejects_hostile_payloads() {
+    let alice = Keys::generate();
+    let bob = Keys::generate();
+    let message = "Archipelago signing compatibility — \u{1f30a}";
+    let encrypted = nip44::encrypt(
+        alice.secret_key(),
+        &bob.public_key(),
+        message,
+        nip44::Version::V2,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        nip44::decrypt(bob.secret_key(), &alice.public_key(), &encrypted).unwrap(),
+        message
+    );
+    let encrypted = nip04::encrypt(alice.secret_key(), &bob.public_key(), message).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        nip04::decrypt(bob.secret_key(), &alice.public_key(), encrypted).unwrap(),
+        message
+    );
+    // Valid v2 prefix followed by a payload exceeding the codec's maximum.
+    // This must fail at the size gate, before allocation/decoding/HMAC work.
+    let oversized = format!("AgAA{}", "A".repeat(100_000));
+    assert!(matches!(
+        nip44::decrypt(bob.secret_key(), &alice.public_key(), oversized),
+        Err(nip44::Error::MessageTooLong)
+    ));
+    for malformed in ["", "Ag==", "not base64!", "?iv=", "YQ==?iv=YQ=="] {
+        assert!(nip04::decrypt(bob.secret_key(), &alice.public_key(), malformed).is_err());
+        assert!(nip44::decrypt(bob.secret_key(), &alice.public_key(), malformed).is_err());
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn relay_cannot_substitute_forged_fields_for_a_known_event_id() {
+    use futures_util::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
+    use tokio::net::TcpListener;
+    use tokio_tungstenite::{accept_async, tungstenite::Message};
+    let test = async {
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let known = EventBuilder::text_note("already verified")
+            .sign_with_keys(&author)
+            .unwrap();
+        let valid = EventBuilder::text_note("new legitimate message")
+            .sign_with_keys(&author)
+            .unwrap();
+        let mut forged_content = known.clone();
+        forged_content.content = "forged content".into();
+        let mut forged_author = known.clone();
+        forged_author.pubkey = Keys::generate().public_key();
+        let mut forged_signature = known.clone();
+        forged_signature.sig = valid.sig;
+        for forged in [&forged_content, &forged_author, &forged_signature] {
+            assert!(forged.verify().is_err());
+        }
+        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let url = format!("ws://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
+        let expected_id = valid.id;
+        let relay = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let (socket, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
+            let mut socket = accept_async(socket).await.unwrap();
+            while let Some(message) = socket.next().await {
+                let text = match message.unwrap() {
+                    Message::Text(text) => text,
+                    Message::Ping(payload) => {
+                        socket.send(Message::Pong(payload)).await.unwrap();
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    Message::Close(_) => break,
+                    _ => continue,
+                };
+                let message: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&text).unwrap();
+                if message[0] != "REQ" {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let subscription = message[1].as_str().unwrap();
+                for event in [&forged_content, &forged_author, &forged_signature, &valid] {
+                    socket
+                        .send(Message::Text(
+                            serde_json::json!(["EVENT", subscription, event]).to_string(),
+                        ))
+                        .await
+                        .unwrap();
+                }
+                socket
+                    .send(Message::Text(
+                        serde_json::json!(["EOSE", subscription]).to_string(),
+                    ))
+                    .await
+                    .unwrap();
+            }
+        });
+        let client = Client::new(Keys::generate());
+        client.database().save_event(&known).await.unwrap();
+        client.add_relay(&url).await.unwrap();
+        client
+            .try_connect_relay(&url, std::time::Duration::from_secs(3))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let events = client
+            .fetch_events(
+                Filter::new().kind(Kind::TextNote),
+                std::time::Duration::from_secs(5),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            events.len(),
+            1,
+            "forged events must never reach SDK consumers"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(events.iter().next().unwrap().id, expected_id);
+        client.disconnect().await;
+        relay.abort();
+    };
+    tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15), test)
+        .await
+        .expect("local relay test timed out");
+}

core/archipelago/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ impl EndpointRateLimiter {
         limits.insert("wallet.send".to_string(), (5usize, 300u64));
         limits.insert("wallet.ecash-send".to_string(), (10, 300));
         limits.insert("lnd.sendcoins".to_string(), (5, 300));
+        limits.insert("lnd.bump-submit".to_string(), (5, 300));
+        limits.insert("lnd.bump-quote".to_string(), (30, 60));
         limits.insert("lnd.payinvoice".to_string(), (10, 300));
         limits.insert("lnd.openchannel".to_string(), (3, 300));
         limits.insert("lnd.closechannel".to_string(), (3, 300));

core/archipelago/src/server.rs

@@ -1475,6 +1475,48 @@ pub fn is_peer_allowed_path(path: &str) -> bool {
         || path.starts_with("/dwn/")
 }
 
+/// The ordinary API listener is a management surface even when contacted
+/// directly, without host nginx. Peer traffic has its own path-restricted
+/// listener and retains its existing cryptographic authentication.
+fn management_peer_is_private(address: std::net::IpAddr) -> bool {
+    match address {
+        std::net::IpAddr::V4(ip) => {
+            ip.is_loopback()
+                || ip.is_private()
+                || ip.is_link_local()
+                || (ip.octets()[0] == 100 && (64..=127).contains(&ip.octets()[1]))
+        }
+        std::net::IpAddr::V6(ip) => {
+            if let Some(mapped) = ip.to_ipv4_mapped() {
+                management_peer_is_private(std::net::IpAddr::V4(mapped))
+            } else {
+                ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unique_local() || ip.is_unicast_link_local()
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn request_surface_allowed(
+    peer_only: bool,
+    peer: std::net::IpAddr,
+    request: &hyper::Request<hyper::Body>,
+) -> bool {
+    if peer_only {
+        return is_peer_allowed_path(request.uri().path());
+    }
+    // Keep purpose-built content/peer HTTP endpoints reachable with their
+    // existing handler-level checks. The general RPC dispatcher is a management
+    // surface here; only the dedicated peer listener retains public peer RPC.
+    if request.uri().path() != "/rpc/v1" && is_peer_allowed_path(request.uri().path()) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    management_peer_is_private(peer)
+        && !request
+            .headers()
+            .get("x-archipelago-public-ingress")
+            .is_some_and(|value| !value.as_bytes().is_empty())
+}
+
 async fn accept_loop(
     handler: Arc<ApiHandler>,
     listener: TcpListener,
@@ -1552,7 +1594,7 @@ async fn accept_loop(
                             // forwarded headers on loopback (nginx) connections.
                             req.extensions_mut()
                                 .insert(crate::api::rpc::PeerAddr(peer_addr));
-                            if peer_only && !is_peer_allowed_path(req.uri().path()) {
+                            if !request_surface_allowed(peer_only, peer_addr.ip(), &req) {
                                 let resp = hyper::Response::builder()
                                     .status(hyper::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND)
                                     .body(hyper::Body::empty())
@@ -2520,3 +2562,97 @@ mod merge_tests {
         );
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod management_surface_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn public_api_listener_rejects_management_despite_forged_headers() {
+        for peer in [
+            "198.18.0.2",
+            "2001:db8::2",
+            "::ffff:198.18.0.2",
+            "100.63.255.255",
+            "100.128.0.1",
+        ] {
+            for path in ["/", "/login", "/assets/index.js", "/rpc/v1", "/ws"] {
+                for method in ["GET", "POST"] {
+                    let request = hyper::Request::builder()
+                        .uri(path)
+                        .method(method)
+                        .header("host", "127.0.0.1")
+                        .header("x-forwarded-for", "127.0.0.1")
+                        .header("x-real-ip", "192.168.1.10")
+                        .body(hyper::Body::empty())
+                        .unwrap();
+                    assert!(
+                        !request_surface_allowed(false, peer.parse().unwrap(), &request),
+                        "{peer} {method} {path}"
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn private_management_and_restricted_peer_transport_remain_available() {
+        let mut request = hyper::Request::builder()
+            .uri("/rpc/v1")
+            .body(hyper::Body::empty())
+            .unwrap();
+        for peer in [
+            "127.0.0.1",
+            "10.0.0.2",
+            "172.16.0.2",
+            "192.168.1.2",
+            "169.254.1.2",
+            "100.64.0.1",
+            "100.127.255.254",
+            "::1",
+            "fd00::1",
+            "fe80::1",
+            "::ffff:192.168.1.2",
+        ] {
+            assert!(request_surface_allowed(
+                false,
+                peer.parse().unwrap(),
+                &request
+            ));
+        }
+        request
+            .headers_mut()
+            .insert("x-archipelago-public-ingress", "1".parse().unwrap());
+        assert!(!request_surface_allowed(
+            false,
+            "127.0.0.1".parse().unwrap(),
+            &request
+        ));
+        // The dedicated peer listener retains its existing signed RPC contract.
+        assert!(request_surface_allowed(
+            true,
+            "198.18.0.2".parse().unwrap(),
+            &request
+        ));
+        for path in [
+            "/content",
+            "/content/fixture/invoice",
+            "/blob/fixture",
+            "/dwn/health",
+            "/archipelago/node-message",
+        ] {
+            *request.uri_mut() = path.parse().unwrap();
+            assert!(request_surface_allowed(
+                false,
+                "198.18.0.2".parse().unwrap(),
+                &request
+            ));
+        }
+        *request.uri_mut() = "/login".parse().unwrap();
+        assert!(!request_surface_allowed(
+            true,
+            "198.18.0.2".parse().unwrap(),
+            &request
+        ));
+    }
+}

core/archipelago/src/update.rs

@@ -2059,6 +2059,25 @@ pub async fn rollback_update(data_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
 
     let backup_binary = backup_dir.join("archipelago");
     if backup_binary.exists() {
+        // The restored frontend can contain a pre-guard runtime template. An
+        // older binary copies that template verbatim on startup, undoing live
+        // containment. Protect it before permitting the binary downgrade.
+        let template = "/opt/archipelago/web-ui/archipelago-runtime/image-recipe/configs/nginx-archipelago.conf";
+        if Path::new(template).exists() {
+            let protected = host_sudo(&[
+                "python3",
+                "-c",
+                include_str!("../../../scripts/dashboard-public-guard.py"),
+                "--protect-template",
+                template,
+            ])
+            .await
+            .context("protect nginx runtime template before rollback")?;
+            anyhow::ensure!(
+                protected.success(),
+                "unsafe nginx rollback template; previous binary not restored"
+            );
+        }
         // Same two namespace gotchas as apply_update()'s binary swap:
         // `cp` straight onto the running binary is O_TRUNC and fails
         // ETXTBSY (exit 1 — exactly what broke the .116 rollback), and
@@ -2654,6 +2673,8 @@ mod tests {
 
     #[test]
     fn test_is_newer() {
+        assert!(is_newer("1.9.0-alpha", "1.8.22-alpha"));
+        assert!(!is_newer("1.9.0-alpha", "1.9.0-alpha"));
         assert!(is_newer("1.7.19-alpha", "1.7.18-alpha"));
         assert!(is_newer("1.8.0-alpha", "1.7.99-alpha"));
         assert!(is_newer("1.7.10-alpha", "1.7.9-alpha")); // numeric, not lexical

core/container/src/manifest.rs

@@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ pub struct ContainerConfig {
 
 /// Derived-env entry. The template is rendered against `HostFacts` at
 /// apply time; exactly one `{{PLACEHOLDER}}` occurrence per supported
-/// fact name is allowed (host_ip, host_mdns, disk_gb).
+/// fact name is allowed (host_ip, host_mdns, disk_gb, bitcoin_host,
+/// node_identity_pubkeys).
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct DerivedEnv {
     pub key: String,
@@ -1428,6 +1429,13 @@ pub struct HostFacts {
     /// right host. Both are reachable on archy-net by their container name;
     /// only the name differs. Falls back to `bitcoin-knots` when undetected.
     pub bitcoin_host: String,
+    /// Nostr public keys of the node's identities that the app identity
+    /// picker offers for signing (the node's own appliance key excluded),
+    /// as comma-joined, sorted, lowercase 64-char hex. Lets an app grant
+    /// the node's users owner rights (e.g. a Blossom server's allowed
+    /// uploaders). Empty unless a manifest templates it; the orchestrator
+    /// resolves it on demand and refuses to render an empty set.
+    pub node_identity_pubkeys: String,
 }
 
 impl HostFacts {
@@ -1439,13 +1447,20 @@ impl HostFacts {
             host_mdns: "test-node.local".to_string(),
             disk_gb: 2000,
             bitcoin_host: "bitcoin-knots".to_string(),
+            node_identity_pubkeys: "1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111,2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222".to_string(),
         }
     }
 }
 
 /// Supported placeholder names in `DerivedEnv::template`. Keep in sync
 /// with `HostFacts`. Centralized so validation and rendering agree.
-const DERIVED_PLACEHOLDERS: &[&str] = &["HOST_IP", "HOST_MDNS", "DISK_GB", "BITCOIN_HOST"];
+const DERIVED_PLACEHOLDERS: &[&str] = &[
+    "HOST_IP",
+    "HOST_MDNS",
+    "DISK_GB",
+    "BITCOIN_HOST",
+    "NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS",
+];
 
 fn validate_derived_template(key: &str, template: &str) -> Result<(), ManifestError> {
     // Walk `{{NAME}}` occurrences and ensure each NAME is recognized.
@@ -1529,7 +1544,8 @@ impl ContainerConfig {
                     .replace("{{HOST_IP}}", &facts.host_ip)
                     .replace("{{HOST_MDNS}}", &facts.host_mdns)
                     .replace("{{DISK_GB}}", &facts.disk_gb.to_string())
-                    .replace("{{BITCOIN_HOST}}", &facts.bitcoin_host);
+                    .replace("{{BITCOIN_HOST}}", &facts.bitcoin_host)
+                    .replace("{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}", &facts.node_identity_pubkeys);
                 format!("{}={}", e.key, value)
             })
             .collect()
@@ -2396,6 +2412,46 @@ app:
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn node_identity_pubkeys_placeholder_is_accepted() {
+        let yaml = r#"
+app:
+  id: wildbloom-node
+  name: Wildbloom Node
+  version: 0.2.2
+  container:
+    image: ghcr.io/forgesworn/wildbloom-node:0.2.2
+    derived_env:
+      - key: WILDBLOOM_ALLOW_PUBKEYS
+        template: "{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}"
+"#;
+        AppManifest::parse(yaml).expect("NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS is a supported placeholder");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_derived_env_renders_node_identity_pubkeys() {
+        let yaml = r#"
+app:
+  id: wildbloom-node
+  name: Wildbloom Node
+  version: 0.2.2
+  container:
+    image: ghcr.io/forgesworn/wildbloom-node:0.2.2
+    derived_env:
+      - key: WILDBLOOM_ALLOW_PUBKEYS
+        template: "{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}"
+"#;
+        let manifest = AppManifest::parse(yaml).unwrap();
+        let facts = HostFacts::sample();
+        assert_eq!(
+            manifest.app.container.resolve_derived_env(&facts),
+            vec![format!(
+                "WILDBLOOM_ALLOW_PUBKEYS={}",
+                facts.node_identity_pubkeys
+            )]
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn path_traversal_secret_file_is_rejected() {
         let yaml = r#"
@@ -2451,6 +2507,7 @@ app:
             host_mdns: "test-node.local".to_string(),
             disk_gb: 2000,
             bitcoin_host: "bitcoin-core".to_string(),
+            node_identity_pubkeys: String::new(),
         };
 
         let out = c.resolve_derived_env(&facts);

core/container/src/podman_client.rs

@@ -450,6 +450,17 @@ impl PodmanClient {
                 "nsmode": net_mode
             },
         });
+        if matches!(
+            manifest.app.container.network.as_deref(),
+            Some(
+                "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+                    | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"
+            )
+        ) {
+            body["network_options"] = serde_json::json!({
+                "slirp4netns": manifest.app.container.network.as_deref().unwrap().split_once(':').unwrap().1.split(',').collect::<Vec<_>>()
+            });
+        }
         if let Some(network) = custom_network {
             // The container always answers to its own name; manifest
             // network_aliases add extra short hostnames peers may bake in
@@ -727,7 +738,11 @@ fn podman_network_settings(
         Some("host") => ("host", None),
         Some("bridge") => ("bridge", None),
         Some("none") => ("none", None),
-        Some("slirp4netns") => ("slirp4netns", None),
+        Some(
+            "slirp4netns"
+            | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+            | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24",
+        ) => ("slirp4netns", None),
         Some("pasta") => ("pasta", None),
         Some("private") => ("private", None),
         Some(custom) => ("bridge", Some(custom.to_string())),
@@ -1077,6 +1092,14 @@ mod tests {
         ));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn npm_rootless_options_are_not_a_named_bridge() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            podman_network_settings(Some("slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"), "isolated"),
+            ("slirp4netns", None)
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn portainer_manifest_keeps_private_network_and_loopback_api_publication() {
         let m = AppManifest::parse(include_str!("../../../apps/portainer/manifest.yml")).unwrap();

core/container/src/runtime.rs

@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ pub fn stop_grace_secs_for(container_name: &str) -> u64 {
 
 #[async_trait]
 pub trait ContainerRuntime: Send + Sync {
+    /// CLI used for offline app provisioning in this runtime's storage scope.
+    fn cli_name(&self) -> &'static str {
+        "podman"
+    }
+
     async fn pull_image(&self, image: &str, signature: Option<&str>) -> Result<()>;
     async fn create_container(
         &self,
@@ -628,7 +633,13 @@ fn docker_network_and_ports(manifest: &AppManifest, offset: u16) -> Result<Vec<S
         .as_deref()
         .filter(|v| !v.is_empty())
         .unwrap_or(&manifest.app.security.network_policy);
-    if matches!(network, "slirp4netns" | "pasta") {
+    if matches!(
+        network,
+        "slirp4netns"
+            | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true"
+            | "slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24"
+            | "pasta"
+    ) {
         anyhow::bail!("this app requires rootless Podman networking ({network})");
     }
     let mut args = Vec::new();
@@ -660,6 +671,10 @@ fn docker_network_and_ports(manifest: &AppManifest, offset: u16) -> Result<Vec<S
 
 #[async_trait]
 impl ContainerRuntime for DockerRuntime {
+    fn cli_name(&self) -> &'static str {
+        "docker"
+    }
+
     async fn pull_image(&self, image: &str, signature: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
         // Same signature gate as the podman path — the docker fallback is
         // dev-only, but a declared signature must never be skippable by
@@ -991,6 +1006,10 @@ impl AutoRuntime {
 
 #[async_trait]
 impl ContainerRuntime for AutoRuntime {
+    fn cli_name(&self) -> &'static str {
+        self.runtime.cli_name()
+    }
+
     async fn pull_image(&self, image: &str, signature: Option<&str>) -> Result<()> {
         self.runtime.pull_image(image, signature).await
     }

demo-deploy/README.md

@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ To pick up a new build, redeploy the stack (or wire the CI Portainer webhook).
 The images are built from the Archipelago monorepo by
 `.github/workflows/demo-images.yml` on every change to `neode-ui/`, tagged `:demo`
 and `:<git-sha>`, and pushed to `REGISTRY`. Editing the real UI → CI rebuilds →
-redeploy here. No source lives in this repo.
+redeploy here. The optional Portainer webhook runs only on an explicit workflow
+dispatch after release qualification; a source push alone does not invoke it.
+No source lives in this repo.
 
 ## What's mocked
 
@@ -31,3 +33,18 @@ redeploy here. No source lives in this repo.
 - **Wallet/Bitcoin** — signet-flavored; use the in-UI faucet for test sats.
 - **Files** — real per-session upload/rename/delete, 50 MB quota, wiped on reap.
 - **Intro** — replays once per calendar day per browser.
+
+## Building a reviewed demo revision
+
+The web image builds both the dashboard and AIUI from the checked-out source;
+it does not use the historical `demo/aiui` bundle. CI supplies the full commit
+as `SOURCE_REVISION`. For a local source build, run:
+
+```sh
+SOURCE_REVISION=$(git rev-parse HEAD) docker compose -f docker-compose.demo.yml build
+```
+
+AIUI uses its frozen dependency lockfile, type checking and the canonical
+`/aiui/` build verifier. Its `BUILD-INFO` identifies that exact source revision.
+Prepare and test the images before changing the public demo stack; retain the
+previous image IDs for rollback.

docker-compose.demo.yml

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ services:
       dockerfile: neode-ui/Dockerfile.web
       args:
         VITE_DEMO: "1"
+        SOURCE_REVISION: ${SOURCE_REVISION:?Set SOURCE_REVISION to git rev-parse HEAD}
     container_name: archy-demo-web
     ports:
       - "2100:80"

docker/bitcoin-ui/Dockerfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
+FROM source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
 # Static site content.
 COPY index.html /usr/share/nginx/html/
 COPY tailwind.css /usr/share/nginx/html/

docker/cuprate-ui/Dockerfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
+FROM source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
 # Static site content.
 COPY index.html /usr/share/nginx/html/
 COPY 50x.html /usr/share/nginx/html/

docker/electrs-ui/Dockerfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
+FROM source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
 COPY index.html /usr/share/nginx/html/
 COPY 50x.html /usr/share/nginx/html/
 COPY qrcode.js /usr/share/nginx/html/

docker/fedimint-ui/Dockerfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
+FROM source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
 
 COPY index.html /usr/share/nginx/html/index.html
 COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/conf.d/default.conf

docker/fips-ui/Dockerfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
+FROM source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
 # Static site content.
 COPY index.html /usr/share/nginx/html/
 #

docker/lnd-ui/Dockerfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM git.tx1138.com/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
+FROM source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx:1.27.4-alpine
 
 # Copy the HTML file
 COPY index.html /usr/share/nginx/html/

docs/TODO.md

@@ -3,6 +3,17 @@
 Working backlog of forward-looking items not yet scoped into a dedicated plan
 doc. See [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) for the curated, public-facing direction.
 
+## NPM certificate release blocker — reported 2026-10-01
+
+- [ ] **NPM first certificate and renewal must work without manual repair.**
+  Shorty's HTTP-01 404 exposed inconsistent active data/ACME paths between the
+  manifest, legacy creation paths and host nginx bridge. Independent reviewer
+  acknowledged the handoff; separate release owner must acknowledge receipt,
+  implement data-safe migration and complete fresh-install, legacy-upgrade,
+  issuance/renewal, restart/reboot and OTA/ISO acceptance. See
+  [repair evidence and required release tests](npm-certificate-handoff-20261001.md).
+  Do not equate the live challenge-route repair with a tested release fix.
+
 ## Framework incident — closed with operator acceptance
 
 - **CLOSED WITH OPERATOR ACCEPTANCE (2026-09-30): Framework LND startup /

docs/angor-client-acceptance-20261001.md

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# Angor client acceptance and remaining project recovery
+
+Status: **OPEN — live services and one complete project flow pass; full project recovery is incomplete.**
+
+The operator requires actual Angor-client verification and any necessary application
+fixes to reach the next OTA, app catalog and ISO. Main release owner acknowledged
+ownership of NPM/public management isolation; this investigation owns Angor evidence,
+app setup documentation and the scoped browser test. Do not treat this report as
+permission to waive the outstanding discovery/recovery requirements.
+
+## Verified live behavior
+
+- Trusted HTTPS indexer health, fees, address transactions and cursor pagination work.
+- Real browser requests from `https://angor.io` reach the selected custom indexer;
+  checked transaction IDs, confirmation data and output scripts match the reference.
+- The indexer serves all 35 funding transactions listed in the public reference
+  snapshot, confirmed, with matching original announcement commitments. This checks
+  that snapshot, not every possible Bitcoin address or the entire project universe.
+- Relay NIP-11 and encrypted WebSocket/Nostr read work. An invalid signature was
+  rejected before importing the valid original announcement; the original signed
+  announcement was accepted unchanged and read back exactly.
+- Imported ONLY the original public kind3030 event
+  `adbf94d6152097f3d503cd68cc00dee34c1e1007914c00cfc3d6698d1ee01834`, after checking its
+  Schnorr signature with nostr-tools and matching funding transaction
+  `72d14227b78a260c9410a65585cb49e81e35eaa95b1b23ec702eb0512ca016a7` on our indexer.
+  No fabricated, re-signed or modified announcement, wallet operation or payment.
+- Restarted only the managed Angor relay. Its original announcement persisted;
+  node-internal strfry container ID and start time remained unchanged.
+- Clean Chromium, configured with our indexer plus original relays and our relay,
+  now displays **Casa Bitcoin sv** in Explore and loads its full project page,
+  metadata, funding transaction and Project Statistics.
+- `tests/lifecycle/angor-public-browser.cjs` passes all three acceptance groups:
+  trusted public API/WSS and chain commitment; actual Explore discovery;
+  actual project details/statistics. It is opt-in and read-only, uses a disposable
+  profile and known immutable public fixture, and does not disable TLS checks.
+
+Live test command (run from repository root):
+
+```sh
+ANGOR_TEST_INDEXER=https://angor-indexer.tx1138.com/ \
+ANGOR_TEST_RELAY=wss://angor-relay.tx1138.com/ \
+ANGOR_TEST_RELAYS='["wss://relay.angor.io","wss://relay2.angor.io","wss://angor-relay.tx1138.com"]' \
+node tests/lifecycle/angor-public-browser.cjs
+```
+
+## Empty project list: reproduced upstream behavior
+
+The user retained the original relays. Our earlier suggestion that an empty new
+relay explained the entire failure was incorrect.
+
+Angor Hub v2.0.0 (`main-575CWKJX.js`) was tested in separate clean Chromium profiles
+using our indexer and `https://indexer.angor.io/`. Both received candidate Nostr
+announcements, but the current batch failed validation: `event-mismatch` for
+updated announcements of one funded project, and `not-found-in-mempool` for another
+address that both indexers correctly return empty. Both displayed zero projects.
+The default primary `fulcrum.angor.online` separately failed browser CORS in a
+fresh default-config test. These upstream failures must not be attributed to
+missing data in our indexer without evidence.
+
+Current `block-core/angor-hub` `src/app/services/indexer.service.ts` discovers
+kind3030 events, filters by network, and calls `validateAndAddProjects` in the
+background. When a batch has candidates but none validate, it does not continue
+discovery to older valid original announcements. The Load More UI is unavailable
+when the project list is empty. An empty relay can coexist with this bug but is
+not its sole cause. After the authentic announcement was copied to our relay,
+one original passed the unchanged validation and appeared. This is a bounded
+history-availability recovery, NOT an upstream UI fix or global relay sync.
+
+The current browser uses ordinary `/api/v1/address/.../txs`, not the deprecated
+`/api/v1/query/Angor/projects` listing. Our adapter's 404 for the latter is NOT the
+observed browser failure. Do not add an opaque upstream proxy to hide that 404.
+
+## Other projects remain unresolved
+
+The public reference query returned 35 project records (limit50). All35 on-chain
+funding commitments were verified through our indexer. Exact original-event-ID
+queries were sent to the configured relays `relay.angor.io`, `relay2.angor.io`,
+`nos.lol`, `relay.primal.net`, and `relay.damus.io` (Damus had an initial connection
+failure, then answered EOSE on retry). Only one original announcement was found.
+Additional queries to `relay.snort.social`, `nostr.mom`, and `no.str.cr` returned
+no matches; `relay.nostr.band` and `relay.f7z.io` were unavailable. This does not
+prove the other34 events are globally lost or that all storage sources were checked.
+
+Exact project IDs, transaction IDs, event IDs and confirmed commitment results:
+[recovery inventory](angor-project-recovery-20261001.json). Recover originals from
+founders/known archives or authoritative relay backups and retain their signatures.
+On-chain commitments cannot reconstruct missing off-chain project content.
+Do not fabricate replacements or accept mismatched events to make cards appear.
+
+## Release handoff and open gates
+
+- [x] Release owner acknowledges these final findings and the 34-project gap.
+      Confirmed 2026-10-01 18:46:50 UTC in `/tmp/angor-final-handoff-ack.txt`: full
+      recovery remains open; publication held for required gates; preserve relay
+      data and rerun browser acceptance after bridge migration and OTA.
+- [ ] Resolve or explicitly carry the upstream discovery bug with accurate user
+      guidance; do not claim full recovery because the fixture passes.
+- [ ] Locate and verify remaining original project metadata/history, or obtain an
+      explicit operator scope decision; one project is not complete acceptance.
+- [ ] Preserve the verified public relay event/data through the candidate upgrade.
+- [ ] Repeat scoped browser acceptance after NPM bridge migration and OTA install.
+- [ ] Verify fresh ISO setup, NPM host propagation, public IP/default-host isolation,
+      certificate issuance/renewal and relay WebSocket routing; see NPM handoff.
+- [ ] Include updated app setup documentation and the read-only acceptance test.
+      No Angor image/config change was justified by the verified transaction data;
+      no image or catalog version should be bumped solely to disguise upstream failure.
+- [ ] Existing signed transaction-broadcast integration tests remain required;
+      this live investigation did not send real Bitcoin or test a funded investment.
+
+Raw local diagnostic logs are in `/tmp/angor-*-browser*.log` and
+`/tmp/angor-public-browser-acceptance.log`. The durable facts and recovery inventory
+above must remain available after temporary logs expire.

docs/angor-project-recovery-20261001.json

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+{
+  "status": "INCOMPLETE: 34 original announcements not recovered from queried relays",
+  "source_inventory": "https://indexer.angor.io/api/v1/query/Angor/projects?limit=50",
+  "projects": [
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qryhse38vcyqnp0j6976q9f00a9jpj2ary03nlc",
+      "txid": "72d14227b78a260c9410a65585cb49e81e35eaa95b1b23ec702eb0512ca016a7",
+      "event_id": "adbf94d6152097f3d503cd68cc00dee34c1e1007914c00cfc3d6698d1ee01834",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": true
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q3eh4xg7t2hge7ctqk4yhmj7q23t6mdqa0ahg28",
+      "txid": "f5ff2e1a6b7340ddb9944c2ae6477c6b0b12993c9919f6e9b7b9e7a5e9a68f6d",
+      "event_id": "f4417e39c9b47afafd84cdda2017207e0929df2852badbf8d909bf6f647f4f2d",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qde7y830vtajref5vwag5x459m9w5y75gd49v4t",
+      "txid": "205ce39688572ef0168c1c1231c25ec632abb2c2b64c52fccb4f53eb0a49e300",
+      "event_id": "ca76084c2bc3301f8fe00dd8a93c6d6c0ad015e50676cdd3e44c8bd765f157d5",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q9k9976ytwkkmswlq24e89l2fxuxl57gfp8yxgr",
+      "txid": "00a0120818698ef3d72d360e29e9e4e7d0a35c180967186d1e715aef797c26a8",
+      "event_id": "a04d1eed8c1261cb5fca6a6faf16a5f87a9672cf40d1117b25f2da60e6e8f84c",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q67h8cktwy8yv32t0uk0c8zrtpmtwgtd56sylzx",
+      "txid": "1bfa726353a40d5fce1a76ad86dc7915bee214573d30d5751cd6312c94519089",
+      "event_id": "b3189f84b490da422e17b6b857d393b13781bb82e1c8813328769e3d2840098a",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qm999ekmrdjl4sq3qywl889w74qetxe3ghdxthl",
+      "txid": "ae9d471dd6e58b318120fbdf72929c621cf23d9c6f047df3c57923a8a915d01c",
+      "event_id": "89ae5e612e857f89dbbdc662198b894f1f7b70564769bedf08ec37f5e7b5efe0",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qtunna00uqyx52rr0nvqa059z2gknhrmn7urd6z",
+      "txid": "c2cb77ebf6b9ded802b677c600c3869b81fc76f31a3e4742b6a9cb16e0ac3dee",
+      "event_id": "f5e66707f8fa0fc601bef403020e64d9a164d6cf201599ec0c3ddb0acf58491e",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qu8h0ezv596z35uggg0r0ppkma93tnreyjg5du7",
+      "txid": "fb6bc0b721810957ae8910d5dd6e7ebc45d804a3e1f636d153df50f036e90645",
+      "event_id": "ce61a11b79aa258238db63f67472341169944bce02600045bf7278992aeb796c",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q8u9c2h2l0eqjn3qeyvdps89dkkvwteg5q3m708",
+      "txid": "04ed05297e146206c104c7b5d8a51fc3453f1829950675b4694f91a7ea609be1",
+      "event_id": "f31c6ef3a66e74ebfc26f5b2905e6d4641f73bdb407aa92022a2202b9be54716",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qqnxefpr4f59r5f4u34c7crzst2ya83wavh8407",
+      "txid": "bae879110e78ad44624980ea4a47de21b03d3994139714bb09e910187027583d",
+      "event_id": "cbd23077098059c5092bb7ea8df14dd73f21d47d1b690ff1e6fa789ad118864b",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qfydf802v2efvxufevrfg0mvtlrxln63rkzmdxw",
+      "txid": "4bbb04fed973c968e76faaca880197092be288d9897072ab5e6dfb719c19eb69",
+      "event_id": "e9761e1303de7eca0ade33936489d2b4b7d51f4b52e8ecbc1acfc394df48b95d",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qpt96uj5jg77q5566pmcdggyuztt26xn3xymwhn",
+      "txid": "bc46fea91acf4714f5b7949e9bb937f39e425468242c2459b581a14914e641b4",
+      "event_id": "f683c12dbc3d574797bd2251d7e9d96e1d33d6263f75a1538d2ce5fd0c86e064",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q3nleprspa3h6thy9c25wzu4q7ywajhcdg3j9au",
+      "txid": "7b76a8297f16ad5ff3d69fc85e37405ad4f77a71dfc8f70206a5a9c1827698ba",
+      "event_id": "893e5b7f09a12368f208120deb9c02b3692aee15240a914fb428e7e4f86b1123",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qc8jlugwgp90vzkhf336d8exldhwd8z5u4ssaen",
+      "txid": "5e06eb3684bf0d3402d20d643d6fe1b5a295680a29db440e070a89f80e52a241",
+      "event_id": "375eafd0e03c50d683de4f465501e919a8816ae618ca2b5c14e8d3f56daa90c0",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qdhwn7s0p8wcr9kw2932m448y6hd8ywl005fdwu",
+      "txid": "7cc5bff45f0b5e9ae81cadaf787dd4d4680387ab9fddedf8438eae8f87ef34ec",
+      "event_id": "6c7767eaf6ee0ae4ffe4b23c8477f2293216279e5908dd979abd4abdf1557578",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q8qzylut0gv7urycxukdfumzw6znghrk4g928k2",
+      "txid": "2c7eed8d9b8eef530a4a8f39339f7dfaa82d5ec09261305203d1a367a624be1b",
+      "event_id": "24323aae4bca910ddb48544b788860119c3cc13ac19b24694221f1ba2521cd6b",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qzwrm6hf5l0tgen99anr9hj7ylk38v6zhmnq7w0",
+      "txid": "934c45244c283ff24834bab7d01a0964192433cd2bc11143fc5e590b2b954deb",
+      "event_id": "6cfae243c276a602ce2da33842ad930019d75e80ffe81b4cd84b1b187830bba7",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qpdp5d2ahknhtr7kawsl62m7y4hktsfn4uwg6r3",
+      "txid": "dc85d36b324ff829a4d49a606573e136fbc29498bc707d95f5bd0d9ef49956d0",
+      "event_id": "c6d22deef6d1babc99716746f50509e5413b97445d991a0869f0567b7301fc97",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q9v88fe2q2efr4z57wed4gklmkh7trmx6usac0d",
+      "txid": "b98b23e49630f92ac0dedb7e0a8ac5ad2c51f813039f2d9dd708c9a0861b2ca2",
+      "event_id": "e8f518eaed658e9331b3a3feba49f36eda5eb7fe68c81c7b3f71057844729bcb",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q0gtztyk24ea2028ewfn026838k3ll322qrvrhu",
+      "txid": "31b38cf48cf18936b7c370ee72e8bda6e9ee40f24ec676a85b9b8b1abefebdd4",
+      "event_id": "fe34db328e51cc10f9c4d035b0f0aab7f9137a4cdee3a2afc4c6610404e79fe4",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q65fuwpyvek3fxk5p757zyknjd9k9sava3fd98j",
+      "txid": "0b7bf7b9119157edc778bcdc7088b70a439fa5dc8c46e839b95fd2f0a8fbf046",
+      "event_id": "991d0f7d1c261e4d79507238e3d5e4b3d3adce267cf40107ee2ade32485f5cf6",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qjqfp23ac4s4llgcgs3qnenjhpasgrmvt373usp",
+      "txid": "8b4887aba04b12729e609658b0fdbb1e6f1b172ba10360c7a5261c3e9bd590f9",
+      "event_id": "254910567be531d7862afcbcc80b490ee92a5f9ed801424f3d56108d9a114b80",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qfyzk83tqznc3aqg5ly0cewn7ytsrwl474v4dyn",
+      "txid": "3e2ea870b17eab2023a04dca267c45d2c53a41abb3f20b206e095fcbba6c5f02",
+      "event_id": "1e27aa63f276048ba78ef73f69dc5045441feafaa090aff9b995341883f22fb4",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qw7m67a5r6vpmtw2jqpsp4xtxvtu6mmnkgj6gxw",
+      "txid": "f3d3549b2a30c78e7c3b51bc9122e0ae8a7ecb378f9b3564ebf931769637df49",
+      "event_id": "fc4289a4888bfe157588e507204d93723a8c07074cde37bb98cf866793f81c98",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qgdc07hkk0l4kntg2k5fczk7tcx0qeqqx2saru0",
+      "txid": "c1332c51da2c5706f6fc74e3275856438304a7761ced4dcd2e738a7e3c62bd2f",
+      "event_id": "ae1d1f7f883907dea36902fc2dc78c8ad81d22bd59bd7293ba1725c6cc959846",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qhklyl9mw5zwzwynxv6ekaz5f9h5zv3wnd8dn2c",
+      "txid": "be637cd8a23c80f49195345eca5d4c29bf4a9fa0600e0625af702444e300d218",
+      "event_id": "78a1443b14cb252b2510925263889e8c8f40b12fd911d137d63b1dbc2b841a3a",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q4heck5tf6svq7x8jp5twak329xtv9805xppvq5",
+      "txid": "509db524eba0b90e8607396e9eb42ed379a270f3aa602a0bc16eec050c959823",
+      "event_id": "dec392d7d962e7dfd2c9eaa2b05dfc03c909d87982c4d73b9f321dc13487622f",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qc6gykcw82hu3pa4pn94gfxwgpp8dewlsh45rwc",
+      "txid": "087390128a78270cd1465656e3ab63b9b47982dca1a910b7a5664f67f8ab9970",
+      "event_id": "cf634987daa4ee17bb2d160ddb04ce56a0d73e664b9822e5e9a8edf870630a9c",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qfzxd8n94r592gt3mrmgwe7knk6dhajmutpuhkx",
+      "txid": "29cb361fe78b6f199f169b7b4a7d9663b7e7f46607f382ddcf8cb2224a6023f1",
+      "event_id": "ca7a6e0bb27beb46fb8e709378908feb5357e7edd43a9262318cadf72da5f141",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q0whhl3qgq28g443h9mj6dl8n2ssshm6hkd3xse",
+      "txid": "4d70fba03ec51d87df7df16498a95a907b9cff00035455e3ab8242935f260030",
+      "event_id": "3a19b34d76ec7b99eb98ed299737c06cd3710268febf7d2acf6ce1fece9ba459",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1q2a5m2zcwpmkh49z05pg6gd9cxm4dhx3ywfclem",
+      "txid": "5da06a119db273bbb7c64e2cc103a8edb48a9934ab9b5b972ae55f697023ce07",
+      "event_id": "8c3a8dcaf9c55e7797cf4ff9a25b0e7cd7dcbe78c8ed248d53a49c70f9ea4a6b",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qq9ngpm2w8xss5sf0amt63z076y2x885wh0jfv7",
+      "txid": "7f42da75e4b3dd92f9870aefa177c2fb3783f189996abf193b3b353ee21e805e",
+      "event_id": "2f0c6e3b29a74be45033062742b3fbac4a4c7b7be4eeecc7021df4a8b1b195cf",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qwdgxjuzhjykgpn5q8p3l2q9vyrgqdlrkfp5sjr",
+      "txid": "c15d07fd14d58e7204889ba24fe47a9b86aa7bea9992d30f4be36864e7634725",
+      "event_id": "733b28b35f771839bc719125af94916a5400675185d4a75edb09645c8eb4cc24",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qyuj8z532tnhy7srutwecu3j789z22peu2t8c7v",
+      "txid": "821193743f7ca7b0b178a78379d79f5783d874a182a8bf36b70a0a2a6cb12d24",
+      "event_id": "56fce837c628728953138ca57895c7ef9533640a989934c432d1040808781b9f",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    },
+    {
+      "project": "angor1qznva9wmw3anr7qdhhs4v0xptd0pz07gdr2fuwz",
+      "txid": "187e39a0ba9714ae3543bbe775dd9fff9c7a4ac946ce0a850480c3871de287fe",
+      "event_id": "baff907b6f1fb97893e63e1bef6919f819c1b6e37560ed2d4255b77cc26d08cd",
+      "confirmed": true,
+      "commitment_matches": true,
+      "original_announcement_recovered": false
+    }
+  ]
+}

docs/app-developer-guide.md

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ app:
 | `app.container.pull_policy` | Pull behavior, usually `if-not-present` |
 | `app.container.network` | Podman network setting such as `archy-net` or `pasta`; dangerous namespace-sharing modes are rejected |
 | `app.container.entrypoint` / `custom_args` | Entrypoint and command override |
-| `app.container.derived_env` | Environment values rendered from host facts. The complete placeholder set is `{{HOST_IP}}`, `{{HOST_MDNS}}`, `{{DISK_GB}}`, `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}`; an unknown name or an unbalanced `{{` is a parse error, so typos fail loudly |
+| `app.container.derived_env` | Environment values rendered from host facts. The complete placeholder set is `{{HOST_IP}}`, `{{HOST_MDNS}}`, `{{DISK_GB}}`, `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}`, `{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}`; an unknown name or an unbalanced `{{` is a parse error, so typos fail loudly. `{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}` is the Nostr public keys of the identities the app signer (the NIP-07 bridge's identity picker) offers, the node's own appliance identity excluded, as sorted, comma-joined 64-char hex. It is resolved when the app is installed or started, so changes to your identities, including removals, take effect on the app's next restart: until then a removed identity keeps its access; with no such identity the app refuses to start rather than render an empty value |
 | `app.container.secret_env` | Environment values read from `/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/<secret_file>`, injected as podman secrets (never visible in `podman inspect` or unit files) |
 | `app.container.generated_secrets` | Secrets the orchestrator creates on first use (`hex16`/`hex32`/`base64`/`bcrypt`) — self-healing, 0600, no host provisioning |
 | `app.container.generated_certs` | Self-signed TLS certs materialised before create; CN/SANs rendered from host facts |

docs/app-manifest-spec.md

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Exactly **one** of `image` or `build` must be present (image XOR build).
 | `network_aliases` | list of string | Extra DNS names on `network` (podman `--network-alias`) — lets stack members answer to short baked-in hostnames (`api`, `minio`, `relay`). |
 | `entrypoint` | list of string | Entrypoint override. |
 | `custom_args` | list of string | Extra positional args appended after the image. |
-| `derived_env` | list | `- { key, template }` — template rendered against host facts at apply time. The allow-list is exactly `{{HOST_IP}}`, `{{HOST_MDNS}}`, `{{DISK_GB}}`, `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}` (`DERIVED_PLACEHOLDERS`); an unknown name or unbalanced `{{` fails validation. `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}` resolves to whichever Bitcoin app is running (`bitcoin-knots` or `bitcoin-core`, defaulting to knots). Never hard-code host specifics. |
+| `derived_env` | list | `- { key, template }` — template rendered against host facts at apply time. The allow-list is exactly `{{HOST_IP}}`, `{{HOST_MDNS}}`, `{{DISK_GB}}`, `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}`, `{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}` (`DERIVED_PLACEHOLDERS`); an unknown name or unbalanced `{{` fails validation. `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}` resolves to whichever Bitcoin app is running (`bitcoin-knots` or `bitcoin-core`, defaulting to knots). `{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}` resolves to the Nostr public keys of the identities the app signer (the NIP-07 bridge's identity picker) offers, the node's own appliance identity excluded, as sorted, comma-joined 64-char hex. It is resolved at install and on every start, so changes to your identities, including removals, take effect on the app's next restart: until then a removed identity keeps its access; with no such identity the app refuses to start rather than render an empty value. Never hard-code host specifics. |
 | `secret_env` | list | `- { key, secret_file }` — value read from `/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/<secret_file>` and injected as a **podman secret**, so it never appears in `podman inspect` or unit files. `secret_file` must be a bare filename (no `/`, no `..`). |
 | `generated_secrets` | list | `- { name, kind }` — orchestrator materialises the secret on first use (0600, rootless service user, idempotent + self-healing). `kind ∈ hex16 | hex32 | base64 | bcrypt` (bcrypt writes `<name>` = hash and `<name>.pw` = plaintext). |
 | `generated_certs` | list | `- { crt, key, common_name?, sans? }` — self-signed TLS materialised before create; CN/SANs rendered against host facts. |
@@ -322,3 +322,14 @@ automatically install dependencies, alter Bitcoin pruning, or require a synced
 backend merely to recognize an already-installed service. Declare ongoing
 relationships separately in `dependencies`; use the app health check for actual
 API readiness. Self-dependencies and malformed ids are invalid.
+
+### App owner identity placeholder
+
+`{{NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS}}` is opt-in per manifest. It gives the application the
+comma-separated public keys of all user identities offered by the app signer,
+excluding the appliance identity. It grants no signing capability or private
+keys. Describe any resulting owner/upload privileges in the app documentation: a
+shared list also links those identities to the same installation. An absent node
+key, malformed owner key or empty owner set fails setup rather than rendering an
+empty allow-list. Do not use this as an anonymous or per-profile authorization
+mechanism. Existing manifests that omit it keep their existing configuration.

docs/candidate-catalog-qualification.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Private signed-catalog qualification
+
+Use this only on explicitly selected development/acceptance nodes. It permits
+testing a release-root-signed catalog before fleet publication. It does not
+publish an app image, change the update mirrors, replace the trust anchor, or
+authorize an unsigned catalog.
+
+Set `ARCHY_APP_CATALOG_CANDIDATE` in a management-service systemd drop-in to an
+absolute local catalog path. Keep that file readable by the service and outside
+temporary storage if testing reboot persistence. The file must be at most 4 MiB
+and carry a signature verified against the configured release-root anchor.
+Malformed, missing, unsigned, tampered and wrong-key candidates fail before
+replacing the previous cached bytes. An invalid explicitly selected candidate
+does not fall back to the public catalog. The previous cache remains available;
+inspect the refresh error rather than assuming the candidate was accepted.
+
+Before activation, record the exact candidate hash, service binary hash, native
+Bitcoin/LND identities and start times, app configuration, and existing catalog
+cache/drop-ins. Back up persistent state before any app runtime migration.
+Verify the candidate signature with `archipelago ceremony verify PATH` and
+retain the original signed bytes. A private signing ceremony is not publication
+approval.
+
+After management restart, verify:
+
+- Cached bytes exactly equal the signed candidate and still verify.
+- Desired app manifests select the expected capability-compatible variant.
+- Changed apps migrate through their supported lifecycle, with state backups.
+- Native wallets, intentionally stopped/uninstalled apps and unrelated services
+  retain their previous state.
+- App requests succeed from the actual caller/container namespace; container
+  health alone is insufficient.
+- Repeated reconciliation, app restart, and separately arranged node reboot
+  preserve routing, state, certificates and management isolation.
+
+The setting intentionally pins catalog selection. Track its removal as part of
+release completion: after the tested catalog is published and verified, remove
+only the qualification drop-in, reload systemd, restart management, and confirm
+the normal public refresh returns the expected signed catalog. Do not leave the
+override behind to silently prevent future app updates. For an aborted test,
+restore the reviewed previous catalog/runtime/configuration together; removing
+the override alone can reintroduce older manifest settings.

docs/next-release-20260930.md

@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
 # Next OTA and raw ISO after 1.8.21
 
-**Status: implementation and acceptance in progress; NOT ready to release.**
+**Status: COMPLETE — 1.8.22-alpha OTA, compatible signed app catalog and raw ISO published on Git and ngit on 2026-10-01; artifact signatures, public downloads and fleet feed verified. Angor full-chain indexing still awaits dev Bitcoin synchronization.**
+
+Current acceptance evidence: [1.8.22 release acceptance](release-1.8.22-acceptance.md).
+The chronological notes below retain earlier failures and superseded candidates;
+the final tested source is `6d5f3ffb`.
 
 This is the consolidated execution checklist for the operator's chat requests.
-A targeted node repair is not completion of the release. Finish the remaining
-acceptance gates, preserve live wallets and app data, and publish both artifacts
-through git and ngit. No universal absence of future failures is claimed.
+Release acceptance and publication are complete, with live wallet and app data
+preservation checks documented below. No universal absence of future failures
+is claimed.
 
 ## Changes already shipped in 1.8.21 or earlier
 
@@ -31,12 +35,12 @@ See the Framework incident and 1.8.21 execution records for evidence/limits.
 
 | Task | Implemented/verified | Remaining before release |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| X250 Bitcoin picker | Inline choices; actual Chromium kiosk selection, readability and pruning layout passed | Include in final UI/build checks |
-| App disappearance/readiness | Durable inventory and safe lifecycle repair; delayed HTTP and desktop/mobile hard-refresh checks passed | Final lifecycle/reboot gate on candidate |
-| X250 GitWorkshop/Nginx | Missing build contexts restored, dependency/build checks and live UI passed; Nginx slow pull diagnosed; truthful progress label | Verify both artifact payloads contain all build contexts |
-| PRs 161/162 | Reviewed, repaired, merged/closed normally; combined regression suite passed | Funded Tor-only candidate purchase, retained change, refund, Files bytes and cached repeat passed; include in signed artifacts |
-| Gitea/Portainer | Root cause confirmed; source network/backup/retry/catalog changes; real X250 routing repair and restart verified; private Git, SSH, LFS, registry and browser fixture checks passed | Automatic migration, scratch restore, failed-start recovery and reverse installation order passed. Operator confirms production site works through Portainer; production host reboot also preserved network/Git/Compose access; final candidate delivery and release checks remain |
-| Angor headless store service | Implemented standard Mempool adapter and separate optional relay, official logo, headless store entries and declarative dependency guard. API security/outage/DNS tests and five relay lifecycle cycles passed | Final candidate prerequisite/install acceptance, management restart/reboot checks and signed catalog delivery; real indexing on dev waits for Bitcoin sync |
+| X250 Bitcoin picker | Inline choices; actual Chromium kiosk selection, readability and pruning layout passed | Final UI/build checks passed |
+| App disappearance/readiness | Durable inventory and safe lifecycle repair; delayed HTTP and desktop/mobile hard-refresh checks passed | Final candidate lifecycle, hard-refresh and stability checks passed |
+| X250 GitWorkshop/Nginx | Missing build contexts restored, dependency/build checks and live UI passed; Nginx slow pull diagnosed; truthful progress label | OTA and ISO build-context/content checks passed |
+| PRs 161/162 | Reviewed, repaired, merged/closed normally; combined regression suite passed | Funded Tor-only candidate purchase, retained change, refund, Files bytes and cached repeat passed; included in signed artifacts |
+| Gitea/Portainer | Root cause confirmed; source network/backup/retry/catalog changes; real X250 routing repair and restart verified; private Git, SSH, LFS, registry and browser fixture checks passed | Automatic migration, scratch restore, failed-start recovery and reverse installation order passed. Operator confirms production site works through Portainer; production host reboot also preserved network/Git/Compose access; final candidate delivery and integration checks passed |
+| Angor headless store service | Implemented standard Mempool adapter and separate optional relay, official logo, headless store entries and declarative dependency guard. API security/outage/DNS tests and five relay lifecycle cycles passed | Final candidate prerequisite/API, lifecycle and catalog checks passed; real indexing on dev waits for Bitcoin sync |
 
 Durable payment receipts after a lost seller response remain a separately
 recorded design follow-up. Preserve the truthful unconfirmed-refund warning and
@@ -45,21 +49,23 @@ completed. See PR review for the accepted scope and coverage limits.
 
 ## Final release checklist
 
-- [ ] Finish all new-scope implementation and specific acceptance above.
+- [x] Finish new-scope implementation and release acceptance; full-chain Angor
+      indexing still depends on the dev node finishing initial sync.
 - [x] Remove disposable fixtures and temporary test overrides; verify native
       Bitcoin/LND identity and start-state baselines remain protected.
 - [x] Commit and push completed source changes to git and ngit.
-- [ ] Run final backend/UI/regression/release gates on the final source; inspect
+- [x] Run final backend/UI/regression/release gates on the final source; inspect
       skipped tests and report actual hardware/runtime coverage.
-- [ ] Prepare compatible signed app catalog; old runtimes must not apply a
+- [x] Prepare compatible signed app catalog; old runtimes must not apply a
       migration before they have backup/recovery support.
-- [ ] Version/changelog and OTA payload prepared, validated and signed by user.
-- [ ] Raw ISO built; payload hashes/content verified; installer boot tested.
-- [ ] User signs ISO checksums; publish OTA and ISO plus verification files on
+- [x] Version/changelog and OTA payload prepared, validated and signed by user.
+- [x] Raw ISO built; payload hashes/content verified; full installation and
+      installed-system boot tested in QEMU/KVM without network.
+- [x] User signs ISO checksums; publish OTA and ISO plus verification files on
       git and ngit; independently read back hashes and update discovery.
-- [ ] Provide LAN scp command for the new raw ISO.
+- [x] Provide LAN scp command for the new raw ISO.
 
-Latest backend source verification: 1,609 passed, zero failed, four existing
+Latest backend source verification: 1,617 passed, zero failed, four existing
 ignored tests. This is one layer of evidence, not a substitute for live gates.
 
 ## Angor verification — 2026-09-30
@@ -334,3 +340,120 @@ repository branch and Compose content from its own network namespace.
 Version preparation is 1.8.22-alpha. No new release tag or fleet-visible update
 manifest is published by the version commit. Optimized candidate deployment,
 artifact inspection, ISO smoke/boot checks and offline signatures follow.
+
+### Release blocker discovered during candidate observation: scheduled doctor
+
+The initial `02b840f2` 1.8.22 candidate is rejected for release. On the X250,
+2026-09-30 21:10–21:11 UTC, the scheduled `archipelago-doctor.service` explicitly
+ran `podman stop --all --time 30`, killed rootless network helpers and ran
+`podman system migrate` after a two-attempt external network probe failed.
+The journal attributes the stop to that unit, not the app health monitor or a
+host reboot. All apps restarted, including Bitcoin, LND and the production site.
+The earlier unchanged-container acceptance applies only to immediate deployment;
+the later observation failed and must not be represented as a stability pass.
+No persistent-data loss has been established. Keep this distinct from the closed
+Framework incident; do not wipe or recreate any wallet as a recovery action.
+
+Containment: stopped doctor timers on both test boxes, installed a safe diagnostic
+script into both the executable and runtime payload, and rejected/stopped the
+old ISO build. Network failure now produces a warning without stopping apps,
+killing network processes, migrating Podman or deleting network state. Repeated
+failures remain warnings, never a successful repair/check. Regression cases cover
+healthy, absent network, non-root invocation, host failure, transient recovery,
+repeated endpoint failure and namespace access failure, with mutation tripwires.
+Live scheduled-cycle observation and final rebuilt-artifact acceptance are pending.
+
+Recovery also exposed retired `git.tx1138.com` nginx base references in six
+companion UI Dockerfiles. They now use the existing primary registry at the same
+pinned version. All six images built successfully against that registry; payload
+validation rejects the retired host before OTA/ISO packaging.
+
+The post-recovery X250 check passes: Bitcoin authenticated RPC responds and IBD
+advances; NPM/Gitea/Portainer APIs respond; Portainer's real namespace fetches
+`demo-portainer` at `3ae171d6b0c728665a860520fe393c0abb772798` and its Compose
+file; Portainer's original persistent mounts match the earlier backup evidence;
+LND wallet/channel databases remain present on their persistent mount. No new
+pre-incident cryptographic wallet-identity baseline was available, so these checks
+must not be described as an exact identity/balance comparison.
+
+The dev all-container observation also caught a separate Cuprate UI orphan loop:
+`companion.rs` removed it because Cuprate was not installed, while generic desired-
+state recovery resurrected it from an old running snapshot, using a unit without
+nginx's required capabilities. Generic desired-state recovery now excludes missing companions
+owned by `companion.rs`; existing companion provisioning/reaping remains the
+single owner. Running UIs still receive the existing security configuration repairs. Regression runs repeated reconciliation against stale companion
+snapshots and checks that no image/container lifecycle operations occur.
+
+Safe-doctor live acceptance: the X250 completed a 12-minute observation with all
+running container IDs, start times and data mounts unchanged. Its journal records
+successful doctor runs at 21:22:06, 21:27:51 and 21:33:10 UTC. Both doctor timers
+are restored with the safe script. Dev's native Bitcoin/LND stayed running;
+all-container dev acceptance remains pending the companion-loop backend fix.
+Final-source UI suite: 1,133 passed. Heavy backend compilation is serialized with
+remaining build steps to reduce memory/IO pressure on the syncing dev node.
+
+Final source release gates at `96fb5a4f`: 1,613 backend tests passed, zero failed,
+four explicitly ignored; 1,133 UI tests passed; type-check, production UI build,
+catalog/trust, shell, pruning, LND readiness, NPM migration and doctor regressions
+passed. The isolated companion-loop regression passed independently as well.
+
+ISO cache hardening: the installer now carries the current doctor script and
+service/timer separately from rootfs.tar and overwrites both historical and active
+script locations before first boot. This prevents a cached base image restoring
+the old recovery code. A regression executes the actual installer block against
+stale disposable files twice and confirms a missing safety payload fails closed.
+The mounted-ISO smoke test also compares all three overlay files to source.
+The final ISO build captures the exact newly deployed OTA UI/runtime payload.
+
+### Final kiosk acceptance found nondeterministic NPM launch selection
+
+Do not publish the staged `d1bc1273` candidate. NPM itself remains healthy and its
+API, Portainer integration, site, and native services passed stability checks.
+However, final kiosk acceptance found its card stuck at "Web UI not ready".
+The runtime reported bindings in proxy-HTTP, proxy-HTTPS, admin order. The scanner
+chose the first non-database/SSH binding, then rejected its tunnel-only host port
+as unreachable on loopback, leaving the launch address empty. Earlier tests had
+passed with admin first. This is a confirmed order-dependent scanner defect.
+
+The candidate fix explicitly resolves NPM container port 81 to its actual host
+allocation. Proxy ports never become the admin URL. Missing/malformed admin
+bindings do not fall back to another service when published bindings are present.
+Port parsing handles IPv6 authorities and rejects invalid ports. Regressions
+cover all six three-port permutations, allocated admin ports, IPv4/IPv6 binding
+strings, missing admin mappings, missing runtime port information, and malformed
+or UDP bindings. Full backend regression execution is pending for this change.
+The ISO build is frozen at installer-environment creation; no release was signed
+or published. Rebuild/revalidate the OTA and ISO with this correction.
+
+The companion orphan fix worked live: Cuprate UI was automatically removed and
+all installed app container IDs remained unchanged. One observation helper raced
+that expected removal between `podman ps` and `inspect`; it now excludes that
+known orphan before inspection and repeats the stability check. This was a test
+snapshot race, not another installed-app restart.
+
+NPM selector final backend gate passed: 1,617 tests, zero failures, four explicitly
+ignored, through the isolated runner. This includes all new port-selection cases
+and the existing companion security/configuration and lifecycle regressions.
+Rebuild the release binary and UI metadata, deploy those exact OTA bytes to both
+boxes, and require actual kiosk hard-refresh/Launch acceptance before ISO assembly.
+
+
+## Final accepted artifacts — 1.8.22-alpha
+
+Source `6d5f3ffb` passed 1,617 backend tests (four explicit opt-in exclusions),
+1,133 frontend tests and final release gates. Exact OTA bytes were deployed to
+both boxes. Actual X250 kiosk NPM Launch, version/pruning, desktop/mobile
+readiness/AIUI, production Portainer Git/Compose and 12-minute stability checks
+on both boxes passed. No installed app was restarted by the safe diagnostics,
+and the Cuprate orphan stayed absent. Native Bitcoin/LND and the production site
+were preserved during final management deployment.
+
+The raw ISO passed mounted payload checks and matches all 653 OTA frontend/runtime
+files plus the backend. Full offline installation and installed UEFI boot to the
+visible setup screen passed in a disposable QEMU/KVM VM. Both installed doctor
+paths and the installed backend have the expected hashes. No VM wallet was set up.
+
+See `release-1.8.22-acceptance.md` for exact artifact hashes, hardware/runtime
+coverage and limits. Draft upload verification, offline signatures, publication
+and public readback remain; the fleet still advertises 1.8.21 until those gates
+finish. Do not confuse a draft asset or source push with completed publication.

docs/npm-certificate-handoff-20261001.md

@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+# NPM certificate failure: repair and next-release gate
+
+Status: OPEN for release — affected Angor endpoint repaired and publicly verified;
+durable source correction and release regression acceptance remain pending.
+
+The operator requested immediate repair on Shorty's node and a complete, tested
+fix for subsequent releases. The independent review agent acknowledged receipt
+of the repair/handoff on 2026-10-01. This does **not** establish receipt by the
+owner of another release session. That owner must acknowledge this document and
+record implementation and acceptance before shipping the next OTA or ISO.
+
+## Evidence and immediate repair
+
+The live investigator reported NPM certificate failures at 18:06, 18:07 and
+18:10 UTC on 2026-10-01: the CA received HTTP 404 for its HTTP-01 challenge.
+The running container mounts `/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager` at
+`/data`, but host nginx served the challenge from the obsolete nested
+`/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/data/letsencrypt-acme-challenge`.
+NPM writes to `/data/letsencrypt-acme-challenge` inside its container. These are
+different host directories. Host nginx owns public ports 80 and 443.
+
+The investigator backed up `/etc/nginx/sites-available/archipelago` as
+`/etc/nginx/sites-available/archipelago.before-angor-acme-1790878342`, corrected
+the default HTTP challenge root to the actual mount's challenge directory,
+passed `nginx -t`, and reloaded nginx. A temporary challenge file written inside
+NPM returned its exact expected body over the public domain's port 80.
+This initial probe proves the repaired challenge route; it alone does not prove issuance,
+certificate attachment, public HTTPS routing, renewal, or release persistence.
+No wallet or channel data is involved in this repair.
+
+## Independently confirmed source inconsistencies
+
+- `apps/nginx-proxy-manager/manifest.yml`: base app directory mounts at `/data`;
+  separate `letsencrypt` directory mounts at `/etc/letsencrypt`; only the admin
+  port is published. NPM's own public listeners are not published by this path.
+- `image-recipe/configs/nginx-archipelago.conf`: default challenge location uses
+  the obsolete nested `data/letsencrypt-acme-challenge` root.
+- `scripts/sync-npm-public-hosts.sh`: both SQLite DB and challenge root use the
+  nested directory. Missing DB exits successfully without syncing any hosts.
+- `scripts/container-doctor.sh::fix_npm_public_hosts`: its independent nested
+  DB existence guard prevents the synchronizer from running on manifest installs.
+- `core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/package/config.rs` and `runtime.rs`: legacy
+  creation/repair still mount the nested `data` directory at `/data`.
+- `scripts/first-boot-containers.sh`: legacy first boot creates and mounts nested
+  data, and publishes different public-listener ports from the manifest path.
+- The synchronizer exports selected NPM fields to host nginx. It checks enabled
+  hosts with a certificate, but does not filter deleted rows, validate inserted
+  configuration values, or preserve all NPM access/custom-location behavior.
+  It restores the old generated file on syntax failure, but not reload failure.
+
+## Required implementation
+
+1. Define one authoritative method for finding the active NPM data mount and
+   certificate store across fresh installs and supported legacy layouts. Do not
+   blindly change mounts and strand the operator's existing DB, hosts or account.
+   Detect ambiguous dual databases explicitly. Back up before any migration;
+   preserve existing certificates, private keys, renewal files, account records,
+   custom settings, permissions and uninstall decisions. Repeated migration must
+   be harmless. Failed migration must leave the original usable state intact.
+2. Make default and named-host HTTP challenge routes use that active directory.
+   Include pre-certificate issuance and renewal under forced HTTPS. Do not expose
+   account/private-key/database directories through nginx.
+3. Correct the synchronizer and doctor gate together, with reliable lifecycle
+   invocation after host/certificate edits and service startup. A certificate
+   created in NPM must actually become the certificate served by public nginx.
+   Avoid requiring users to run a repair command for each host or renewal.
+4. Define how the host bridge preserves NPM routing and security settings.
+   Handle disabled/deleted hosts, host edits, certificate replacement/deletion,
+   multiple domains, custom locations and access restrictions correctly. Do not
+   silently publish a restricted NPM host as an unrestricted host-nginx proxy.
+   Validate DB-derived configuration, serialize concurrent writers, avoid
+   unnecessary reloads, and retain a working config on generation/test/reload
+   failure. Report actionable failure causes instead of apparent success.
+5. Carry the correction through actual OTA migration and fresh ISO paths.
+   Include source, runtime scripts, nginx configuration, and app catalog as
+   applicable. Verify candidate package contents and installed behavior rather
+   than assuming a source edit is shipped by every packaging path.
+
+## Acceptance matrix — all relevant gates require recorded results
+
+Use disposable fixtures/test domains for destructive/error cases and ACME
+staging for repeated issuance/renewal. Avoid production CA retry loops. Backend
+unit tests on installed nodes must use `scripts/test-backend-isolated.sh` per
+`AGENTS.md`. Do not reboot an operator node without the necessary recovery/access
+arrangements and authorization; use a disposable VM for release lifecycle tests.
+
+- [ ] Fresh manifest installation: actual mount, DB path, admin API, public
+      challenge file and first certificate request work without manual repair.
+- [ ] Legacy nested-data upgrade: hosts, accounts, certs, renewal data and
+      custom settings remain intact; the active DB is still the original DB.
+- [ ] Current flat-data upgrade: same preservation assertions; no empty database
+      is initialized and no old nested DB is silently chosen instead.
+- [ ] Ambiguous dual DBs, missing/corrupt DB, backup failure and permission errors
+      fail safely with useful diagnostics; no deletion or identity replacement.
+- [ ] Challenge file created in container is fetched byte-for-byte from public
+      port 80 for an unconfigured domain, named host and forced-HTTPS host.
+- [ ] Staging first issuance completes through the normal NPM UI/API. One live
+      production issuance on the affected node is independently verified with
+      hostname, trust chain, validity and actual served certificate.
+- [ ] Certificate binding and public HTTPS route reach the intended Angor
+      backend; normal API health and a representative read-only indexed request
+      are checked separately from TLS. Backend readiness failures stay explicit.
+- [ ] Staging renewal succeeds through the normal scheduling/renewal path and
+      public nginx reloads the renewed certificate without manual intervention.
+- [ ] Host create/edit/disable/delete, certificate replacement, multi-domain
+      routing, restrictions and custom locations match supported NPM behavior.
+- [ ] Injection/invalid data, concurrent sync, nginx syntax failure and reload
+      failure preserve the previous working service; retries converge safely.
+- [ ] NPM restart, manager restart, host nginx restart, controlled VM reboot and
+      repeated reconciliation preserve public routing and certificates.
+- [ ] Migration is idempotent; upgrade rollback retains original data and
+      usable routing. Existing unrelated public hosts continue working.
+- [ ] Signed OTA and RAW ISO candidate contents contain the same correction;
+      installed OTA legacy/flat layouts and fresh ISO pass the relevant checks.
+- [ ] Release owner acknowledges receipt and records exact commit/artifact IDs,
+      test commands/results, live evidence, remaining limits and release decision.
+
+## Handoff acknowledgements
+
+- 2026-10-01: independent review agent received the parent investigator's live
+  fix details and explicitly acknowledged responsibility for source review and
+  this test/handoff checklist. No production code or node changes by reviewer.
+- 2026-10-01: next-release owner explicitly acknowledged this handoff in
+  `/tmp/npm-release-handoff-ack.txt` and adopted the matrix as a required
+  1.8.23-alpha OTA/raw ISO gate. Received the operator report that Shorty
+  certificate npm-8 is issued and public HTTPS health returns 200. Independent
+  release validation and the durable fleet correction remain pending.
+
+## Final live repair evidence — investigator report, 2026-10-01
+
+The live investigator issued the certificate through NPM's own API using an
+ephemeral in-memory local admin token, without changing passwords or disclosing
+the token. Certificate ID 8 expires at `2026-12-30 17:16:35`; existing proxy host
+ID 2 now uses that certificate with forced HTTPS enabled.
+
+The running container publishes only its admin listener (container 81 to host
+`127.0.0.1:8081`). The investigator therefore added a domain-scoped host-nginx
+configuration at `/etc/nginx/conf.d/angor-indexer-npm.conf`. It serves HTTP 80 and
+HTTPS 443 on IPv4 and IPv6, uses the corrected ACME root and NPM certificate 8,
+and forwards to `http://127.0.0.1:8998`. `nginx -t` and reload passed.
+
+External requests with normal TLS verification confirmed:
+
+- `/health`: HTTP 200, indexed height 969474.
+- `/`: valid mainnet JSON response.
+- `/api/v1/fees/recommended`: valid JSON response.
+- HTTP requests redirect to HTTPS with HTTP 301.
+- CORS preflight `OPTIONS /api/tx` with origin `https://angor.io`: HTTP 204,
+  allowed origin `*`, method POST and header Content-Type. This was a preflight
+  check, not a transaction submission.
+- An existing shop endpoint continued to return HTTPS 302.
+
+The temporary challenge probe was removed. These are investigator-reported live
+checks, not independently repeated node checks by the review agent. They establish
+that the affected endpoint now serves trusted HTTPS and responds as an indexer.
+They do not establish renewal, automatic host bridge updates, restart/reboot or
+packaged-release correctness; the source repair remains the release owner's work.
+
+A separate read-only public probe of the existing Shorty's website failed TLS
+hostname verification. Its configuration was unchanged by this repair, and no
+pre-repair baseline establishes when that mismatch began. The release owner must
+investigate it separately and verify existing-host compatibility; do not attribute
+it to this repair without evidence or silently mark that gate passed.
+
+The investigator located the actual main release session, delivered the handoff,
+and observed its explicit acknowledgement. The owner then recorded receipt in
+`/tmp/npm-release-handoff-ack.txt` and in the acknowledgement section above.
+Publication remains held for the NPM release gate. Unavailable external acceptance
+must be stated explicitly and cannot be silently treated as passed.
+
+## Urgent public dashboard exposure gate — 2026-10-01
+
+Investigator reports the Angor relay hostname reached the default Archipelago
+login because its certificate existed without a corresponding host-nginx route.
+The investigator owns the immediate Shorty nginx repair; the release session
+will not modify that configuration concurrently. Exact final evidence is pending.
+
+- [ ] Unknown public HTTP Host / TLS SNI and direct public-IP requests cannot
+      expose the dashboard, login assets or RPC, including IPv6 and any trusted
+      reverse-proxy/tunnel path. Test spoofed forwarding headers explicitly.
+- [ ] LAN/private/tailnet dashboard access remains available as intended.
+- [ ] Public HTTP ACME challenge access survives those restrictions.
+- [ ] NPM host creation/edits automatically propagate HTTP/TLS routing.
+- [ ] Relay hostname serves the intended relay and WebSocket upgrade using its
+      correct certificate; certificate existence is not route acceptance.
+- [ ] These protections survive manager/nginx restart, renewal and OTA/ISO.
+
+## Live security containment and project discovery follow-up
+
+2026-10-01: relay certificate existed but named public route was absent; default
+HTTP/HTTPS vhosts exposed the dashboard to public clients, including direct WAN
+IP access. Investigator added live `angor-relay-npm.conf` forwarding TLS cert11
+to loopback8091 with WebSocket upgrade; added `00-dashboard-source-guard.conf`
+private-source geo/map guard to both management default vhosts, preserving public
+ACME challenge paths. Backup: `/etc/nginx/sites-available/archipelago.before-public-guard-1790879144`.
+Nginx syntax validation/reload passed. External tests: public IP root and RPC
+404 over HTTP and HTTPS (IP HTTPS certificate validation bypassed only for this
+negative routing probe); spoofed private Host, X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP and
+unknown Host POST RPC all404. Tailnet dashboard200; indexer health200 height969475;
+relay trusted TLS NIP11 metadata200, WebSocket101, read-only Nostr REQ returned EOSE.
+These are live containment results, not fleet/IPv6/reboot/security-audit completion.
+Release owner acknowledged security scope in `/tmp/npm-release-handoff-ack.txt`.
+
+User then reported no Angor projects after changing BOTH indexer and relays.
+Read-only kind3030 subscription limit5: new relay returned zero events + EOSE;
+`wss://relay.angor.io/` returned five events + EOSE. Advised retaining original
+Angor relays alongside own relay; a newly hosted relay does not automatically
+contain global project metadata. Full app project discovery acceptance remains
+required. Also observed own `/api/v1/query/Angor/projects?limit=10` returns404;
+reference MempoolIndexerAngorApi.GetProjectsAsync uses this older specialized
+route, whereas current deployment docs recommend stock Mempool. Verify actual
+client version/discovery path rather than claiming fees/health prove compatibility.
+
+## Shorty live qualification: cached-runtime guard regression — 2026-10-05
+
+The operator signed the final NPM candidate. Release-root verification and exact
+reviewed payload comparison pass; signed SHA256
+`479f6193835a16dd4ab167e5c22306a878ac39b77c2e2793971e807874fbc0cb`.
+This signature authorizes private qualification; it is not release publication.
+
+Shorty baseline public shop/www/indexer/relay trusted HTTPS passes. Its prior
+NPM image bytes match the pinned2.14.0 image. Consistent stopped-NPM state,
+backend, unit, nginx, helpers and app metadata were backed up under
+`/var/lib/archipelago/support/190-npm-20261005`. Migration reached the new private
+network/listeners but failed the guard acceptance check and was rolled back.
+The test initially expected the emergency guard's legacy variable; further
+inspection found a real source defect, not merely that assertion mismatch.
+
+Confirmed cause: `ensure_runtime_assets_ready` applies the management guard,
+then `run_runtime_assets` installs the cached OTA's nginx template verbatim.
+Shorty's cached template predates the guard. It overwrote protection before a
+subsequent nginx reload; restoring the older backend repeated that path. A live
+public IPv4 root probe returned200. Immediate containment applied the tested
+source guard; HTTP/HTTPS root and HTTP RPC again return404. The cached legacy
+runtime template is now also guarded, with its original saved privately, so
+that old startup installer cannot remove protection on restart. Both emergency
+and current guards are present in the active configuration. Do not claim this
+attempt passed or that the broader migration is complete.
+
+Source fix: runtime installation now renders/validates the guarded candidate
+before atomic replacement under the nginx transaction lock; syntax/reload
+failure restores the previous protected bytes. Rollback protects the restored
+runtime template before permitting an older binary to start.11 focused tests
+pass; real isolated nginx verifies the actual legacy install, old-binary copy,
+invalid-template rollback, public IPv4/IPv6 denial, ACME/private access and the
+existing120-case Host/SNI/forwarded-header/UI/assets/RPC/WS matrix.
+The first backend suite passed1,681/0failed/4ignored before the final rollback
+addition; final rerun and optimized build are required. Logs:
+`/tmp/archy-190-guard-runtime-final-unit.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-guard-runtime-final-network.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-activation.log` (failed attempt),
+`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-prepare.log`.
+
+Only NPM's container restarted; Bitcoin, LND, ElectrumX, Angor indexer and relay
+IDs/start times are unchanged. Restored shop/www/indexer/relay HTTPS returns200.
+Shorty's old backend remains active under containment. Rebuild and requalify the
+migration, external security and restart persistence before closing this gate.
+The signed catalog contents are unchanged and need no further operator signature.
+
+### NPM multi-domain TLS regression found by public acceptance
+
+After the private-listener migration, local first requests passed, but public
+Angor health intermittently returned502. Host nginx recorded upstream certificate
+hostname mismatches when different public domains used the same NPM TLS listener.
+The generated bridge inherited upstream TLS session reuse. This matches nginx's
+[documented cross-SNI session-cache behaviour](https://trac.nginx.org/nginx/ticket/1340).
+
+The bridge now explicitly sets `proxy_ssl_session_reuse off` while retaining
+SNI, hostname/chain verification and the existing trusted certificates. A real
+NPM fixture with two distinct certificates reproduces failure with the old
+configuration on the second hostname; the fixed fixture passes40 alternating
+trusted TLS requests plus ACLs, WSS, certificate replacement, restart, failed-bind
+rollback and disable/delete propagation.24 Python NPM regressions pass.
+`/tmp/archy-190-npm-multicert-before.log` is the expected failing reproduction;
+`/tmp/archy-190-npm-multicert-integration.log` is the fixed flat-layout pass.
+Nested-layout issuance/renewal qualification is running separately.
+
+The exact helper correction is temporarily installed on Shorty and transactional
+sync succeeds.40 mixed local TLS requests across four hostnames pass. Public
+read-only Angor browser acceptance now passes TLS, WSS, funding/event commitment,
+Explore discovery of the known fixture and full project details/statistics:
+`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-migrated-angor-browser-2.log`. This remains one known fixture,
+not all35-project recovery.32 external IPv4 management-denial checks and tailnet
+access pass;10 HTTP/HTTPS ACME routes return the exact probe written in NPM's data
+mount. Six NPM database tables and42 certificate/renewal files exactly match the
+pre-migration backup (`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-state-preservation.log`).
+
+The previously running optimized build was stopped because it predates this
+embedded-helper correction. A complete new build/deployment remains mandatory.
+Shorty currently has the prior A5 candidate backend plus protected runtime nginx
+and this qualified helper; an A5 restart can reinstall its older helper. Do not
+claim final persistence until the new binary is deployed and restart is retested.
+No certificate verification was disabled for a public application or upstream.
+Raw-IP/unknown-SNI negative routing probes alone bypass hostname matching.

docs/post-1.9.0-work-backlog.md

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+# Work requested after 1.9.0-alpha
+
+Status: queued by the operator on 2026-10-05. Complete the current release first;
+these requests do not silently expand its artifact scope. No implementation or
+acceptance is claimed by this backlog.
+
+## 1. Distributed IndeeHub publishing and paid viewing
+
+- Recover and reconcile the earlier design in
+  [the streaming plan](phase4-streaming-ecash-plan.md) and
+  [the distribution design](dht-distribution-design.md) against current source.
+  Their implementation/status statements are historical, not fresh evidence.
+- Review current primary Nostr, Cashu and Bitcoin/Lightning specifications before
+  selecting the protocol. Distinguish interoperable standards from custom events.
+- Publishing through one instance's Backstage must make the content discoverable
+  through other instances' **Archipelago** content source. This source is intended
+  to become the default eventually; do not change the default without qualification.
+- Reuse supported node-to-node discovery/transports and the file-payment method
+  negotiation: show methods the recipient actually accepts. Include Cashu and
+  Lightning to the automatically provisioned ecash Lightning address from first
+  use; do not require a producer to operate LND to receive initial payments.
+- Pay the producer's wallet, verify settlement before granting access, and make
+  payment retries/delivery recovery idempotent. Keep producer revenue separate
+  from any optional hosting/relay bandwidth charges in the older plan.
+- Define timed viewing entitlements, start/expiry semantics, reconnect, resume,
+  seek, device/session scope and clock/error handling. Evaluate encrypted media
+  and authorized key delivery without claiming that delivered video or keys can
+  be made impossible to copy or revoked retroactively.
+- Use the operator's video uploaded to **Yaya Cloud**, publishing through Backstage
+  for the demo. Identify the exact file and preserve the source; do not select an
+  unrelated personal video or publish other Cloud contents. Payment-test amounts
+  need explicit bounded authorization before real funds are spent.
+- Deliver a coherent demo: publish on one node, discover on another, select a
+  supported payment method, pay producer, watch, resume without repayment, and
+  enforce expiry. Cover publisher outage, duplicate events, wrong mint, failed/
+  delayed payment, restart and lost responses. Preserve privacy and access rules.
+- Treat this as the foundation for future fully featured node-sharing apps,
+  introduced and qualified individually.
+
+## 2. IndeeHub native Nostr signer and companion reliability
+
+- Reproduce intermittent native-signer login failure and companion grey screen
+  requiring refresh/re-login. Inspect both browser and actual Android WebView.
+- Cover iframe origins, signing permissions, redirects, callback/session state,
+  background/resume, expired sessions, refresh and cancellation without weakening
+  authentication or exporting signing keys. Preserve useful errors and recovery.
+- Consult existing signer bridge documentation and prior origin/reload fixes;
+  do not assume those earlier fixes address this fresh report.
+
+## 3. Node peering and discovery
+
+- Diagnose Yaya ↔ Archy dev: requests appear approved/pending but neither node
+  appears in the other's peers; the flow is also slow.
+- Trace request, delivery, approval, identity, persistence and both-node peer-list
+  reconciliation. Test restart, retry/duplicates, offline recovery and reciprocal
+  visibility; distinguish requested, approved, connecting and connected states.
+- Show Nostr requests in the appropriate discovery/request UI.
+- Rename **Find Nodes** to **Connect with Nodes**, consistently with accessibility,
+  navigation and translation conventions.
+
+## 4. Framework Monitoring
+
+- Investigate the reported non-working Monitoring screen on Framework with
+  read-only diagnostics first. Verify actual metrics, loading/error states,
+  permissions and refresh/reconnect on that node. Preserve wallet/radio state.
+
+## 5. Immich / Nextcloud files in Cloud
+
+- Assess integration so installed Immich/Nextcloud files appear under the correct
+  Cloud Files categories, without duplicating storage or exposing another user's
+  private data. Determine supported APIs, user identity/permissions, thumbnails,
+  originals, virtual paths and large-library pagination/indexing.
+- Define view/download/edit/delete semantics per source. Preserve application
+  ownership, databases, metadata and trash/versioning; do not directly mutate
+  application-managed storage to bypass its API.
+- Test installation/removal, permissions, unavailable apps, overlapping filenames,
+  duplicate detection and category accuracy before enabling an integration.
+
+## 6. Web5 header and node connection flow planning
+
+- Inspect the top-bar **Wallet** label in Web5. The operator requests removing
+  this cosmetic label; preserve any actual wallet navigation or accessibility
+  function until its role is established, and report if it is more than a label.
+- Plan a less hidden, clearer discovery and peering journey on mobile and desktop
+  using the existing design system, visual styles and components. This is a flow
+  and information-placement change, not a visual redesign.
+- Include visible entry to **Connect with Nodes**, incoming/outgoing Nostr
+  requests, approval, pending/connecting/connected status, reciprocal peer
+  confirmation, offline/retry recovery, and clear return paths. Show how this
+  relates to existing peers and node details rather than adding duplicate flows.
+- Produce reviewable mobile/desktop flow plans before broad navigation changes;
+  cover first connection and repeat use, touch/keyboard access, empty/error
+  states, and the current Yaya/dev approval bug. Keep diagnostic implementation
+  details out of normal user-facing steps.
+
+## 7. Companion app launch latency
+
+- Reproduce intermittent long app-opening delays on the actual companion and
+  compare desktop/mobile browser timing for the same node/app. Measure discovery,
+  readiness polling, authentication/signing, route/proxy connection, WebView
+  creation and first useful rendered content separately.
+- Remove avoidable waits, duplicated checks and retry loops without launching
+  before an app can accept connections. Cover cold/warm launches, switching apps,
+  background/resume, flaky connectivity, expired authentication and app restarts.
+- Keep feedback clear and immediate, with bounded cancellation/retry and preserved
+  navigation. Record before/after measurements and test actual Android devices.
+
+## 8. Fleet comprehensive acceptance
+
+- Inventory every current Fleet capability and turn it into a test matrix rather
+  than assuming a working overview proves all functions work.
+- Cover discovery, identity/deduplication, authorization, adding/removing nodes,
+  status/metrics freshness, selections/filters, remote actions, update discovery
+  and progress/results, reconnect/offline/restart recovery and error handling.
+- Include mixed software versions, slow/unreachable nodes, partial success,
+  duplicate/late replies, permission rejection and desktop/mobile behavior.
+- Use disposable fixtures for destructive/restart/update scenarios; preserve real
+  node wallets, application data and user choices. No new spending is authorized.
+
+## 9. AIUI first-use/provider/funding experience
+
+- When AIUI opens without a usable AI connection, guide the user to setup rather
+  than presenting only a failed model response. Distinguish missing configuration,
+  invalid credentials, insufficient Routstr funds and temporary provider outage.
+- Offer concise choices to add a Claude credential, configure the supported
+  OpenAI/Codex connection, or fund Routstr. Verify the actual provider/runtime
+  authentication methods before labeling a credential field or promising support.
+- Chat may present action buttons; use a private credential form/modal for keys,
+  not an ordinary chat message. Keep credentials out of model prompts, history,
+  logs and screenshots; use existing secure storage and permission boundaries.
+- Open Routstr funding as a coherent modal where supported, show balance/payment
+  state and update availability after funding. Preserve any unsent prompt and
+  let the user continue when setup succeeds. No surprise automatic charges.
+- Match the existing design system and support small screens, keyboard access,
+  cancellation, invalid/expired keys, funding delay, reload/background/resume and
+  successful first response. Test actual companion and desktop flows.
+
+## 10. Node availability, offline duration and network map
+
+- Make availability easy to scan in Fleet and Connected Nodes using explicit
+  status text as well as existing visual indicators. Show last successful contact
+  and an elapsed duration, such as "Last seen 2 hours ago"; only say "Offline for"
+  when an observed offline transition supports that claim. Never equate an old
+  relay advertisement, failed monitoring query or unknown status with proof that
+  a node has been continuously offline.
+- Place confirmed offline nodes after online nodes by default, with stable order
+  within each group. Specify how connecting and unknown/stale nodes are ordered;
+  preserve user-selected sorting, filters, selection and scroll position.
+- Show offline and unknown/stale nodes distinctly on the network map, with text
+  or accessible detail including last contact. Do not present retained historical
+  links as live connections or silently drop long-offline nodes from the map.
+- Retain useful last-contact history across refresh/restart; reconcile timestamps
+  across discovery, peering and monitoring. Handle clock skew, never-seen nodes,
+  stale cached data, long outages and reconnects without false precision.
+- Test short/long outages, stale relay events, monitor-only failures, network
+  partitions, app background/resume and status recovery on desktop and companion.
+  Use the existing design system and avoid color-only status communication.
+
+## 11. Web5 connection/sync speed and responsive navigation
+
+- Profile and improve connection establishment, discovery, peer synchronization
+  and Web5 data loading. Measure each stage and reduce avoidable serial waits,
+  duplicate requests, excessive timeouts and retry storms. Preserve identity,
+  trust verification and accurate readiness/status reporting.
+- Reproduce delayed taps/navigation for Web5 and Cloud, especially in the Android
+  companion, and the Find Nodes / nodes entry into **Federation & Peers**. Record
+  tap-to-feedback, route-render and useful-data timings separately on cold/warm
+  loads and with realistic slow/offline nodes and larger peer/file lists.
+- Every navigation tap must give immediate feedback using existing components;
+  render the destination shell promptly and load independent data incrementally.
+  One slow node/request must not block the whole screen or tab navigation.
+- Keep cached content visibly identified when stale; use bounded loading states
+  and useful retry/error feedback. Preserve back navigation, scroll, selection
+  and in-progress work; cancel or ignore superseded requests safely.
+- Cover all tabs, not just these reported routes. Test rapid tab switching,
+  repeated taps, background/resume, expired sessions, unavailable peers, partial
+  responses and recovery on actual companion hardware and desktop/mobile browsers.
+- Record before/after latency distributions and agree measurable budgets after
+  establishing a baseline. Faster feedback alone is not evidence that the
+  underlying connection/synchronization delay has been fixed.
+
+## 12. Missing Fleet card metrics and secure FIPS transport
+
+- Reproduce missing metrics on multiple Fleet **Nodes** cards; trace collection,
+  authorization, transport delivery, identity matching, subscriptions/cache and
+  rendering separately. Verify each metric is real, current and associated with
+  the correct node; show unavailable/stale explicitly rather than invented zeros.
+- Evaluate and use existing FIPS transport wherever supported and measurably
+  beneficial across Fleet, discovery, peering and synchronization. Preserve peer
+  authentication, access controls, confidentiality and existing trust boundaries;
+  transport reachability must never grant permission to read metrics or act.
+- Prefer fresh authenticated updates without duplicate polling or excessive
+  subscriptions. Measure propagation latency and resource use, including large
+  fleets, while retaining safe fallback for unavailable/incompatible FIPS peers.
+- Test spoofed/unauthorized peers, expired trust, disconnect/reconnect, partial
+  metrics, stale/out-of-order/duplicate messages, mixed transport capability and
+  fallback recovery. Do not claim FIPS is faster until timings demonstrate it.
+
+## Required qualification before user acceptance testing
+
+Operator explicitly requires extensive headless testing using the authorized
+nodes before deploying the next features for UAT. For each task, qualify source
+regressions, actual browser behavior, integration between appropriate nodes,
+permissions and failure/recovery paths first. Use existing access and useful
+read-only checks on real nodes; use isolated fixtures for destructive scenarios.
+Headless browser success does not substitute for actual companion/WebView checks
+where lifecycle, native signing, media or navigation behavior is involved.
+
+Record exact revisions/artifacts, nodes, environments, before/after measurements,
+executed scenarios, failures and untested boundaries. Retest fixes and relevant
+regressions; do not mark gaps passed or claim perfection. UAT handoff must contain
+short node-specific steps with expected outcomes, deployment scope and rollback.
+Preserve wallets, files, identities and operator app choices throughout.
+
+If IndeeHub changes are needed, include its app update explicitly: build and test
+the versioned image, preserve app data and configuration, qualify fresh install,
+upgrade/restart and rollback, publish through the signed app catalog, and verify
+existing nodes discover and apply the intended version. Distinguish an app-only
+release from any backend/OTA dependency; use the documented decoupled app-update
+path where supported. Do not silently require a full OTA for an app-only change.
+
+Sequencing clarification: finish1.9.0-alpha first. Publish any required IndeeHub
+app update at the end of the follow-up implementation and qualification, not
+ahead of that work or as an untested addition to the current release.
+
+## 13. V4V Portainer demo as a Yaya node app
+
+- After the current release, deploy/package the existing V4V Portainer deployment
+  as a demo app on Yaya, showcasing how an ordinary third-party app works on a
+  node **without native Nostr signer integration**, as explicitly requested.
+- Inspect the actual existing Portainer source, branch/image revision, Compose
+  stack, access/authentication and data before changes; retain the working V4V
+  site, stack and persistent state. Do not confuse this with the public Archipelago
+  software demo at demo.archipelago-foundation.org.
+- Follow the current app-development guide and supported app packaging/gate/
+  lifecycle conventions. Define the app card/icon/category, launch URL/readiness,
+  network/auth boundaries, health, configuration and persistent mounts properly.
+  Do not expose the native signer or implicitly grant signing permissions.
+- Qualify fresh installation in isolation, then Yaya deployment, desktop/mobile/
+  companion launch, normal app functionality, restart, update/rollback and safe
+  removal behavior. Verify the deployed app actually runs the intended V4V source
+  revision, not a stale build or unrelated image.
+- Record a short reproducible demo flow and operator UAT checklist. Preserve
+  existing Gitea/Portainer connectivity and unrelated apps; no new payment or
+  public sharing of private test content is implied by the demo packaging.
+
+### V4V node-only catalog and Sovereign Music promotion
+
+- Source is on the existing Gitea on the146 server; locate the actual V4V repo,
+  branch and deployment revision there rather than guessing a replacement source.
+- Add a **Sovereign Music** banner for V4V on Yaya, following the existing
+  Sovereign Streaming banner treatment and using the app's own login background.
+  Retrieve and inspect the real asset; do not invent a replacement illustration.
+- Both demo app availability and its promotion must be confined to Yaya. Evaluate
+  a signed per-node/DID-scoped demo catalog or existing supported node-specific
+  candidate mechanism. Do not publish the demo to the global catalog or let
+  unrelated nodes install it implicitly through a shared catalog cache.
+- Test matching/nonmatching identities, copying URLs/catalogs between nodes,
+  missing identity, refresh/restart/update and promotion visibility. Catalog
+  selection or visibility must not bypass normal artifact-signature enforcement.
+- This may become a real app later; preserve an explicit tested promotion path
+  from node-only demo to proper public app release without duplicate app IDs,
+  conflicting state, lost configuration or automatic exposure before approval.

docs/release-1.8.22-acceptance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# Archipelago 1.8.22-alpha acceptance
+
+Source: `6d5f3ffb850bfd3dcd396bac986ba770935d1daa`.
+
+## Verified application and runtime changes
+
+- Full isolated backend suite: 1,617 passed, zero failed, four explicit opt-in exclusions.
+- Frontend suite: 1,133 passed. Final frontend and AIUI production builds succeeded.
+- Container suite: 79 passed. Catalog compatibility/trust, release manifest, build contexts, pruning, Lightning readiness, NPM migration, safe doctor, companion recovery and ISO doctor-overlay regressions passed.
+- Six companion dashboard images built using the current registry.
+- Final OTA backend SHA-256: `e108b78bbbd21cb7d5d47c8d0b7b9b19b63fb0c44678773603202440ec7d6f5b`.
+- Final OTA frontend SHA-256: `2da485a2da75ff2fbe4aba52d6f217150e303be43a031723480c9c4ff9d43f41`.
+
+## Live acceptance
+
+The exact OTA bytes were deployed to the development box and ThinkPad X250.
+Native Bitcoin/LND and the X250 production site retained their container identity
+and start time during these final management deployments. Both boxes completed
+12-minute observations including scheduled diagnostics with running containers
+and persistent mounts unchanged. The orphaned Cuprate dashboard stayed absent.
+
+Actual X250 Chromium kiosk: hard refresh, NPM Launch to the correct admin URL,
+visible login/admin page, readable inline Bitcoin version choices and pruning
+checkbox passed. No Bitcoin installation was triggered by this test.
+
+Final desktop/mobile checks passed for Bitcoin's IBD dashboard, one Mempool card,
+headless Phoenixd, LND waiting/unknown-balance behavior and all five transparent
+AIUI embedding layers. Standalone AIUI retains its wallpaper.
+
+Portainer's actual production network namespace fetched Git refs and the Compose
+file after final deployment. Original mounts were preserved. Earlier disposable
+fresh/reverse-install and migration/rollback tests, and the production host's
+operator-initiated reboot check, passed.
+
+Live Tor-only Cashu paid-file acceptance verified a one-satoshi net purchase,
+change, rejected-payment refund, exact file bytes, Files access and free repeat
+delivery. No native Bitcoin/LND funds were moved. PRs 161/162 are merged and
+closed; the open pull-request list is empty.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Angor's real dev API, fees, block tip, CORS and rootless/headless configuration
+  passed. Full-chain indexing remains dependent on initial Bitcoin sync finishing.
+- Optional live AI providers, physical RNode hardware, the opt-in Reticulum TCP
+  subprocess test and creation of a production Minibits profile were not run.
+- The previously recorded unsafe-doctor incident changed X250 container start
+  times before the final fix. Persistent databases were present after recovery,
+  but no pre-incident cryptographic wallet-identity baseline was available.
+  Do not describe recovery evidence as an exact pre-incident balance comparison.
+- No claim of perfect behavior on every device, network or future failure is made.
+
+## Raw ISO acceptance
+
+The raw ISO is 2,755,072,000 bytes. SHA-256:
+`cf7be6378dcd52f6f62774523341fa75dd453fa73a9cadff5390846f483e0140`.
+
+Mounted-artifact smoke checks passed, including BIOS/UEFI boot files, live-boot
+hooks, build contexts, current doctor overlay, crash-capture configuration,
+version and frontend payload. The ISO backend and all 653 OTA frontend/runtime
+files match exactly. AIUI metadata names the tested source commit.
+
+A disposable QEMU/KVM x86_64 VM with UEFI firmware, 3 GiB RAM, two vCPUs, a fresh
+64 GiB NVMe virtual disk and no network completed the full installation. This
+covered partitioning, LUKS2 data encryption, swap, system configuration, UEFI
+bootloader and initramfs generation. Cold boot with the ISO detached reached the
+visible Welcome to Archipelago setup screen. The installed backend and both
+historical/current doctor paths matched source hashes. Backend/nginx were active;
+health reported RPC/sessions ready, crash recovery complete and version 1.8.22.
+No wallet was initialized in this disposable VM.
+
+The first automatic VM reboot selected the still-attached installer ISO. That
+was corrected in the test configuration by detaching the ISO and explicitly
+booting NVMe. It was not accepted as an installed-system boot. The subsequent
+cold boot above is the successful acceptance run.
+
+The dev native Bitcoin/LND identity/start-time baseline also remained unchanged
+after the ISO build and VM acceptance.
+
+## Publication verification
+
+All three operator signatures verify against the pinned release root. The five
+Gitea assets match independent server-side SHA-256 checks. Both OTA components
+also passed complete public HTTPS downloads with exact hashes and sizes; the
+raw ISO passed public size/range checks and both checksum sidecars read back
+exactly. Only after these checks were the signed OTA manifest and compatible
+app catalog promoted. The release tag identifies the tested source above.
+
+Git and ngit publication completed on 2026-10-01. Both repository relays
+acknowledged the ngit release; independent `release view` resolved all five
+assets with exact hashes and sizes and no unresolved asset IDs. Main and the
+release tag were pushed to both remotes.
+
+Public main-branch OTA manifests and the app catalog read back byte-for-byte
+and verified cryptographically. Live `update.check` on the accepted dev node
+reported 1.8.22-alpha with no further update, as expected for the installed
+release. Discovery on an older production node was not repeated during this
+publication step.
+
+- [Release and verification files](https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/tag/v1.8.22-alpha)
+- [Raw ISO](https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/releases/download/v1.8.22-alpha/archipelago-installer-1.8.22-alpha-unbundled-x86_64_RC1.iso)
+

docs/release-1.8.23-acceptance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
+# Archipelago 1.9.0 acceptance
+
+The operator changed the release target from 1.8.23-alpha to **1.9.0**. This file retains its historical path so handoff links remain valid.
+
+Status: PREPARING. Do not publish until artifact checks and offline signatures pass.
+
+## Scope
+
+Durable Lightning paid-file entitlements and delivery retries, atomic buyer
+ownership, compact persistent upload progress/cancellation, mobile transaction
+filters, Immich inventory and retired-app uninstall, Portainer duplicate-network
+migration, channel-close fee selection, and shared app-search clearing.
+
+Angor Indexer and the optional Angor Relay remain in the signed catalog. They
+were already included in 1.8.22; full-chain acceptance still awaits dev Bitcoin
+initial sync. Do not advertise full-chain verification as complete.
+
+## Validation carried into preparation
+
+- Candidate deployed on dev and Framework with matching backend/dashboard bytes.
+- Native Bitcoin/LND and Framework Immich container IDs/start times preserved.
+- Six live desktop/mobile app-search cases passed.
+- Actual uploads verified exact bytes, original destination after navigation,
+  compact progress geometry and cancellation. These are browser checks, not
+  physical companion acceptance.
+- Framework seller's settled invoice recovered to a mode-0600 entitlement and
+  remained paid across another manager restart; mismatched item rejected.
+- Framework CryptPad stale inventory removed with data preserved; removal
+  persisted after management restart. Dev normal package.uninstall RPC also
+  completed with preserve_data=true and zero cleanup errors for the retired ID.
+- Cooperative-close fee selector tested with intercepted requests; no real
+  channel was closed. Real payment recovery never sent another payment.
+- Shorty's Mempool inspected read-only; frontend/API healthy for over two weeks,
+  systemd zero restarts. Operator reported normal status after their update.
+
+## Follow-ups accepted for release preparation
+
+The operator authorized release preparation after available tests pass.
+
+- Actual failed-purchase delivery still requires buyer/file confirmation. The
+  located invoice's source file is missing from Framework's recorded paths.
+  Seller settlement recovery does not prove buyer delivery.
+- Physical companion upload diagnosis needs the affected device/route.
+- Framework rendered inventory/uninstall checks need dashboard second-factor
+  authentication; SSH/runtime and dev API acceptance are recorded separately.
+- Angor full-chain indexing awaits Bitcoin IBD.
+- Prior Primal automatic-comment and lost-response ecash receipt follow-ups
+  retain their documented boundaries; this release does not claim to fix them.
+
+## Final release checks
+
+Pending full release gates, versioned builds, exact artifact deployment, ISO
+payload/boot acceptance, pinned-root signatures and publication verification.
+No universal or future-failure guarantee is implied by these tests.
+
+## Required NPM certificate gate
+
+The release owner acknowledged `docs/npm-certificate-handoff-20261001.md` in
+`/tmp/npm-release-handoff-ack.txt`. Shorty's npm-8 issuance and HTTPS health 200
+were reported by the operator; durable data-path resolution, safe host routing,
+automatic certificate renewal/reload, and the handoff acceptance matrix remain
+required before publication. Earlier authorization does not waive this new gate.
+
+## Urgent public dashboard exposure gate — 2026-10-01
+
+Investigator reports the Angor relay hostname reached the default Archipelago
+login because its certificate existed without a corresponding host-nginx route.
+The investigator owns the immediate Shorty nginx repair; the release session
+will not modify that configuration concurrently. Exact final evidence is pending.
+
+- [ ] Unknown public HTTP Host / TLS SNI and direct public-IP requests cannot
+      expose the dashboard, login assets or RPC, including IPv6 and any trusted
+      reverse-proxy/tunnel path. Test spoofed forwarding headers explicitly.
+- [ ] LAN/private/tailnet dashboard access remains available as intended.
+- [ ] Public HTTP ACME challenge access survives those restrictions.
+- [ ] NPM host creation/edits automatically propagate HTTP/TLS routing.
+- [ ] Relay hostname serves the intended relay and WebSocket upgrade using its
+      correct certificate; certificate existence is not route acceptance.
+- [ ] These protections survive manager/nginx restart, renewal and OTA/ISO.
+
+## Additional isolated security checks — not deployed
+
+The management source-guard prototype passed five unit checks including legacy
+address-specific HTTPS, idempotence, backup permissions and syntax/reload rollback.
+An actual nginx instance in a private network namespace passed 120 negative
+HTTP/TLS cases across IPv4/IPv6, raw/unknown/spoofed Host/SNI and forwarded headers,
+including POST RPC and WebSocket upgrade requests. Exact ACME token reads,
+private LAN/tailnet/ULA access, named public HTTP app routing and reload passed.
+These are scoped checks, not complete fleet, trusted-tunnel, reboot or artifact
+acceptance. Shorty's containment was not modified.
+
+The NPM storage/routing prototype passed eight focused tests: fresh/flat/nested/
+custom mount selection without mutation, ambiguity/wrong-mount refusal, corrupt
+or uninitialized database preservation, duplicate/missing mounts, deleted/disabled
+host exclusion, domain injection rejection, and rejection of mixed public and
+loopback listener bindings. Automatic application/migration and end-to-end NPM
+security/routing remain unfinished and block release.
+
+Final Angor handoff was read and acknowledged in
+`/tmp/angor-final-handoff-ack.txt`; see `angor-client-acceptance-20261001.md`.
+One complete project flow is investigator-verified; 34 original announcements
+remain unrecovered from queried sources. Full recovery acceptance remains open.
+
+## Additional Angor public explorer gate
+
+- [ ] Public indexer hostname serves Mempool UI and its assets/deep links/live
+      WebSocket updates while preserving Angor API/CORS/broadcast/readiness.
+- [ ] Existing stack reused; no duplicate Mempool app/database and no management
+      or Bitcoin RPC exposure.
+- [ ] Documentation/catalog/runtime metadata and exact OTA/ISO reflect the tested
+      implementation; repeat official-client browser acceptance afterward.
+
+Confirmed official deployment guide describes a shared frontend/API origin.
+Current adapter 1.0.1 is API-only; this requirement is not yet implemented.
+
+## NPM real-image integration progress
+
+Disposable real NPM API tests passed for both flat and legacy nested `/data`
+layouts: initial account/host creation, multiple domains, custom location,
+forwarded-client spoof rejection, exact challenge file access under forced HTTPS,
+trusted TLS and WSS upgrade/frame, certificate replacement/reload, password and
+network access lists, disable/enable/delete propagation, and restart with the
+original database and account authentication preserved. Local fixture certificates
+are not public Let's Encrypt staging issuance/renewal evidence; that gate is open.
+
+Certificate replacement initially failed because the updated bridge could not
+complete the upstream TLS request after replacing the fixture certificate.
+Reloading and validating NPM's own TLS listener on certificate fingerprint changes,
+as well as host nginx, resolved the test. Rollback/retry unit coverage was added.
+
+The initial dev guard deployment changed only the inactive sites-available copy;
+private HTTP 200 and unchanged entry bytes were insufficient acceptance evidence.
+A later public-ingress-marker probe caught this: it incorrectly returned 200.
+The resolver now chooses the active sites-enabled copy or resolves its symlink
+without replacing the link. Guard backups live outside nginx include directories.
+After the correction, live private requests return200 and marked requests 404.
+No app was restarted. Direct-backend protection still awaits its candidate build.
+
+Angor candidate UI was exercised against the actual dev Mempool stack in a
+throwaway gateway: desktop/mobile rendered, zero failed JS/CSS assets, one
+WebSocket connection each. The gateway was removed afterward; this is candidate
+integration evidence, not a published or permanently installed app update.
+
+### Same-node NPM networking correction
+
+Read-only inspection of the production NPM namespace reproduced HTTP 502 for its
+own configured indexer route. Host requests to the LAN upstream returned 200;
+requests from the existing pasta namespace to that same LAN address were refused.
+A disposable container on the proposed `slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true`
+network returned 200 for both the LAN upstream and `host.containers.internal`.
+No production NPM/nginx configuration or container was changed in this check.
+
+The candidate now declares this network in the manifest and first-boot path,
+with explicit Quadlet/API support and legacy drift detection. The Podman API
+`network_options` shape was checked against `podman generate spec` locally.
+The real NPM integration fixture now uses the proposed network and a LAN-bound
+same-node upstream, rather than placing both fixtures on one custom bridge.
+Flat-layout integration passed namespace reachability, host routing, verified
+TLS/WSS, ACME file access, certificate replacement/reload, custom routes, password
+and IP ACLs, spoof rejection, host lifecycle and NPM restart with preserved DB.
+The earlier loopback-only fixture failed because this machine resolves the host
+alias to its LAN address; its bind was corrected before repeating the test.
+
+The latest isolated nginx guard test passed 120 public IPv4/IPv6 negative cases
+plus private access, ACME, proxy-marker rejection and reload. Python guard/bridge
+regressions passed 23 tests, including exact emergency-route retirement, failed
+migration rollback and preserving operator-modified routes. Backend compilation
+and new direct-listener tests are still pending. Required public staging renewal,
+actual upgrade/reboot, yaya and exact OTA/ISO acceptance remain open.
+
+
+### Active nginx site layout regression
+
+The dev node has a regular `sites-enabled/archipelago` file, not a symlink to
+`sites-available`. Both the guard and ACME resolver now select the active file.
+Unit coverage verifies copied sites and symlink targets, preserving inactive
+operator copies and the links themselves. Nginx configuration backups must not
+be created inside `sites-enabled`, whose wildcard include would load them.
+The active guard was applied on dev, with private HTTP 200 and public-ingress
+marker 404 verified after reload. Shorty remains untouched. Do not count the
+initial inactive-file edit as a security deployment pass.
+
+### LoRa flasher added to release gates
+
+Both dev and Framework lack the esptool executable and Python module. The
+backend invokes a bare `esptool` and retries even process-spawn failures. The
+shell updater installs it opportunistically, but the OTA runtime tool list
+omits it. Candidate packaging adds a pinned self-contained `archy-esptool`
+with its ESP32-S3 stub to mandatory OTA/ISO payloads. Candidate preflight runs
+before stopping the radio; retries are limited to recognized serial transport
+failures. Concurrent flash registration now uses one exclusive lock.
+
+CP2102 USB identity does not uniquely identify a Heltec V3. The candidate removes
+that unsafe inference from backend and UI and requires explicit board selection.
+Actual board models were requested before firmware writes. Dev exposes one
+CP2102 serial radio. Framework SSH works but currently exposes no mesh-radio,
+ttyUSB or ttyACM port. No radio has been erased or flashed in this investigation.
+Physical MeshCore UK acceptance on both nodes remains required and pending.
+
+Dev connection diagnosis: the failed flash stopped its listener before spawn
+failed and left the enabled setting true. A read-only protocol probe identifies
+the existing radio as Reticulum/RNode. An explicit listener disable/enable restored
+`device_connected: true` on `/dev/mesh-radio`, without flashing or native-service
+restarts. Candidate configure logic now compares desired enabled state with the
+actual listener task, including stopped/finished handles; same-settings reconnect
+is covered by a new isolated regression. Probe/configure and flash registration
+are coordinated to prevent concurrent serial owners.
+
+The packaged `archy-esptool` build passes in a clean environment, including loading
+the actual ESP32-S3 stub through esptool's own loader. It is installed and self-tested
+on dev and Framework; a compatibility command supports their current backends.
+This verifies tooling availability, not physical flashing. Framework's USB sysfs
+inventory shows its hub/storage/network/keyboard/display devices but no serial
+radio. Board confirmation and Framework radio detection remain pending.
+
+Additional Podman API acceptance: a disposable API service created a container
+with the candidate `netns`/`network_options` payload. Its effective generated
+specification preserves `allow_host_loopback=true`. The normal inspect network
+mode omits options for API-created containers, unlike the CLI-created case;
+candidate drift detection now consults the effective specification before
+recreating such a container. Added a regression against repeated recreation.
+The probe container and temporary API service were removed. The real isolated
+nftables tunnel regression also passed (NPM peer port and LND remain separate).
+
+### Latest acceptance checkpoint: radio connection and release status
+
+The complete frontend suite passed: 143 files, 1,159 tests. Type checking and
+both new radio setup tests also passed. The final isolated backend build/test
+run is still pending; the previous run exposed an NPM/Router port collision,
+which was corrected by assigning NPM's local HTTP listener port 8088. Do not
+report the previous run as fully passing or the final run as completed.
+
+Yaya's identity has been confirmed. Its existing managed web-tunnel drop-in
+clears manifest port publications and supplies private tunnel HTTP/HTTPS ports
+plus the local admin port. This would suppress the candidate bridge's new
+loopback HTTP/TLS listeners. Migration must preserve the working tunnel/site,
+add the required local listeners, validate the managed firewall/lifecycle,
+retain custom overrides, and cover repeat upgrade and rollback. The current
+bridge rejects non-loopback listeners, so the supported tunnel topology also
+needs explicit qualification. No tunnel or NPM runtime change was applied to
+yaya during this diagnosis. Its management source guard was applied and tested:
+private dashboard HTTP 200, public-ingress-marked request 404.
+
+Dev radio connection has been restored on its existing Reticulum firmware.
+Framework still does not enumerate a USB serial radio. Both nodes now have the
+self-tested packaged flasher, but physical MeshCore UK flashing, post-flash
+handshake and reconnect acceptance remain open pending board identification and
+Framework USB detection. No device firmware has been written.
+
+OTA, app catalog and raw ISO publication remain held. Outstanding acceptance
+includes NPM migration/renewal/reboot and exact artifacts, end-to-end delivery
+of the reported paid file, physical companion uploads, full Angor discovery
+(the 34 missing original announcements), radio hardware tests, and the final
+dev/yaya candidate deployment checks. Retained tasks above remain in scope.
+
+### Dev Heltec V3 physical flashing result
+
+Full 8 MiB pre-flash backup saved privately with mode 0600 and checksum. After
+removing the confirmed stale radio sidecar, the exclusive read completed.
+The normal mesh.flash-device RPC then flashed the official Heltec V3 Companion
+USB v1.17.1-d929643 merged image successfully (100%, no error). The image's
+size and SHA-256 were checked against the official GitHub release metadata.
+
+Independent serial protocol queries confirmed model Heltec V3, firmware
+v1.17.1-d929643 and actual RF readback: 869618 kHz, 62500 Hz bandwidth, SF8,
+CR8 (EU/UK Narrow). This is device readback, not merely saved host settings.
+The listener was then re-enabled and reported connected as meshcore. No wallet
+or native Bitcoin/LND service restart was used. MeshCore remote reboot is not
+supported by the current API; that attempted check returned an explicit error.
+Physical unplug/replug and communication to Framework remain pending.
+
+Live qualification additionally found incorrect binary DEVICE_INFO/SELF_INFO
+parsing and a stale host-side RF-applied marker after full-chip flashing.
+Candidate changes decode the current official binary layout, query the actual
+firmware version during initialization, and invalidate the RF marker after a
+successful flash. The dev marker was backed up and cleared before provisioning;
+the independent readback above confirms settings applied. New parser, startup
+cancellation and marker lifecycle regressions are queued/running; the prior
+1,647 passing tests do not cover these later changes.
+
+Framework's V4 official USB image has been downloaded and verified. Despite the
+operator confirming it is plugged in, repeated sysfs/device checks show no
+ESP32 USB or serial port. USER/BOOT plus RST bootloader entry was requested;
+Framework has NOT been flashed and the two-device acceptance remains open.
+
+### Operator deferral and latest qualification
+
+Operator explicitly deferred Framework radio/hardware work and instructed us to
+continue all other release tasks. Framework V4 flashing, USB reconnect and
+radio-to-radio acceptance remain UNVERIFIED / OPERATOR-DEFERRED; this is not a
+pass. Do not request further Framework radio operations unless needed and the
+operator resumes that work. Dev V3 acceptance and durable fleet fixes remain.
+
+The final radio backend suite passed 1,650 tests, zero failed, four ignored,
+including sidecar-startup cancellation, current MeshCore metadata parsing, and
+post-flash RF-marker invalidation. Frontend baseline remains 1,159 passed.
+
+Correction to the earlier yaya tunnel concern: direct inspection of the active
+Quadlet and all drop-ins confirms web-tunnel.conf ADDS private tunnel ports; it
+does not contain an empty PublishPort reset. The earlier statement that it
+cleared manifest listeners was incorrect. The new loopback publications therefore
+coexist declaratively without editing that working tunnel drop-in. The bridge
+validator now permits only the known HTTP/TLS tunnel ports bound to a currently
+assigned RFC1918 address on an actual WireGuard interface named wg-web; it still
+requires a separate loopback upstream, and rejects wildcard/public/unassigned
+bindings and any admin-port exception. Python bridge/guard tests: 27 passed.
+Actual yaya candidate upgrade and public route acceptance remain pending.
+
+### NPM public certificate and restart qualification checkpoint
+
+- Main backend: 1,651 passed, zero failed, four explicitly ignored hardware /
+  external integration tests. Container runtime library: 80 passed, zero failed.
+- Bridge/management guard Python suite: 27 passed. Shell syntax and actual ISO
+  overlay-content test passed.
+- Candidate validator inspected yaya's real runtime/WireGuard interface and
+  accepted its existing web tunnel publications while selecting proposed
+  loopback HTTP/TLS upstreams. This was read-only, not a runtime upgrade.
+- Existing yaya public HTTP ACME route returned the exact random token body
+  written inside NPM. Lets Encrypt STAGING initial issuance and renewal dry run
+  succeeded using separate temporary account/config/work/log storage. Current
+  production certificate and host records were not replaced. Public site HTTP
+  and trusted HTTPS retain their authentication requirement (401).
+- First renewal harness timed out while Certbot used a 292.7-second randomized
+  delay; the remote log confirmed successful simulated renewal. A deterministic
+  rerun with --no-random-sleep-on-renew returned exit 0 and success confirmation.
+  Only the temporary staging directory was removed afterward.
+- Real disposable NPM nested-layout test completed: namespace LAN upstream,
+  API host creation, custom locations, client-IP spoof rejection, exact ACME
+  token, trusted TLS/WSS, certificate replacement, password/network ACLs,
+  enable/disable/delete, and restart with retained DB. Latest restart took 7.6s.
+  Earlier rerun exceeded the fixture's 90-second restart window; the test now
+  uses the manifest's 180-second budget and records both route/admin statuses
+  and container state on failure. Do not erase that earlier observed failure.
+- Cleanup was hardened to continue cleaning other fixtures after a timeout.
+  Two early test runs passed functional assertions but failed cleanup; their
+  leftover disposable containers/networks were explicitly removed. The latest
+  full run exited successfully.
+
+Legacy non-Quadlet repair now retains the old container for rollback, restores
+it after replacement failure, preserves its exact image and environment values,
+and waits for HTTP API readiness. Environment values use an exclusive mode0600
+file cleaned on drop, not argv or the host process environment. Invalid/multiline
+entries fail before stopping the original. An occupied rollback slot is preserved
+for review rather than deleting an unknown container. Live interrupted-migration,
+additional operator-override and rollback acceptance remain OPEN; unit success
+is not proof of those deployment paths.
+
+The deployment backend and frontend build are in progress. Full candidate dev/
+yaya upgrade acceptance, reboot, exact signed OTA/catalog and booted raw ISO
+remain open. Framework radio is operator-deferred, not passed. The original paid
+file bytes, physical companion upload and 34 missing Angor announcements remain
+separately tracked.
+
+### Further completed acceptance
+
+The complete disposable NPM test now includes a deliberately failed replacement
+with an occupied host port. Restoring the retained container preserved its exact
+container ID, database, configured hosts and authenticated API access; the test
+exited successfully and cleaned its fixtures. This verifies the Podman rollback
+mechanism, not yet the full installed backend's legacy-repair entry point.
+
+Dev frontend build completed and was deployed with a separate rollback backup.
+Served production Transactions layout passed at widths 390 and 1440: transparent
+background, no image/blur/shadow/border, nowrap and exactly one row. Mobile rail
+is 324px wide with 419px scroll content. Backend candidate compilation is still
+in progress, so the latest backend changes are not yet deployed.
+
+Dev Bitcoin remains unpruned and in IBD (observed block543676/header969495,
+verification progress0.2284). This is not full-chain Angor acceptance. The operator
+identified the seller of the failed Lightning purchase as Amish Paradise.
+On 2026-10-02 the operator confirmed the other tester received the file and
+accepted closure of this individual recovery. Seller access is no longer needed
+for that recovery. This does not establish that the candidate fix delivered it;
+durable settlement/delivery regression acceptance remains required before
+release. No additional payment was made. Earlier references in this document
+to missing original purchase bytes are superseded by this operator acceptance.
+
+### Read-only Shorty migration preflight: remaining ownership conflict
+
+Preflight found both flat and nested NPM databases. The live container's explicit
+/data mount identifies the active one, so the candidate resolver now uses that
+verified mount (or its saved validated receipt after a managed stop), preserves
+both databases, and still refuses multiple databases without an authoritative
+selection. Python coverage verifies both explicit choices and unchanged bytes.
+This helper update occurred after the deployment binary build started; a final
+release rebuild must include it. Do not claim the in-progress binary contains it.
+
+After resolving storage, the two Angor emergency routes match the exact known
+handoff templates. Another existing file, shop-btcpay.conf, conflicts with an
+enabled NPM record: the manual route supplies HTTPS using certificate10, while
+the NPM host currently has certificate_id0 and SSL forcing disabled. The manual
+route and NPM record cover the same two public names and backend web port. Blindly
+retiring the route would break its HTTPS. No database, host, certificate, route
+or runtime was changed on Shorty. The bridge correctly refuses this ownership
+conflict and now names its configuration file in the diagnostic. Align TLS/route
+ownership and verify the public shop before retiring that manual configuration;
+Shorty's full migration acceptance remains OPEN. Preserve live containment.
+
+### Candidate deployment and additional real-upgrade ACME regression
+
+The operator explicitly deferred Framework's physical radio investigation and
+requested continuation of all other work. Framework radio remains unverified.
+Dev and yaya now run the backed-up unpublished backend candidate SHA256
+4c47269b3480ca0362df18dae160c073a19ea33507e04cacdad5b96837990ca6 and production
+frontend index 3099c4ba44528a4a4c524f9a26159414558efa16abdd12cc7bfd64376cbb6089.
+Both management health checks passed; native Bitcoin/LND container identities
+and start times were unchanged. Yaya public site retains trusted TLS and its
+401 authentication requirement; NPM admin API200, private dashboard200 and
+public-ingress-marked dashboard404. The first yaya staging attempt stopped
+before binary replacement because rsync was absent; deployment now uses Python
+copying without that dependency and completed successfully.
+
+Actual startup exposed an additional regression: the canonical nginx template
+had only HTTP ACME, while the bridge demanded two locations. Startup rewrote the
+previously repaired config and the bridge rejected it before fixing the nested
+root. Source now adds HTTPS ACME to the shipped template and migrates the exact
+recognized legacy default-server layout; custom/ambiguous layouts still fail
+closed. The missing-token route must return404 rather than the dashboard SPA.
+28 Python checks passed. The real isolated nginx suite now starts from the
+legacy missing-HTTPS layout, applies the migration, and passes all120 public
+negative cases plus HTTP/TLS exact-token, private-access and reload checks.
+
+Applied the latest helper and its atomic ACME-only repair to yaya: actual token
+written inside NPM returned exact200 over host HTTP, host HTTPS and public HTTP;
+missing tokens returned404 for allthree. Public site trustedTLS/auth preserved.
+Local self-signed host HTTPS was tested with certificate verification disabled;
+public site HTTPS used normal certificate verification. Shorty was not modified.
+The running backend still embeds the older helper/template; final rebuild is
+REQUIRED before restart/reboot/persistent upgrade acceptance can pass.
+
+The prepared unsigned catalog validates with zero metadata drift and trusted
+registry hosts. Its only changed entries are NPM and Angor indexer1.0.2. It has
+not been signed, installed or published. Yaya's current signed catalog retains
+NPM's old pasta network/tunnel-only HTTP+TLS listeners; full NPM runtime/bridge
+migration acceptance awaits the reviewed signed catalog. Do not mistake the
+backend/UI deployment or ACME-only fix for completed catalog migration.
+
+### 2026-10-02: rebuilt candidate deployed; private catalog qualification prepared
+
+Release-profile candidate build completed successfully. SHA256:
+af0648ad4ef8b6183d3c1ff485721fa40b12bb730c6e0322bc5f209ed06fce39.
+Focused bootstrap tests:10 passed. Full isolated backend rerun:1651 passed,
+zero failed, four explicit hardware/external ignores. Python guard/bridge28
+passed again. No new source changes occurred between these checks and deployment.
+
+Deployed this rebuilt backend on dev and yaya, with private previous-binary,
+nginx and native-container baselines. Both manager health checks passed. A later
+post-startup comparison confirmed Bitcoin/LND identities/start times unchanged.
+The installed bridge helper now matches latest source bytes after restart.
+Private UI200, marked-public HTTP/HTTPS404 and missing HTTPS challenge404 passed.
+Dev HTTPS intentionally binds its LAN/WireGuard addresses, not127.0.0.1; an
+initial loopback probe got connection refused, corrected to the actual listener.
+This was a test-address error, not a product outage. Local self-signed HTTPS
+checks skip certificate verification; public-site TLS checks use normal trust.
+Full-machine reboot qualification is still pending.
+
+Prepared a fresh candidate catalog with only NPM and Angor indexer entries changed.
+Metadata drift0; registry trust check passed. Unsigned SHA256:
+5801309bf21d3f6fd03ce5702d68b383a518f734092bf265f5e0ad243095a25e.
+NPM's new manifest is capability-gated by runtime-migration-backup-v1; older
+nodes retain the original manifest. This candidate is for private qualification,
+not fleet publication. An operator-only hidden-input signer validates the exact
+catalog and binary hashes, checks the pinned release root and restores the
+unsigned original on failure. Its noninteractive refusal was tested. Signature
+is required before testing through the nodes' normal trusted-catalog path.
+No catalog, app image, OTA or ISO was published. Framework remains deferred;
+all other open requirements retain their previous status.
+
+### Signed catalog and private qualification selector
+
+The operator signed the qualification catalog. Cryptographic release-root
+verification passed locally and on yaya; after removing signature envelope fields,
+its contents exactly match the reviewed unsigned candidate. No publication.
+The catalog is staged under /var/lib/archipelago/qualification on both test nodes,
+with previous catalog/app metadata and container identities privately backed up.
+
+Normal mirror loading deliberately forces the public origin first, so simply
+prepending a private mirror cannot reliably test an unpublished candidate.
+Implemented ARCHY_APP_CATALOG_CANDIDATE as an explicit absolute-file selection:
+requires an anchored release-root signature, validates before cache replacement,
+retains exact signed bytes, does not alter mirrors/trust, and fails without
+public fallback when the selected file is invalid. Added unsigned, tampered,
+wrong-key, malformed, missing, oversized, relative-path, valid and idempotent
+coverage. Full isolated backend suite:1653 passed,0 failed,4 explicit ignores.
+The optimized selector build is still in progress; selection is not enabled yet.
+See docs/candidate-catalog-qualification.md for activation and mandatory removal
+once the tested public catalog is available. Do not leave test nodes pinned.
+
+Yaya NPM preflight:8088/8444 are free, active public host has no conflicting
+host-nginx ownership, database tables and certificate-file hashes saved privately.
+No Shorty mutation. Dev public Angor reference acceptance passed TLS/WSS, exact
+funding commitment, official Explore and detail/statistics again; this still
+checks only the known original project, not all35. Dev Bitcoin continues syncing
+(reported sync_progress approximately0.307); full-chain acceptance remains open.
+Current tested hardware product codes:dev20CLS7S900 and yaya20CLS6BH00, both Podman
+5.4.2; kernels6.12.74+deb13+1-amd64 and6.12.107+deb13-amd64 respectively. Framework
+remains deferred. No Docker or new ISO-boot acceptance is implied.
+
+
+### Signed qualification deployment and legacy upstream compatibility
+
+The optimized candidate selector build completed, SHA256
+`9cc9271ee1b4f8f13d798193cef97c1e4304a89a240f11f851eb71568bd105e1`.
+Both development acceptance nodes now run it with the exact root-verified private
+catalog. The isolated backend suite passed 1,653 tests, zero failures, four
+explicit ignores. This is unpublished qualification, not a release.
+
+Actual NPM migration exposed an additional regression that the LAN-upstream
+fixture missed: a saved site uses pasta's former host gateway `169.254.1.2`.
+Default slirp's gateway differs, so the request timed out from inside NPM even
+though admin readiness passed. A disposable container verified the same saved
+upstream with `slirp4netns:allow_host_loopback=true,cidr=169.254.1.0/24`.
+A temporary qualification Quadlet drop-in now selects that network, using an
+empty `Network=` reset before the replacement to avoid multiple network modes.
+The existing site's trusted public HTTPS authentication response is restored.
+
+Post-repair checks passed: request from NPM's actual namespace; exact saved user,
+host, certificate, ACL and settings rows; unchanged certificate bytes; private
+migration backup and prior unit; unchanged unrelated container IDs/start times;
+retained WireGuard tunnel ports; host bridge completion; private dashboard200,
+marked public HTTP/HTTPS404; missing challenge404; exact challenge body from
+inside NPM over local HTTP/HTTPS and public HTTP. Native Bitcoin/LND identities
+and start times remain unchanged.
+
+**Release blocker:** integrate and test legacy gateway compatibility in all
+supported runtime paths and signed manifest, including fresh/upgrade/restart
+cases and LAN/host.containers.internal upstreams. The current signed candidate
+alone is insufficient. Temporary user-unit drop-in
+`nginx-proxy-manager.container.d/90-qualification-host-gateway.conf` must be
+removed after the corrected managed configuration is verified. Do not remove
+it before then or claim the migration passed without it. Candidate catalog
+service selectors also require the cleanup described in
+`docs/candidate-catalog-qualification.md` after final publication.
+
+
+### Development Angor candidate update
+
+The supported `package.update` RPC selected the private signed catalog and
+upgraded only `angor-indexer` to the locally built 1.0.2 image. The actual dev
+endpoint rendered the Mempool explorer at widths 390 and 1440 with zero failed
+JavaScript/CSS requests and one WebSocket connection each. All unrelated dev
+containers retained their exact IDs and start times. This verifies the local
+explorer presentation, not complete blockchain indexing or recovery of the 34
+missing original Angor project announcements. Bitcoin remains in IBD.
+
+The repaired NPM namespace also reached the saved gateway,
+`host.containers.internal`, and the node LAN address with the expected site
+authentication response. The durable compatibility blocker remains open.
+
+
+## Live Lightning purchase: Framework to Shorty — 2026-10-02
+
+Operator explicitly authorized a very small new test purchase, then performed
+it from Framework. This is separate from recovering the Amish Paradise sale.
+Fixture: `archy-lightning-delivery-test-20261002.txt`, price 1 sat, Lightning only.
+Read-only checks confirmed one matching seller invoice, SETTLED for exactly
+1 sat, and Framework payment SUCCEEDED for 1 sat with 1 sat routing fee
+(1,000 msat). Total spent was 2 sats. The assistant sent no payment.
+
+Framework has exactly one durable purchased-content ownership entry for the
+fixture, with backend `lightning`, paid_sats=1 and size_bytes=121. Its cached
+file SHA256 equals the original seller fixture:
+`d55f7a6acd77bdc3c35c65ecac6d1492096e99252d07d433e6286544540cde7e`.
+**PASS: actual node-wallet payment, seller settlement, delivered bytes and
+persisted buyer ownership/cache.** Framework runs the candidate backend
+`8fb6249d1869bb8c9aea26d0f846de5b3eec328113a5c7f573628306e26e652e`;
+Shorty runs `e108b78bbbd21cb7d5d47c8d0b7b9b19b63fb0c44678773603202440ec7d6f5b`.
+This also exercises the candidate buyer against the existing seller version.
+
+Live reopen without payment and restart acceptance are not established by
+this check. Shorty had no matching durable entitlement JSON in the inspected
+location; do not attribute the candidate seller persistence implementation to
+this older seller binary. No node or wallet was restarted. The tiny fixture
+remains available for a free cached reopen check; remove only its catalog
+entry/source file afterwards, preserving buyer ownership and payment records.
+
+
+### Operator-confirmed free reopen — 2026-10-02
+
+After the verified one-sat purchase, the operator reopened the file on Framework
+and confirmed it worked without another payment. **PASS: live paid delivery,
+durable buyer ownership/cache, and free repeat access**, with independent
+settlement/byte checks above and operator confirmation of the reopen UI.
+This closes that specific live acceptance check; it does not establish an
+untested restart, outage, or seller-upgrade scenario.
+
+The temporary seller catalog entry and source fixture were removed after
+acceptance. Buyer purchased bytes/ownership and all payment records were preserved.

docs/release-1.9.0-acceptance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,965 @@
+# Archipelago 1.9.0-alpha release acceptance
+
+Status: **OPEN — unpublished.** Operator requires the `-alpha` suffix: final version
+`1.9.0-alpha`, tag `v1.9.0-alpha`, and matching OTA/ISO artifact names. Earlier
+unsuffixed candidate evidence below is historical, not a final artifact pass.
+Operator selected the 1.9.0 series instead of the provisional
+1.8.23-alpha. This is the current summary; retain the detailed history and all
+requirements in [the regression ledger](post-1.8.22-regressions-20261001.md) and
+[the earlier acceptance record](release-1.8.23-acceptance.md). No unexecuted test
+is a pass. Provide the operator a node-specific action/expected-result checklist
+whenever human acceptance is needed.
+
+## Current evidence
+
+- Alpha backend: isolated suite **1,681 passed**, zero failed, four explicit
+  ignores; separate container runtime suite **82 passed**. Optimized binary
+  SHA256 `560aa6006cd9ef8be95b1f7831cf3b53854e911622b50022bb4402ce0f8b010a`
+  is deployed on dev, yaya and Shorty with private rollback backups. Framework
+  retains the preceding A5 candidate; its earlier acceptance remains recorded.
+- Frontend: **1,222 passed across 150 files**; production build and real mobile/
+  desktop media/menu checks pass. Dev serves index SHA256
+  `c18b24024a78789fe65c74c5ce27efe2125ae869016ab65e33c5a2680b543f17`.
+  Yaya now serves the same index and companion package; Framework retains the
+  preceding qualified upload UI `67de835a…`.
+- Companion **0.5.34/build54**: 12 native tests, clean build, v1/v2/v3 signatures
+  and unchanged signer pass. Viewer and phone download are operator accepted.
+  Dev APK SHA256 `ceb58a7dc5f1398fe84f30255ec9ed79834f5db5f8fbc03eac52e14186fab1a1`.
+  Fleet publication remains part of the final release.
+- NPM corrected gateway/client-IP integration: 23 Python checks and complete
+  disposable real-image integration passed. Catalog generator now requires both
+  migration-backup and legacy-gateway capabilities; its generator/drift selection
+  regression passes. Candidate metadata drift zero and registry trust passed.
+- Cuprate/NetBird/BTCPay grouping previously passed actual yaya desktop/mobile,
+  hard reload and BTCPay category/icon checks. No product installs were performed.
+- Real one-sat Lightning purchase, exact bytes, buyer ownership/cache and operator
+  free reopen passed. Original tester recovery accepted separately.
+- Transparent transaction rail, compact origin-screen upload bar/cancellation and
+  cooperative-close controls have recorded desktop/mobile browser acceptance.
+- Framework original LND startup incident is closed with operator acceptance.
+
+## Open release gates
+
+- [ ] **NPM:** corrected private signature, dev/yaya selection and yaya override
+      retirement now PASS (2026-10-05). Remaining: full boot/OTA/ISO and
+      full legacy-backend migration/rollback
+      acceptance; retain the completed
+      fresh/nested disposable, public staging issuance/forced renewal and actual
+      yaya state-preservation checks.
+- [ ] **Shorty NPM:** shop certificate12/Force SSL and manual-route migration pass. Final
+      corrected backend restart, 302 continuous denial probes and the external
+      32-case security matrix pass. Remaining: packaged boot/OTA acceptance.
+      Preserve management containment and current public app routing.
+- [ ] **Security:** verify final deployed/booted artifacts against public raw IP,
+      unknown Host/SNI, forged forwarding headers, IPv4/IPv6, assets/RPC/WS;
+      preserve private access, ACME issuance/renewal and public app TLS/WSS.
+- [ ] **Fees/Bump:** deployed dev/yaya Fast UI and real isolated funded regtest
+      (CPFP/RBF, fee history, restart, confirmation/reorg) pass. Authenticated
+      Framework read-only quote/status acceptance remains. Preserve approved green UI.
+      No production spending or channel closure is authorized by this checklist.
+- [ ] **Paid files:** finish buyer restart/outage and updated-seller persistence
+      acceptance; preserve atomic ownership and safe retries without repayment.
+- [x] **Uploads:** real dev/yaya interrupted-network, offset recovery, lost
+      replies, hashes, cancellation and compact origin-screen display pass.
+      Physical companion background/reconnect and Framework Cloud flow are
+      operator accepted. Final packaged-artifact checks remain below.
+- [ ] **File Browser credentials:** unique managed login, default-password
+      removal, account/file preservation and rollback pass real Podman fixtures
+      including actual Quadlet restart. Dev/yaya/Framework migration and Cloud
+      acceptance pass. Remaining: packaged OTA/ISO startup. Docker behavior is not inferred from Podman fixtures.
+- [ ] **Apps:** complete upgrade inventory matrix for installed/stopped/removed/
+      restarting/legacy aliases; Immich/retired-app removal and unexpected-service
+      identification; Portainer/Gitea migration from actual request namespace.
+- [x] **UI:** category-view clear-search control passes on served dev/yaya UI
+      at390/1440px: click and Escape clear the field, retain focus and stay inside
+      the existing field. `/tmp/archy-190-final-search-live.log`. Earlier grouping
+      and transaction-rail results are retained.
+- [ ] **Angor:** dev full-chain acceptance after unpruned Bitcoin sync; retain
+      the operator-accepted historical discovery limitation (34 unrecovered announcements);
+      recovery is follow-up work, not a publication blocker.
+      Publish tested explorer/API app update and optional relay in signed catalog.
+- [ ] **Post-release demo deployment:** operator requests updating the existing
+      public software demo at https://demo.archipelago-foundation.org/ through its
+      established Portainer/Gitea workflow after release. Inspect the exact
+      stack/source, preserve rollback, verify served 1.9.0-alpha and demo flows.
+      This is not the Yaya v4v website or a Portainer version upgrade.
+- [ ] **Final artifacts:** finish versioned build; exact candidate deployment;
+      OTA update/rollback and raw ISO boot/install; signature/checksum validation;
+      publish Git/ngit, app images/catalog and artifacts; verify public downloads
+      and fleet discovery; remove temporary catalog selectors after publication;
+      supply LAN SCP command for the raw ISO.
+
+## Retained regression scope
+
+Mempool version/update clearing/deduplication; Minibits and Cashu same-mint payment
+handling; LND startup/Receive/unknown balances; Bitcoin warmup and IBD dashboards;
+pruning and X250 kiosk picker; AIUI background; launch readiness/card geometry;
+GitWorkshop; Gitea/Portainer; safe network diagnostics; operator uninstall/stop
+choices; companion images and generated service configuration; radio payload and
+UK MeshCore dev V3 acceptance; previously reviewed/merged PRs. Detailed original
+requirements and evidence remain in the linked ledger, not silently dropped.
+
+## Explicit boundaries
+
+Framework V4 radio is now reported working by the operator (2026-10-05).
+No reflash is requested; retain this as operator evidence, separate from automated
+hardware coverage. Previously
+accepted Primal comment and lost-response Cashu receipt follow-ups remain separate.
+Only one Angor project has full public browser acceptance; 34 missing announcements
+are not proven globally lost. Do not claim complete recovery from one fixture.
+
+### Further live evidence
+
+Framework's existing one-sat purchased-file ownership entry and exact 121-byte
+cache remain present after the Bump management restart. Purchase timestamp
+09:15:03 UTC precedes manager start 10:42:52 UTC on 2026-10-02. SHA256 remains
+`d55f7a6acd77bdc3c35c65ecac6d1492096e99252d07d433e6286544540cde7e`.
+This establishes buyer persisted bytes/ownership across that actual manager
+restart. It does not establish a full-machine reboot or seller outage scenario.
+No payment or restart was performed for this read-only check.
+
+Yaya post-deployment checks pass: native Bitcoin/LND unchanged, private UI200,
+marked public HTTP/HTTPS404, missing HTTPS challenge404, exact challenge bytes
+written inside NPM over local HTTP/HTTPS and public HTTP, existing public site
+trusted HTTPS/authentication preserved. This is not yet the new signed-catalog
+migration without the temporary network override.
+
+### Versioned build and final suites
+
+The optimized 1.9.0 backend build passed; SHA256
+`e1b94e6de9b5cc3dfcec16994bc3d0f710f3b7bcc6e5af045c6e53bb94b6abf0`.
+The final frontend suite passed **1,187 tests in 146 files**, zero failed.
+All 48 script unit tests passed, as did app build-context, manifest-shell,
+ISO overlay, network-doctor, pruning and LND UI readiness checks. The release
+harness now includes NPM bridge, guard, catalog capability and isolated actual
+nginx security tests. All 120 public-network rejection cases passed again.
+
+Yaya category search clearing passes desktop/mobile: click, Escape, focus and
+contained icon, unchanged 40/52px field heights. Portainer's actual namespace
+still reads Git smart HTTP refs and Compose from the expected branch; native
+services and the production site were not changed by those probes.
+
+Fresh Angor relay queries still recover only one of the 35 original signed
+announcements. Eight relays returned results/EOSE; two archive endpoints were
+unavailable. A release-scope decision was requested rather than silently waiving
+this external-data requirement. The reference HTTP endpoint was readable through
+Python, while the Node HTTP client received HTML; relay queries used the recorded
+35 exact event IDs, and accepted only matching validly signed kind3030 events.
+
+A new isolated runtime harness executes the production backend against actual
+Bitcoin/LND regtest processes, with private process/network/filesystem namespaces,
+normal account setup/login and disposable wallets. Its CPFP, child RBF, recipient,
+fee-budget, duplicate-submit and backend-restart checks passed. Confirmation and reorg recovery also passed after the fixture announced a
+competing empty block. The earlier disconnect-only fixture failed to notify the
+expected new chain state and is retained as a failed attempt. Full run evidence:
+`/tmp/archy-fee-regtest-run3.log`. No production wallets or funds were used.
+
+### Current deployment and final history correction
+
+The versioned backend `e1b94e6de9b5cc3dfcec16994bc3d0f710f3b7bcc6e5af045c6e53bb94b6abf0`
+and the production UI are deployed on dev and yaya. Manager health200, served
+index byte match and unchanged unrelated container IDs/start times passed on
+both. Private rollback directories are `support/190-versioned-20261002`.
+Actual category search clearing passes desktop/mobile on both nodes.
+
+A final source audit found fee-only child history grouping was still absent.
+The correction is now implemented with conservative receipt/ownership/input/
+fee-only/current-chain verification, replacement-aware totals, linked fee
+history and current-child Bump targeting. Nine focused UI tests and the new
+production dashboard build passed. This correction is NOT in the deployed
+backend above. Its isolated backend suite and extended actual regtest acceptance
+remain in progress. The concurrent optimized compile was deliberately stopped
+to reduce build contention and must be restarted after isolated compilation.
+
+Corrected NPM candidate remains unsigned. The operator was given the exact
+private signing command and asked for the affected physical companion route.
+No publication or release-scope waiver is inferred from silence.
+
+### Payment audit follow-up
+
+Found a separate older Cashu repeat-download fallback that allowed a new spend
+when an ownership record existed but its cached bytes were missing; an unreadable
+index was also treated as empty. The payment guard now reads ownership strictly
+and returns a recovery error before mint/spend in either case. Successful cache
+hits retain the zero-payment response and same-seller filename alias handling.
+The new regression exercises first purchase, exact/alias cache hits, different
+seller, missing bytes and damaged index preservation. Final suite/rebuild are
+running; no live wallet was modified. Previously documented lost-response ecash
+receipt limitations remain separate from this correction.
+
+Framework read-only optional Files-copy verification could not proceed because
+the SSH control connection expired and BatchMode login was rejected. Existing
+buyer cache/restart evidence remains valid; no password or account was changed.
+
+Actual served Fast-send controls pass on dev/yaya at390/1440px: initial Fast,
+explicit Standard selection and reopen reset to Fast. No spending RPC submitted.
+Two earlier harness attempts had ambiguous Close/Send locators during modal
+transitions; the corrected final run passes all four cases. This is send-form
+acceptance, not a real cooperative-close transaction or omitted-fee wallet spend.
+
+Final isolated suite after fee-history and missing-cache payment corrections:
+**1,668 passed, zero failed, four explicit hardware/external ignores**. The
+optimized build and extended real-regtest run are chained in
+`/tmp/archy-190-complete-validation.py`; log
+`/tmp/archy-190-complete-validation.log`. They have not yet completed.
+The packaged radio flasher self-test also passes (`archy-esptool4.8.1`,
+ESP32-S3 stub ready); this does not change Framework radio deferral.
+
+## Signed qualification completed — 2026-10-05
+
+Operator confirmed signing; exact private catalog verifies against the pinned
+release root. Final optimized backend SHA256
+`cfddec834a53609f8bef924f3905da76df45f22426cac2628c4c2cb06bea5d09`
+and final dashboard index SHA256
+`4b8f6ceb4ebe1e3b8ce1a0786f3e8a9d38e6d42ba174bf64bd54f4b23d7c13ff`
+are now deployed on dev and yaya. Both health checks, served byte matches and
+unrelated container identity/start-time checks passed. Root-only rollback
+directories: `support/190-final-20261005-20261002` (literal generated name).
+Both cached catalogs exactly match the new signed candidate.
+
+The optimized actual Bitcoin/LND regtest passed with the new history assertions:
+CPFP, child replacement, unchanged recipient, bounded fee, duplicate submission,
+one payment with replacement-aware fee history, backend restart, confirmation
+and reorg. No production funds were spent. Log: `/tmp/archy-fee-regtest-run4.log`.
+
+Yaya selected the managed legacy-compatible gateway from the signed variant.
+The temporary `90-qualification-host-gateway.conf` was backed up and removed
+only after inspecting the generated managed network. NPM restarted successfully.
+Complete selected DB tables and certificate bytes match the private baseline;
+loopback and existing tunnel publications remain intact, admin API is healthy,
+and an actual NPM-namespace upstream request returns the expected authenticated
+site response. A private managed migration archive exists.
+
+A subsequent manager restart and120 seconds of repeated reconciliation retained
+all container identities/start times and did not recreate the removed override.
+Migration checks passed again. Logs: `/tmp/archy-190-npm-override-retirement.log`
+and `/tmp/archy-190-npm-persistence.log`. This is not full-machine reboot evidence.
+
+Post-migration public integration passes: exact challenge bytes from NPM on
+local HTTP/HTTPS and public HTTP, missing HTTPS challenge404, private UI200,
+public-marked management HTTP/HTTPS404, public application trusted TLS and
+authentication retained. Portainer's actual namespace reads Git refs and Compose
+at verified tip `3ae171d6b0c728665a860520fe393c0abb772798`. Native Bitcoin/LND
+unchanged. Deployed Fast-default/reopen/slower-select browser checks pass on
+both nodes at390/1440px, without submitting transactions.
+
+Additional external IPv4 probes from Shorty passed24 raw-IP/unknown/forged-host
+cases with forged forwarding headers and root/RPC/assets/WebSocket paths.
+Important boundary: the public front gateway returns its static Default Site
+for unknown HTTP roots, rejects assets/RPC/WS with400/404, and rejects unknown
+TLS names during handshake. Those are not dashboard responses. The first
+harness required404 everywhere and failed on that public Default Site; retained
+logs record the corrected interpretation. These probes validate the deployed
+public gateway path, not direct WAN access to the node nginx. External IPv6
+remains unverified; prior isolated IPv4/IPv6 guard tests remain separate.
+No Shorty nginx/NPM configuration was changed.
+
+Remaining operator inputs: normal Shorty NPM shop SSL ownership correction
+(existing admin login unavailable), affected physical companion upload route,
+and the retained Angor34-announcement recovery/release-scope requirement.
+OTA/catalog publication, final ISO build/boot and fleet discovery remain held.
+
+Read-only dev chain check2026-10-05: unpruned Bitcoin at830743/970017, verification progress0.63846, IBD true, warnings empty. Full-chain Angor acceptance remains pending sync; no service or wallet change made.
+
+## Operator checks accepted; upload UX amendment — 2026-10-05
+
+Operator reports the requested human checks worked perfectly: Shorty shop SSL,
+physical upload flow and Framework dashboard/purchased-file checks. This is
+operator acceptance, not a claim of newly independent device testing. Read-only
+Shorty verification confirms shop certificate_id12 and Force SSL enabled.
+Remaining migration/artifact/security and Angor requirements still apply.
+
+Operator supersedes the globally persistent upload-bar requirement: keep the
+bar only on the screen where the batch originated, continue transfers across
+navigation, show explicit Complete on successful server save, and use a
+completion notification elsewhere. Source now retains the originating route,
+removes the global floating bar, keeps the original44px inline bar, and reports
+success/error/cancellation distinctly.25 focused store/component/notification
+tests pass. The subsequent full frontend suite passed1,193 tests; production
+build and actual served desktop/mobile real-upload checks passed. Deployed to
+dev/yaya with index SHA256
+`86bb728017b118d8e98f032419e7fbfd6ecd78b7e464c982a2075cc38c582814`;
+no apps or backend services restarted. Retain this as the preceding UI evidence,
+not evidence for the later resumable-upload implementation. No new payment was requested or performed.
+
+### Resumable upload addition — 2026-10-05
+
+Operator requests recovery after a background pause or connection loss. The
+installed File Browser identifies as2.63.23/e8a388f8 and supports TUS. Cloud now
+has a candidate chunked upload implementation: random same-folder staging path,
+server-offset reconciliation, transient retry/online/visibility recovery,
+cancellation, final SHA256 verification and rename. Lost final chunk/rename
+responses are reconciled without restarting or accepting a same-size old file.
+The original-screen-only44px bar, Complete label and off-screen notification
+remain. Fifteen focused protocol tests pass; full build/deployed fault injection
+are in progress. This is not yet live acceptance.
+
+Recovery requires the selected File to remain available in the running page.
+An OS-killed app or expired server upload session may require reselecting the
+file. Do not promise uninterrupted background execution or restart persistence.
+This gate is additional to the already accepted physical upload flow.
+
+## ngit PR integration — 2026-10-05
+
+Both requested proposals are merged and pushed to Gitea and ngit main at
+`2c1bcacf`; ngit independently reports both as `applied`.
+
+- `494d2483`: opt-in NODE_IDENTITY_PUBKEYS for app owner allow-lists. Review
+  corrected ECMAScript/Rust whitespace differences and added strict public-key
+  validation. Appliance identity excluded; no private keys or signing capability
+  given to apps. Existing manifests and the native signing flow are unchanged.
+  Documentation explicitly describes linking all offered user identities.
+- `c18ebd7f`: nostr0.44.7 and nostr-relay-pool0.44.3. The standalone relay pool's
+  maintenance advisory remains; SDK0.45 migration is a separate follow-up.
+- Combined isolated backend suite:1,678 passed, zero failed,4 explicit ignores.
+  Real loopback hostile-relay test rejects altered content, author and signature
+  reusing a known DB event ID while accepting a valid event. NIP04/NIP44 normal
+  encryption and hostile/oversized payload tests pass. The initial relay harness
+  returned before connection establishment; corrected to wait for an actual
+  connection before fetch, and the complete rerun passes.
+- Evidence: /tmp/archy-190-ngit-complete-tests.log, origin/ngit push logs and
+  /tmp/archy-190-ngit-postmerge.json. This is source publication, not OTA/ISO or
+  catalog publication. Later File Browser credential changes need a new suite.
+
+## File Browser secure automatic login — NEW REQUIRED GATE
+
+Operator requests unique per-node credentials, working Cloud from first launch,
+no admin/admin and fleet-wide testing. Framework's reported authentication issue
+recovered, which is not proof that this gate is fixed. Yaya rejects the saved
+password with403 despite healthy File Browser2.63.23. Never count that as a
+passed upload test.
+
+Confirmed source issues: first-boot paths still try noauth/admin defaults; the
+post-install hook assumes admin/admin and uses an incompatible password-change
+request shape; the generated ISO path updates a running DB and uses a different
+DB filename; Cloud hardcodes admin and invents admin/admin on missing secrets.
+
+Candidate scripts/filebrowser-credentials.py now provisions a random username
+and256-bit password offline with the pinned app image, backs up the selected
+DB/config, preserves custom accounts, tests automatic login plus folder access
+in a network-isolated container, rejects unauthenticated access, rotates only a
+proven admin/admin login, and atomically publishes a0600 credential record.
+Fresh real-image acceptance passes. Legacy/default/custom/restart/rollback,
+first-boot/Quadlet/runtime wiring, live yaya/dev/Framework qualification and final
+artifacts remain OPEN. No live File Browser account or DB has been modified.
+
+Upload resume: source/build/full frontend1,208 tests passed; subsequent48 focused
+protocol/client tests passed after filename escaping correction. UI deployed on
+dev/yaya index SHA256
+`31ac7bcc704c18f88a8b9800fb46bc7941651983e1a99b97d036a8d9e95a58b5`.
+Actual dev1440/390px real-server fault injection passed partial offset123456,
+offline reconnect, lost final PATCH and rename replies, exactSHA256, encoded
+filenames, original-screen-only44px bar, notification, cancel and empty files.
+Yaya is blocked at the credential gate above. Physical suspended/killed-app
+acceptance is not inferred from these viewport tests.
+
+## 2026-10-05 resumed release qualification
+
+- Latest full frontend: 1,210 tests passed across 148 files. Production Cloud UI
+  and AIUI builds passed. Dev and yaya serve index SHA256
+  `3e10a25db75e4712310eb34c98bf7595ad5db3a444f9126a73715b1d40493a33`;
+  UI archive SHA256 `586d1864c5c4027086194f6b5951a9b770c4e7ce9ba9ec3128e2ac0c1bde55e7`.
+  Private UI backups: `/var/lib/archipelago/support/cloud-auth-20261005`.
+- Real dev browser upload tests pass at 1440/390px, including interrupted JWT
+  refresh, partial write, offline recovery, lost final PATCH/rename responses,
+  exact SHA256, encoded filenames, cancellation, empty file, origin-only 44px
+  bar and completion notification. Initial run overlapped UI deployment and
+  failed navigation/bar timing; kept as failed evidence. Clean rerun explicitly
+  verifies successful navigation and passes both viewports. Physical OS suspension
+  and yaya authentication/upload acceptance remain separate gates.
+- Real File Browser image matrix passed fresh, legacy-default, legacy-custom,
+  legacy-noauth and forced-failure exact DB rollback. Existing file bytes and
+  user IDs/permissions preserved; custom credentials preserved; admin/admin and
+  anonymous access rejected. Actual disposable Quadlet pre-start and restart
+  also pass, with stable managed credentials. Four Python unit tests pass.
+- File Browser startup integration now covers the direct runtime, Quadlet,
+  first boot and ISO script. Binary bootstrap installs its matching helper before
+  reconciliation. Fixed bundled first-boot missing NET_BIND_SERVICE and duplicate
+  creation attempt for a stopped File Browser. Live credential migration is still
+  pending the optimized backend build; no production DB/account modified yet.
+- Final combined isolated backend suite: 1,681 passed, zero failed, four ignored.
+  An earlier run failed the Nostr relay fixture after a normal ping closed its
+  text-only receive loop. Fixed the fixture to answer pings; the complete rerun
+  passes. No failed run is counted as acceptance.
+- NPM: 23 Python tests pass, including exact emergency BTCPay route recognition,
+  operator edit preservation, missing certificate/alias refusal and transactional
+  rollback. Existing emergency Angor routes now also require complete TLS
+  replacements before retirement. Actual disposable flat-layout NPM integration
+  passed namespace reachability, legacy gateway, ACME exact bytes, forced HTTPS,
+  WSS, certificate replacement, password/network ACLs and forged-header rejection,
+  restart, disable/delete, and forced bind-failure restoration. This is not a
+  staging-CA issuance/renewal or ISO/reboot pass.
+- Shorty read-only inspection confirms shop certificate12 and Force SSL with both
+  hostname aliases; old manual shop route still uses certificate10. No live
+  Shorty routing change in this qualification. Migration remains pending.
+- Evidence logs: `/tmp/archy-190-final-combined-backend.log`,
+  `/tmp/archy-190-cloud-auth-ui-dev-live-2.log`,
+  `/tmp/archy-190-filebrowser-final-integration.log`,
+  `/tmp/archy-190-filebrowser-quadlet.log`,
+  `/tmp/archy-190-npm-final-integration.log`.
+- OTA/catalog/raw ISO publication remains held. Framework radio deferred;
+  Angor 34 unrecovered original announcements and dev full-chain acceptance
+  remain open. README alpha/funds notice is separately published to both remotes.
+
+Additional qualification: real nested-layout NPM integration passed the same
+namespace/ACME/TLS/WSS/access-control/restart/rollback matrix as flat layout
+(`/tmp/archy-190-npm-final-nested-integration.log`). Container crate isolated
+suite: 82 passed, zero failed. Corrected Nostr hostile-relay test passed a separate
+isolated repeat (`/tmp/archy-190-nostr-relay-repeat.log`). Dev Bitcoin read-only
+status: height832232 of970036, verification0.641006, IBDtrue, prunedfalse. Full-chain
+Angor acceptance therefore remains blocked on synchronization, not passed.
+
+## Live File Browser ownership regression — publication hold
+
+2026-10-05 dev candidate backend SHA256
+`3e01da72fcea0a61852f3d9038e67630e328c65d6433da749671d60b91c37ffa`
+built successfully, then failed live credential migration before DB mutation.
+The helper could not create its private backup under the legacy data-directory
+owner (host UID100000). The original real-image fixtures aligned data ownership
+to the image UID and therefore missed the shipped manifest's different mapping.
+The managed File Browser has DAC_OVERRIDE for that layout; the helper did not.
+
+Restored prior backend SHA256
+`cfddec834a53609f8bef924f3905da76df45f22426cac2628c4c2cb06bea5d09`
+and original File Browser Quadlet with the staged rollback script. Both services
+are active. Yaya backend was not changed. No candidate credential record was
+published; failed setup stopped at backup-directory creation before DB changes.
+
+Source helper now includes the managed server's DAC_OVERRIDE storage capability;
+new real-image legacy-owner and actual-Quadlet fixtures reproduce that mapping.
+Rollback fixture now forces an account-policy failure after noauth migration so
+it still verifies restoration after a real DB mutation. These revised tests and
+combined backend validation are in progress. A corrected embedded-helper build
+and new live qualification remain required. Do not reuse the failed binary as
+final release or mark the credential gate passed from earlier fixture results.
+
+Release-note drift corrected to1.9.0/current upload behavior and File Browser/
+Nostr additions. The checker now rejects stale descriptions/dates for an existing
+version; its regression passes. Latest notes UI built and deployed dev/yaya index
+SHA256 `97aab07e67eccc1bb3d215534b537b83e1372bf5c36b505b6127a24a2b629e23`.
+Phone background/reconnect acceptance question is pending, not passed.
+
+## Corrected credential qualification and mirror policy — 2026-10-05
+
+The DAC_OVERRIDE correction passed all six real-image cases, including legacy
+manifest ownership and restoration after an actual DB mutation. Actual disposable
+Quadlet first start/restart passed with legacy ownership. Corrected helper SHA256
+`e9e2fd94534130f10f19f81ebe0d4e382dca4338118393c7d1e30535a8478eb5`
+also migrated the dev node's actual File Browser storage successfully: managed
+login/folder200, private credential record, unchanged unrelated containers, and
+manager/File Browser restored active. The old backend remains deployed pending
+the corrected optimized build. Yaya credential/backend acceptance remains open.
+
+Evidence: `/tmp/archy-190-filebrowser-ownership-integration.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-filebrowser-ownership-quadlet.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-filebrowser-ownership-live-dev.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-filebrowser-ownership-dev-cloud.log`.
+Updated isolated backend suite: 1,681 passed, zero failed, four ignored
+(`/tmp/archy-190-filebrowser-ownership-backend.log`).
+Browser protocol recovery also passes explicit CDP frozen-page/offline/reconnect
+at both widths (`/tmp/archy-190-cloud-frozen-dev.log`); physical phone acceptance
+is still pending and is not inferred from browser automation.
+
+Operator selected ngit as the canonical contribution/review platform; Gitea
+mirrors accepted main and release tag objects without requiring duplicate PRs.
+Rule, contributor docs and read-only parity gate are committed as `138a541d`,
+pushed to both mirrors and main/local parity verified. Disposable bare-repository
+regression covers missing refs, partial pushes, divergence, annotation drift,
+unpublished local commits, intentionally separate branches and inaccessible
+remotes. Final release gate must additionally check the actual release tag.
+
+## Alpha candidate: live Cloud and ACME qualification — 2026-10-05
+
+Operator requires final version **1.9.0-alpha** and tag **v1.9.0-alpha**. Cargo,
+frontend package/lock, changelog and What's New now agree; the unused unsuffixed
+What's New block was removed. The optimized alpha build is in progress. Current
+backend qualification SHA256 `e218e40f5c16c3d0cc4dc06c0a378c14b56b9087ded5c515b8a48351ceea3bcf`
+is deployed on dev and yaya but predates this suffix change; it is not the final
+artifact. Both returned backend health200 and managed Cloud login/folder200 with
+unrelated container IDs/start times unchanged.
+
+A real upload rerun initially failed after concurrent token refresh. A new unit
+regression reproduced the race: mutable shared failure state let another login
+turn a network interruption into a credential rejection. Authentication now
+shares an in-flight request and returns its own retryability result. Regression
+failed before and passes after. Full frontend: **1,211 passed / 148 files**.
+Full alpha backend isolated suite: **1,681 passed, zero failed, four ignored**.
+Deployed alpha UI index SHA256 on dev/yaya:
+`67de835a25db59a483314eff583b809c3468c8529080bfa74c9962e44a6f54f9`.
+Both real browser upload suites pass 390/1440px including partial writes, frozen
+page/offline return, interrupted refresh, lost final replies, exact saved hash,
+encoded filenames, origin-only bar, completion notification and cancellation.
+
+Framework access was restored with the supplied updated SSH credential. Its
+LND reports chain/graph sync; balance and channel queries work. Confirmed the
+legacy File Browser still accepted admin/admin, then applied the exact qualified
+helper with a private backup and bounded File Browser/manager stop-start. Both
+managed and compatibility logins/folder reads200; admin/admin403; credential mode
+0600; all other container IDs/start times unchanged. Prior backend retained until
+final alpha deployment. Dashboard RPC session needs second-factor login; no
+wallet funds were spent. Operator now reports Framework radio working; no reflash.
+
+Local Pebble ACME **fresh and legacy nested layouts passed** actual pre-host
+issuance, HTTP challenges, forced-HTTPS renewal, new certificate served, unknown
+management404, trusted WSS, access controls, restart and forced-bind rollback.
+Fixture fixes: modern NPM meta schema; explicit slirp loopback CA route; disable
+random test-CA nonce rejection for deterministic route/renewal coverage. This is
+an isolated test CA, not a public Let's Encrypt staging/ISO/reboot pass. All test
+containers were cleaned up. Source NPM regression remains23/23.
+
+Evidence: `/tmp/archy-190-alpha-backend-tests.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-alpha-frontend-tests.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-cloud-concurrent-login-before.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-cloud-concurrent-login-after.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-alpha-cloud-dev.log`, `/tmp/archy-190-alpha-cloud-yaya.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-framework-secure-cloud.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-framework-cloud-compatibility.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-npm-acme-flat-6.log`, `/tmp/archy-190-npm-acme-nested.log`.
+
+Public demo target clarified: https://demo.archipelago-foundation.org/, currently
+reported1.8.8. Existing Docker Compose demo deployment located read-only; do not
+confuse it with Yaya's v4v stack. Update after release, preserving rollback and
+qualifying mock backend compatibility with new Cloud uploads. No demo deployed yet.
+No OTA/catalog/ISO has been published.
+
+## 2026-10-05 additional mobile media and file-action qualification
+
+Operator accepted both physical phone upload recovery and Framework Cloud
+folder/upload/open checks. These manual gates are closed.
+
+A subsequent Cloud screenshot and touch-action report introduced new release
+requirements: safe-area-aware photo/video viewing, separated touch controls,
+fullscreen/exit, permanent translucent file-card actions, and the same actions
+inside the viewer. Source and component tests are in the regression ledger.
+The complete updated frontend suite passes: **1,222 tests in 150 files**.
+Production frontend build passes. Chromium checks cover phone portrait,
+landscape and desktop geometry, native fullscreen, action-menu access while
+fullscreen, video decoding/playback, no accidental preview from a menu tap,
+and cancellation before deletion. The deployed dev box reads the operator's
+actual screenshot and 4K video without changing either file.
+
+The new Android fullscreen callback implementation compiles and its three
+Robolectric lifecycle tests pass with zero failures/errors. It still requires a
+clean APK, signature verification and physical companion acceptance; compilation
+and browser fullscreen do not establish that acceptance. Version 0.5.33/build53
+is reserved for the companion update. No native fullscreen APK published yet.
+
+Final OTA/frontend/ISO checksums and source attribution must be regenerated after
+these additions. Candidate ISO build215 is superseded for publication purposes.
+Previously recorded NPM fleet migration, exact signed OTA/rollback and ISO install
+qualification, full-chain/Angor scope, mirror parity and public-demo requirements
+remain open unless separately closed by direct evidence. No prior publication
+hold is waived by the mobile test results.
+
+### Companion download qualification update
+
+Operator accepted the viewer but reported companion-only download failure.
+Browser download of the same file matches its exact bytes. Added native saving
+through Android's system file picker with authentication, streamed progress,
+cancellation and error cleanup. The clean download/fullscreen suite passes all
+12cases. Canonical clean companion0.5.34/build54 packaging passes v1/v2/v3 and
+existing-signer verification. Dev serving is verified byte-for-byte with SHA256
+`ceb58a7dc5f1398fe84f30255ec9ed79834f5db5f8fbc03eac52e14186fab1a1`.
+The operator reports “works, we can proceed” after the phone save/open/cancel
+check. This physical companion download gate is **accepted (2026-10-05)**. The APK is staged for fleet OTA/ISO and official/demo downloads;
+only the dev-box test download is updated now. No fleet/public release is claimed.
+
+### Demo upload compatibility — 2026-10-05
+
+The prior demo backend lacked TUS, returned folder metadata for completed files,
+and only accepted JSON-body renames. Added the actual Cloud upload protocol with
+per-visitor sessions, reserved-byte quota, committed offsets, checksum metadata,
+query-based rename and partial cancellation. Literal encoded filenames survive
+unchanged. Deleting seeded files cannot subtract uncharged bytes from the quota;
+deleting a folder releases its pending upload reservations.
+
+Four real HTTP scenarios run the production `resumableUpload` client against an
+isolated demo process and pass: lost chunk/save responses with exact5MiB+123bytes,
+visitor isolation, zero-byte/replacement/cancellation, simultaneous quota, stale
+offsets/oversized chunks and a real interrupted TCP request. The first run's10s
+cold-start limit failed before startup; the bounded60s run passes. Evidence:
+`/tmp/archy-190-demo-upload-final-2.log`.
+
+The existing mesh/federation parity harness initially discarded demo cookies,
+creating a new visitor on every request. It now retains its session and always
+runs demo-only on loopback, never against the live container runtime. It also
+found two newly missing radio configuration handlers. Demo now explicitly reports
+hardware unavailable and refuses to claim an applied radio configuration. The
+full parity run passes, including those assertions:
+`/tmp/archy-190-demo-rpc-parity-final-2.log`. Both checks are release harness stages.
+These changes are locally qualified; the public demo remains unchanged pending
+final release, fresh AIUI packaging and deployed browser acceptance.
+
+### Yaya accepted mobile candidate deployment
+
+The same dev UI index `c18b2402…` and signed companion0.5.34/build54 APK
+`ceb58a7d…` are now served on Yaya. All75 changed files match their reviewed
+source hashes, including HTTP-served index/APK/metadata. Container identities
+and start times are unchanged; the qualified catalog and AIUI are preserved.
+Private rollback backup: `/var/lib/archipelago/support/190-mobile-20261005`.
+Evidence: `/tmp/archy-190-yaya-mobile-deploy.log`. Phone acceptance was on the dev
+APK; this byte-identity deployment check is not another physical-phone test.
+
+Source review proposal: [ngit5957be8c](https://gitworkshop.dev/nevent1qqs9j4a73jyu6xfrpzrqcx2tqkldnuc8wzfas2zdkq6s2qlvftdaakqpz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn8d96zuer9wcq8s3xt),
+covering daac47ca,5aa74d05,b8266c28,ba8b1f29. Proposal publication succeeded;
+remote main refs and release tags have not been advanced. Do not call it merged
+or the mirrors synchronized from proposal upload alone.
+
+Private final NPM catalog candidate is ready for the operator's signature.
+Compared with the previously signed candidate, only NPM's variant version2.14.0,
+immutable image digest and the catalog timestamp changed.64 apps/63 manifests,
+zero drift, registry trust and the pinned-image integration pass. This signature
+is for migration qualification, not full-release acceptance or publication.
+The operator was separately asked to resolve Angor's outstanding discovery scope.
+
+Yaya post-deployment browser checks pass at390/1440px for grouping, icons, hard
+refresh and BTCPay Commerce-only placement. The first harness session had an
+expired login cookie and used catalog fallback; after normal login, the signed
+catalog endpoint returns200/64apps and the complete rerun passes without401.
+Evidence: `/tmp/archy-190-yaya-final-ui-smoke-authenticated.log`.
+
+## Shorty live qualification: cached-runtime guard regression — 2026-10-05
+
+The operator signed the final NPM candidate. Release-root verification and exact
+reviewed payload comparison pass; signed SHA256
+`479f6193835a16dd4ab167e5c22306a878ac39b77c2e2793971e807874fbc0cb`.
+This signature authorizes private qualification; it is not release publication.
+
+Shorty baseline public shop/www/indexer/relay trusted HTTPS passes. Its prior
+NPM image bytes match the pinned2.14.0 image. Consistent stopped-NPM state,
+backend, unit, nginx, helpers and app metadata were backed up under
+`/var/lib/archipelago/support/190-npm-20261005`. Migration reached the new private
+network/listeners but failed the guard acceptance check and was rolled back.
+The test initially expected the emergency guard's legacy variable; further
+inspection found a real source defect, not merely that assertion mismatch.
+
+Confirmed cause: `ensure_runtime_assets_ready` applies the management guard,
+then `run_runtime_assets` installs the cached OTA's nginx template verbatim.
+Shorty's cached template predates the guard. It overwrote protection before a
+subsequent nginx reload; restoring the older backend repeated that path. A live
+public IPv4 root probe returned200. Immediate containment applied the tested
+source guard; HTTP/HTTPS root and HTTP RPC again return404. The cached legacy
+runtime template is now also guarded, with its original saved privately, so
+that old startup installer cannot remove protection on restart. Both emergency
+and current guards are present in the active configuration. Do not claim this
+attempt passed or that the broader migration is complete.
+
+Source fix: runtime installation now renders/validates the guarded candidate
+before atomic replacement under the nginx transaction lock; syntax/reload
+failure restores the previous protected bytes. Rollback protects the restored
+runtime template before permitting an older binary to start.11 focused tests
+pass; real isolated nginx verifies the actual legacy install, old-binary copy,
+invalid-template rollback, public IPv4/IPv6 denial, ACME/private access and the
+existing120-case Host/SNI/forwarded-header/UI/assets/RPC/WS matrix.
+The first backend suite passed1,681/0failed/4ignored before the final rollback
+addition; final rerun and optimized build are required. Logs:
+`/tmp/archy-190-guard-runtime-final-unit.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-guard-runtime-final-network.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-activation.log` (failed attempt),
+`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-prepare.log`.
+
+Only NPM's container restarted; Bitcoin, LND, ElectrumX, Angor indexer and relay
+IDs/start times are unchanged. Restored shop/www/indexer/relay HTTPS returns200.
+Shorty's old backend remains active under containment. Rebuild and requalify the
+migration, external security and restart persistence before closing this gate.
+The signed catalog contents are unchanged and need no further operator signature.
+
+### NPM multi-domain TLS regression found by public acceptance
+
+After the private-listener migration, local first requests passed, but public
+Angor health intermittently returned502. Host nginx recorded upstream certificate
+hostname mismatches when different public domains used the same NPM TLS listener.
+The generated bridge inherited upstream TLS session reuse. This matches nginx's
+[documented cross-SNI session-cache behaviour](https://trac.nginx.org/nginx/ticket/1340).
+
+The bridge now explicitly sets `proxy_ssl_session_reuse off` while retaining
+SNI, hostname/chain verification and the existing trusted certificates. A real
+NPM fixture with two distinct certificates reproduces failure with the old
+configuration on the second hostname; the fixed fixture passes40 alternating
+trusted TLS requests plus ACLs, WSS, certificate replacement, restart, failed-bind
+rollback and disable/delete propagation.24 Python NPM regressions pass.
+`/tmp/archy-190-npm-multicert-before.log` is the expected failing reproduction;
+`/tmp/archy-190-npm-multicert-integration.log` is the fixed flat-layout pass.
+Nested-layout issuance/renewal qualification is running separately.
+
+The exact helper correction is temporarily installed on Shorty and transactional
+sync succeeds.40 mixed local TLS requests across four hostnames pass. Public
+read-only Angor browser acceptance now passes TLS, WSS, funding/event commitment,
+Explore discovery of the known fixture and full project details/statistics:
+`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-migrated-angor-browser-2.log`. This remains one known fixture,
+not all35-project recovery.32 external IPv4 management-denial checks and tailnet
+access pass;10 HTTP/HTTPS ACME routes return the exact probe written in NPM's data
+mount. Six NPM database tables and42 certificate/renewal files exactly match the
+pre-migration backup (`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-state-preservation.log`).
+
+The previously running optimized build was stopped because it predates this
+embedded-helper correction. A complete new build/deployment remains mandatory.
+Shorty currently has the prior A5 candidate backend plus protected runtime nginx
+and this qualified helper; an A5 restart can reinstall its older helper. Do not
+claim final persistence until the new binary is deployed and restart is retested.
+No certificate verification was disabled for a public application or upstream.
+Raw-IP/unknown-SNI negative routing probes alone bypass hostname matching.
+
+### NPM final source qualification and demo packaging
+
+Backend source e0b2181a: all1,681 isolated tests pass (zero failures, four
+explicit ignores). Corrected nested-layout NPM integration also passes real
+local ACME issuance/renewal,40 cross-certificate TLS requests, WSS, ACLs,
+restart, failed-bind rollback and host enable/delete propagation. Real public
+Let’s Encrypt staging issuance plus forced renewal pass on migrated Shorty;
+production certificate files and NPM container identity/start time are unchanged.
+Evidence: `/tmp/archy-190-npm-guard-final-backend-tests.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-npm-multicert-nested-acme.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-shorty-migrated-staging-acme.log`.
+Optimized build and final deployment/restart acceptance are still pending.
+
+Demo image preparation found the web Dockerfile copied historical prebuilt AIUI.
+It now builds the current source with the canonical script and frozen lockfile,
+with explicit source revision for archive/container builds. Both CI workflows
+track AIUI changes and pass the checkout revision. Actual image qualification
+and public demo deployment remain pending. The demo/release VPS currently has
+under1GiB free disk; capacity must be resolved before image/artifact publication.
+No running container, volume, release or repository was deleted.
+
+### Authorized release-storage cleanup — 2026-10-05
+
+Operator approved removing only the old v1.8.13-alpha and v1.8.15-alpha ISO
+attachments, then clarified that broader retention changes should be dropped if
+that suffices. Both local ISO archives were independently hashed against their
+published checksum files before removal. Gitea API deletion removed attachment
+IDs219 and226 only; all other assets in both releases were verified unchanged.
+Public server free space increased from887MiB to5.9GiB. Remaining historical
+releases, OTA files, registry packages and application data were preserved.
+Gitea's prior read-only storage doctor found no orphaned archives, attachments or
+package blobs. No storage-doctor fix or package garbage collection was run.
+Further removals are not planned; check exact final upload/image sizes first.
+
+### Corrected binary deployed and restart verified
+
+Final security backend SHA256
+`560aa6006cd9ef8be95b1f7831cf3b53854e911622b50022bb4402ce0f8b010a`
+built from e0b2181a after the complete1,681-test isolated pass. Deployed dev,
+yaya and Shorty: health200, both embedded helper files match reviewed source,
+active HTTP/HTTPS defaults are guarded, and all existing container IDs/start
+times are unchanged. Backup per node: `support/190-guard-560aa6006cd9`.
+The first dev check incorrectly inspected sites-available rather than the actual
+regular sites-enabled file; automatic backend rollback ran. Corrected check
+uses the helper's active-dashboard resolution, and the second deployment passes.
+This was a qualification-script path error; retain the first failed log.
+
+Shorty's final backend manager restart passed302 continuous public HTTP/HTTPS
+RPC denial probes, followed by healthy management. Existing public32-case and
+read-only Angor acceptance are rerunning against this exact deployed binary.
+Logs: `/tmp/archy-190-guard-dev-deploy-2.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-guard-yaya-deploy.log`, `/tmp/archy-190-guard-shorty-deploy.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-final-shorty-restart-security.log`.
+
+ISO release packaging now explicitly selects the qualified dashboard/AIUI
+payload rather than capturing a live node's cached runtime files or choosing
+AIUI by timestamp. Three executable builder-branch fixtures pass qualified,
+missing and partial payloads; missing inputs fail without a live-node fallback.
+The release wrapper sets this path and the release harness includes the test.
+Accepted companion54 APK/metadata replace the stale copies in the packaging
+staging directory; exact SHA remains ceb58a7d…fab1a1. Final ISO and OTA package
+acceptance/signatures remain pending.
+
+### Final demo images and exact-node follow-up
+
+Shorty final backend restart follow-up passes the external32-case management
+denial matrix and trusted public TLS/WSS/official Angor browser fixture. Evidence:
+`/tmp/archy-190-final-shorty-public-security-after-restart.log` and
+`/tmp/archy-190-final-shorty-angor-browser.log`. This is the known recovered
+project, not all35-project discovery. Signed catalog479f6193 is privately active
+on dev, yaya and Shorty; no public catalog publication has occurred.
+
+Built demo images pass isolated real-image qualification: optional upstream DNS
+failure returns502 for that service while the main demo remains200; fresh AIUI
+provenance, backend healthcheck, four upload protocol/recovery cases, and normal
+mobile intro/login/dashboard pass. The test uses a temporary container-only DNS
+file; host DNS and the live public demo are untouched. Test:
+`tests/lifecycle/demo-images.py`; evidence:
+`/tmp/archy-190-demo-images-acceptance-final-2.log`. Earlier failure in the added
+DNS test was an incorrect assumption about Podman's generated resolver, repaired
+by explicitly mounting the disposable resolver fixture.
+
+Qualified web image169e59da is built from157c9ec0; backend2722fa29 frome6e46a14.
+Public demo deployment remains scheduled after release with rollback. RC2 raw
+ISO assembly is running; no boot/install or final OTA pass is claimed yet.
+
+### RC2 actual installation and first-boot retry correction
+
+RC2 passed mounted payload checks and completed a full UEFI installation to an
+80GiB disposable NVMe disk with encrypted data. Installed backend560, both
+security helpers, dashboardc18, AIUI415 and APK54 match qualified bytes. After
+boot from the installed disk, SSH, dashboard200 and backend health/version pass.
+Actual installed nginx passes32 IPv4/IPv6 public-source denial requests including
+unknown Host/SNI and forged forwarding headers (`/tmp/archy-190-vm-guard-test.log`).
+The VM's EDAC hardware initialization service reports unsupported virtual
+hardware; this is not claimed as physical ECC/EDAC acceptance.
+
+Actual first boot exposed `log: command not found` in the unbundled setup: the
+logger was declared below that path's early exit. Moving it before first use
+restores diagnostics. Retry testing also demonstrated that unconditional
+`podman system migrate` stops existing apps and races manager reconciliation.
+The unbundled path changes no ID mappings and no longer migrates; bundled setup
+only migrates when it actually adds mappings. Podman documents this stop behavior
+in its [migration reference](https://docs.podman.io/en/latest/markdown/podman-system-migrate.1.html).
+
+Corrected actual-VM retry preserves container IDs/start times and produces clean
+logs: `/tmp/archy-190-vm-firstboot-logging-fix-2.log`. Executable isolated retry
+regression passes twice with stored-secret preservation and fails against the
+prior script. Added to release harness. RC2 must not be published: rebuild the
+ISO with this script and qualify its boot/install path before signing. The OTA
+backend/frontend payloads are unchanged by this installer-only correction.
+
+Demo archive33ec4111…6fae8 matches after private server transfer; both tested image
+IDs loaded successfully without changing running demo containers. Clearing only
+unused build cache recovered1.743GB; no additional historical ISO, image, volume
+or application data was deleted. Final publication capacity must be rechecked.
+
+### Operator accepts Angor discovery limitation — 2026-10-05
+
+The operator explicitly accepted releasing with incomplete historical project
+discovery documented as a known limitation ("that's fine for now"). Funding
+commitments for all35 reference projects were verified;34 original signed
+announcements remain unrecovered from the sources checked. This releases the
+all-project-discovery publication hold, not a claim that recovery passed. Track
+recovery separately and retain the limitation in release notes. Other artifact,
+upgrade, security and publication checks remain required.
+
+### Work explicitly queued after this release
+
+The operator requested returning to distributed IndeeHub, signer/companion login,
+node peering, Framework Monitoring and external-app Cloud integration after
+1.9.0-alpha. All details are retained in
+[the post-release backlog](post-1.9.0-work-backlog.md). These additions do not
+expand or delay the current release's artifact scope.
+
+### Final RC3 installed-artifact qualification — 2026-10-05
+
+Final raw ISO `archipelago-installer-1.9.0-alpha-unbundled-x86_64.iso` is byte-for-byte
+the tested RC3 (SHA256 `aad5f0350428976969043079a63b0e7a8264dcee2574526bd34719c798c750af`).
+Actual installation completed to a disposable80GiB disk with encrypted data.
+Installed legacy BIOS/SATA and UEFI/SATA boot, mounted encrypted data, healthy
+backend1.9.0-alpha with completed startup recovery, and private dashboard pass.
+The initial SeaBIOS/NVMe boot could not find the disk; the same installed disk
+boots with SATA. Installer logs show both GRUB installations succeeded. This
+is not a claim of physical legacy-BIOS/NVMe support.
+
+The final installed script retries without changing container IDs/start times
+or managed File Browser credentials. Normal dashboard setup/login, Cloud token
+and authenticated listing pass; anonymous and admin/admin access are rejected.
+Initial test omitted CSRF and correctly received403; corrected normal-cookie/
+CSRF flow passes. Onboarding also replaces the initial SSH password as expected.
+The fixture was corrected to retain its own generated password privately; no
+production credentials or access controls were changed.
+
+After UEFI boot the installed nginx passes32 IPv4/IPv6 public-source rejection
+cases including unknown Host/SNI, forged forwarding headers, assets, RPC and
+WebSocket upgrade requests. Early health showed startup recovery still running;
+subsequent explicit status/recovery assertions pass after61seconds.
+Evidence: `/tmp/archy-190-rc3-installed-test-2.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-rc3-uefi-acceptance-2.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-rc3-uefi-healthy.log`. Unsupported virtual EDAC remains separate
+from the supported service checks.
+
+Artifacts are ready for operator signing, not publication. The final signed
+OTA apply/rollback test necessarily follows signing. Mirror/tag parity, public
+artifact downloads, catalog promotion, fleet discovery and demo deployment
+remain required. The Angor historical limitation is explicitly accepted and
+documented in [known limitations](release-1.9.0-known-limitations.md).
+
+### Signed OTA qualification — 2026-10-05
+
+Operator signed final OTA manifest and raw-ISO checksum document; both verify
+against the pinned release root. Existing signed catalog also verifies. On the
+disposable installed VM, the actual published1.8.22 backend and frontend were
+verified against their published hashes, installed as the baseline, and used to
+discover/download/apply the final signed1.9.0 artifacts through normal authenticated
+RPC. Component verification, automatic manager restart, post-OTA verification,
+exact backend/UI hashes, Cloud access and persistent credential/file checks pass.
+
+A deliberately missing new frontend plus the real pending-verification marker
+triggered automatic rollback: exact1.8.22 binary/UI restored, file and credentials
+preserved.32 public-source IPv4/IPv6 management-denial requests still pass with
+the restored old binary/template. Reapplying the signed1.9.0 OTA succeeds with the
+same post-update assertions. Final whole-VM reboot qualification is running.
+Logs: `/tmp/archy-190-vm-ota-cycle-2.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-vm-ota-rollback.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-vm-ota-rollback-security.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-vm-ota-reapply.log`. Fixture setup corrections (missing systemd
+drop-in directory and underscore in update_state.json) preceded the passing run;
+no failed fixture run is counted as acceptance.
+
+Publication storage required temporary upload headroom beyond the previous
+cleanup. Under the operator's existing old-ISO retention authorization, removed
+only1.8.18 ISO attachment235 after verifying its retained local copy against the
+public signed checksum. All other assets unchanged;1.8.19/21/22 server ISOs remain.
+Server free space is7.2GB before upload. Use an SSH-tunneled direct Gitea upload
+so the public reverse proxy does not buffer an additional multi-GB copy.
+
+Historical mirror audit identified three missing ngit tags1.8.16/17/18; their
+local annotated tag objects exactly matched Gitea and were copied to ngit without
+rewriting history. Unrelated proposal-only branch differences are inventoried
+in `/tmp/archy-190-historical-mirror-audit.log`; full branch parity is not claimed.
+Final main/tag parity remains a separate publication gate.
+
+### Final reboot caught a stale OTA runtime script — corrected package
+
+The whole-VM reboot itself reached healthy1.9.0, but the first-boot retry check
+failed: the OTA runtime overlay still shipped the old first-boot script and
+bootstrap installed it over the ISO's corrected version. Retry logged missing
+`log` and changed running container IDs/start times. This is a real package
+regression, not a passed check. The original signed frontend archive3047a19f is
+obsolete and MUST NOT be published.
+
+Repacked only `archipelago-runtime/scripts/first-boot-containers.sh` with the
+already qualified source repair. Full archive comparison proves every other
+entry, content and mode unchanged. Corrected frontend SHA256 is
+`6d5135fa8e79b1bc84c8ed972770ebf99fe6611d819e5c1453f38f1593c26e66`.
+ISO/backend/dashboard/AIUI/APK/catalog bytes are unchanged; ISO and catalog
+signatures remain valid. Only the corrected OTA manifest needs renewed signing.
+
+Added a release-manifest payload gate that rejects stale, absent or duplicate
+first-boot scripts. Four archive fixture cases and existing executable first-boot
+retry regression pass; the stale real archive fails, corrected real archive
+passes. Actual backend bootstrap successfully promotes the corrected member on
+the disposable node. Post-promotion retry/Cloud checks are in progress.
+Logs: `/tmp/archy-190-stale-ota-reproduced.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-repackage-runtime-2.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-corrected-manifest-integrity.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-vm-corrected-runtime.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-vm-corrected-retry.log`. Renewed signature and exact signed apply
+remain required. Keep earlier rollback evidence for the unchanged backend, but
+do not claim the obsolete frontend is the final accepted artifact.
+
+Corrected runtime post-promotion retry now PASS: container IDs/start times and
+credentials preserved, Cloud token/listing work, default/anonymous access denied.
+Corrected OTA pre-sign receipt is ready; existing ISO/catalog signatures retained.
+
+### Corrected signed OTA final reboot — PASS
+
+The renewed OTA signature verifies. Published1.8.22 baseline discovered, downloaded
+and applied corrected frontend6d5135fa plus backend560aa600 through normal RPC.
+Exact payload hashes, automatic restart/verification, saved file/credentials and
+Cloud login pass. A full VM reboot (boot time2026-10-05T22:52:47Z) then passed
+healthy startup, actual first-boot retry with unchanged container IDs/start times
+and credentials, managed Cloud access, default/anonymous login denial and32
+IPv4/IPv6 management-denial requests. Logs:
+`/tmp/archy-190-vm-corrected-signed-ota.log`,
+`/tmp/archy-190-vm-corrected-signed-reboot.log`.
+
+Installed and cached runtime first-boot scripts on dev, yaya and Shorty now match
+the qualified source, with private backups and no app/service operation:
+`/tmp/archy-190-firstboot-final-node-deploy.log`. Existing ISO/catalog signatures
+remain valid. The obsolete frontend must remain archived only.
+
+Source/tag parity, asset publication/public hashes, public catalog selection,
+fleet discovery and demo deployment are the remaining release operations.
+Retain coverage boundaries: virtual BIOS/SATA and UEFI/SATA tested, no physical
+legacy-BIOS/NVMe claim; IPv6 guard tested in isolation, no actual WAN IPv6 route;
+Framework authenticated read-only fee quote and a new live seller-outage exercise
+were not independently completed (funded regtest, prior operator purchase/free
+reopen and persisted ownership/file evidence remain separate). Dev Bitcoin is
+still in IBD; live full-chain Angor evidence is from Shorty. Historical discovery
+limitation was explicitly accepted, not relabeled a passing recovery test.

docs/release-1.9.0-known-limitations.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# 1.9.0-alpha: Angor historical discovery
+
+Historical project discovery is incomplete. Funding commitments for all35
+reference projects were verified, but34 original signed announcements were not
+recovered from the relays and archives checked. They are not proven globally
+lost. One recovered project passes Explore, details, statistics and public
+TLS/WebSocket acceptance using the self-hosted services.
+
+The operator explicitly accepted shipping with this limitation on2026-10-05.
+Recovery remains follow-up work; this acceptance does not mean all-project
+discovery passed. Retain the original relays alongside the self-hosted relay.
+
+Full indexing requires a synced, unpruned Bitcoin node and indexing dependencies.
+The dev node is still syncing; full-chain evidence comes from Shorty.
+
+Evidence and inventory: [client acceptance](angor-client-acceptance-20261001.md),
+[project recovery inventory](angor-project-recovery-20261001.json), and
+[release acceptance](release-1.9.0-acceptance.md).

image-recipe/_archived/build-auto-installer-iso.sh

@@ -1343,6 +1343,15 @@ else
     echo "   ⚠️  archy-rnodeconf not found at $RNODECONF — ISO nodes can't flash RNode firmware until it's sideloaded"
 fi
 
+# Mandatory offline flasher: cached rootfs images may lack system esptool.
+ESPTOOL_BUNDLE="${ARCHY_ESPTOOL:-$SCRIPT_DIR/../../reticulum-daemon/dist/archy-esptool}"
+if [ ! -x "$ESPTOOL_BUNDLE" ]; then
+    echo "ERROR: packaged archy-esptool missing; build reticulum-daemon/build-esptool.sh" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+"$ESPTOOL_BUNDLE" --archy-self-test || exit 1
+install -m 755 "$ESPTOOL_BUNDLE" "$ARCH_DIR/bin/archy-esptool"
+
 if [ "$BACKEND_CAPTURED" = "0" ]; then
     if [ "$BUILD_FROM_SOURCE" != "1" ]; then
         echo "   ⚠️  Could not capture from live server, building from source..."
@@ -1439,7 +1448,19 @@ mkdir -p "$ARCH_DIR/web-ui"
 
 # Try to get from live server first (unless BUILD_FROM_SOURCE=1)
 WEBUI_CAPTURED=0
-if [ "$BUILD_FROM_SOURCE" != "1" ]; then
+if [ -n "${ARCHIPELAGO_WEB_UI:-}" ]; then
+    # Release builds supply the qualified payload explicitly. Never substitute
+    # a running node's cached runtime files or an older installed dashboard.
+    if [ ! -f "$ARCHIPELAGO_WEB_UI/index.html" ] || \
+       [ ! -f "$ARCHIPELAGO_WEB_UI/aiui/index.html" ] || \
+       [ ! -f "$ARCHIPELAGO_WEB_UI/aiui/BUILD-INFO" ]; then
+        echo "ERROR: ARCHIPELAGO_WEB_UI must contain the qualified dashboard and AIUI"
+        exit 1
+    fi
+    cp -r "$ARCHIPELAGO_WEB_UI/." "$ARCH_DIR/web-ui/"
+    WEBUI_CAPTURED=1
+fi
+if [ "$WEBUI_CAPTURED" = "0" ] && [ "$BUILD_FROM_SOURCE" != "1" ]; then
     # Direct copy from local filesystem (when running on target with sudo)
     if [ -d "/opt/archipelago/web-ui" ] && [ "$(ls -A /opt/archipelago/web-ui 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
         cp -r /opt/archipelago/web-ui/* "$ARCH_DIR/web-ui/"
@@ -1495,6 +1516,9 @@ AIUI_INCLUDED=0
 # or yesterday's hashed assets linger next to today's forever.
 AIUI_SRC=""
 AIUI_NEWEST=0
+if [ -n "${ARCHIPELAGO_WEB_UI:-}" ]; then
+    AIUI_SRC="$ARCHIPELAGO_WEB_UI/aiui"
+else
 for AIUI_DIR in \
     "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../aiui/packages/app/dist" \
     "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../AIUI/packages/app/dist" \
@@ -1511,6 +1535,7 @@ for AIUI_DIR in \
         fi
     fi
 done
+fi
 if [ -n "$AIUI_SRC" ]; then
     echo "   Including AIUI from $AIUI_SRC (newest of the candidates)..."
     mkdir -p "$ARCH_DIR/web-ui/aiui"
@@ -2449,42 +2474,24 @@ runuser -u archipelago -- bash -c 'export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 && syst
 # Ensure podman socket is active for archipelago user
 runuser -u archipelago -- bash -c 'export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 && systemctl --user enable --now podman.socket' 2>>"$LOG" || true
 
-# Create FileBrowser container as archipelago user (rootless podman)
-# Generate random FileBrowser password and store for auto-login
-FB_PASS_DIR="/var/lib/archipelago/secrets/filebrowser"
-mkdir -p "$FB_PASS_DIR"
-if [ ! -f "$FB_PASS_DIR/password" ]; then
-    head -c 24 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -d '/+=' | head -c 24 > "$FB_PASS_DIR/password"
-    chmod 600 "$FB_PASS_DIR/password"
-    chown 1000:1000 "$FB_PASS_DIR/password"
-fi
-
-if ! runuser -u archipelago -- bash -c 'export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 && podman ps -a --format "{{.Names}}"' 2>/dev/null | grep -q filebrowser; then
-    echo "[$(date)] Creating FileBrowser container ($FILEBROWSER_IMAGE)..." >> "$LOG"
-    runuser -u archipelago -- bash -c "export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 && podman run -d --name filebrowser --restart unless-stopped \
-        --cap-drop=ALL \
-        --cap-add=DAC_OVERRIDE \
-        --cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE \
+# Provision the same unique verified Cloud login used by app installation/OTA.
+if ! runuser -u archipelago -- env XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 podman container exists filebrowser; then
+    install -d -o 100000 -g 100000 /var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser /var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser-data
+    install -d -o archipelago -g archipelago -m 700 /var/lib/archipelago/secrets/filebrowser
+    runuser -u archipelago -- env XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 \
+        python3 /opt/archipelago/scripts/filebrowser-credentials.py --image "$FILEBROWSER_IMAGE" >>"$LOG" 2>&1 || exit 1
+    runuser -u archipelago -- env XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 podman run -d \
+        --name filebrowser --restart unless-stopped \
+        --cap-drop=ALL --cap-add=DAC_OVERRIDE --cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE \
         --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true \
-        --read-only \
         --tmpfs=/tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,size=64m \
-        --health-cmd='curl -sf http://localhost:80/ || exit 1' \
+        --health-cmd='wget -q --spider http://localhost:80/health || exit 1' \
         --health-interval=30s --health-timeout=5s --health-retries=3 \
-        --memory=256m \
-        -p 8083:80 \
+        --memory=256m -p 127.0.0.1:8083:80 \
         -v /var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser:/srv \
         -v /var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser-data:/data \
         -v /var/lib/archipelago/data/cloud:/srv/cloud \
-        $FILEBROWSER_IMAGE \
-        --database=/data/database.db --root=/srv --address=0.0.0.0 --port=80" 2>>"$LOG" && \
-        echo "[$(date)] FileBrowser created successfully" >> "$LOG" || \
-        echo "[$(date)] WARNING: FileBrowser creation failed" >> "$LOG"
-    # Set FileBrowser password to match the stored random password
-    sleep 5
-    FB_PASS=$(cat "$FB_PASS_DIR/password" 2>/dev/null || echo "admin")
-    runuser -u archipelago -- bash -c "export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 && podman exec filebrowser filebrowser users update admin --password '$FB_PASS' --database /data/database.db" 2>>"$LOG" && \
-        echo "[$(date)] FileBrowser admin password set" >> "$LOG" || \
-        echo "[$(date)] WARNING: Could not set FileBrowser password" >> "$LOG"
+        "$FILEBROWSER_IMAGE" --config /data/.filebrowser.json >>"$LOG" 2>&1 || exit 1
 fi
 echo "[$(date)] Minimal first-boot complete" >> "$LOG"
 FBUNBUNDLED
@@ -2607,6 +2614,17 @@ if [ -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../scripts/image-versions.sh" ]; then
     echo "   ✅ Bundled image-versions.sh"
 fi
 
+# Always overlay the current doctor, including when rootfs.tar is cached.
+cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../scripts/container-doctor.sh" "$ARCH_DIR/scripts/"
+cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/../configs/archipelago-doctor.service" "$ARCH_DIR/scripts/"
+cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/../configs/archipelago-doctor.timer" "$ARCH_DIR/scripts/"
+for npm_file in dashboard-public-guard.py npm-public-bridge.py sync-npm-public-hosts.sh filebrowser-credentials.py; do
+    cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../scripts/$npm_file" "$ARCH_DIR/scripts/"
+done
+for npm_unit in archipelago-npm-bridge.service archipelago-npm-bridge.timer; do
+    cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/../configs/$npm_unit" "$ARCH_DIR/scripts/"
+done
+
 # Build-source apps need their complete contexts even on unbundled ISOs.
 # Keep this identical to the OTA runtime payload; a per-app allowlist silently
 # omitted GitWorkshop, FIPS and Cuprate and made fresh installs fail at 70%.
@@ -3137,6 +3155,10 @@ if [ -d "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/bin" ]; then
     chmod +x /mnt/target/usr/local/bin/* 2>/dev/null || true
 fi
 
+# Required even when the cached rootfs never had esptool installed.
+install -m 755 "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/bin/archy-esptool" /mnt/target/usr/local/bin/archy-esptool || exit 1
+chroot /mnt/target /usr/local/bin/archy-esptool --archy-self-test || exit 1
+
 if [ -d "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/web-ui" ]; then
     cp -r "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/web-ui" /mnt/target/opt/archipelago/
 fi
@@ -3230,6 +3252,25 @@ for test_script in run-e2e-tests.sh run-post-install-tests.sh; do
     fi
 done
 
+# BEGIN DOCTOR OVERLAY
+# Replace both the active and historical script locations before first boot.
+# A cached rootfs can contain the unsafe network recovery implementation.
+mkdir -p /mnt/target/opt/archipelago/scripts /mnt/target/home/archipelago/archy/scripts
+for doctor_dir in /mnt/target/opt/archipelago/scripts /mnt/target/home/archipelago/archy/scripts; do
+    install -m 755 "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/scripts/container-doctor.sh" "$doctor_dir/container-doctor.sh" || exit 1
+done
+for doctor_unit in archipelago-doctor.service archipelago-doctor.timer; do
+    install -m 644 "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/scripts/$doctor_unit" "/mnt/target/etc/systemd/system/$doctor_unit" || exit 1
+done
+for npm_file in dashboard-public-guard.py npm-public-bridge.py sync-npm-public-hosts.sh filebrowser-credentials.py; do
+    install -m 755 "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/scripts/$npm_file" "/mnt/target/opt/archipelago/scripts/$npm_file" || exit 1
+done
+for npm_unit in archipelago-npm-bridge.service archipelago-npm-bridge.timer; do
+    install -m 644 "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/scripts/$npm_unit" "/mnt/target/etc/systemd/system/$npm_unit" || exit 1
+done
+systemctl --root=/mnt/target enable archipelago-npm-bridge.timer || exit 1
+# END DOCTOR OVERLAY
+
 # Copy self-update script
 if [ -f "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/scripts/self-update.sh" ]; then
     cp "$BOOT_MEDIA/archipelago/scripts/self-update.sh" /mnt/target/opt/archipelago/scripts/

image-recipe/_archived/test-iso-qemu.sh

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
 
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
 QEMU_TMPDIR="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"
+SSH_FORWARD_PORT="${QEMU_SSH_PORT:-2222}"
+HTTP_FORWARD_PORT="${QEMU_HTTP_PORT:-8100}"
 SERIAL_LOG="$QEMU_TMPDIR/archipelago-qemu-serial.log"
 FORCE_BIOS=false
 NOGRAPHIC=false
@@ -67,6 +69,10 @@ echo "  CPU:    2 cores"
 echo "  Serial: $SERIAL_LOG"
 echo ""
 
+# Never accept boot markers left by an earlier VM.
+mkdir -p "$QEMU_TMPDIR"
+: > "$SERIAL_LOG"
+
 # Create test disk if it doesn't exist
 DISK="$QEMU_TMPDIR/archipelago-test-disk.qcow2"
 if [ ! -f "$DISK" ]; then
@@ -81,8 +87,9 @@ QEMU_ARGS=(
     -boot d
     -cdrom "$ISO"
     -drive if=virtio,format=qcow2,file="$DISK"
-    -net nic,model=virtio -net user,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22,hostfwd=tcp::8100-:80
+    -net nic,model=virtio -net "user,hostfwd=tcp:127.0.0.1:${SSH_FORWARD_PORT}-:22,hostfwd=tcp:127.0.0.1:${HTTP_FORWARD_PORT}-:80"
     -serial file:"$SERIAL_LOG"
+    -qmp "unix:$QEMU_TMPDIR/archipelago-qmp.sock,server=on,wait=off"
 )
 
 # Display mode
@@ -99,28 +106,37 @@ echo ""
 
 # Detect UEFI firmware
 OVMF=""
+OVMF_VARS=""
 if [ "$FORCE_BIOS" = false ]; then
     if [ -f "/opt/homebrew/share/qemu/edk2-x86_64-code.fd" ]; then
         OVMF="/opt/homebrew/share/qemu/edk2-x86_64-code.fd"
     elif [ -f "/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd" ]; then
         OVMF="/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE.fd"
+        OVMF_VARS="/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS.fd"
+    elif [ -f "/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd" ]; then
+        OVMF="/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_CODE_4M.fd"
+        OVMF_VARS="/usr/share/OVMF/OVMF_VARS_4M.fd"
     fi
 fi
 
-run_qemu() {
-    if [ -n "$OVMF" ]; then
-        echo "  Boot: UEFI ($OVMF)"
-        qemu-system-x86_64 \
-            -machine q35 \
-            -drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file="$OVMF" \
-            "${QEMU_ARGS[@]}"
-    else
-        echo "  Boot: Legacy BIOS"
-        qemu-system-x86_64 \
-            -machine pc \
-            "${QEMU_ARGS[@]}"
+QEMU_COMMAND=(qemu-system-x86_64)
+if [ -r /dev/kvm ] && [ -w /dev/kvm ]; then
+    QEMU_COMMAND+=(-enable-kvm)
+fi
+if [ -n "$OVMF" ]; then
+    echo "  Boot: UEFI ($OVMF)"
+    QEMU_COMMAND+=(-machine q35 -drive "if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file=$OVMF")
+    if [ -f "$OVMF_VARS" ]; then
+        if [ ! -f "$QEMU_TMPDIR/archipelago-uefi-vars.fd" ]; then
+            cp "$OVMF_VARS" "$QEMU_TMPDIR/archipelago-uefi-vars.fd" || exit 1
+        fi
+        QEMU_COMMAND+=(-drive "if=pflash,format=raw,file=$QEMU_TMPDIR/archipelago-uefi-vars.fd")
     fi
-}
+else
+    echo "  Boot: Legacy BIOS"
+    QEMU_COMMAND+=(-machine pc)
+fi
+QEMU_COMMAND+=("${QEMU_ARGS[@]}")
 
 # Wrap the QEMU invocation in `timeout` when a CI caller passed one so
 # the script always returns instead of hanging on a VM that never exits
@@ -129,14 +145,16 @@ run_qemu() {
 # the serial log shows a kernel reaching userspace — we inspect that
 # after the QEMU process ends.
 if [ "$TIMEOUT" -gt 0 ] 2>/dev/null; then
-    timeout --foreground --preserve-status "${TIMEOUT}s" bash -c "$(declare -f run_qemu); run_qemu"
+    # A new bash -c loses the unexportable argument array and firmware path.
+    # Invoke the complete command directly and keep timeout's distinct status.
+    timeout --foreground --kill-after=10 "${TIMEOUT}s" "${QEMU_COMMAND[@]}"
     rc=$?
-    if [ $rc -eq 124 ] || [ $rc -eq 137 ]; then
+    if [ $rc -eq 124 ]; then
         echo "(QEMU terminated after ${TIMEOUT}s boot-test window)"
         rc=0
     fi
 else
-    run_qemu
+    "${QEMU_COMMAND[@]}"
     rc=$?
 fi
 
@@ -150,12 +168,15 @@ tail -20 "$SERIAL_LOG" 2>/dev/null
 # by live-boot/systemd early in the sequence. If the marker never
 # appeared, surface the real failure; otherwise treat "timeout reached
 # with a live kernel" as a pass.
+if [ "${rc:-0}" -ne 0 ]; then
+    exit "$rc"
+fi
 if [ "$TIMEOUT" -gt 0 ] 2>/dev/null && [ -f "$SERIAL_LOG" ]; then
-    if grep -qE "Welcome to Debian|Reached target|systemd\[1\]:" "$SERIAL_LOG"; then
-        echo "  Boot sanity: OK (systemd reached in serial log)"
+    if grep -qE 'Welcome to Debian|Reached target|systemd\[1\]:|Debian GNU/Linux [0-9]+ archipelago-installer ttyS0' "$SERIAL_LOG"; then
+        echo "  Boot sanity: OK (userspace reached in serial log; installation not yet tested)"
         exit 0
     fi
-    echo "  Boot sanity: FAIL — no systemd markers in serial log within ${TIMEOUT}s"
+    echo "  Boot sanity: FAIL — no userspace markers in serial log within ${TIMEOUT}s"
     exit 1
 fi
 exit "${rc:-0}"

image-recipe/configs/archipelago-npm-bridge.service

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Synchronize NPM public domains and certificate renewal
+After=nginx.service archipelago.service
+ConditionPathExists=/etc/nginx/sites-available/archipelago
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+User=root
+ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/archipelago/scripts/dashboard-public-guard.py
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /opt/archipelago/scripts/npm-public-bridge.py
+TimeoutStartSec=120
+UMask=0077
+Nice=10
+StandardOutput=journal
+StandardError=journal

image-recipe/configs/archipelago-npm-bridge.timer

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Watch NPM domain configuration and renewed certificates
+
+[Timer]
+OnBootSec=30s
+OnUnitInactiveSec=15s
+AccuracySec=1s
+Unit=archipelago-npm-bridge.service
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target

image-recipe/configs/nginx-archipelago.conf

@@ -1,3 +1,42 @@
+# BEGIN ARCHIPELAGO MANAGEMENT SOURCE GUARD
+# Use the original socket peer, before any real_ip / forwarded-header rewrite.
+geo $realip_remote_addr $archy_management_private_source {
+    default 0;
+    127.0.0.0/8 1;
+    169.254.0.0/16 1;
+    10.0.0.0/8 1;
+    172.16.0.0/12 1;
+    192.168.0.0/16 1;
+    100.64.0.0/10 1;
+    ::1/128 1;
+    fc00::/7 1;
+    fe80::/10 1;
+}
+# A configured trusted proxy may have rewritten remote_addr. Require both
+# the original peer and the validated effective client to be private.
+geo $remote_addr $archy_management_private_client {
+    default 0;
+    127.0.0.0/8 1;
+    169.254.0.0/16 1;
+    10.0.0.0/8 1;
+    172.16.0.0/12 1;
+    192.168.0.0/16 1;
+    100.64.0.0/10 1;
+    ::1/128 1;
+    fc00::/7 1;
+    fe80::/10 1;
+}
+map $http_x_archipelago_public_ingress $archy_management_public_ingress {
+    default 1;
+    '' 0;
+}
+map "$archy_management_private_source:$archy_management_private_client:$archy_management_public_ingress:$uri" $archy_management_denied {
+    default 1;
+    ~^1:1:0: 0;
+    "~^[01]:[01]:[01]:/\.well-known/acme-challenge/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$" 0;
+}
+# END ARCHIPELAGO MANAGEMENT SOURCE GUARD
+
 # Rate limit zones
 limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=rpc:10m rate=20r/s;
 limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=auth:10m rate=3r/s;
@@ -8,6 +47,8 @@ resolver 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8 valid=300s ipv6=off;
 resolver_timeout 5s;
 
 server {
+    if ($archy_management_denied) { return 404; }
+
     listen 80 default_server;
     # IPv6 listener is REQUIRED: companion phones reach this node over the
     # FIPS mesh at its fips0 ULA (http://[fdxx:…]) — without [::]:80 that
@@ -48,7 +89,7 @@ server {
     # Serve Nginx Proxy Manager HTTP-01 challenge files before the SPA fallback.
     location ^~ /.well-known/acme-challenge/ {
         default_type text/plain;
-        root /var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/data/letsencrypt-acme-challenge;
+        root /var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/letsencrypt-acme-challenge;
         try_files $uri =404;
     }
 
@@ -1021,6 +1062,8 @@ server {
 
 # HTTPS - required for PWA install (Add to Home Screen) from dev servers
 server {
+    if ($archy_management_denied) { return 404; }
+
     listen 443 ssl default_server;
     listen [::]:443 ssl default_server;
     server_name _;
@@ -1035,6 +1078,12 @@ server {
     include snippets/archipelago-pwa.conf;
 
     # Same CA download over HTTPS — see the note in the HTTP block above.
+    location ^~ /.well-known/acme-challenge/ {
+        default_type text/plain;
+        root /var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/letsencrypt-acme-challenge;
+        try_files $uri =404;
+    }
+
     location = /ca.crt {
         alias /etc/archipelago/ssl/ca-download.crt;
         default_type application/x-x509-ca-cert;

neode-ui/Dockerfile.web

@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+FROM node:22-alpine AS aiui-builder
+RUN apk add --no-cache bash git coreutils findutils && corepack enable
+WORKDIR /source
+COPY aiui/ ./aiui/
+COPY scripts/build-aiui.sh ./scripts/build-aiui.sh
+ARG SOURCE_REVISION
+ARG VITE_DEMO=1
+RUN test -n "$SOURCE_REVISION" && \
+    if [ "$VITE_DEMO" = "1" ] || [ "$VITE_DEMO" = "true" ]; then export VITE_DEMO_CONTENT=true; fi && \
+    ARCHY_SOURCE_REVISION="$SOURCE_REVISION" bash scripts/build-aiui.sh
+
 FROM node:22-alpine AS builder
 
 WORKDIR /app
@@ -49,8 +60,8 @@ FROM nginx:alpine
 # Copy built files to nginx
 COPY --from=builder /app/dist /usr/share/nginx/html
 
-# Copy AIUI pre-built dist
-COPY demo/aiui/ /usr/share/nginx/html/aiui/
+# Build AIUI from the same source revision as the dashboard.
+COPY --from=aiui-builder /source/aiui/packages/app/dist/ /usr/share/nginx/html/aiui/
 
 # Copy nginx config template and entrypoint
 COPY neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf /etc/nginx/nginx.conf.template

neode-ui/demo-uploads.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+// In-memory File Browser TUS subset used by the public demo. Each visitor's
+// reservations and bytes belong to their existing isolated, expiring session.
+export function installDemoUploads(app, { currentStore, quota, normalize, parent, base, type }) {
+  const route = '/app/filebrowser/api/tus/*'
+  const number = value => typeof value === 'string' && /^\d+$/.test(value) && Number.isSafeInteger(Number(value)) ? Number(value) : null
+  const locate = req => normalize(req.params[0] || '')
+  const headers = (res, upload) => res.set({
+    'Tus-Resumable': '1.0.0', 'Upload-Offset': String(upload.offset),
+    'Upload-Length': String(upload.length), 'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
+  })
+  const complete = (files, name, upload) => {
+    const data = Buffer.concat(upload.chunks, upload.length)
+    files.contents[name] = data
+    files.tree[parent(name)].push({ name: base(name), path: name, size: data.length,
+      modified: new Date().toISOString(), isDir: false, type: type(base(name)) })
+    files.bytes += data.length
+    files.reserved -= upload.length
+    files.uploaded.add(name)
+    files.uploads.delete(name)
+  }
+  app.head(route, (req, res) => {
+    const upload = currentStore().files.uploads.get(locate(req))
+    if (!upload) return res.sendStatus(404)
+    headers(res, upload).status(200).end()
+  })
+  app.post(route, (req, res) => {
+    const name = locate(req)
+    const files = currentStore().files
+    const length = number(req.get('Upload-Length'))
+    if (req.get('Tus-Resumable') !== '1.0.0' || length === null || name === '/' ||
+        name.split('/').some(p => p === '.' || p === '..' || p.includes('\0'))) return res.sendStatus(400)
+    if (!files.tree[parent(name)]) return res.sendStatus(404)
+    if (files.uploads.has(name) || files.tree[parent(name)].some(e => e.path === name)) return res.sendStatus(409)
+    // Reserve the whole declared size, so concurrent uploads cannot evade quota.
+    // Bound empty/abandoned session entries independently of their byte length.
+    if (files.bytes + files.reserved + length > quota || files.uploads.size >= 64) return res.sendStatus(507)
+    const upload = { length, offset: 0, chunks: [], writing: false }
+    files.uploads.set(name, upload)
+    files.reserved += length
+    if (!length) complete(files, name, upload)
+    headers(res, upload).location(req.path).status(201).end()
+  })
+  app.patch(route, async (req, res) => {
+    const name = locate(req)
+    const files = currentStore().files
+    const upload = files.uploads.get(name)
+    if (!upload) return res.sendStatus(404)
+    if (req.get('Tus-Resumable') !== '1.0.0') return res.sendStatus(412)
+    if (req.get('Content-Type') !== 'application/offset+octet-stream') return res.sendStatus(415)
+    if (upload.writing || number(req.get('Upload-Offset')) !== upload.offset) return headers(res, upload).status(409).end()
+    upload.writing = true
+    const chunks = []
+    let size = 0
+    try {
+      for await (const chunk of req) {
+        size += chunk.length
+        if (size > 2 * 1024 * 1024 || size > upload.length - upload.offset) {
+          res.status(413).end()
+          return
+        }
+        chunks.push(chunk)
+      }
+      // A simultaneous cancellation must never resurrect its staging file.
+      if (files.uploads.get(name) !== upload) return res.sendStatus(404)
+      upload.chunks.push(...chunks)
+      upload.offset += size
+      if (upload.offset === upload.length) complete(files, name, upload)
+      headers(res, upload).status(204).end()
+    } catch {
+      // An interrupted chunk does not advance the committed offset. HEAD tells
+      // the reconnecting client exactly where to resume.
+      if (!res.headersSent && !req.destroyed) res.sendStatus(400)
+    } finally {
+      upload.writing = false
+    }
+  })
+  app.delete(route, (req, res) => {
+    const files = currentStore().files
+    const name = locate(req)
+    const upload = files.uploads.get(name)
+    if (!upload) return res.sendStatus(404)
+    files.reserved -= upload.length
+    files.uploads.delete(name)
+    res.status(204).end()
+  })
+}

neode-ui/docker/docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
 #!/bin/sh
+set -eu
 # Copy nginx config template
 cp /etc/nginx/nginx.conf.template /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
 
+# Use the container's own DNS (Docker and Podman use different addresses).
+# Resolve the optional external demo only on request, so its DNS outage cannot
+# prevent the dashboard from starting. Only IP literals enter nginx syntax.
+resolvers=$(awk '$1 == "nameserver" && $2 ~ /^[0-9a-fA-F:.]+$/ {
+  if (index($2, ":")) printf "[%s] ", $2; else printf "%s ", $2
+}' /etc/resolv.conf)
+[ -n "$resolvers" ] || resolvers="1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8"
+sed -i "s/__ARCHY_DNS_RESOLVERS__/$resolvers/g" /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
+
 # Ensure client_max_body_size 0 is present (unlimited uploads)
 # This is a safety net in case the config template was cached without the directive
 if ! grep -q 'client_max_body_size' /etc/nginx/nginx.conf; then

neode-ui/docker/nginx-demo.conf

@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ http {
     server {
         listen 2101;
         server_name _;
+        resolver __ARCHY_DNS_RESOLVERS__ valid=30s ipv6=off;
+        resolver_timeout 3s;
 
         # Demo sign-in seeder, served same-origin to the proxied SPA.
         location = /__demo/indee-demo-signin.js {
@@ -203,7 +205,8 @@ http {
         }
 
         location / {
-            proxy_pass https://indee.tx1138.com;
+            set $indee_host indee.tx1138.com;
+            proxy_pass https://$indee_host$request_uri;
             proxy_ssl_server_name on;
             proxy_ssl_name indee.tx1138.com;
             proxy_set_header Host indee.tx1138.com;

neode-ui/mock-backend.js

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'
 import Docker from 'dockerode'
 import { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks'
 import crypto from 'crypto'
+import { installDemoUploads } from './demo-uploads.js'
 
 const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)
 const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename)
@@ -209,7 +210,8 @@ const corsOptions = {
 app.use(cors(corsOptions))
 // Skip JSON body parsing for filebrowser upload routes (binary file bodies)
 app.use((req, res, next) => {
-  if (req.path.startsWith('/app/filebrowser/api/resources') && req.method === 'POST') {
+  if ((req.path.startsWith('/app/filebrowser/api/resources') && req.method === 'POST') ||
+      (req.path.startsWith('/app/filebrowser/api/tus') && req.method === 'PATCH')) {
     return next()
   }
   express.json({ limit: '50mb' })(req, res, next)
@@ -3246,6 +3248,19 @@ app.post('/rpc/v1', (req, res) => {
       // =====================================================================
       // Mesh Networking (LoRa radio via Meshcore)
       // =====================================================================
+      case 'mesh.rnode-config': {
+        return res.json({ result: {
+          settings: { enabled: true, port: null, frequency: 869525000,
+            bandwidth: 125000, spreading_factor: 8, coding_rate: 5, txpower: 17,
+            airtime_limit_short: null, airtime_limit_long: null },
+          live: null, live_error: 'Radio hardware is unavailable in this demo.',
+        } })
+      }
+      case 'mesh.rnode-config-apply': {
+        // Never make a hardware claim or execute a radio command in the demo.
+        return res.json({ result: { applied: false, confirmed: false, live: null,
+          message: 'Radio settings cannot be applied in this demo. Connect to your own node to configure its radio.' } })
+      }
       case 'mesh.status': {
         globalThis.__meshHeaders ||= { announce_block_headers: false, receive_block_headers: true }
         // Stateful enable/disable so the dev UI can demo the global
@@ -5242,7 +5257,8 @@ const FB_QUOTA_BYTES = Number(process.env.DEMO_FILE_QUOTA_BYTES) || 50 * 1024 *
 
 function fbNormalize(raw) {
   // → leading slash, no trailing slash (root stays '/')
-  const p = '/' + decodeURIComponent(raw || '').split('/').filter(Boolean).join('/')
+  // Express already decodes path parameters. Preserve literal %, + and ? names.
+  const p = '/' + (raw || '').split('/').filter(Boolean).join('/')
   return p === '/' ? '/' : p.replace(/\/+$/, '')
 }
 function fbParent(p) {
@@ -5275,11 +5291,18 @@ function fbListResponse(res, items) {
   })
 }
 
+installDemoUploads(app, { currentStore, quota: FB_QUOTA_BYTES, normalize: fbNormalize, parent: fbParent, base: fbBase, type: fbType })
+
 // FileBrowser list resources (root: /api/resources or /api/resources/)
 app.get(['/app/filebrowser/api/resources', '/app/filebrowser/api/resources/*'], (req, res) => {
   const dir = fbNormalize(req.params[0] || '')
-  const items = currentStore().files.tree[dir] || []
-  fbListResponse(res, items)
+  const { tree, contents } = currentStore().files
+  if (tree[dir]) return fbListResponse(res, tree[dir])
+  const entry = (tree[fbParent(dir)] || []).find(e => e.path === dir)
+  if (!entry) return res.sendStatus(404)
+  const checksums = req.query.checksum === 'sha256' && contents[dir] !== undefined
+    ? { sha256: crypto.createHash('sha256').update(contents[dir]).digest('hex') } : undefined
+  res.json({ ...entry, checksums })
 })
 
 // FileBrowser POST = upload a file OR create a folder (trailing slash ⇒ folder)
@@ -5301,33 +5324,38 @@ app.post('/app/filebrowser/api/resources/*', (req, res) => {
     return res.sendStatus(200)
   }
 
-  // File upload — collect body with a quota guard.
+  // Reserve incoming bytes immediately, including concurrent legacy/TUS writes.
   const chunks = []
   let size = 0
   let aborted = false
+  const release = () => { store.files.reserved -= size; size = 0 }
   req.on('data', (c) => {
-    size += c.length
-    if (store.files.bytes + size > FB_QUOTA_BYTES) {
+    if (aborted) return
+    if (store.files.bytes + store.files.reserved + c.length > FB_QUOTA_BYTES) {
       aborted = true
-      req.destroy()
+      release()
+      res.status(507).send('Demo storage quota exceeded')
       return
     }
+    size += c.length
+    store.files.reserved += c.length
     chunks.push(c)
   })
   req.on('end', () => {
-    if (aborted) return res.status(507).send('Demo storage quota exceeded (50 MB)')
+    if (aborted) return
     const buf = Buffer.concat(chunks)
-    // Replace existing entry of the same name (override=true).
-    const existing = tree[parent].find(e => e.name === name && !e.isDir)
-    if (existing) store.files.bytes -= existing.size
-    tree[parent] = tree[parent].filter(e => !(e.name === name && !e.isDir))
-    const type = fbType(name)
-    tree[parent].push({ name, path: full, size: buf.length, modified: new Date().toISOString(), isDir: false, type })
-    contents[full] = type === 'text' ? buf.toString('utf-8') : buf
+    release()
+    if (!tree[parent] || store.files.uploads.has(full) || tree[parent].some(e => e.name === name && e.isDir)) return res.sendStatus(409)
+    if (store.files.uploaded.has(full)) store.files.bytes -= Buffer.byteLength(contents[full])
+    tree[parent] = tree[parent].filter(e => e.name !== name)
+    tree[parent].push({ name, path: full, size: buf.length, modified: new Date().toISOString(), isDir: false, type: fbType(name) })
+    contents[full] = buf
     store.files.bytes += buf.length
+    store.files.uploaded.add(full)
     res.sendStatus(200)
   })
-  req.on('error', () => { if (!res.headersSent) res.sendStatus(400) })
+  req.on('aborted', () => { aborted = true; release() })
+  req.on('error', () => { aborted = true; release(); if (!res.headersSent) res.sendStatus(400) })
 })
 
 // FileBrowser delete (file or folder + its subtree)
@@ -5337,10 +5365,16 @@ app.delete('/app/filebrowser/api/resources/*', (req, res) => {
   const full = fbNormalize(req.params[0] || '')
   const parent = fbParent(full)
   if (tree[parent]) {
-    const entry = tree[parent].find(e => e.path === full)
-    if (entry && !entry.isDir) store.files.bytes -= entry.size || 0
+    if (store.files.uploaded.delete(full)) store.files.bytes -= Buffer.byteLength(contents[full])
     tree[parent] = tree[parent].filter(e => e.path !== full)
   }
+  // Cancel unfinished sessions in the deleted subtree too.
+  for (const [name, upload] of store.files.uploads) {
+    if (name === full || name.startsWith(full + '/')) {
+      store.files.reserved -= upload.length
+      store.files.uploads.delete(name)
+    }
+  }
   // Recursively drop a directory's children.
   if (tree[full]) {
     const stack = [full]
@@ -5348,7 +5382,10 @@ app.delete('/app/filebrowser/api/resources/*', (req, res) => {
       const d = stack.pop()
       for (const e of tree[d] || []) {
         if (e.isDir) stack.push(e.path)
-        else { store.files.bytes -= e.size || 0; delete contents[e.path] }
+        else {
+          if (store.files.uploaded.delete(e.path)) store.files.bytes -= Buffer.byteLength(contents[e.path])
+          delete contents[e.path]
+        }
       }
       delete tree[d]
     }
@@ -5362,11 +5399,29 @@ app.patch('/app/filebrowser/api/resources/*', (req, res) => {
   const store = currentStore()
   const { tree, contents } = store.files
   const full = fbNormalize(req.params[0] || '')
-  const dest = fbNormalize((req.body && req.body.destination) || '')
+  let destination = req.body?.destination || ''
+  if (req.query.action === 'rename') {
+    try { destination = decodeURIComponent(String(req.query.destination || '')) }
+    catch { return res.sendStatus(400) }
+  }
+  const dest = fbNormalize(destination)
   if (!dest || dest === '/') return res.sendStatus(400)
   const parent = fbParent(full)
   const entry = (tree[parent] || []).find(e => e.path === full)
   if (!entry) return res.sendStatus(404)
+  const newParent = fbParent(dest)
+  if (!tree[newParent]) return res.sendStatus(404)
+  if (dest === full) return res.sendStatus(200)
+  const replaced = tree[newParent].find(e => e.path === dest)
+  if (replaced && (replaced.isDir || req.query.override !== 'true')) return res.sendStatus(409)
+  if (store.files.uploaded.has(dest)) {
+    store.files.bytes -= Buffer.byteLength(contents[dest])
+    store.files.uploaded.delete(dest)
+  }
+  tree[parent] = tree[parent].filter(e => e !== entry)
+  tree[newParent] = tree[newParent].filter(e => e.path !== dest)
+  tree[newParent].push(entry)
+  if (store.files.uploaded.delete(full)) store.files.uploaded.add(dest)
   const newName = fbBase(dest)
   entry.name = newName
   entry.path = dest
@@ -6071,7 +6126,7 @@ function makeSessionStore() {
     userState: seedUserState(),
     mockState: seedMockState(),
     bitcoinRelayMockState: structuredClone(SEED_BTCRELAY),
-    files: { tree: structuredClone(SEED_FILES), contents: structuredClone(SEED_FILE_CONTENTS), bytes: 0 },
+    files: { tree: structuredClone(SEED_FILES), contents: structuredClone(SEED_FILE_CONTENTS), bytes: 0, reserved: 0, uploads: new Map(), uploaded: new Set() },
     // Mesh chat mutable state: messages sent this session + attachment bytes
     // (cid → {mime, filename, b64, thumb_b64}). Per-session so one demo
     // visitor's uploads are never visible to another.
@@ -6348,7 +6403,7 @@ async function hydrateRealTestnetTxids() {
   } catch { /* offline — keep mock hashes */ }
 }
 
-server.listen(PORT, '0.0.0.0', async () => {
+server.listen(PORT, process.env.MOCK_BACKEND_HOST || '0.0.0.0', async () => {
   const runtime = await isContainerRuntimeAvailable()
 
   // Initialize package data from Docker

neode-ui/package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "neode-ui",
-  "version": "1.8.22-alpha",
+  "version": "1.9.0-alpha",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "neode-ui",
-      "version": "1.8.22-alpha",
+      "version": "1.9.0-alpha",
       "dependencies": {
         "@scure/bip39": "^2.2.0",
         "@types/dompurify": "^3.0.5",

neode-ui/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "neode-ui",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "1.8.22-alpha",
+  "version": "1.9.0-alpha",
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
     "start": "./start-dev.sh",
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
     "test:watch": "vitest",
     "test:mock-parity": "node scripts/mock-rpc-parity.mjs",
     "dev": "vite",
-    "dev:mock": "concurrently --raw \"node mock-backend.js\" \"VITE_AIUI_URL=http://localhost:5173 vite\" \"cd ../../AIUI && perl -MPOSIX -e 'POSIX::setsid(); exec @ARGV' -- pnpm dev 2>/dev/null || echo '[AIUI] Not found at ../../AIUI — chat will show placeholder'\"",
+    "dev:mock": "concurrently --raw \"node mock-backend.js\" \"VITE_AIUI_URL=http://localhost:5173 vite\" \"cd ../../AIUI && perl -MPOSIX -e 'POSIX::setsid(); exec @ARGV' -- pnpm dev 2>/dev/null || echo '[AIUI] Not found at ../../AIUI \u2014 chat will show placeholder'\"",
     "dev:boot": "VITE_DEV_MODE=boot concurrently --raw \"VITE_DEV_MODE=boot node mock-backend.js\" \"VITE_DEV_MODE=boot vite\"",
     "dev:real": "echo 'Start backend: cd ../core && cargo run --release' && vite",
     "backend:mock": "node mock-backend.js",

neode-ui/previews/fee-bump/Preview.vue

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+<template>
+  <main class="min-h-screen text-white p-6">
+    <div class="max-w-md mx-auto py-8 space-y-4">
+      <p class="text-xs text-orange-200">UI PREVIEW · SAMPLE DATA · NO WALLET ACCESS</p>
+      <h1 class="text-2xl font-semibold">Bump a transaction</h1>
+      <p class="text-sm text-white/55">Open the transaction list and tap the small Bump button. You can try both supported methods and the custom fee review without spending anything.</p>
+      <div class="flex gap-2">
+        <button class="rounded-lg px-4 py-2 bg-white/10 text-sm" @click="open('cpfp')">Preview CPFP</button>
+        <button class="rounded-lg px-4 py-2 bg-white/10 text-sm" @click="open('rbf')">Preview RBF</button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+    <TransactionsModal :key="revision" :show="show" :transactions="transactions" @close="show = false" />
+  </main>
+</template>
+<script setup lang="ts">
+import { ref } from 'vue'
+import TransactionsModal from '@/components/TransactionsModal.vue'
+import { choose } from './rpc'
+const show = ref(false)
+const revision = ref(0)
+const transactions = [{ tx_hash: 'a'.repeat(64), amount_sats: 161794, direction: 'outgoing' as const, num_confirmations: 0, time_stamp: Math.floor(Date.now()/1000)-120, total_fees: 144, dest_addresses: [], label: '', block_height: 0 }]
+function open(method: string) { choose(method); revision.value++; show.value = true }
+</script>