13-06 delivered the content pipeline and unit-tested it, but nothing in the
live UI invokes it, and 13-11 as written only added an equally-uncalled
sibling. No plan in the phase triggers the fetch from a UI event. Without this
AIUI-03 ships green-tested and visibly broken — empty grids. Wiring belongs
here, where useArchy.ts and ChatPage.vue's render tree are already in scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- archyBridge.ts: content:push case resolving the pending content:request
by id, and requestArchyContent(kind, scope) mirroring requestContext's
shape. Not in the plan's files_modified list, but required to satisfy
Task 3's own instruction to register the content:push handler on the
existing single bridge listener rather than adding a second
window.addEventListener('message') — see SUMMARY deviations.
- useContentPanel.ts: setArchyContent + archyContentActive; guards only
the panelFilms/panelSongs/panelPodcasts assignments inside
updatePanelFromText so Archy-sourced grids stay the source of truth
once populated, per plan scope. Books/TV/images/places/magazine/code/
recipes/news are untouched (13-PATTERNS.md: partial deprecation).
- useArchy.ts: requestArchyContent(kind, scope) calling
archyBridge.requestArchyContent then useContentPanel().setArchyContent.
No FilmGrid/SongGrid/NewsGrid/ContentGridView/content.ts edits (D-12).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- aiui-protocol.ts: AIUIContentRequest (kind + optional scope, no RPC
method or params) and ArchyContentPush (adapted bundle + permitted
flag).
- contextBroker.ts: handleContentRequest gates on the media/files
permission categories (either grants access), resolves scope to
content.list-mine / content.browse-peer (fanned out across every known
federation peer) / content.owned-list, and routes results through
archyContentAdapter's adaptContentItems before crossing the iframe
boundary. contentRequestSeq is a monotonic guard: a stale RPC response
that resolves after a newer content:request has started is discarded
rather than posted (AIUI-03 concurrency edge).
- contextBroker.test.ts: permission-denied, own-scope, and stale/
out-of-order coverage. Fixed a pre-existing latent flake risk in this
file — perms.toggle() is not idempotent across tests because the
permissions store persists to localStorage, which vi.clearAllMocks()
does not reset; switched the new tests to perms.enableAll().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- archyContentAdapter.ts: hand-written adaptContentItems mapping (D-12),
fixture-pinned at the adjacency, empty, ordering and paid-lock edges
named in AIUI-03; classifyByMime covers the m4a/aac/opus/wma extension
gap ShareModal.vue's mime map leaves today; buildMediaUrl never puts a
credential in a query string (T-13-32).
- filebrowser-client.ts: streamUrl now returns a query-free same-origin
raw-file URL, relying on the path=/ cookie login() already sets instead
of also putting the JWT in the URL (T-13-39 — closes the pre-existing
leak CONTEXT.md names, rather than merely not repeating it).
- filebrowserStreamUrl.test.ts: regression pin for the fix, including a
traversal case confirming sanitizePath behavior is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator-accepted deviation from 13-02 Task 3: the relay is structurally gone
but /aiui/api/openrouter/ still answers 200 via the SPA catch-all. 13-09 already
owns this nginx config, so the explicit return 404 belongs here rather than
bolted onto a completed plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Positive path confirmed by the operator on real hardware. Machine half
independently re-probed by the orchestrator rather than taken from the
executor's report. Openrouter status-code finding accepted as a deviation with
the reasoning recorded; explicit 404 scheduled in 13-09.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
run_runtime_assets() reinstalls a second on-node copy of the nginx template
over /etc/nginx/sites-available on every daemon restart. Found on
archy-x250-dev3 during 13-02 Task 3, where a hand-patched deploy was reverted
within ~5s of the restart. Live OTA hazard: an operator can deploy an nginx
fix, watch it apply, restart, and lose it with no error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds tests/production-quality/aiui-proxy-closed.sh (follows lnd-cors-test.sh's
shape) and deploys+runs it against a real, genuinely remote node
(archy-x250-dev3, operator-approved deviation from archi-dev-box — see
SUMMARY key-decisions for why).
Confirmed on the node: unauthenticated /aiui/api/claude/v1/messages and
/aiui/api/ollama/api/tags both 401; claude-api-proxy sidecar unit gone;
nothing listens on :3142; the second key ledger (claude-api-proxy.env) is
gone. Along the way, root-caused and worked around a real deploy-topology
gap — the daemon self-heals nginx config from a second, stale on-node
template copy on every restart, silently reverting a hand-patched fix.
One finding is reported honestly rather than tuned away: deleted
/aiui/api/openrouter/ returns 200/405 via this app's SPA catch-all, not the
plan's literal 404 — the relay is structurally gone (zero proxy_pass to
openrouter.ai), but the exact status code doesn't match the acceptance
criterion. Left open for a human decision, per this task's own instruction
not to force a probe to pass.
This is Task 3 of a checkpoint:human-verify plan with gate="blocking". The
positive-path browser check and the openrouter-finding disposition remain
for a human; this executor does not self-approve the gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator deleted /home/archipelago/Projects/AIUI after the subtree import was
proven byte-identical (tree 5ac3173a on both sides, every branch contained in
development, no stashes, clean tree). The ../AIUI script paths no longer
resolve, so they fail loudly instead of shipping stale bytes. Still in scope
for this plan — a deploy script that dies on a missing directory is not a
shipping story — but the severity note is corrected so a future executor does
not act on a stale premise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The planner correctly flagged dev-start.sh and deploy-tailscale.sh as out of
its mandate. Verified the risk is live, not theoretical: the orphaned
pre-migration clone still exists AND still has a built packages/app/dist, so
both scripts copy stale AIUI bytes and report success rather than failing
loudly. That is the same silent-staleness class as the /assets 404. Same
one-line fix as the two scripts already in scope, so it belongs in this plan
rather than in a follow-up nobody schedules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Substantive rework, not a path swap:
- Retires D-15's pin-and-verify model. scripts/aiui.pin, pin_commit and
--update-pin are dropped outright — there is no second repository left
to pin, so build-aiui.sh now attributes a build to this repo's own
`git rev-parse HEAD` instead.
- Re-derives the build: aiui/ is an in-repo pnpm/turbo workspace with its
own package.json and lockfile but no committed node_modules, so
build-aiui.sh must `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` before it can build
(new requirement; the old model assumed a developer's separate AIUI
clone was already installed).
- Retargets deploy-to-target.sh (both its primary and --both/secondary
AIUI sections) and setup-aiui-server.sh off the stale
$PROJECT_DIR/../AIUI/packages/app/dist path, which still resolves on
disk to a stale pre-migration clone and would otherwise silently ship
old bytes instead of failing loudly.
- Carries the /aiui/-scoped CSP sandbox work (AIUI-04) through unchanged
per D-19, and fixes two acceptance-criteria drifts discovered while
verifying the plan against deploy-to-target.sh's post-13-02 state and
nginx-archipelago.conf's post-pentest-hardening state (CSP header count
and the "no session gate needed" grep), neither of which is a D-19
effect.
- Folds in a real defect found while doing this work: the 2026-07-31
same-host deploy guard only catches path containment, not sibling
directories — the exact shape this worktree's own topology exhibits
(archy-phase13 as a sibling of the main checkout, reachable over
loopback SSH). New Task 3 widens it to refuse any same-host
source/destination mismatch, extracted into a testable
assert_safe_same_host_deploy in scripts/lib/common.sh and pinned by
tests/production-quality/deploy-guard-same-host.sh. The checkpoint task
is renumbered Task 3 -> Task 4 accordingly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mechanical path swap: useArchy.ts now lives at aiui/packages/app/... in
this repo (D-19), not the old separate clone. Drops the separate-branch/
push language. Verified paths and referenced symbols still exist and at
essentially the same line numbers post-subtree-import; task content and
must_haves are otherwise unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mechanical path swap: AIUI's composables now live at aiui/packages/app/...
in this repo (git subtree import, D-19), not at the old separate clone
/home/archipelago/Projects/AIUI. Drops the "separate development branch to
push" language accordingly. Verified every retargeted path exists on disk
before rewriting; task content and must_haves are otherwise unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the 'Talk to AIUI about it' path from the other side. archyBridge
gains a chat:prefill case behind its existing parent-origin validation, and
ChatInput prefills + focuses with the caret at the end.
Prefills rather than auto-sends: the operator sees and can amend the question
before it costs a model call, and a draft they had already started is never
clobbered by a background handoff. Auto-send is the natural seam for the
follow-up that actions things directly.
The bridge buffers a prefill that arrives before the composer mounts (collapsed
chat, mobile content tab) and replays it on registration, so a Cmd+K ask into a
cold frame is not silently dropped. onPrefill returns an unsubscribe so a
remounting composer cannot leak a stale handler.
Verified: vue-tsc clean; AIUI suite 332 passed. The 3 remaining failures
(seed-songs extraction x2, web-search system prompt) are pre-existing — I
confirmed by reverting 13-01's two AIUI files to their parent state and
reproducing the identical 3 failures without any phase-13 change present.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cmd/Ctrl+K search could only match text against known screens; anything it
did not recognise dead-ended at 'No results'. That text is now handed to the
assistant instead: a blue accented row (chat-bubble + sparkle) appears while
there is a query, always last in the keyboard order, so Cmd+K -> type -> Enter
reaches AIUI without the mouse. On a zero-match query it is the only option.
The prompt travels by postMessage, NOT as an iframe URL param. Chat.vue's
aiuiUrl is deliberately free of reactive dependencies so the iframe src stays
byte-identical and AIUI survives a tab switch (see the D14_FLAGS comment);
threading the question through the URL would reload AIUI and discard the
conversation on every ask — the opposite of the intent. Two regression tests
pin this: the src is byte-identical across an ask, and ask/askedAt are
stripped afterwards so a refresh cannot silently re-ask.
The ask is queued and flushed on AIUI's 'ready' handshake, because arriving
from Cmd+K on a cold Chat tab means the iframe has not connected yet.
AIUI-side receiver lands separately; until then this posts a message AIUI
ignores, which is inert rather than broken.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
D-19 supersedes D-15's two-repo premise and voids D-18. Flags 13-06/13-09/13-11
as needing a re-plan against aiui/ before wave 2 runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings AIUI's full 230-commit history under aiui/ via git subtree, plus main's
current head. Operator decision 2026-08-03: AIUI moves into this repo rather
than staying at git.tx1138.com. This also lands e30ac1d (13-01 Task 3), which
was stranded local-only while that remote was unreachable.
Plans 13-06, 13-09 and 13-11 still target /home/archipelago/Projects/AIUI paths
and must be re-planned against aiui/ before wave 2 runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tasks 1 (session-gated model forwarder, 97921d99) and 2 (retire the Python
sidecar/OpenRouter relay, b28cc3ee) are committed, cargo build --package
archipelago succeeds, and all 5 model_proxy:: unit tests are confirmed
passing (via direct execution of the compiled test binary, since a fresh
`cargo test` invocation was too slow to complete under severe host resource
contention — see the SUMMARY's Issues Encountered for the full account).
Task 3 (checkpoint:human-verify, gate="blocking" — real-node curl/systemd
proof, S-15) is intentionally NOT executed. Per the plan and this
executor's instructions, it halts here and returns a structured checkpoint
rather than self-approving.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records the continuation ground-truth review of WIP checkpoint 6ba52b22,
the atomic per-task re-commit (fe6ccff7 Rust spine, 0ab9bdc7 neode-ui
broker), and the external-repo Task 3 commit (AIUI e30ac1d, not yet
pushed). Logs two open WINDOWS.md items: the cargo test run that never
completed under machine resource contention (id 16), and the AIUI push
blocked by an unreachable git.tx1138.com (id 17).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the live production exposure this plan targets: /aiui/api/claude/
and /aiui/api/ollama/ proxied straight through with "no session gate
needed", and /aiui/api/openrouter/ was a plain unauthenticated relay to a
paid third-party API the node holds no key for (T-13-08/T-13-09/T-13-10).
image-recipe/configs/nginx-archipelago.conf (BOTH server blocks, ~line 49
and ~line 961 — a fix applied to only one leaves the exposure live on
whichever block serves the request, T-13-15):
- /aiui/api/claude/ and /aiui/api/ollama/ proxy_pass re-pointed from
127.0.0.1:3142 / 127.0.0.1:11434 to the Rust daemon at 127.0.0.1:5678
(no trailing path component, so the daemon's own prefix match sees the
full request URI)
- Forward the session Cookie header to the daemon so it can re-derive auth
- location /aiui/api/openrouter/ deleted outright in both blocks
- Old comment "API key managed by proxy, no session gate needed" (the
reasoning error that produced the exposure) replaced with rationale
scripts/deploy-to-target.sh: deleted the embedded claude-api-proxy.py
heredoc, its systemd unit creation/enable/restart, the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
extraction, and the 3141->3142 sed fixups. Added an unconditional step that
stops/disables/removes any pre-existing claude-api-proxy unit and deletes
/opt/archipelago/claude-api-proxy.py and
<data_dir>/secrets/claude-api-proxy.env on every deploy — so
already-provisioned nodes actually lose the old unauthenticated listener,
not just newly-deployed ones.
scripts/setup-aiui-server.sh: dropped the hard ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
requirement and the patch-nginx-claude.py step; the script's remaining job
is the AIUI dist rsync. (Also drops the FileBrowser-fix step that lived
here — that logic already exists, and is kept, in deploy-to-target.sh; this
script narrows to exactly what its rewritten header now says it does.)
core/archipelago/src/api/rpc/system/handlers.rs: `claude_api_key` setting
branch no longer writes a second key copy to secrets/claude-api-proxy.env
or restarts claude-api-proxy. secrets/claude-api-key (0600) remains the
single ledger, with a comment naming it as such.
`cargo build --package archipelago` succeeds. Verified via grep against
every acceptance criterion in 13-02-PLAN.md's Task 2 (openrouter count 0,
3142 gone from nginx, both location blocks present, PORT=3142 gone,
claude-api-proxy gone from handlers.rs, secrets/claude-api-key present).
Task 3 (real-node curl/systemd verification, S-15) is NOT done in this
commit — see 13-02-SUMMARY.md.
Continues WIP checkpoint 13b576da (reset --soft, recommitted atomically
per task per plan protocol).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds core/archipelago/src/api/handler/model_proxy.rs: a Rust-daemon handler
that re-derives session auth from the request's own cookie (does not trust
nginx to have gated it already) before forwarding to Anthropic's Messages
API or local Ollama. Replaces the unauthenticated claude-api-proxy.py
sidecar (port 3142, its own ANTHROPIC_API_KEY copy) that let anyone who
could reach the node's web port spend the owner's API budget
(T-13-08/T-13-09/T-13-11).
- Unauthenticated/invalid-session requests get 401 before any upstream call
- Missing key ledger (data_dir/secrets/claude-api-key) returns 503 with a
plain-language body, never 500, never the key path
- Inbound authorization/x-api-key/cookie headers are never forwarded
upstream (T-13-14) — only content-type/accept survive the round trip
- Response streamed through rather than buffered, matching proxy.rs's
peer-content streaming shape, so token-by-token replies still stream
- No log line at any level references a body or a key (AI-SPEC §7b)
- Wired into api/handler/mod.rs's path dispatch alongside the WebSocket
auth-gated arms, matching the existing is_authenticated idiom
Tests (model_proxy::tests): claude_without_session_is_401,
ollama_without_session_is_401, claude_with_invalid_session_is_401,
missing_key_is_503_not_500, inbound_authorization_header_is_not_forwarded.
`cargo build --package archipelago` succeeds. `cargo test --package
archipelago model_proxy::` was still compiling (test-binary link step) when
this commit was made — see 13-02-SUMMARY.md for the honest status.
Continues WIP checkpoint 13b576da (reset --soft, recommitted atomically
per task per plan protocol).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds archyBridge.sendChat(text) built on the existing postToParent +
origin-validated listener pattern (same request-id correlation as
requestContext), with a 180s timeout matching the node's
ASSISTANT_HTTP_TIMEOUT. Adds useAI.ts's streamViaArchy, which branches all
three existing send sites on the same __AIUI_EMBEDDED__ signal useArchy.ts
already reads: embedded mode delegates the model call, the tool-calling
loop and the model key to the node; standalone mode is untouched and keeps
using streamClaude/streamOpenRouter with AIUI's own dev proxy (D-17).
CLAUDE_PATH/OPENROUTER_PATH are not removed — 13-02 changes what those
paths resolve to on a node, 13-09 retires them.
Verified: vitest run 332/335 passing (3 pre-existing failures confirmed via
a scratch worktree at the prior HEAD, unrelated to this change — seed
extraction count assertions and a web-search-integration body.webSearch
assertion); vue-tsc --noEmit clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
4 cores, load 35, 15G of 23G swap in use, rustc at 8.3G RSS while a live
node (bitcoind/electrumx/lnd) shares the machine. Two concurrent cargo
builds in separate worktrees (no shared target dir) made wave 1 crawl for
over an hour with zero commits. Wave 2 has four plans, so this would have
gotten worse before it got better.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds chat:request/chat:response to the AIUI postMessage protocol
(AIUIChatRequest, ArchyChatResponse) and a handleChatRequest handler in
contextBroker.ts that calls assistant.chat over rpcClient on the page's own
session, then posts the result back through the existing postToIframe
helper. Reuses the broker's existing allowedOrigin guard unchanged — no
second postMessage channel, no relaxed origin check.
No permission category is threaded through the chat handler on purpose:
authority is resolved node-side from CallerScope (Task 1), and duplicating
a browser-side gate here would recreate the second, divergent security
model D-02 exists to prevent. tool-call is deliberately NOT added to
AIActionType — tool selection stays node-side by D-01/D-03.
On RPC failure the handler posts only the error message, never the raw
exception object.
Verified: contextBroker.test.ts (16/16) and chatAiuiEmbed.test.ts (7/7)
green; vue-tsc --noEmit clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
D-01/D-02/D-06 tracer slice: a new crate::assistant module (CallerScope,
PermissionCategory, ToolExecCtx, chat()) runs a multi-turn tool-calling loop
(run_loop/execute_tool, MAX_TURNS=8) against a curated single-tool registry
(system_disk_status, hand-written JSON Schema — no schemars) via a Claude
Messages API backend. execute_tool is the single choke point: unknown tools
are refused not ignored, D-16 category grants are re-checked even though the
system prompt already omits ungranted tools, and every real tool dispatches
through the SAME handle_system_disk_status RPC handler every other
authenticated caller uses (assistant_dispatch_tool bridge in
api/rpc/assistant_chat.rs) — never an AI-only backdoor.
assistant.chat is registered in dispatcher.rs as a single guarded
`m if m.starts_with("assistant.")` arm reached only after the existing
session-cookie + CSRF + role.can_access() gate in api/rpc/mod.rs — asserted
directly by assistant_methods_require_session against the live
UNAUTHENTICATED_METHODS list (visibility only widened to pub(crate) for that
assertion; the list's contents are untouched, per the Phase-10 hard
constraint).
Key read from data_dir/secrets/claude-api-key — the same path
mesh/rpc/mesh/assistant.rs already probes — never a second key location.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Groundwork for the app gate (item 1): before anything can enforce
authentication on app ports, the node has to know which ports are
*supposed* to be reachable without it.
`PortMapping` grows `auth` (PortAuth::Session | None, defaulting to
Session) and `auth_rationale`. The default is deliberately the protected
one. Every app port on this node answered with no credential at all over
LAN, Tailscale, Tor and the FIPS mesh alike — reproduced 2026-08-03 —
precisely because exposure was what you got by saying nothing. Inverting
the default means a new app is protected unless its manifest argues for
an exemption.
Validation makes the argument mandatory: `auth: none` without a
rationale is rejected, and so is a rationale without `auth: none` (that
combination means the author wrote an exemption and did not get one —
shipping it silently would leave them believing otherwise).
17 ports across 12 apps are declared exempt, each with its reason. They
are the ports that cannot sit behind an HTTP login page at all: Lightning
p2p (BOLT-8 noise), LND gRPC/REST and CLN gRPC (macaroon / mutual TLS —
Zeus and remote wallets dial these directly), Bitcoin p2p gossip,
electrum wire protocol, Wyoming voice streams, git-over-SSH, and the UDP
discovery protocols (mDNS, SSDP, STUN). Everything else — 39 published
ports — now defaults to gated.
Bitcoin's RPC 8332 is deliberately NOT exempted: it is already
`bind: 127.0.0.1`, so the gate never sees it, and claiming an exemption
it does not need would put a line in the audit list that means nothing.
If the loopback bind is ever dropped, it fails closed.
Two corpus tests keep this honest: every shipped manifest must parse
under the new rules, and the exempt set is pinned at 17 so any change to
the node's unauthenticated surface has to be a deliberate edit.
Tests: 73/73 archipelago-container, workspace builds clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Promotion to Trusted is a privilege escalation — a Trusted peer can read
node state, be deployed to, and is exempt from the `!= Untrusted` gates
federation/DWN/messaging use. It must therefore cost a fresh proof that
the person at the keyboard is the operator, not merely that a session
cookie exists. Same reasoning as node.rotate-identity and TOTP setup,
both of which already re-verify.
Both entry points are covered:
- `federation.invite` gates on the RESOLVED level, not on an explicit
request for Trusted: "Link Your Nodes" sends no `trust_level` at all
and falls through to the Trusted default. The invite is a bearer grant
of Trusted to whoever redeems it, so minting it IS the escalation.
Observer invites are untouched.
- `federation.set-trust` gates only when the peer is not already
Trusted, so the dropdown re-emitting its own value doesn't demand a
password for a no-op.
Demotion is deliberately NOT gated: making something less privileged
must never be harder than leaving it alone, or the safe action becomes
the inconvenient one.
The backend is the sole authority on what counts as an escalation — it
returns a `PASSWORD_REQUIRED:`-prefixed error and the UI prompts and
retries only on that, so the rule lives in exactly one place and the
frontend never pre-judges. TrustPasswordModal.vue (modelled on
RotateDidModal.vue) serves both flows. NodeDetailModal's select snaps
back to the node's real level on change, since a cancelled or failed
promotion would otherwise leave the dropdown displaying a level the node
never accepted.
The operator path stamps TrustSource::Manual; set_trust_level grew an
`Option<TrustSource>` so automatic adjustments (the discovery-handshake
demotion safety net) pass None and leave the recorded provenance alone
rather than laundering an uninvited-join peer into looking approved.
Follow-up, deliberately out of scope: `federation.join` also reaches
Trusted when redeeming someone else's Trusted invite, with no re-auth.
Tests: 44/44 federation, 79/79 rpc-client, vue-tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wave 1 recovery: 13-03 was complete and is merged into the lane; 13-01 and
13-02 had uncommitted executor work rescued into WIP checkpoints and are
being continued in their existing worktrees.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
13-ROUTSTR-FINDINGS.md records the routstr_probe run against all three
docs.routstr.com default relays: zero kind-38421 events and zero
#d=routstr-provider fallback events in a 30s window each, with all
three relay connections succeeding (ruling out a connectivity
failure as the explanation). Every claim is labelled OBSERVED or
DOCS-ONLY per the plan's scope note; RESEARCH assumption A2 is
recorded as neither confirmed nor refuted, risk unchanged.
COVERAGE.md's three former "INTEGRATE — UNCONFIRMED" rows (tool
calling, Cashu payment header, Nostr provider discovery) are
downgraded to explicit opt-outs with dated, evidenced reasons — zero
rows retain unconfirmed-integration status. The Gate section states
13-13 may not proceed directly and must open with a checkpoint:
decision, which 13-13-PLAN.md's Task 1 already is (proceed-observed /
proceed-docs-with-probe-first / defer-with-residual) — no edit to
13-13-PLAN.md was needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
examples/routstr_probe.rs subscribes to the docs-cited default relays
(damus.io, nostr.band, nos.lol) for kind-38421 provider announcements
plus a #d=routstr-provider fallback filter in case the kind number
drifted, then issues at most two unauthenticated GETs against any
discovered endpoint. Spends nothing: no Cashu token is ever built or
sent, no Authorization header, no Nostr event published, ephemeral
subscription key.
Reproduces (does not import) nostr_discovery.rs::build_nostr_client's
Tor-proxy-aware client shape, since this package ships no [lib]
target and an examples/ binary cannot reach binary-crate internals.
Live run against the three default relays (60s total wait budget)
found zero matching events under either filter — recorded honestly
as NO LIVE PROVIDER OBSERVED, exit 0, per the plan's "no provider
found is a first-class outcome" requirement. Full output feeds
13-ROUTSTR-FINDINGS.md in the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan-checker revision iteration 1 — 1 blocker + 2 warnings.
BLOCKER (context_compliance, D-13): the music track blocked phase
completion despite being locked as non-blocking. 13-15 depended on
13-11, which chains back through 13-07 to 13-04, so the phase could
not close without the entire music chain. Took the checker's option
(b): 13-15 depends_on is now ["13-06","13-09","13-14"] — 13-06 added
so the content-grid check stays a real gate, 13-11 dropped so no path
reaches 13-04/13-07/13-11. UAT step 7 is now content-only and blocking;
new step 7b is the music view as record-and-defer, the same shape step
10 already used for Routstr. Verified: 13-15's transitive closure
contains no music plan.
WARNING (scope_reduction): T-13-32 claimed the filebrowser-client.ts
JWT-in-query-string leak was "fixed" while only guaranteeing it was not
propagated. Now actually fixed — streamUrl returns a query-free
same-origin URL and relies on the path=/ cookie login() already sets;
filebrowser-client.ts and a new regression test are in 13-06's
files_modified. T-13-32 is scoped to new code; new T-13-39 owns the
pre-existing leak and names the residual (the JWT is still 24h, now
confined to the cookie jar).
WARNING (verification_derivation): the edge-probe reconciliation did
not match the files. Corrected in 13-VALIDATION.md — 10 probe findings
vs 9 edge entries kept apart, 13-07's 3 truths retagged as authored
rather than probe-surfaced. No truths deleted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
AIUI conversational node control & content surfaces, decomposed tracer-first:
13-01 leads with one end-to-end read-only tool proving the whole spine
(AIUI chat -> postMessage -> authenticated RPC -> Rust agent loop -> real
node data), then expands.
Waves 1-8 across three tracks that stay independent per D-13:
- control/assistant: 13-01, 13-05, 13-08, 13-10, 13-12, 13-13, 13-14
- content: 13-06
- music library: 13-04, 13-07, 13-11 (no control/content plan depends on it)
- security & delivery: 13-02, 13-03, 13-09
- on-device sign-off: 13-15
Notable decisions recorded in the plans:
- Open Q1: delete-and-replace the live unauthenticated port-3142 Claude proxy
with a session-gated Rust forwarder; the OpenRouter open relay is removed.
- Open Q2: /aiui/-scoped CSP connect-src plus a per-session rate limit;
the iframe sandbox attribute is explicitly rejected with reasons.
- Open Q3: a live Routstr spike (13-03) gates the Routstr backend (13-13).
- Open Q4: one "assistant." dispatcher prefix arm, so the existing
session/CSRF/RBAC gate applies unchanged before dispatch.
- Promote (not add-alongside) CallerScope as the primary caller/permission
noun; the mesh-specific controls become one variant's resolution inputs.
- schemars rejected as an unaudited crate; JSON Schema is hand-written.
- AI-SPEC's `cargo test --test assistant_evals` corrected to an in-crate
module: core/archipelago is a binary-only crate with no lib target.
Also adds COVERAGE.md (Routstr capability matrix, every opt-out reasoned).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
v1.7.120-alpha is shipped and verified; do not re-cut it. Two fixes landed
after it: federation trust escalation (c0cfc72a) and the lnd-ui OTA pin +
host networking (5088aef5).
The task file now carries a RESUME HERE block with the groundwork already
located for the next item (the password gate on granting Trusted) — the
exact helper, both entry points with line numbers, and the rule that
demotion stays ungated — so the next session does not repeat the search.
Paused here deliberately rather than starting the app-port auth work at
low context: it is the largest item, the operator asked for umbrelOS and
StartOS research first, and it is the same bug class as the leaks fixed
in v1.7.120 but across every app port and transport.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reported: Framework PT took the OTA and got the new bitcoin-ui but not
lnd-ui. Two causes, both in the update path rather than the app.
1. LND_UI_IMAGE was "lnd-ui:latest" while BITCOIN_UI_IMAGE was pinned to
1.7.119-alpha. Podman does not re-pull a tag it already holds locally,
so a node that ever pulled lnd-ui:latest keeps that copy forever and
every subsequent release silently no-ops. Pinned to 1.7.119-alpha, so
a version change is what triggers the pull — the same mechanism that
made bitcoin-ui update correctly.
2. first-boot-containers.sh declared lnd-ui as bridge with -p 18083:80.
docker/lnd-ui/nginx.conf listens on 18083 DIRECTLY (it must, to proxy
the backend on 127.0.0.1:5678 same-origin), so that maps a host port
onto a container port nothing serves — reproduced on-node as HTTP 000.
This is the THIRD copy of the same declaration: container-specs.sh and
apps/lnd-ui/manifest.yml were both already corrected, this one was
missed, and it is the copy fresh installs use. Now host-networked with
no published ports, matching its siblings and the other two copies.
The underlying hazard is that one container spec lives in three files
that can disagree; recorded as a follow-up rather than refactored here.
Also opens .planning/RELEASE-1.7.121-TASKS.md — every outstanding item
for the next release with its evidence, so nothing in a fast-moving queue
gets lost between sessions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reported: "peers seem to be slipping into trusted status somehow which is
absolutely terrible for security". Two independent fail-open paths, both
granting Trusted with no operator decision anywhere in the loop.
1. federation.peer-joined is UNAUTHENTICATED (middleware's no-session
list — federated peers call it over Tor without cookies) and reachable
on /rpc/v1, which is peer-allowed. It does verify an ed25519 signature,
but against THE PUBKEY THE CALLER SUPPLIED, so it proves the caller
holds its own key and nothing about whether we ever invited it. A join
presenting no invite_token fell through to
None => TrustLevel::Trusted.min(claimed_trust)
and claimed_trust itself defaults to Trusted when the field is absent.
So anything able to reach the node could generate a keypair, omit the
token, and be recorded as Trusted. Now capped at Observer: an invite
WE minted is the only path to Trusted. `min` is kept so a peer's own
lower claim is still honoured — this can only ever reduce trust.
2. merge_transitive_peers added every peer advertised by a Trusted source
as Trusted. That makes trust viral rather than transitive-by-one-hop:
the merged node is itself synced with, its peers merged in turn, so a
single invite anywhere in the graph eventually marked the entire graph
Trusted on every node. Now Observer — which is what this feature's own
spec always said. NodeStateSnapshot.federated_peers is documented as
"adds them as Observers on her side… doesn't auto-promote Observer-via-
Bob to Trusted". The code contradicted the comment directly above it.
Observer is deliberate rather than Untrusted: the merge exists for
routing, and Observer still passes the `!= Untrusted` gates that
federation, DWN and messaging actually check, so a legacy peer degrades
instead of breaking. Per the operator's decision, existing peers are NOT
auto-demoted — silently rewriting live trust relationships across the
fleet would be worse than the bug.
Instead they are made auditable: FederatedNode.trust_source records WHY a
level was granted (invite | uninvited-join | transitive-merge | manual).
It deliberately has no default provenance — None means "recorded before
this existed", which is exactly the population worth reviewing.
The one failing test was asserting the vulnerable behaviour
(merge_transitive_peers_skips_source_and_local_node expected Trusted); it
now asserts the security property and says why, so the escalation cannot
be reintroduced by making a test go green.
Verified: 42/42 federation tests, cargo check --all-targets clean.
Still open, tracked in .planning/RELEASE-1.7.121-TASKS.md: surface
trust_source in the UI, and require the node password to grant Trusted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
