Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
archipelago 379fb930fc chore: prepare release v1.8.18-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 43s
2026-09-20 11:45:35 -04:00
archipelago 1bebdeac0f Prepare v1.8.18-alpha release notes 2026-09-18 06:36:43 -04:00
9 changed files with 62 additions and 371 deletions
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
## Unreleased
## v1.8.18-alpha (2026-09-18)
- Framework startup prioritizes Bitcoin and LND before unrelated containers, and unavailable LND balances remain unavailable instead of appearing as false zeroes.
- Cashu Receive guides unseeded wallets through recovery-phrase setup, with shorter backup guidance and a single-column layout.
- Added live Framework verification for automatic LND unlock, native balance preservation, Cashu address registration, and proof preservation.
## v1.8.17-alpha (2026-09-15)
- Minibits claims that every mint reports as already spent leave the retry queue, clearing repeated failure notices. Network errors and mixed mint failures remain queued for another attempt.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "archipelago"
version = "1.8.17-alpha"
version = "1.8.18-alpha"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"archipelago-container",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "archipelago"
version = "1.8.17-alpha"
version = "1.8.18-alpha"
edition = "2021"
license.workspace = true
description = "Archipelago Bitcoin Node OS - Native backend"
+1 -15
View File
@@ -162,25 +162,11 @@ impl ApiHandler {
r#"{"error":"This file is shared with the host's federation peers only. Federate with that node (exchange invites) so it recognizes you, then try again."}"#,
),
)),
Ok(content_server::ServeResult::NotFound) => Ok(build_response(
Ok(content_server::ServeResult::NotFound) | Err(_) => Ok(build_response(
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
"text/plain",
hyper::Body::from("Content not found"),
)),
// A server-side failure is NOT "not found": reporting it as a 404
// hid an unreadable file behind a silent, unlogged response, and a
// buyer's client re-sends a 404 over another transport. 5xx it, and
// say why in the journal.
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(content_id = %content_id, "content request failed: {e:#}");
Ok(build_response(
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
"application/json",
hyper::Body::from(
r#"{"error":"The seller could not read this file right now. You have not been charged."}"#,
),
))
}
}
}
+19 -46
View File
@@ -22,11 +22,9 @@ const FILE_CATALOG_PROTOCOL: &str = "https://archipelago.dev/protocols/file-cata
/// Best-effort reclaim of an ecash payment token that was minted but the sale
/// didn't complete (seller unreachable or couldn't redeem it), so the buyer
/// doesn't lose the value. For Fedimint the spender can reissue its own
/// un-redeemed notes; for Cashu the proofs are received back. Returns whether
/// the value came back: false if the seller already claimed the token (then
/// the value is genuinely gone), so callers never tell the buyer they were
/// refunded when they weren't.
async fn reclaim_spent_ecash(data_dir: &std::path::Path, token: &str, backend: &str) -> bool {
/// un-redeemed notes; for Cashu the proofs are received back. Fails silently if
/// the seller already claimed the token (then the value is genuinely gone).
async fn reclaim_spent_ecash(data_dir: &std::path::Path, token: &str, backend: &str) {
let res = match backend {
"fedimint" => crate::wallet::fedimint_client::reissue_into_any(data_dir, token)
.await
@@ -34,29 +32,13 @@ async fn reclaim_spent_ecash(data_dir: &std::path::Path, token: &str, backend: &
_ => ecash::receive_token(data_dir, token).await,
};
match res {
Ok(sats) => {
tracing::info!(
"paid download: reclaimed {sats} sats of unspent {backend} ecash after a failed sale"
);
true
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
"paid download: could not reclaim {backend} ecash (the peer may have already \
claimed it): {e:#}"
);
false
}
}
}
/// What to tell the buyer about their payment after a failed sale.
fn refund_note(reclaimed: bool) -> &'static str {
if reclaimed {
"Your ecash was refunded to your wallet."
} else {
"The seller had already claimed the payment, so it could not be refunded \
automatically — contact the seller."
Ok(sats) => tracing::info!(
"paid download: reclaimed {sats} sats of unspent {backend} ecash after a failed sale"
),
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
"paid download: could not reclaim {backend} ecash (the peer may have already \
claimed it): {e:#}"
),
}
}
@@ -582,13 +564,9 @@ impl RpcHandler {
tracing::warn!("paid peer download dial failed for {}: {:#}", onion, e);
// The token was already minted/spent — reclaim it so the buyer
// doesn't lose the value when the seller was simply unreachable.
let reclaimed =
reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
return Ok(serde_json::json!({
"error": format!(
"Could not reach the peer over mesh or Tor — it may be offline. {} Please try again.",
refund_note(reclaimed)
)
"error": "Could not reach the peer over mesh or Tor — it may be offline. Your ecash was refunded to your wallet. Please try again."
}));
}
};
@@ -614,19 +592,15 @@ impl RpcHandler {
);
// Seller couldn't redeem the token — reclaim it so the buyer keeps
// their funds (the spent-but-unredeemed-notes case the user hit).
let reclaimed =
reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
// The 402 body is generic, so don't assert a cause — a seller that
// redeemed the token and then failed to deliver also lands here.
reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
let hint = match used_backend {
"fedimint" => "the seller may not be in the same Fedimint federation as you",
_ => "the seller may not accept your Cashu mint",
"fedimint" => "the seller isn't in the same Fedimint federation as you",
_ => "the seller doesn't accept your Cashu mint",
};
return Ok(serde_json::json!({
"error": format!(
"Payment not accepted by the seller — {hint}. {} Try the other ecash \
type, or use a shared mint/federation.",
refund_note(reclaimed)
"Payment rejected by the seller — {hint}. Your ecash was refunded to \
your wallet. Try the other ecash type, or use a shared mint/federation."
)
}));
}
@@ -635,10 +609,9 @@ impl RpcHandler {
let status = response.status();
let body = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
tracing::warn!("paid download: seller {onion} returned {status}: {body}");
let reclaimed =
reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
reclaim_spent_ecash(&self.config.data_dir, &token_str, used_backend).await;
return Ok(serde_json::json!({
"error": format!("Peer returned an error ({status}). {}", refund_note(reclaimed))
"error": format!("Peer returned an error ({status}). Your ecash was refunded to your wallet.")
}));
}
+19 -305
View File
@@ -5,110 +5,13 @@
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::future::Future;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tokio::fs;
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use tracing::{debug, warn};
const CATALOG_FILE: &str = "content/catalog.json";
const CONTENT_DIR: &str = "content/files";
/// How long a redeemed payment token keeps entitling its buyer to re-fetch the
/// item it paid for. Long enough to cover a buyer's transport fallback (FIPS →
/// Tor re-sends the same request, token included) and a manual retry; short
/// enough that the ledger stays tiny and a leaked token isn't a standing pass.
const REDEMPTION_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(600);
/// One ledger slot per payment token (keyed by its SHA-256 — the raw bearer
/// token is never held here). The inner mutex serialises verification of the
/// same token; its value is the content id the token was redeemed for.
struct RedemptionSlot {
created_at: Instant,
redeemed_for: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
}
static REDEMPTIONS: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, RedemptionSlot>>> =
LazyLock::new(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
/// Decide whether `token` pays for `content_id`, redeeming it at most once.
///
/// Payment tokens are single-use: verifying one swaps its proofs at the mint,
/// so a second verification of the same token always fails "already spent".
/// A buyer's HTTP client can legitimately send the same request twice — its
/// FIPS attempt gets a 404/5xx and it re-sends over Tor — and without this
/// the seller redeemed the token on the first request, then answered the
/// retry `402 Payment required`: money taken, file never delivered.
///
/// So the first verification that succeeds is remembered (per token, per
/// item, for [`REDEMPTION_TTL`]) and later requests for the same item present
/// the same token are authorised without touching the mint again. Concurrent
/// requests with one token queue on the slot so only one runs `verify`.
/// A failed verification is not remembered — the slot is dropped so garbage
/// tokens can't accumulate and a legitimate retry gets a fresh attempt.
async fn authorize_payment<F, Fut>(token: &str, content_id: &str, verify: F) -> bool
where
F: FnOnce() -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = bool>,
{
let key = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(token.as_bytes()));
let redeemed_for = {
let mut ledger = REDEMPTIONS.lock().await;
ledger.retain(|_, s| s.created_at.elapsed() < REDEMPTION_TTL);
ledger
.entry(key.clone())
.or_insert_with(|| RedemptionSlot {
created_at: Instant::now(),
redeemed_for: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
})
.redeemed_for
.clone()
};
let mut state = redeemed_for.lock().await;
if state.as_deref() == Some(content_id) {
debug!(
"Payment token already redeemed for '{}' — serving without re-verifying",
content_id
);
return true;
}
if verify().await {
*state = Some(content_id.to_string());
return true;
}
// Keep a slot that already holds a redemption (this token paid for a
// different item); drop one that never verified anything.
let never_redeemed = state.is_none();
drop(state);
if never_redeemed {
REDEMPTIONS.lock().await.remove(&key);
}
false
}
/// Confirm the node can actually hand the file over: it exists and this
/// process may read it. Must run BEFORE a payment is redeemed — a paid buyer
/// who then hits a read error has lost their token for nothing (2026-09-18:
/// filebrowser-owned `0640` files the node's service user couldn't open; the
/// stat calls passed, `fs::read` failed after the swap, the buyer got a 404).
/// Reading a byte (not just opening) also rejects a directory.
async fn ensure_servable(file_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
let mut file = fs::File::open(file_path)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("content file {} is not readable", file_path.display()))?;
let mut probe = [0u8; 1];
file.read(&mut probe)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("content file {} cannot be read", file_path.display()))?;
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ContentItem {
pub id: String,
@@ -393,31 +296,6 @@ pub async fn serve_content(
}
}
// Verify the file can be served BEFORE any payment is redeemed. The gate
// below swaps the buyer's token at the mint; failing to hand over the file
// after that takes their money and delivers nothing.
let file_path = content_file_path(data_dir, item);
if !file_path.exists() {
// The catalog entry survived (it's a separate JSON file) but its
// backing file is gone — most likely lost in an unrelated data-dir
// reset (a shared filebrowser file, 2026-07-01: two catalog entries
// outlived a filebrowser reinstall that wiped the files themselves).
// Leaving the entry in place would keep advertising it as available
// to every peer forever, each hitting the exact same dead end this
// one just did. Prune it so it stops being offered.
warn!(
content_id = %id,
filename = %item.filename,
"content catalog entry's file is missing on disk — pruning the stale entry"
);
prune_missing_content_entry(data_dir, id).await;
return Ok(ServeResult::NotFound);
}
if let Err(e) = ensure_servable(&file_path).await {
warn!(content_id = %id, "cannot serve content (payment not taken): {e:#}");
return Err(e);
}
// Check access control
if !owner_session {
match &item.access {
@@ -431,10 +309,7 @@ pub async fn serve_content(
if let Some(token) = payment_token {
if (method_accepted(&item.access, "ecash")
|| method_accepted(&item.access, "fedimint"))
&& authorize_payment(token, id, || {
verify_payment_token(data_dir, token, *price_sats)
})
.await
&& verify_payment_token(data_dir, token, *price_sats).await
{
authorized = true;
}
@@ -461,6 +336,24 @@ pub async fn serve_content(
}
}
let file_path = content_file_path(data_dir, item);
if !file_path.exists() {
// The catalog entry survived (it's a separate JSON file) but its
// backing file is gone — most likely lost in an unrelated data-dir
// reset (a shared filebrowser file, 2026-07-01: two catalog entries
// outlived a filebrowser reinstall that wiped the files themselves).
// Leaving the entry in place would keep advertising it as available
// to every peer forever, each hitting the exact same dead end this
// one just did. Prune it so it stops being offered.
warn!(
content_id = %id,
filename = %item.filename,
"content catalog entry's file is missing on disk — pruning the stale entry"
);
prune_missing_content_entry(data_dir, id).await;
return Ok(ServeResult::NotFound);
}
let metadata = fs::metadata(&file_path)
.await
.context("Failed to read file metadata")?;
@@ -832,182 +725,3 @@ mod prune_missing_content_tests {
assert_eq!(reloaded.items[0].id, "present-item");
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod paid_delivery_tests {
use super::*;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
/// A verifier that counts how often it actually runs.
fn counting(
calls: &Arc<AtomicUsize>,
result: bool,
) -> impl FnOnce() -> std::future::Ready<bool> {
let calls = calls.clone();
move || {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
std::future::ready(result)
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn replayed_token_is_served_without_redeeming_twice() {
// The 2026-09-18 incident: the buyer's client re-sent the same request
// over Tor after the seller had already redeemed the token, and the
// second verification ("already spent") turned into a 402.
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
assert!(authorize_payment("tok-replay", "item-a", counting(&calls, true)).await);
assert!(authorize_payment("tok-replay", "item-a", counting(&calls, true)).await);
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1, "mint must be hit once");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn concurrent_requests_with_one_token_redeem_once() {
// FIPS attempt still in flight when the Tor fallback arrives.
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
let slow = |calls: Arc<AtomicUsize>| {
move || async move {
calls.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
true
}
};
let (a, b) = tokio::join!(
authorize_payment("tok-concurrent", "item-a", slow(calls.clone())),
authorize_payment("tok-concurrent", "item-a", slow(calls.clone())),
);
assert!(a && b, "both requests must be served");
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn failed_verification_is_not_remembered() {
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
assert!(!authorize_payment("tok-bad", "item-a", counting(&calls, false)).await);
// A retry gets a fresh attempt — and can succeed (e.g. mint was down).
assert!(authorize_payment("tok-bad", "item-a", counting(&calls, true)).await);
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 2);
let ledger = REDEMPTIONS.lock().await;
let key = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(b"tok-bad"));
assert!(ledger.contains_key(&key), "successful redemption is kept");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn failed_verification_leaves_no_ledger_entry() {
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
assert!(!authorize_payment("tok-garbage", "item-a", counting(&calls, false)).await);
let key = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(b"tok-garbage"));
assert!(
!REDEMPTIONS.lock().await.contains_key(&key),
"garbage tokens must not accumulate"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn token_redeemed_for_one_item_does_not_unlock_another() {
let calls = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
assert!(authorize_payment("tok-cross", "item-a", counting(&calls, true)).await);
// Item B is verified on its own merits (the real mint would say
// "already spent"); it must not ride on item A's redemption…
assert!(!authorize_payment("tok-cross", "item-b", counting(&calls, false)).await);
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 2);
// …and failing there must not revoke what the token already paid for.
assert!(authorize_payment("tok-cross", "item-a", counting(&calls, true)).await);
assert_eq!(calls.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 2);
}
fn paid_item(id: &str, filename: &str) -> ContentItem {
ContentItem {
id: id.to_string(),
filename: filename.to_string(),
mime_type: "audio/mpeg".to_string(),
size_bytes: 4,
description: String::new(),
access: AccessControl::Paid {
price_sats: 10,
accepted: vec!["ecash".to_string()],
},
availability: Availability::AllPeers,
added_at: "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z".to_string(),
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn unreadable_paid_file_errors_before_any_payment_is_redeemed() {
// Filebrowser-owned 0640 files the node's service user can't read:
// stat() succeeds, read() fails. That must surface as an error BEFORE
// the token is verified — never after the swap has taken the money.
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let data_dir = dir.path();
save_catalog(
data_dir,
&ContentCatalog {
items: vec![paid_item("locked", "locked.mp3")],
},
)
.await
.unwrap();
let files = data_dir.join("content").join("files");
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&files).await.unwrap();
let file = files.join("locked.mp3");
tokio::fs::write(&file, b"data").await.unwrap();
std::fs::set_permissions(&file, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o000)).unwrap();
if std::fs::File::open(&file).is_ok() {
return; // running as root: permissions can't be enforced here
}
// A token that would fail verification if it were reached: getting
// PaymentRequired here would mean the gate ran before the file check.
let result = serve_content(
data_dir,
"locked",
Some("cashuBnot-a-real-token"),
None,
None,
None,
false,
)
.await;
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"unreadable file must be a server error, not 402/404"
);
let key = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(b"cashuBnot-a-real-token"));
assert!(
!REDEMPTIONS.lock().await.contains_key(&key),
"no redemption may be attempted for an unservable file"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn readable_paid_file_with_bad_token_still_requires_payment() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let data_dir = dir.path();
save_catalog(
data_dir,
&ContentCatalog {
items: vec![paid_item("ok", "ok.mp3")],
},
)
.await
.unwrap();
let files = data_dir.join("content").join("files");
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&files).await.unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(files.join("ok.mp3"), b"data").await.unwrap();
let result = serve_content(
data_dir,
"ok",
Some("cashuBnot-a-real-token-2"),
None,
None,
None,
false,
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(matches!(result, ServeResult::PaymentRequired(10)));
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "neode-ui",
"version": "1.8.17-alpha",
"version": "1.8.18-alpha",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "neode-ui",
"version": "1.8.17-alpha",
"version": "1.8.18-alpha",
"dependencies": {
"@scure/bip39": "^2.2.0",
"@types/dompurify": "^3.0.5",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"name": "neode-ui",
"private": true,
"version": "1.8.17-alpha",
"version": "1.8.18-alpha",
"type": "module",
"scripts": {
"start": "./start-dev.sh",
@@ -362,6 +362,18 @@ init()
</button>
</div>
<div class="overflow-y-auto flex-1 min-h-0 space-y-6 pr-1">
<!-- v1.8.18-alpha -->
<div>
<div class="flex items-center gap-2 mb-3">
<span class="text-xs font-mono px-2 py-0.5 rounded bg-orange-500/20 text-orange-300">v1.8.18-alpha</span>
<span class="text-xs text-white/40">September 18, 2026</span>
</div>
<div class="space-y-3 text-sm text-white/80 pl-3 border-l border-white/10">
<p>Framework startup now brings Bitcoin and LND up before unrelated containers, and the dashboard keeps balances unavailable instead of showing a false zero when LND is not ready.</p>
<p>Cashu wallets can set up a recovery phrase from Receive, with clearer backup and restore guidance.</p>
<p>Ecash backup guidance is shorter and arranged in a single column for easier use on small screens.</p>
</div>
</div>
<!-- v1.8.17-alpha -->
<div>
<div class="flex items-center gap-2 mb-3">