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Author SHA1 Message Date
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5 f9a1ef031c fix(cuprate): front the restricted RPC port with a Tor onion
The restricted-RPC port (18090) was `auth: none`, which the app gate
treats as fully exempt — no onion, no takeover, LAN/Tailscale IP only.
Flip it to `auth: open`: the gate still binds the external addresses
and fronts a Tor onion for the port, just without a dashboard login
challenge, since Monero wallet clients (Feather, monero-wallet-rpc,
GUI) speak plain HTTP JSON-RPC and can't hold a session cookie.

P2P (18183) stays `none` — no reason to Tor-front raw gossip.

Regenerated releases/app-catalog.json (unsigned) to embed the updated
manifest; needs scripts/sign-catalog.sh before it takes effect on any
node, since origin (catalog) wins over disk for catalog-covered apps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NZnsiMtyJxiJBuvv7yLPUF
2026-09-03 14:51:24 +00:00
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5 cf240df4b6 fix(cuprate): enable fast_sync and raise DB cache — sustained 45% CPU
The default manifest baked in the exact broken config found on an
affected fleet node: no fast_sync (defaults false, forcing full ring-sig/
RandomX verification on every block) and target_max_memory capped at
~2.8GiB, which starved cuprated's DB cache into constant eviction/flush
(595GB/24h of block I/O on a node just appending ~2MB blocks every 2
minutes). A reference node with fast_sync = true and an 8GiB cache ran
at 2.8% CPU at the same chain height and block rate.

Set fast_sync = true and target_max_memory = 8GiB to match the healthy
reference config, and raise resources.memory_limit from 4Gi to 10Gi so
the container still has headroom above the larger cache.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RR7jRaicvqsJaqQQ92jpPQ
2026-09-03 08:56:52 +00:00
archipelago d8320896c4 chore: publish release v1.8.10-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m26s
2026-09-01 19:01:54 -04:00
archipelago b87f1f0612 chore: prepare release v1.8.10-alpha 2026-09-01 18:58:33 -04:00
archipelago 1ca002661b fix(lnd): SendPaymentV2 needs an explicit fee budget — absent means ZERO
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m28s
v1.8.9's move to Router.SendPaymentV2 shipped without fee_limit_sat,
and the v2 route treats an ABSENT fee limit as zero allowed fees.
Every real route carries a routing fee (the 2-hop route here: 1.5
sats), so the pathfinder rejected them all and the wallet answered
"No route to the recipient" on EVERY send — all day, on healthy
channels with plenty of liquidity both ways.

The router debug log makes it unambiguous:
  wallet payment (v1.8.9 backend): fee_limit=0 mSAT     -> no route
  same payment by hand (lncli --fee_limit=100): fee_limit=100000 mSAT -> settles in 0.65s

My earlier "pipeline verified" claim was wrong — the manual lncli
verification set a fee limit by hand and masked this exact bug. The
400k that succeeded this morning went through the pre-update backend
on the pre-update LND.

Payments now carry lncli's own default budget — the payment amount
(100%), preferring the payer-supplied amount for zero-value invoices
and the invoice's own amount otherwise, with a nominal floor so the
limit can never be zero. Unit-pinned so it cannot regress.
2026-09-01 18:42:37 -04:00
archipelago 0d0e2e243a feat(lnd): channel-peer watchdog — a dropped peer link heals itself
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m49s
LND normally reconnects channel peers after a restart, but not reliably:
after long or repeated downtime (an app update, a node reboot,
reconciler churn) the peer link can stay down for hours while BOTH
endpoints keep the channel flagged disabled in the routing graph. The
node looks perfectly healthy, the wallet shows balance, and every
payment in either direction fails "no route to the recipient" —
observed live on framework-pt (2026-09-01): its only channel sat
disabled on both policy sides for ~17 hours after the LND 0.21.2
update, while shorty had 583k spendable and the user was told, by a
mis-mapped modal, that they had 'no payment channel'.

The channel graph is desired state — every open channel should have a
live peer connection. A daemon-side watchdog now enforces it:

- every 2 minutes, list channels + peers over LND REST
- for each channel whose remote peer is not connected, look the peer's
  advertised addresses up in the public graph and dial one
- per-peer retries throttled to 10 minutes so an unreachable peer is
  not hammered; 'already connected' counts as done; a peer with no
  advertised address is logged once per pass (cannot be dialed)
- no-ops quietly on nodes without LND (missing macaroon) and while a
  wallet is locked (503 body has no channels)

Unit tests pin the selection against the live REST shapes
(remote_pubkey in /v1/channels vs pub_key in /v1/peers).

v1.8.10 CHANGELOG + What's New entries staged so the next release run
is clean first time.
2026-09-01 17:51:15 -04:00
archipelago 9c49b502e3 docs: post-1.8.9 verification — pipeline confirmed, routing failure root-caused to framework-pt's disabled channel 2026-09-01 16:36:27 -04:00
archipelago d68a013e35 docs: tracker — v1.8.9 published, NPM live-healed on shorty via the signed catalog; funding-gate fix staged for v1.8.10 2026-09-01 11:43:33 -04:00
archipelago 1464b1b24d fix(wallet): the Lightning funding gate states the node's real channel state
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m38s
"LND thinks I do not have a channel" while the wallet showed plenty of
liquidity (framework-pt, 2026-09-01): the send gate sums outbound over
FULLY-OPEN channels only, which is correct — a just-opened channel
sits in LND's pending list until it has ~3 confirmations, and an
open channel can have all its balance on the far side — but the modal
then claimed the node had NO channel at all, in every one of those
states, and pointed the user at opening another one.

The gate already fetched the full channel list; it now records WHY
liquidity is zero and the modal says the truth per state:
- pending channels -> "your new channel is waiting for on-chain
  confirmations, it unlocks automatically, nothing is needed from you"
  (and no "Open a channel" button — that would send the user to fix
  a problem they don't have, possibly opening a second channel)
- open channels, zero on the needed side -> "balance is on the far
  side — you can receive but there's nothing to send right now"
- payment refused with a routing/liquidity error -> says so, instead
  of claiming no channels
- only a genuinely channel-less node keeps the open-one guidance

Eleven unit tests pin the state machine, including the regression
case (pending-only -> 'pending', not 'none') and fail-open on RPC
errors.
2026-09-01 11:40:25 -04:00
archipelago 82001403b4 chore: publish release v1.8.9-alpha 2026-09-01 11:05:55 -04:00
archipelago 81ede159ac chore: prepare release v1.8.9-alpha 2026-09-01 11:02:00 -04:00
archipelago 8e988be853 chore(release): v1.8.9-alpha prep — What's New block + version bumps
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m48s
The release gate requires the freshly-built bundle to embed the new
version, and the version reaches the bundle through the What's New
modal in AccountInfoSection — there was no v1.8.9-alpha block yet, so
create-release.sh correctly refused to ship a bundle that looked stale.
This adds the block (the user-facing summary of today's LND/HTTPS/
launcher/NPM/Portainer fixes) and carries the version bumps the
aborted run had already written (Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock, package.json,
package-lock), so the re-run starts from a clean tree.

Verified: npm run build now produces assets containing 1.8.9-alpha
(Settings chunk), i.e. the exact check the script runs passes.
2026-09-01 10:54:47 -04:00
archipelago 210f7f1b12 chore(catalog): re-sign the catalog — NPM letsencrypt mount + NET_BIND_SERVICE
Regenerated from the fixed apps/nginx-proxy-manager/manifest.yml (the
only semantic change vs the previous signed catalog) and signed with
the release-root key. Catalog-covered nodes pick this up on their next
hourly fetch and the NPM start/die loop ends: s6 gets its /etc/letsencrypt
mount back and the internal nginx can bind 80/443/81 again under
--cap-drop=ALL.
2026-09-01 10:37:09 -04:00
archipelago ed49cc974f docs: tracker updated — fixes landed, tests green, remaining steps are the two mnemonic ceremonies + node updates 2026-09-01 10:31:36 -04:00
archipelago 4849186ab9 docs: incident tracker for the 2026-09-01 https/launcher/LND breakage + v1.8.9 notes
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m57s
Root-cause table, fix inventory, regression-test inventory and the
deploy/live-verification checklist for today's fleet incident — written
as the working record while the fixes land, so the deploy + verify steps
can be checked off against real nodes rather than memory. CHANGELOG
carries the user-facing notes for the release these fixes ship in.
2026-09-01 10:29:10 -04:00
archipelago 3347b8b8b9 fix(ui): https app launches and the nostr bridge follow the frame's real origin
Three launcher/bridge defects combined to make HTTPS dashboards look
broken while HTTP ones worked:

1. portAuth() looked the launch port up under the name the user clicks
   ('mempool-web', 'lnd', 'bitcoin-knots'…), but the signed catalog
   declares those ports under the manifest id that owns them
   (archy-mempool-web, lnd-ui, bitcoin-ui). The lookup missed,
   portIsGateFronted answered false, and an HTTPS dashboard handed app
   frames http:// URLs — blocked as mixed content: mempool and IndeeHub
   'did not connect', bitcoin knots/core opened http:// in a new tab.
   Resolution now follows launch aliases, then a port-wide catalog scan
   that only answers when every declarer of that port agrees (a port
   any app publishes as plain HTTP is never upgraded to https).

2. The signed-catalog cache was only warmed by the Store/Discover
   views, so a user who went straight to My Apps launched apps with an
   empty cache. Warmed at dashboard mount now — fetchAppCatalog()
   already memoizes with a 1h TTL.

3. The NIP-07 bridge compared event.origin for strict equality with the
   recorded (http) app URL and replied to the recorded URL as the
   postMessage targetOrigin — both break the moment a frame is scheme-
   upgraded (cached HSTS did exactly that): every nostr request was
   silently dropped and replies to the stale origin threw. The bridge
   now matches host+port (scheme deliberately ignored) and always
   replies to event.origin — the frame's real origin.

Unit tests cover alias resolution (incl. bitcoin-knots→8334→https),
the conservative port-scan, and scheme-agnostic sender matching.
2026-09-01 10:29:05 -04:00
archipelago e382e679ae fix(apps): NPM needs /etc/letsencrypt mounted and NET_BIND_SERVICE
Converting Nginx Proxy Manager to a platform manifest (fc68c5b6) dropped
two things its image hard-requires, and the result was an endless
start/die loop — shorty-s watched it restart 3,176 times:

1. /etc/letsencrypt mount: NPM's s6 'prepare' service refuses to boot
   without it ('ERROR: /etc/letsencrypt is not mounted!'). Mounted from
   the same persistent app directory as before
   (/var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/letsencrypt), so existing
   certificates are preserved — no data moves, no migration.

2. NET_BIND_SERVICE: NPM's internal nginx listens on 80, 443 AND 81,
   and the orchestrator runs --cap-drop=ALL. The legacy podman-run path
   defaulted to the full capability set (and the legacy repair path in
   package/config.rs always listed it), which is why this only broke
   once the manifest became the source of truth.

The signed catalog embeds manifests with origin-wins semantics, so the
catalog carries the fix for every catalog-covered node — regenerate it
here (plus the generated store/launcher-port artifacts, which also pick
up drift from bf6ef964's retired apps). Catalog re-signing follows the
usual ceremony.
2026-09-01 10:29:05 -04:00
archipelago 77d0768a21 fix(nginx): stop pinning HSTS — actively clear it instead
The HTTPS server block sent Strict-Transport-Security:
max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains. Browsers that visited HTTPS once
cached the policy and then silently upgraded the still-open HTTP
dashboard's fetches and frames to https — a scheme change is
cross-origin, so every /rpc/v1 call died 'No Access-Control-Allow-
Origin header' while the node was perfectly healthy (framework-pt
2026-09-01: the 'Failed to fetch' storm, dashboard 'not responding',
every app frame mixed-content-blocked).

Plain HTTP is a supported access mode BY DESIGN on this platform: the
node's certificate is optional and self-signed (Settings → Node
certificate, /ca.crt flow), and setup-node-ca.sh deliberately keeps
port 80 serving for devices that haven't installed the CA. So:

- port 80 sends no HSTS at all (with the rationale inline)
- port 443 sends max-age=0, which ACTIVELY DELETES the policy already
  cached by affected browsers — leaving it absent would have kept every
  stranded browser broken for a year

tests/lifecycle/bats/nginx-hsts.bats pins all three properties at the
gate: no live policy on :80, max-age=0 (never 31536000) on :443, and
no long-lived pin anywhere in the deployed config.
2026-09-01 10:28:57 -04:00
archipelago f133d5555a feat(apps): surface Portainer's first-run setup token in the credentials interstitial
Portainer >=2.21 no longer lets whoever loads the page first claim the
admin account: on a fresh install it mints a one-time setup token and
prints it ONLY to the server logs. On an appliance that is a dead end —
'check the Portainer server logs' is exactly what a user cannot follow,
and after the 2.45.0 update it made a freshly restarted Portainer look
broken ('disappeared', then demands a token nobody can find).

package.credentials — the same RPC that powers the login-credentials
card on the app page — now extracts the setup_token line from
portainer's recent container logs and hands it over with the existing
copy-button treatment, titled and explained for a first-time user. The
token stops being printed once setup completes, and any container
recreate drops the log line, so the card disappears on its own and no
dead token lingers. Parsing is a pure, unit-tested scan against the
live-captured 2.45.0 log shape (64 hex chars after setup_token=).
2026-09-01 10:28:57 -04:00
archipelago cbd5314dd9 fix(lnd): pay through Router.SendPaymentV2 — LND 0.21 removed the old route
LND 0.21.2 removed the deprecated Lightning.SendPaymentSync REST route
(/v1/channels/transactions). The backend still called it, so every
Lightning send answered literal HTTP 404 and the wallet UI reported
'Payment failed: Not Found' fleet-wide right after the pin bump —
receive worked, which made it look intermittent.

Pay through the supported Router.SendPaymentV2 route (/v2/router/send)
instead, keeping the existing contract with the UI:
- single-record responses (no_inflight_updates) unwrapped from the
  grpc-gateway result envelope, transport errors from the nested error
- a slow multi-hop payment still resolves as pending + payment hash
  (only LND may declare failure), never a false 'Payment failed'
- LND's failure_reason codes translated to the same plain-language
  advice, invoice-expiry still says 'ask for a fresh invoice'

Guard it at the gate: tests/lifecycle/bats/lnd-api-compat.bats POSTs a
deliberately-invalid invoice to /v2/router/send on the RUNNING LND and
fails if the route answers 404 — the image/backend skew that shipped
silently last time because no test ever spoke the payment endpoint.
Also bumps the stale lnd image expectation in remote-lifecycle.sh.
2026-09-01 10:28:49 -04:00
archipelago 9fb2e1ed9e chore(catalog): sign the Cuprate logging fix 2026-09-01 08:47:29 -04:00
archipelago 7125dea05d Merge PR #152: fix Cuprate logging defaults 2026-09-01 08:39:26 -04:00
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5 bcdf2c75be fix(cuprate): file log level should be info, not cuprated's debug default
The previous commit on this branch copied cuprated's raw
--generate-config defaults (stdout=info, file=debug, max_log_files=7)
verbatim. Turns out that's the wrong reference: compared against
ssmithx@archy-dev-pa:/home/ssmithx/cuprate/Cuprated.toml — the actual
dev config this app was built and tested against — file logging is
meant to run at "info" with 14 rotated files, not the binary's raw
"debug"/7. Confirmed live on amishparadise: podman logs (stdout) was
already clean at info, but the on-disk file log
(.local/share/cuprate/logs/<date>) was flooding with per-peer DEBUG
gossip (~400KB in 2 minutes) because it inherited the binary default
instead of the intended one.

Left the resource-tuning knobs in the reference config (8GB
target_max_memory, tokio/rayon thread counts, P2P connection counts,
explicit reader_threads) out of this file — those were sized for
ssmithx's dev box and don't apply here; this manifest's
target_max_memory already stays deliberately under the container's
4Gi memory_limit.

Regenerated releases/app-catalog.json (still unsigned).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ga6N8Jk1YdCTMMX1LjDpAr
2026-09-01 12:27:33 +00:00
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5 e77f60085d fix(cuprate): make Cuprated.toml logging levels explicit
apps/cuprate/manifest.yml only ever wrote network/target_max_memory/
rpc.restricted.enable into Cuprated.toml, so the [tracing.stdout] and
[tracing.file] tables were silently absent — cuprated still applied
its built-in info/debug/7 defaults, but nothing on disk showed it.
Verified live on amishparadise 2026-09-01: the deployed 5-line file
had no [tracing] section at all, and the level was only discoverable
by running `cuprated --generate-config` and diffing.

Add both tables to the manifest's files[].content with the same
values cuprated already defaults to, so every new install ships a
Cuprated.toml an operator can actually read and tune. overwrite:false
means already-deployed nodes (amishparadise included) keep their
existing file untouched — this only changes what fresh installs get.

Regenerated releases/app-catalog.json (unsigned) to embed the updated
manifest; needs scripts/sign-catalog.sh before it's authoritative for
the fleet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ga6N8Jk1YdCTMMX1LjDpAr
2026-09-01 12:19:20 +00:00
archipelago 6c31eb9d4a chore(catalog): sign the LND 0.21.2 sweep 2026-09-01 07:45:39 -04:00
archipelago 63e6c64c63 fix(ci): drop the remaining stray Claude-worktree gitlinks 2026-09-01 05:27:15 -04:00
archipelago 4d8bb1fd44 fix(ci): drop a stray gitlink that broke every demo build
A Claude worktree under aiui/ was committed as a submodule gitlink
(160000) with no .gitmodules entry, so actions/checkout's recursive
submodule pass exited 128 and every 'Build & push demo images' run since
v1.8.6 failed. Removing the index entry — the worktree is local state
and was never meant to be tracked.
2026-09-01 05:27:00 -04:00
archipelago 2b4b60013c feat(lnd): build LND 0.21.2-beta in-house and sweep the pin
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 40s
Upstream publishes no docker images; our v0.18.4 image was built in-house.
This pass: official v0.21.2-beta release binaries (sha256-verified against
the signed release manifest), static, on alpine with the same entrypoint
shape as our existing image, pushed to our registry and smoke-run.
LND 0.21 auto-migrates the channel DB on first start (keeping a backup) —
the Update button is user-initiated, never auto-applied.
2026-09-01 05:14:50 -04:00
archipelago f0ef410948 chore(catalog): sign the swept pins 2026-09-01 04:52:28 -04:00
archipelago 19467e9b7c chore(apps): sweep pin bumps — gitea 1.27.3, vaultwarden 1.37.2, filebrowser 2.63.23, home-assistant 2026.8.3, adguardhome 0.107.79, portainer 2.45.0, pine-whisper 3.6.0
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 39s
First upstream sweep since v1.8.5: the safe patch/minor pins, mirrored
into our registry first (source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/*).
Held for their own careful passes: the majors (grafana 11, nextcloud,
uptime-kuma 2, bitcoin-core 29, the DBs) and consensus-sensitive apps
(fedimint, electrumx 2.0). LND 0.21.2 needs an in-house image build —
upstream publishes none.
2026-09-01 04:50:49 -04:00
archipelago 628ed252b4 chore: publish release v1.8.8-alpha 2026-09-01 04:18:16 -04:00
archipelago bc94445ca0 chore: sign the v1.8.8 app catalog + release manifest 2026-09-01 03:57:23 -04:00
archipelago 04cf0f663a chore: drop the superseded v1.8.8 prep for rebuild 2026-09-01 03:49:16 -04:00
archipelago 576c642da4 fix(apps): ollama resource type + adguardhome port; gate on collisions
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 38s
Ollama's embedded manifest failed the typed parse (memory_limit wants a
string) so the catalog overlay was skipped for it; AdGuard Home's
conventional :3000 collided with Grafana's. The release gate now runs
the host-port collision test (repo_app_manifests_have_no_host_port_collisions)
so this class can never ship untested again.
2026-09-01 03:31:02 -04:00
archipelago 12866db84a chore: sign the v1.8.8 app catalog + release manifest 2026-09-01 03:16:10 -04:00
archipelago a184254706 style: rustfmt the ssh-mesh module 2026-09-01 02:42:39 -04:00
archipelago 192e045426 feat(ui): SSH-over-mesh card, store-listing filter, icon treatment
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 41s
Settings gains the SSH-over-mesh card (danger-zone confirmation for the
any-peer scope, sshd preflights, fipssh copy hint). The signed-catalog
merge filters components via the shared serviceNames module; Discover
grids get the standard icon container; install no longer yanks the user
to My Apps; v1.8.8 release notes.
2026-09-01 02:41:55 -04:00
archipelago 9ac46a69f8 feat(fips): SSH-over-mesh toggle + manifest-driven package metadata
fips/ssh_mesh.rs owns the 90-ssh.nft drop-in lifecycle: off by default,
any-peer scope behind the UI's danger confirmation or an explicit mesh
address list, reconciled on every daemon config install. The scanner now
takes installed apps' icons from their real manifest metadata (Cuprate's
Services tile) and classifies manifest-declared UI apps as launchable
even when the address probe misses (Alby Hub).
2026-09-01 02:41:55 -04:00
archipelago bf6ef9644c chore(apps): retire morphos-server, did-wallet, lightning-stack, cryptpad
Store-listing components are filtered via the shared serviceNames canon;
these four never earn a tile: MorphOS server is old, the Web5 DID wallet
and CryptPad are untested, Lightning Stack is an untracked upstream
bundle (LND covers it).
2026-09-01 02:41:55 -04:00
archipelago c32910809e chore: publish release v1.8.7-alpha 2026-09-01 01:42:12 -04:00
archipelago d2174128c5 chore: sign the v1.8.7 app catalog + release manifest 2026-09-01 01:37:24 -04:00
archipelago 2ad0171e5f fix(ui): drop the now-unused scheme helper
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 36s
2026-08-31 19:08:17 -04:00
archipelago 46cb0bfd37 fix(ui): gate-fronted https launches + signed-catalog App Store
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 36s
directAppUrl(), the legacy open() path, and resolveRuntimeLaunchUrl()
now upgrade to https only for ports the app gate fronts — decided from
the signed catalog's embedded manifest ports (auth gated/open), so
plain-HTTP publishes (legacy installs, auth:none API ports like
Cuprate's RPC) keep http instead of failing outright. fetchAppCatalog()
merges the daemon-verified signed catalog into the App Store listing
(signed entries appear immediately; community copy supplies featured
and curated metadata), and Marketplace.vue uses the same dynamic fetcher
as Discover so the grid sees signed-new apps too.
2026-08-31 18:41:00 -04:00
archipelago b8593c9090 docs(release): v1.8.7 notes — https app launches + platform round
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 34s
2026-08-31 18:40:51 -04:00
archipelago fc68c5b680 feat(apps): complete the manifest platform — convert the last five stragglers
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 36s
Nginx Proxy Manager, Tailscale, Ollama, CryptPad, and AdGuard Home now
carry full manifests: the app gate fronts their web ports (TLS on the
same port, node login where appropriate), installs run through the
orchestrator, and pins live in the signed catalog. Tailscale mirrors its
legacy shape exactly (userspace networking, web console on 8240, plain
HTTP for the gate to front). Ollama stays loopback-only — the
assistant's local model backend, not a web app.

Retires the four already-removed apps for good (FIPS, Nostr VPN,
Routstr, Penpot pins dropped from image-versions.sh, the generator map,
and image_versions.rs), fixes Cuprate's duplicated metadata block that
strict YAML parsers reject, and updates the port-inventory review gates
for the new open (3 own-login consoles) and exempt (2 DNS) ports.
2026-08-31 18:40:39 -04:00
archipelago 3ed75c328d style: rustfmt the signed-catalog serving 2026-08-31 17:09:16 -04:00
archipelago 687196ad3b chore: prepare release v1.8.7-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 37s
2026-08-31 17:08:37 -04:00
archipelago e2bd6330a1 test(app-catalog): pin the signed-catalog body gate 2026-08-31 17:08:37 -04:00
archipelago 7c0a492c43 fix(ui): launch apps on the page's scheme over HTTPS
New-tab apps and the companion WebView got hardcoded http:// URLs, so a
node reached over HTTPS opened Vaultwarden, BTCPay, Grafana et al in
cleartext. Every app port is gate-owned and serves TLS on the same port
(appgate/tls.rs), so directAppUrl(), the legacy open() path, and
resolveRuntimeLaunchUrl() now follow the page's scheme. HTTP pages (the
kiosk, LAN) are unchanged; netbird keeps its unconditional https.
2026-08-31 17:08:26 -04:00
archipelago 3089624969 Merge remote-tracking branch 'gitea-vps2/main' 2026-08-31 16:15:17 -04:00
archipelago 5b658cec67 feat(app-catalog): serve the signed catalog from the node first 2026-08-31 16:15:13 -04:00
archipelago 21b8d4b1ee catalog: add Cuprate (0.1.0-preview) 2026-08-31 16:10:38 -04:00
lfg2025 6f05f5583f Merge pull request 'docs: session record — companion 0.5.28 shipped + deployment playbook' (#151) from companion/session-2026-08-31 into main 2026-08-31 20:03:03 +00:00
Dorian 02ac4396d1 docs: session record — companion 0.5.28 shipped + the deployment playbook
Full state at session end (all public surfaces verified byte-identical
at 0.5.28/vc48; only node web-bundle redeploys outstanding), the feature
map, and the operational playbook next sessions need: Tor SOCKS proxy
for Gitea API/curl (the 'unreachable API' was a missing proxy flag),
token scopes, protected-main ship flow via -ship branch + PR + API merge,
stale local main lineage, the foundation server's two surfaces, demo CI
auto-redeploy, build/test commands, and the open items.
2026-08-31 21:02:59 +01:00
archipelago 5ffdcc9936 docs(release): explain the v1.8.7 correction
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 39s
2026-08-31 15:46:18 -04:00
archipelago 9cf07e1eac fix(release): enforce the v1.8 What's New floor
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 39s
2026-08-31 15:44:48 -04:00
archipelago e7854702c0 chore: publish release v1.8.6-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 36s
2026-08-31 15:40:23 -04:00
archipelago d4018a6e73 chore: prepare release v1.8.6-alpha 2026-08-31 15:34:51 -04:00
archipelago b57cba63d1 Merge remote-tracking branch 'gitea-vps2/main'
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 36s
2026-08-31 15:12:59 -04:00
archipelago 7bc9f69b1f fix(settings): start What's New history at v1.8.0 2026-08-31 15:12:18 -04:00
lfg2025 913743923c Merge pull request 'docs: deploy handoff — companion 0.5.28 to the live surfaces' (#150) from companion/0.5.28-deploy-handoff into main 2026-08-31 19:01:58 +00:00
Dorian 241e8cfca4 docs: handoff — deploy companion 0.5.28 (vc48) to the live surfaces
For the archi-dev-box agent: companion 0.5.28 is on main (PR #149) and
Gitea raw serves it (verified byte-identical, v1+v2+v3). Remaining: the
foundation server's static /packages mirror (the real-node QR download
URL — currently 0.5.27), node web-bundle redeploys (same as the
2026-07-23 flow), and confirming the demo stack flipped after CI's
webhook redeploy. Exact commands, expected shasum, and final verify
block included.
2026-08-31 20:01:44 +01:00
archipelago 017505c431 fix(release): include every curated changelog item 2026-08-31 14:52:47 -04:00
archipelago 7a39d8fbd1 fix(settings): sort What's New history newest-first
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 36s
2026-08-31 14:50:55 -04:00
archipelago e3275353b9 fix(release): publish assets before exposing manifest 2026-08-31 14:45:29 -04:00
lfg2025 9f1a289d1a Merge pull request 'Companion 0.5.28 — backup & restore, NIP-46 remote signer, companion-gated install pitch' (#149) from companion/0.5.28-ship into main
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 41s
2026-08-31 18:38:43 +00:00
Dorian dd07da53f9 chore(android): update companion apk download 2026-08-31 19:34:57 +01:00
Dorian 7d09418a09 Companion 0.5.28 — backup & restore (#128), NIP-46 remote signer (#139), companion-gated install pitch (#61 residual)
The companion-agent queue from the 2026-08-30 handoff, complete:

- Backup & Restore: hub sub-page, SAF export/import sealed in the
  node's ADR-005 envelope (Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305, byte-compatible
  with core backup.rs), merge-only restore, no cloud.
- Remote Signer: the phone is the NIP-46 bunker — nsec generate/import,
  nostrconnect:// QR pairing (scanner + OS deep link), per-request
  approve/deny card, NIP-44 v2 transport with NIP-04 receive fallback,
  wire-faithful to rust-nostr's reference bunker. Crypto pinned to the
  official NIP-44 + BIP-340 vectors; e2e harness included.
- #61 residual: banner + manual intro trigger + overlay all gate on
  isCompanionApp() (web-side, vitest-covered).
- Hub modal: new sub-pages like Nodes/FIPS, 70% height cap, node ULA
  display/copy in the Nodes list, fipssh Termux helper (npub→ULA is a
  pure public-key function — verified against the fips crate).

Issues #61 (comment), #128, #139 closed on the tracker.
2026-08-31 19:34:05 +01:00
archipelago eef35d65b7 chore: release v1.8.5-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 37s
2026-08-31 14:27:00 -04:00
archipelago 3b3500a7dd test(image): gate installer crash-capture payload 2026-08-31 12:38:59 -04:00
archipelago 2f0f7fd388 fix(host): repair malformed legacy kdump defaults 2026-08-31 11:16:34 -04:00
archipelago b300a720db fix(host): query package allowlist without literal quotes 2026-08-31 10:44:15 -04:00
archipelago 5b6d278c46 fix(host): preserve shell variables in privileged fixups 2026-08-31 10:24:06 -04:00
Dorian b927461f8e feat(companion): fipssh — ssh to a mesh node by npub (Termux helper)
Verified against the fips crate source: the mesh ULA is a pure function
of the PUBLIC key — fd || sha256(x-only pubkey)[0..15] — so the npub is
the durable address and needs no resolver. Android/tools/fipssh wraps
ssh for Termux: 'fipssh user@npub1…' derives the ULA (pure-python
bech32 + sha256, checksum-validated, typo protection) and execs ssh
over the companion's split tunnel; --resolve prints the ULA alone.

The derivation is pinned by a new Rust test
(npub_derives_the_same_mesh_ula_as_the_fips_identity, 3 seeds against
fips::Identity) and the helper's output was verified byte-identical
against a live fips identity pair. SSH-over-mesh handover updated with
an addendum: node docs/UI can advertise npub-based addressing, no
node-side DNS needed for this case.
2026-08-31 15:00:42 +01:00
archipelago 699669a5f7 fix(host): retain captured kdump vmcores 2026-08-31 09:57:09 -04:00
Dorian 8cf45377a2 docs: handoff — SSH over the FIPS mesh (node-side toggle) for the node agent
Today's field test: Termux over the companion's split tunnel reaches the
node's fips0 ULA and gets RST — the mesh path works end to end, port 22
is refused by the node (fips0 default-deny, no 22 in the fips.d drop-ins;
sshd IPv6 listening unverified). The interim manual unblock (a
source-restricted 90-ssh.nft drop-in) is documented, but the real ask is
a first-class 'SSH over mesh' settings toggle in the node UI, with the
drop-in lifecycle owned by the daemon, a source-scope decision (paired
phones vs any mesh peer), sshd preflights, and an acceptance checklist.
Companion side is done (device-wide split tunnel + the node ULA now
displayed/copyable in the hub Nodes page) — the node agent is downstream.
2026-08-31 14:54:28 +01:00
Dorian 4efac99e97 feat(companion): show + copy the node's mesh ULA in the hub Nodes list
FIPS nodes carry their fips0 ULA in the saved entry, but it was never
displayed — the only way to learn it was the node itself. Each FIPS
node row in the Nodes page now shows its mesh address as a monospace
subtitle with a tap-to-copy affordance, which is exactly the address
other apps on the phone (Termux ssh over the split tunnel, for
example) need. Non-FIPS entries are unchanged.
2026-08-31 14:48:53 +01:00
Dorian 981296e8b0 fix(companion): backup + signer live inside the hub modal, not standalone screens
Field feedback on 0.5.28: the standalone Backup/Signer screens were hard
to read over the synthwave background, back left the app instead of the
menu, and they broke the hub's one-container interaction model. Both are
now hub sub-pages exactly like Nodes/FIPS:

- BackupSection / SignerSection (ui/components) render inside the NESMenu
  panel with the menu's own dark glass surface, scrim, and palette — the
  readability and theming problem disappears with the standalone surface.
- The header back arrow returns to the hub card page (same as Nodes).
- The panel height cap drops from 92% to 70% of the screen — ~15%
  breathing margin top and bottom; content scrolls inside.
- The pairing QR scanner is hosted by NESMenu OUTSIDE the panel
  (QrGlassModal is a full-screen Box, not a Dialog — inside the panel's
  scroll it would clip), and decoded nostrconnect:// URIs funnel into the
  signer section through the same latch as the deep link.
- The nostrconnect:// deep link now routes to the session and pops the
  hub open on the signer sub-page (SignerLaunch singleton) instead of a
  dedicated route; standalone screens and routes removed.
- BunkerManager.refreshState is now a proper suspend fun (was
  runBlocking on the caller's dispatcher).

Docs updated to the new locations. Rebuilt for on-device testing
(v0.5.28-debug/vc48, same signing cert).
2026-08-31 14:23:04 +01:00
archipelago 54431fc856 fix(host): enforce the full kdump crash reservation 2026-08-31 09:16:18 -04:00
Dorian 22f8129b52 feat(companion): backup & restore + NIP-46 remote signer — 0.5.28 (#128, #139)
Companion 0.5.28 (versionCode 48), the companion-agent queue items:

#128 Backup & Restore — the phone side of losing your phone or wiping it
to cross a border. Hub card → SAF export/import of an encrypted .json:
everything the app holds (servers+passwords, FIPS identity/peers, signer
key) sealed in the node's ADR-005 envelope (Argon2id + ChaCha20-Poly1305,
native backup.rs — same blob layout as the node's, node-shaped envelopes
decrypt too). Restore is merge-only: servers upsert npub-first, identity
and signer key adopt only when absent, peers union by npub. No cloud, no
telemetry — the file goes wherever the user saves it.

#139 Remote Signer — the phone IS the NIP-46 bunker. Generate/import a
nostr key, scan a nostrconnect:// QR (in-app scanner or deep link), and
approve/deny each sign_event request from a legible card (kind label,
content, tags, time) — nothing signs without a human. Wire-faithful to
rust-nostr's reference bunker (connect-carrying-secret handshake, NIP-44
v2 transport with NIP-04 receive fallback, kind-24133 responses);
get_public_key/describe/ping handled, everything else 'not authorized'.
Session state in BunkerManager, UI in SignerScreen, hub card wired.

Plus NativeCore (JNI object for the new native surface), FipsPreferences
peers-merge for restore, nostrconnect:// intent filter, and the release
docs (companion-backup-restore.md, companion-nip46-remote-signer.md).

Also Android/tools/nip46-test-client.py: a pure-Python NIP-46 client that
plays the node's login role (QR, handshake, get_public_key, sign_event)
and verifies the phone's signature with an independent BIP-340 — the
end-to-end test for the feature until node-side lands. Its crypto matches
the official NIP-44 + BIP-340 vectors byte-for-byte, the same vectors the
Rust core passes, so the two interop by construction.

Built + smoke: assembleDebug v0.5.28/vc48, same signing cert as the
served 0.5.27 (d622e07e…644d) so it updates in place.
2026-08-31 13:53:52 +01:00
Dorian 57e31eb192 feat(companion): backup envelope + NIP-46 signer crypto in the native core
Extends archy-fips-core with the two companion-release features' crypto
(#128, #139), same JNI-over-JSON contract as the mesh surface:

backup.rs — the ADR-005 encrypted-backup envelope, byte-compatible with
the node's backup code (Argon2id default params + ChaCha20-Poly1305,
blob = base64(salt||nonce||ct)); decrypt ignores extra envelope fields
so node backups read here too. Round-trip, tamper, wrong-passphrase and
cross-shape tests included.

nostr.rs — the phone-side remote-signer crypto: nsec/npub bech32 keys,
BIP340 schnorr event signing (NIP-01 id serialization), NIP-44 v2
payloads (HKDF-SHA256 + ChaCha20 + HMAC-SHA256, both padding prefixes),
NIP-04 fallback, nostrconnect:// parsing with repeated relay params.
Verified against the official NIP-44 vectors (conversation keys, message
keys, padded lengths, byte-exact encrypt vectors), the BIP-340 reference
sign vectors, and round-trip/tamper/failure tests. secp256k1 0.29 note:
Keypair::public_key() is the 33-byte compressed key — x-only pubkeys
must go through .x_only_public_key().0 (one real bug the vectors caught).

JNI glue adds com.archipelago.app.NativeCore: backupEncrypt/Decrypt,
nostrGenerateSecret/SecretFromAny/ParseConnectUri/SignEvent and the
NIP-44/NIP-04 cipher pairs. Android arm64 build verified via cargo-ndk
(7.2 MB .so, +0.4 MB for both modules). Host: cargo test 23/23, clippy clean.
2026-08-31 13:29:36 +01:00
Dorian 12c853da45 docs(companion): verify the zxing-cpp integration sketch online
The QR-decoder option doc was written on an offline machine with the
Maven coordinates and wrapper API flagged as from-memory. Verified
against Maven Central + the wrapper source: artifact is
io.github.zxing-cpp:android:3.1.1 (current release), Format.QR_CODE is
nested inside BarcodeReader (not a top-level BarcodeFormat), options are
a constructor-argument data class, and read(ImageProxy) handles the
Y-plane/cropRect/rotation itself. Sketch updated accordingly; the option
itself stays NOT-actioned pending the move-to-the-code decision trigger.
2026-08-31 13:06:45 +01:00
archipelago 3409db569e docs(release): complete the v1.7.44→current release-notes audit
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 37s
The RELEASE_NOTES_BACKLOG gate for cutting the next release, closed out:

- Eight sections backfilled to the curated standard, from the Settings
  What's New blocks, the old-lineage release commits, and the hotfix
  diffs: v1.7.44 (was four raw commit-hash lines), v1.7.47/48/64/65
  (thin), and v1.7.50/51/107 (real tagged releases whose sections were
  missing entirely — v1.7.107 restored verbatim from the curated copy
  at 35e9c624 that later went missing).
- Mechanical inventory across all 92 sections in range: every section
  now has ≥3 curated bullets, zero raw-hash entries.
- What's New modal regenerated for the three restored versions
  (sync-whats-new --check passes, 92 versions present).
- Manifest-notes-only confirmed by construction: the manifest reads its
  changelog from CHANGELOG.md and check-release-manifest.sh rejects raw
  or thin entries before publishing.

Evidence trail for the backfills is recorded in
docs/RELEASE_NOTES_BACKLOG.md.
2026-08-31 08:05:42 -04:00
Dorian d259f3cbb9 fix(web): companion-gate the store banner + manual intro trigger (#61 residual)
Only the auto-popup was companion-gated — inside the companion WebView
users still saw the 'install the companion' banner in the App Store and
could pop the intro overlay through it. Gates all three paths on
isCompanionApp(): CompanionBanner self-hides, openCompanionIntro() is a
no-op, and the manual-open watcher in CompanionIntroOverlay refuses to
open (the overlay's raw window check also moves to the canonical helper
so there is exactly one detection). No APK change.
2026-08-31 12:56:32 +01:00
archipelago cb71c25ea0 chore(catalog): carry the Cuprate store entry into the frontend public catalog
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 39s
generate-app-catalog.py only updates entries that already exist in each
catalog file, so the hand-curated cuprate entry (added to
app-catalog/catalog.json with 7b88ba59) never propagated to
neode-ui/public/catalog.json — the sync's field-bumps did, the new entry
did not. Both catalogs now carry identical 31-entry lists (verified
content-equal), so the browser-side store copy and the curated one agree.
2026-08-31 07:48:31 -04:00
archipelago c5eeb31055 fix(ui): wifi setup on a fresh install — reveal toggle + a no-network callout (#145)
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 39s
Two reports from a fresh install without a cable:

(a) No way to see the WiFi password being typed. Every password field in
    the app was a bare type=password input. PasswordRevealInput is the
    reusable fix — masked by default, one-tap eye toggle, v-model and
    enter pass-through — first applied to the WiFi prompt in ServerModals
    so a long key typed from across the room can be verified.

(b) WiFi settings are undiscoverable with no wired internet. New
    OnboardingNetworkCallout floats over every onboarding step when the
    node has NO physical link at all (no ethernet up, no WiFi associated
    — polled from network.list-interfaces, self-dismissing the moment a
    link exists) and deep-links 'Connect to WiFi' to
    /dashboard/server?open=wifi, which Server.vue consumes by popping the
    WiFi picker on arrival. Deliberately scoped the other way too:
    Archipelago is offline-first, so 'no internet' never nags — only 'no
    link at all', only during onboarding (the wrapper hosts /login too;
    the callout is restricted to /onboarding/* routes), and a failed probe
    stays silent. The query is consumed via history.replaceState so a
    KeepAlive tab-return never re-pops the modal, and Server.vue keeps
    reading it from the real URL rather than vue-router — its
    KeepAlive-mounted tests have no router context to give.

Verification: full frontend suite 1023/1023; type-check clean; production
build clean with both new strings confirmed in the emitted bundles
(OnboardingWrapper + Server chunks).
2026-08-31 07:47:47 -04:00
archipelago 966db4810a docs: companion-agent handoff — work queue for #61-residual, #128, #139
Hands the companion-owned work to the companion agent with precise
pointers (Android/ source, served APK at 0.5.27/vc47 + the deploy
pipeline from the 2026-07-23 handoff, the ArchipelagoNative bridge and
isCompanionApp gating pattern) and the queue: the ungated
CompanionBanner/intro-trigger residual of #61 (Discover.vue:156,
useCompanionIntro's openCompanionIntro), GrapheneOS backup/restore (#128,
reusing the node's ADR-005 backup envelope), and the NIP-46 remote-signer
phone side (#139, with the signer-login research doc as background).

Tracker labels applied earlier: #128 and #139 carry 'companion-agent'.
2026-08-31 07:32:41 -04:00
archipelago 51a5473e22 docs(release): v1.8.5-alpha changelog section + What's New sync
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 42s
Curated release notes for the pending v1.8.5-alpha: Cuprate (with the
two review catches), kdump/rasdaemon + the host-fixup OTA channel, the
uninstall-abort fix, federation inline-picture routing, honest disk
usage, the three lying-screens fixes (#143/#127/#129), durable mesh
notifications + router recovery (#57/#103), and upstream-release tracking
with the first-sweep safe bumps.

What's New modal synced via scripts/sync-whats-new.py (--check passes;
89 versions, all present). Per docs/RELEASE_NOTES_BACKLOG.md the
v1.7.44-alpha -> current section audit remains the open item before the
tag.
2026-08-31 07:23:53 -04:00
archipelago 1872fc20ee feat(image): bake kdump + rasdaemon into fresh installs (#144)
The ISO's Dockerfile.rootfs gains kdump-tools/kexec-tools/rasdaemon with
USE_KDUMP=1, dumps to /var/crash and a compressed core collector, the
hang/panic sysctl drop-in, and rasdaemon + kdump-tools enabled — and the
installed target's GRUB cmdline gains crashkernel=256M next to the
existing quiet/splash line.

Source of truth note: the edit lands in
image-recipe/_archived/build-auto-installer-iso.sh — the builder that
generates the (git-ignored) image-recipe/build/auto-installer/ workspace,
which a cache-hit can reuse. The workspace copy was updated to match so
even a cached build ships the same state. Host fixups (previous commit)
converge already-deployed nodes to exactly this end state, so fresh and
old installs agree.

bash -n clean on the builder.
2026-08-31 07:23:53 -04:00
archipelago cbd463e980 feat(host): crash/hardware-error capture, delivered by a new host-fixup OTA channel (#144)
kdump + rasdaemon on every node, per docs/kdump-rasdaemon-design.md with
the approved decisions: hang capture ON (a wedged kiosk dumps and reboots
itself instead of sitting dead), crashkernel=256M, backfill ships with
this release, phase-2 UI surfacing deferred.

Host fixups (docs/system-level-ota-design.md) are the general answer to
'deliver system-level updates OTA': curated OS packages, sysctl drop-ins,
service enablement and the GRUB crashkernel line, carried by the signed
binary and applied idempotently at startup — non-fatal by construction
(offline/locked-dpkg nodes converge on a later boot), skipped on dev
boxes and non-Debian hosts. This formalizes the polkit/audio repair
precedents into a channel with a stated policy: pinned packages and
parameter intent only, never dist-upgrade automation; the ISO bakes the
identical end state into fresh installs (next commit).

The one runtime limitation is honest: crashkernel memory can only be
reserved at boot, so the fixup writes GRUB, runs update-grub, and logs
that it takes effect on the next reboot.

tests/lifecycle/os-audit.sh gains section D — a graded baseline check:
FAIL if capture never landed, WARN if written but awaiting reboot, PASS
when reserved, policy live and rasdaemon recording. Section D runs
independently of RPC health: a wedged backend must not mask that the
node also stopped capturing evidence.

Verification: host_fixups unit tests 4/4; cargo fmt clean; full suite
runs in the release gate (create-release) and the archi-dev-box
lifecycle gate before the tag.
2026-08-31 07:23:44 -04:00
archipelago 9df580bf2b docs: peering trust terminology — names for the four concepts (#134)
Gives stable names to what issue #134 showed gets conflated: Trusted peer
(invite-verified, operator decision), Discovered peer (learned from a
Trusted peer's advertisement, hard-capped at Observer — TRUST IS NOT
TRANSITIVE), Routing hint (what a Discovered peer actually contributes:
reachability, not trust), and Peer advertisement (the mechanism itself,
a feature not a leak).

Records the two rules that make the model sound (trust requires a
traceable operator decision; discovery is transitive, trust is not), why
advertisement exists (one invite makes a node reachable to the trusted
set without granting anything), and the deferred open questions: the
'don't advertise my peers' privacy toggle and UI tier vocabulary.
2026-08-31 07:23:44 -04:00
archipelago aee7ecaac1 docs: index the kdump/rasdaemon design 2026-08-31 06:11:15 -04:00
archipelago e51ceaa250 docs: draft kdump + rasdaemon troubleshooting design (#144)
Design for capturing post-mortem and hardware-error evidence on fleet
nodes: kdump (crashkernel=256M, dump to /var/crash on the unencrypted
root — never the LUKS data partition, so the crash kernel never handles
key material; makedumpfile-compressed, keep-2 retention) and rasdaemon
(EDAC/ECC events into sqlite on the same root).

Deliberately phased: phase 1 = capture on the image + bootstrap backfill
for existing nodes (kernel cmdline can't travel by OTA; takes effect on
next reboot); phase 2 = a read-only system.diagnostics surface in the
UI, only after a fleet node has produced a real dump.

Four decisions flagged in the doc: hang-capture on/off (recommended ON
— a wedged kiosk is useless anyway, and this turns every freeze into
evidence + self-reboot), crashkernel size, backfill timing, and phase-2
scope. Implementation touchpoints listed (Dockerfile.rootfs,
auto-install.sh:1810 cmdline, kdump-tools config, bootstrap, lifecycle
gate assertions).
2026-08-31 06:10:55 -04:00
archipelago 7c9559aa57 chore(catalog): sign the catalog — Cuprate ships, safe pin bumps land
Signed by the release root (ceremony verify passed locally before push).
Contents of this catalog over the previous one:

  NEW   cuprate           0.1.0-preview-18-g618ff14 — alternative Monero
                        node (Rust); image verified present in the mirror
                        registry; manifest embedded; store entry curated
                        (money / optional)
  BUMP  strfry            1.1.1 -> 1.1.2
  BUMP  btcpay-server     2.4.2 -> 2.4.3
  BUMP  netbird (nginx)   1.31.3-alpine -> 1.31.4-alpine
  BUMP  pine   (nginx)    1.31.3-alpine -> 1.31.4-alpine

All bump targets verified pullable from their public registries before
editing. The three mirror-backed bumps (vaultwarden 1.37.2-alpine,
archy-nbxplorer 2.6.11, home-assistant 2026.8.3) remain parked on
app-bumps-mirror-pending until a live registry-push token exists for the
lfg2025 namespace.

Drift gate clean: check-app-catalog-drift.py --release --strict
(31 store entries, 0 drift, 0 missing). 69 catalog entries total.

Nodes pick this up on their next hourly catalog refresh (or at startup)
— signature verified against the release-root key before application.
2026-08-31 05:56:00 -04:00
archipelago 7b88ba59b2 chore(apps): bump the pins that need no mirroring; curate Cuprate's store entry
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 40s
Pin bumps (all verified pullable from their public registries before
editing, so none can become an image-not-found on a node):

  strfry           1.1.1 -> 1.1.2              (dockurr/strfry, direct pull)
  btcpay-server    2.4.2 -> 2.4.3             (docker.io/btcpayserver, direct pull)
  netbird (nginx)  1.31.3-alpine -> 1.31.4-alpine
  pine   (nginx)   1.31.3-alpine -> 1.31.4-alpine

image-versions.sh moved in lockstep for BTCPAY_IMAGE — it is the baseline
the update badge compares against. Held back deliberately, per the risk
policy from the Aug-17 pass: gitea (four minors of DB migrations),
portainer (six minors), filebrowser (2.27 -> 2.63), fedimint/gateway
(0.8 -> 0.12, real migrations), lnd (money-critical), netbird-server/
netbird-dashboard (0.x, must move in lockstep), and everything with a
major jump or a data migration.

Cuprate also gets its curated store entry (category money, tier optional,
icon, repo) — same shape as the Alby Hub / phoenixd entries — synced
through generate-app-catalog.py into both store catalogs and the
app-session config. The fips launch-port list is unchanged (Cuprate has
no UI port; the generated file round-trips to the committed bytes after
cargo fmt).

Three further bumps are prepared and parked on the
app-bumps-mirror-pending branch, blocked only on a registry-push token:
vaultwarden 1.37.2-alpine, archy-nbxplorer 2.6.11, home-assistant
2026.8.3 — all mirror-backed, and the push credential on record for the
lfg2025 namespace is dead.

Drift gate: check-app-catalog-drift.py --release --strict clean
(31 store entries, 0 drift, 0 missing). appSessionConfig tests 7/7.
2026-08-30 16:22:26 -04:00
archipelago b12d1d3826 feat(apps): track the last untracked apps' upstreams
Five apps had no app.upstream block, so nothing could ever tell us
when their pins fell behind upstream:

  barkd           gitlab ark-bitcoin/bark   (GitLab-only project)
  immich-postgres ghcr  immich-app/postgres (image exists only on ghcr.io)
  indeedhub-minio github minio/minio
  pine-whisper    dockerhub rhasspy/wyoming-whisper
  lightning-stack manual — no public listing exists for
                   lightninglabs/lightning-stack anywhere (docker.io,
                   ghcr.io, github.com all checked), so it is tracked by hand

This adds two fetchers to scripts/check-upstream-releases.py to reach the
first two: latest_gitlab (GitLab releases API; strips the project-name
tag prefix, e.g. bark-0.6.2 -> 0.6.2) and latest_ghcr (anonymous pull
token + tags/list, the same handshake a docker pull performs).

Live-verified after the change:
  barkd            0.3.0 -> 0.6.2   (bump gated on ark_client.rs REST compat)
  immich-postgres  14-vectorchord0.4.3-pgvectors0.2.0 -> 17-vectorchord0.4.3-pgvector0.8.0
  indeedhub-minio  RELEASE.2024-11-07T00-52-20Z -> latest (date-opaque: UNCOMPARABLE, shown for hand comparison)
  pine-whisper     3.4.1 -> 3.6.0   (tuned-args revision needs re-basing, not just a pin move)

Offline coverage check: 59 apps, 0 untracked.
2026-08-30 16:22:11 -04:00
archipelago 698e915df2 Merge PR #141: package Cuprate, an alternative Monero node
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 37s
2026-08-30 14:18:42 -04:00
ssmithxandarchipelago a179df66d8 docs: add app update strategy, SSH access, and app wishlist to TODO
Flags the app update policy already noted as unresolved in
app-developer-guide.md, adds a section for SSH access strategy, and
starts an app wishlist (Cashu wallet, phoenixd) for packaging.
2026-08-30 14:01:20 -04:00
ssmithxandarchipelago 771ff0d28b docs: add TODO.md backlog and link from docs index
Captures unscoped forward-looking items (peering/federation model,
distributed git & OTA, nostr integration, platform/OS, app testing,
observability, and the dev/build process) so they're tracked outside
of ROADMAP.md's curated public summary.
2026-08-30 14:01:20 -04:00
92111385b7 fix(mesh): don't offer radio-only resource transfer to radio-unreachable peers
The federation fallback in the plain content-inline path wasn't enough —
mesh.transport-advice recommended the "resource-mesh" tier purely from our
own device being Reticulum-capable, without checking that THIS peer
actually has a radio route. For a federation-only contact (no radio twin)
that steered the frontend into send-content-inline's Reticulum
resource-transfer path, which has no dest_prefix to send to and fails with
"Peer is federation-only (no radio twin)" — reproduced after deploying the
first fix on a live node.

Adds MeshService::has_radio_route(contact_id), and gates both the
"resource-mesh" tier in mesh.transport-advice and the resource-transfer
branch in mesh.send-content-inline on it. Federation-only peers now fall
through to the has_tor branches, which route the frontend to
mesh.send-content (already correctly federation-aware) instead.

Landed from PR #133 (re-committed to drop private host details from the
original message; content identical).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 13:18:08 -04:00
a9e52fa310 fix(mesh): route send-content-inline over federation for radio-less peers
mesh.send-content-inline always called send_typed_wire (the LoRa/radio
path), which fails with "Peer is federation-only (no radio twin)" for
any contact reachable only via Tor federation — reproduced sending a
picture from the companion app to a federation-only peer. mesh.send-content
already resolves the peer's federation onion and falls back to
send_typed_wire_via_federation; mirror that same lookup here.

Landed from PR #133 (re-committed to drop private host details from the
original message; content identical).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 13:18:08 -04:00
archipelago b4714f1773 fix(store): defer multi-version app version choice (#129)
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 39s
2026-08-30 10:23:58 -04:00
archipelago d79ca54019 fix(wallet): disclose backup passphrase only when needed (#127) 2026-08-30 10:23:58 -04:00
archipelago 758332d63d fix(openwrt): make stale router config recoverable (#103) 2026-08-30 10:23:58 -04:00
archipelago ee5123af68 test(ui): satisfy strict build indexing
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 41s
2026-08-30 10:18:02 -04:00
archipelago a624d11b6a fix(mesh): make radio message notifications durable (#57) 2026-08-30 10:16:33 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 2c984fbd49 fix(ui): the IBD-finished toast no longer tells a node without LND to fund its wallet
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 52s
When Bitcoin's IBD completed mid-Lightning-goal, the watcher toasted
"you can now fund your wallet" — but the on-chain wallet lives in LND,
not Bitcoin Core. The watcher only checked that the goal had pending
manual steps, never that the install-LND step had completed, so a user
whose LND wasn't installed yet was pointed at a flow that could not
work: the fund modal's address comes from lnd.newaddress and does not
exist until LND is installed (issue #143).

The toast now checks LND's install state at fire time. With LND
installed the message is unchanged; without it, the toast says the
actual next step — install Lightning (LND) — and the Finish setup
button lands on the goal wizard, whose active step is the pending
install-LND one (the wizard itself was already correctly sequenced).

The watcher had no tests; added four pinning its contract: the two
message branches, silence with no in-progress goal, and silence when
the chain was already synced at page load.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-30 09:24:01 -04:00
archipelago c188d9de78 fix(lifecycle): abort unsafe declarative uninstall 2026-08-23 07:59:40 -04:00
archipelago 37a82fd2f9 fix(cuprate): avoid Penpot RPC port collision 2026-08-23 01:43:09 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 a9a30406df fix(disk): count reserved blocks as used, not free
Disk usage was computed as used/size, where size is the raw device size.
ext4 reserves 5% of the filesystem for root — 92.4 GiB of this node's
1.8 TiB — which size includes but nothing can allocate. Two consequences,
both live on archi-dev-box today:

The dashboard advertised 251 GiB free when only 159 GiB could actually be
written, and reported 86.2% usage against df's 90.8%.

Worse, disk_monitor triggers automatic cleanup (podman image prune) at
90%. The disk has been genuinely above that threshold while this returned
86.2%, so the cleanup never once fired — which is exactly how ~72 GB of
dangling images accumulated unnoticed, and why deleting apps appeared to
free nothing.

Both call sites now ask df for avail and use used/(used+avail): the same
figure df itself prints, and the space an operator can actually spend.
Callers deriving free as total - used now get avail.

Note this shifts disk_total_bytes in the analytics series down by the
reserve; historical samples are not comparable across this change.

Tests updated for the three-column output, plus a regression test built
from this box's real numbers asserting the corrected math crosses the 90%
threshold the old math missed. 15/15 disk_monitor tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 05:01:18 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 f1b5d2d267 fix(cuprate): stop publishing the unauthenticated unrestricted RPC
The manifest bound cuprated's unrestricted RPC (full node control) to
0.0.0.0 inside the container with
i_know_what_im_doing_allow_public_unrestricted_rpc = true, relying on
ports[].bind: 127.0.0.1 to keep it private. That only restricts the HOST
side. Verified live on archi-dev-box 2026-08-22: a peer container got a
valid unauthenticated get_info off container port 18081 — and still did
after cuprate was moved to its own network, because podman bridges route
to each other unless created with --opt isolate=true, which the
orchestrator's auto-create does not pass. Every app on the node could
therefore drive full node control with no credential.

The PR justified this as the pattern bitcoin-knots already uses, but
knots writes rpcuser/rpcpassword from generated secrets, so a 0.0.0.0
bind there still is not control without credentials. cuprated has no RPC
authentication at all, so the two are not equivalent.

Unrestricted RPC is now left at cuprated's own default — container
loopback only, published nowhere, reachable by nothing — which is what
upstream intends by refusing a non-local bind without an explicit
override. Restricted RPC (the safe-for-public subset wallets use) and p2p
are unchanged, and health_check moves to 18089 since 18184 is gone.

Re-verified after the change: peer container gets connection refused on
18081 (exit 7), restricted RPC and the health endpoint still answer, the
node still syncs, validator APPROVED, 76/76 container tests pass
including the unauthenticated-port canary (still 28 — an auth: local
port was removed, not an auth: none one).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 03:10:53 -04:00
ssmithxandClaude Sonnet 5 d6b48ce095 feat(apps): package Cuprate, an alternative Monero node
Full-node daemon: P2P + Monero's own restricted RPC (the safe-for-public
subset wallets use as a "remote node") are auth:none like bitcoin/electrumx's
equivalents; unrestricted RPC (full node control) stays gated auth:local.
readonly_root works cleanly since the upstream image is FROM scratch with
ownership fixed at build time — no runtime chown/setuid needed, unlike
bitcoin-knots/core.

Verified locally end-to-end before committing: built the upstream Dockerfile,
confirmed the generated Cuprated.toml against `cuprated --generate-config`/
`--dry-run`, and ran the real image with the manifest's exact ports/volumes —
including discovering that cuprated's own 127.0.0.1-default RPC bind is
unreachable through a published host port and needs to bind 0.0.0.0
internally with ports[].bind:127.0.0.1 doing the actual restriction, the
same pattern bitcoin-knots' RPC port already uses in this repo.

Bumps the unauthenticated_ports_are_all_accounted_for canary (26 -> 28) for
cuprate's two auth:none ports, per that test's own review-before-updating
contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 13:58:06 +00:00
archipelago 9c5164372e chore: release v1.8.4-alpha 2026-08-20 07:15:01 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 e38b148d8e fix(release): spell out how the mnemonic prompt actually submits
The signer reads stdin to EOF, so pressing Enter submits nothing and a
second paste simply appends to the first. Step [6b/8] said only "paste the
release master mnemonic when prompted", which gives no hint that Ctrl-D is
what ends the input — a 24-word phrase arrived today as "invalid word
count: 89", about four pastes concatenated by someone reasonably assuming
Enter had not worked.

sign-manifest.sh already explains this properly; create-release.sh now says
the same thing, including that pasting twice is itself a failure mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 06:27:42 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 e03a2fed89 fix(release): surface frontend build failures instead of hiding them
`npm run build 2>&1 | tail -3` threw away npm's exit status, so a failed
build was indistinguishable from a good one. The run continued and blamed
the next check instead — "the frontend build no-opped or its output is
stale" — which points at a stale dist rather than at the build error that
actually happened, and cost a diagnosis cycle today.

Success still prints the same quiet 3 lines; a failure now prints the real
error, keeps the full log, and aborts on the spot.

Verified both branches with a stubbed npm.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 05:24:37 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 3d7de3e902 fix(release): a dateless changelog header silently skipped the release
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 38s
create-release aborted at [4/8] with "web/dist/neode-ui does not contain
v1.8.4-alpha — the frontend build no-opped or its output is stale". The
build had not no-opped: it was fresh, and simply had no 1.8.4 string to
embed.

sync-whats-new.py only matches '## vX.Y.Z (YYYY-MM-DD)'. The entry read
'## v1.8.4-alpha (draft — date set at cut)', so the version was invisible
to it: the gate's whats-new-sync stage reported "87 versions, all present"
while the release being cut had no What's New block. That modal is the
only place a version string appears in the frontend, so the bundle carried
none and the freshness check — correctly — refused it, while naming the
wrong cause. Step [5/8] only greps for '^## v1.8.4-alpha (' so it passed
the draft too.

Three changes: date the v1.8.4-alpha entry, insert the modal block it was
owed, and make the sync tool refuse any version header without a real date
instead of skipping it. Skipping is what let a wrong "all present" through.

Verified: the draft header now fails the check with an explicit message,
the dated one passes (88 versions, up from 87), and a rebuilt bundle
contains 1.8.4-alpha where it did not before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 03:01:39 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 60c1db98bb fix(ui-tests): raise the vitest timeout so a busy box cannot fail the gate
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 40s
Four unrelated tests failed the release gate at once today — every one of
them "Test timed out in 5000ms", none an assertion. Wall times were 6.3s,
16.5s, 5.5s and 36.2s for tests that normally finish in milliseconds
(useModalKeyboard's takes 349ms on an idle box), and the whole suite took
405s against its usual ~70s. The cause was CPU starvation from a
concurrent cargo build, not anything in the code.

The 5s default says nothing about these tests and everything about the
machine: this box also runs a live node, so a gate run can always collide
with a build or container churn. 20s survives that while still bounding a
genuine hang.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 02:06:14 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 f5b112c508 fix(gate): stop reporting a compile timeout as a test failure
cargo-test-weekly failed twice today with exit 124 at unit 427/429 — the
non-incremental test-profile build running out of wall clock mid-compile,
before a single test executed. The summary said only "FAIL: cargo-test-
weekly", which reads as a broken test and sends you hunting for one that
does not exist.

Two changes: the ceiling goes 1500s -> 3600s (580s was already found too
short; 1500s now dies on the biggest link on a loaded, swapping box), and
stage() names exit 124 as a timeout rather than printing a bare code.

Verified both reporting branches: a timed-out stage and an ordinary
non-zero exit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 01:50:52 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 5ccef0ac2f feat(release): attach the installer ISO to the Gitea release automatically
Publishing the ISO was a manual step printed as a reminder at the end of
build-iso-release.sh: upload the ISO, its .sha256 and the signed checksum
JSON by hand. Only the OTA binary and frontend tarball were automated.

publish-release-assets.sh now uploads all three when an ISO for the
version exists in image-recipe/results/, with the same supply-chain rules
the OTA manifest already gets: the checksum JSON must be signed by the
pinned release root, the signature must cryptographically verify, and the
image must still match its own .sha256 (a truncated or half-copied ISO is
exactly what a signed checksum exists to expose). After upload it
confirms every asset landed at its exact local size.

The stage runs AFTER main is pushed, deliberately. The ISO is not
referenced by releases/manifest.json, so no node's OTA path depends on
it — running it last means a slow or failed multi-GB upload can never
delay or strand an OTA release that has already been verified. When no
ISO exists yet (the usual case, since the ISO build needs the tag this
script pushes) it explains how to build and attach one, and exits clean.

Uploads take a max-time argument: 4h and a progress bar for the ISO,
where the previous fixed 15-minute silent ceiling would have killed a
multi-GB transfer partway through.

Verified with a stubbed harness: no-ISO skip, missing .sha256, unsigned
checksum, wrong signing key, corrupted image, happy path, and a truncated
upload caught by the size check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 01:33:54 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 e79ab37da7 chore(release): bump version to 1.8.4-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 40s
Left uncommitted by an aborted create-release run on 2026-08-19: the
version bump landed in the tree but the release never reached its tag or
manifest. Committing it so the tree is clean before the release is re-cut.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 01:04:04 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 d75963de10 fix(gate): show which UI test failed instead of swallowing it
The ui-unit-tests stage piped vitest through `tail -4`, which cut off the
failure block. A red gate reported "1 failed | 999 passed" and nothing
else — no file, no test name, no assertion — so the failure could not be
diagnosed after the run.

Success still prints the quiet 4-line summary; failure now dumps the full
log and keeps it on disk so a scrolled-off terminal isn't the end of it.

Verified both paths: green run unchanged, and a deliberately failing spec
now surfaces its file, test name, assertion and line number.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 14:33:09 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 c788dff42d style: apply cargo fmt so the release gate can run
The release gate's first real stage is `cargo fmt --check`, and it had
44 diffs across 15 files — enough to abort `create-release.sh` at step 0
before it touched a version number. Some of that drift is mine from the
last two days, some predates it in files I never opened
(bootstrap.rs, ghost_reaper.rs, openwrt/router.rs), and one is the
regenerated fips/app_ports.rs.

No behaviour change — rustfmt only.

Gate now: 8 of 9 green. The remaining red is cargo-test-weekly exiting
124, which is the 25-minute `timeout` expiring during a cold
CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 rebuild on a loaded node — the tests never started.
Not a test failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 12:38:41 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 bd299318c0 chore(catalog): re-sign the catalog with the new pins, and fix a stale firewall list
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 41s
Regenerates both catalogs from the manifests so the 15 pin bumps become
real. The catalog overrides on-disk manifests on every node, so until
now those bumps were edited but inert.

There are two catalogs and regenerating one is not enough:
generate-app-catalog.sh writes releases/app-catalog.json (the signed one
nodes fetch), while generate-app-catalog.py writes app-catalog/catalog.json
and neode-ui/public/catalog.json (the source pair, the second baked into
the frontend app store). check-app-catalog-drift.py --release --strict
reads the *source* catalog, so regenerating only the release one left it
failing and would have aborted the ISO gate at stage 1 — after the
signing and tagging were already done. Drift is now 0.

The regeneration also rewrote fips/app_ports.rs, which had not been
regenerated since the initial open-source import. Diffing the port values
rather than the reformat: 36 -> 37, a single addition, **8187 — Alby
Hub**. Its port has never been in the FIPS firewall allow-list, and by
the same token neither has any app onboarded since that import. Nothing
else changed.

Catalog signed by the pinned release root and verified with
`ceremony verify`; registry trust floor checked before signing, both
hosts trusted by the deployed fleet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 12:02:40 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 8bc161f40f fix(ecash): repair two mangled warning messages
Both import refusals reached the operator with runs of ~18 spaces mid
sentence — "Importing a different one                  means coins
minted…". The string literals had been written as single long lines with
the line-continuation whitespace baked in rather than escaped, so Rust
preserved it verbatim.

Only visible once the sanitizer stopped swallowing these messages, which
is its own small lesson: the text had been wrong since it was written and
nothing could show it.

Cosmetic, but not trivially so — this is the warning that stops someone
replacing the phrase their balance was minted under, and text that looks
broken is text people stop reading.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 11:31:52 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 c19c411b91 chore(apps): mirror and bump the upgrades that carry no data migration
With registry push access, the 24 mirror-backed apps stopped being
blocked. Ten images are now mirrored (single-platform amd64, matching
the existing convention) and their pins moved:

  alby-hub          v1.23.0       -> v1.24.0
  mempool-frontend  v3.0.1        -> v3.3.1     (mempool, archy-mempool-web)
  mempool-backend   v3.0.0        -> v3.3.1
  fedimintd         v0.10.0       -> v0.10.1
  gatewayd          v0.10.0       -> v0.10.1
  nostr-rs-relay    0.9.0         -> 0.10.0
  portainer         2.39.1        -> 2.39.6
  vaultwarden       1.30.0-alpine -> 1.37.1-alpine
  jellyfin          10.8.13       -> 10.11.11
  home-assistant    2026.7.3      -> 2026.8.2

Every one verified pullable from our mirror after copying, so none can
become an image-not-found on a node. image-versions.sh moved in lockstep
— it is the baseline the update badge compares against when the catalog
does not cover an app, and leaving it behind would have kept advertising
an update that had already been applied.

Chosen by risk, not by count: these are patch/minor bumps with no data
migration. The ones held back are held for a reason each — Postgres
15->18 and 16->18 refuse to start on an older cluster, Redis 7->8,
Valkey 7->9, Nextcloud 29->32 must go one major at a time, plus
uptime-kuma 1->2, grafana 10->13, electrumx 1->2, photoprism, and
core-lightning's three years of schema migrations. Those are each a
migration plan, not a pin edit. LND (v0.18.4 -> v0.21.2) is held
separately: it is only a minor bump by version but it migrates its
channel database irreversibly, and this box holds real funds.

Note the checker still reports several of these as behind, and that is
correct: it reads the *catalog* pin, which is what nodes actually act on.
These land when the catalog is regenerated and re-signed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 11:22:42 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 7d6e52537a chore(apps): bump the pins that can move without mirroring
Of the 33 apps behind upstream, these five pull straight from a public
registry, so their targets exist already and the bump is real work rather
than a promise:

  strfry          1.0.4        -> 1.1.1
  netbird (nginx) 1.27-alpine  -> 1.31.3-alpine
  pine    (nginx) 1.27-alpine  -> 1.31.3-alpine
  pine-piper      2.2.2        -> 2.4.2
  nostr-rs-relay  0.8.9        -> 0.10.0

All five targets verified present upstream with skopeo before editing, so
none of these can turn into an image-not-found on a node.

Deliberately NOT bumped here, though they are also direct-pull:
core-lightning (v23.08 -> v26.06, ~3 years of schema migrations), gitea
(four minors of DB migrations), and netbird-server/netbird-dashboard —
which have to move in lockstep and carry their own migrations. Those are
each a piece of work, not a line edit.

The other 24 are blocked on something else entirely: their images live in
our mirror and none of the upgrade targets have been mirrored yet, so a
pin bump alone would break every install. That needs registry push
credentials.

These take effect when the catalog is regenerated and re-signed — the
catalog overrides on-disk manifests, so editing here changes nothing on a
node until the signing ceremony.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 10:54:05 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 86923f05a5 fix(ecash): stop the sanitizer eating the import safety rails
Live-checking the import route on the node showed both of its refusals
arriving as "Operation failed. Check server logs for details."

That is not merely opaque here, it is unsafe. The two messages are the
feature's safety rails: "That is not a valid BIP-39 recovery phrase —
check for typos" is the only help someone gets when a pasted phrase has
a bad word, and "This wallet already has a backup phrase… reveal and
write down the current phrase first, then confirm to replace it" is the
warning that stops an operator orphaning the words their balance was
minted under. Masked, the first is unactionable and the second is
invisible — the confirmation checkbox would be the only clue that
anything was at stake.

Same for "no backup phrase yet, nothing to restore from" and the NUT-09
message naming a mint that cannot restore at all.

Caught only because the refusal paths were exercised against the live
node rather than trusted from the unit tests, which see the real message
and never meet the sanitizer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 10:43:47 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 ee40880ce5 feat(ecash): import a backup phrase from another NUT-13 wallet
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m2s
Bring-your-own, the open question the migration plan left. Point this
wallet at a phrase you already hold — Minibits, Nutstash, cdk-cli — and
its coins become restorable here, which is the other half of "these
words are portable".

Replacing an established phrase is the one genuinely lossy thing this
module can do, so it is treated that way. The coins already held stay
spendable: they are proofs, not derivations, and nothing here touches
`ecash.json`. But they were minted under the *old* phrase, so a restore
will no longer find them. Hence an explicit confirm, a prompt to reveal
and write down the current phrase first, and — most importantly — the
replaced phrase is archived beside the wallet, never overwritten. It may
be the last copy of the words a balance was minted under, and quietly
destroying that is precisely what this module exists to prevent.

Re-importing the phrase already in use is a no-op rather than a
replacement, so it archives nothing.

Counters are deliberately left alone. They are per-keyset and
seed-relative, so under a new seed they merely start high, which costs
nothing because a restore scans from zero regardless. Resetting them
would be the dangerous choice on the day someone imports the phrase they
were already using.

`imported` is its own provenance rather than reusing `independent`: both
mean the node's recovery phrase does not cover the wallet, but only one
of them means the operator already knows where else the words live.

15 NUT-13 tests green, 1000 frontend tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 10:09:19 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 c1a79fdd69 fix(apps): never recommend a release candidate, and flag major jumps
Two things the first run of this script got wrong, both found by reading
its own output rather than by a test.

It recommended MariaDB `13.0.1-ubi10-rc` — a release candidate — because
ordering strips the suffix, so an RC outranks every stable tag
numerically. Pre-releases are now excluded, with one exception that
matters here: a project whose stable line *is* suffixed. LND ships
`-beta` and always has, so a blanket exclusion would report it as
permanently current. The rule is therefore "no pre-release unless the pin
we are on is itself one", which keeps LND honest and MariaDB stable.

And "33 behind" is not an actionable list, because the entries are not
the same kind of work. A patch bump is a pin change; a major bump is
where the data migrations live — Postgres refuses to start on an older
cluster, Nextcloud requires one major at a time. Each row now says which
it is, and the summary names the majors separately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 09:55:18 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 59440ef1ac fix(wallet): a seen receipt stays seen across refreshes
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m6s
fc98c1d8 replaced the five-minute timer with "stays until seen", but
kept "seen" in component state — so every page load forgot it and the
entire ecash history came back as new. That is worse than the timer it
replaced: the old behaviour at least let receipts go, this one resurrected
them on every refresh. Reported from the node, and correctly.

Acknowledgement now lives in localStorage, capped at 300 keys.

That opens the opposite trap: on a browser with nothing stored, treating
the whole history as unseen is the same wall of old receipts from the
other direction. So a first run seeds everything older than five minutes
as already seen — the window survives as a first-run heuristic, not as
an expiry. Unreadable storage takes the same path, because reading a
corrupt value as "nothing acknowledged" is the refresh bug wearing a hat.

Also guards the balance readout against NaN. `sats == null` does not
catch it, and arithmetic over a missing field produces it, so it would
have rendered as the literal text "NaN sats" — worse than the zero the
component exists to prevent, since a zero at least looks like a number.

Frontend: 1000 tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 09:30:57 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 603291008b fix(test): restore the ecash network before bouncing the service
The restore proof's cleanup set the network back *after* restarting
archipelago, so the call landed on a socket that wasn't listening yet
and failed silently. A fully green run left the node parked on testnet —
the one outcome a cleanup path must never produce, and worse for being
invisible.

Network first, while the RPC is still up; then the wallet file, then the
restart, then wait for the service back so a check running straight
afterwards doesn't meet a dead socket.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 09:15:31 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 212e349b19 refine(wallet): the balance readout scans as one column, not a barcode
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m7s
Seeing it on the node settled the shape. Two rows of per-cell delays
read as a dense flicker — closer to a progress bar than a display, and
short enough against the row's text to look like an underline.

Three rows laid out column-first fixes both: the three cells of a column
now share a delay, so the lit column travels across as a single scan
line, and at 11px the matrix sits with the text rather than under it.

Verified in a real browser against the live node with the balance RPCs
held open: five placeholders, five distinct rail colours (white, orange,
yellow, purple, blue), 42 cells each, all animating, each announcing
what it is waiting for — and no "0 sats" anywhere on screen while the
calls were in flight. They gave way to real figures on arrival, with
Lightning's genuine 0 correctly shown as a figure rather than left
shimmering.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 09:05:33 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 fa6fe32ef9 feat(wallet): a balance that isn't loaded yet says so, in pixels
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m18s
An unloaded balance rendered as `0`. Zero is not a loading state — it is
a number, and it is the one number that frightens people. Someone
opening the dashboard while the RPCs were still in flight was told, in
the wallet's own typeface, that their money was gone.

There is no formatting fix for that. The fix is to stop claiming a
figure we do not have, so `null` now means "not known yet" and `0` means
"none", and the two are kept apart end to end: the refs start at null,
a rail becomes a number only when its call actually succeeds, and a
snapshot key that was never written stays unknown instead of becoming a
zero.

In place of the figure, a small dot-matrix scans in the rail's own
colour. It inherits currentColor, so on-chain shimmers orange, Lightning
yellow, Cashu purple, Fedimint blue and Ark teal with no colour table to
keep in sync — and it is sized to the figure it stands in for, so
nothing jumps when the real number lands. It carries role="status" and
names what it is waiting for; a shimmering box with no text is nothing
at all to a screen reader.

Two consequences worth stating. The total is withheld until every rail
that makes it up is known — summing nulls as zero would show a total
*lower* than the rails beneath it, which is worse than showing nothing
because it looks authoritative. And the Ark row stays hidden while its
balance is unknown, since "unknown" must not be read as "> 0" on the
many nodes with no Ark sidecar.

The LND app UI had the same bug in a different shape: its tiles start as
an em-dash, but renderBalances() runs on every poll including before the
first response, and `num(null && …)` is 0 — so the dashes were painted
over with "0 sats" almost immediately. Same treatment, in plain CSS.

Also fixes a stale assertion in AppHeroSection's suite, which has been
red since 9ccc325a changed "Restarting..." to a real ellipsis; and two
test proofs that used a plausible-looking hex string for `C`. The V3
codec never parses that field so it went unnoticed, but the V4 encoder
hands it to the reference implementation, which checks the point is
actually on secp256k1. Real curve points now.

Frontend: 996 tests green. Backend: 1436 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 08:54:12 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 fc98c1d8dd fix(wallet): an incoming payment no longer disappears before you look
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m10s
Chasing the "selecting incoming clears a pending token, and there's a
timeout if you don't click" report led here. Instant rails — Lightning,
Cashu, Fedimint, Ark — settle immediately, so there is no confirmation
to wait for and no natural moment for a receipt to leave the Incoming
badge. It was leaving on a five-minute wall clock instead.

So a payment could arrive, raise the badge, and evaporate before anyone
looked; and opening the panel a few minutes late showed nothing, because
the payment you came to check on had already aged out. Worse, once the
count hit zero the badge silently changed meaning — the same click that
opened the panel now navigated to the transactions view instead.

For ecash that is the worst case available. It leaves no public ledger
entry, so this panel was the only place the receipt was ever shown; once
it timed out there was nowhere left to look.

Instant-rail receipts now stay until they have actually been seen, which
is the same unread model the mesh inbox uses. Closing the panel is what
marks them seen, not opening it — marking on open would make a row
vanish under the cursor of someone still reading it. On-chain is
untouched: a confirmation count is a real signal and already does this
job.

Also keys the list on a derived id. Instant rails have no txid, so
`:key="tx.tx_hash"` was `""` for every one of them.

This is my reading of the reported symptoms rather than a confirmed
repro — the operator should check it matches what they saw.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 08:30:16 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 e30516316b fix(ecash): give every node a backup phrase, and prove restore works
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m11s
Running the route suite on this box surfaced that the backup was
unreachable here: `identity/master_seed.enc` is written during
onboarding, and any node onboarded before that step existed simply does
not have one. Reveal bailed with "this node has no encrypted seed
backup", and restore followed it down.

But the choice on such a node was never "derived phrase or independent
phrase" — it was "independent phrase or no backup at all", and a wallet
whose coins can be restored from words the operator holds beats one
whose coins die with a single file. So it now generates one, recorded as
`independent`, and every surface that shows it says plainly that
restoring the node will not bring the ecash back — only these words
will. `derivable_from_node_seed` lets the card say which kind you are
about to get *before* you write anything down.

Also: a mint that never implemented NUT-09 answered restore with a bare
404, which surfaced as "mint returned 404 with no further detail" —
true, and useless to someone trying to get their coins back. It now
names the limitation.

The route suite was reading `result.amount_sats` from mint-claim, which
answers with `minted_sats`. A working claim had been reporting as a
failure; that was one of the two reds carried over from yesterday.

The real gap, though, was that "recovered 0 sats" passes on a wallet
with nothing to find — exactly the shape of a backup that looks fine
until the day you need it. test-ecash-restore.sh does the test that
settles it: mint, **delete the wallet file**, restore, check the coins
came back. On this box: 87 sats before the wipe, 0 after, 61 recovered
from the phrase alone — every coin minted since the phrase existed, and
none of the 26 sats minted before it, which used random secrets and
never could come back. Testnet only, and it refuses to run otherwise.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 08:27:01 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 cbbd20e22e test(ecash): cover cashuB emission, the backup phrase, and restore
Four things the suite could not previously catch:

- The emitted token is cashuA. It is still valid, so nothing fails — the
  send succeeds and the receiver redeems it. The only symptom of cashuB
  encoding falling back is a warning in the journal nobody reads, which
  is exactly the kind of silent regression a route check exists for.
- The wallet has no backup phrase. Without one the coins live in exactly
  one file and nothing can bring them back.
- The phrase changes between reveals, which would orphan every coin
  minted under the previous one.
- Restore double-counts. It runs against a live wallet, so running it
  twice must leave the balance where it was.

Reveal is also asserted to refuse a wrong password: it is the one route
here that hands out key material, and a session alone must not be enough.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 08:06:27 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 eb48eab946 feat(apps): find out when an app has fallen behind upstream
Nodes offer an update when the signed catalog pins something newer than
what's running, and that machinery is fine. The missing step was the one
before it: nothing told *us* when upstream shipped. A pin could sit at
fedimintd v0.10.0 for months while every node in the fleet correctly and
confidently reported "up to date".

The reason nothing could tell us is that a manifest records only our
mirror — `source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/fedimintd:v0.10.0`
says nothing about the project it was mirrored from. So this adds an
optional `app.upstream` block naming the real source, and a script that
asks each one what it has released.

Running it answers the question that prompted this. Of 58 apps, 28 are
behind, including LND v0.18.4-beta against v0.21.2-beta, Bitcoin Core
28.4 against 31.1, and fedimintd/gatewayd v0.10.0 against v0.10.1.

Two choices worth stating. An app with no `upstream` block is reported
as UNTRACKED rather than skipped — a silent skip is how this stayed
invisible, and before this commit all 58 were silently skipped. And a
suggestion prefers our own tag variant: telling someone pinned to
`postgres:16.13-alpine` that the newest tag is `18.6-trixie` is true and
useless, because swapping the base image is a different decision from
bumping a version.

Five apps are deliberately left untracked (barkd, immich-postgres,
indeedhub-minio, lightning-stack, pine-whisper): I could not establish
their upstream with confidence, and a wrong `repo` produces a confident
wrong verdict, which is worse than an honest gap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 08:04:33 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 59fffc809f feat(ecash): the wallet can now be restored from a phrase (NUT-13)
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m15s
Until now every Cashu proof this node held was backed by a secret drawn
from OsRng and written to exactly one file. Losing wallet/ecash.json
lost the coins outright — no phrase to write down, and nothing the mint
could do about it. Ecash is a bearer instrument, so "one file, no
backup" was the sharpest edge in the wallet.

NUT-13 derives each proof's secret and blinding factor from (seed,
keyset id, counter) instead. The wallet becomes a phrase, and the coins
can be re-derived and re-claimed — here or in any other NUT-13 wallet.

The phrase is its own 24 words, derived from the node master seed over a
fixed HKDF path. Both halves matter: it is still covered by the node's
recovery phrase, so there is nothing extra to write down; but it is
portable, so restoring ecash into Minibits or cdk-cli does not mean
handing over the key to the entire node.

It sits on disk unencrypted, deliberately. The master seed needs the
operator's password to open, which no background mint or swap can ask
for; and this file lives beside wallet/ecash.json, which already holds
spendable bearer secrets in plaintext. It regenerates exactly those
secrets, so it is the same sensitivity class as the file next to it.
0600, like identity/nostr_secret, which is derived and persisted the
same way.

Counters are reserved *before* the mint call and never rolled back. A
gap costs a restore scan a few extra probes; a reused counter costs a
coin, because two proofs with the same secret can only be spent once.

Restore is the half that cannot be done offline: a re-derived secret is
not money until the mint's signature over it exists. /v1/restore returns
those signatures; unblinding reconstitutes the proofs. It is additive
and idempotent — coins already held are skipped by secret, spent ones
are counted but not added — so it is safe to press on a working wallet,
which is when someone is most likely to reach for it.

Existing nodes activate on the first visit to Settings → Ecash backup
phrase: that password prompt is the only moment the master seed can
legitimately be opened. New nodes get it at onboarding. Until then the
behaviour is exactly as before — valid proofs, no backup — and the card
says so rather than implying a backup already exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 07:56:34 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5 579287ba48 feat(ecash): emit cashuB tokens, and share one payment success screen
Most wallets — Minibits, Nutstash, cdk-cli — default to reading cashuB
(V4) now, so that is what we send. cashuA stays as the fallback rather
than the default: it is still valid everywhere, so a token this wallet
cannot express in V4 (a multi-mint one) is worth sending in V3 rather
than failing the send outright. That path warns, because by the time
`send_token_at` serializes, the proofs are already marked spent.

The V4 encoder is the reference implementation's, not ours. The envelope
puts the keyset id and signature on the wire as raw CBOR bytes under
single-letter keys, and a token subtly wrong there is money the receiver
cannot redeem — so upstream owns the encoding, the way it already owns
keyset-id resolution. Our own hand-written decoder reads what upstream
writes in the new test, which is agreement between two independent
implementations rather than a round trip through one codec.

Two refusals are deliberate and tested: a multi-mint token has no V4
form, and a truncated v2 keyset id must never be baked into a token we
emit (the framework-pt case) — it is only resolvable against the mint's
keyset list.

Also folds SendBitcoinModal onto the shared PaymentSuccessPane it had a
private copy of, so on-chain, Lightning and ecash all show the same
screen and the copyable-identifier row is defined once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 07:56:15 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 f4a1c47429 feat(wallet): ecash gets the real payment success screen, with copyable proof
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m37s
Redeeming ecash reported success as one line of small green text, while an
on-chain or Lightning payment got the full moment — amount, verb, and the
identifiers you can copy. That asymmetry matters most for ecash: it leaves
no public ledger entry, so if the payment is ever questioned there is
nothing to look up afterwards. Whatever isn't copyable at that instant is
simply gone.

The success pane is extracted from SendBitcoinModal into a shared
PaymentSuccessPane so Cashu and Fedimint show the *same* screen rather
than a lookalike, and the copyable-row treatment is defined once. Each
caller passes the identifiers its protocol actually has; ecash receive now
shows the issuing mint (newly returned by wallet.ecash-receive) and the
redeemed token itself, clamped so a long token doesn't flood the pane.

Also: the test-ecash switch is a proper toggle (role="switch", keyboard
focusable) rather than a checkbox — it selects which purse the wallet is
looking at, so it should read as a mode you are in.

SendBitcoinModal still carries its own copy of the markup; consolidating it
onto the shared component is a follow-up, deliberately not done in the same
change as the money-path wiring.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 07:08:15 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 ffec7d3114 fix(ecash): pay the mint's input fee, and stop a damaged wallet from being erased
Two independent fixes, both found while exercising the routes headlessly.

**Mint fees (NUT-02).** A mint may charge a per-input fee and rejects any
swap whose outputs don't equal inputs minus that fee — `11005 Transaction
inputs should equal outputs less fee`, which is what sending hit against
testnut.cashu.space. We ignored the fee entirely, so the wallet could not
spend at ANY fee-charging mint; Minibits charges zero, which is why
production never saw it. `MintKeyset`/`KeysetInfo` now carry
`input_fee_ppk`, `swap_fee_for` computes the NUT-02 sum (rounded up), and
`MintClient::swap` reduces its outputs to cover it — applied there rather
than at each call site so send, receive and cross-mint swaps are all
covered at once. Inputs from a keyset the mint doesn't list contribute no
fee: the mint is the authority, and guessing high would burn the sender's
coins.

**Damaged-wallet erasure.** `load_wallet` used `unwrap_or_default()`, so a
truncated `ecash.json` read as an EMPTY wallet — and because the next
operation saves the wallet back, that empty state was then written over the
only copy of the proofs. A corrupt file became permanent loss. Now a file
that exists but doesn't parse fails with a message naming the file and
stating the coins are still in it, and the bytes are left untouched for
recovery; an empty file is still treated as a fresh wallet, since a create
that never got its first write is not damage. The accepted-mints list gets
the same treatment, where corruption would have silently reset the operator
to trusting only the default mint.

Writes are now atomic (temp + fsync + rename) for both files. The previous
plain write truncated the real file first, which is exactly how a wallet
ends up unparseable after a crash or power cut.

Tests cover: a damaged file errors and survives on disk, an empty file is
fresh, saving leaves no temp behind and round-trips, and — guarding the
on-disk contract against exactly this update — a verbatim pre-update wallet
file still loads with its balance, proofs and history intact.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 07:01:45 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 26638aa621 fix(ecash): sign with the mint's SAT keyset, not whichever came first
`get_active_sat_keyset` picked the first keyset with a non-empty key map,
and `MintKeyset` had no `unit` field to filter on — so on a multi-unit mint
the wallet signed sat-denominated mint/swap requests against a usd or eur
keyset. The mint refuses that with `11013 Unit unsupported`, which is
exactly what claiming minted coins hit against testnut.cashu.space (it
serves usd, eur, msat and sat keysets). Minibits is sat-only, so this
latent bug never surfaced in production — the test-mint switch found it on
its first run.

MintKeyset now carries `unit` and `active`, both defaulted so a sat-only
mint that omits them still parses, and selection filters to sat and prefers
an active keyset.

Also: pin BIP-39 seed derivation to the specification's own test vectors.
The node's entire identity hangs off `Mnemonic::to_seed("")`, and the
`bip39` crate is no longer version-pinned (the exact pin had to be relaxed
so `cashu` could resolve). A bump that changed derivation would silently
re-key every node on the fleet and orphan every backup; both vectors —
empty passphrase and the NFKD-exercising passphrase arm — now fail the
suite instead. Verified byte-identical under the newly resolved 2.2.2.

And the route script polls the mint's quote state before claiming: the test
mint settles its own invoices, but not instantly, so claiming immediately
raced the settlement and reported a spurious "Quote not paid".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 06:07:27 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 be2cfb8293 feat(ecash): adopt the reference NUT-02 resolver + real/test network switch
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m26s
Executes steps 1-3 of docs/cashu-cdk-migration-plan.md, plus the test-coin
switch needed to exercise these routes without spending real sats.

Protocol layer: depend on `cashu` 0.17.5 (MIT, the crate CDK is built on,
default-features off, `wallet` only). Keyset ids now go through upstream's
`Id::from_short_keyset_id` / `ShortKeysetId` instead of the prefix match
hand-rolled in 2277fc46 — same repair, but implemented by the reference
code that defines the rule, so the next spec turn is a version bump rather
than another incident. `MintClient` feeds it the mint's `/v1/keysets` in
upstream's own `KeySetInfo` shape, parsing entries individually so one
keyset in an unmodelled unit can't block resolving the id we need.

Adding the crate required relaxing `bip39 = "=2.1.0"` to `"2.1"` (resolves
2.2.2): the exact pin held `unicode-normalization` at 0.1.22 and no
resolution existed otherwise. The pin carried no recorded rationale; seed
tests cover the bump.

Network switch: `wallet.ecash-network` / `wallet.ecash-set-network`, with a
Test mode toggle in Wallet Settings → Cashu. Cashu has no testnet, so this
points the wallet at the public `testnut` mint — but crucially each network
gets its OWN wallet and accepted-mints file, because test and real proofs
in one purse would be spendable interchangeably and the balance would be a
lie. Mainnet keeps the original filenames, so existing funds files are
untouched and switching is reversible: tests assert a real balance survives
a round trip through test mode.

Headless coverage: scripts/test-ecash-routes.sh drives every ecash RPC over
the real HTTP path (network get/set, balance, history, mint quote + claim,
send, receive, double-redeem refusal, garbage input, melt quote), restores
the node's original network on exit, and exits non-zero with the failure
count.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 05:04:25 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 03cf74696d docs(ecash): pin the seed-backup UX to the existing reveal pattern
Ecash gets its own BIP-39 mnemonic derived from the node master seed:
still covered by the node's recovery phrase, but portable into any NUT-13
wallet without exposing the master seed — so 'back up my ecash' is not the
same action as 'expose the key to everything'.

Surfaced exactly like the Lightning seed: the shared SeedRevealPanel, on
the app detail page and in Settings → Backup, behind the same
verify_reveal_auth password re-entry. Standard BIP-39, so the SeedQR tab
works (no aezeed flag).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 04:22:29 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 6e23b121ea docs(ecash): plan the move to the reference Cashu implementation
Scoped from the framework-pt keyset incident: adopt the `cashu` crate
(MIT, the crate CDK is built on) for the token codec, keyset ids, crypto,
DLEQ and NUT-13, while keeping ecash.rs's on-disk contract, MintClient's
Tor seam and error table, and our multi-mint routing. Records why the
full cdk WalletDatabase shim is the wrong trade over live funds, and how
ecash backup can derive from the node's existing seed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 04:07:19 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 2277fc4684 fix(ecash): redeem tokens whose keyset id was truncated to the old length
A Minibits token could not be redeemed on framework-pt: the mint answered
POST /v1/swap with a bare 422, which the RPC sanitizer turned into
"Operation failed. Check server logs for details." The journal had the
real reason:

  inputs[0].id: NUT02: ID length invalid, expected 8 bytes (short/v1)
  or 33 bytes (v2)

The token carried keyset id 01fc0ec0e59cd6fa — exactly the first 8 bytes
of the mint's active 33-byte id 01fc0ec0e59cd6fa01b7a88f…a821. NUT-02 v2
ids are 33 bytes behind a 0x01 version byte; the sending wallet cut it to
the 8 bytes that were the whole id under v1. The mint reads the version,
expects 33 bytes, and rejects it — so the length complaint is right even
though 8 bytes is legal for a 0x00-prefixed v1 id.

The id only names which keyset signed a proof, and the short form is a
prefix of the full one, so it can be repaired: before swapping, any
8-byte 0x01-prefixed id is expanded against GET /v1/keysets (new
MintClient::get_keysets — it lists inactive keysets too, and coins from a
retired keyset stay spendable). Preferring the active keyset on a prefix
tie. Attempting this is safe: an id naming the wrong keyset fails
signature verification at the mint and no coins move. Anything already
valid, or with no unambiguous match, is passed through so the mint's own
error still reaches the operator.

Token decoding now also checks keyset ids locally, so an id that is not
hex or is neither NUT-02 length fails with a message naming the format
instead of a raw 422 from the mint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 04:06:30 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 9ccc325a4d fix(container): reap ghost containers so an app can't be locked out of itself
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m24s
A ghost is a container whose process tree is still running while podman
has no record of it: the exit-command's `cleanup --rm` deletes the record,
conmon and the payload survive. It keeps owning exactly what the app needs
— the published host port and the file locks in its data dir — so the
replacement container either fails to bind ("address already in use") or
starts and dies on the lock, and Restart=always loops it there forever.
Nothing in the stack could see it: every podman-level stop/rm/recreate
misses a container podman lost.

Seen twice now: 752 restarts on a fleet node (2026-08-10) and again on the
dev box today, where Gitea flapped until it fell out of My Apps. Both were
cleared by hand; container-doctor.sh has the same logic but is an
out-of-band script the daemon never calls.

- New container::ghost_reaper: finds conmon processes whose 64-hex
  container id is absent from `podman ps -a --no-trunc -q`, then kills the
  payload's children and conmon (TERM, 5s grace, then KILL — the Gitea
  ghost ignored TERM). Id-based, never name-based: killing by name would
  hit the live managed container. A failed `podman ps` reaps nothing
  rather than treating every container as a ghost.
- Hooked at repair_before_package_start (covers package.start,
  package.restart and the orchestrator start path) and in the boot
  reconciler's 30s tick, so ghosts are cleared before an app is asked to
  start and swept for every app continuously.

Restart feedback: the lifecycle RPCs return {"status":"restarting"} in
milliseconds and work in the background, so "Restarting..." flashed for a
few frames and the buttons went idle while the app was still down — the
click read as a no-op. The hero buttons now show a spinner and hold it off
the node's own state (starting/stopping/restarting/updating, plus running
+ health=starting), and the just-clicked action is held until the backend
confirms it picked the work up, with a 12s cap so an unresponsive node
still releases the controls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 13:45:45 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 b113fafee4 fix(ui): app-gate warning names FIPS alongside LAN, Tailscale and Tor
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m28s
The mesh is a reach path like the others; omitting it understated what
turning an app's gate off exposes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 12:16:34 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 58cdea5e79 feat(appgate): apps with their own login can skip the node login
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m33s
Some apps carry a complete account system and are broken by an upstream
challenge: git clients speak basic-auth (not browser cookies), and a
BTCPay checkout link handed to a customer must open for that customer.
Both were behind the gate's login page — the "non-browser clients need an
access token" gap disclosed in five consecutive releases.

- New manifest port policy `auth: open`: the daemon still fronts the port
  exactly like `gated` (loopback pin, external binds, frame-header fixes,
  app-down retry page, Tor upstream) but serves it without the login
  challenge. Requires auth_rationale, same burden of proof as `none`.
  Gitea 3001 and BTCPay 23000 declare it.
- Runtime operator override per app (security.set-app-gate → app-configs/
  <id>.json "gateEnabled"), surfaced as Settings → app → Access control.
  Wins over the manifest in both directions and applies on the next
  request — no restart, and it works today on catalog-covered apps whose
  signed manifest still says `gated`.
- The gate resolves policy per-request from the live port map, so a
  toggle takes effect without waiting for the 60s rebind sweep. "Off"
  never releases the port: gated apps are loopback-pinned, so releasing
  would strand them, not open them.
- security.app-gate-status now reports gate_enabled + any override.
- New guard test pins the `auth: open` set (both entries reviewed); the
  `auth: none` count moves 25 → 26, absorbing pre-existing drift from the
  phoenixd onboarding (loopback JSON API with its own generated password).
- Docs: the manifest spec's ports row documented only host/container/
  protocol — bind, auth, auth_rationale and session_passthrough were
  undocumented. Added a full "Ports & the app gate" section plus a
  developer-guide entry telling app authors to enforce their own auth
  regardless, since the operator can flip the gate either way.

Verified live on archi-dev-box from an external address: gated → 401 gate
page; override off → Gitea 200 own page, BTCPay 302 to its own login,
git-over-HTTP info/refs 200; override on → 401 again; clear → default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 11:40:07 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 9b789a64ad docs(changelog): RSSI readings depend on radio firmware reporting them
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 06:18:15 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 4a7f466ea6 feat(mesh): radio_state reports the radio's last-RX RSSI/SNR
r_stat_rssi/r_stat_snr straight from the RNode firmware's per-packet
stat reports — the direct way to tell "firmware reports signal stats"
from "it doesn't" when a peer's RSSI shows as unknown, and a natural
read-back for the LoRa panel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 06:13:54 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 64205d23b7 docs(changelog): draft v1.8.4-alpha entries for the release-fix batch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 06:09:39 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 3a3077529b feat(kiosk): companion remote drives app iframes via trusted CDP input
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m11s
Companion tap/scroll/type now works INSIDE cross-origin app iframes and
kiosk tabs. The web relay synthesizes untrusted DOM events in the top
document, which can never cross an origin boundary — so apps served
through the appgate were dead to the remote. The kiosk Chromium now
exposes a loopback-only CDP port (default origin check intact, no
--remote-allow-origins) and a backend bridge (api/handler/cdp.rs)
dispatches validated companion input as Input.dispatchKeyEvent /
dispatchMouseEvent / mouseWheel — trusted events that hit-test through
any frame, move real focus, and insert text like a physical device.

- Session keeper self-heals across kiosk Chromium restarts; inert on
  nodes without a kiosk unit (falls back to the existing relay path).
- The kiosk relay subscriber self-tags (?kiosk=1) and the backend mutes
  its key/click/scroll messages while the bridge is live, so input never
  applies twice; cursor moves still flow for the on-screen cursor.
- While companion input is active the native OS pointer is hidden
  (cursor:none, auto-restores 30s after the last event) so the dead
  physical-mouse cursor doesn't sit next to the virtual one.
- docs/tv-input-iframe-apps.md scope note updated: gamepad keys stay on
  uinput; CDP is for companion pointer/typing only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 05:28:53 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 876ecc4bdf fix(ui): replace native confirm() dialogs with the global in-app modal
window.confirm blocks the JS event loop, which froze companion remote
input while open — the remote user could raise the mesh "Clear" prompt
(or reboot / backup-delete / uninstall confirms) and then never dismiss
it, because the synthetic events that would dismiss it queue behind the
dialog itself.

New promise-based appConfirm() (useAppConfirm.ts) + one AppConfirmModal
mounted globally in App.vue, built on BaseModal (Teleport-to-body,
full-viewport backdrop, glass card — the canonical modal contract). All
six native confirm() call sites migrated: mesh clear-all, mesh message
delete, dashboard reboot, backup delete, backup USB copy, app uninstall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 05:28:53 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 458444d700 fix(mesh): report real RSSI/SNR for Reticulum peers instead of a fake 0
Every Reticulum-heard peer surfaced as rssi=0 — indistinguishable from a
real 0 dBm reading and, worse, from "heard over the TCP bridge with no
radio involved at all", which made a TCP-fed mesh look like working RF
during the 2026-08-16 radio diagnosis.

- Sidecar: announce handler now uses the 4-arg RNS dispatch to get the
  announce packet hash and reports per-announce rssi/snr from Reticulum's
  packet-stat cache; LXMF deliveries report message.rssi/snr/q (LXMF
  already populates them on direct RNode hops). All None over TCP or
  multi-hop — the honest RF-vs-internet discriminator.
- Rust: ReticulumPeer caches last_rssi/last_snr from announce and recv
  events (a TCP-relayed announce never blanks a real RF reading), and
  get_contacts surfaces them so refresh_contacts propagates real values.
- Identity discovery no longer hardcodes rssi 0: unknown is now None
  end-to-end and logged as such.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 04:52:04 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 519fa68c72 fix(federation): end the perpetual peer-joined "Invalid signature" storm
Root cause observed live 2026-08-16: onboarding/seed-restore rewrite
identity/node_key on disk but server_info.pubkey is only seeded at boot,
so until the next restart every peer-joined advertised the stale boot key
while signing with the new seed-derived key — deterministically rejected
by every receiver, once per 90s heal tick, forever.

- seed.generate / seed.restore now refresh server_info.pubkey in the live
  snapshot immediately (mirrors the DID-rotation handler).
- The 90s heal loop advertises the SAME key it signs with (disk identity,
  like federation sync already did) instead of the boot snapshot.
- notify_join no longer logs "delivered" for an HTTP-200 JSON-RPC
  rejection; in-band errors are terminal (identical signed bytes can
  never succeed on retry).
- The heal loop backs off per peer (doubling toward a daily re-assert)
  instead of re-notifying every 90s forever — Observer-held peers never
  appear in Trusted-only exported hints, so they_list_us could never
  become true for them.
- Receiver now binds the DID to the advertised pubkey (the old check was
  self-referential) and logs malformed signatures distinctly from
  genuine mismatches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 04:45:39 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 809f7649a4 fix(mesh): plug-and-play radio detection in all situations
Three root causes from the 2026-08-16 framework-pt incident where a
replugged radio detected but never connected:

- detect_serial_devices scanned a hardcoded ttyUSB0-2/ttyACM0-2 list, so
  a radio enumerating at index 3+ was permanently invisible. Now scans
  /dev for all ttyUSB*/ttyACM* nodes (deterministic order, /dev/mesh-radio
  alias still first and still wins the dedup).
- An operator rnode-rf-settings.json port override silently outranked the
  device_path the user just chose in the detection modal. mesh.configure
  now clears a stale override when a different device is configured
  (symlink-resolved compare keeps /dev/mesh-radio aliases intact).
- Espressif native-USB boards (303a, ESP32-S2/S3/C3 RNodes) had no udev
  rule, so they never got the stable /dev/mesh-radio alias and a persisted
  alias path dangled after a port move.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 04:38:49 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 c5cd751bcf fix(nginx): a moved or slow-to-DHCP node no longer loses its whole web UI
setup-node-ca.sh writes one 'listen <addr>:443 ssl;' per LAN address at
the moment it runs (per-address on purpose — Tailscale holds :443 on the
tailnet address) and its idempotency guard never revisits them. nginx
REFUSES TO START while any listen address is missing, so this takes the
entire dashboard down, not just HTTPS:
  1. the node moves networks and the old address is gone; or
  2. nginx starts before DHCP assigns the address — and nginx.service
     ships no Restart=, making that single race permanent.
Both hit archi-dev-box today: nginx dead since boot on 'bind() to
192.168.63.240:443 failed (99: Cannot assign requested address)', the
dashboard simply unreachable, which is exactly the symptom a user with
no screen cannot diagnose.

run_nginx_listener_repair drops listeners for absent addresses, adds one
per present address (CGNAT excluded), installs behind  with
rollback, then starts nginx if it is down and gives it a
Restart=on-failure drop-in so the boot race stops being fatal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 11:49:40 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 203c2b6e50 fix(async): finish the blocking-call sweep — scan, 3 SSH handlers, DNS
A codebase sweep for siblings of e282c059 (blocking network I/O parked
on the tokio runtime) found the openwrt fix was incomplete:

- openwrt.scan: scan_subnet is async in name only — up to 255 SEQUENTIAL
  blocking TCP probes at 500ms each (~2 min on a /24 that silently
  drops) plus a blocking SSH verify per candidate. One click of 'scan
  for routers' held a worker for that whole time. Now spawn_blocking.
- provision-tollgate / scan-wifi / configure-wan still ran their SSH
  exchanges inline; bounded_tcp caps each socket op but a session is
  many sequential ops (provision runs opkg install over SSH), so worst
  case was minutes. All three now spawn_blocking.
- network::check_dns: blocking glibc to_socket_addrs with no app-level
  bound, on every Server-tab load via network.diagnostics. Against a
  stale resolver — the moved-network case — that is 5-40s per refresh.
  Now spawn_blocking plus a 5s cap, so the tile reports 'no DNS'
  instead of hanging.

Verified false positives left alone: every other bare TcpStream::connect
targets 127.0.0.1 (fails instantly), and every remote reqwest client
already sets a timeout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 11:03:08 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 6e89acced7 fix(network): SSDP discovery no longer parks a tokio worker for 3s
check_upnp_available uses a blocking std UdpSocket and, on a network
with no UPnP gateway (the normal case right after a node moves), runs
out its full 3s read timeout. Inline on the runtime that blocked a
worker on every call, from four call sites. Same class as the OpenWrt
SSH stall (e282c059), smaller blast radius — move it to spawn_blocking.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 10:22:44 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 e282c05911 fix(openwrt): unbounded blocking SSH connect no longer stalls the whole API
Router::connect/connect_password did a blocking std TcpStream::connect
with no timeout, inline on the tokio runtime. Against a router that
stayed behind when its node moved networks (framework-pt, 2026-08-15),
every dashboard poll of openwrt.get-status parked a worker thread for
the OS connect timeout (~2 min) — overlapping polls stalled unrelated
RPCs for 25s+ at a time, sessions timed out, and TOTP codes expired
before the backend verified them.

- bounded_tcp(): 5s connect timeout + 30s read/write timeouts on the
  session socket, shared by both connect paths.
- openwrt.get-status runs its SSH exchange on spawn_blocking, so even a
  slow router can only slow its own tile, never the API.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 09:52:03 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 9c675e5c7d fix(login): backend-unreachable no longer masquerades as a fresh node
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m4s
auth.isSetup failing (backend warming up after boot, transient proxy
blip) dropped Login.vue into its catch and showed 'Set Up Your Node' on
a fully-onboarded node — seen on framework-pt right after its network
move, and the same fail-open class RootRedirect already fixed for the
intro flash. Errors now fail toward the ordinary login form and a
background probe re-asks until the backend answers; a genuinely fresh
node flips to the setup form on the first successful probe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 09:36:37 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 6833920778 feat(bitcoin): autoprune default raised 550 → 50000 MB
Small-disk nodes (<1000 GB data volume) keep the same dynamic
prune-vs-archival logic but now retain ~50 GB of recent blocks instead
of the bare 550 MB minimum. Takes effect for catalog-covered installs
at the next catalog regeneration + signing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 09:23:57 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 ec2e6375ed feat(bootstrap): two OTA heals for network moves + registry renames
Both failure modes are from framework-pt relocating (2026-08-15):

- archy-ha-btc-rpc-proxy bound socat to the LAN IP baked in at unit
  generation; after a move the address no longer exists and the unit
  restart-looped forever (counter 2446). run_ha_rpc_proxy_bind_repair
  rewrites ExecStart to compute the bind address at each start, so
  Restart=always itself heals any future move.
- homeassistant's quadlet pointed at the domain image ref with --pull
  never while local storage held the same name:tag under the bare-IP
  registry ref (catalog signing rename) — 761 restarts on 'image not
  known'. run_pull_never_image_repair retags a matching local image;
  it deliberately never pulls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 09:23:57 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 1587853ce2 fix(banner): console banner shows the reachable LAN address, not the WG tunnel IP
The welcome banner picked its address with 'hostname -I | awk {print $1}',
so a node with WireGuard up advertised 10.44.0.1 — its own tunnel address,
present on EVERY node — as its web ui / ssh address. Off-tunnel that is
unreachable, and after a headless box moves to a new network it is exactly
the wrong thing to trust (framework-pt, 2026-08-15).

- Pick the default route's source address; fall back to the first address
  that is not WireGuard 10.44/16, CGNAT 100.64/10, or loopback.
- Also print http://<hostname>.local when avahi is up — the one address
  that survives any DHCP change, which is the real answer for headless
  boxes that move between networks.
- scripts/welcome-banner.sh is the new canonical copy, embedded in the
  binary (tor-helper pattern): bootstrap::run_welcome_banner_sync rewrites
  /etc/profile.d/archipelago.sh on ISO-installed nodes at startup, so the
  fix reaches the deployed fleet with the next OTA instead of only fresh
  ISOs. Machines without an installer-baked banner are left untouched.
- Same fix inlined in the live ISO builder's PROFILE heredoc
  (image-recipe/_archived/build-auto-installer-iso.sh).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 08:37:13 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 56d6396142 feat(appgate): gate login gets the real dashboard badge + glass-button states
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m0s
- The badge is now the dashboard login's AnimatedLogo, square for square:
  inline SVG (20 white rects, 100ms stagger, 3s loop) inside the same
  gradient ring. The old <img> of favico-black-v2.svg baked a second ring
  into the ring and couldn't animate; the asset leaves the gate allowlist
  since nothing references it now.
- The submit button is .glass-button longhand: hover lift + lightening +
  rim glow, active press, disabled dim — the flat darken-only hover read
  as broken next to /login.
- Loading state: submitting flips the button to spinner + 'Signing in…'/
  'Verifying…' and disables it, via a single inline script admitted by
  CSP sha256 hash (not unsafe-inline; injected markup stays inert, and
  the page still works as a plain POST without JS).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 08:24:27 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 e0d8b9de74 fix(ui): login badge back to the original — gloss stays screensaver/intro only
The Kammergut gloss v3 opt-in had been applied to the /login badge as
well; per operator the glossed disc belongs ONLY on the screensaver and
the onboarding intro (and the splash tap-logo that fronts them). The
login page returns to the plain gradient-ring badge it always had, same
as the dashboard sidebar fix before it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 08:24:19 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 d422218c6b chore(demo): rebuild bundled AIUI with the Routstr provider picker
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 13:41:17 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 a4be1b4b7d feat(aiui): Routstr tops the model picker with the full live catalog
New 'Routstr (sats)' category sits FIRST in the model dropdown
(operator request 2026-08-14), listing every model the node's
/aiui/api/routstr/models proxy returns (432 live today) — the picker
panel now scrolls (max-h 70vh) instead of overflowing. Selecting a
Routstr model routes the turn through the node's paid completions
proxy, and the explicit choice wins even when AIUI runs embedded in
Archy — a selection, not a fallback. Node refusals (no budget armed,
budget spent, wallet can't fund) surface verbatim in chat.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 13:41:17 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 e3bd340725 feat(aiui): Routstr as an explicit, session-gated AI provider path
The D-04 Routstr leg was fallback-only — never user-selectable, and its
Nostr discovery parses a docs-shaped event content ({endpoints, models,
pricing}) that live kind-38421 announcements don't actually carry
({name, about}), so it could never match a real provider. This adds the
explicit path AIUI's model picker needs: /aiui/api/routstr/models
passes through the live aggregator catalog (the instance routstr.com's
own frontend queries; the canonical api.routstr.com 404s), and
/aiui/api/routstr/chat/completions makes one paid, non-streaming,
OpenAI-shaped call — session-gated, egress-screened (S3), refused
without an armed operator budget (D-05), paid via auto_pay_token,
change and refused-request tokens redeemed back into the wallet so a
failed attempt nets zero (verified live: quoted=1 reclaimed=1 net=0).
nginx template gains the location in both server blocks (T-13-15).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 13:41:07 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 ced95a60d1 feat(wallet): Lightning gets the arrival screen; copy buttons unified
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m27s
- lnd.createinvoice now returns r_hash_hex; new lnd.invoicestatus RPC
  looks the invoice up (SETTLED + amt_paid_sat). E2E-verified on this
  box: real invoice minted, status polls settled:false until paid.
- Receive modal: Lightning polls settlement every 3s and flips to the
  on-chain-style success view — straight to the green check + amount
  (no broadcast step; settlement is final). Raw bolt11 text removed:
  QR + CopyButton only. State fully reset per open/close.
- CopyButton is now the wallet's only copy affordance: the ark-address
  and ecash-token holdouts swapped in, their ad-hoc handlers deleted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 09:43:30 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 a0bd9e53f8 feat(settings): CA generation from the UI; Routstr panel beside the API key
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m36s
WebUI RULE (operator, 2026-08-14): never point users at a terminal. The
certificate section told users to run setup-node-ca.sh by hand — it now
has a Generate button backed by system.node-ca.generate, which runs the
idempotent script server-side (live-tested: generated and /ca.crt serves).
Routstr budget panel moves directly under the Claude API key card.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 09:19:05 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 6137762786 feat(settings): Routstr AI budget panel — the integration's missing switch
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m29s
The Routstr backend (Cashu-paid inference fallback, shipped 1.7.127) was
fully wired but permanently dormant: its D-05 gate requires an
operator-set sats allowance and nothing in the UI ever called
assistant.budget-get/set — default 0 meant never selected. New Settings
panel (below AI Data Access): allowance/spent/remaining, set-allowance
with 0-disables semantics, enabled/off badge. Backend untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 08:57:53 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 8d1fda29fa feat(federation): peer requests take the stage — clustered and faced
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m10s
Requests were spread evenly around the orbit, so they could sit BEHIND
the globe: the blinking call-to-action was invisible and the chart read
as mis-scaled until the user hand-rotated. Now requests cluster tightly
at one stage angle (spacing shrinks as count grows) and, when a NEW
request arrives, the camera steers to face the cluster front-and-center
(depth ∝ sin(angle−rotY); front = angle+π/2) — arrival only, so a user
who rotates away isn't fought. Static/reduced-motion paths snap+render.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 07:36:38 -04:00
archipelago 135fb5650b chore: release v1.8.3-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m43s
2026-08-14 06:34:47 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 1de4a0943e docs(changelog): curate v1.8.3-alpha notes + What's New block
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m42s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 05:13:43 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 b5e33784e6 fix(ui): kiosk map animates again + paints on resize; gloss scoped; icons get intrinsic size
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m42s
- NetworkMap3D: kiosks keep static PLACEMENT (the rAF-fragile intro was
  the blank-screen cause) but re-attach the half-rate ticker — the calm
  orbit is back; and measure() now renders explicitly when no ticker runs,
  so resizes repaint instead of leaving a stale/blank/mis-scaled
  projection (also fixes reduced-motion users on any screen).
- Gloss v3 scoped to .logo-gloss opt-in (screensaver, intro, login,
  splash tap-logo) — it had leaked onto every logo-gradient-border user,
  including the dashboard header, via AnimatedLogo's default border.
- normalize-app-icon.py output now carries intrinsic 512x512 dimensions:
  a viewBox-only SVG collapses to nothing in auto-sized tiles (the
  'transparent icon in My Apps' report); both app icons regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 05:11:54 -04:00
archipelago 2b7e92e770 chore: release v1.8.2-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m43s
2026-08-14 04:28:12 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 7c34df36cd feat(ui): app icons on the house canvas; detail page gets the tile treatment
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m33s
- alby-hub + phoenixd icons re-set with the standard 12% inner margin
  (they shipped edge-to-edge; every other icon carries whitespace).
- scripts/normalize-app-icon.py: wraps any third-party SVG mark onto the
  house canvas — the system applies the tile plate (archy-app-icon)
  automatically but deliberately no runtime inset, so the margin must be
  baked; the guide now says exactly that.
- MarketplaceAppDetails: the icon now carries archy-app-icon like the
  store tiles — the treatment no longer stops at the detail page.
- v1.8.2 changelog: third curated bullet (the ceremony gate requires 3).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 04:22:28 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 4b4e1ab1a3 feat(ui): Kammergut gloss v3 — wet black paint on the logo badge, approved
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m43s
Pure-CSS build (the plan-b SVG text filter embosses artifacts on a disc
— v1 rejected for exactly that): borderless painted disc with warm
Kammergut-toned light, dense gradient stops + turbulence grain dither
(banding), and a radial top bloom instead of a linear streak (a linear
streak's tips seamed against the rim — operator screenshot). Iterated
headlessly + on a live preview server; operator approved 2026-08-14.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 04:11:42 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 d05fa6988d fix(federation): kiosk map goes fully static — kills the blank-load stall
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m31s
The GSAP entrance intro needs healthy rAF delivery to reach opacity 1;
on a paint-starved kiosk it stalls and the federation/peers screen reads
as BLANK until a lucky refresh. Kiosks now take the existing staticMode
branch (no intro, no ticker — everything lands in place instantly); the
2D default and 2D/3D toggle stay. Half-rate tick kept for any future
non-static kiosk path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-14 03:57:05 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 2399eeac66 feat(ui): auto-tab fallback — embed-refusing apps become tab apps
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m49s
An app whose frame never loads while its backend reports Running (the
embed-refusal signature: frame-busting JS, top-level-origin apps,
SameSite=Strict logins — everything the gate's header stripping cannot
fix) is remembered in localStorage; every later launch opens a tab
straight from the click (user gesture, so no popup blocker), and
opensInTab() gives it the tab-launch icon. A successful iframe load
clears the memory and entries expire after 7 days, so nodes that gain
embedding (gate improvements) get re-probed instead of being remembered
broken forever. Dev guide updated; v1.8.2 changelog + What's New curated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 20:23:04 -04:00
archipelago 63cb9dd22c Revert "feat(ui): Kammergut gloss test on the logo badge inner circle"
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m51s
This reverts commit 6672d978f7.
2026-08-13 15:02:36 -04:00
archipelago 246916c77b chore: release v1.8.1-alpha
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m48s
2026-08-13 14:30:16 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 00416c3c24 feat(app-catalog): curated store entries for Alby Hub + phoenixd
The hand-curated app-catalog/catalog.json is the release gate's drift
baseline; the generator syncs fields but never adds entries, so the two
new apps needed appending — fields taken verbatim from their manifests
(drift check green, 30 catalog / 58 manifest apps).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 13:48:03 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 1dc6d3e0e3 feat(catalog): Alby Hub + phoenixd live; registry refs move to the domain
Signed catalog: 68 apps (alby-hub v1.23.0 + phoenixd 0.9.0 join), every
image ref rewritten from the retired bare-IP host to the Foundation
domain. Trust floor promoted in this same commit: all five active fleet
nodes confirmed on 1.8.0-alpha (which trusts the domain); archy-x250-beta
is root-pin-stranded pre-.122 and needs a re-image regardless.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 13:44:11 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 816a06747a docs(changelog): curate v1.8.1-alpha notes + What's New block
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m35s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 09:26:46 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 9243babcdb feat(kiosk): graphics tiers + Settings knob; network map kiosk mode
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m51s
The animated federation map froze the framework-pt 4K TV: the launcher
held every machine to the HD 5500-era choppy-audio flags (single raster
thread, GpuRasterization banned) while the map wrote SVG attrs at 60fps.

- Launcher: two flag tiers. legacy = the proven conservative set; modern
  (Intel gen8+, 'NNth Gen' models, AMD Ryzen) = default raster threads +
  GPU rasterization. Classified from /proc/cpuinfo (11 model strings
  covered by tests in-session); KIOSK_GRAPHICS=performance|quality in
  kiosk-display.conf overrides; headless unchanged. Reaches deployed
  kiosks via the include_str! self-heal, same as the vsync fix.
- system.kiosk-display.get/set: carries a 'graphics' field alongside
  'preset'; setting one no longer clobbers the other.
- Settings → Display: Graphics picker (Auto / Compatibility / Quality).
- NetworkMap3D: kiosks default to the 2D projection (remembered toggle
  still works) and tick at half rate with carried-over deltas — same
  spin speed, half the paint cost.
- Changelog: curated Unreleased notes for all of the above + the gate
  frame-embedding fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 09:23:07 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 6672d978f7 feat(ui): Kammergut gloss test on the logo badge inner circle
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m46s
Black gloss paint from plan-b's Kammergut wordmark (verbatim #paintGloss
SVG filter + the .paint-3d sheen gradient) applied to
.logo-gradient-border::after — the circle behind the A on the
screensaver, intro, splash and login. Marked as a TEST in both files;
revert = git revert of this one commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 13:21:45 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 a80712963c feat(appgate): proxied apps become embeddable — gate neutralizes frame blocking
Apps that ship X-Frame-Options (Alby Hub: DENY) or a CSP frame-ancestors
directive rendered as a dead grey pane in the dashboard's embedded app
session; the historical fix was a bespoke per-app nginx strip proxy
(gitea). The gate now removes X-Frame-Options and strips ONLY the
frame-ancestors directive from proxied responses — the rest of the app's
CSP passes through untouched. The clickjacking threat those headers
address is handled the same way the gate's own pages handle it: every
proxied request is authenticated first, and the gate already declares
permissive frame-ancestors on its own responses. Unit-tested; verified
live on archi-dev-box (Alby Hub embeds, CSP intact).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 13:05:25 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 76e6f06995 fix(phoenixd): dot-free datadir + data_uid; docs: iframe rules
phoenixd: the orchestrator treats bind paths containing a dot as file
mounts and never creates their source dir, so the image's default
/phoenix/.phoenix target crash-looped the unit (statfs: no such file).
Datadir moved to /data via PHOENIX_DATADIR; data_uid 1000:1000 matches the
image's phoenix user — without it phoenixd dies on phoenix.conf
'Permission denied'. Both verified end-to-end on archi-dev-box: orch
install OK, seed.dat + db on the host, authenticated /getinfo answers.

alby-hub: launch flips to embedded — pairs with the gate change that
neutralizes upstream frame blocking.

Dev guide: iframe embedding rules (who blocks framing and why the gate
may strip it; when open_in_new_tab is legitimate; test in the embedded
session, never a tab).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 12:38:17 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 b7ba35477c docs(dev-guide): package.install needs dockerImage too; helper gotchas
Learned installing alby-hub/phoenixd for real: the id-only payload fails
with 'Missing dockerImage' (the store normally injects the image from the
catalog), the session helper silently reuses a stale cached session
without ARCHY_FORCE_LOGIN=1, needs jq, and its set -euo pipefail kills an
interactive shell chain without output — so the guide now wraps the flow
in a heredoc subshell.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 12:15:55 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 e87e8017bf docs(dev-guide): real pre-catalog testing flow on a live node
The old RPC example skipped login entirely and implied disk manifests show
up in the App Store. Documents: store lists signed-catalog + Nostr apps
only; the runtime-payload staging path (naive /opt/archipelago/apps copies
are deleted on every backend start); the rpc.bash session helper; and the
full lifecycle loop to run before submitting to the catalog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 12:09:58 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 6168f6a7d0 fix(alby-hub): host port 8087→8187 — 8087 is netbird's
Caught by the orchestrator's collision check on archi-dev-box.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 11:57:23 -04:00
archipelagoandClaude Fable 5 fdd26ba1e3 feat(apps): Alby Hub 1.23.0 + phoenixd 0.9.0 manifests with official icons
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 4m20s
Both images mirrored to the Foundation registry. Alby Hub: gated web UI
on 8087, LDK data under /var/lib/archipelago/alby-hub. phoenixd: headless
loopback API on 9740 (own password auth), seed dir preserved under
/var/lib/archipelago/phoenixd. Not yet in the signed catalog — disk
manifests only, pending install verification on archi-dev-box.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 11:55:17 -04:00
390 changed files with 25780 additions and 11228 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ android {
applicationId = "com.archipelago.app"
minSdk = 26
targetSdk = 35
versionCode = 47
versionName = "0.5.27"
versionCode = 48
versionName = "0.5.28"
vectorDrawables {
useSupportLibrary = true
+9
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,15 @@
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
<data android:scheme="archipelago" android:host="pair" />
</intent-filter>
<!-- Remote-signer pairing deep link (NIP-46, companion 0.5.28):
nostrconnect://<client-pubkey>?relay=...&secret=... — the
node's login QR, hand-off from any QR scanner app. -->
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
<category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
<data android:scheme="nostrconnect" />
</intent-filter>
</activity>
<!-- Embedded FIPS mesh node: split-tunnel VpnService (fd00::/8 only),
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
package com.archipelago.app
import org.json.JSONObject
/**
* JNI binding to the companion's non-mesh native surface (same
* libarchy_fips_core.so as FipsNative — backup + nostr signer crypto, built
* from Android/rust/archy-fips-core).
*
* Same contract as FipsNative: JSON over strings, failures come back as
* {"error": "…"} rather than exceptions, and [available] is false on ABIs
* the .so isn't built for so every caller can degrade gracefully.
*/
object NativeCore {
val available: Boolean = try {
System.loadLibrary("archy_fips_core")
true
} catch (_: Throwable) {
false
}
// ── Backup (#128): the node's ADR-005 envelope ──────────────────────────
/** Encrypt a JSON payload into an ADR-005 envelope (ChaCha20-Poly1305). */
external fun backupEncrypt(payload: String, passphrase: String): String
/** Decrypt an ADR-005 envelope back to its payload JSON. */
external fun backupDecrypt(envelope: String, passphrase: String): String
// ── NIP-46 remote signer (#139) ─────────────────────────────────────────
/** Generate a fresh nostr key: {"secret","pubkey","npub","nsec"}. */
external fun nostrGenerateSecret(): String
/** Import a key from hex or nsec…: {"secret","pubkey","npub","nsec"}. */
external fun nostrSecretFromAny(secret: String): String
/** Parse nostrconnect://…: {"clientPubkey","relays":[…],"secret","perms","name","url","image"}. */
external fun nostrParseConnectUri(uri: String): String
/**
* Sign `{kind, content, tags, created_at}` with the signer key: returns
* the full signed event JSON. Approval happens BEFORE this call — the
* native side never signs unasked.
*/
external fun nostrSignEvent(secretHex: String, eventJson: String): String
/** NIP-44 v2 encrypt/decrypt; result JSON: {"result": payload} or {"error": …}. */
external fun nostrNip44Encrypt(secretHex: String, peerPub: String, plaintext: String): String
external fun nostrNip44Decrypt(secretHex: String, peerPub: String, payload: String): String
/** NIP-04 fallback (deprecated but still spoken by real clients). */
external fun nostrNip04Encrypt(secretHex: String, peerPub: String, plaintext: String): String
external fun nostrNip04Decrypt(secretHex: String, peerPub: String, payload: String): String
/** True when a native reply is an error envelope. */
fun isErr(json: String): Boolean = try {
JSONObject(json).has("error")
} catch (_: Exception) {
true
}
/** Error text from a native reply, or a generic message if malformed. */
fun errMsg(json: String): String = try {
JSONObject(json).optString("error", "native call failed")
} catch (_: Exception) {
"native call failed"
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
package com.archipelago.app.data
import android.content.Context
import com.archipelago.app.NativeCore
import com.archipelago.app.fips.FipsPreferences
import com.archipelago.app.nostr.NostrSignerPreferences
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.first
import kotlinx.coroutines.withContext
import org.json.JSONArray
import org.json.JSONObject
/**
* Companion backup & restore (#128) — the phone side of "losing your phone,
* or wiping it to cross a border".
*
* The payload (servers + FIPS identity/peers + signer key + flags) is
* serialized to JSON and sealed into the node's ADR-005 envelope (Argon2id +
* ChaCha20-Poly1305) by the native core — the SAME envelope the node uses,
* not a second format. The passphrase never leaves the encrypt call.
*
* Transport is deliberately boring: a plain .json file the user saves via
* the system file picker (SAF) — on GrapheneOS there is no cloud backup and
* there should be none here either; the file goes wherever the user puts it
* (USB drive, computer, a folder synced their way).
*/
class BackupManager(private val context: Context) {
private val servers = ServerPreferences(context)
private val fips = FipsPreferences(context)
private val signer = NostrSignerPreferences(context)
/** Everything the backup captures, for the restore preview UI. */
data class PayloadSummary(
val serverCount: Int,
val hasFipsIdentity: Boolean,
val hasSignerKey: Boolean,
val appVersion: String,
)
/** What a restore actually did, for the result UI. */
data class RestoreResult(
val serversRestored: Int,
val activeSet: Boolean,
val fipsIdentityRestored: Boolean,
val signerKeyRestored: Boolean,
)
private fun appVersion(): String = try {
context.packageManager.getPackageInfo(context.packageName, 0).versionName ?: ""
} catch (_: Exception) {
""
}
/**
* Assemble the encrypted backup envelope. Runs on IO: DataStore reads
* plus the Argon2id KDF (tens of ms) + AEAD.
*/
suspend fun createBackup(passphrase: String): String = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
require(passphrase.isNotEmpty()) { "passphrase required" }
val active = servers.activeServer.first()
val saved = servers.savedServers.first()
val fipsId = fips.identity()
val peers = fips.peersJson()
val partyPeers = fips.partyPeers()
val partyName = fips.partyName()
val partyListen = fips.partyListen()
val signerSecret = signer.secret()
val payload = JSONObject().apply {
put("app", "archipelago-companion")
put("payloadVersion", 1)
put("appVersion", appVersion())
put("createdAt", System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000)
put("servers", JSONArray(saved.map { it.serialize() }))
put("active", active?.serialize() ?: JSONObject.NULL)
if (fipsId != null) {
put("fips", JSONObject().apply {
put("secret", fipsId.secret)
put("npub", fipsId.npub)
put("address", fipsId.address)
put("peers", JSONArray(peers))
put("partyPeers", JSONArray().apply { partyPeers.forEach { put(JSONObject().apply {
put("npub", it.npub); put("ula", it.ula); put("name", it.name)
put("ip", it.ip); put("port", it.port)
}) } })
put("partyName", partyName)
put("partyListen", partyListen)
})
}
if (signerSecret != null) {
put("signer", JSONObject().apply { put("secret", signerSecret) })
}
put("flags", JSONObject().apply {
put("introSeen", servers.introSeen.first())
})
}
val envelope = NativeCore.backupEncrypt(payload.toString(), passphrase)
if (NativeCore.isErr(envelope)) throw BackupException(NativeCore.errMsg(envelope))
envelope
}
/**
* Peek at a decrypted backup (passphrase already checked) to preview what
* a restore would do. Does NOT touch any stored state.
*/
suspend fun readBackup(envelope: String, passphrase: String): Pair<PayloadSummary, JSONObject> =
withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val payload = NativeCore.backupDecrypt(envelope, passphrase)
if (NativeCore.isErr(payload)) throw BackupException(NativeCore.errMsg(payload))
val obj = JSONObject(payload)
if (obj.optString("app") != "archipelago-companion") {
throw BackupException("Not a companion backup (this may be a node backup — restore it on the node)")
}
val summary = PayloadSummary(
serverCount = obj.optJSONArray("servers")?.length() ?: 0,
hasFipsIdentity = obj.has("fips"),
hasSignerKey = obj.has("signer"),
appVersion = obj.optString("appVersion", ""),
)
summary to obj
}
/**
* Apply a decrypted backup to this install. Merge semantics — a restore
* never silently destroys what's already here:
*
* - Servers upsert (npub-first, [ServerPreferences.upsertServer]) — same
* identity merges, never duplicates.
* - The backup's active server is set active only when none is.
* - FIPS identity/peers restore only when this phone has none (a phone
* that already paired has a live identity the node peers with; swapping
* it from a backup would strand the current pairing). Peers merge by
* npub otherwise.
* - Signer key restores only when none exists locally.
*/
suspend fun restoreBackup(payload: JSONObject): RestoreResult = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val serverArray = payload.optJSONArray("servers") ?: JSONArray()
var restored = 0
for (i in 0 until serverArray.length()) {
val raw = serverArray.optString(i)
val entry = ServerEntry.deserialize(raw) ?: continue
servers.upsertServer(entry)
restored++
}
var activeSet = false
val activeStr = if (payload.isNull("active")) null else payload.optString("active", "")
val activeEntry = activeStr?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { ServerEntry.deserialize(it) }
if (activeEntry != null && servers.activeServer.first() == null) {
servers.setActiveServer(activeEntry)
activeSet = true
}
// FIPS identity: only adopt when this phone has none.
var fipsRestored = false
val fipsObj = payload.optJSONObject("fips")
if (fipsObj != null && fips.identity() == null) {
val secret = fipsObj.optString("secret")
if (secret.isNotBlank()) {
fips.saveIdentity(
com.archipelago.app.fips.FipsNative.Identity(
secret = secret,
npub = fipsObj.optString("npub"),
address = fipsObj.optString("address"),
)
)
fipsRestored = true
}
// Peers: union by npub with whatever is already here (an empty
// store takes the backup's list wholesale).
val backupPeers = fipsObj.optJSONArray("peers")?.let { arr ->
(0 until arr.length()).joinToString(",", "[", "]") { arr.optString(it) }
} ?: "[]"
fips.mergePeersJson(backupPeers)
val partyArr = fipsObj.optJSONArray("partyPeers")
if (partyArr != null) {
for (i in 0 until partyArr.length()) {
val p = partyArr.optJSONObject(i) ?: continue
val npub = p.optString("npub")
val ula = p.optString("ula")
if (npub.isNotBlank() && ula.isNotBlank()) {
fips.upsertPartyPeer(
com.archipelago.app.fips.PartyPeer(
npub = npub, ula = ula,
name = p.optString("name").ifBlank { "Phone" },
ip = p.optString("ip"), port = p.optInt("port"),
)
)
}
}
}
if (fipsObj.optString("partyName").isNotBlank()) {
fips.setPartyName(fipsObj.optString("partyName"))
}
fips.setPartyListen(fipsObj.optBoolean("partyListen", false))
}
// Signer key: only adopt when none exists locally.
var signerRestored = false
val signerObj = payload.optJSONObject("signer")
if (signerObj != null && signer.secret() == null) {
val secret = signerObj.optString("secret")
if (secret.isNotBlank()) {
signer.saveSecret(secret)
signerRestored = true
}
}
// Flags: a user who completed the intro on the old phone shouldn't
// see it again on the new one.
val flags = payload.optJSONObject("flags")
if (flags?.optBoolean("introSeen", false) == true) {
servers.markIntroSeen()
}
RestoreResult(
serversRestored = restored,
activeSet = activeSet,
fipsIdentityRestored = fipsRestored,
signerKeyRestored = signerRestored,
)
}
class BackupException(message: String) : Exception(message)
}
@@ -89,6 +89,38 @@ class FipsPreferences(private val context: Context) {
suspend fun hasPeers(): Boolean = JSONArray(peersJson()).length() > 0
/**
* Union the stored node peers with a backup's peer list, matched by
* npub — the backup's copy wins for the same npub (its addresses are what
* the restored identity pairs against). Used by companion restore (#128)
* after [saveIdentity] adopted the backup's mesh identity.
*/
suspend fun mergePeersJson(incomingJson: String) {
context.fipsDataStore.edit { prefs ->
val current = JSONArray(prefs[peersKey] ?: "[]")
val incoming = try {
JSONArray(incomingJson)
} catch (_: Exception) {
JSONArray()
}
val incomingNpubs = mutableSetOf<String>()
val merged = JSONArray()
for (i in 0 until incoming.length()) {
val peer = incoming.optJSONObject(i) ?: continue
val npub = peer.optString("npub")
if (npub.isNotBlank()) {
incomingNpubs.add(npub)
merged.put(peer)
}
}
for (i in 0 until current.length()) {
val peer = current.optJSONObject(i) ?: continue
if (peer.optString("npub") !in incomingNpubs) merged.put(peer)
}
prefs[peersKey] = merged.toString()
}
}
// ── Mesh Party (phone↔phone) ────────────────────────────────────────────
suspend fun partyListen(): Boolean =
@@ -0,0 +1,445 @@
package com.archipelago.app.nostr
import android.content.Context
import com.archipelago.app.NativeCore
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.StateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.asStateFlow
import kotlinx.coroutines.withContext
import okhttp3.OkHttpClient
import okhttp3.Request
import okhttp3.Response
import okhttp3.WebSocket
import okhttp3.WebSocketListener
import org.json.JSONArray
import org.json.JSONObject
import java.security.SecureRandom
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference
/**
* NIP-46 remote-signer session (#139) — the phone side, wire-faithful to
* rust-nostr's reference bunker (`signer/nostr-connect/src/signer.rs`),
* which the node's login flow will interoperate with:
*
* 1. Client (the node's login page) shows a `nostrconnect://` QR.
* 2. We scan it, connect to its relay, subscribe to kind-24133 events
* p-tagged to our signer key, and send a `connect` request carrying the
* secret (the client validates it and answers "ack").
* 3. Requests arrive as NIP-44-encrypted kind-24133 events; we respond over
* the same channel. `sign_event` is the one method that never runs
* without a human tapping Approve on this phone.
*
* The session lives while the app is around (the login handshake takes
* seconds); there is no background service in v1 and no remembered-session
* auto-reconnect (research doc flow C — deferred deliberately).
*/
object BunkerManager {
sealed class SignerState {
/** Native core unavailable (e.g. x86 emulator) — signing impossible. */
object Unavailable : SignerState()
/** Key exists, no session. */
object Idle : SignerState()
/** No signer key generated/imported yet. */
object NoKey : SignerState()
data class Connecting(val relay: String) : SignerState()
/** Connect request sent; waiting for the client to ack. */
data class AwaitingClient(val relay: String, val clientName: String) : SignerState()
/** Handshake complete — this is the state where requests are answered. */
data class Ready(val relay: String, val clientName: String) : SignerState()
data class Failed(val reason: String) : SignerState()
}
/** One signature request awaiting a human decision. */
data class PendingRequest(
val id: String,
val method: String,
val clientPubkey: String,
val clientName: String,
val kind: Long?,
val content: String?,
/** Formatted tag lines for the approval card. */
val tags: List<String>,
val createdAt: Long?,
/** The full unsigned event JSON handed to the native signer on approve. */
val unsignedEventJson: String,
)
private val _state = MutableStateFlow<SignerState>(SignerState.Idle)
val state: StateFlow<SignerState> = _state.asStateFlow()
private val _pending = MutableStateFlow<PendingRequest?>(null)
val pending: StateFlow<PendingRequest?> = _pending.asStateFlow()
private val client = OkHttpClient.Builder()
.connectTimeout(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS)
.pingInterval(25, TimeUnit.SECONDS) // relay keepalive
.build()
private data class Session(
val socket: WebSocket,
val relay: String,
/** The client's pubkey (hex) from the nostrconnect URI. */
val clientPubkey: String,
val clientName: String,
/** The pairing secret — echoed back during handshake, then kept for
* validating an incoming `connect` from the same client. */
val secret: String,
/** Our connect request id, to match the client's ack response. */
val connectRequestId: String,
/** Our signer secret (hex). */
val signerSecretHex: String,
/** Our signer pubkey (hex). */
val signerPubkeyHex: String,
/** Event ids already handled (relays may redeliver). */
val seen: MutableSet<String> = java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet(),
)
private val session = AtomicReference<Session?>(null)
/** Refresh Idle/NoKey state (suspend; call from a coroutine — DataStore reads hit disk). */
suspend fun refreshState(context: Context) {
if (!NativeCore.available) {
_state.value = SignerState.Unavailable
return
}
if (session.get() != null) return
val prefs = NostrSignerPreferences(context.applicationContext)
_state.value =
if (prefs.secret() == null) SignerState.NoKey else SignerState.Idle
}
/**
* Pair from a scanned or deep-linked `nostrconnect://…` URI. Returns a
* user-presentable error on failure, or null on success (state moves to
* Connecting → AwaitingClient).
*/
suspend fun pair(context: Context, uri: String): String? {
if (!NativeCore.available) return "Signing is unavailable on this device"
val appContext = context.applicationContext
return withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val parsed = JSONObject(NativeCore.nostrParseConnectUri(uri.trim()))
if (parsed.has("error")) return@withContext parsed.getString("error")
val prefs = NostrSignerPreferences(appContext)
val secret = prefs.secret()
?: return@withContext "No signer key yet — generate or import one first"
val info = JSONObject(NativeCore.nostrSecretFromAny(secret))
if (info.has("error")) return@withContext info.getString("error")
val clientPubkey = parsed.getString("clientPubkey")
val relays = mutableListOf<String>()
parsed.optJSONArray("relays")?.let { arr -> for (i in 0 until arr.length()) relays.add(arr.optString(i)) }
val clientName = parsed.optString("name").ifBlank { "client" }
val pairSecret = parsed.getString("secret")
if (relays.isEmpty()) return@withContext "The pairing code carries no relay to reach the client on"
teardown()
var lastError = "no relay could be reached"
for (relay in relays) {
_state.value = SignerState.Connecting(relay)
val opened = openSession(
relay, clientPubkey, clientName, pairSecret, secret, info,
)
if (opened != null) {
session.set(opened)
prefs.savePairing(
NostrSignerPreferences.Pairing(clientPubkey, relay, clientName)
)
_state.value = SignerState.AwaitingClient(relay, clientName)
return@withContext null
}
lastError = "relay $relay did not answer"
}
_state.value = SignerState.Failed(lastError)
lastError
}
}
/** Re-establish the last saved pairing without a fresh QR. */
suspend fun resume(context: Context): String? {
if (!NativeCore.available) return "Signing is unavailable on this device"
val appContext = context.applicationContext
return withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val prefs = NostrSignerPreferences(appContext)
val pairing = prefs.lastPairing()
?: return@withContext "Nothing to resume — no saved pairing"
val secret = prefs.secret()
?: return@withContext "No signer key"
val info = JSONObject(NativeCore.nostrSecretFromAny(secret))
if (info.has("error")) return@withContext info.getString("error")
teardown()
_state.value = SignerState.Connecting(pairing.relay)
val opened = openSession(
pairing.relay, pairing.clientPubkey, pairing.name,
secret = "", signerSecretHex = secret, info = info,
)
if (opened == null) {
_state.value = SignerState.Failed("relay ${pairing.relay} did not answer")
return@withContext "Could not reach ${pairing.relay}"
}
session.set(opened)
_state.value = SignerState.AwaitingClient(pairing.relay, pairing.name)
null
}
}
fun unpair() {
teardown()
_state.value = SignerState.Idle
}
private fun teardown() {
session.getAndSet(null)?.socket?.close(1000, "unpaired")
_pending.value = null
}
private fun randomId(): String {
val bytes = ByteArray(8)
SecureRandom().nextBytes(bytes)
return bytes.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) }
}
private fun openSession(
relay: String,
clientPubkey: String,
clientName: String,
secret: String,
signerSecretHex: String,
info: JSONObject,
): Session? {
val signerPubkeyHex = info.getString("pubkey")
val connectRequestId = randomId()
// The listener needs the Session, the Session needs the WebSocket:
// bind through a holder set right after newWebSocket returns (OkHttp
// invokes onOpen on its own dispatcher after the network round-trip,
// i.e. always after the bind below).
val holder = AtomicReference<Session?>()
val request = Request.Builder().url(relay).build()
val socket = client.newWebSocket(request, object : WebSocketListener() {
override fun onOpen(webSocket: WebSocket, response: Response) {
val s = holder.get() ?: return
// Subscribe to requests addressed to us (p-tag filter), from
// now — no history replay of stale login attempts.
webSocket.send(
"""["REQ","${s.connectRequestId}sub",{"kinds":[24133],"#p":["${s.signerPubkeyHex}"],"since":${epochSecs() - 120}}]"""
)
// Handshake: the signer sends `connect` carrying the secret
// (rust-nostr's NostrConnectRemoteSigner.send_connect_ack —
// the exact frame the node's client waits for).
val content = JSONObject().apply {
put("id", s.connectRequestId)
put("method", "connect")
put("params", JSONArray().put(s.signerPubkeyHex).put(s.secret))
}.toString()
if (!sendEncrypted(s, content)) {
_state.value = SignerState.Failed("Could not encrypt the connect message")
}
}
override fun onMessage(webSocket: WebSocket, text: String) {
val s = session.get() ?: return
handleRelayMessage(s, text)
}
override fun onFailure(webSocket: WebSocket, t: Throwable, response: Response?) {
if (session.get()?.socket === webSocket) {
_state.value = SignerState.Failed(t.message ?: "relay connection failed")
session.getAndSet(null)
}
}
override fun onClosed(webSocket: WebSocket, code: Int, reason: String) {
if (session.get()?.socket === webSocket) {
_state.value = SignerState.Idle
session.getAndSet(null)
}
}
})
val s = Session(
socket = socket,
relay = relay,
clientPubkey = clientPubkey,
clientName = clientName,
secret = secret,
connectRequestId = connectRequestId,
signerSecretHex = signerSecretHex,
signerPubkeyHex = signerPubkeyHex,
)
holder.set(s)
return s
}
private fun epochSecs(): Long = System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000
/** Encrypt a JSON-RPC frame to the peer and publish it as kind 24133. */
private fun sendEncrypted(s: Session, json: String): Boolean {
val enc = NativeCore.nostrNip44Encrypt(s.signerSecretHex, s.clientPubkey, json)
if (NativeCore.isErr(enc)) return false
val payload = JSONObject(enc).getString("result")
val event = JSONObject().apply {
put("kind", 24133)
put("content", payload)
put("tags", JSONArray().put(JSONArray().put("p").put(s.clientPubkey)))
put("created_at", epochSecs())
}.toString()
val signed = NativeCore.nostrSignEvent(s.signerSecretHex, event)
if (NativeCore.isErr(signed)) return false
return s.socket.send("""["EVENT",$signed]""")
}
private fun handleRelayMessage(s: Session, text: String) {
val arr = try {
JSONArray(text)
} catch (_: Exception) {
return
}
if (arr.length() == 0) return
when (arr.optString(0)) {
"EVENT" -> {
val event = arr.optJSONObject(2) ?: return
if (event.optLong("kind") != 24133L) return
val id = event.optString("id")
if (id.isNotEmpty() && !s.seen.add(id)) return
val author = event.optString("pubkey")
if (author != s.clientPubkey) return // not our client
handleClientEvent(s, author, event.optString("content"))
}
// OK / CLOSED / NOTICE: nothing actionable for the bunker in v1.
}
}
private fun handleClientEvent(s: Session, author: String, content: String) {
// NIP-44 is the mandated transport; NIP-04 stays as receive fallback
// for clients that still speak the deprecated scheme.
val plain = run {
val nip44 = NativeCore.nostrNip44Decrypt(s.signerSecretHex, author, content)
if (!NativeCore.isErr(nip44)) JSONObject(nip44).getString("result") else {
val nip04 = NativeCore.nostrNip04Decrypt(s.signerSecretHex, author, content)
if (!NativeCore.isErr(nip04)) JSONObject(nip04).getString("result") else return
}
}
val msg = try {
JSONObject(plain)
} catch (_: Exception) {
return
}
val id = msg.optString("id")
val method = msg.optString("method", "")
if (method.isNotEmpty()) {
when (method) {
"connect" -> {
val params = msg.optJSONArray("params") ?: return
// Param 0 must be OUR pubkey (client is connecting to us,
// not some other bunker through this session).
val target = params.optString(0)
val givenSecret = params.optString(1)
val authorized = target == s.signerPubkeyHex &&
(s.secret.isBlank() || givenSecret == s.secret || givenSecret.isBlank())
if (authorized) {
respond(s, id, result = "ack")
_state.value = SignerState.Ready(s.relay, s.clientName)
} else {
respond(s, id, error = "unauthorized")
}
}
"get_public_key" -> respond(s, id, result = s.signerPubkeyHex)
"describe" -> respond(s, id, result = "connect get_public_key sign_event ping")
"ping" -> respond(s, id, result = "pong")
"sign_event" -> {
val params = msg.optJSONArray("params") ?: return
val eventJson = params.optString(0)
val ev = try {
JSONObject(eventJson)
} catch (_: Exception) {
respond(s, id, error = "malformed event")
return
}
// Never overwrite a pending request silently — a second
// tap on the node would otherwise cancel the visible one.
if (_pending.value == null) {
_pending.value = PendingRequest(
id = id,
method = method,
clientPubkey = author,
clientName = s.clientName,
kind = if (ev.has("kind") && !ev.isNull("kind")) ev.optLong("kind") else null,
content = if (ev.has("content") && !ev.isNull("content")) ev.optString("content") else null,
tags = formatTags(ev.optJSONArray("tags")),
createdAt = if (ev.has("created_at") && !ev.isNull("created_at")) ev.optLong("created_at") else null,
unsignedEventJson = eventJson,
)
} else {
respond(s, id, error = "busy")
}
}
else -> respond(s, id, error = "not authorized")
}
} else if (msg.has("result") || msg.has("error")) {
// A response to OUR connect request (the client's ack).
if (id == s.connectRequestId) {
if (msg.has("error")) {
_state.value = SignerState.Failed("Client rejected the connection: ${msg.optString("error")}")
} else if (msg.optString("result") == "ack") {
_state.value = SignerState.Ready(s.relay, s.clientName)
}
}
}
}
/** Approve the pending request: sign and send the result. */
suspend fun approve(): Boolean {
val s = session.get() ?: return false
val req = _pending.value ?: return false
val ok = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val signed = NativeCore.nostrSignEvent(s.signerSecretHex, req.unsignedEventJson)
if (NativeCore.isErr(signed)) {
respond(s, req.id, error = "signing failed")
false
} else {
// Result is the signed event, JSON-stringified per the spec.
respond(s, req.id, result = signed)
}
}
_pending.value = null
return ok
}
/** Deny the pending request with an explicit error. */
fun deny() {
val s = session.get() ?: return
val req = _pending.value ?: return
respond(s, req.id, error = "denied")
_pending.value = null
}
/** Send a JSON-RPC response frame to the client. True when the WS send worked. */
private fun respond(s: Session, id: String, result: String? = null, error: String? = null): Boolean {
val frame = JSONObject().apply {
put("id", id)
if (error != null) put("error", error)
if (result != null) put("result", result)
}.toString()
return sendEncrypted(s, frame)
}
private fun formatTags(tags: JSONArray?): List<String> {
tags ?: return emptyList()
val out = mutableListOf<String>()
for (i in 0 until tags.length()) {
val tag = tags.optJSONArray(i) ?: continue
val parts = mutableListOf<String>()
for (j in 0 until tag.length()) parts.add(tag.optString(j))
out.add(parts.joinToString(" "))
}
return out
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
package com.archipelago.app.nostr
import android.content.Context
import androidx.datastore.core.DataStore
import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.Preferences
import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.edit
import androidx.datastore.preferences.core.stringPreferencesKey
import androidx.datastore.preferences.preferencesDataStore
import com.archipelago.app.NativeCore
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.Flow
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.distinctUntilChanged
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.first
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.map
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
import kotlinx.coroutines.withContext
import org.json.JSONObject
private val Context.signerDataStore: DataStore<Preferences> by preferencesDataStore(name = "nostr_signer")
/**
* Storage for the phone-side NIP-46 remote signer (#139): the signer secret
* key (hex) and the last pairing, so a re-opened app can resume a session
* without re-scanning the node's QR.
*
* Same plaintext-DataStore model as the FIPS secret (app-private storage,
* no extra OS keystore ceremony — the node login password lives the same way
* in ServerPreferences); the nsec grants the ability to sign as this identity,
* never node login.
*/
class NostrSignerPreferences(private val context: Context) {
private val secretKey = stringPreferencesKey("signer_secret")
private val clientPubkeyKey = stringPreferencesKey("pair_client_pubkey")
private val clientRelayKey = stringPreferencesKey("pair_client_relay")
private val clientNameKey = stringPreferencesKey("pair_client_name")
/** The signer secret (hex) or null when no key exists yet. */
suspend fun secret(): String? = context.signerDataStore.data.first()[secretKey]
val secretFlow: Flow<String?> = context.signerDataStore.data
.map { it[secretKey] }
.distinctUntilChanged()
suspend fun saveSecret(hex: String) {
context.signerDataStore.edit { it[secretKey] = hex.trim() }
}
/** Generate a fresh signer key (fails if the native core is missing). */
suspend fun generateSecret(): JSONObject = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val json = NativeCore.nostrGenerateSecret()
val obj = JSONObject(json)
if (obj.has("error")) throw IllegalStateException(obj.getString("error"))
saveSecret(obj.getString("secret"))
obj
}
/** Import a secret from hex or nsec…; returns the parsed key info. */
suspend fun importSecret(raw: String): JSONObject = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
val json = NativeCore.nostrSecretFromAny(raw.trim())
val obj = JSONObject(json)
if (obj.has("error")) throw IllegalArgumentException(obj.getString("error"))
saveSecret(obj.getString("secret"))
obj
}
data class Pairing(val clientPubkey: String, val relay: String, val name: String)
suspend fun lastPairing(): Pairing? {
val prefs = context.signerDataStore.data.first()
val pubkey = prefs[clientPubkeyKey] ?: return null
val relay = prefs[clientRelayKey] ?: return null
if (pubkey.isBlank() || relay.isBlank()) return null
return Pairing(pubkey, relay, prefs[clientNameKey] ?: "")
}
suspend fun savePairing(pairing: Pairing) {
context.signerDataStore.edit {
it[clientPubkeyKey] = pairing.clientPubkey
it[clientRelayKey] = pairing.relay
it[clientNameKey] = pairing.name
}
}
suspend fun clearPairing() {
context.signerDataStore.edit {
it.remove(clientPubkeyKey)
it.remove(clientRelayKey)
it.remove(clientNameKey)
}
}
suspend fun wipeKey() {
context.signerDataStore.edit { it.remove(secretKey) }
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
package com.archipelago.app.ui.components
import androidx.activity.compose.rememberLauncherForActivityResult
import androidx.activity.result.contract.ActivityResultContracts
import androidx.compose.foundation.background
import androidx.compose.foundation.border
import androidx.compose.foundation.clickable
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Box
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxWidth
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.height
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.padding
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.size
import androidx.compose.foundation.shape.RoundedCornerShape
import androidx.compose.material.icons.Icons
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Restore
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Save
import androidx.compose.material3.Icon
import androidx.compose.material3.Text
import androidx.compose.runtime.Composable
import androidx.compose.runtime.getValue
import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableStateOf
import androidx.compose.runtime.remember
import androidx.compose.runtime.rememberCoroutineScope
import androidx.compose.runtime.setValue
import androidx.compose.ui.Alignment
import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
import androidx.compose.ui.draw.clip
import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.Color
import androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalContext
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontWeight
import androidx.compose.ui.text.style.TextAlign
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.sp
import com.archipelago.app.data.BackupManager
import com.archipelago.app.ui.theme.BitcoinOrange
import com.archipelago.app.ui.theme.SuccessGreen
import com.archipelago.app.ui.theme.TextMuted
import com.archipelago.app.ui.theme.TextPrimary
import kotlinx.coroutines.Dispatchers
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import kotlinx.coroutines.withContext
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat
import java.util.Date
import java.util.Locale
/**
* Backup & Restore (#128) — the hub's BACKUP sub-page (same container as
* Nodes/FIPS), the phone side of losing your phone or wiping it to cross a
* border. See docs/companion-backup-restore.md for the envelope and merge
* semantics; this composable is the flow only.
*/
@Composable
internal fun BackupSection() {
val context = LocalContext.current
val scope = rememberCoroutineScope()
val manager = remember { BackupManager(context) }
var passphrase by remember { mutableStateOf("") }
var confirm by remember { mutableStateOf("") }
var status by remember { mutableStateOf<String?>(null) }
var statusError by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
var busy by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
// Decrypted backup awaiting the user's go-ahead (restore flow).
var restorePreview by remember { mutableStateOf<Pair<BackupManager.PayloadSummary, org.json.JSONObject>?>(null) }
fun say(msg: String, error: Boolean) {
status = msg
statusError = error
}
val exportLauncher = rememberLauncherForActivityResult(
ActivityResultContracts.CreateDocument("application/json")
) { uri ->
if (uri == null) return@rememberLauncherForActivityResult
scope.launch {
busy = true
try {
val envelope = manager.createBackup(passphrase)
withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
context.contentResolver.openOutputStream(uri)?.use { out ->
out.write(envelope.toByteArray())
} ?: throw BackupManager.BackupException("could not open the destination file")
}
say("Saved — keep the file and the passphrase somewhere safe.", false)
} catch (e: Exception) {
say(e.message ?: "backup failed", true)
} finally {
busy = false
}
}
}
val importLauncher = rememberLauncherForActivityResult(
ActivityResultContracts.OpenDocument()
) { uri ->
if (uri == null) return@rememberLauncherForActivityResult
scope.launch {
busy = true
try {
val envelope = withContext(Dispatchers.IO) {
context.contentResolver.openInputStream(uri)?.use { it.readBytes().decodeToString() }
?: throw BackupManager.BackupException("could not read the selected file")
}
val (summary, payload) = manager.readBackup(envelope, passphrase)
restorePreview = summary to payload
} catch (e: Exception) {
say(e.message ?: "restore failed", true)
} finally {
busy = false
}
}
}
Column(verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(10.dp)) {
SectionCopy(
"An encrypted copy of everything this phone holds — nodes and their passwords, " +
"your mesh identity, the remote-signer key. Same envelope your node uses (ADR-005), " +
"one passphrase, no cloud."
)
// ── Create a backup ──────────────────────────────────────────────
SectionHeader(Icons.Default.Save, "Create a backup")
GlassField(
value = passphrase,
onValueChange = { passphrase = it },
placeholder = "Passphrase",
visualTransformation = androidx.compose.ui.text.input.PasswordVisualTransformation(),
)
GlassField(
value = confirm,
onValueChange = { confirm = it },
placeholder = "Repeat passphrase",
visualTransformation = androidx.compose.ui.text.input.PasswordVisualTransformation(),
)
SectionHint("The passphrase cannot be recovered — a backup nobody can open is a paperweight.")
WideAction(
text = if (busy) "Working…" else "Save backup file",
onClick = {
if (busy) return@WideAction
if (passphrase.length < 8) {
say("Use at least 8 characters — this passphrase guards every secret in the app.", true)
return@WideAction
}
if (passphrase != confirm) {
say("The two passphrases don't match.", true)
return@WideAction
}
val stamp = SimpleDateFormat("yyyyMMdd-HHmm", Locale.US).format(Date())
exportLauncher.launch("archy-companion-backup-$stamp.json")
},
)
Spacer(Modifier.height(2.dp))
// ── Restore a backup ─────────────────────────────────────────────
SectionHeader(Icons.Default.Restore, "Restore a backup")
SectionHint(
"Nothing is overwritten: nodes merge by identity, and the mesh identity and " +
"signer key only restore when this phone has none."
)
WideAction(
text = if (busy) "Working…" else "Choose backup file",
onClick = {
if (busy) return@WideAction
if (passphrase.isEmpty()) {
say("Enter the backup's passphrase first.", true)
return@WideAction
}
importLauncher.launch(arrayOf("application/json"))
},
)
restorePreview?.let { (summary, payload) ->
Spacer(Modifier.height(2.dp))
Column(
Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(14.dp))
.background(Color.White.copy(alpha = 0.04f))
.border(1.dp, Color.White.copy(alpha = 0.08f), RoundedCornerShape(14.dp))
.padding(12.dp),
verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(6.dp),
) {
Text(
"Backup verified${if (summary.appVersion.isNotBlank()) " (made by v${summary.appVersion})" else ""}",
color = SuccessGreen, fontSize = 13.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold,
)
SummaryRow("Nodes", summary.serverCount.toString())
if (summary.hasFipsIdentity) SummaryRow("Mesh identity", "included")
if (summary.hasSignerKey) SummaryRow("Remote-signer key", "included")
WideAction(
text = if (busy) "Restoring…" else "Restore onto this phone",
onClick = {
if (busy) return@WideAction
scope.launch {
busy = true
try {
val result = manager.restoreBackup(payload)
restorePreview = null
passphrase = ""
confirm = ""
say(
"Restored ${result.serversRestored} node(s)" +
(if (result.activeSet) ", set active" else "") +
(if (result.fipsIdentityRestored) ", mesh identity" else "") +
(if (result.signerKeyRestored) ", signer key" else "") +
". Restart the app to reconnect.",
false,
)
} catch (e: Exception) {
say(e.message ?: "restore failed", true)
} finally {
busy = false
}
}
},
)
}
}
status?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { msg ->
Text(
msg,
color = if (statusError) Color(0xFFFF6B6B) else SuccessGreen,
fontSize = 12.sp,
textAlign = TextAlign.Center,
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
)
}
}
}
@Composable
internal fun SectionHeader(icon: androidx.compose.ui.graphics.vector.ImageVector, title: String) {
Row(
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(10.dp),
) {
Icon(icon, contentDescription = null, tint = BitcoinOrange, modifier = Modifier.size(18.dp))
Text(title, color = TextPrimary, fontSize = 15.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold)
}
}
@Composable
internal fun SectionCopy(text: String) {
Text(text, color = TextMuted, fontSize = 12.sp, lineHeight = 16.sp)
}
@Composable
internal fun SectionHint(text: String) {
Text(text, color = TextMuted.copy(alpha = 0.8f), fontSize = 10.sp, lineHeight = 13.sp)
}
/** Wide orange-outline action button in the menu's visual language. */
@Composable
internal fun WideAction(
text: String,
onClick: () -> Unit,
icon: androidx.compose.ui.graphics.vector.ImageVector? = null,
) {
Row(
Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.height(44.dp)
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(12.dp))
.background(BitcoinOrange.copy(alpha = 0.15f))
.border(1.dp, BitcoinOrange.copy(alpha = 0.4f), RoundedCornerShape(12.dp))
.clickable { onClick() },
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.Center,
) {
if (icon != null) {
Icon(icon, contentDescription = null, tint = BitcoinOrange, modifier = Modifier.size(16.dp))
Spacer(Modifier.size(8.dp))
}
Text(text, color = BitcoinOrange, fontSize = 13.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.Bold)
}
}
@Composable
internal fun SummaryRow(label: String, value: String) {
Row(
Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.SpaceBetween,
) {
Text(label, color = TextMuted, fontSize = 12.sp)
Text(value, color = TextPrimary, fontSize = 12.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium)
}
}
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Dns
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Groups
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Keyboard
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.RestartAlt
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.SettingsBackupRestore
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Key
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.SportsEsports
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.heightIn
import androidx.compose.foundation.shape.RoundedCornerShape
@@ -106,22 +108,62 @@ fun NESMenu(
onKeyboard: () -> Unit,
onBackToWebView: (() -> Unit)? = null,
onMeshParty: (() -> Unit)? = null,
// Remote-signer pairing request (nostrconnect://… deep link, or a scan):
// non-null opens the hub on the signer sub-page and pairs. Consumed once
// the signer section hands it back via [onSignerPairHandled].
signerPairRequest: String? = null,
onSignerPairHandled: () -> Unit = {},
) {
// Pairing state is latched here (not passed straight through) so the
// source can clear itself while the request stays alive until consumed.
var pendingSignerPair by remember { mutableStateOf<String?>(null) }
var signerScan by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
LaunchedEffect(signerPairRequest) {
if (signerPairRequest != null) pendingSignerPair = signerPairRequest
}
AnimatedVisibility(visible = visible, enter = fadeIn(), exit = fadeOut()) {
// Contained hub overlay: a centred glass panel (not full-screen) that
// holds the card page and its sub-pages (Nodes, FIPS) and scrolls
// inside its own bounds when content is tall. Tapping the dimmed
// backdrop dismisses.
// holds the card page and its sub-pages (Nodes, FIPS, Backup, Signer)
// and scrolls inside its own bounds when content is tall. Tapping the
// dimmed backdrop dismisses.
Box(
Modifier.fillMaxSize().background(Color.Black.copy(alpha = 0.7f))
.clickable(indication = null, interactionSource = remember { MutableInteractionSource() }) { onDismiss() },
contentAlignment = Alignment.Center,
) {
AnimatedVisibility(visible = visible, enter = fadeIn() + scaleIn(initialScale = 0.95f), exit = fadeOut() + scaleOut(targetScale = 0.95f)) {
MenuPanel(servers, activeServer, onDismiss, onSelectServer, onAddServer, onScanQr, onEditServer, onRemoveServer, onRemote, onKeyboard, onBackToWebView, onMeshParty)
MenuPanel(
servers, activeServer, onDismiss, onSelectServer, onAddServer, onScanQr,
onEditServer, onRemoveServer, onRemote, onKeyboard, onBackToWebView, onMeshParty,
signerPairUri = pendingSignerPair,
onSignerScan = { signerScan = true },
onSignerPairHandled = {
pendingSignerPair = null
onSignerPairHandled()
},
)
}
}
}
// Pairing-QR scanner for the signer sub-page — a full-screen glass
// modal hosted OUTSIDE the hub panel so it isn't clipped to the panel's
// bounds (same layering the pairing scanner gets from WebViewScreen).
QrGlassModal(
visible = signerScan && visible,
title = "Scan pairing QR",
status = null,
idleHint = "Point at the nostrconnect QR the node or client shows",
permissionRationale = "Camera access is needed to scan the pairing code",
onDismiss = { signerScan = false },
onDecoded = { text ->
if (text.startsWith("nostrconnect://")) {
signerScan = false
pendingSignerPair = text
}
},
)
}
@Composable
@@ -138,6 +180,9 @@ private fun MenuPanel(
onKeyboard: () -> Unit,
onBackToWebView: (() -> Unit)?,
onMeshParty: (() -> Unit)?,
signerPairUri: String?,
onSignerScan: () -> Unit,
onSignerPairHandled: () -> Unit,
) {
var showAdd by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
// The saved server being edited, or null when adding a new one.
@@ -176,9 +221,10 @@ private fun MenuPanel(
.widthIn(max = 420.dp)
.fillMaxWidth()
.padding(horizontal = 20.dp)
// Cap height just short of the full screen; the panel wraps short
// content and only scrolls in the rare case it outgrows this.
.heightIn(max = (LocalConfiguration.current.screenHeightDp * 0.92f).dp)
// Cap height at 70% of the screen — a ~15% breathing margin top
// and bottom — the panel wraps short content and scrolls inside
// its own bounds when a sub-page outgrows this.
.heightIn(max = (LocalConfiguration.current.screenHeightDp * 0.70f).dp)
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(PANEL_R))
.background(PanelBg.copy(alpha = 0.86f))
.border(1.dp, PanelBorder, RoundedCornerShape(PANEL_R))
@@ -201,7 +247,13 @@ private fun MenuPanel(
IconRound(Icons.AutoMirrored.Filled.ArrowBack, "Back") { resetForm(); page = HubPage.HUB }
Spacer(Modifier.width(12.dp))
Text(
if (page == HubPage.NODES) "Nodes" else "FIPS Mesh",
when (page) {
HubPage.NODES -> "Nodes"
HubPage.FIPS -> "FIPS Mesh"
HubPage.BACKUP -> "Backup & Restore"
HubPage.SIGNER -> "Remote Signer"
HubPage.HUB -> "Menu"
},
color = TextPrimary, fontSize = 20.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.SemiBold, letterSpacing = 1.sp,
)
}
@@ -233,6 +285,12 @@ private fun MenuPanel(
if (onMeshParty != null) {
HubCard(Icons.Default.Groups, "Mesh Party", "Phone-to-phone chat & beam") { onMeshParty() }
}
// Backup & Restore (#128): the phone side of losing your phone
// or wiping it to cross a border — encrypted export file, no cloud.
HubCard(Icons.Default.SettingsBackupRestore, "Backup & Restore", "Encrypted export for a wiped phone") { page = HubPage.BACKUP }
// Remote Signer (#139): hold a nostr key on the phone and
// approve/deny remote signature requests (NIP-46).
HubCard(Icons.Default.Key, "Remote Signer", "Approve signatures for your node") { page = HubPage.SIGNER }
// Dark/Classic style lives on the remote/keyboard screen next to
// the settings button — not here.
@@ -272,6 +330,11 @@ private fun MenuPanel(
val active = server.serialize() == activeServer?.serialize()
MenuItem(
label = server.displayName(),
// FIPS nodes carry their mesh ULA — the address Termux
// (or any other app) can reach over the split-tunnel,
// from anywhere. Tap to copy; the node's npub stays
// visible in the FIPS Mesh page.
subtitle = server.meshIp.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() },
selected = active,
onClick = { onSelectServer(server) },
onEdit = { startEdit(server) },
@@ -391,11 +454,23 @@ private fun MenuPanel(
HubPage.FIPS -> {
FipsSection(embedded = true)
}
HubPage.BACKUP -> {
BackupSection()
}
HubPage.SIGNER -> {
SignerSection(
pairUri = signerPairUri,
onScan = onSignerScan,
onPairHandled = onSignerPairHandled,
)
}
}
}
}
private enum class HubPage { HUB, NODES, FIPS }
private enum class HubPage { HUB, NODES, FIPS, BACKUP, SIGNER }
/** Big tappable destination card for the hub page: icon + title + subtitle. */
@Composable
@@ -582,26 +657,52 @@ private fun MenuItem(
onClick: () -> Unit,
onEdit: (() -> Unit)? = null,
onRemove: (() -> Unit)? = null,
/** Optional second line (the node's mesh ULA); tapping it copies. */
subtitle: String? = null,
) {
val clipboard = LocalClipboardManager.current
Row(
Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.height(ROW_H)
// Rows with a second line grow to fit it.
.then(if (subtitle == null) Modifier.height(ROW_H) else Modifier.heightIn(min = ROW_H))
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(ROW_R))
.background(if (selected) BitcoinOrange.copy(alpha = 0.12f) else RowBg)
.border(1.dp, if (selected) BitcoinOrange.copy(alpha = 0.4f) else RowBorder, RoundedCornerShape(ROW_R))
.clickable { onClick() }
.padding(horizontal = 16.dp),
.padding(horizontal = 16.dp)
.then(if (subtitle == null) Modifier else Modifier.padding(vertical = 8.dp)),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.SpaceBetween,
) {
Text(
label,
color = if (selected) BitcoinOrange else labelColor,
fontSize = 16.sp,
fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium,
modifier = Modifier.weight(1f),
)
Column(Modifier.weight(1f)) {
Text(
label,
color = if (selected) BitcoinOrange else labelColor,
fontSize = 16.sp,
fontWeight = FontWeight.Medium,
)
if (subtitle != null) {
Row(
Modifier
.padding(top = 2.dp)
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(6.dp))
.clickable { clipboard.setText(AnnotatedString(subtitle)) }
.padding(horizontal = 4.dp, vertical = 2.dp),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
) {
Text(
subtitle,
color = TextMuted,
fontSize = 10.sp,
fontFamily = androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontFamily.Monospace,
maxLines = 1,
overflow = androidx.compose.ui.text.style.TextOverflow.Ellipsis,
)
Text("⧉", color = TextMuted.copy(alpha = 0.7f), fontSize = 11.sp, modifier = Modifier.padding(start = 6.dp))
}
}
}
if (onEdit != null) {
Text(
"✎",
@@ -623,7 +724,7 @@ private fun MenuItem(
/** Glass text field with centered input text. */
@Composable
private fun GlassField(
internal fun GlassField(
value: String,
onValueChange: (String) -> Unit,
placeholder: String,
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
package com.archipelago.app.ui.components
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.MutableStateFlow
/**
* Cross-layer handoff for remote-signer pairing (#139): NavGraph's
* `nostrconnect://` deep link drops the URI here and routes to the session;
* WebViewScreen collects it, opens the hub menu, and NESMenu opens the
* signer sub-page with the request. Cleared once the signer section has
* consumed it (via NESMenu's onSignerPairHandled).
*/
object SignerLaunch {
val pendingUri = MutableStateFlow<String?>(null)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
package com.archipelago.app.ui.components
import androidx.compose.foundation.background
import androidx.compose.foundation.border
import androidx.compose.foundation.clickable
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Arrangement
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Box
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Column
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Row
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.Spacer
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.fillMaxWidth
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.height
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.heightIn
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.padding
import androidx.compose.foundation.layout.size
import androidx.compose.foundation.shape.RoundedCornerShape
import androidx.compose.foundation.text.KeyboardActions
import androidx.compose.foundation.text.KeyboardOptions
import androidx.compose.material.icons.Icons
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.Key
import androidx.compose.material.icons.filled.QrCodeScanner
import androidx.compose.material3.Icon
import androidx.compose.material3.Text
import androidx.compose.runtime.Composable
import androidx.compose.runtime.LaunchedEffect
import androidx.compose.runtime.collectAsState
import androidx.compose.runtime.getValue
import androidx.compose.runtime.mutableStateOf
import androidx.compose.runtime.remember
import androidx.compose.runtime.rememberCoroutineScope
import androidx.compose.runtime.setValue
import androidx.compose.ui.Alignment
import androidx.compose.ui.Modifier
import androidx.compose.ui.draw.clip
import androidx.compose.ui.graphics.Color
import androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalClipboardManager
import androidx.compose.ui.platform.LocalContext
import androidx.compose.ui.text.AnnotatedString
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontFamily
import androidx.compose.ui.text.font.FontWeight
import androidx.compose.ui.text.input.ImeAction
import androidx.compose.ui.text.style.TextAlign
import androidx.compose.ui.text.style.TextOverflow
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.dp
import androidx.compose.ui.unit.sp
import com.archipelago.app.NativeCore
import com.archipelago.app.nostr.BunkerManager
import com.archipelago.app.nostr.NostrSignerPreferences
import com.archipelago.app.ui.theme.BitcoinOrange
import com.archipelago.app.ui.theme.SuccessGreen
import com.archipelago.app.ui.theme.TextMuted
import com.archipelago.app.ui.theme.TextPrimary
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch
import org.json.JSONObject
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat
import java.util.Date
import java.util.Locale
/**
* Remote Signer (#139) — the hub's SIGNER sub-page (same container as
* Nodes/FIPS). The phone holds a nostr key; a NIP-46 client (the node's
* login QR, any nostrconnect:// app) pairs via [pairUri] or the scanner
* (hosted by NESMenu outside this panel), and every `sign_event` request
* lands as a legible approve/deny card. See
* docs/companion-nip46-remote-signer.md.
*/
@Composable
internal fun SignerSection(
pairUri: String?,
onScan: () -> Unit,
onPairHandled: () -> Unit,
) {
val context = LocalContext.current
val scope = rememberCoroutineScope()
val clipboard = LocalClipboardManager.current
val prefs = remember { NostrSignerPreferences(context) }
var keyInfo by remember { mutableStateOf<JSONObject?>(null) }
var keyError by remember { mutableStateOf<String?>(null) }
var importText by remember { mutableStateOf("") }
var showNsec by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
var notice by remember { mutableStateOf<String?>(null) }
var noticeError by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }
val bunkerState by BunkerManager.state.collectAsState()
val pending by BunkerManager.pending.collectAsState()
fun say(msg: String, error: Boolean) {
notice = msg
noticeError = error
}
suspend fun loadKey() {
val secret = prefs.secret()
keyInfo = secret?.let {
val json = NativeCore.nostrSecretFromAny(it)
if (NativeCore.isErr(json)) null else JSONObject(json)
}
}
LaunchedEffect(Unit) {
BunkerManager.refreshState(context)
loadKey()
}
// Consume a pairing request (deep link or scanner) exactly once.
LaunchedEffect(pairUri) {
val uri = pairUri?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() } ?: return@LaunchedEffect
if (keyInfo == null) loadKey()
val err = BunkerManager.pair(context, uri)
if (err != null) say(err, true) else say("Pairing started…", false)
onPairHandled()
}
Column(verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(10.dp)) {
SectionCopy(
"Hold a nostr key on this phone and sign for it remotely — pair with your " +
"node's login QR (or any NIP-46 client), then approve each signature " +
"request as it arrives. Nothing signs without you."
)
if (bunkerState is BunkerManager.SignerState.Unavailable) {
Text(
"Signing is unavailable on this device (native core missing).",
color = Color(0xFFFF6B6B), fontSize = 12.sp,
)
}
val info = keyInfo
if (info == null) {
// ── No key yet: generate or import ──────────────────────────
keyError?.let { Text(it, color = Color(0xFFFF6B6B), fontSize = 11.sp) }
WideAction(text = "Generate signer key", onClick = {
scope.launch {
try {
keyInfo = prefs.generateSecret()
keyError = null
BunkerManager.refreshState(context)
} catch (e: Exception) {
keyError = e.message ?: "could not generate a key"
}
}
})
GlassField(
value = importText,
onValueChange = { importText = it },
placeholder = "or import nsec…",
keyboardOptions = KeyboardOptions(imeAction = ImeAction.Done),
keyboardActions = KeyboardActions(onGo = {
if (importText.isNotBlank()) {
scope.launch {
try {
keyInfo = prefs.importSecret(importText)
importText = ""
keyError = null
BunkerManager.refreshState(context)
} catch (e: Exception) {
keyError = e.message ?: "not a valid nsec"
}
}
}
}),
)
WideAction(text = "Import", onClick = {
if (importText.isBlank()) return@WideAction
scope.launch {
try {
keyInfo = prefs.importSecret(importText)
importText = ""
keyError = null
BunkerManager.refreshState(context)
} catch (e: Exception) {
keyError = e.message ?: "not a valid nsec"
}
}
})
} else {
// ── Identity ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
SectionHeader(Icons.Default.Key, "Signer identity")
MonoValue("npub", info.optString("npub")) {
clipboard.setText(AnnotatedString(info.optString("npub")))
}
if (showNsec) {
MonoValue("nsec", info.optString("nsec"), secret = true) {
clipboard.setText(AnnotatedString(info.optString("nsec")))
}
SectionHint("Anyone with the nsec can sign as you — clear the clipboard after copying.")
} else {
Text(
"Show nsec",
color = TextMuted, fontSize = 11.sp,
modifier = Modifier
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(8.dp))
.clickable { showNsec = true }
.padding(vertical = 2.dp, horizontal = 6.dp),
)
}
// ── Session ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
Spacer(Modifier.height(2.dp))
val label = when (val s = bunkerState) {
BunkerManager.SignerState.Unavailable -> "Unavailable on this device"
BunkerManager.SignerState.NoKey -> "No signer key yet"
BunkerManager.SignerState.Idle -> "Idle — pair to start"
is BunkerManager.SignerState.Connecting -> "Connecting to ${s.relay}…"
is BunkerManager.SignerState.AwaitingClient -> "Paired with \"${s.clientName}\" — waiting for the handshake to finish"
is BunkerManager.SignerState.Ready -> "Ready for \"${s.clientName}\""
is BunkerManager.SignerState.Failed -> s.reason
}
Text("Session", color = TextMuted, fontSize = 11.sp)
Text(
label,
color = if (bunkerState is BunkerManager.SignerState.Failed) Color(0xFFFF6B6B)
else if (bunkerState is BunkerManager.SignerState.Ready) SuccessGreen
else TextPrimary,
fontSize = 13.sp,
lineHeight = 17.sp,
)
WideAction(
text = "Scan pairing QR",
onClick = {
if (bunkerState is BunkerManager.SignerState.NoKey) {
say("Generate or import a signer key first.", true)
return@WideAction
}
onScan()
},
icon = Icons.Default.QrCodeScanner,
)
if (bunkerState is BunkerManager.SignerState.Ready ||
bunkerState is BunkerManager.SignerState.AwaitingClient ||
bunkerState is BunkerManager.SignerState.Connecting
) {
Text(
"End session",
color = TextMuted, fontSize = 11.sp,
modifier = Modifier
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(8.dp))
.clickable { BunkerManager.unpair() }
.padding(vertical = 2.dp, horizontal = 6.dp),
)
}
// ── Pending signature request — the whole point ──────────────
pending?.let { req ->
Spacer(Modifier.height(2.dp))
Column(
Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(14.dp))
.background(Color.White.copy(alpha = 0.04f))
.border(1.dp, BitcoinOrange.copy(alpha = 0.35f), RoundedCornerShape(14.dp))
.padding(12.dp),
verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(6.dp),
) {
Text("Signature request", color = BitcoinOrange, fontSize = 13.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.Bold)
SummaryRow("Client", req.clientName.ifBlank { req.clientPubkey.take(12) + "…" })
SummaryRow("Kind", kindLabel(req.kind))
req.createdAt?.let {
SummaryRow("Time", SimpleDateFormat("HH:mm:ss", Locale.US).format(Date(it * 1000)))
}
req.content?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { content ->
Text(
content,
color = TextPrimary, fontSize = 10.sp, lineHeight = 14.sp,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
modifier = Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(10.dp))
.background(Color.Black.copy(alpha = 0.45f))
.padding(8.dp)
.heightIn(max = 160.dp),
)
}
if (req.tags.isNotEmpty()) {
Column(
Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(10.dp))
.background(Color.Black.copy(alpha = 0.45f))
.padding(8.dp),
verticalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(2.dp),
) {
req.tags.take(6).forEach {
Text(
it,
color = TextMuted, fontSize = 9.sp,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
maxLines = 1,
overflow = TextOverflow.Ellipsis,
)
}
if (req.tags.size > 6) {
Text("+${req.tags.size - 6} more", color = TextMuted, fontSize = 9.sp)
}
}
}
Row(horizontalArrangement = Arrangement.spacedBy(10.dp)) {
Box(
Modifier
.weight(1f)
.height(40.dp)
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(12.dp))
.background(Color(0xFFE5484D).copy(alpha = 0.16f))
.border(1.dp, Color(0xFFE5484D).copy(alpha = 0.5f), RoundedCornerShape(12.dp))
.clickable { BunkerManager.deny() },
contentAlignment = Alignment.Center,
) { Text("Deny", color = Color(0xFFFF8A8D), fontSize = 13.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.Bold) }
Box(
Modifier
.weight(1f)
.height(40.dp)
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(12.dp))
.background(BitcoinOrange.copy(alpha = 0.2f))
.border(1.dp, BitcoinOrange.copy(alpha = 0.6f), RoundedCornerShape(12.dp))
.clickable {
scope.launch {
val ok = BunkerManager.approve()
say(if (ok) "Signed and sent." else "Could not send the signature.", !ok)
}
},
contentAlignment = Alignment.Center,
) { Text("Approve", color = BitcoinOrange, fontSize = 13.sp, fontWeight = FontWeight.Bold) }
}
}
}
}
notice?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }?.let { msg ->
Text(
msg,
color = if (noticeError) Color(0xFFFF6B6B) else SuccessGreen,
fontSize = 12.sp,
textAlign = TextAlign.Center,
modifier = Modifier.fillMaxWidth(),
)
}
}
}
/** Kind number → legible label, so the approve/deny card reads like a sentence. */
private fun kindLabel(kind: Long?): String = when (kind) {
0L -> "Metadata (kind 0)"
1L -> "Text note (kind 1)"
3L -> "Contact list (kind 3)"
4L -> "Direct message (kind 4)"
7L -> "Reaction (kind 7)"
14L -> "Chat message (kind 14)"
22242L -> "Client authentication (kind 22242)"
30078L -> "App-stored data (kind 30078)"
null -> "Unknown kind"
else -> "Kind $kind"
}
/** Monospace value chip with a copy affordance (tap the row). */
@Composable
private fun MonoValue(label: String, value: String, secret: Boolean = false, onCopy: () -> Unit) {
Column(Modifier.fillMaxWidth()) {
Text(label, color = TextMuted, fontSize = 10.sp)
Row(
Modifier
.fillMaxWidth()
.clip(RoundedCornerShape(10.dp))
.background(Color.Black.copy(alpha = 0.45f))
.clickable { onCopy() }
.padding(horizontal = 10.dp, vertical = 8.dp),
verticalAlignment = Alignment.CenterVertically,
) {
Text(
value,
color = if (secret) Color(0xFFFFB86B) else TextPrimary,
fontSize = 10.sp,
fontFamily = FontFamily.Monospace,
modifier = Modifier.weight(1f),
maxLines = 1,
overflow = TextOverflow.Ellipsis,
)
Text("⧉", color = TextMuted, fontSize = 13.sp, modifier = Modifier.padding(start = 8.dp))
}
}
}
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import com.archipelago.app.data.ServerEntry
import com.archipelago.app.data.ServerPreferences
import com.archipelago.app.data.ServerQrParser
import com.archipelago.app.fips.FipsManager
import com.archipelago.app.ui.components.SignerLaunch
import com.archipelago.app.ui.screens.FlareScreen
import com.archipelago.app.ui.screens.IntroScreen
import com.archipelago.app.ui.screens.NodePickerScreen
@@ -133,27 +134,41 @@ fun AppNavHost(
LaunchedEffect(pairUri) {
val raw = pairUri ?: return@LaunchedEffect
onPairUriConsumed()
when (val result = ServerQrParser.parse(raw)) {
is PairResult.Success -> {
// Pairing implies the app is installed and in use — skip the intro.
when {
// Remote-signer pairing deep link (NIP-46): nostrconnect://…
// from the node's login QR — any QR scanner app can hand it over.
// The signer UI lives inside the hub menu: drop the URI where
// WebViewScreen picks it up and route to the session, which opens
// the hub on its signer sub-page.
raw.startsWith("nostrconnect://") -> {
prefs.markIntroSeen()
val merged = prefs.upsertServer(result.server)
FipsManager.registerNode(context, result.fips, merged.displayName())
if (merged.password.isNotBlank()) {
// Demo flow: password came with the link — connect in one step.
prefs.setActiveServer(merged)
navController.navigate(Routes.WEB_VIEW) {
popUpTo(0) { inclusive = true }
}
} else {
pairPrefill = merged
navController.navigate(Routes.SERVER_CONNECT) {
popUpTo(0) { inclusive = true }
}
SignerLaunch.pendingUri.value = raw
navController.navigate(Routes.WEB_VIEW) {
popUpTo(0) { inclusive = true }
}
}
else -> {
// Invalid or too-new pairing link — ignore; normal startup continues.
else -> when (val result = ServerQrParser.parse(raw)) {
is PairResult.Success -> {
// Pairing implies the app is installed and in use — skip the intro.
prefs.markIntroSeen()
val merged = prefs.upsertServer(result.server)
FipsManager.registerNode(context, result.fips, merged.displayName())
if (merged.password.isNotBlank()) {
// Demo flow: password came with the link — connect in one step.
prefs.setActiveServer(merged)
navController.navigate(Routes.WEB_VIEW) {
popUpTo(0) { inclusive = true }
}
} else {
pairPrefill = merged
navController.navigate(Routes.SERVER_CONNECT) {
popUpTo(0) { inclusive = true }
}
}
}
else -> {
// Invalid or too-new pairing link — ignore; normal startup continues.
}
}
}
}
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ import com.archipelago.app.fips.FipsManager
import com.archipelago.app.ui.components.GestureHintOverlay
import com.archipelago.app.ui.components.MeshLoadingScreen
import com.archipelago.app.ui.components.NESMenu
import com.archipelago.app.ui.components.SignerLaunch
import com.archipelago.app.ui.components.QrScannerOverlay
import com.archipelago.app.ui.components.SlidingLoader
import com.archipelago.app.ui.components.WalletQrScannerModal
@@ -1373,6 +1374,16 @@ fun WebViewScreen(
// Hub menu overlay — opened by the three-finger hold, drawn above
// everything (also reachable from the error screen, where switching
// servers is exactly what's needed).
// Remote-signer deep link: route to the session and pop the hub open
// on its signer sub-page (the request itself is consumed by NESMenu).
var signerPairRequest by remember { mutableStateOf<String?>(null) }
val signerLaunch by SignerLaunch.pendingUri.collectAsState()
LaunchedEffect(signerLaunch) {
val uri = signerLaunch ?: return@LaunchedEffect
signerPairRequest = uri
SignerLaunch.pendingUri.value = null
showHubMenu = true
}
NESMenu(
visible = showHubMenu,
servers = savedServers,
@@ -1427,6 +1438,8 @@ fun WebViewScreen(
onKeyboard = { showHubMenu = false; onRemoteKeyboard() },
onBackToWebView = { showHubMenu = false },
onMeshParty = onMeshParty?.let { open -> { showHubMenu = false; open() } },
signerPairRequest = signerPairRequest,
onSignerPairHandled = { signerPairRequest = null },
)
// Pairing-QR scan launched from the menu's Nodes page; the menu stays
+369 -1
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,17 @@ dependencies = [
"generic-array",
]
[[package]]
name = "aes"
version = "0.8.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b169f7a6d4742236a0a00c541b845991d0ac43e546831af1249753ab4c3aa3a0"
dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"cipher",
"cpufeatures 0.2.17",
]
[[package]]
name = "aho-corasick"
version = "1.1.4"
@@ -81,17 +92,41 @@ checksum = "330a5ed07fa54e4702c9d6c4174f74427fc0ef6e214bbd677ae50a5099946470"
name = "archy-fips-core"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"aes",
"anyhow",
"argon2",
"base64",
"bech32",
"cbc",
"chacha20 0.9.1",
"chacha20poly1305",
"fips",
"getrandom 0.2.17",
"hex",
"hkdf",
"hmac",
"jni",
"libc",
"paranoid-android",
"secp256k1 0.29.1",
"serde_json",
"sha2",
"tokio",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
"url",
]
[[package]]
name = "argon2"
version = "0.5.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3c3610892ee6e0cbce8ae2700349fcf8f98adb0dbfbee85aec3c9179d29cc072"
dependencies = [
"base64ct",
"blake2",
"cpufeatures 0.2.17",
"password-hash",
]
[[package]]
@@ -124,6 +159,18 @@ version = "1.1.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1505bd5d3d116872e7271a6d4e16d81d0c8570876c8de68093a09ac269d8aac0"
[[package]]
name = "base64"
version = "0.22.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "72b3254f16251a8381aa12e40e3c4d2f0199f8c6508fbecb9d91f575e0fbb8c6"
[[package]]
name = "base64ct"
version = "1.8.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2af50177e190e07a26ab74f8b1efbfe2ef87da2116221318cb1c2e82baf7de06"
[[package]]
name = "bech32"
version = "0.11.1"
@@ -172,6 +219,15 @@ version = "2.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b588b76d00fde79687d7646a9b5bdf3cc0f655e0bbd080335a95d7e96f3587da"
[[package]]
name = "blake2"
version = "0.10.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "46502ad458c9a52b69d4d4d32775c788b7a1b85e8bc9d482d92250fc0e3f8efe"
dependencies = [
"digest",
]
[[package]]
name = "block-buffer"
version = "0.10.4"
@@ -181,6 +237,15 @@ dependencies = [
"generic-array",
]
[[package]]
name = "block-padding"
version = "0.3.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a8894febbff9f758034a5b8e12d87918f56dfc64a8e1fe757d65e29041538d93"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
]
[[package]]
name = "blocking"
version = "1.6.2"
@@ -200,6 +265,15 @@ version = "1.12.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "fc652a48c352aef3ea3aed32080501cf3ef6ed5da78602a020c991775b0aff04"
[[package]]
name = "cbc"
version = "0.1.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "26b52a9543ae338f279b96b0b9fed9c8093744685043739079ce85cd58f289a6"
dependencies = [
"cipher",
]
[[package]]
name = "cc"
version = "1.3.0"
@@ -406,6 +480,17 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "displaydoc"
version = "0.2.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c6232dd377dcc64799954cbd3a9bb882e9cdc1308ccd87b1c098f1fb2eaf82a8"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 3.0.3",
]
[[package]]
name = "either"
version = "1.16.0"
@@ -476,7 +561,7 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
"rand 0.10.2",
"rtnetlink",
"secp256k1",
"secp256k1 0.30.0",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"serde_yaml",
@@ -491,6 +576,15 @@ dependencies = [
"tun",
]
[[package]]
name = "form_urlencoded"
version = "1.2.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cb4cb245038516f5f85277875cdaa4f7d2c9a0fa0468de06ed190163b1581fcf"
dependencies = [
"percent-encoding",
]
[[package]]
name = "futures"
version = "0.3.33"
@@ -676,6 +770,110 @@ dependencies = [
"digest",
]
[[package]]
name = "icu_collections"
version = "2.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "fa68d21081c4a05d5a901a1c62add574c77048b6a1c67be3b50ce0b60d4ca513"
dependencies = [
"displaydoc",
"potential_utf",
"utf8_iter",
"yoke",
"zerofrom",
"zerovec",
]
[[package]]
name = "icu_locale_core"
version = "2.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d56e28588da92eee5c3201a6eff33fabdd49b62269c8938d4ff050ce4d900deb"
dependencies = [
"displaydoc",
"litemap",
"tinystr",
"writeable",
"zerovec",
]
[[package]]
name = "icu_normalizer"
version = "2.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "12f9cf5f235641ed274641dd81c3f28d870e276763d0797aeeab72317b1c646f"
dependencies = [
"icu_collections",
"icu_normalizer_data",
"icu_properties",
"icu_provider",
"smallvec",
"zerovec",
]
[[package]]
name = "icu_normalizer_data"
version = "2.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1563da1ed3e0b3bf3d74c9b85917ac9c56464d2f57242270c09c9e752f8021a0"
[[package]]
name = "icu_properties"
version = "2.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "7e7ca276ad3145661a65914e6daf131ca5120cd3dcee8f8f3214b8875184a148"
dependencies = [
"displaydoc",
"icu_collections",
"icu_locale_core",
"icu_properties_data",
"icu_provider",
"zerotrie",
"zerovec",
]
[[package]]
name = "icu_properties_data"
version = "2.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e590f038c1464a96894fd6d10127e90a8be4509f56ff7ecef851b15cee0b7caa"
[[package]]
name = "icu_provider"
version = "2.3.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d27bbb9d3abbefac45d55f647c9de1d44aafcd1186eb91879afef17c396c3e73"
dependencies = [
"displaydoc",
"icu_locale_core",
"writeable",
"yoke",
"zerofrom",
"zerotrie",
"zerovec",
]
[[package]]
name = "idna"
version = "1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3b0875f23caa03898994f6ddc501886a45c7d3d62d04d2d90788d47be1b1e4de"
dependencies = [
"idna_adapter",
"smallvec",
"utf8_iter",
]
[[package]]
name = "idna_adapter"
version = "1.2.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cb68373c0d6620ef8105e855e7745e18b0d00d3bdb07fb532e434244cdb9a714"
dependencies = [
"icu_normalizer",
"icu_properties",
]
[[package]]
name = "indexmap"
version = "2.14.0"
@@ -692,6 +890,7 @@ version = "0.1.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "879f10e63c20629ecabbb64a8010319738c66a5cd0c29b02d63d272b03751d01"
dependencies = [
"block-padding",
"generic-array",
]
@@ -788,6 +987,12 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
]
[[package]]
name = "litemap"
version = "0.8.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "47d9d19d1d6efa0109d2f65ff4c85cddd50bd572e5a00127ab10987290bcefae"
[[package]]
name = "log"
version = "0.4.33"
@@ -954,12 +1159,29 @@ version = "2.2.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f38d5652c16fde515bb1ecef450ab0f6a219d619a7274976324d5e377f7dceba"
[[package]]
name = "password-hash"
version = "0.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "346f04948ba92c43e8469c1ee6736c7563d71012b17d40745260fe106aac2166"
dependencies = [
"base64ct",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "paste"
version = "1.0.15"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "57c0d7b74b563b49d38dae00a0c37d4d6de9b432382b2892f0574ddcae73fd0a"
[[package]]
name = "percent-encoding"
version = "2.3.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9b4f627cb1b25917193a259e49bdad08f671f8d9708acfd5fe0a8c1455d87220"
[[package]]
name = "pin-project-lite"
version = "0.2.17"
@@ -988,6 +1210,15 @@ dependencies = [
"universal-hash",
]
[[package]]
name = "potential_utf"
version = "0.1.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d83eb9bc6d8e5cf568e7a1101d60ee05e81ed50ea106026f3d18deeb046d7661"
dependencies = [
"zerovec",
]
[[package]]
name = "ppv-lite86"
version = "0.2.21"
@@ -1129,6 +1360,15 @@ dependencies = [
"winapi-util",
]
[[package]]
name = "secp256k1"
version = "0.29.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9465315bc9d4566e1724f0fffcbcc446268cb522e60f9a27bcded6b19c108113"
dependencies = [
"secp256k1-sys",
]
[[package]]
name = "secp256k1"
version = "0.30.0"
@@ -1272,6 +1512,12 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "stable_deref_trait"
version = "1.2.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6ce2be8dc25455e1f91df71bfa12ad37d7af1092ae736f3a6cd0e37bc7810596"
[[package]]
name = "strsim"
version = "0.11.1"
@@ -1306,6 +1552,17 @@ dependencies = [
"unicode-ident",
]
[[package]]
name = "synstructure"
version = "0.13.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "728a70f3dbaf5bab7f0c4b1ac8d7ae5ea60a4b5549c8a5914361c99147a709d2"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.119",
]
[[package]]
name = "thiserror"
version = "1.0.69"
@@ -1355,6 +1612,16 @@ dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
]
[[package]]
name = "tinystr"
version = "0.8.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b1e27c91459209c2986af3dcf603a5a74a4368754ce37414f59acc971167f643"
dependencies = [
"displaydoc",
"zerovec",
]
[[package]]
name = "tokio"
version = "1.53.1"
@@ -1519,6 +1786,24 @@ version = "0.2.11"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "673aac59facbab8a9007c7f6108d11f63b603f7cabff99fabf650fea5c32b861"
[[package]]
name = "url"
version = "2.5.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ff67a8a4397373c3ef660812acab3268222035010ab8680ec4215f38ba3d0eed"
dependencies = [
"form_urlencoded",
"idna",
"percent-encoding",
"serde",
]
[[package]]
name = "utf8_iter"
version = "1.0.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b6c140620e7ffbb22c2dee59cafe6084a59b5ffc27a8859a5f0d494b5d52b6be"
[[package]]
name = "utf8parse"
version = "0.2.2"
@@ -1657,6 +1942,35 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.61.2",
]
[[package]]
name = "writeable"
version = "0.6.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3ad82d2a33cdc9674dc7465672f271e096168fcdbe0f799d9e6db8c5892679dc"
[[package]]
name = "yoke"
version = "0.8.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "709fe23a0424b6a435d82152b1bd3fdfb0833487d5fa90d05d42762a9891fef5"
dependencies = [
"stable_deref_trait",
"yoke-derive",
"zerofrom",
]
[[package]]
name = "yoke-derive"
version = "0.8.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "de844c262c8848816172cef550288e7dc6c7b7814b4ee56b3e1553f275f1858e"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.119",
"synstructure",
]
[[package]]
name = "zerocopy"
version = "0.8.55"
@@ -1677,12 +1991,66 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.119",
]
[[package]]
name = "zerofrom"
version = "0.1.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0ec05a11813ea801ff6d75110ad09cd0824ddba17dfe17128ea0d5f68e6c5272"
dependencies = [
"zerofrom-derive",
]
[[package]]
name = "zerofrom-derive"
version = "0.1.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "11532158c46691caf0f2593ea8358fed6bbf68a0315e80aae9bd41fbade684a1"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 2.0.119",
"synstructure",
]
[[package]]
name = "zeroize"
version = "1.9.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "e13c156562582aa81c60cb29407084cdb54c4164760106ab78e6c5b0858cf64e"
[[package]]
name = "zerotrie"
version = "0.2.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4ea269c3bd32f0a32c321907a2ae912ba6f4649bb0fc764a15627e99a7095a3f"
dependencies = [
"displaydoc",
"yoke",
"zerofrom",
]
[[package]]
name = "zerovec"
version = "0.11.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "bb0464e17806c1d976d5cba29399c7f08e516e279e2ba493f63123b5fca67dd8"
dependencies = [
"yoke",
"zerofrom",
"zerovec-derive",
]
[[package]]
name = "zerovec-derive"
version = "0.11.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "34df6fc39dbd26ddc9c10e6a2984476e13acce22e64e4487636ef494369225da"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
"syn 3.0.3",
]
[[package]]
name = "zmij"
version = "1.0.23"
+29
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,35 @@ tracing = "0.1"
# fcntl: force the VpnService TUN fd into blocking mode (see mesh::start).
libc = "0.2"
# ── Companion backup (#128) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
# ADR-005 envelope: the SAME crates and blob layout as the node's backup code
# (core/archipelago/src/backup/identity.rs) — Argon2id KDF + ChaCha20-Poly1305
# AEAD — applied to the companion's own JSON payload. Do not diverge from
# those parameters: a companion backup and a node backup must decrypt with
# the same code path on either side.
argon2 = "0.5"
chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
base64 = "0.22"
# ── NIP-46 remote signer (#139) ───────────────────────────────────────────
# BIP340 schnorr signing + secp256k1 ECDH (NIP-44/NIP-04 conversation keys).
# Audited libsecp256k1 via cc; cargo-ndk provides the NDK clang on Android.
secp256k1 = "0.29"
# NIP-44 v2: HKDF-SHA256 (conversation/message keys) + HMAC-SHA256 (MAC).
sha2 = "0.10"
hmac = "0.12"
hkdf = "0.12"
# NIP-44 v2 stream cipher (raw ChaCha20, RFC 8439 — NOT the AEAD).
chacha20 = "0.9"
# NIP-04 fallback (deprecated in the spec but still sent by real clients):
# AES-256-CBC, key = raw ECDH x-coordinate.
aes = "0.8"
cbc = { version = "0.1", features = ["alloc"] }
# npub/nsec (bech32, BIP173 variant — NOT Bech32m).
bech32 = "0.11"
# nostrconnect:// URI parsing (repeated relay params + percent-decoding).
url = "2.5"
# The JNI surface only exists on Android; host builds skip it and drive the
# mesh module directly (tests).
[target.'cfg(target_os = "android")'.dependencies]
+246
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
//! Companion app backup — the ADR-005 encrypted-backup envelope.
//!
//! Reuses the node's backup format exactly (ADR-005:
//! `core/archipelago/src/backup/identity.rs`): Argon2id key derivation with
//! default params, ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, and the same blob layout
//! `base64(salt[16] || nonce[12] || ciphertext)`. A companion backup and a
//! node backup share one crypto story — the payload differs (the companion
//! serializes its servers, FIPS identity and signer key instead of a node
//! key), the envelope does not.
//!
//! The envelope is JSON with `version`, `kind`, `encrypted`, `blob` and
//! `timestamp`; [`decrypt`] ignores any extra fields, so node envelopes
//! (which carry `did`/`pubkey`/`kid`) decrypt here too.
use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
use argon2::Argon2;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use base64::Engine;
use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, KeyInit};
use chacha20poly1305::{ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce};
use serde_json::json;
/// Envelope version. Bump only when the blob layout itself changes — and
/// then only with a reader for the old layout (same policy as the node).
const BACKUP_VERSION: u32 = 1;
const SALT_LEN: usize = 16;
const NONCE_LEN: usize = 12;
const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
/// Encrypt a JSON payload into an ADR-005 envelope.
///
/// The passphrase never leaves this call; the envelope carries only the
/// salt (Argon2id parameter), the AEAD nonce, and the ciphertext.
pub fn encrypt(payload: &str, passphrase: &str) -> Result<String> {
if payload.is_empty() {
bail!("backup payload is empty");
}
if passphrase.is_empty() {
bail!("backup passphrase must not be empty");
}
let mut salt = [0u8; SALT_LEN];
let mut nonce = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
// Same CSPRNG discipline as identity generation (getrandom, see mesh.rs):
// OS RNG, never thread-local or derived-from-content randomness for key
// material or nonces.
getrandom::getrandom(&mut salt).context("OS RNG")?;
getrandom::getrandom(&mut nonce).context("OS RNG")?;
let key = derive_key(passphrase, &salt)?;
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(&key));
let ciphertext = cipher
.encrypt(Nonce::from_slice(&nonce), payload.as_bytes())
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("encryption failed"))?;
let mut blob = Vec::with_capacity(SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN + ciphertext.len());
blob.extend_from_slice(&salt);
blob.extend_from_slice(&nonce);
blob.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
Ok(json!({
"version": BACKUP_VERSION,
"kind": "companion",
"encrypted": true,
"blob": BASE64.encode(&blob),
"timestamp": chrono_like_now(),
})
.to_string())
}
/// Decrypt an ADR-005 envelope back into its JSON payload.
///
/// Accepts `version: 1` envelopes regardless of `kind` or extra fields —
/// the node's identity backups use the same blob, and being able to decrypt
/// one here is free interop (the caller decides what to do with it).
pub fn decrypt(envelope: &str, passphrase: &str) -> Result<String> {
let obj: serde_json::Value =
serde_json::from_str(envelope).context("not a JSON backup envelope")?;
if obj.get("version").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()) != Some(BACKUP_VERSION as u64) {
bail!("unsupported backup version (expected {BACKUP_VERSION})");
}
let blob_b64 = obj
.get("blob")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.context("missing 'blob' in backup envelope")?;
let blob = BASE64
.decode(blob_b64)
.context("invalid base64 in backup blob")?;
if blob.len() < SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN {
bail!("backup blob too short");
}
let salt = &blob[..SALT_LEN];
let nonce = &blob[SALT_LEN..SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN];
let ciphertext = &blob[SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN..];
let key = derive_key(passphrase, salt)?;
let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(&key));
let plaintext = cipher
.decrypt(Nonce::from_slice(nonce), ciphertext)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("decryption failed — wrong passphrase or corrupted backup"))?;
String::from_utf8(plaintext).context("decrypted payload is not valid UTF-8")
}
fn derive_key(passphrase: &str, salt: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; KEY_LEN]> {
let mut key = [0u8; KEY_LEN];
Argon2::default()
.hash_password_into(passphrase.as_bytes(), salt, &mut key)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Argon2 key derivation failed: {e}"))?;
Ok(key)
}
/// RFC 3339 UTC timestamp without pulling chrono into the .so — the node's
/// envelope field is informational (display), not part of the authenticated
/// or derived material.
fn chrono_like_now() -> String {
let secs = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
.unwrap_or(0);
let days = secs / 86_400;
let rem = secs % 86_400;
let (h, m, s) = (rem / 3600, (rem % 3600) / 60, rem % 60);
// Civil-from-days (Howard Hinnant's algorithm), valid for 1970-2100+.
let z = days as i64 + 719_468;
let era = z.div_euclid(146_097);
let doe = z.rem_euclid(146_097);
let yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36_524 - doe / 146_096) / 365;
let y = yoe + era * 400;
let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100);
let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153;
let d = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1;
let mo = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 };
let y = if mo <= 2 { y + 1 } else { y };
format!("{y:04}-{mo:02}-{d:02}T{h:02}:{m:02}:{s:02}Z")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
const PAYLOAD: &str = r#"{"app":"archipelago-companion","servers":["192.168.1.10|false|1301||Lab Node|fd00::1|npub1abc"]}"#;
#[test]
fn round_trip() {
let envelope = encrypt(PAYLOAD, "correct horse battery staple").unwrap();
let decrypted = decrypt(&envelope, "correct horse battery staple").unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, PAYLOAD);
}
#[test]
fn wrong_passphrase_fails() {
let envelope = encrypt(PAYLOAD, "right").unwrap();
let err = decrypt(&envelope, "wrong").unwrap_err();
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("wrong passphrase"),
"error should name the likely cause: {err}"
);
}
#[test]
fn envelope_shape_matches_node_format() {
let envelope = encrypt(PAYLOAD, "pw").unwrap();
let obj: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&envelope).unwrap();
assert_eq!(obj["version"], 1);
assert_eq!(obj["encrypted"], true);
assert!(obj["kind"].as_str().is_some());
assert!(obj["timestamp"].as_str().is_some());
// Blob layout is exactly the node's: base64(salt||nonce||ct) with the
// AEAD tag inside the ciphertext — at least 16+12+16+1 bytes.
let blob = BASE64
.decode(obj["blob"].as_str().unwrap())
.expect("blob is base64");
assert!(blob.len() >= SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN + 16 + PAYLOAD.len());
}
#[test]
fn fresh_salt_and_nonce_every_time() {
let a = encrypt(PAYLOAD, "pw").unwrap();
let b = encrypt(PAYLOAD, "pw").unwrap();
let (oa, ob): (serde_json::Value, serde_json::Value) = (
serde_json::from_str(&a).unwrap(),
serde_json::from_str(&b).unwrap(),
);
assert_ne!(oa["blob"], ob["blob"], "salt/nonce must never repeat");
}
#[test]
fn tampered_blob_fails_to_decrypt() {
let envelope = encrypt(PAYLOAD, "pw").unwrap();
let mut obj: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&envelope).unwrap();
let blob = BASE64.decode(obj["blob"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
let mut tampered = blob.clone();
// Flip a bit inside the ciphertext (past salt+nonce).
tampered[SALT_LEN + NONCE_LEN] ^= 0x01;
obj["blob"] = serde_json::Value::String(BASE64.encode(&tampered));
assert!(decrypt(&obj.to_string(), "pw").is_err());
}
/// Node identity backups use the same blob layout but carry their own
/// envelope fields (did/pubkey/kid). Decrypt must ignore those extras —
/// one envelope reader, two producers.
#[test]
fn node_style_envelope_with_extra_fields_decrypts() {
let envelope = encrypt(PAYLOAD, "pw").unwrap();
let mut obj: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&envelope).unwrap();
obj["kind"] = serde_json::Value::String("node-identity".into());
obj["did"] = serde_json::Value::String("did:key:z6Mktest".into());
obj["pubkey"] = serde_json::Value::String("aabbcc".into());
obj["kid"] = serde_json::Value::String("did:key:z6Mktest#key-1".into());
let decrypted = decrypt(&obj.to_string(), "pw").unwrap();
assert_eq!(decrypted, PAYLOAD);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_unknown_version_and_garbage() {
let err = decrypt("{\"version\":99,\"blob\":\"AAAA\"}", "pw").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("version"));
assert!(decrypt("not json", "pw").is_err());
assert!(decrypt("{\"version\":1}", "pw").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn rejects_empty_passphrase_and_payload() {
assert!(encrypt(PAYLOAD, "").is_err());
assert!(encrypt("", "pw").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn timestamp_is_rfc3339_utc() {
let envelope = encrypt(PAYLOAD, "pw").unwrap();
let obj: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&envelope).unwrap();
let ts = obj["timestamp"].as_str().unwrap();
// 2026-08-31T12:34:56Z — 20 chars, RFC 3339 UTC.
assert_eq!(ts.len(), 20);
assert!(ts.ends_with('Z'));
assert_eq!(&ts[4..5], "-");
assert_eq!(&ts[10..11], "T");
assert!(ts.starts_with("20"));
}
}
+177 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
//! JNI surface for `com.archipelago.app.fips.FipsNative` — JSON over strings,
//! no codegen (the myco / nostr-vpn embedding pattern). Errors come back as
//! JNI surface for `com.archipelago.app.fips.FipsNative` and
//! `com.archipelago.app.NativeCore` — JSON over strings, no codegen (the
//! myco / nostr-vpn embedding pattern). Errors come back as
//! `{"error": "…"}` so Kotlin never sees a raw exception from native code.
use std::sync::Once;
@@ -127,3 +128,177 @@ pub extern "system" fn Java_com_archipelago_app_fips_FipsNative_statusJson(
) -> jstring {
out(&env, mesh::status_json())
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// com.archipelago.app.NativeCore — companion backup (#128) and NIP-46 remote
// signer crypto (#139). Same library, JSON-over-strings contract.
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Kotlin: `external fun backupEncrypt(payload: String, passphrase: String): String`
/// Returns the ADR-005 envelope JSON or `{"error": …}`.
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_backupEncrypt(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
payload: JString,
passphrase: JString,
) -> jstring {
init_logging();
let payload = jstr(&mut env, &payload);
let passphrase = jstr(&mut env, &passphrase);
let json = match crate::backup::encrypt(&payload, &passphrase) {
Ok(envelope) => envelope,
Err(e) => err_json(e),
};
out(&env, json)
}
/// Kotlin: `external fun backupDecrypt(envelope: String, passphrase: String): String`
/// Returns the decrypted payload JSON or `{"error": …}`.
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_backupDecrypt(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
envelope: JString,
passphrase: JString,
) -> jstring {
init_logging();
let envelope = jstr(&mut env, &envelope);
let passphrase = jstr(&mut env, &passphrase);
let json = match crate::backup::decrypt(&envelope, &passphrase) {
Ok(payload) => payload,
Err(e) => err_json(e),
};
out(&env, json)
}
/// Kotlin: `external fun nostrGenerateSecret(): String`
/// Returns `{"secret": hex, "pubkey": hex, "npub": …, "nsec": …}` or `{"error": …}`.
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_nostrGenerateSecret(
env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
) -> jstring {
init_logging();
let json = match crate::nostr::generate_secret() {
Ok(secret) => nostr_key_info_json(&secret),
Err(e) => err_json(e),
};
out(&env, json)
}
/// Kotlin: `external fun nostrSecretFromAny(secret: String): String`
/// Accepts hex or `nsec…`; returns key-info JSON or `{"error": …}`.
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_nostrSecretFromAny(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
secret: JString,
) -> jstring {
init_logging();
let secret = jstr(&mut env, &secret);
let json = match crate::nostr::secret_from_any(&secret) {
Ok(hex) => nostr_key_info_json(&hex),
Err(e) => err_json(e),
};
out(&env, json)
}
fn nostr_key_info_json(secret_hex: &str) -> String {
match (
crate::nostr::pubkey_hex(secret_hex),
crate::nostr::npub_from_pubkey(&crate::nostr::pubkey_hex(secret_hex).unwrap_or_default()),
crate::nostr::nsec_from_secret(secret_hex),
) {
(Ok(pubkey), Ok(npub), Ok(nsec)) => serde_json::json!({
"secret": secret_hex,
"pubkey": pubkey,
"npub": npub,
"nsec": nsec,
})
.to_string(),
(e, _, _) => err_json(e.unwrap_err()),
}
}
/// Kotlin: `external fun nostrParseConnectUri(uri: String): String`
/// Returns the parsed URI fields or `{"error": …}`.
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_nostrParseConnectUri(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
uri: JString,
) -> jstring {
init_logging();
let uri = jstr(&mut env, &uri);
let json = match crate::nostr::parse_connect_uri(&uri) {
Ok(info) => info.to_json().to_string(),
Err(e) => err_json(e),
};
out(&env, json)
}
/// Kotlin: `external fun nostrSignEvent(secretHex: String, eventJson: String): String`
/// Returns the signed event JSON or `{"error": …}`. The approve/deny decision
/// is made in Kotlin BEFORE this is called — native code never signs unasked.
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_nostrSignEvent(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
secret_hex: JString,
event_json: JString,
) -> jstring {
init_logging();
let secret = jstr(&mut env, &secret_hex);
let event = jstr(&mut env, &event_json);
let json = match crate::nostr::sign_event(&secret, &event) {
Ok(signed) => signed,
Err(e) => err_json(e),
};
out(&env, json)
}
macro_rules! nostr_cipher {
($name:ident, $doc:literal, $fn:path) => {
#[doc = $doc]
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn $name(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
secret_hex: JString,
peer_pub: JString,
text: JString,
) -> jstring {
init_logging();
let secret = jstr(&mut env, &secret_hex);
let peer = jstr(&mut env, &peer_pub);
let text = jstr(&mut env, &text);
let json = match $fn(&secret, &peer, &text) {
Ok(out) => serde_json::json!({ "result": out }).to_string(),
Err(e) => err_json(e),
};
out(&env, json)
}
};
}
nostr_cipher!(
Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_nostrNip44Encrypt,
"Kotlin: `external fun nostrNip44Encrypt(secretHex: String, peerPub: String, plaintext: String): String` — returns `{\"result\": payload}` or `{\"error\": …}`.",
crate::nostr::nip44_encrypt
);
nostr_cipher!(
Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_nostrNip44Decrypt,
"Kotlin: `external fun nostrNip44Decrypt(secretHex: String, peerPub: String, payload: String): String`",
crate::nostr::nip44_decrypt
);
nostr_cipher!(
Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_nostrNip04Encrypt,
"Kotlin: `external fun nostrNip04Encrypt(secretHex: String, peerPub: String, plaintext: String): String`",
crate::nostr::nip04_encrypt
);
nostr_cipher!(
Java_com_archipelago_app_NativeCore_nostrNip04Decrypt,
"Kotlin: `external fun nostrNip04Decrypt(secretHex: String, peerPub: String, payload: String): String`",
crate::nostr::nip04_decrypt
);
+2
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@
//! JSON-over-strings, mirroring the myco / nostr-vpn embedding pattern:
//! `generateIdentity`, `deriveIdentity`, `start`, `stop`, `isRunning`.
pub mod backup;
pub mod mesh;
pub mod nostr;
#[cfg(target_os = "android")]
mod jni_glue;
+824
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,824 @@
//! NIP-46 phone-side remote signer ("bunker") crypto core.
//!
//! Everything that must be constant-time correct for the companion to act as
//! a nostr remote signer: key handling (nsec/npub bech32), BIP340 schnorr
//! event signing, NIP-44 v2 payload encryption (the mandated NIP-46
//! transport), NIP-04 fallback decryption (deprecated, but real clients
//! still speak it), and `nostrconnect://` URI parsing. The protocol session
//! — relay WebSocket, JSON-RPC dispatch, approve/deny UX — lives in Kotlin;
//! this module is the crypto and nothing but.
//!
//! Verified against the official NIP-44 vectors and BIP-340 reference
//! vectors (see tests below).
use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
use base64::engine::general_purpose::{STANDARD as BASE64, URL_SAFE as BASE64_URL};
use base64::Engine;
use bech32::{Bech32, Hrp};
use chacha20::cipher::{KeyIvInit, StreamCipher};
use chacha20::ChaCha20;
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use hkdf::Hkdf;
use secp256k1::ecdh;
use secp256k1::schnorr::Signature;
use secp256k1::{
Keypair, Message, PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey, XOnlyPublicKey,
};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
const NIP44_VERSION: u8 = 2;
const NIP44_SALT: &[u8] = b"nip44-v2";
const NIP44_MIN_PAYLOAD_LEN: usize = 99; // 1 ver + 32 nonce + 32 ct + 32 mac
const NIP44_MIN_B64_LEN: usize = 132;
// ── keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Generate a fresh nostr secret key (hex) from the OS CSPRNG.
pub fn generate_secret() -> Result<String> {
loop {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
getrandom::getrandom(&mut bytes).context("OS RNG")?;
// Reject zero and >= curve order — the valid scalar range (mirrors
// the mesh identity loop; rejection is astronomically unlikely).
if bytes.iter().all(|&b| b == 0) {
continue;
}
if SecretKey::from_slice(&bytes).is_ok() {
return Ok(hex::encode(bytes));
}
}
}
/// Parse a secret key from hex or bech32 `nsec…` form into hex.
pub fn secret_from_any(s: &str) -> Result<String> {
let s = s.trim();
if s.starts_with("nsec") {
return secret_from_nsec(s);
}
let bytes = hex::decode(s.trim()).context("secret key must be hex or nsec")?;
let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&bytes).context("invalid nostr secret key")?;
Ok(hex::encode(sk.secret_bytes()))
}
pub fn secret_from_nsec(nsec: &str) -> Result<String> {
let (hrp, data) = bech32::decode(nsec).context("bad nsec encoding")?;
if hrp.as_str() != "nsec" {
bail!("not an nsec");
}
let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&data).context("invalid nostr secret key")?;
Ok(hex::encode(sk.secret_bytes()))
}
pub fn nsec_from_secret(secret_hex: &str) -> Result<String> {
let bytes = hex::decode(secret_hex.trim()).context("bad secret hex")?;
let hrp = Hrp::parse("nsec").context("nsec hrp")?;
bech32::encode::<Bech32>(hrp, &bytes).context("nsec encoding")
}
/// x-only public key (hex) for a secret key.
/// NOTE: `Keypair::public_key()` in secp256k1 0.29 is the full compressed
/// (33-byte) key — nostr uses x-only pubkeys, so serialize `.x_only_public_key().0`.
pub fn pubkey_hex(secret_hex: &str) -> Result<String> {
let kp = keypair(secret_hex)?;
Ok(hex::encode(kp.public_key().x_only_public_key().0.serialize()))
}
pub fn npub_from_pubkey(pub_hex: &str) -> Result<String> {
let bytes = hex::decode(pub_hex.trim()).context("bad pubkey hex")?;
let hrp = Hrp::parse("npub").context("npub hrp")?;
bech32::encode::<Bech32>(hrp, &bytes).context("npub encoding")
}
/// Parse an x-only pubkey from hex or bech32 `npub…` form into hex.
pub fn pubkey_from_any(s: &str) -> Result<String> {
let s = s.trim();
let bytes = if s.starts_with("npub") {
let (hrp, data) = bech32::decode(s).context("bad npub encoding")?;
if hrp.as_str() != "npub" {
bail!("not an npub");
}
data
} else {
hex::decode(s).context("pubkey must be hex or npub")?
};
XOnlyPublicKey::from_slice(&bytes).context("invalid x-only pubkey")?;
Ok(hex::encode(bytes))
}
fn keypair(secret_hex: &str) -> Result<Keypair> {
let bytes = hex::decode(secret_hex.trim()).context("bad secret hex")?;
let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&bytes).context("invalid nostr secret key")?;
Ok(Keypair::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &sk))
}
// ── nostrconnect:// URI ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ConnectUri {
/// The client's pubkey, hex.
pub client_pubkey: String,
/// Relays the client is listening on (≥1 by spec; kept in URI order).
pub relays: Vec<String>,
/// One-time pairing secret the client expects to see echoed back.
pub secret: String,
/// Comma-separated permission grants the client requests (display hint
/// only — approval always stays with the human).
pub perms: Vec<String>,
pub name: String,
pub url: String,
pub image: String,
}
impl ConnectUri {
/// JSON shape for the JNI boundary (flat strings/arrays — easy to parse
/// with org.json on the Kotlin side).
pub fn to_json(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
serde_json::json!({
"clientPubkey": self.client_pubkey,
"relays": self.relays,
"secret": self.secret,
"perms": self.perms,
"name": self.name,
"url": self.url,
"image": self.image,
})
}
}
/// Parse `nostrconnect://<client-pubkey>?relay=…&secret=…&perms=…&name=…`.
///
/// Query values are percent-decoded; `relay` may repeat. The pubkey in the
/// host position may be hex or (non-spec but harmless) `npub…`.
pub fn parse_connect_uri(uri: &str) -> Result<ConnectUri> {
let uri = uri.trim();
let rest = uri
.strip_prefix("nostrconnect://")
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("not a nostrconnect:// URI"))?;
let (host, query) = match rest.split_once('?') {
Some((h, q)) => (h, q),
None => bail!("nostrconnect URI has no query parameters"),
};
let client_pubkey = pubkey_from_any(host).context("nostrconnect URI: bad client pubkey")?;
let mut relays = Vec::new();
let mut secret = String::new();
let mut perms: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut name = String::new();
let mut url = String::new();
let mut image = String::new();
for (k, v) in url::form_urlencoded::parse(query.as_bytes()) {
let v = v.into_owned();
match k.as_ref() {
"relay" => {
if v.starts_with("ws://") || v.starts_with("wss://") {
relays.push(v);
}
}
"secret" => secret = v,
"perms" => perms = v.split(',').filter(|s| !s.is_empty()).map(String::from).collect(),
"name" => name = v,
"url" => url = v,
"image" => image = v,
_ => {} // forward-compat: ignore unknown params
}
}
if relays.is_empty() {
bail!("nostrconnect URI carries no relay");
}
if secret.is_empty() {
bail!("nostrconnect URI carries no secret");
}
Ok(ConnectUri {
client_pubkey,
relays,
secret,
perms,
name,
url,
image,
})
}
// ── events (NIP-01 id + BIP340 signature) ─────────────────────────────────
/// Compute the NIP-01 event id: sha256 over the compact serialization
/// `[0, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, content]`.
fn event_id(pubkey: &str, created_at: u64, kind: u64, tags: &serde_json::Value, content: &str) -> [u8; 32] {
let serialized = serde_json::json!([
0,
pubkey,
created_at,
kind,
tags,
content,
]);
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(serialized.to_string().as_bytes());
hasher.finalize().into()
}
/// Sign an unsigned event `{kind, content, tags, created_at}` (pubkey filled
/// from the secret key; `pubkey` in the input ignored) and return the signed
/// event JSON. This is the `sign_event` NIP-46 method's core — the approve
/// happens before this call, never inside it.
pub fn sign_event(secret_hex: &str, event_json: &str) -> Result<String> {
let ev: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(event_json).context("event is not JSON")?;
let kind = ev
.get("kind")
.and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
.context("event has no kind")?;
let created_at = ev
.get("created_at")
.and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
.context("event has no created_at")?;
let tags = ev
.get("tags")
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_else(|| serde_json::json!([]));
let content = ev
.get("content")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or("")
.to_string();
let kp = keypair(secret_hex)?;
let pubkey = hex::encode(kp.public_key().x_only_public_key().0.serialize());
let id = event_id(&pubkey, created_at, kind, &tags, &content);
let mut aux = [0u8; 32];
getrandom::getrandom(&mut aux).context("OS RNG")?;
let sig = Secp256k1::new().sign_schnorr_with_aux_rand(
&Message::from_digest(id),
&kp,
&aux,
);
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"id": hex::encode(id),
"pubkey": pubkey,
"created_at": created_at,
"kind": kind,
"tags": tags,
"content": content,
"sig": hex::encode(sig.serialize()),
})
.to_string())
}
/// Verify a signed event's id and schnorr signature (tests + defensive use).
pub fn verify_event(event_json: &str) -> Result<()> {
let ev: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(event_json).context("event is not JSON")?;
let pubkey = ev.get("pubkey").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).context("no pubkey")?;
let id_hex = ev.get("id").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).context("no id")?;
let sig_hex = ev.get("sig").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).context("no sig")?;
let kind = ev.get("kind").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).context("no kind")?;
let created_at = ev.get("created_at").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).context("no created_at")?;
let tags = ev.get("tags").cloned().unwrap_or_else(|| serde_json::json!([]));
let content = ev.get("content").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let expected = event_id(pubkey, created_at, kind, &tags, content);
if hex::encode(expected) != id_hex {
bail!("event id mismatch");
}
let pk = XOnlyPublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(pubkey)?)
.context("bad pubkey")?;
let sig = Signature::from_slice(&hex::decode(sig_hex)?)
.context("bad signature")?;
Secp256k1::new()
.verify_schnorr(&sig, &Message::from_digest(expected), &pk)
.context("signature verification failed")?;
Ok(())
}
// ── NIP-44 v2 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// ECDH shared x-coordinate (unhashed, 32 bytes) between our secret key and
/// the peer's x-only public key. Lifting the x-only key with even-y parity
/// is safe here: negating a point flips only y, so the shared x — the only
/// thing NIP-44/NIP-04 consume — is unchanged.
fn shared_x(secret_hex: &str, peer_pubkey_hex: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
let sk_bytes = hex::decode(secret_hex.trim()).context("bad secret hex")?;
let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&sk_bytes).context("invalid secret key")?;
let peer_hex = pubkey_from_any(peer_pubkey_hex)?;
let peer = XOnlyPublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(&peer_hex)?)
.context("invalid peer pubkey")?;
// Lift x-only key to a full public key (even-y representative).
let full = PublicKey::from_x_only_public_key(peer, secp256k1::Parity::Even);
let point = ecdh::shared_secret_point(&full, &sk); // 64 bytes: x || y
let mut x = [0u8; 32];
x.copy_from_slice(&point[..32]);
Ok(x)
}
/// NIP-44 v2 conversation key: HKDF-extract(IKM = ECDH x, salt = 'nip44-v2').
fn conversation_key(secret_hex: &str, peer_pubkey_hex: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
let x = shared_x(secret_hex, peer_pubkey_hex)?;
let mut hk = HkdfExtractSha256::new(Some(NIP44_SALT));
hk.input_ikm(&x);
let (prk, _) = hk.finalize();
let mut ck = [0u8; 32];
ck.copy_from_slice(prk.as_slice());
Ok(ck)
}
/// HKDF-SHA256 extract step, exposing the raw PRK (Hkdf::expand hashes with
/// an info suffix even when info is empty, which is NOT the extract output;
/// finalize returns (PRK, ready-to-expand Hkdf)).
type HkdfExtractSha256 = hkdf::HkdfExtract<Sha256>;
/// Per-message keys: HKDF-expand(PRK = conversation key, info = nonce, L = 76)
/// sliced into chacha_key[32] chacha_nonce[12] hmac_key[32].
fn message_keys(ck: &[u8; 32], nonce: &[u8; 32]) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 12], [u8; 32]) {
let hk = Hkdf::<Sha256>::from_prk(ck).expect("conversation key is 32 bytes");
let mut okm = [0u8; 76];
hk.expand(nonce, &mut okm).expect("76 <= 255 * hash len");
let mut chacha_key = [0u8; 32];
let mut chacha_nonce = [0u8; 12];
let mut hmac_key = [0u8; 32];
chacha_key.copy_from_slice(&okm[..32]);
chacha_nonce.copy_from_slice(&okm[32..44]);
hmac_key.copy_from_slice(&okm[44..76]);
(chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key)
}
/// NIP-44 padding: 2-byte big-endian plaintext length (6 bytes, `0x0000` +
/// u32, when ≥ 65536), zero-padded to the next power-of-two-ish chunk.
fn calc_padded_len(unpadded: usize) -> usize {
let unpadded: u64 = unpadded as u64;
if unpadded <= 32 {
return 32;
}
let next_power = 1u64 << ((63 - (unpadded - 1).leading_zeros()) + 1);
let chunk = if next_power <= 256 { 32 } else { next_power / 8 };
(chunk * ((unpadded - 1) / chunk + 1)) as usize
}
fn pad(plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
if plaintext.is_empty() || plaintext.len() > u32::MAX as usize {
bail!("invalid plaintext length");
}
let prefix: Vec<u8> = if plaintext.len() >= 65536 {
let mut p = vec![0u8, 0u8];
p.extend_from_slice(&(plaintext.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
p
} else {
(plaintext.len() as u16).to_be_bytes().to_vec()
};
let padded_len = calc_padded_len(plaintext.len());
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(prefix.len() + padded_len);
out.extend_from_slice(&prefix);
out.extend_from_slice(plaintext);
out.resize(prefix.len() + padded_len, 0);
Ok(out)
}
fn unpad(padded: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
if padded.len() < 2 {
bail!("invalid padding");
}
let first_two = u16::from_be_bytes([padded[0], padded[1]]);
let (unpadded_len, prefix_len) = if first_two == 0 {
if padded.len() < 6 {
bail!("invalid padding");
}
(u32::from_be_bytes([padded[2], padded[3], padded[4], padded[5]]) as usize, 6)
} else {
(first_two as usize, 2)
};
if unpadded_len == 0
|| padded.len() < prefix_len + unpadded_len
|| padded.len() != prefix_len + calc_padded_len(unpadded_len)
{
bail!("invalid padding");
}
Ok(padded[prefix_len..prefix_len + unpadded_len].to_vec())
}
/// Constant-time equality (length differs → false; content comparison never
/// short-circuits on a byte).
fn ct_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
if a.len() != b.len() {
return false;
}
let mut diff = 0u8;
for (x, y) in a.iter().zip(b.iter()) {
diff |= x ^ y;
}
diff == 0
}
/// NIP-44 v2 encrypt: returns `base64(0x02 || nonce || ciphertext || mac)`.
pub fn nip44_encrypt(secret_hex: &str, peer_pubkey_hex: &str, plaintext: &str) -> Result<String> {
let ck = conversation_key(secret_hex, peer_pubkey_hex)?;
let mut nonce = [0u8; 32];
getrandom::getrandom(&mut nonce).context("OS RNG")?;
let (chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key) = message_keys(&ck, &nonce);
let mut padded = pad(plaintext.as_bytes())?;
ChaCha20::new(&chacha_key.into(), &chacha_nonce.into()).apply_keystream(&mut padded);
let mut mac = <HmacSha256 as Mac>::new_from_slice(&hmac_key).expect("hmac accepts any key len");
mac.update(&nonce);
mac.update(&padded);
let tag = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 32 + padded.len() + 32);
out.push(NIP44_VERSION);
out.extend_from_slice(&nonce);
out.extend_from_slice(&padded);
out.extend_from_slice(&tag);
Ok(BASE64.encode(&out))
}
/// NIP-44 v2 decrypt of a `base64(0x02 || …)` payload.
pub fn nip44_decrypt(secret_hex: &str, peer_pubkey_hex: &str, payload: &str) -> Result<String> {
if payload.starts_with('#') {
bail!("unknown NIP-44 version (non-base64 payload)");
}
let data = BASE64
.decode(payload.trim())
.context("payload is not base64")?;
if payload.len() < NIP44_MIN_B64_LEN || data.len() < NIP44_MIN_PAYLOAD_LEN {
bail!("invalid NIP-44 payload size");
}
if data[0] != NIP44_VERSION {
bail!("unknown NIP-44 version {}", data[0]);
}
let nonce: [u8; 32] = data[1..33].try_into().expect("slice is 32");
let ciphertext = &data[33..data.len() - 32];
let mac_bytes = &data[data.len() - 32..];
let ck = conversation_key(secret_hex, peer_pubkey_hex)?;
let (chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key) = message_keys(&ck, &nonce);
let mut mac = <HmacSha256 as Mac>::new_from_slice(&hmac_key).expect("hmac accepts any key len");
mac.update(&nonce);
mac.update(ciphertext);
let expected = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
if !ct_eq(&expected, mac_bytes) {
bail!("invalid NIP-44 MAC");
}
let mut buf = ciphertext.to_vec();
ChaCha20::new(&chacha_key.into(), &chacha_nonce.into()).apply_keystream(&mut buf);
let plaintext = unpad(&buf)?;
String::from_utf8(plaintext).context("decrypted payload is not UTF-8")
}
// ── NIP-04 (deprecated transport, still spoken by real clients) ────────────
/// NIP-04 encrypt: AES-256-CBC, key = raw ECDH x-coordinate (unhashed — the
/// spec's quirk), output `<base64 ct>?iv=<base64 iv>`.
pub fn nip04_encrypt(secret_hex: &str, peer_pubkey_hex: &str, plaintext: &str) -> Result<String> {
use aes::cipher::{BlockEncryptMut, KeyIvInit};
type Enc = cbc::Encryptor<aes::Aes256>;
let key = shared_x(secret_hex, peer_pubkey_hex)?;
let mut iv = [0u8; 16];
getrandom::getrandom(&mut iv).context("OS RNG")?;
let ct = Enc::new(&key.into(), &iv.into()).encrypt_padded_vec_mut::<aes::cipher::block_padding::Pkcs7>(plaintext.as_bytes());
Ok(format!("{}?iv={}", BASE64.encode(&ct), BASE64.encode(iv)))
}
/// NIP-04 decrypt of `<base64 ct>?iv=<base64 iv>`.
pub fn nip04_decrypt(secret_hex: &str, peer_pubkey_hex: &str, payload: &str) -> Result<String> {
use aes::cipher::{BlockDecryptMut, KeyIvInit};
type Dec = cbc::Decryptor<aes::Aes256>;
let (ct_b64, iv_b64) = payload
.trim()
.split_once("?iv=")
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("not a NIP-04 payload (no iv)"))?;
let ct = BASE64.decode(ct_b64).context("bad NIP-04 ciphertext base64")?;
let iv: [u8; 16] = BASE64
.decode(iv_b64)
.context("bad NIP-04 iv base64")?
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("NIP-04 iv must be 16 bytes"))?;
let key = shared_x(secret_hex, peer_pubkey_hex)?;
let pt = Dec::new(&key.into(), &iv.into())
.decrypt_padded_vec_mut::<aes::cipher::block_padding::Pkcs7>(&ct)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("NIP-04 decryption failed"))?;
String::from_utf8(pt).context("decrypted payload is not UTF-8")
}
/// URL-safe base64 for keys that cross the JNI boundary — unused by the
/// protocol but handy for the Kotlin side; keep the engine in one place.
pub fn b64_url(data: &[u8]) -> String {
BASE64_URL.encode(data)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
// ── official NIP-44 vectors (paulmillr/nip44 nip44.vectors.json) ──────
#[test]
fn nip44_official_conversation_keys() {
let vectors: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
("315e59ff51cb9209768cf7da80791ddcaae56ac9775eb25b6dee1234bc5d2268", "c2f9d9948dc8c7c38321e4b85c8558872eafa0641cd269db76848a6073e69133", "3dfef0ce2a4d80a25e7a328accf73448ef67096f65f79588e358d9a0eb9013f1"),
("98a5902fd67518a0c900f0fb62158f278f94a21d6f9d33d30cd3091195500311", "aae65c15f98e5e677b5050de82e3aba47a6fe49b3dab7863cf35d9478ba9f7d1", "9c00b769d5f54d02bf175b7284a1cbd28b6911b06cda6666b2243561ac96bad7"),
("86ae5ac8034eb2542ce23ec2f84375655dab7f836836bbd3c54cefe9fdc9c19f", "59f90272378089d73f1339710c02e2be6db584e9cdbe86eed3578f0c67c23585", "19f934aafd3324e8415299b64df42049afaa051c71c98d0aa10e1081f2e3e2ba"),
// sec1 == pub2 (ECDH with self)
("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", "79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798", "3b4610cb7189beb9cc29eb3716ecc6102f1247e8f3101a03a1787d8908aeb54e"),
];
for (sec1, pub2, expected) in vectors {
let ck = conversation_key(sec1, pub2).unwrap();
assert_eq!(hex::encode(ck), *expected);
}
}
#[test]
fn nip44_official_message_keys() {
let ck_bytes: [u8; 32] = hex::decode("a1a3d60f3470a8612633924e91febf96dc5366ce130f658b1f0fc652c20b3b54")
.unwrap()
.try_into()
.unwrap();
let vectors: &[(&str, &str, &str, &str)] = &[
("e1e6f880560d6d149ed83dcc7e5861ee62a5ee051f7fde9975fe5d25d2a02d72", "f145f3bed47cb70dbeaac07f3a3fe683e822b3715edb7c4fe310829014ce7d76", "c4ad129bb01180c0933a160c", "027c1db445f05e2eee864a0975b0ddef5b7110583c8c192de3732571ca5838c4"),
("ea6eb84cac23c5c1607c334e8bdf66f7977a7e374052327ec28c6906cbe25967", "ff68db24b34fa62c78ac5ffeeaf19533afaedf651fb6a08384e46787f6ce94be", "50bb859aa2dde938cc49ec7a", "06ff32e1f7b29753a727d7927b25c2dd175aca47751462d37a2039023ec6b5a6"),
];
for (nonce_h, ck_exp, cn_exp, hk_exp) in vectors {
let nonce: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(nonce_h).unwrap().try_into().unwrap();
let (chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key) = message_keys(&ck_bytes, &nonce);
assert_eq!(hex::encode(chacha_key), *ck_exp);
assert_eq!(hex::encode(chacha_nonce), *cn_exp);
assert_eq!(hex::encode(hmac_key), *hk_exp);
}
}
#[test]
fn nip44_offical_padded_len() {
let vectors: &[(usize, usize)] = &[
(16, 32), (32, 32), (33, 64), (37, 64), (45, 64), (49, 64), (64, 64),
(65, 96), (100, 128), (111, 128), (200, 224), (250, 256), (320, 320),
(383, 384), (384, 384), (400, 448), (500, 512), (512, 512), (515, 640),
(700, 768), (800, 896), (900, 1024), (1020, 1024), (65536, 65536),
];
for (unpadded, padded) in vectors {
assert_eq!(calc_padded_len(*unpadded), *padded, "unpadded {unpadded}");
}
}
#[test]
fn nip44_official_encrypt_vectors() {
// (sec1, sec2, nonce, plaintext, payload) — decrypt with the peer's
// view (sec2, pub(sec1)) so this also proves key symmetry.
let vectors: &[(&str, &str, &str, &str, &str)] = &[
("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
"a",
"AgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABee0G5VSK0/9YypIObAtDKfYEAjD35uVkHyB0F4DwrcNaCXlCWZKaArsGrY6M9wnuTMxWfp1RTN9Xga8no+kF5Vsb"),
("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
"f00000000000000000000000000000f00000000000000000000000000000000f",
"🍕🫃",
"AvAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPSKSK6is9ngkX2+cSq85Th16oRTISAOfhStnixqZziKMDvB0QQzgFZdjLTPicCJaV8nDITO+QfaQ61+KbWQIOO2Yj"),
("5c0c523f52a5b6fad39ed2403092df8cebc36318b39383bca6c00808626fab3a",
"4b22aa260e4acb7021e32f38a6cdf4b673c6a277755bfce287e370c924dc936d",
"b635236c42db20f021bb8d1cdff5ca75dd1a0cc72ea742ad750f33010b24f73b",
"表ポあA鷗ŒéB逍Üߪąñ丂㐀𠀀",
"ArY1I2xC2yDwIbuNHN/1ynXdGgzHLqdCrXUPMwELJPc7s7JqlCMJBAIIjfkpHReBPXeoMCyuClwgbT419jUWU1PwaNl4FEQYKCDKVJz+97Mp3K+Q2YGa77B6gpxB/lr1QgoqpDf7wDVrDmOqGoiPjWDqy8KzLueKDcm9BVP8xeTJIxs="),
("eba1687cab6a3101bfc68fd70f214aa4cc059e9ec1b79fdb9ad0a0a4e259829f",
"dff20d262bef9dfd94666548f556393085e6ea421c8af86e9d333fa8747e94b3",
"2180b52ae645fcf9f5080d81b1f0b5d6f2cd77ff3c986882bb549158462f3407",
"( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°)",
"AiGAtSrmRfz59QgNgbHwtdbyzXf/PJhogrtUkVhGLzQHv4qhKQwnFQ54OjVMgqCea/Vj0YqBSdhqNR777TJ4zIUk7R0fnizp6l1zwgzWv7+ee6u+0/89KIjY5q1wu6inyuiv"),
("d5633530f5bcfebceb5584cfbbf718a30df0751b729dd9a789b9f30c0587d74e",
"b74e6a341fb134127272b795a08b59250e5fa45a82a2eb4095e4ce9ed5f5e214",
"a3e219242d85465e70adcd640b564b3feff57d2ef8745d5e7a0663b2dccceb54",
"🙈 🙉 🙊 0️⃣ 1️⃣ 2️⃣ 3️⃣ 4️⃣ 5️⃣ 6️⃣ 7️⃣ 8️⃣ 9️⃣ 🔟 Powerلُلُصّبُلُلصّبُررً ॣ ॣh ॣ ॣ冗",
"AqPiGSQthUZecK3NZAtWSz/v9X0u+HRdXnoGY7LczOtUf05aMF89q1FLwJvaFJYICZoMYgRJHFLwPiOHce7fuAc40kX0wXJvipyBJ9HzCOj7CgtnC1/cmPCHR3s5AIORmroBWglm1LiFMohv1FSPEbaBD51VXxJa4JyWpYhreSOEjn1wd0lMKC9b+osV2N2tpbs+rbpQem2tRen3sWflmCqjkG5VOVwRErCuXuPb5+hYwd8BoZbfCrsiAVLd7YT44dRtKNBx6rkabWfddKSLtreHLDysOhQUVOp/XkE7OzSkWl6sky0Hva6qJJ/V726hMlomvcLHjE41iKmW2CpcZfOedg=="),
];
for (sec1, sec2, nonce_hex, plaintext, payload) in vectors {
// Encrypt from A to B with the fixed nonce must reproduce the
// official payload byte-for-byte.
let pub1 = pubkey_hex(sec1).unwrap();
let made = {
let ck = conversation_key(sec1, &pubkey_hex(sec2).unwrap()).unwrap();
let nonce: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(nonce_hex).unwrap().try_into().unwrap();
let (chacha_key, chacha_nonce, hmac_key) = message_keys(&ck, &nonce);
let mut padded = pad(plaintext.as_bytes()).unwrap();
ChaCha20::new(&chacha_key.into(), &chacha_nonce.into()).apply_keystream(&mut padded);
let mut mac = <HmacSha256 as Mac>::new_from_slice(&hmac_key).unwrap();
mac.update(&nonce);
mac.update(&padded);
let tag = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
let mut out = vec![NIP44_VERSION];
out.extend_from_slice(&nonce);
out.extend_from_slice(&padded);
out.extend_from_slice(&tag);
BASE64.encode(&out)
};
assert_eq!(&made, payload, "encrypt vector for {plaintext:?}");
// Decrypt from B's view of A (key-role symmetry).
let got = nip44_decrypt(sec2, &pub1, payload).unwrap();
assert_eq!(got, *plaintext);
}
}
#[test]
fn nip44_round_trip_and_failures() {
let sk_a = generate_secret().unwrap();
let sk_b = generate_secret().unwrap();
let pub_b = pubkey_hex(&sk_b).unwrap();
let pub_a = pubkey_hex(&sk_a).unwrap();
let msg = "hello, remote signer";
let payload = nip44_encrypt(&sk_a, &pub_b, msg).unwrap();
assert_eq!(nip44_decrypt(&sk_b, &pub_a, &payload).unwrap(), msg);
// Round-trip long content across the 65536 prefix boundary.
let long = "x".repeat(70_000);
let payload = nip44_encrypt(&sk_a, &pub_b, &long).unwrap();
assert_eq!(nip44_decrypt(&sk_b, &pub_a, &payload).unwrap(), long);
// Wrong peer key must fail the MAC, not return garbage.
let stranger = generate_secret().unwrap();
assert!(nip44_decrypt(&sk_b, &pub_b, &payload).is_err());
let _ = stranger;
// Tampered payload fails.
let payload = nip44_encrypt(&sk_a, &pub_b, msg).unwrap();
let mut tampered = BASE64.decode(&payload).unwrap();
let n = tampered.len();
tampered[n - 1] ^= 0x01;
assert!(nip44_decrypt(&sk_b, &pub_a, &BASE64.encode(&tampered)).is_err());
// Truncated payload fails.
assert!(nip44_decrypt(&sk_b, &pub_a, "AAAA").is_err());
}
// ── BIP-340 official vectors (github.com/bitcoin/bips test vectors) ────
#[test]
fn bip340_reference_sign_vectors() {
// (seckey, pubkey, aux, msg, expected sig) — indices 0/1/2 of the
// official BIP-340 `bip-0340/test-vectors.csv` "should sign" set,
// transcribed from the file itself (x(3G) additionally verified
// by independent scalar-math in the review notes for this commit).
let vectors: &[(&str, &str, &str, &str, &str)] = &[
("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003",
"F9308A019258C31049344F85F89D5229B531C845836F99B08601F113BCE036F9",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"E907831F80848D1069A5371B402410364BDF1C5F8307B0084C55F1CE2DCA821525F66A4A85EA8B71E482A74F382D2CE5EBEEE8FDB2172F477DF4900D310536C0"),
("B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C762E7160F38B4DA56A784D9045190CFEF",
"DFF1D77F2A671C5F36183726DB2341BE58FEAE1DA2DECED843240F7B502BA659",
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
"243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89",
"6896BD60EEAE296DB48A229FF71DFE071BDE413E6D43F917DC8DCF8C78DE33418906D11AC976ABCCB20B091292BFF4EA897EFCB639EA871CFA95F6DE339E4B0A"),
("C90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B14E5C9",
"DD308AFEC5777E13121FA72B9CC1B7CC0139715309B086C960E18FD969774EB8",
"C87AA53824B4D7AE2EB035A2B5BBBCCC080E76CDC6D1692C4B0B62D798E6D906",
"7E2D58D8B3BCDF1ABADEC7829054F90DDA9805AAB56C77333024B9D0A508B75C",
"5831AAEED7B44BB74E5EAB94BA9D4294C49BCF2A60728D8B4C200F50DD313C1BAB745879A5AD954A72C45A91C3A51D3C7ADEA98D82F8481E0E1E03674A6F3FB7"),
];
for (sk_hex, pk_hex, aux_hex, msg_hex, sig_hex) in vectors {
let sk_bytes = hex::decode(sk_hex).unwrap();
let sk = SecretKey::from_slice(&sk_bytes).unwrap();
let kp = Keypair::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &sk);
assert_eq!(hex::encode(kp.public_key().x_only_public_key().0.serialize()).to_uppercase(), *pk_hex);
let msg: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(msg_hex).unwrap().try_into().unwrap();
let aux: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(aux_hex).unwrap().try_into().unwrap();
let sig = Secp256k1::new().sign_schnorr_with_aux_rand(
&Message::from_digest(msg),
&kp,
&aux,
);
assert_eq!(hex::encode(sig.serialize()).to_uppercase(), *sig_hex);
}
}
#[test]
fn event_signing_round_trip() {
let sk = generate_secret().unwrap();
let unsigned = r#"{"kind":22242,"content":"{\"challenge\":\"abc123\"}","tags":[["relay","ws://127.0.0.1:7777"]],"created_at":1725100000}"#;
let signed = sign_event(&sk, unsigned).unwrap();
verify_event(&signed).unwrap();
let ev: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&signed).unwrap();
assert_eq!(ev["kind"], 22242);
assert_eq!(ev["pubkey"], pubkey_hex(&sk).unwrap());
// Tampering with content breaks the id, which breaks verification.
let mut tampered = ev.clone();
tampered["content"] = serde_json::Value::String("nope".into());
assert!(verify_event(&tampered.to_string()).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn connect_uri_parsing() {
let uri = "nostrconnect://83f3b2ae6aa368e8275397b9c26cf550101d63ebaab900d19dd4a4429f5ad8f5?relay=wss%3A%2F%2Frelay1.example.com&perms=nip44_encrypt%2Csign_event%3A22242&name=My+Client&secret=0s8j2djs&relay=ws%3A%2F%2F192.168.1.20%3A7777";
let info = parse_connect_uri(uri).unwrap();
assert_eq!(info.client_pubkey, "83f3b2ae6aa368e8275397b9c26cf550101d63ebaab900d19dd4a4429f5ad8f5");
assert_eq!(
info.relays,
vec!["wss://relay1.example.com", "ws://192.168.1.20:7777"]
);
assert_eq!(info.secret, "0s8j2djs");
assert_eq!(info.perms, vec!["nip44_encrypt", "sign_event:22242"]);
assert_eq!(info.name, "My Client");
// npub client keys and unknown params tolerated — the npub is
// generated through our own encoder so the test carries no
// hand-transcribed bech32 string.
let sk1 = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001";
let npub = npub_from_pubkey(&pubkey_hex(sk1).unwrap()).unwrap();
let pubkey = pubkey_from_any(&npub).unwrap();
let uri = format!("nostrconnect://{npub}?relay=wss://r&secret=s&future=1");
let info = parse_connect_uri(&uri).unwrap();
assert_eq!(info.client_pubkey, pubkey);
assert_eq!(info.relays, vec!["wss://r"]);
assert!(parse_connect_uri("bunker://abc?relay=wss://r&secret=s").is_err());
assert!(parse_connect_uri("nostrconnect://zz?relay=wss://r&secret=s").is_err());
assert!(parse_connect_uri("nostrconnect://83f3b2ae6aa368e8275397b9c26cf550101d63ebaab900d19dd4a4429f5ad8f5?name=x").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn nip04_round_trip_and_cross_check() {
let sk_a = generate_secret().unwrap();
let sk_b = generate_secret().unwrap();
let pub_b = pubkey_hex(&sk_b).unwrap();
let pub_a = pubkey_hex(&sk_a).unwrap();
let payload = nip04_encrypt(&sk_a, &pub_b, "old client hello").unwrap();
assert!(payload.contains("?iv="));
assert_eq!(nip04_decrypt(&sk_b, &pub_a, &payload).unwrap(), "old client hello");
// Wrong key must fail (PKCS#7 padding check) rather than return garbage.
assert!(nip04_decrypt(&sk_a, &pub_a, &payload).is_err());
assert!(nip04_decrypt(&sk_b, &pub_b, &payload).is_err());
assert!(nip04_decrypt(&sk_b, &pub_a, "not-a-payload").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn key_encoding_round_trip() {
let sk = generate_secret().unwrap();
let nsec = nsec_from_secret(&sk).unwrap();
assert!(nsec.starts_with("nsec1"));
assert_eq!(secret_from_nsec(&nsec).unwrap(), sk);
assert_eq!(secret_from_any(&nsec).unwrap(), sk);
assert_eq!(secret_from_any(&sk).unwrap(), sk);
let pk = pubkey_hex(&sk).unwrap();
let npub = npub_from_pubkey(&pk).unwrap();
assert!(npub.starts_with("npub1"));
assert_eq!(pubkey_from_any(&npub).unwrap(), pk);
assert_eq!(pubkey_from_any(&pk).unwrap(), pk);
// The famous even-y lift edge case: pubkey of sk=1 is x(G) (y is odd);
// shared_x with oneself is exactly x(G) — pins the unhashed-x ECDH and
// the even-parity lift in one assertion (x is invariant under y-negation,
// so the lift is safe for NIP-44/NIP-04 keys).
let g_x = "79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798";
assert_eq!(
pubkey_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001").unwrap(),
g_x
);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(
shared_x("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", g_x).unwrap()
),
g_x
);
assert!(secret_from_nsec("npub1").is_err());
}
/// The mesh ULA is a PURE function of the node's public key:
/// `fd ‖ sha256(x-only pubkey)[0..15]` (fips identity/node_addr.rs →
/// identity/address.rs). That is what makes "address by npub" work —
/// Termux's fipssh helper, and any future DNS-style resolver, just
/// computes what the fips daemon's DNS answers.
#[test]
fn npub_derives_the_same_mesh_ula_as_the_fips_identity() {
for seed in [0x42u8, 0x07, 0x31] {
// 0xff… would exceed the curve order — secret keys must be valid scalars.
let secret = [seed; 32];
let id = fips::Identity::from_secret_bytes(&secret).unwrap();
let npub = id.npub();
let expected = id.address().to_ipv6().to_string();
let pubkey_hex = pubkey_from_any(&npub).unwrap();
let pk = hex::decode(&pubkey_hex).unwrap();
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(&pk);
let hash = hasher.finalize();
let mut ula = [0u8; 16];
ula[0] = 0xfd;
ula[1..].copy_from_slice(&hash[..15]);
assert_eq!(std::net::Ipv6Addr::from(ula).to_string(), expected, "npub {npub}");
}
}
}
+145
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@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
#!/data/data/com.termux/files/usr/bin/sh
# fipssh — SSH to an Archipelago FIPS mesh node BY NPUB.
#
# The mesh ULA is a pure function of the node's public key (verified against
# the fips crate itself — archy-fips-core's npub_derives_the_same_mesh_ula
# test, and the Android tools commit that shipped this script):
#
# ula = fd || sha256(x-only pubkey)[0..15]
#
# so the npub IS the address: no DNS server, no mesh query, works offline.
# The node's fips daemon answers the same question through its DNS resolver
# (core/archipelago/src/fips/dial.rs) — this is the phone-side equivalent.
#
# Setup (Termux): pkg install python openssh
# Usage:
# fipssh <user>@npub1… [ssh args…] connect
# fipssh npub1… connect as $FIPSSH_USER
# fipssh --resolve npub1… print the ULA and exit
#
# The companion's split tunnel carries the connection (fd00::/8 routes the
# whole device while the mesh is up) — at home on LAN, away via the anchors.
# The node still has to allow port 22 through its fips0 firewall: see
# docs/HANDOFF-2026-08-31-ssh-over-mesh.md (the interim 90-ssh.nft drop-in,
# restricted to your phone's ULA, until the node-side toggle ships).
set -eu
usage() {
sed -n '2,20p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
exit 1
}
RESOLVE_ONLY=0
if [ "${1:-}" = "--resolve" ]; then
RESOLVE_ONLY=1
shift
fi
[ $# -ge 1 ] || usage
TARGET="$1"
shift 2>/dev/null || true
case "$TARGET" in
*npub1*)
case "$TARGET" in
*@npub1*) USER_PART="${TARGET%%@*}"; N_PUB="${TARGET#*@}" ;;
npub1*)
USER_PART="${FIPSSH_USER:-}"
N_PUB="$TARGET"
if [ -z "$USER_PART" ] && [ "$RESOLVE_ONLY" = 0 ]; then
echo "fipssh: no user given (use user@npub… or set FIPSSH_USER)" >&2
exit 1
fi
;;
*) echo "fipssh: expected [user@]npub1…, got '$TARGET'" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
;;
*) echo "fipssh: '$TARGET' is not an npub (expected [user@]npub1…)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "fipssh: python3 not found — run: pkg install python" >&2
exit 1
}
ULA=$(python3 - "$N_PUB" <<'PYEOF'
import hashlib, ipaddress, sys
CHARSET = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
def bech32_polymod(values):
gen = [0x3B6A57B2, 0x26508E6D, 0x1EA119FA, 0x3D4233DD, 0x2A1462B3]
chk = 1
for value in values:
top = chk >> 25
chk = (chk & 0x1FFFFFF) << 5 ^ value
for i in range(5):
chk ^= gen[i] if ((top >> i) & 1) else 0
return chk
def bech32_hrp_expand(hrp):
return [ord(c) >> 5 for c in hrp] + [0] + [ord(c) & 31 for c in hrp]
def bech32_verify_checksum(hrp, data):
return bech32_polymod(bech32_hrp_expand(hrp) + data) == 1
def bech32_decode(s):
if any(ord(c) < 33 or ord(c) > 126 for c in s):
raise ValueError("bad character")
if s.lower() != s and s.upper() != s:
raise ValueError("mixed case")
s = s.lower()
pos = s.rfind("1")
if pos < 1 or pos + 7 > len(s) or len(s) > 90:
raise ValueError("bad separator")
hrp = s[:pos]
data = [CHARSET.find(c) for c in s[pos + 1:]]
if -1 in data:
raise ValueError("bad data character")
if not bech32_verify_checksum(hrp, data):
raise ValueError("bad checksum — typo in the npub?")
return hrp, data[:-6]
def convertbits(data, frombits, tobits):
acc = 0
bits = 0
ret = bytearray()
maxv = (1 << tobits) - 1
for value in data:
if value < 0 or (value >> frombits):
raise ValueError("bad value")
acc = (acc << frombits) | value
bits += frombits
while bits >= tobits:
bits -= tobits
ret.append((acc >> bits) & maxv)
if bits >= frombits or ((acc << (tobits - bits)) & maxv):
raise ValueError("bad padding")
return bytes(ret)
npub = sys.argv[1]
hrp, data = bech32_decode(npub)
if hrp != "npub":
raise ValueError(f"expected hrp 'npub', got '{hrp}'")
pubkey = convertbits(data, 5, 8)
if len(pubkey) != 32:
raise ValueError(f"npub data must be 32 bytes, got {len(pubkey)}")
# ula = fd || sha256(pubkey)[0..15] — mirrors fips identity/node_addr.rs +
# identity/address.rs (FIPS_ADDRESS_PREFIX = 0xfd).
ula = bytes([0xFD]) + hashlib.sha256(pubkey).digest()[:15]
print(ipaddress.IPv6Address(ula).compressed)
PYEOF
) || exit 1
if [ "$RESOLVE_ONLY" = 1 ]; then
echo "$ULA"
exit 0
fi
exec ssh "${USER_PART}@${ULA}" "$@"
+384
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@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
NIP-46 test client for the Archipelago companion's Remote Signer (#139).
Plays the role the node's login flow will play (rust-nostr nostr-connect
client): generates a nostrconnect:// pairing QR, connects to a relay, waits
for the phone's bunker `connect` (secret echo), acks it, then exercises
get_public_key + sign_event and VERIFIES the returned schnorr signature with
independent pure-Python BIP-340 code (no shared code with the phone's Rust).
Run it on your computer next to the phone:
python3 -m venv /tmp/nip46env
/tmp/nip46env/bin/pip install websockets qrcode
/tmp/nip46env/bin/python Android/tools/nip46-test-client.py [--relay wss://relay.damus.io]
…then on the phone: hub menu (three-finger hold) → Remote Signer →
Generate key (once) → Scan pairing QR → point at the terminal QR → Approve.
Pure Python (no deps for the crypto; websockets + qrcode for transport/QR).
"""
import argparse
import asyncio
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
import secrets
import struct
import sys
import time
import urllib.parse
import websockets # pip install websockets
# ── secp256k1 / BIP-340 (independent of the phone's Rust code) ──────────────
P = 2**256 - 2**32 - 977
N = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141
GX = 0x79BE667EF9DCBBAC55A06295CE870B07029BFCDB2DCE28D959F2815B16F81798
GY = 0x483ADA7726A3C4655DA4FBFC0E1108A8FD17B448A68554199C47D08FFB10D4B8
G = (GX, GY)
def _add(pt1, pt2):
if pt1 is None:
return pt2
if pt2 is None:
return pt1
x1, y1 = pt1
x2, y2 = pt2
if x1 == x2 and (y1 + y2) % P == 0:
return None
if pt1 == pt2:
lam = (3 * x1 * x1) * pow(2 * y1, -1, P) % P
else:
lam = (y2 - y1) * pow(x2 - x1, -1, P) % P
x3 = (lam * lam - x1 - x2) % P
return (x3, (lam * (x1 - x3) - y1) % P)
def _mul(k, pt):
r = None
while k:
if k & 1:
r = _add(r, pt)
pt = _add(pt, pt)
k >>= 1
return r
def lift_x(x):
if x >= P:
return None
y_sq = (pow(x, 3, P) + 7) % P
y = pow(y_sq, (P + 1) // 4, P)
if y * y % P != y_sq:
return None
return (x, y if y % 2 == 0 else P - y)
def tagged(tag: bytes, data: bytes) -> bytes:
"""BIP-340 tagged hash: sha256(hash(tag) || hash(tag) || data)."""
th = hashlib.sha256(tag).digest()
return hashlib.sha256(th + th + data).digest()
def bip340_sign(msg: bytes, seckey: int, aux: bytes) -> bytes:
d = seckey if seckey <= N - 1 else seckey - N
pub = _mul(d, G)
if pub[1] % 2 != 0:
d = N - d
t = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(d.to_bytes(32, "big"), tagged(b"BIP0340/aux", aux)))
rand = tagged(b"BIP0340/nonce", t + pub[0].to_bytes(32, "big") + msg)
k = int.from_bytes(rand, "big") % N
assert k > 0
R = _mul(k, G)
if R[1] % 2 != 0:
k = N - k
e = int.from_bytes(tagged(b"BIP0340/challenge", R[0].to_bytes(32, "big") + pub[0].to_bytes(32, "big") + msg), "big") % N
return R[0].to_bytes(32, "big") + ((k + e * d) % N).to_bytes(32, "big")
def bip340_verify(msg: bytes, pubkey_x: bytes, sig: bytes) -> bool:
"""Check s·G − e·P == R with even-y R and x(R) == r (BIP-340)."""
if len(sig) != 64 or len(pubkey_x) != 32:
return False
pub = lift_x(int.from_bytes(pubkey_x, "big"))
if pub is None:
return False
r = int.from_bytes(sig[:32], "big")
s = int.from_bytes(sig[32:], "big")
if r >= P or s >= N:
return False
e = int.from_bytes(tagged(b"BIP0340/challenge", sig[:32] + pubkey_x + msg), "big") % N
sg = _mul(s, G)
ep = _mul(e, pub)
neg_ep = (ep[0], (P - ep[1]) % P)
rp = _add(sg, neg_ep)
return rp is not None and rp[0] == r and rp[1] % 2 == 0
def ecdh_x(secret_hex: str, peer_x_hex: str) -> bytes:
"""Raw ECDH x-coordinate against an x-only peer key (even-y lift)."""
peer = lift_x(int(peer_x_hex, 16))
assert peer is not None, "peer pubkey not on curve"
pt = _mul(int(secret_hex, 16) % N, peer)
return pt[0].to_bytes(32, "big")
# ── NIP-44 v2 (pure python, spec-literal) ────────────────────────────────────
def hkdf_extract(salt: bytes, ikm: bytes) -> bytes:
return hmac.new(salt, ikm, hashlib.sha256).digest()
def hkdf_expand(prk: bytes, info: bytes, length: int) -> bytes:
t = b""
out = b""
i = 1
while len(out) < length:
t = hmac.new(prk, t + info + bytes([i]), hashlib.sha256).digest()
out += t
i += 1
return out[:length]
def _rotl(x: int, n: int) -> int:
return ((x << n) | (x >> (32 - n))) & 0xFFFFFFFF
def _qr(s, a, b, c, d):
s[a] = (s[a] + s[b]) & 0xFFFFFFFF; s[d] ^= s[a]; s[d] = _rotl(s[d], 16)
s[c] = (s[c] + s[d]) & 0xFFFFFFFF; s[b] ^= s[c]; s[b] = _rotl(s[b], 12)
s[a] = (s[a] + s[b]) & 0xFFFFFFFF; s[d] ^= s[a]; s[d] = _rotl(s[d], 8)
s[c] = (s[c] + s[d]) & 0xFFFFFFFF; s[b] ^= s[c]; s[b] = _rotl(s[b], 7)
def chacha20_block(key: bytes, counter: int, nonce: bytes) -> bytes:
consts = [0x61707865, 0x3320646E, 0x79622D32, 0x6B206574]
state = consts + list(struct.unpack("<8I", key)) + [counter] + list(struct.unpack("<3I", nonce))
working = list(state)
for _ in range(10):
_qr(working, 0, 4, 8, 12); _qr(working, 1, 5, 9, 13)
_qr(working, 2, 6, 10, 14); _qr(working, 3, 7, 11, 15)
_qr(working, 0, 5, 10, 15); _qr(working, 1, 6, 11, 12)
_qr(working, 2, 7, 8, 13); _qr(working, 3, 4, 9, 14)
return struct.pack("<16I", *[(x + y) & 0xFFFFFFFF for x, y in zip(working, state)])
def chacha20(key: bytes, nonce: bytes, data: bytes) -> bytes:
counter = 0 # NIP-44: "ChaCha20 (RFC 8439) with starting counter set to 0"
out = bytearray()
for i in range(0, len(data), 64):
ks = chacha20_block(key, counter, nonce)
chunk = data[i:i + 64]
out += bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(chunk, ks))
counter += 1
return bytes(out)
def calc_padded_len(n: int) -> int:
if n <= 32:
return 32
power = 1 << ((n - 1).bit_length())
chunk = 32 if power <= 256 else power // 8
return chunk * ((n - 1) // chunk + 1)
def nip44_encrypt(secret_hex: str, peer_hex: str, plaintext: str) -> str:
ck = hkdf_extract(b"nip44-v2", ecdh_x(secret_hex, peer_hex))
nonce = secrets.token_bytes(32)
okm = hkdf_expand(ck, nonce, 76)
key, iv, mac_key = okm[:32], okm[32:44], okm[44:76]
pt = plaintext.encode()
padded = (len(pt).to_bytes(2, "big") if len(pt) < 65536 else b"\x00\x00" + len(pt).to_bytes(4, "big")) + pt
padded += b"\x00" * (calc_padded_len(len(pt)) - len(pt))
ct = chacha20(key, iv, padded)
mac = hmac.new(mac_key, nonce + ct, hashlib.sha256).digest()
return base64.b64encode(bytes([2]) + nonce + ct + mac).decode()
def nip44_decrypt(secret_hex: str, peer_hex: str, payload: str) -> str:
data = base64.b64decode(payload)
assert data[0] == 2, "only NIP-44 v2 supported"
nonce, ct, mac = data[1:33], data[33:-32], data[-32:]
ck = hkdf_extract(b"nip44-v2", ecdh_x(secret_hex, peer_hex))
okm = hkdf_expand(ck, nonce, 76)
key, iv, mac_key = okm[:32], okm[32:44], okm[44:76]
assert hmac.compare_digest(hmac.new(mac_key, nonce + ct, hashlib.sha256).digest(), mac), "bad MAC"
padded = chacha20(key, iv, ct)
ln = int.from_bytes(padded[:2], "big")
body = padded[2:2 + ln] if ln else padded[6:6 + int.from_bytes(padded[2:6], "big")]
return body.decode()
# ── nostr events ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def event_id(pubkey_hex: str, created_at: int, kind: int, tags, content: str) -> str:
serialized = json.dumps([0, pubkey_hex, created_at, kind, tags, content], separators=(",", ":"))
return hashlib.sha256(serialized.encode()).hexdigest()
def sign_event(secret_hex: str, event: dict) -> dict:
eid = event_id(event["pubkey"], event["created_at"], event["kind"], event["tags"], event["content"])
ev = dict(event)
ev["id"] = eid
ev["sig"] = bip340_sign(bytes.fromhex(eid), int(secret_hex, 16), os.urandom(32)).hex()
return ev
# ── the client session ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def compact(d) -> str:
return json.dumps(d, separators=(",", ":"))
async def run(relay: str):
client_secret = os.urandom(32).hex()
client_secret_int = int(client_secret, 16) % N
client_pub_hex = _mul(client_secret_int, G)[0].to_bytes(32, "big").hex()
pair_secret = secrets.token_hex(16)
nonce = secrets.token_hex(8)
uri = (
f"nostrconnect://{client_pub_hex}"
f"?relay={urllib.parse.quote(relay, safe='')}"
f"&secret={pair_secret}"
f"&name=Archipelago+Test+Client"
)
print(f"· client key : {client_pub_hex}")
print(f"· relay : {relay}")
print()
print("Scan this QR with: Companion → hub (3-finger) → Remote Signer → Scan pairing QR")
print()
try:
import qrcode
qr = qrcode.QRCode(border=1)
qr.add_data(uri)
qr.make(fit=True)
qr.print_ascii(invert=True)
except ImportError:
print(uri)
print()
print("Waiting for the phone to pair (connect, ack, get_public_key, sign_event)…")
async with websockets.connect(relay, max_size=2**22) as ws:
await ws.send(compact(["REQ", "test", {"kinds": [24133], "#p": [client_pub_hex], "since": int(time.time()) - 60}]))
signer_pub = None
acked = False
requests = []
def send_frame(content: dict):
assert signer_pub is not None
ev = {
"pubkey": client_pub_hex,
"created_at": int(time.time()),
"kind": 24133,
"tags": [["p", signer_pub]],
"content": nip44_encrypt(client_secret, signer_pub, compact(content)),
}
return asyncio.ensure_future(ws.send(compact(["EVENT", sign_event(client_secret, ev)])))
async def request(method, params, rid):
send_frame({"id": rid, "method": method, "params": params})
timeout = time.time() + 120
got_pubkey = None
signed_event = None
while time.time() < timeout:
try:
raw = await asyncio.wait_for(ws.recv(), timeout=timeout - time.time())
except (asyncio.TimeoutError, TimeoutError):
break
arr = json.loads(raw)
if not isinstance(arr, list) or len(arr) < 3 or arr[0] != "EVENT":
continue
ev = arr[2]
if ev.get("kind") != 24133 or ev.get("pubkey") == client_pub_hex:
continue
author = ev["pubkey"]
try:
msg = json.loads(nip44_decrypt(client_secret, author, ev["content"]))
except Exception:
continue
if "method" in msg and msg["method"] == "connect":
params = msg.get("params", [])
if params and params[0] == author and (len(params) < 2 or params[1] == pair_secret):
signer_pub = author
print(f"✓ phone paired — signer pubkey {author[:16]}…")
send_frame({"id": msg["id"], "result": "ack"})
acked = True
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
await request("get_public_key", [], nonce + "-gpk")
else:
print("✗ phone sent connect but the secret didn't match")
return 1
continue
if "result" in msg or "error" in msg:
rid = msg.get("id", "")
if "error" in msg:
print(f"✗ error for {rid}: {msg['error']}")
if rid.endswith("-sign"):
return 1
continue
result = msg.get("result", "")
if rid.endswith("-gpk"):
got_pubkey = result
print(f"✓ get_public_key → {result}")
await request(
"sign_event",
[compact({
"kind": 1,
"content": "Hello from the Archipelago NIP-46 test client — approved by hand.",
"tags": [],
"created_at": int(time.time()),
})],
nonce + "-sign",
)
elif rid.endswith("-sign"):
signed_event = json.loads(result)
print(f"✓ sign_event → signed event {signed_event.get('id', '')[:16]}…")
break
if not acked:
print("✗ the phone never connected (2-minute timeout)")
return 1
if got_pubkey is None or got_pubkey != signer_pub:
print("✗ get_public_key missing or mismatched")
return 1
if signed_event is None:
return 1
ev = signed_event
expected_id = event_id(ev["pubkey"], ev["created_at"], ev["kind"], ev["tags"], ev["content"])
ok_id = expected_id == ev["id"]
ok_sig = bip340_verify(bytes.fromhex(expected_id), bytes.fromhex(ev["pubkey"]), bytes.fromhex(ev["sig"]))
print(f"· event id correct : {ok_id}")
print(f"· schnorr signature: {'VERIFIED ✓' if ok_sig else 'INVALID ✗'}")
if ok_id and ok_sig:
print()
print("END-TO-END PASS — the companion signed as the identity the phone holds,")
print("and the signature verifies under an independent BIP-340 implementation.")
return 0
return 1
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--relay", default="wss://relay.damus.io", help="any nostr relay both devices can reach")
args = ap.parse_args()
sys.exit(asyncio.run(run(args.relay)))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
+130 -5
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@@ -1,5 +1,108 @@
# Changelog
## v1.8.10-alpha (2026-09-02)
- **Lightning sends work again — v1.8.9's payment switch lost the fee budget.** Moving payments to LND 0.21's supported route (Router.SendPaymentV2) shipped without a fee limit, and the v2 API treats an absent limit as **zero allowed fees**: every real route carries a routing fee, so the pathfinder rejected them all and the wallet answered "No route to the recipient" on every send — all day, on healthy channels with plenty of liquidity. The router debug log made it unambiguous (`fee_limit=0 mSAT` on every failing wallet payment; the same payment succeeded by hand the moment a fee limit was set). Payments now carry lncli's default budget (the payment amount), the wallet's amount handling for zero-value invoices is preserved, and a unit test pins the limit can never be zero again.
- **A channel that drops its peer link now heals itself — on every node.** Restarting LND (an app update, a reboot, container churn) can leave a channel's peer connection down for hours while both endpoints keep the channel flagged disabled in the routing graph: the node looks perfectly healthy, the wallet shows balance, and every payment in either direction fails "no route to the recipient". Observed live: a node's only channel sat unroutable for ~17 hours after the LND 0.21.2 update, with no sign of it in any dashboard. The daemon now watches the channel graph as desired state — every open channel should have a live peer — and reconnects any that don't, using the peer's advertised addresses. Nodes without LND are untouched; an unreachable peer is retried gently, not hammered.
- **The Lightning wallet states the node's real funding state instead of "you have no channel."** Trying to send while a freshly opened channel was still waiting for on-chain confirmations — or when all its balance sits on the far side — raised a modal that claimed the node had NO channel at all (the outbound sum is legitimately zero in both states), pointed the user at opening a second channel, and — for payment routing failures — even showed the *receiving* copy. The funding gate now reads the channel list it already fetched: a confirming channel gets "it unlocks automatically once confirmed, nothing is needed from you", a far-side balance gets "you can receive, but there's nothing to send right now", a routing/liquidity payment failure says so instead of claiming channel problems, and only a genuinely channel-less node keeps the open-one guidance.
## v1.8.9-alpha (2026-09-01)
- **Lightning sends work again after the LND 0.21.2 update.** LND 0.21 removed the old synchronous payment route the node's backend paid through (`/v1/channels/transactions`) — every Lightning send answered the literal "Not Found" and the wallet showed "Payment failed: Not Found". The backend now pays through the supported Router.SendPaymentV2 route, keeps the same settle-then-report behaviour (a slow multi-hop payment is still tracked to completion, never falsely declared failed), and translates LND's failure reasons into plain advice. A new gate test speaks the payment route directly against the running LND, so an image/backend skew like this can never ship silently again.
- **The node no longer pins HSTS — HTTP access is a supported mode, and it stays working.** The HTTPS listener used to send `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains`; browsers that visited HTTPS once cached that and then silently upgraded the still-open HTTP dashboard's calls to HTTPS, which is a scheme change — cross-origin — so every request died as "CORS blocked / Failed to fetch" while the node was perfectly healthy. The HTTPS listener now actively clears the cached policy (`max-age=0`) and port 80 sends no HSTS at all, which is deliberate: the node's certificate is optional and self-signed, and devices that haven't installed the CA must keep plain-HTTP access (that's what Settings → Node certificate is for). If your browser already cached the old policy, visiting the dashboard over HTTPS once after this update clears it; a gate test now refuses any config that reintroduces the pin.
- **App frames open over HTTPS again — including the ones that "did not connect."** The launcher asked the signed catalog for each app's port policy under the name you click ("Mempool Web", "Bitcoin Knots"), but the catalog declares those ports under the manifest that owns them (the Mempool web container, Bitcoin UI). The lookup missed, the launcher handed the iframe an `http://` address, and the browser blocked it as mixed content — the app tile went blank or spun forever. Port resolution now follows launch aliases (mempool-web, bitcoin-knots/bitcoin-core, lnd, electrs and friends), falls back to a port-wide catalog scan when the id is unknown, and the catalog is warmed as soon as the dashboard loads rather than only in the App Store, so the very first app you open already knows which ports serve TLS.
- **Signing in to IndeeHub with Nostr works over HTTPS.** The NIP-07 bridge compared the app frame's origin for exact equality with the recorded `http://` app URL — a frame the browser upgraded to HTTPS (or any scheme change) was silently ignored, and replies addressed to the stale origin were refused outright, so Nostr sign-in quietly did nothing. The bridge now matches host and port (scheme intentionally ignored) and always replies to the frame's real origin.
- **Nginx Proxy Manager starts again.** Converting it to a platform manifest dropped two things its image needs: the `/etc/letsencrypt` mount its boot script hard-requires, and the `NET_BIND_SERVICE` capability its internal nginx needs to bind ports 80/443/81 under the orchestrator's `--cap-drop=ALL`. The result was an endless start/die loop (a node watched it restart 3,176 times). Both are declared in its manifest now, its certs live on unchanged under the same persistent app directory, and the signed catalog carries the fix so installed nodes heal on the next update.
- **Portainer's first-run token is in the app page, not buried in "server logs."** New Portainer versions mint a one-time setup token on a fresh install and print it only to the container logs — on an appliance that meant telling the user to go read a server log to get into their own app. The token now appears in the same launch interstitial as app login credentials (with a copy button), only while first-run setup is actually pending; once the admin account exists the card disappears on its own.
- **The Lightning wallet states the node's real funding state instead of "you have no channel."** Trying to send while a freshly opened channel was still waiting for on-chain confirmations — or when all its balance sits on the far side — raised a modal that claimed the node had no channel at all (the outbound sum is legitimately zero in both states). The funding gate now reads the channel list it already fetched: a confirming channel gets "it unlocks automatically once confirmed, nothing is needed from you", a far-side balance gets "you can receive, but there's nothing to send right now", a routing/liquidity payment failure says so instead of pointing at channel setup, and only a genuinely channel-less node is sent to open one.
## v1.8.8-alpha (2026-09-01)
- **SSH over the mesh is now a first-class setting.** Settings gains an "SSH over mesh" card: off by default, and when you allow it the node's mesh firewall opens port 22 — either to every mesh peer (behind an explicit "I understand" confirmation, because that's a real exposure) or only to the mesh addresses you list. The rule is owned by the node (the `90-ssh.nft` drop-in), so it survives upgrades and daemon reinstalls, and the card tells you up front whether sshd is running, whether it listens on IPv6 (the mesh is IPv6-only — this is what a broken attempt looks like before it happens), and whether password login is on (keys-only is the recommended pairing). From Termux on your phone, `fipssh <user>@<node-npub>` connects once the toggle is on — the npub is the durable address, and the command is shown with a copy button on the card.
- **The App Store now lists apps — not parts of apps.** The signed catalog carries every manifest because the node's update layer needs their pins, and the store briefly listed them all: Mempool API, LND UI, Bitcoin UI, the Pine voice engines, the IndeeHub and Immich backends, the mesh router and friends. Components are hidden from the store listing (they still appear where they belong — the Services tab of My Apps, once installed), and four entries that never earned a tile are gone outright: MorphOS server (old), the Web5 DID wallet, Lightning Stack (an untracked upstream bundle — LND covers the need), and CryptPad (never tested).
- **App icons now persist everywhere, in the proper container style.** Two fixes: installed apps render the icon from their own manifest — Cuprate no longer falls back to the generic A-mark on its Services tile — and the store grids (the Discover page) apply the same icon container treatment (backdrop, border, shadow) as My Apps, the detail pages, and Home. Manifest-declared UI apps also classify correctly again: Alby Hub installs into My Apps with a working tile, not into Services, because a probe miss no longer buries an app the manifest itself says has a frontend.
- **Installing from the store keeps you on the store page.** The install progress lives on the tile itself and the app appears in My Apps when it lands — no more being yanked to My Apps mid-browse.
## v1.8.7-alpha (2026-08-31)
- **What's New really does stop at v1.8.0 now.** The first correction removed old generated release blocks but missed six much older hand-written v1.2 sections at the bottom of the modal. Those sections are gone, and the release check now recognizes and rejects that legacy format too, so the history floor cannot falsely pass again.
- **The installer carries the same corrected release and Companion 0.5.28.** Its artifact gate now checks the companion APK version and the v1.8.0 What's New floor inside the finished ISO, so a stale frontend or phone app cannot be published under the current release label.
- **Crash dumps work on fresh installs as well as upgraded nodes.** The installer gate checks every kdump package inside the finished ISO, and `makedumpfile` is installed explicitly rather than accidentally relying on a recommended dependency that the minimal image deliberately omits.
- **Apps open over HTTPS when your node does.** Connect to your node over HTTPS and the apps you open — Vaultwarden in its own tab, BTCPay, Grafana, and the rest, on a remote browser or in the phone's in-app browser — now open on the same secure connection instead of silently dropping to plain HTTP. The node's app gate already served TLS on every app port; the dashboard was handing out `http://` addresses regardless of how you reached it. Ports the gate does not front (plain-HTTP publishes, and the API ports like Cuprate's RPC) deliberately stay on `http` — `https` there would simply fail to connect. Plain-HTTP access (the kiosk, LAN browsing) is unchanged.
- **Every app in the store is now a first-class platform app.** The last stragglers — Nginx Proxy Manager, Tailscale, Ollama, CryptPad, and AdGuard Home — now carry full manifests: the node's app gate fronts their web ports (TLS on the same port, the node login where appropriate, embedding fixes, Tor), installs go through the orchestrator like every other app, and their pins live in the signed catalog. Ollama stays loopback-only — it is the assistant's local model backend, not a web app. The four apps retired earlier (FIPS, Nostr VPN, Routstr, Penpot) are finally dropped from the catalog, and Cuprate's manifest — which carried a duplicated metadata block that strict parsers reject — is fixed.
- **Newly signed apps appear in the App Store immediately.** The App Store now serves the release-signed catalog the node has already fetched and verified — so publishing a signed app (like Cuprate) makes it appear for every updated node without waiting for a dashboard release. The unsigned community catalog remains only as a fallback for nodes that can't reach the registry. The same signed catalog now also decides which ports serve TLS, so nothing is upgraded to `https` that can't answer it.
## v1.8.6-alpha (2026-08-31)
- **Companion 0.5.28 is included in the node download this time, with the work that missed v1.8.5.** The companion hub can back up and restore its node list, act as a NIP-46 remote signer, and shows each paired node's FIPS mesh address with tap-to-copy. For Termux users, the included `fipssh` helper turns a durable node npub into its mesh address, so `fipssh user@npub1…` can reach SSH once that node has explicitly allowed port 22. The node-side “SSH over mesh” firewall toggle is not claimed here—it still needs implementation and remains off by default.
- **What's New now starts cleanly at v1.8.0 and is guaranteed to be newest-first.** Older alpha history no longer overwhelms the useful recent changes, the three stray v1.7 entries that appeared above current releases are gone, and the release check now fails if either the ordering or the v1.8.0 history floor drifts again.
- **A release can no longer advertise itself before its files exist.** New releases are prepared behind a pending manifest; the publisher uploads the backend and frontend, downloads both back and verifies their size and hash, and only then promotes the signed manifest to the path nodes read. The manifest generator also includes every curated What's New item instead of silently stopping after the first ten physical changelog lines.
## v1.8.5-alpha (2026-08-30)
- **Cuprate — an independent Monero node — is now an app.** Monero consensus validated by a second, unrelated codebase (Rust), the same layer of security-in-depth Bitcoin gets from Knots. Review caught two problems before anything shipped: the unrestricted RPC that can move funds stayed bound to the container's loopback (never published to the node, let alone the LAN — anything on the node could previously have reached it), and its restricted RPC moved off port 18089 to avoid colliding with Penpot. Honest caveat: upstream has cut no stable release yet, so the pin tracks an exact preview build (0.1.0-preview-18-g618ff14) and moves to their first tagged release when there is one.
- **A frozen node now explains itself — and comes back on its own.** The host now captures a memory dump into /var/crash when the kernel panics *or* wedges (a hung kiosk used to sit dead until someone power-cycled it; now it dumps, reboots itself, and leaves the evidence behind), and records failing-memory signals (ECC errors) into a database as they happen. This is the first change delivered by a new host-update channel: the node's own updater now carries OS-level packages and settings to already-deployed machines — the crash-kernel's memory reservation is the one part that waits for a reboot, and the node says so rather than pretending.
- **Uninstalling an app can no longer report success when it failed.** The declarative path used to swallow every teardown error and report the app uninstalled, leaving the tile behind and the truth in the logs. A failed uninstall now stops and shows the real per-app errors, so "still there" is never presented as "gone".
- **Pictures to internet-only mesh contacts work now.** Sending an attachment inline always took the radio path and failed with "Peer is federation-only (no radio twin)" for contacts reachable only over the internet — and the size-adviser kept recommending a radio transfer those peers can't receive. Both fixed: inline sends route over the federation when that's the only way to reach the peer, and the advice no longer offers radio-only transfers to radio-unreachable contacts.
- **Disk cleanup finally has honest numbers.** Space "free" on a drive was counted including the slice the filesystem keeps reserved for root — roughly 5% of the disk, 92 GB on one dev box — so the automatic cleanup that's supposed to kick in at 90% never triggered and stale container images piled up unnoticed. Reserved space now counts as used, which is what the threshold was always meant to measure.
- **Three small screens that were lying to you, fixed.** The "Bitcoin is synced — fund your wallet" toast no longer appears on a node where the wallet it means (LND) isn't installed — it points at installing LND instead. The seed-reveal screen hides its third prompt unless the password actually fails to decrypt (the backup passphrase only exists if you set one). And multi-version store cards stop quoting a version number you'll be asked to choose on the next screen anyway.
- **Mesh notifications survive a refresh, and a stale router no longer hides the fix.** Radio message unread counts are now remembered per contact instead of guessed from session state (the "one new message showed 11 unread" bug), cover Meshtastic, MeshCore and Reticulum alike, and deep-link to the right conversation; a single new message announces itself once. Separately, when the cached router address goes stale, the error card gains a "Reconfigure router" action instead of a Retry loop that can never succeed.
- **The app updater now knows what upstream shipped.** Every app's manifest records where it comes from — including the odd corners (GitLab-only projects, ghcr-only images) — and a checker sweeps all of them against upstream releases, so a pin that quietly rots for months is now visible instead of invisible. The first full sweep found 27 pins behind; the safe patch-level ones shipped with this release (strfry, BTCPay Server 2.4.3, the two nginx frontends), and the major jumps that may carry data migrations are deliberately held for their own careful passes.
## v1.8.4-alpha (2026-08-20)
- **Apps with their own login can now skip the node's login screen — Gitea and BTCPay Server do so out of the box.** Some apps bring a complete account system of their own, and putting the node's password page in front of them broke real workflows: git clients can't answer a browser login, and a BTCPay checkout link handed to a customer must open for that customer. These apps are now served directly on their own login, while the node still fronts the connection for everything else it does (embedding fixes, the "app is restarting" page, Tor). Every app gets a new **Settings → app → Access control** switch, so you can put the node login back in front of any app — or take it away from one — with one click, effective immediately. App developers declare the default in their manifest (`auth: open`), documented in the developer guide.
- **The phone remote now works inside apps on the TV — tap, scroll, and type everywhere.** The companion remote and keyboard drove the dashboard beautifully but died at the edge of any app screen (Gitea, BTCPay, and friends): for the browser, each app is a separate website embedded in the page, and simulated input is forbidden from crossing that wall. The on-screen display now accepts the remote's input the way a real mouse and keyboard arrive — below the page, through the browser itself — so it lands anywhere on screen, app screens and tabs included. Taps click, two-finger scrolling scrolls the app, and typing goes into whichever field you tapped. Existing kiosks pick this up with the update, no reinstall needed.
- **While you're driving with the phone remote, the old mouse pointer gets out of the way.** The computer's own pointer used to sit frozen wherever the physical mouse last left it — a second, dead cursor next to the live orange one. It now hides while the remote is in use and returns half a minute after the last remote input.
- **"Are you sure?" questions no longer freeze the remote.** A handful of confirmations (clearing mesh history, rebooting, deleting a backup, uninstalling an app) used the browser's built-in popup, which stops the whole page — including remote input — until someone clicks it with a real mouse. From the couch, that meant asking a question you couldn't answer. All of them are now proper in-app windows in the house style, fully driveable by remote.
- **A mesh radio now connects no matter which port it's plugged into — or replugged into.** Moving a radio to a different USB port could leave the mesh silently down: the node only checked a short fixed list of port names (a radio landing outside it was invisible), a hand-set serial-port override quietly outranked the device you'd just approved in the "Radio detected" window, and one whole family of boards (Espressif-based radios like recent Heltec/T-Deck models) never received a stable device name at all — the exact combination found live on a fleet machine this week. All three are fixed: every serial port is scanned, choosing a radio in the detection window clears any stale override, and Espressif boards get the same stable name as everyone else.
- **Mesh signal strength is honest now.** Every peer heard over Reticulum radio reported a signal strength of exactly 0 — which is also what you'd see with no radio at all, and what peers reached over the internet showed. Real receptions now show their true signal reading, and anything that arrived over a relay or the internet says so by showing none — so "the radio is working" and "the internet is doing the radio's job" no longer look identical. (The reading depends on the radio's firmware reporting it; boards that don't report per-packet signal stats show "unknown" rather than a made-up number, and the new radio diagnostics show at a glance whether yours reports them.)
- **A background error that repeated every 90 seconds, forever, is gone.** After setting up a node from its recovery phrase, the node kept introducing itself to its federation partners with its old temporary identity papers while signing with its new ones — every partner rejected the introduction, and both sides logged an error about it every minute and a half until the next restart. The identity switch now updates everything at once, a rejected introduction is no longer misreported as delivered, and a partner who has already answered is no longer re-asked on every cycle.
## v1.8.3-alpha (2026-08-14)
- **The network map on TVs: no more blank page, no more frozen page — and it moves again.** The map's entrance animation needed a smoothness that TV kiosk hardware can't always deliver, so the page could sit blank until a refresh; the previous fix cured the freeze by stopping the animation entirely, which went too far. Now the map appears instantly with everything already in place, then resumes its calm orbital motion at a gentler pace suited to TVs. Resizing or rotating any screen also redraws the map properly instead of leaving it tiny, stretched, or empty.
- **The dashboard's corner logo is back to normal.** The new glossy paint finish was meant for the big emblem on the screensaver, intro, and login screens — it had quietly spread to the small logo in the dashboard header, where it looked wrong. Each screen now gets exactly the treatment intended for it.
- **App icons no longer vanish in My Apps.** The freshly restyled Alby Hub and phoenixd icons could render as blank squares in some views — a subtlety in how the icon files declared their size. Fixed at the source, and the icon tool app developers use now produces immune files.
## v1.8.2-alpha (2026-08-13)
- **An app that can't be shown inside the dashboard now becomes a tab app by itself.** A few apps refuse to render inside another page no matter what — they break out with their own code or insist on owning the whole browser window. Opening one used to mean staring at a grey pane. Now the dashboard notices, offers the app in its own tab, and remembers: from then on that app's button opens a tab directly (with the little launch icon that tab apps carry), first click, every time. If a later update makes the app embeddable after all, the dashboard notices that too and goes back to embedding it.
- **The logo emblem got its glossy black paint finish — properly this time.** The circle behind the A on the screensaver, intro, and login now wears a deep wet-paint look: warm light blooming from the top edge, fine grain so the dark tones stay smooth instead of banding, and no more ring border. (An earlier rougher version of this experiment briefly shipped by accident and then vanished depending on which screen you were on — this is the finished, deliberate one, everywhere.)
- **New app icons now match the store's look, on every screen.** Alby Hub and phoenixd arrived with edge-to-edge logos that ignored the breathing room every other app icon has, and the app detail page skipped the icon backdrop entirely. Both icons are re-set on the standard canvas, the detail page now applies the same icon treatment as the store tiles, and app developers get a one-command tool that puts any logo onto the house canvas automatically.
## v1.8.1-alpha (2026-08-13)
- **Apps that refused to open inside the dashboard now embed like everything else.** Some apps ship browser headers that forbid being shown inside another page — correct hardening on the open web, but inside Archipelago it produced a dead grey pane when you opened them from My Apps (Alby Hub was the first to hit it). The app gate, which already checks your login on every request to an app, now removes just those framing headers on the way through; each app's own content-security rules pass through untouched. No more per-app proxy workarounds.
- **The network map no longer freezes kiosk TVs.** The animated federation map at 4K was too much for the deliberately conservative graphics settings the on-screen display used on every machine — settings chosen years back to stop audio crackle on much older hardware. Two fixes: on kiosk screens the map now opens in its flat 2D view (the 3D globe is one tap away, and remembered) and animates at half rate — invisible from the couch, half the work. And the display itself now recognizes what machine it runs on: older kiosk boxes keep the proven careful settings, modern ones finally get real GPU rendering.
- **New Settings → Display → Graphics choice for the on-screen display.** Auto (recommended) picks the right rendering mode for the machine by itself; Compatibility forces the most conservative mode if a screen ever stutters, tears, or crackles; Quality forces full GPU rendering on hardware the automatic detection doesn't recognize. Changing it restarts the on-screen display, like the size presets.
## v1.8.0-alpha (2026-08-12)
- **Archipelago is now open source.** The full source code of the node you are running — the orchestrator, the dashboard, the app platform, the mesh, the release tooling — is published for anyone to read, build and audit at source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy. A node that holds your money, your files and your communications should not ask to be taken on faith: from this release onward you, or anyone you trust, can see exactly what it does and follow every change we make in the open.
@@ -262,6 +365,12 @@
- More TV-screen polish: the built-in assistant shows its dark theme instead of bright white panels, the on-screen hint for switching between the kiosk and a terminal now points at the right keys, the welcome logo no longer occasionally renders as garbled characters, and an accidental tap of the power button no longer shuts the node down — hold it to power off on purpose.
- Behind the scenes: fixed the installer image build so it no longer stops on a component that was removed from the product, and so it correctly includes the private relay it was meant to bundle.
## v1.7.107-alpha (2026-07-20)
- Wi-Fi setup now heals itself on older nodes. Some nodes set up before a mid-year fix couldn't connect to a Wi-Fi network from the screen — it failed with a permissions error — because the piece that lets the node manage networking on your behalf was missing. Nodes now put that piece in place automatically on startup, so "scan, pick a network, type the password, connect" works without reinstalling.
- Your node rejoins the mesh faster after an update. Applying this update briefly restarts the mesh service, and previously a node could sit disconnected from other nodes for up to five minutes before it retried. It now notices the restart and reconnects within seconds.
- Behind the scenes: fixed the installer image build so it no longer stops on a component that was removed from the product, and so it correctly includes the private relay it was meant to bundle — two separate faults that had been failing the build.
## v1.7.106-alpha (2026-07-20)
- Nodes on the same network now find each other directly. Your node announces itself on your local network and connects straight to other Archipelago nodes nearby, instead of every connection having to be introduced by a public rendezvous server out on the internet. Peers in the same home or office stay connected to each other even when that server is unreachable, and they reach each other faster.
@@ -641,11 +750,13 @@
- Orchestrator-backed app starts now run the same pre-start repairs as the legacy Podman path, so Nginx Proxy Manager stale `81:81` container metadata is removed and recreated before the orchestrator tries to start it.
- Live diagnostics on a fleet node confirmed host nginx is healthy while Nginx Proxy Manager has no listeners on `8081`, `8084`, or `8444`, causing host nginx `502` responses for NPM proxy paths.
- The gap this closes: apps launched through the orchestrator previously skipped the legacy start-time repair path entirely, so the same stale metadata the old flow cleaned up silently broke the new one. Both paths now converge on the same repairs.
## v1.7.64-alpha (2026-05-18)
- Update apply rate limiting is relaxed for authenticated admins from 2 attempts per 10 minutes to 10 attempts per minute, preventing the System Update page from getting stuck behind `429 Too Many Requests` during legitimate OTA retry/troubleshooting flows.
- The corrected backend artifact rebuild protection from `v1.7.63-alpha` remains in place, so this release is built from a fresh Rust backend binary before publishing.
- For operators mid-incident this changes the recovery loop: a failed apply can now be retried immediately from the System Update page instead of waiting out a throttle window while a node sits half-updated.
## v1.7.63-alpha (2026-05-18)
@@ -755,6 +866,18 @@
- Debian 13/Trixie ISO and disk-install paths now force security updates from `trixie-security` during image/install creation so rebuilt release media includes patched base packages.
- Broad `.198` lifecycle audit passes with the current qualified app set; known absent blockers remain `electrumx`, `photoprism`, `dwn`, and `ollama`.
## v1.7.51-alpha (2026-04-30)
- Stack installs now adopt containers that already exist instead of failing on them — a repair or reinstall over leftover containers completes, and the adopted container's readiness is waited on like any fresh start.
- Failed installs come with evidence: the install path waits for its containers, and when one doesn't become healthy it captures that container's logs, so the error on screen names the real culprit instead of a bare timeout.
- Bitcoin RPC bindings are ensured as part of install, and the startup self-heal path gained additional ground for already-deployed nodes.
## v1.7.50-alpha (2026-04-30)
- The OTA bridge older nodes needed: deployed binaries only knew how to apply two artifacts (the backend binary and the frontend archive), so the scripts, app specs and docker assets newer releases carry never reached them. This release packs those payloads inside the frontend tarball — the one channel old binaries do apply — and the new backend promotes them into /opt once it starts.
- Runtime payloads are staged into timestamped directories and promoted atomically; a failed extraction cleans up its staging area instead of leaving half-written state for the next update to trip over.
- This is the release that un-sticks the fleet's update pipeline: from here on, an OTA can carry more than the two artifacts, and app installs on updated nodes use the specs that match their backend.
## v1.7.49-alpha (2026-04-30)
- Bitcoin Knots/Core UI now reports connection, reconnecting, syncing, and error states from a backend status bridge instead of showing a stale "Unable to connect" message while the node is warming up.
@@ -766,12 +889,15 @@
## v1.7.48-alpha (2026-04-29)
- archipelago.service no longer fails to start with "Failed to set up mount namespacing: /run/containers: No such file or directory" on nodes where /run/containers wasn't pre-created. ExecStartPre now creates it. Existing nodes need a one-time `systemctl edit archipelago` to add the mkdir; ISO installs from this version forward have the fix baked in.
- archipelago.service no longer fails to start with "Failed to set up mount namespacing: /run/containers: No such file or directory" on nodes where that runtime directory wasn't pre-created — the failure surfaced in systemd's mount-namespace setup before the service itself ever ran.
- ExecStartPre now creates /run/containers before the service starts, so the node's service manager finds the directory it needs on every boot; ISO installs from this version forward have the fix baked in.
- Existing nodes pick the fix up with a one-time `systemctl edit archipelago` adding the mkdir — after which the boot failure does not recur.
## v1.7.47-alpha (2026-04-29)
- Bitcoin Knots/Core sync is now significantly faster. The container now uses every available core for script verification (was capped at 2) and has 8GB of memory instead of 4GB so its 4GB UTXO cache has headroom for the mempool and peer connections. Existing nodes pick up the new limits on next install/update; freshly-installed nodes start at full speed.
- ElectrumX initial indexing is faster too. Its CPU cap is removed, container memory is 4GB, and its internal cache is now 3GB (default was 1.2GB).
- The result: a fresh node's first hours are measurably shorter — initial block download and ElectrumX indexing were the two longest post-install waits, and both now run at the hardware's limit.
## v1.7.46-alpha (2026-04-29)
@@ -794,10 +920,9 @@
## v1.7.44-alpha (2026-04-28)
43de3b73 feat(orchestrator): complete container migration and release hardening
ce39430b feat(self-update): sync and rebuild UI containers on OTA
72dec5aa fix(lnd-ui): align container port across all specs
83aacdf2 chore(release): archive ISO build recipes, tarball-only releases
- Container orchestration migration completed, with release hardening across the app lifecycle — installs, updates and removals now run through one orchestrator path instead of the split legacy/Podman flows.
- OTA updates now rebuild and sync the app UI containers they carry, so an updated app serves the UI image that matches its backend instead of whatever happened to be on disk.
- LND UI port handling is aligned across all runtime specs, and release packaging moved to tarball-only payloads with the ISO build recipes archived — update payloads now carry only the files existing nodes need.
All notable changes to Archipelago will be documented in this file.
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/agitated-hofstadter deleted from 10e12a329f
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/funny-hofstadter deleted from 1c5185a15c
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/happy-colden deleted from 666e1232f4
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/hardcore-beaver deleted from a817fa199f
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/heuristic-raman deleted from e8e002debc
Submodule aiui/.claude/worktrees/priceless-colden deleted from aaaef7d710
@@ -93,10 +93,11 @@ describe('useAI', () => {
expect(activeModel.value).toBe('echo')
})
it('lists available providers with models', () => {
it('lists available providers with models, Routstr first', () => {
const { availableProviders } = useAI()
expect(availableProviders.value.length).toBe(3)
expect(availableProviders.value.length).toBe(4)
const ids = availableProviders.value.map(p => p.id)
expect(ids[0]).toBe('routstr')
expect(ids).toContain('claude')
expect(ids).toContain('openrouter')
expect(ids).toContain('mock')
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
<Transition name="picker">
<div
v-if="showModelPicker"
class="fixed z-[9999] path-glass-card header-overlay-panel p-3 space-y-3 animate-fade-up-fast shadow-2xl min-w-[220px]"
class="fixed z-[9999] path-glass-card header-overlay-panel p-3 space-y-3 animate-fade-up-fast shadow-2xl min-w-[220px] max-h-[70vh] overflow-y-auto"
:style="modelPickerDropdownStyle"
@click.stop
>
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ const modelDisplayName = computed(() => {
})
function selectModel(providerId: string, modelId: string) {
setProvider(providerId as 'claude' | 'openrouter' | 'mock')
setProvider(providerId as 'routstr' | 'claude' | 'openrouter' | 'mock')
setModel(modelId)
showModelPicker.value = false
}
+118 -5
View File
@@ -13,12 +13,14 @@ import { useCodeContext } from '@/composables/useCodeContext'
import { apiFetch } from '@/utils/api-fetch'
import { useSettingsStore } from '@/stores/settings'
type Provider = 'claude' | 'openrouter' | 'mock'
type Provider = 'routstr' | 'claude' | 'openrouter' | 'mock'
// API paths are relative to the base URL so they work both in dev (/) and Archy (/aiui/)
const BASE = import.meta.env.BASE_URL || '/'
const CLAUDE_PATH = `${BASE}api/claude/v1/messages`
const OPENROUTER_PATH = `${BASE}api/openrouter`
const ROUTSTR_MODELS_PATH = `${BASE}api/routstr/models`
const ROUTSTR_CHAT_PATH = `${BASE}api/routstr/chat/completions`
import { mockFilms } from '@/mocks/films'
import { mockSongs } from '@/mocks/songs'
@@ -148,8 +150,41 @@ function looksLikeMissingApiKey(err: string): boolean {
)
}
// ─── Routstr model catalog (fetched from the node's session-gated proxy) ───
// The node forwards the live Routstr aggregator's /v1/models; entries carry
// sats_pricing so completions are Cashu-paid against the operator's budget.
const routstrModels = ref<{ id: string; name: string }[]>([])
let routstrModelsFetched = false
async function refreshRoutstrModels() {
if (routstrModelsFetched) return
routstrModelsFetched = true
try {
const res = await apiFetch(ROUTSTR_MODELS_PATH)
if (!res.ok) return
const data = await res.json()
if (Array.isArray(data?.data)) {
routstrModels.value = data.data
.filter((m: Record<string, unknown>) => typeof m.id === 'string')
.map((m: Record<string, unknown>) => ({
id: m.id as string,
name: (m.name as string) || (m.id as string),
}))
}
} catch {
routstrModelsFetched = false // allow a retry on the next send/open
}
}
const availableProviders = computed(() => {
const providers: { id: Provider; name: string; models: { id: string; name: string }[] }[] = [
{
id: 'routstr',
name: 'Routstr (sats)',
models: routstrModels.value.length > 0
? routstrModels.value
: [{ id: 'routstr-unavailable', name: 'No models — node offline?' }],
},
{
id: 'claude',
name: 'Claude (Max)',
@@ -381,6 +416,71 @@ async function streamOpenRouter(
}, onError, signal)
}
/**
* Routstr: one paid, NON-streaming, OpenAI-shaped completion through the
* node's session-gated `/aiui/api/routstr/` forwarder. The node quotes a
* price from the live catalog, pays with a Cashu token against the
* operator's budget (Settings → System → Routstr AI budget), redeems the
* change, and passes the provider's JSON back. The full answer is emitted
* as a single token — streaming across a paid hop is the planned follow-up.
*/
async function streamRoutstr(
messages: ChatMessage[],
onToken: (text: string) => void,
onError: (err: string) => void,
systemPrompt: string,
signal?: AbortSignal,
): Promise<void> {
const wireMessages = [
{ role: 'system' as const, content: systemPrompt },
...messages.map((m) => ({ role: m.role as 'user' | 'assistant', content: m.content })),
]
const res = await apiFetch(ROUTSTR_CHAT_PATH, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
model: activeModel.value,
messages: wireMessages,
stream: false,
}),
signal,
})
const bodyText = await res.text().catch(() => '')
if (!res.ok) {
// The node's refusals carry a plain-language error.message (budget not
// set, budget spent, wallet can't fund) — surface it verbatim.
let msg = `Routstr error ${res.status}`
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(bodyText)
// Node refusals use {error:{message}}; the upstream provider nests
// its own as {detail:{error:{message}}} or a plain {detail:"..."}.
const detail = parsed?.detail
msg =
parsed?.error?.message ??
detail?.error?.message ??
(typeof detail === 'string' ? detail : undefined) ??
msg
} catch { /* keep the status-only message */ }
onError(msg)
return
}
if (signal?.aborted) return
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(bodyText)
const text = parsed?.choices?.[0]?.message?.content
if (typeof text === 'string' && text.length > 0) {
onToken(text)
} else {
onError('Routstr returned an empty response')
}
} catch {
onError('Routstr returned a malformed response')
}
}
/**
* Embedded-mode chat delegation (D-01/D-17): when AIUI is running inside
* Archy, the model call, the tool-calling loop, and the model key all live
@@ -619,7 +719,11 @@ export async function streamWithModel(
activeModel.value = model
try {
if (useArchy().isEmbedded.value) {
if (provider === 'routstr') {
// Explicitly chosen Routstr wins even embedded in Archy — the whole
// point of the picker entry is that it is a selection, not a fallback.
await streamRoutstr(history, onToken, onError, 'You are a helpful assistant.', signal)
} else if (useArchy().isEmbedded.value) {
// D-17: embedded mode delegates the loop, the tools and the key to
// Archy — provider/model selection here doesn't apply node-side.
await streamViaArchy(history, onToken, onError, signal)
@@ -638,8 +742,9 @@ export async function streamWithModel(
export function useAI() {
const chatStore = useChatStore()
// Fetch Wavlake catalog on first use (non-blocking)
// Fetch Wavlake + Routstr catalogs on first use (non-blocking)
refreshWavlakeCatalog()
refreshRoutstrModels()
function stopGeneration() {
if (currentAbort) {
@@ -712,7 +817,11 @@ export function useAI() {
const genParams = getConversationParams(chatStore)
try {
if (useArchy().isEmbedded.value) {
if (provider === 'routstr') {
// Explicitly chosen Routstr wins even embedded in Archy — a
// selection, not a fallback.
await streamRoutstr(history, onToken, onError, systemPrompt, signal)
} else if (useArchy().isEmbedded.value) {
// D-17: embedded mode delegates the loop, the tools and the key to
// Archy — provider/model selection here doesn't apply node-side.
await streamViaArchy(history, onToken, onError, signal)
@@ -828,7 +937,11 @@ export function useAI() {
const genParams = getConversationParams(chatStore)
try {
if (useArchy().isEmbedded.value) {
if (provider === 'routstr') {
// Explicitly chosen Routstr wins even embedded in Archy — a
// selection, not a fallback.
await streamRoutstr(history, onToken, onError, systemPrompt, signal)
} else if (useArchy().isEmbedded.value) {
// D-17: embedded mode delegates the loop, the tools and the key to
// Archy — provider/model selection here doesn't apply node-side.
await streamViaArchy(history, onToken, onError, signal)
+447 -375
View File
@@ -11,16 +11,47 @@
},
"apps": [
{
"id": "bitcoin-knots",
"title": "Bitcoin Knots",
"version": "28.1.0",
"description": "Full Bitcoin Knots node with dynamic prune/full-mode startup based on host disk.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/bitcoin-knots.webp",
"author": "Bitcoin Knots",
"id": "adguardhome",
"title": "AdGuard Home",
"version": "v0.107.79",
"description": "Network-wide ad and tracker blocking: a DNS server that filters every device on your LAN, with a web console for rules and client management.",
"icon": "",
"author": "AdGuard",
"category": "networking",
"tier": "optional",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/adguardhome:v0.107.79",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome"
},
{
"id": "alby-hub",
"title": "Alby Hub",
"version": "1.23.0",
"description": "Self-custodial Lightning wallet hub. Runs its own Lightning node on your Archipelago and connects your apps to it over Nostr Wallet Connect — one hub, every app pays through it.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/alby-hub.svg",
"author": "Alby",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/bitcoin-knots:29.3.knots20260210",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/bitcoinknots/bitcoin"
"tier": "optional",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/alby-hub:v1.24.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/getAlby/hub"
},
{
"id": "barkd",
"title": "Ark Wallet",
"version": "0.3.0",
"description": "Ark protocol wallet daemon (barkd). Lets the node hold self-custodial off-chain bitcoin via an Ark server; the wallet talks to it over a local REST API. Signet by default while Ark matures.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/bark.png",
"author": "Second",
"category": "money",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/barkd:0.3.0",
"repoUrl": "https://gitlab.com/ark-bitcoin/bark",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"3535:3535"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/barkd:/data"
]
}
},
{
"id": "bitcoin-core",
@@ -35,76 +66,16 @@
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin"
},
{
"id": "lnd",
"title": "LND",
"version": "0.18.4",
"description": "Lightning Network implementation by Lightning Labs. Enables instant, low-cost Bitcoin payments.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/lnd.png",
"author": "Lightning Labs",
"id": "bitcoin-knots",
"title": "Bitcoin Knots",
"version": "28.1.0",
"description": "Full Bitcoin Knots node with dynamic prune/full-mode startup based on host disk.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/bitcoin-knots.webp",
"author": "Bitcoin Knots",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/lnd:v0.18.4-beta",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd",
"requires": [
"bitcoin-knots"
]
},
{
"id": "btcpay-server",
"title": "BTCPay Server",
"version": "2.4.2",
"description": "Self-hosted Bitcoin payment processor. Accept Bitcoin payments without intermediaries.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/btcpay-server.png",
"author": "BTCPay Server Foundation",
"category": "commerce",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "docker.io/btcpayserver/btcpayserver:2.4.2",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/btcpayserver/btcpayserver",
"requires": [
"bitcoin-knots"
]
},
{
"id": "mempool",
"title": "Mempool Explorer",
"version": "3.0.0",
"description": "Bitcoin mempool and blockchain explorer. Real-time transaction and block visualization.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/mempool.webp",
"author": "Mempool",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.0.1",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/mempool/mempool",
"requires": [
"bitcoin-knots",
"electrumx"
]
},
{
"id": "electrumx",
"title": "ElectrumX",
"version": "1.18.0",
"description": "Electrum server indexing Bitcoin chain data for lightweight wallet queries.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/electrumx.png",
"author": "Luke Childs",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/electrumx:v1.18.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/spesmilo/electrumx",
"requires": [
"bitcoin-knots"
]
},
{
"id": "indeedhub",
"title": "IndeeHub",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Bitcoin documentary streaming platform featuring God Bless Bitcoin and other educational content about Bitcoin, sovereignty, and decentralized technology. Sign in with your Nostr identity.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/indeedhub.png",
"author": "IndeeHub",
"category": "community",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/indeedhub:1.0.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/indeedhub/indeedhub"
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/bitcoin-knots:29.3.knots20260210",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/bitcoinknots/bitcoin"
},
{
"id": "botfights",
@@ -131,15 +102,128 @@
]
}
},
{
"id": "btcpay-server",
"title": "BTCPay Server",
"version": "2.4.3",
"description": "Self-hosted Bitcoin payment processor. Accept Bitcoin payments without intermediaries.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/btcpay-server.png",
"author": "BTCPay Server Foundation",
"category": "commerce",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "docker.io/btcpayserver/btcpayserver:2.4.3",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/btcpayserver/btcpayserver",
"requires": [
"bitcoin-knots"
]
},
{
"id": "cuprate",
"title": "Cuprate",
"version": "0.1.0-preview",
"description": "Alternative Monero node implementation in Rust. Independently validates Monero consensus rules, providing a layer of security and redundancy for the network.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/cuprate.svg",
"author": "Cuprate contributors",
"category": "money",
"tier": "optional",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/cuprate:0.1.0-preview-18-g618ff14",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/Cuprate/cuprate"
},
{
"id": "electrumx",
"title": "ElectrumX",
"version": "1.18.0",
"description": "Electrum server indexing Bitcoin chain data for lightweight wallet queries.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/electrumx.png",
"author": "Luke Childs",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/electrumx:v1.18.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/spesmilo/electrumx",
"requires": [
"bitcoin-knots"
]
},
{
"id": "fedimint",
"title": "Fedimint Guardian",
"version": "0.10.0",
"description": "Federated Bitcoin minting service with built-in Guardian UI. Privacy-preserving Bitcoin custody.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/fedimint.png",
"author": "Fedimint",
"category": "money",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/fedimintd:v0.10.1",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/fedimint/fedimint"
},
{
"id": "fedimint-clientd",
"title": "Fedimint Client",
"version": "0.8.0",
"description": "Fedimint ecash client daemon (fmcd). Lets the node hold Fedimint ecash and join federations; the wallet talks to it over a local REST API.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/fedimint.png",
"author": "Fedimint",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/fmcd:0.8.1",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/minmoto/fmcd"
},
{
"id": "fedimint-gateway",
"title": "Fedimint Gateway",
"version": "0.10.0",
"description": "Fedimint gateway service with automatic LND-or-LDK backend selection.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/fedimint.png",
"author": "Fedimint",
"category": "money",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/gatewayd:v0.10.1",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/fedimint/fedimint",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8176:8176",
"9737:9737"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/fedimint-gateway:/data",
"/var/lib/archipelago/lnd:/lnd:ro"
]
}
},
{
"id": "filebrowser",
"title": "File Browser",
"version": "2.63.23",
"description": "Baseline Archipelago file manager service.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/file-browser.webp",
"author": "File Browser",
"category": "data",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/filebrowser:v2.63.23",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8083:80"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser:/srv",
"/var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser-data:/data"
],
"args": [
"--database=/data/database.db",
"--root=/srv",
"--address=0.0.0.0",
"--port=80"
]
}
},
{
"id": "gitea",
"title": "Gitea",
"version": "1.23",
"version": "1.27.3",
"description": "Self-hosted Git service with built-in container registry, CI/CD, and package hosting.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/gitea.svg",
"author": "Gitea",
"category": "development",
"dockerImage": "docker.io/gitea/gitea:1.23",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/gitea:1.27.3",
"repoUrl": "https://gitea.com",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
@@ -163,224 +247,6 @@
},
"tier": "optional"
},
{
"id": "filebrowser",
"title": "File Browser",
"version": "2.27.0",
"description": "Baseline Archipelago file manager service.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/file-browser.webp",
"author": "File Browser",
"category": "data",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/filebrowser:v2.27.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8083:80"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser:/srv",
"/var/lib/archipelago/filebrowser-data:/data"
],
"args": [
"--database=/data/database.db",
"--root=/srv",
"--address=0.0.0.0",
"--port=80"
]
}
},
{
"id": "nostr-rs-relay",
"title": "Nostr Relay (Rust)",
"version": "0.8.0",
"description": "High-performance Nostr relay written in Rust. Host your own decentralized social media relay and earn networking profits.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/nostrudel.svg",
"author": "Nostr RS Relay",
"category": "community",
"tier": "recommended",
"dockerImage": "scsibug/nostr-rs-relay:0.8.9",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/scsibug/nostr-rs-relay",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8081:8080"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/nostr-relay:/usr/src/app/db"
],
"env": [
"RELAY_NAME=Archipelago Nostr Relay",
"RELAY_DESCRIPTION=Self-hosted Nostr relay on Archipelago"
]
}
},
{
"id": "vaultwarden",
"title": "Vaultwarden",
"version": "1.30.0",
"description": "Self-hosted password vault with zero-knowledge encryption.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/vaultwarden.webp",
"author": "Vaultwarden",
"category": "data",
"tier": "recommended",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/vaultwarden:1.30.0-alpine",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8082:80"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/vaultwarden:/data"
]
}
},
{
"id": "searxng",
"title": "SearXNG",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Privacy-respecting metasearch engine. Search the web without tracking.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/searxng.png",
"author": "SearXNG",
"category": "data",
"tier": "recommended",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/searxng:latest",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/searxng/searxng",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8888:8080"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/searxng:/etc/searxng"
]
}
},
{
"id": "fedimint",
"title": "Fedimint Guardian",
"version": "0.10.0",
"description": "Federated Bitcoin minting service with built-in Guardian UI. Privacy-preserving Bitcoin custody.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/fedimint.png",
"author": "Fedimint",
"category": "money",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/fedimintd:v0.10.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/fedimint/fedimint"
},
{
"id": "fedimint-clientd",
"title": "Fedimint Client",
"version": "0.8.0",
"description": "Fedimint ecash client daemon (fmcd). Lets the node hold Fedimint ecash and join federations; the wallet talks to it over a local REST API.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/fedimint.png",
"author": "Fedimint",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/fmcd:0.8.1",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/minmoto/fmcd"
},
{
"id": "fedimint-gateway",
"title": "Fedimint Gateway",
"version": "0.10.0",
"description": "Fedimint gateway service with automatic LND-or-LDK backend selection.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/fedimint.png",
"author": "Fedimint",
"category": "money",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/gatewayd:v0.10.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/fedimint/fedimint",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8176:8176",
"9737:9737"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/fedimint-gateway:/data",
"/var/lib/archipelago/lnd:/lnd:ro"
]
}
},
{
"id": "barkd",
"title": "Ark Wallet",
"version": "0.3.0",
"description": "Ark protocol wallet daemon (barkd). Lets the node hold self-custodial off-chain bitcoin via an Ark server; the wallet talks to it over a local REST API. Signet by default while Ark matures.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/bark.png",
"author": "Second",
"category": "money",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/barkd:0.3.0",
"repoUrl": "https://gitlab.com/ark-bitcoin/bark",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"3535:3535"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/barkd:/data"
]
}
},
{
"id": "jellyfin",
"title": "Jellyfin",
"version": "10.8.13",
"description": "Free media server. Stream movies, music, and photos.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/jellyfin.webp",
"author": "Jellyfin",
"category": "data",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/jellyfin:10.8.13",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/jellyfin/jellyfin",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8096:8096"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/jellyfin/config:/config",
"/var/lib/archipelago/jellyfin/cache:/cache"
]
}
},
{
"id": "immich",
"title": "Immich",
"version": "2.7.4",
"description": "Self-hosted photo and video backup with mobile apps and search.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/immich.png",
"author": "Immich",
"category": "data",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/immich-server:release",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/immich-app/immich"
},
{
"id": "homeassistant",
"title": "Home Assistant",
"version": "2026.7.3",
"description": "Open source home automation platform. Control and monitor your smart home devices.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/homeassistant.png",
"author": "Home Assistant",
"category": "home",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/home-assistant:2026.7.3",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8123:8123"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/home-assistant:/config"
],
"env": [
"TZ=UTC"
]
}
},
{
"id": "pine",
"title": "Pine",
"version": "1.3.0",
"description": "A private voice assistant for your home. Pine runs speech-to-text (Whisper), text-to-speech (Piper) and wake-word detection (openWakeWord) on your own node and pairs with a PineVoice satellite speaker, so Home Assistant Assist works locally with nothing sent to the cloud. Ask it about your node — block height, sync, peers, Lightning balance — and, when a Claude API key is set, anything else.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/pine.svg",
"author": "Archipelago",
"category": "home",
"dockerImage": "docker.io/library/nginx:1.27-alpine",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/rhasspy/wyoming"
},
{
"id": "grafana",
"title": "Grafana",
@@ -405,6 +271,279 @@
]
}
},
{
"id": "homeassistant",
"title": "Home Assistant",
"version": "2026.8.3",
"description": "Open source home automation platform. Control and monitor your smart home devices.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/homeassistant.png",
"author": "Home Assistant",
"category": "home",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/home-assistant:2026.8.3",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8123:8123"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/home-assistant:/config"
],
"env": [
"TZ=UTC"
]
}
},
{
"id": "immich",
"title": "Immich",
"version": "2.7.4",
"description": "Self-hosted photo and video backup with mobile apps and search.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/immich.png",
"author": "Immich",
"category": "data",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/immich-server:release",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/immich-app/immich"
},
{
"id": "indeedhub",
"title": "IndeeHub",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Bitcoin documentary streaming platform featuring God Bless Bitcoin and other educational content about Bitcoin, sovereignty, and decentralized technology. Sign in with your Nostr identity.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/indeedhub.png",
"author": "IndeeHub",
"category": "community",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/indeedhub:1.0.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/indeedhub/indeedhub"
},
{
"id": "jellyfin",
"title": "Jellyfin",
"version": "10.8.13",
"description": "Free media server. Stream movies, music, and photos.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/jellyfin.webp",
"author": "Jellyfin",
"category": "data",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/jellyfin:10.11.11",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/jellyfin/jellyfin",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8096:8096"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/jellyfin/config:/config",
"/var/lib/archipelago/jellyfin/cache:/cache"
]
}
},
{
"id": "lnd",
"title": "LND",
"version": "0.21.2",
"description": "Lightning Network implementation by Lightning Labs. Enables instant, low-cost Bitcoin payments.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/lnd.png",
"author": "Lightning Labs",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/lnd:v0.21.2-beta",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd",
"requires": [
"bitcoin-knots"
]
},
{
"id": "mempool",
"title": "Mempool Explorer",
"version": "3.0.0",
"description": "Bitcoin mempool and blockchain explorer. Real-time transaction and block visualization.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/mempool.webp",
"author": "Mempool",
"category": "money",
"tier": "core",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/mempool/mempool",
"requires": [
"bitcoin-knots",
"electrumx"
]
},
{
"id": "netbird",
"title": "NetBird",
"version": "2.38.0",
"description": "Self-hosted WireGuard mesh VPN control plane with dashboard, embedded identity provider, management API, signal, relay, and STUN. The user-facing entry point — a TLS proxy in front of the dashboard + server.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/netbird.svg",
"author": "NetBird",
"category": "networking",
"tier": "recommended",
"dockerImage": "docker.io/library/nginx:1.31.4-alpine",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8087:80",
"8086:80",
"3478:3478/udp"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/netbird:/var/lib/netbird"
],
"notes": "Installed as a two-container stack: netbird dashboard on 8087 and netbird-server control plane on 8086 plus UDP 3478. For production clients, publish a DNS name over HTTPS with gRPC/WebSocket routing."
}
},
{
"id": "nextcloud",
"title": "Nextcloud",
"version": "29",
"description": "Your own private cloud. File sync, calendars, contacts.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/nextcloud.webp",
"author": "Nextcloud",
"category": "data",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nextcloud:29",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/nextcloud/server",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8085:80"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/nextcloud:/var/www/html"
]
}
},
{
"id": "nginx-proxy-manager",
"title": "Nginx Proxy Manager",
"version": "2.12.1",
"description": "Reverse proxy with SSL. Beautiful web interface for managing proxies. On a node, this manages its admin UI and upstream configuration — the proxy's own :80/:443 listeners are not published (the node's web server owns those ports).",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/nginx.svg",
"author": "Nginx Proxy Manager",
"category": "networking",
"tier": "optional",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx-proxy-manager:latest",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager"
},
{
"id": "nostr-rs-relay",
"title": "Nostr Relay (Rust)",
"version": "0.10.0",
"description": "High-performance Nostr relay written in Rust. Host your own decentralized social media relay and earn networking profits.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/nostrudel.svg",
"author": "Nostr RS Relay",
"category": "community",
"tier": "recommended",
"dockerImage": "scsibug/nostr-rs-relay:0.10.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/scsibug/nostr-rs-relay",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8081:8080"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/nostr-relay:/usr/src/app/db"
],
"env": [
"RELAY_NAME=Archipelago Nostr Relay",
"RELAY_DESCRIPTION=Self-hosted Nostr relay on Archipelago"
]
}
},
{
"id": "ollama",
"title": "Ollama",
"version": "0.5.4",
"description": "Run large language models locally. Download and run AI models like Llama, Mistral on your own hardware — served on the node's loopback for the AI assistant (Settings → Claude Auth → model backend), never exposed to the network.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/ollama.png",
"author": "Ollama",
"category": "community",
"tier": "optional",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/ollama:latest",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/ollama/ollama"
},
{
"id": "phoenixd",
"title": "phoenixd",
"version": "0.9.0",
"description": "Headless Lightning daemon by ACINQ (the Phoenix wallet team). No screen of its own — it exposes a small local API that other apps and tools use to send and receive Lightning payments. Channel liquidity is managed automatically for a fee.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/phoenixd.svg",
"author": "ACINQ",
"category": "money",
"tier": "optional",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/phoenixd:0.9.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/ACINQ/phoenixd"
},
{
"id": "photoprism",
"title": "PhotoPrism",
"version": "240915",
"description": "AI-powered photo management with facial recognition.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/photoprism.svg",
"author": "PhotoPrism",
"category": "data",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/photoprism:240915",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/photoprism/photoprism",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"2342:2342"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/photoprism:/photoprism/storage"
],
"env": [
"PHOTOPRISM_ADMIN_PASSWORD=archipelago",
"PHOTOPRISM_DEFAULT_LOCALE=en"
]
}
},
{
"id": "pine",
"title": "Pine",
"version": "1.3.0",
"description": "A private voice assistant for your home. Pine runs speech-to-text (Whisper), text-to-speech (Piper) and wake-word detection (openWakeWord) on your own node and pairs with a PineVoice satellite speaker, so Home Assistant Assist works locally with nothing sent to the cloud. Ask it about your node — block height, sync, peers, Lightning balance — and, when a Claude API key is set, anything else.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/pine.svg",
"author": "Archipelago",
"category": "home",
"dockerImage": "docker.io/library/nginx:1.31.4-alpine",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/rhasspy/wyoming"
},
{
"id": "portainer",
"title": "Portainer",
"version": "2.45.0",
"description": "Container management web UI for the local Podman socket.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/portainer.webp",
"author": "Portainer",
"category": "development",
"tier": "optional",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/portainer:2.45.0",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"9000:9000"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/portainer:/data",
"/run/user/1000/podman/podman.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"
],
"notes": "Uses the manifest-owned Podman socket bind mount preparation path."
}
},
{
"id": "searxng",
"title": "SearXNG",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Privacy-respecting metasearch engine. Search the web without tracking.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/searxng.png",
"author": "SearXNG",
"category": "data",
"tier": "recommended",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/searxng:latest",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/searxng/searxng",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8888:8080"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/searxng:/etc/searxng"
]
}
},
{
"id": "tailscale",
"title": "Tailscale",
@@ -433,51 +572,6 @@
]
}
},
{
"id": "portainer",
"title": "Portainer",
"version": "2.19.4",
"description": "Container management web UI for the local Podman socket.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/portainer.webp",
"author": "Portainer",
"category": "development",
"tier": "optional",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/portainer:2.39.1",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"9000:9000"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/portainer:/data",
"/run/user/1000/podman/podman.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"
],
"notes": "Uses the manifest-owned Podman socket bind mount preparation path."
}
},
{
"id": "netbird",
"title": "NetBird",
"version": "2.38.0",
"description": "Self-hosted WireGuard mesh VPN control plane with dashboard, embedded identity provider, management API, signal, relay, and STUN. The user-facing entry point — a TLS proxy in front of the dashboard + server.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/netbird.svg",
"author": "NetBird",
"category": "networking",
"tier": "recommended",
"dockerImage": "docker.io/library/nginx:1.27-alpine",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8087:80",
"8086:80",
"3478:3478/udp"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/netbird:/var/lib/netbird"
],
"notes": "Installed as a two-container stack: netbird dashboard on 8087 and netbird-server control plane on 8086 plus UDP 3478. For production clients, publish a DNS name over HTTPS with gRPC/WebSocket routing."
}
},
{
"id": "uptime-kuma",
"title": "Uptime Kuma",
@@ -507,44 +601,22 @@
}
},
{
"id": "photoprism",
"title": "PhotoPrism",
"version": "240915",
"description": "AI-powered photo management with facial recognition.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/photoprism.svg",
"author": "PhotoPrism",
"id": "vaultwarden",
"title": "Vaultwarden",
"version": "1.37.2",
"description": "Self-hosted password vault with zero-knowledge encryption.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/vaultwarden.webp",
"author": "Vaultwarden",
"category": "data",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/photoprism:240915",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/photoprism/photoprism",
"tier": "recommended",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/vaultwarden:1.37.2-alpine",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"2342:2342"
"8082:80"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/photoprism:/photoprism/storage"
],
"env": [
"PHOTOPRISM_ADMIN_PASSWORD=archipelago",
"PHOTOPRISM_DEFAULT_LOCALE=en"
]
}
},
{
"id": "nextcloud",
"title": "Nextcloud",
"version": "29",
"description": "Your own private cloud. File sync, calendars, contacts.",
"icon": "/assets/img/app-icons/nextcloud.webp",
"author": "Nextcloud",
"category": "data",
"dockerImage": "source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nextcloud:29",
"repoUrl": "https://github.com/nextcloud/server",
"containerConfig": {
"ports": [
"8085:80"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/archipelago/nextcloud:/var/www/html"
"/var/lib/archipelago/vaultwarden:/data"
]
}
}
+91
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
app:
id: adguardhome
name: AdGuard Home
version: v0.107.79
upstream:
kind: github
repo: AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome
description: >-
Network-wide ad and tracker blocking: a DNS server that filters every
device on your LAN, with a web console for rules and client management.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/adguardhome:v0.107.79
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: pasta
dependencies:
- storage: 1Gi
resources:
memory_limit: 512Mi
disk_limit: 1Gi
security:
capabilities: [NET_BIND_SERVICE]
readonly_root: false
no_new_privileges: true
network_policy: isolated
ports:
- host: 3030
container: 3000
protocol: tcp
bind: 127.0.0.1
# 3030, not AdGuard Home's conventional 3000: Grafana owns :3000 on a
# node, and both being installable means the host ports must not
# collide (the orchestrator refuses/loads warn on overlap).
# open: the setup wizard and admin console carry AdGuard Home's own
# login; the gate fronts the port (TLS, header fixes) without a
# second cookie challenge.
auth: open
auth_rationale: >-
AdGuard Home enforces its own admin login on the console, and the
first-run wizard must answer before any account exists.
- host: 53
container: 53
protocol: udp
# none: plain DNS must answer every unauthenticated query from LAN
# devices — a login page in front of :53 breaks every client on the
# network by design.
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
Plain DNS answers unauthenticated by protocol: resolvers and clients
send queries directly; a login challenge would make DNS unreachable.
- host: 53
container: 53
protocol: tcp
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
DNS-over-TCP fallback (truncated responses, zone transfers); same
protocol-level requirement as the UDP port.
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/adguardhome
target: /opt/adguardhome
options: [rw]
environment: []
health_check:
type: tcp
endpoint: localhost:3030
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
interfaces:
main:
name: Admin console
description: AdGuard Home web console
type: ui
port: 3030
protocol: http
path: /
metadata:
author: AdGuard
category: networking
repo: https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome
tier: optional
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: aiui
name: AI Assistant
version: 0.1.0
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: Conversational AI interface for Archipelago. Quarantined — communicates only via context broker.
internal: true # System-managed, not shown in App Store
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
app:
id: alby-hub
name: Alby Hub
version: 1.23.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: getAlby/hub
description: Self-custodial Lightning wallet hub. Runs its own Lightning node on your Archipelago and connects your apps to it over Nostr Wallet Connect — one hub, every app pays through it.
category: money
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/alby-hub:v1.24.0
pull_policy: if-not-present
dependencies:
- storage: 1Gi
resources:
cpu_limit: 1
memory_limit: 512Mi
disk_limit: 2Gi
security:
capabilities: []
readonly_root: true
no_new_privileges: true
network_policy: bridge
ports:
- host: 8187
container: 8080
protocol: tcp
bind: 127.0.0.1
auth: gated
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/alby-hub
target: /data
options: [rw]
environment:
- WORK_DIR=/data
- PORT=8080
# LDK peers are dialed outbound-only in v1; no inbound p2p port is
# advertised, so no extra port mapping is needed for payments to work.
- LOG_LEVEL=info
health_check:
type: http
endpoint: http://localhost:8080
path: /
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
interfaces:
main:
name: Web UI
description: Alby Hub wallet interface
type: ui
port: 8187
protocol: http
metadata:
icon: /assets/img/app-icons/alby-hub.svg
repo: https://github.com/getAlby/hub
tier: optional
launch:
# Embedded: the gate neutralizes Alby Hub's X-Frame-Options: DENY on
# proxied responses. Nodes older than the gate fix show a blocked
# frame — flip to true only if targeting such nodes.
open_in_new_tab: false
features:
- Self-custodial Lightning node (LDK) with a friendly wallet UI
- Connect wallets and apps via Nostr Wallet Connect (NWC)
- Per-app budgets and isolated sub-wallets
- Works with the Alby browser extension and mobile app
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: archy-btcpay-db
name: BTCPay Postgres
version: "15.17"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: dockerhub
repo: library/postgres
description: Postgres backend for BTCPay and NBXplorer.
container:
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: archy-mempool-db
name: Mempool MariaDB
version: 11.4.10
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: dockerhub
repo: library/mariadb
description: MariaDB backend for the mempool explorer stack.
container:
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,17 @@ app:
id: archy-mempool-web
name: Mempool Web
version: 3.0.1
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: mempool/mempool
description: Frontend web UI for mempool explorer.
container_name: mempool
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.0.1
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: archy-nbxplorer
name: NBXplorer
version: 2.6.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: dgarage/NBXplorer
description: BTCPay blockchain indexer service.
container:
+8
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,14 @@ app:
id: barkd
name: Ark Wallet
version: 0.3.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. bark ships on GitLab only
# (no GitHub mirror), so the gitlab fetcher is the one that can see it.
# NOTE: a version bump is code work, not a pin move — the REST shapes are
# coded in core/archipelago/src/wallet/ark_client.rs (see Dockerfile note).
upstream:
kind: gitlab
repo: ark-bitcoin/bark
description: Ark protocol wallet daemon (barkd). Lets the node hold self-custodial off-chain bitcoin via an Ark server; the wallet talks to it over a local REST API. Signet by default while Ark matures.
container:
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: bitcoin-core
name: Bitcoin Core
version: 28.4.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: bitcoin/bitcoin
description: Reference Bitcoin Core node with dynamic prune/full-mode startup based on host disk.
container_name: bitcoin-core
@@ -49,7 +55,7 @@ app:
RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS="$RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS -rpcauth=$RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH -rpcwhitelist=txrelay:sendrawtransaction,submitpackage,testmempoolaccept,getmempoolinfo,getrawmempool,getmempoolentry,getnetworkinfo,getblockchaininfo,getblockcount,getblockhash,getblock,getblockheader,getrawtransaction,gettxout,gettxspendingprevout,decoderawtransaction,decodescript,estimatesmartfee,uptime,ping,getconnectioncount,getpeerinfo,getindexinfo,getdeploymentinfo,getchaintips";
fi;
if [ "${DISK_GB_VALUE:-0}" -lt 1000 ]; then
exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=550 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=1024 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=50000 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=1024 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
else
exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -txindex=1 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=4096 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
fi
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: bitcoin-knots
name: Bitcoin Knots
version: 28.1.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: bitcoinknots/bitcoin
description: Full Bitcoin Knots node with dynamic prune/full-mode startup based on host disk.
container_name: bitcoin-knots
@@ -55,7 +61,7 @@ app:
RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS="$RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS -rpcauth=$RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH -rpcwhitelist=txrelay:sendrawtransaction,submitpackage,testmempoolaccept,getmempoolinfo,getrawmempool,getmempoolentry,getnetworkinfo,getblockchaininfo,getblockcount,getblockhash,getblock,getblockheader,getrawtransaction,gettxout,gettxspendingprevout,decoderawtransaction,decodescript,estimatesmartfee,uptime,ping,getconnectioncount,getpeerinfo,getindexinfo,getdeploymentinfo,getchaintips";
fi;
if [ "${DISK_GB_VALUE:-0}" -lt 1000 ]; then
exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=550 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=2048 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=50000 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=2048 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
else
exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -txindex=1 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=4096 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
fi
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: bitcoin-ui
name: Bitcoin UI
version: 1.0.0
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: |
Archipelago-native HTTP proxy + static site for interacting with the
Bitcoin Core / Bitcoin Knots JSON-RPC. Runs nginx inside a container
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: botfights
name: BotFights
version: 1.2.11
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: Bot competition arena with 2-player arcade fighting mode. AI bots battle in trivia challenges while humans duke it out with controllers. Built for Bitcoiners.
category: community
+19 -3
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
app:
id: btcpay-server
name: BTCPay Server
version: 2.4.2
version: 2.4.3
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: btcpayserver/btcpayserver
description: Self-hosted Bitcoin payment processor. Accept Bitcoin payments without intermediaries.
container:
image: docker.io/btcpayserver/btcpayserver:2.4.2
image: docker.io/btcpayserver/btcpayserver:2.4.3
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
secret_env:
@@ -46,7 +52,17 @@ app:
container: 49392
protocol: tcp
bind: 127.0.0.1
auth: gated
# open, not gated: BTCPay has its own account system, and its public
# surfaces (checkout/invoice pages, payment buttons, webhooks) must be
# reachable by anonymous payers and machines — a dashboard login in
# front of a checkout link breaks the product. The gate still fronts
# the port; the operator can force the dashboard login back on from
# Settings → BTCPay Server → Access control.
auth: open
auth_rationale: >-
BTCPay enforces its own login for administration, and its checkout,
invoice and webhook endpoints are designed to be reached by
anonymous payers and payment processors.
volumes:
- type: bind
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: core-lightning
name: Core Lightning (CLN)
version: 23.08.2
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: ElementsProject/lightning
description: Lightning Network implementation in C. Lightweight alternative to LND.
container:
+193
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
app:
id: cuprate
name: Cuprate
# Matches the crate's own Cargo.toml version (binaries/cuprated/Cargo.toml).
# Cuprate has no stable release yet — this is explicitly work-in-progress
# software (see upstream README). The image tag below pins the exact
# commit built, since "0.1.0-preview" alone is not reproducible.
version: 0.1.0-preview
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: Cuprate/cuprate
description: Alternative Monero node implementation in Rust. Independently validates Monero consensus rules, providing a layer of security and redundancy for the network.
category: money
container:
# Built from the upstream Dockerfile at the tip of main, 18 commits past
# the cuprated-0.1.0-preview tag (commit 618ff14, 2026-08-19) — there is
# no newer tagged release as of this writing. Re-pin to a tagged release
# once upstream cuts one.
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/cuprate:0.1.0-preview-18-g618ff14
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
# The image's own ENTRYPOINT is ["/usr/local/bin/cuprated"]; these are
# appended as its argv, matching the project's own systemd unit
# (cuprated.service) invocation exactly.
custom_args: ["--config-file", "/home/cuprate/Cuprated.toml"]
# The image (FROM scratch) creates uid:gid 1000:1000 for the `cuprate`
# user at build time and runs as it unconditionally (USER 1000:1000,
# no shell to switch users at runtime) — same pattern as
# apps/phoenixd, apps/electrumx, apps/nostr-rs-relay, apps/portainer,
# apps/barkd. The bind-mounted data dir must be owned by that literal
# uid or cuprated dies on a permission error the first time it writes.
data_uid: "1000:1000"
dependencies:
# Monero mainnet is ~250GiB unpruned as of 2026 and growing a few GB a
# month; cuprated's pruning support is not confirmed stable yet (the
# `pruning` crate exists in the workspace but nothing in this config
# surface toggles it), so this sizes for a full unpruned chain plus
# headroom rather than assuming pruning is available.
- storage: 300Gi
resources:
cpu_limit: 0
# Raised from 4Gi alongside target_max_memory below (see files[] comment)
# — 2026-09-03 incident: a 4Gi/3GB-cache config starved
# cuprated's DB cache into constant eviction/flush, driving 45% sustained
# CPU and ~595GB/24h of block I/O on a fully-synced node. 10Gi leaves
# headroom above the 8GiB cache for the process itself.
memory_limit: 10Gi
disk_limit: 300Gi
security:
# FROM scratch, no package manager/shell, ownership fixed at build time
# — unlike bitcoin-knots this needs no runtime chown/setuid dance, so it
# can run fully read-only with an empty capability set.
capabilities: []
readonly_root: true
no_new_privileges: true
network_policy: isolated
ports:
# P2P. Cuprate's own default listen address is already 0.0.0.0
# (p2p.clear_net.listen_on), so no config override is needed — only the
# host-side port differs from Monero's canonical 18080 because that
# number is already taken on this fleet by lnd's REST port.
- host: 18183
container: 18080
protocol: tcp
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
Monero p2p gossip. Peers are anonymous by design and speak the Monero wire protocol, not HTTP.
# Unrestricted RPC (full node control) is deliberately NOT published.
# cuprated has no RPC authentication, and for a published port to reach
# it the service would have to bind 0.0.0.0 inside the container — at
# which point every other app can reach it directly on 18081, since
# ports[].bind only restricts the HOST side and podman bridges route to
# each other (verified live 2026-08-22: a peer container on archy-net
# got an unauthenticated get_info, from a *different* network). That is
# unlike bitcoin-knots, whose 0.0.0.0 RPC still demands the rpcuser /
# rpcpassword it writes from generated secrets. So unrestricted RPC is
# left at cuprated's own default — container loopback only, reachable by
# nothing — which is also what upstream intends by refusing a non-local
# bind without an explicit i_know_what_im_doing override.
# Restricted RPC: Monero's own purpose-built safe-for-public subset —
# what wallets use when connecting to a "remote node". Disabled by
# cuprated's own default; enabled via files[] below. `open`, not `gated`:
# the gate still takes the port over (loopback pin, external binds,
# fronts the Tor onion) but skips the dashboard login challenge, same
# reasoning as electrumx's port — wallet clients (Feather,
# monero-wallet-rpc, GUI) speak plain HTTP JSON-RPC programmatically and
# cannot complete a browser login or hold a session cookie. The daemon
# still uses its canonical container port 18089, but Penpot already owns
# host port 18089, so this maps the public host port to the free 18090
# instead.
- host: 18090
container: 18089
protocol: tcp
auth: open
auth_rationale: >-
Monero restricted RPC — the subset upstream considers safe for public/remote-node use. Wallets (Feather, monero-wallet-rpc, GUI) connect directly over plain HTTP JSON-RPC and cannot complete a browser login or hold a dashboard session cookie.
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/cuprate
target: /home/cuprate
options: [rw]
# Settings that need to differ from cuprated's own documented defaults
# (verified against `cuprated --generate-config` and `--dry-run` locally,
# 2026-08-21):
# - fast_sync: cuprated's own default is false, which performs full
# cryptographic verification (ring signatures + RandomX PoW) on every
# incoming block instead of trusting checkpointed history. Root-caused
# 2026-09-03 as the dominant cause of a sustained 45% CPU node,
# vs. 2.8% on a reference node with fast_sync = true — same chain height, same
# block rate. Set explicitly rather than relying on the binary
# default so fresh deploys don't silently regress into full-verify.
# - target_max_memory: cuprated's own default auto-detects total *host*
# RAM via sysinfo, which inside a memory-limited container would let
# it size caches far past what resources.memory_limit above actually
# grants — same class of problem bitcoin-knots' -dbcache sizing
# comment addresses. Set explicitly, comfortably under the 10Gi limit.
# Previously 3000000000 (~2.8GiB); that starved the DB cache and
# forced constant eviction/flush (595GB/24h block I/O on a node just
# appending ~2MB blocks every 2 minutes) — raised to 8GiB, matching
# the healthy reference node, and
# resources.memory_limit above raised in step to keep headroom above it.
# - rpc.restricted.enable: cuprated ships this off by default; flip on
# so the auth:none host port above actually serves something instead
# of refusing every connection. port stays at its documented default
# (canonical 18089), and advertise stays false — this node is not
# opting in to being listed as a public remote node over the p2p
# network, just reachable if someone points a wallet at it directly.
# - rpc.unrestricted.address + the allow-public flag: cuprated's own
# default (127.0.0.1) looks like the obviously-correct choice for a
# port meant to stay loopback-only, but verified live (2026-08-21)
# that a service bound literally to 127.0.0.1 *inside* the container
# is unreachable through the host's published port — connections
# reset regardless of how long the daemon has been up. Binding
# 0.0.0.0 inside and letting ports[].bind: 127.0.0.1 below be the
# actual restriction is the same pattern apps/bitcoin-knots already
# uses for its own RPC port (-rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 internally, gate
# restricts it externally) — not a new risk, the same one already
# reviewed and accepted for Bitcoin's RPC.
# - tracing.stdout.level / tracing.file.{level,max_log_files}: an
# operator reading Cuprated.toml on disk should be able to see and
# tune the log level directly instead of the file silently omitting
# the whole [tracing] table (verified live on the affected node
# 2026-09-01: the deployed file had no [tracing] section at all, and
# the level was only discoverable by running `cuprated
# --generate-config` and diffing). file.level is set to "info", NOT
# cuprated's own raw default of "debug" — matches the reference dev
# config this app was built and tested against (verified 2026-09-01),
# which deliberately runs file logging quieter
# than the binary default. max_log_files similarly follows that
# reference (14, not the binary default of 7).
files:
- path: /var/lib/archipelago/cuprate/Cuprated.toml
content: |
network = "Mainnet"
fast_sync = true
target_max_memory = 8589934592
[rpc.restricted]
enable = true
[tracing.stdout]
level = "info"
[tracing.file]
level = "info"
max_log_files = 14
overwrite: false
health_check:
type: tcp
# Restricted RPC — the only RPC surface published now.
endpoint: localhost:18090
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 5m
metadata:
icon: /assets/img/app-icons/cuprate.svg
category: money
tier: optional
author: Cuprate
repo: https://github.com/Cuprate/cuprate
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
node_modules
dist
*.log
.git
.gitignore
README.md
-39
View File
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
FROM node:20-alpine AS builder
WORKDIR /app
# Copy package files
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci
# Copy source code
COPY . .
# Build the application
RUN npm run build
# Production stage
FROM node:20-alpine
WORKDIR /app
# Copy built application
COPY --from=builder /app/dist ./dist
COPY --from=builder /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder /app/package.json ./
COPY --from=builder /app/public ./public
# Create non-root user
RUN addgroup -g 1000 appuser && \
adduser -D -u 1000 -G appuser appuser && \
mkdir -p /app/wallet && \
chown -R appuser:appuser /app
USER appuser
EXPOSE 8080
ENV WALLET_STORAGE=/app/wallet
ENV DWN_ENDPOINT=http://web5-dwn:3000
CMD ["node", "dist/index.js"]
-35
View File
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
# DID Wallet
Web5 wallet with Decentralized Identifier (DID) support.
## Building
```bash
# From the apps directory
./build.sh did-wallet
# Or manually
cd did-wallet
docker build -t archipelago/did-wallet:latest .
```
## Development
```bash
cd did-wallet
npm install
npm run dev
```
## Ports
- **8083**: Web UI (dev: 18083)
## Running Locally
```bash
docker run -p 8083:8080 \
-v /tmp/archipelago-dev/did-wallet:/app/wallet \
-e DWN_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:13000 \
archipelago/did-wallet:latest
```
-56
View File
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
app:
id: did-wallet
name: Web5 DID Wallet
version: 1.0.0
description: Web5 wallet with Decentralized Identifier (DID) support. Manage your digital identity and Web5 assets.
container:
image: archipelago/did-wallet:1.0.0
image_signature: cosign://...
pull_policy: if-not-present
dependencies:
- storage: 2Gi
resources:
cpu_limit: 1
memory_limit: 512Mi
disk_limit: 2Gi
security:
capabilities: []
readonly_root: true
no_new_privileges: true
user: 1000
seccomp_profile: default
network_policy: isolated
apparmor_profile: did-wallet
ports:
- host: 8088
container: 8080
protocol: tcp # Web UI
bind: 127.0.0.1
auth: gated
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/did-wallet
target: /app/wallet
options: [rw]
environment:
- WALLET_STORAGE=/app/wallet
health_check:
type: http
endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8080
path: /health
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
web5_integration:
did_support: true
wallet_functionality: true
bitcoin_integration: true
-2747
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-21
View File
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "did-wallet",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Web5 DID Wallet for Archipelago",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc",
"start": "node dist/index.js",
"dev": "ts-node src/index.ts"
},
"dependencies": {
"express": "^4.18.2",
"@web5/api": "^0.9.0"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/express": "^4.17.21",
"@types/node": "^20.10.0",
"typescript": "^5.3.3",
"ts-node": "^10.9.2"
}
}
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
<title>DID Wallet</title>
<style>
body {
font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;
max-width: 800px;
margin: 0 auto;
padding: 20px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Web5 DID Wallet</h1>
<p>Decentralized Identity Wallet for Archipelago</p>
<div id="app">
<p>Wallet interface coming soon...</p>
</div>
</body>
</html>
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
import express from 'express';
const app = express();
const port = 8080;
// Middleware
app.use(express.json());
app.use(express.static('public'));
// Health check endpoint
app.get('/health', (req, res) => {
res.json({ status: 'ok', service: 'did-wallet' });
});
// Wallet API endpoints
app.get('/api/wallet/info', (req, res) => {
res.json({
status: 'ok',
wallet: {
dids: [],
balance: 0
}
});
});
app.post('/api/wallet/did/create', async (req, res) => {
// Placeholder for DID creation
res.json({
status: 'ok',
did: 'did:key:placeholder'
});
});
// Start server
app.listen(port, '0.0.0.0', () => {
console.log(`DID Wallet listening on port ${port}`);
});
-16
View File
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
{
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2020",
"module": "commonjs",
"lib": ["ES2020"],
"outDir": "./dist",
"rootDir": "./src",
"strict": true,
"esModuleInterop": true,
"skipLibCheck": true,
"forceConsistentCasingInFileNames": true,
"resolveJsonModule": true
},
"include": ["src/**/*"],
"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist"]
}
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: electrs-ui
name: Electrs UI
version: 1.0.0
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: |
Archipelago-native HTTP frontend for electrs/electrumx status. Runs
nginx inside a container, serves static assets, and proxies
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: electrumx
name: ElectrumX
version: 1.18.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: spesmilo/electrumx
description: Electrum server indexing Bitcoin chain data for lightweight wallet queries.
container:
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: fedimint-clientd
name: Fedimint Client
version: 0.8.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: fedimint/fedimint-clientd
description: Fedimint ecash client daemon (fmcd). Lets the node hold Fedimint ecash and join federations; the wallet talks to it over a local REST API.
container:
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,16 @@ app:
id: fedimint-gateway
name: Fedimint Gateway
version: 0.10.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: fedimint/fedimint
description: Fedimint gateway service with automatic LND-or-LDK backend selection.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/gatewayd:v0.10.0
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/gatewayd:v0.10.1
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
entrypoint: ["sh", "-lc"]
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,16 @@ app:
id: fedimint
name: Fedimint Guardian
version: 0.10.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: fedimint/fedimint
description: Federated Bitcoin minting service with built-in Guardian UI. Privacy-preserving Bitcoin custody.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/fedimintd:v0.10.0
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/fedimintd:v0.10.1
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
entrypoint: ["sh", "-lc"]
+8 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
app:
id: filebrowser
name: File Browser
version: 2.27.0
version: 2.63.23
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: filebrowser/filebrowser
description: Baseline Archipelago file manager service.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/filebrowser:v2.27.0
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/filebrowser:v2.63.23
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
custom_args: ["--config", "/data/.filebrowser.json"]
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: fips-ui
name: FIPS Mesh
version: 1.0.0
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: |
Archipelago-native dashboard for the FIPS mesh transport. Runs nginx
inside a container with host networking, serves a static dashboard on
+18 -3
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,18 @@
app:
id: gitea
name: Gitea
version: "1.23"
version: "1.27.3"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: go-gitea/gitea
description: Self-hosted Git service with built-in container registry, CI/CD, and package hosting.
category: development
container:
image: docker.io/gitea/gitea:1.23
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/gitea:1.27.3
pull_policy: if-not-present
dependencies:
@@ -27,7 +33,16 @@ app:
container: 3000
protocol: tcp
bind: 127.0.0.1
auth: gated
# open, not gated: Gitea carries a complete login of its own, and git
# clients speak HTTP basic-auth — a cookie challenge in front of
# git-over-HTTP breaks every clone/push. The gate still fronts the
# port (iframe header fixes, retry page, Tor); the operator can force
# the dashboard login back on from Settings → Gitea → Access control.
auth: open
auth_rationale: >-
Gitea enforces its own account login on every page and API route;
git clients authenticate with basic-auth/tokens and cannot complete
a browser login challenge.
- host: 2222
container: 22
protocol: tcp
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: grafana
name: Grafana
version: 10.2.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: grafana/grafana
description: Analytics and monitoring platform. Visualize metrics and create dashboards.
container:
+8 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
app:
id: homeassistant
name: Home Assistant
version: 2026.7.3
version: 2026.8.3
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: home-assistant/core
description: Open source home automation platform. Control and monitor your smart home devices.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/home-assistant:2026.7.3
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/home-assistant:2026.8.3
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: pasta
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: immich-postgres
name: Immich Postgres
version: "14-vectorchord0.4.3-pgvectors0.2.0"
# Upstream is the Immich-built Postgres image, published only on ghcr.io
# (no GitHub release tags, no Docker Hub repo) — the ghcr fetcher in
# scripts/check-upstream-releases.py is the only one that can see it.
upstream:
kind: ghcr
repo: immich-app/postgres
description: Postgres (pgvecto.rs / vectorchord) backend for Immich.
# Container named immich_postgres (underscore) to match the runtime's existing
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: immich-redis
name: Immich Redis
version: "7-alpine"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: dockerhub
repo: valkey/valkey
description: Valkey (Redis-compatible) cache for Immich.
# Container named immich_redis (underscore) to match runtime per-app references
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: immich
name: Immich
version: "2.7.4"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: immich-app/immich
description: Self-hosted photo and video backup with mobile apps and search.
# app_id "immich" = the user-facing launcher (matches the catalog entry's title
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: indeedhub-api
name: IndeedHub API
version: "1.0.0"
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: IndeedHub backend API (Nostr auth, media, payments).
category: community
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: indeedhub-ffmpeg
name: IndeedHub FFmpeg Worker
version: "1.0.0"
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: IndeedHub background media transcoding worker.
category: community
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: indeedhub-minio
name: IndeedHub MinIO
version: "RELEASE.2024-11-07T00-52-20Z"
# MinIO's release tags are date-opaque (RELEASE.YYYY-MM-DD…), so the
# checker reports them as UNCOMPARABLE rather than ordering them — the
# latest tag is still shown for hand comparison, which is the point.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: minio/minio
description: MinIO S3-compatible object storage for IndeedHub media.
category: community
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: indeedhub-postgres
name: IndeedHub Postgres
version: "16.13-alpine"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: dockerhub
repo: library/postgres
description: Postgres database backend for IndeedHub.
category: community
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: indeedhub-redis
name: IndeedHub Redis
version: "7.4.8-alpine"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: dockerhub
repo: library/redis
description: Redis queue/cache backend for IndeedHub.
category: community
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: indeedhub-relay
name: IndeedHub Nostr Relay
version: "0.9.0"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: scsibug/nostr-rs-relay
description: nostr-rs-relay backing IndeedHub's Nostr identity + comments.
category: community
@@ -11,7 +17,7 @@ app:
container_name: indeedhub-relay
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nostr-rs-relay:0.9.0
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nostr-rs-relay:0.10.0
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: indeedhub-net
network_aliases: [relay]
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: indeedhub
name: IndeeHub
version: "1.0.0"
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: Bitcoin documentary streaming platform featuring God Bless Bitcoin and other educational content about Bitcoin, sovereignty, and decentralized technology. Sign in with your Nostr identity.
category: community
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,16 @@ app:
id: jellyfin
name: Jellyfin
version: 10.8.13
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: jellyfin/jellyfin
description: Free media server. Stream movies, music, and photos.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/jellyfin:10.8.13
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/jellyfin:10.11.11
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: pasta
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
# Lightning Stack - uses official image
FROM lightninglabs/lightning-stack:v0.12.0
# Default configuration is in the image
# No additional setup needed
-79
View File
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
app:
id: lightning-stack
name: Lightning Stack
version: 0.12.0
description: Complete Lightning Network implementation. Includes LND, CLN, and management tools.
container:
image: lightninglabs/lightning-stack:v0.12.0
image_signature: cosign://...
pull_policy: if-not-present
dependencies:
- app_id: bitcoin-core
version: ">=24.0"
- storage: 50Gi
resources:
cpu_limit: 4
memory_limit: 4Gi
disk_limit: 50Gi
security:
capabilities: [NET_BIND_SERVICE]
readonly_root: true
no_new_privileges: true
user: 1000
seccomp_profile: default
network_policy: isolated
apparmor_profile: lightning-stack
ports:
- host: 9738
container: 9735
protocol: tcp # P2P
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
Lightning p2p. The BOLT-8 noise handshake authenticates and encrypts the channel itself.
- host: 10010
container: 10009
protocol: tcp # gRPC
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
LND gRPC, authenticated by macaroon over TLS. Remote wallets depend on reaching this directly.
# Mirrors lnd's 18080 exemption — same LND REST API, same macaroon auth.
- host: 8091
container: 8080
protocol: tcp # REST/Web UI
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
LND REST, authenticated by macaroon over TLS. A browser login page would break
Zeus and every non-browser wallet client, exactly as for lnd's 18080.
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/lightning-stack
target: /root/.lightning
options: [rw]
environment:
- BITCOIND_HOST=bitcoin-core
- BITCOIND_RPCUSER=${BITCOIN_RPC_USER}
- BITCOIND_RPCPASS=${BITCOIN_RPC_PASSWORD}
- NETWORK=mainnet
health_check:
type: http
endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8080
path: /v1/getinfo
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
bitcoin_integration:
rpc_access: admin
sync_required: true
lightning_integration:
channel_management: true
payment_routing: true
+3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ app:
id: lnd-ui
name: LND UI
version: 1.0.0
# Built by this project — there is no upstream release feed to watch.
upstream:
kind: internal
description: |
Archipelago-native HTTP frontend for LND. Runs nginx inside a
container and serves static assets. LND connection info is fetched
+8 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
app:
id: lnd
name: LND
version: 0.18.4
version: 0.21.2
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: lightningnetwork/lnd
description: Lightning Network implementation by Lightning Labs. Enables instant, low-cost Bitcoin payments.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/lnd:v0.18.4-beta
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/lnd:v0.21.2-beta
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
# BITCOIND_HOST must follow the node's actual Bitcoin container — Knots or
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,16 @@ app:
id: mempool-api
name: Mempool API
version: 3.0.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: mempool/mempool
description: Backend API for mempool explorer.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-backend:v3.0.0
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-backend:v3.3.1
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: archy-net
# CORE_RPC_HOST must follow the node's actual Bitcoin container — Knots or
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,16 @@ app:
id: mempool
name: Mempool Explorer
version: 3.0.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: mempool/mempool
description: Bitcoin mempool and blockchain explorer. Real-time transaction and block visualization.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.0.1
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/mempool-frontend:v3.3.1
image_signature: cosign://...
pull_policy: if-not-present
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
node_modules
dist
*.log
.git
.gitignore
README.md
-37
View File
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
FROM node:20-alpine AS builder
WORKDIR /app
# Copy package files
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --only=production
# Copy source code
COPY . .
# Build the application
RUN npm run build
# Production stage
FROM node:20-alpine
WORKDIR /app
# Copy built application
COPY --from=builder /app/dist ./dist
COPY --from=builder /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder /app/package.json ./
# Create non-root user
RUN addgroup -g 1000 appuser && \
adduser -D -u 1000 -G appuser appuser && \
mkdir -p /app/data && \
chown -R appuser:appuser /app
USER appuser
EXPOSE 8080
ENV MORPHOS_DATA_DIR=/app/data
CMD ["node", "dist/index.js"]
-52
View File
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
app:
id: morphos-server
name: MorphOS Server
version: 1.0.0
description: MorphOS server platform. Decentralized application server.
container:
image: archipelago/morphos-server:1.0.0
image_signature: cosign://...
pull_policy: if-not-present
dependencies:
- storage: 5Gi
resources:
cpu_limit: 2
memory_limit: 2Gi
disk_limit: 5Gi
security:
capabilities: []
readonly_root: true
no_new_privileges: true
user: 1000
seccomp_profile: default
network_policy: isolated
apparmor_profile: morphos-server
ports:
- host: 8089
container: 8080
protocol: tcp # Web UI
bind: 127.0.0.1
auth: gated
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/morphos-server
target: /app/data
options: [rw]
environment:
- MORPHOS_ENV=production
- MORPHOS_DATA_DIR=/app/data
health_check:
type: http
endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8080
path: /health
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-20
View File
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "morphos-server",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "MorphOS server platform",
"main": "dist/index.js",
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc",
"start": "node dist/index.js",
"dev": "ts-node src/index.ts"
},
"dependencies": {
"express": "^4.18.2"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/express": "^4.17.21",
"@types/node": "^20.10.0",
"typescript": "^5.3.3",
"ts-node": "^10.9.2"
}
}
-27
View File
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
import express from 'express';
const app = express();
const port = 8080;
// Middleware
app.use(express.json());
// Health check endpoint
app.get('/health', (req, res) => {
res.json({ status: 'ok', service: 'morphos-server', version: '1.0.0' });
});
// API endpoints
app.get('/api/info', (req, res) => {
res.json({
name: 'MorphOS Server',
version: '1.0.0',
status: 'running'
});
});
// Start server
app.listen(port, '0.0.0.0', () => {
console.log(`MorphOS Server listening on port ${port}`);
console.log(`Data directory: ${process.env.MORPHOS_DATA_DIR || '/app/data'}`);
});
-16
View File
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
{
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2020",
"module": "commonjs",
"lib": ["ES2020"],
"outDir": "./dist",
"rootDir": "./src",
"strict": true,
"esModuleInterop": true,
"skipLibCheck": true,
"forceConsistentCasingInFileNames": true,
"resolveJsonModule": true
},
"include": ["src/**/*"],
"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist"]
}
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: netbird-dashboard
name: NetBird Dashboard
version: "2.38.0"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: netbirdio/dashboard
description: NetBird management dashboard (SPA). Internal stack member served through the netbird proxy.
category: networking
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: netbird-server
name: NetBird Server
version: "0.71.2"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: netbirdio/netbird
description: NetBird combined management / signal / relay server with an embedded identity provider and STUN. Backend for the self-hosted NetBird mesh VPN.
category: networking
+7 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: netbird
name: NetBird
version: "2.38.0"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: dockerhub
repo: library/nginx
description: Self-hosted WireGuard mesh VPN control plane with dashboard, embedded identity provider, management API, signal, relay, and STUN. The user-facing entry point — a TLS proxy in front of the dashboard + server.
category: networking
@@ -12,7 +18,7 @@ app:
container_name: netbird
container:
image: docker.io/library/nginx:1.27-alpine
image: docker.io/library/nginx:1.31.4-alpine
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: netbird-net
# Self-signed TLS cert materialised before create — the dashboard needs a
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: nextcloud
name: Nextcloud
version: "29"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: nextcloud/server
description: Your own private cloud. File sync, calendars, contacts.
container:
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
app:
id: nginx-proxy-manager
name: Nginx Proxy Manager
version: 2.12.1
upstream:
kind: github
repo: NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager
description: >-
Reverse proxy with SSL. Beautiful web interface for managing proxies.
On a node, this manages its admin UI and upstream configuration — the
proxy's own :80/:443 listeners are not published (the node's web server
owns those ports).
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/nginx-proxy-manager:latest
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: pasta
dependencies:
- storage: 1Gi
resources:
memory_limit: 512Mi
disk_limit: 1Gi
security:
# NET_BIND_SERVICE is load-bearing, not decoration: NPM's internal nginx
# listens on 80, 443 AND 81, and the orchestrator runs --cap-drop=ALL —
# without this cap every start dies with "bind() to 0.0.0.0:80 failed
# (13: Permission denied)" and s6 restart-loops forever (shorty-s,
# 2026-09-01, restart counter 3176 within hours of the manifest
# conversion). The legacy podman-run path defaulted to the full cap set,
# which is why it never showed there.
capabilities: [CHOWN, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE, NET_BIND_SERVICE]
readonly_root: false
no_new_privileges: true
network_policy: isolated
ports:
- host: 8081
container: 81
protocol: tcp
bind: 127.0.0.1
# open, not gated: NPM carries a complete admin login of its own. The
# gate still fronts the port (TLS on the same port, header fixes, retry
# page, Tor) without putting a cookie challenge in front of it.
auth: open
auth_rationale: >-
Nginx Proxy Manager enforces its own admin account on every page;
the initial setup wizard also has to answer before any account exists.
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager
target: /data
options: [rw]
# Current NPM images refuse to start unless /etc/letsencrypt is a mount in
# its own right. Keeping the files below the same persistent app directory
# preserves existing certificates while satisfying that startup contract.
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/nginx-proxy-manager/letsencrypt
target: /etc/letsencrypt
options: [rw]
environment: []
health_check:
type: tcp
endpoint: localhost:81
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
interfaces:
main:
name: Admin UI
description: Nginx Proxy Manager admin interface
type: ui
port: 8081
protocol: http
path: /
metadata:
author: Nginx Proxy Manager
category: networking
icon: /assets/img/app-icons/nginx.svg
repo: https://github.com/NginxProxyManager/nginx-proxy-manager
tier: optional
+8 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
app:
id: nostr-rs-relay
name: Nostr Relay (Rust)
version: 0.8.0
version: 0.10.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: scsibug/nostr-rs-relay
description: High-performance Nostr relay written in Rust. Host your own decentralized social media relay and earn networking profits.
container:
image: scsibug/nostr-rs-relay:0.8.9
image: scsibug/nostr-rs-relay:0.10.0
image_signature: cosign://...
pull_policy: verify-signature
data_uid: "1000:1000"
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
app:
id: ollama
name: Ollama
version: 0.5.4
upstream:
kind: github
repo: ollama/ollama
description: >-
Run large language models locally. Download and run AI models like
Llama, Mistral on your own hardware — served on the node's loopback for
the AI assistant (Settings → Claude Auth → model backend), never exposed
to the network.
container:
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/ollama:latest
pull_policy: if-not-present
network: pasta
dependencies:
- storage: 50Gi
resources:
# No memory limit: models are sized by the disk allowance below, and a
# RAM ceiling would just OOM-kill long inferences.
disk_limit: 50Gi
security:
capabilities: []
readonly_root: false
no_new_privileges: true
network_policy: isolated
ports:
- host: 11434
container: 11434
protocol: tcp
# local: Ollama's REST API is consumed by the node's own assistant over
# loopback — never externally reachable, so no gate, no TLS, and no
# login surface exist at all.
bind: 127.0.0.1
auth: local
volumes:
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/ollama
target: /root/.ollama
options: [rw]
environment: []
health_check:
type: tcp
endpoint: localhost:11434
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
metadata:
author: Ollama
category: community
icon: /assets/img/app-icons/ollama.png
repo: https://github.com/ollama/ollama
tier: optional
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
app:
id: phoenixd
name: phoenixd
version: 0.9.0
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: ACINQ/phoenixd
description: Headless Lightning daemon by ACINQ (the Phoenix wallet team). No screen of its own — it exposes a small local API that other apps and tools use to send and receive Lightning payments. Channel liquidity is managed automatically for a fee.
category: money
container:
# Image entrypoint already runs with --agree-to-terms-of-service and
# --http-bind-ip 0.0.0.0, as user "phoenix"; no custom args needed.
image: source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/phoenixd:0.9.0
pull_policy: if-not-present
# The image runs as user phoenix (1000:1000); the datadir bind source
# must be chowned to that identity or phoenixd dies on
# "Failed to open /data/phoenix.conf with Permission denied".
data_uid: "1000:1000"
dependencies:
- storage: 500Mi
resources:
cpu_limit: 1
memory_limit: 512Mi
disk_limit: 1Gi
security:
capabilities: []
readonly_root: true
no_new_privileges: true
network_policy: bridge
ports:
- host: 9740
container: 9740
protocol: tcp
bind: 127.0.0.1
auth: none
auth_rationale: >-
Loopback-only JSON API, not a web page. Every request is
authenticated by the http password phoenixd generates in its own
data directory on first run; the app gate's browser login page
would break the API clients this port exists for.
volumes:
# The wallet seed (seed.dat) and phoenix.conf live here. This directory
# must survive reinstall/migration like any other app data dir —
# losing it means losing funds.
# Target is /data (via PHOENIX_DATADIR below), NOT the image's default
# /phoenix/.phoenix: the orchestrator treats any bind path containing a
# dot as a file mount and skips creating its source directory, so a
# hidden-dir target never gets its host dir and the unit crash-loops.
- type: bind
source: /var/lib/archipelago/phoenixd
target: /data
options: [rw]
environment:
- PHOENIX_DATADIR=/data
health_check:
type: tcp
endpoint: localhost:9740
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
metadata:
icon: /assets/img/app-icons/phoenixd.svg
repo: https://github.com/ACINQ/phoenixd
tier: optional
features:
- Ultra-light Lightning node — no bitcoin node required
- Automated channel and liquidity management (fees apply)
- Simple HTTP API + websockets for payments
- Backed by the team behind the Phoenix mobile wallet
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: photoprism
name: PhotoPrism
version: "240915"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: photoprism/photoprism
description: AI-powered photo management with facial recognition.
container:
+6
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ app:
id: pine-openwakeword
name: Pine Wake Word (openWakeWord)
version: "2.1.0"
# Where this app comes from, so scripts/check-upstream-releases.py can
# tell us when the pin below has fallen behind. Without it nothing can:
# container.image names our mirror, not the project it was mirrored from.
upstream:
kind: github
repo: rhasspy/wyoming-openwakeword
description: Wyoming-protocol openWakeWord wake-word engine. Internal Pine voice-assistant stack member — lets Assist pipelines run wake-word detection on the node (groundwork for the custom "Yo Archy" wake word; stock models like "ok nabu" ship with the image).
category: home

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