b7e57ca9cffcfd39ca96b41700b5a0ae1a04f89c
307
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
f0c289a415 |
feat(marketplace): implement the DID signature layer that was only specified
docs/marketplace-protocol.md described a full authorship-verification chain and
was marked "shipped end-to-end". It wasn't: `signatures.manifest_hash` and
`signatures.did_signature` existed only as two struct fields that nothing read.
The authenticity actually delivered was the Nostr event's NIP-01 Schnorr
signature — which proves who *relayed* an event, not who *authored* the manifest
inside it. Anyone could republish someone else's manifest under their own DID.
Implemented:
- `canonical_signing_bytes` / `manifest_digest` — the signed preimage is the
manifest as canonical JSON (recursively sorted keys, no whitespace) with
`signatures` omitted, SHA-256'd. Canonicalisation is load-bearing, not
cosmetic: `container.env` is a HashMap with per-process random iteration
order, and `serde_json::Map` is only sorted while the `preserve_order` feature
stays off — a feature any crate in the graph can enable for everyone via
feature unification. Either would make the digest vary between runs, so
signatures would fail *intermittently*, which is far worse to diagnose than
failing cleanly.
- `sign_manifest` / `verify_manifest_signature` — Ed25519 over the 32 raw digest
bytes, verified against the key `author.did` encodes (reusing the existing
`identity::pubkey_bytes_from_did_key`).
- `publish` signs before broadcasting, fills `author.did` when empty, and
**refuses** to publish under a DID this node cannot sign as — otherwise we'd
spray manifests across every relay that every verifier then rejects.
- `discover` verifies before caching. A `missing` signature is a normal
unsigned publisher: listed, but earning no identity trust. An `invalid` one is
tampered or forged, so it is **dropped entirely** and logged — it fails closed
rather than appearing behind a warning badge a user can click through.
Trust scoring now requires proof for both identity-derived factors:
- The 30-point identity factor was `did.starts_with("did:")`. An unsigned
manifest with a plausible DID string and a pinned image scored 65 —
"Community" — on no cryptography at all. It now scores 35, "Unverified".
- **The 20-point federation factor is gated too**, which the original spec did
not say. An unverified `author.did` is just a string the publisher chose, so
without this an attacker could copy the DID of a peer the user federates with
and be rewarded for impersonating the party they trust most.
`marketplace.verify` now returns the signature verdict separately from the
advisory policy issues — `valid` has always meant "passes the advisory security
checks", so conflating it with authenticity would have been its own trap.
Tests (22 pass), weighted to the adversarial cases: tampering; tampering that
also rewrites `manifest_hash` while reusing the stolen signature; signing with
key A while claiming B's DID; undecodable did:keys including the old
`z6MkTest123` fixture that used to score 30/30; malformed base64 and
wrong-length signatures; digest stability across map insertion order; the digest
ignoring the `signatures` block; the federation-impersonation case; and a legacy
cache without the new field loading as `missing` rather than defaulting trusted.
Protocol doc rewritten so the preimage rules are normative — a third-party
implementation that canonicalises differently produces signatures we reject, so
"sorted keys, no whitespace, signatures omitted, sign the raw digest" now has to
be stated exactly rather than sketched.
Not included: surfacing the verdict in Marketplace.vue, which reads only
trust_score/trust_tier today. The field reaches the frontend; where the badge
goes is a UI call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
fe46c898d1 |
fix(license): replace the LGPL zbase32 crate with an in-tree implementation
`zbase32 0.1.2` is LGPL-3.0+ — the only hard copyleft dependency in the whole
Rust graph and the last remaining blocker for the MIT release
(docs/LICENSE-COMPLIANCE-AUDIT.md §2). Statically linking LGPL code into a Rust
binary obliges us to ship relinkable objects, which is impractical for a node
image.
The audit offered two routes: the MIT `z32` crate, or an original
implementation. Took the latter — z-base-32 is an alphabet substitution over a
bit stream, so ~60 lines removes the blocker while adding *zero* new
dependencies rather than trading one supply-chain entry for another.
**Byte-compatibility was the requirement, not a nice-to-have.** A `did:dht`
identifier IS this encoding of an Ed25519 public key, so any drift would
silently rotate every node's DID and orphan its already-published DHT records.
So the semantics were not guessed: I read the vendored zbase32-0.1.2 source to
extract exactly what `encode_full_bytes` and `decode_full_bytes_str` do —
including that decode truncates to the next lower byte boundary, which is why a
52-character string round-trips to 32 bytes while discarding 4 padding bits.
A model implementation was then validated against three independent sources
before any Rust was written, all five vectors agreeing:
encode(b"testdata", 64) -> qt1zg7drcf4gn (crate doctest)
encode_full_bytes("Just an…") -> jj4zg7bycfzn… (crate doctest)
decode_full_bytes("qb1ze3m1") -> b"peter" (crate doctest)
encode([f0,bf,c7]) -> 6n9hq (Zimmermann spec)
encode([d4,7a,04]) -> 4t7ye (Zimmermann spec)
The module pins all of those plus four known 32-byte keys, a 0..40-byte
round-trip sweep, a 52-char/round-trip check over 64 keys, rejection of the
characters z-base-32 deliberately omits (`l`, `v`, `2`, `0`) and of non-ASCII,
and an alphabet/decode-table consistency check so the compile-time reverse table
can't drift from the alphabet.
`did_dht.rs` gains `did_for_a_known_key_is_stable`, which pins the full
identifier string for a known key — the regression that would actually hurt,
asserted at the call site that gives the string its meaning.
Dropped from Cargo.toml and Cargo.lock (7 lines); no other user in the tree.
Verified: 28/28 network tests pass, zero copyleft crates remain in the lockfile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
6d33fea157 |
chore(license): actually delete the proprietary fonts and unused packages
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Successful in 3m38s
The audit has claimed since 2026-07-23 that these were git-rm'd. They weren't —
only the web/dist copies went, and all of them were still tracked at HEAD nearly
three weeks later, in a repo about to be published under MIT.
Deleted (~40.7 MB):
neode-ui/public/assets/fonts/Courier_New/{CourierNew-Bold,CourierNew-Regular}.ttf
neode-ui/public/assets/fonts/Benton_Sans/BentonSans-Regular.otf
neode-ui/public/assets/fonts/Redacted/redacted.regular.ttf
neode-ui/public/packages/wireguard.apk (17 MB)
neode-ui/public/packages/atob.s9pk (23 MB)
Courier New is Monotype proprietary and Benton Sans is a commercial Font Bureau
typeface — neither is redistributable. wireguard.apk carries GPL-2.0 libwg
components, so shipping it triggers a source offer. atob.s9pk is a Start9
package of unknown license. Redacted's upstream is OFL-1.1 but no license text
was shipped; deleting was cheaper than sourcing it, since it was unused.
Verified unreferenced before deleting, not after:
- Every @font-face rule in the tree (2 in src/style.css, 2 in
public/entropy/index.html) loads Montserrat. None of these files was ever
loaded by CSS.
- The three `Courier New` hits (tailwind.config.js `mono`, two public HTML
font-family lists) name the *system* font as a fallback — they are not
@font-face sources, so rendering is unchanged.
- wireguard.apk and atob.s9pk have zero references in any tracked file.
- These live under neode-ui/public/, which Vite copies verbatim rather than
resolving, so their absence cannot break a build.
Deliberately kept: neode-ui/public/packages/archipelago-companion.apk, which IS
live (staged by .githooks/pre-push, the Android release flow, and the in-app
pairing QR); Montserrat (OFL.txt) and Open Sans (LICENSE.txt), both properly
licensed; and neode-ui/test-install.sh, which the same audit line listed but
which is not a licensing concern.
Audit updated: §1 and §3's font/package items marked closed, the false DONE
entry rewritten as a history note rather than deleted — a DONE line here is a
claim and should be re-verified with git ls-tree, which is exactly the lesson.
§2 (zbase32, LGPL-3.0+) is now the last hard blocker.
Side effect: ~40 MB off the frontend OTA tarball.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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c3341fc680 |
docs(signing-runbook): Workstream B is complete — the anchor is pinned
The runbook still opened with "the catalog is accepted unsigned (migration window) and the anchor is unpinned (RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX = None)". Both have been true-for-a-while false: `trust::anchor::RELEASE_ROOT_PUBKEY_HEX` is a `Some(...)` with a verification note in its doc comment, and `releases/app-catalog.json` carries both a `signature` and a `signed_by` did:key. This one matters more than a normal stale status: a reader taking the header at face value would think the fleet still accepts unsigned catalogs and that the one-way anchor-pinning door is still open. It isn't — pinning already happened, so any future ceremony is a *rotation*, which is the case the doc's own warning about mismatched-signature hard-rejection applies to most sharply. Marked complete and kept the procedure verbatim below, since it's exactly what a key rotation or publisher change needs. Also dropped a stale `:21` line number from the anchor.rs citation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
a7992233ab |
docs: two design docs say "no code" for subsystems that exist
The inverse of the usual drift — these understate rather than overstate, which is just as misleading for someone deciding what is safe to change. **dht-distribution-design.md** was headed "Status: Design (no code yet)". `core/archipelago/src/swarm/` has five modules plus `content_hash.rs`. **phase4-streaming-ecash-plan.md** was headed "not implemented". `swarm/paid.rs` states in its own header that it implements "DHT distribution plan, Phase 4 step F", and there is a `streaming::` module behind five `streaming.*` RPCs (list-services, configure-service, toggle-service, pay, prepare-payment). Neither is reachable in a stock build, which is presumably why the headers were never updated — and that is the part worth documenting rather than eliding. Both now state the gates: the `iroh-swarm` cargo feature is off by default (iroh and iroh-blobs are optional deps pulled in only by it), `config.swarm_enabled` is off by default, and paid serving stays free for everyone until the operator enables the `content-download` streaming service. Checked the other plan-only docs for the same error; these two were the only ones. `nostr-identity-import-plan.md`, `nostr-signer-login-research.md` and `hardware-signer-design.md` correctly say no code exists — verified: no identity import or NIP-07 login RPC, and no TROPIC01 reference anywhere in core. `dual-ecash-design.md`'s "in progress" is right too — the `wallet.fedimint-*` RPCs exist, no Cashu ones do. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
1481b873f8 |
docs(license-audit): the "deleted" proprietary fonts and APKs were never deleted
The 2026-07-23 status block lists as DONE: "Deleted: Courier_New/, Benton_Sans/,
Redacted/ fonts; wireguard.apk; atob.s9pk; obsolete test-install.sh (all
git-rm'd)". All seven are still tracked at HEAD and present on disk. Only the
web/dist copies went; the sources never did.
git ls-tree -r HEAD --name-only | grep -iE 'Courier_New|Benton_Sans|Redacted/|wireguard.apk|atob.s9pk'
That means a repo about to be published under MIT still carries a commercial
Font Bureau typeface and two proprietary Monotype fonts — precisely what §3 of
this audit says must not ship. An audit that reports a blocker as closed is
worse than one that never checked, so the entry is now struck through with the
file list and the verification command inline.
Deleting them is safe and I checked before saying so: nothing references the
font *files* (the three `Courier New` hits are CSS font-family fallbacks naming
the system font, not @font-face sources), and wireguard.apk / atob.s9pk have
zero references anywhere in the tree. Left the deletion itself to the operator —
it is 40 MB of tracked binaries and outside a docs pass. Removing them also
takes 40 MB off the frontend OTA tarball, which is a separate open item.
Also re-verified the rest of the remaining list:
- `zbase32` (LGPL-3.0+) is still a direct dep (Cargo.toml:113, did_dht.rs:40,49).
Still the only hard copyleft blocker.
- LICENSE (MIT), NOTICE and both THIRD-PARTY-LICENSES inventories are present —
so the headline "no license of its own" is closed; softened the verdict to say
which blockers remain rather than leaving a stale "not releasable as-is".
- The four StartOS-derived crates still exist; flagged that KEY-05 cites
core/models, so that one needs review rather than a blind delete.
- Item 6 (git filter-repo history purge) is superseded — the launch plan is a
fresh-history publish, so there is no history to rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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b33138a13d |
docs(adr): record what ADR-009 actually enforces and amend ADR-004
**ADR-009** lists six "non-negotiable" mandatory security defaults. Checked each against `core/container/src/manifest.rs` and `core/security/src/`: - `seccomp_profile: Default` — the string `seccomp` appears **nowhere in `core/`**. Not as code, not as a TODO. This constraint is entirely fictional. - AppArmor — `container_policies.rs` generates and `apparmor_parser -r`s a profile, but its own comment reads `TODO: Configure Podman to use the profile`. `security.apparmor_profile` parses into a manifest field that nothing ever reads. - `user` UID > 1000 — no UID validation exists in the runtime parser at all. - `image_tag` pinned — preflight script only; the parser accepts `:latest`. - `readonly_root` / `no_new_privileges` — safe defaults when omitted, but `validate_security()` never rejects an explicit `false`, so the ADR's "Reject manifests that violate mandatory defaults" step does not exist. Genuinely enforced: the capability allow-list and bind-mount confinement (the latter stronger than the ADR describes). Added an Implementation status section saying so per-row. The decision stands; the claim of enforcement did not, and on a security ADR that gap is the whole point of writing it down. **ADR-004** said Tor carries *all* inter-node communication and runs as the `archy-tor` container. Neither holds: transport priority is mesh → LAN → FIPS → Tor (`TransportKind` 1-4, Tor as last fallback, largely because of the latency this ADR itself lists), and Tor is the host Debian service driven by `archipelago-tor-helper` — `container-doctor.sh` actively removes an `archy-tor` container if it finds one, and no `apps/tor` manifest exists. Added an amendment rather than rewriting the record. Worth flagging that both changes landed without their own ADR. All 10 ADRs are Status: Accepted; 001-003, 005-008 and 011 verified consistent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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7c214e6497 |
docs(bulletproof-containers): say which parts of the plan actually shipped
Header claimed the whole 2026-04-22 plan "has been implemented". The architecture was adopted, but checking each item against the tree: - The `core/archipelago/src/reconcile/` module the doc lays out in detail — desired.rs / current.rs / diff.rs / apply.rs / derived.rs / backoff.rs — was never created. The reconciler shipped as container/boot_reconciler.rs + container/prod_orchestrator.rs instead. - FM2's named fix `reconcile::derived::render_bitcoin_conf` does not exist. The drift was eliminated a different way: bitcoind runs with an explicit `-conf` derived from secrets each start, and stale datadir configs are removed. - FM1/FM3 are partial — companion UIs are Quadlet units, main app containers are not, since `use_quadlet_backends` still defaults false. The "v1.7.48+ full reconcile module / main containers become Quadlet units" step has not happened. - **FM6 was never implemented.** There is no podman corrupt-state probe and no `system renumber` recovery anywhere in the tree. The 2026-04 failure that made a registry node unreachable would still require manual SSH today — which is precisely the "zero-manual-intervention" target this doc opens with. FM4 and FM5 did ship as described. Replaced the blanket claim with a per-item table so the doc stays useful as incident history without reading as a description of the code, and noted that the unit path throughout says /etc/containers/systemd/ while units are actually written to ~/.config/containers/systemd/ (the path is rootless). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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ecd9295e96 |
docs: fix the wrong journalctl scope and document the host-network port drop
**container-lifecycle.md** told operators to read the reconciler's decisions with `journalctl --user -u archipelago`. That returns nothing: `archipelago.service` is a SYSTEM unit (`WantedBy=multi-user.target`) that merely runs as `User=archipelago`. It's `sudo journalctl -u archipelago`. Easy to get wrong because the companion Quadlet units next door genuinely are `--user`, so both forms appear in the docs and only one is right per unit — spelled that out inline. Swept the rest of docs/: no other instance. **quadlet-compilation.md** — added the `Network=host` case. Podman rejects `PublishPort` with host networking (crash-loop, exit 125), so the renderer drops declared ports rather than emitting them (`render_host_network_omits_publish_ports`). A developer reading the directive list would otherwise expect a mapping that never appears. Everything else in both docs verified against quadlet.rs / prod_orchestrator.rs / boot_reconciler.rs: the unit dir, the DO-NOT-EDIT header, Pull=never, DropCapability=ALL, Secret=…,type=env, TimeoutStartSec=0, RestartSec=10, WantedBy=default.target, the render/write_if_changed/enable_now/disable_remove four-step, uid 1000, adopt_existing, the user-stopped.json / user-uninstalled.json desired-state gates, and the 30s tick. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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623eb0f033 |
docs(SEED-VERIFICATION): add the missing FIPS key, fix the comparison commands
Ran the doc's script rather than only reading it, and cross-checked every primitive it implements against independent libraries (bip_utils for BIP-39 seed / BIP-32 derivation / bech32, and cryptography's own HKDF): BIP-39 seed, m/44'/1237'/0'/0/0, m/84'/0'/0', x-only pubkey, npub encoding and HKDF-SHA256(salt=None) all match byte for byte. The hand-rolled crypto in this doc is correct. Two real gaps fixed: - **The FIPS mesh transport key was missing.** `seed.rs:227` derives it from the same master seed via `archipelago/fips/secp256k1/v1`, and a user verifying their backup had no way to check it — despite it being the key that authenticates them on the mesh. Added it to the diagram and as section 2b of the script (same shape as the node Nostr key; verified against `derive_fips_key` and `hkdf_derive` using `Hkdf::new(None, ikm)`). - **The "compare with your node" commands were wrong.** The RPC endpoint is `/rpc/v1`, not `/api/rpc`, and `identity.get-node` is not a method — the real ones are `node.did` and `node.nostr-pubkey`. Also dropped "UI: Settings > Identity", which is not a screen that exists, in favour of the two identity files on disk. Verified and left alone: all five other HKDF info strings, both BIP-32 paths, and the `node_key.pub` filename. The release-root key (`archipelago/release/root/ed25519/v1`) is deliberately still absent — it is derived from the project's signing seed, not a user's node seed. Noted separately: `system.get-node-key` sits in the CSRF-exempt list (`api/rpc/mod.rs:337`) but has no dispatcher arm, so it is an exemption for a method that does not exist. Harmless, but it should be removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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db60c3382d |
docs(marketplace-protocol): the DID signature layer is specified but not implemented
This doc is marked "Status: implemented ... shipped end-to-end" and then
describes a cryptographic verification chain that does not exist. On a repo
about to go public, that is the single worst kind of doc bug: it promises a
security property.
`signatures.manifest_hash` / `signatures.did_signature` appear exactly once in
the codebase — as two struct fields at `marketplace.rs:106-107`. Nothing reads
them. There is no hash comparison, no DID resolution, no signature check. The
authenticity actually delivered is the Nostr event's own NIP-01 Schnorr
signature, which proves the publishing key sent the event but says nothing about
the DID the manifest names.
Added a warning at the top, marked the "Manifest Signing (DID Layer)" section
and steps 3-6 of the verification flow as not implemented, and annotated steps
7-8 as advisory (validate_manifest returns scoring issues; it does not block
discovery or install).
The trust model was overstated in the same direction:
- "DID Verification | 30 | Manifest is signed by a valid DID key" is a
`did.starts_with("did:")` string test. Any publisher can claim any DID and
take the 30 points.
- "Relay Consensus | 20" is graduated and never zero (1 relay still scores 5).
- "Version History | 15 | multiple published versions (shows maintenance)" —
nothing counts versions; it's 10 for a 3-part semver plus 5 for a non-empty
repo_url.
Worked the arithmetic through: an unsigned manifest with a plausible DID string
and a pinned image scores 65, landing in the "Community" tier. Said so.
Other corrections:
- `marketplace.unpublish` is documented but was never implemented (the string
appears nowhere); removed it and noted why NIP-33 makes it non-trivial. Added
the two payment methods that do exist (`create-invoice`, `check-payment`).
- The schema section said marketplace manifests "follow the existing
apps/{app-id}/manifest.yml schema", contradicting the header three paragraphs
above. They are separate types.
- The security-enforcement list claimed a capability allow-list, a
host-networking ban and system-path mount restrictions. Those rules are real
but live in the runtime manifest parser for a different schema — marketplace
validation checks four things and gates none of them.
- `run_as_user` documented as "> 1000" in two places while the code checks
`>= 1000` and the doc's own example uses 1000.
- Data-storage tree listed `cache/trust-scores.json` and `config.json`; neither
is ever written.
- The 15-minute cache TTL and 30-minute background refresh don't exist —
discovery is RPC-triggered and the cache has no expiry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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69f1d18ee7 |
docs(README): index the contributor docs the launch reader needs
The index covered users, architecture and app development but had no entry point for "I want to work on Archipelago itself" — so eight tracked docs were reachable only by guessing filenames, including the two that matter most to a newcomer: developer-guide.md (how to build the workspace, the frontend and an ISO) and LICENSE-COMPLIANCE-AUDIT.md (dependency licensing, which is exactly what a reader checks first on an open-source repo). Added a "Contributing to Archipelago itself" section covering those plus bulletproof-containers, the signing runbook, the 1.8.0 hardening plan and CLAUDE.md; filed pine-voice-commands under Getting started and demo-build-info under contributing. Also noted that ADR-010 was never issued — verified across all history, so the 009 → 011 gap is not a missing file — and added the two archived session logs (HANDOVER-2026-07-02, SESSION-1.8.0-OTA-PROGRESS) to the archive table, which already claimed to cover completed session logs but listed none. Link check re-run across docs/: 0 broken. Only RELEASE_NOTES_BACKLOG.md is now deliberately unindexed (internal working list). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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a28b3b696d |
docs(registry-manifest-design): stop describing the pre-Phase-1 state as "today"
The header says Phases 1-3 shipped, then §1 "Where we are today" described the world before any of them: catalog carrying "version + image override only", the manifest "never registry-distributed", counts of 48 disk manifests and 28 catalog entries. A reader hits the contradiction immediately and can't tell which half is current. Retitled §1 as the pre-Phase-1 baseline it is, and added the actual state: `releases/app-catalog.json` has 66 entries and 56 embed a full `manifest` block — one for every `apps/*/manifest.yml` in the tree (the stale counts were 48 and 28). What's genuinely left is Phase 4 (build-context apps) and Phase 5 (drop `apps/` from the OTA rsync), which the phase list already marks ⏳. Also: - The install arrow claimed "render Quadlet unit"; same overstatement corrected in architecture.md and app-manifest-spec.md — Quadlet is opt-in, the default is podman create+start. - §8's open question "generated_files with inline content — already supported?" is answered: `app.files[]` takes inline `content` with placeholder rendering. Marked answered rather than leaving a resolved question looking open. Verified present and unchanged: `catalog_manifest_to_overlay`, `install_stack_via_orchestrator`, `install_immich_stack`, and the catalog-wins merge semantics. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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2c53a7d77f |
docs: fix the CSRF-exempt list and describe how secret_env actually reaches a container
**COMMANDS.md** named six CSRF-exempt read-only methods, two of which
(`bitcoin.getinfo`, `monitoring.current`) are not exempt — a client trusting the
doc would send them with the cookie alone and get rejected. The real set is
twelve (`api/rpc/mod.rs:326-340`); listed all of them and said plainly that
everything else needs the header. The rest of the doc verified clean: the 480 /
200 / 160-char caps, the four `assistant_*` config keys, both default model ids,
`is_sender_allowed`, `strip_archy_trigger` / `run_node_cmd`, the three
unauthenticated HTTP endpoints, and `auth.login.totp` all match the code.
**secrets.md** said `secret_env` "sets `<key>` in the container's environment",
which reads as a plain `-e KEY=value` and undersells the design. It isn't:
resolved pairs are registered as podman secrets named
`archy-env-<app-id>-<key>` and referenced by name, precisely so the value stays
out of `podman inspect` and out of plaintext `Environment=` lines in Quadlet
units. Also documented the interpolation-taint rule — a plain `environment`
entry that expands `${SECRET}` (BTCPay's connection strings) is itself treated
as secret-bearing rather than left in the clear, which is what makes it safe to
build connection strings from secrets.
Everything else in secrets.md verified against `container/secrets.rs`: the four
kinds and their file shapes, the bare-filename rule, the every-tick idempotent
`ensure_generated_secrets`, and the atomic 0600 temp-fsync-rename writer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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7adc3260a6 |
docs(app-manifest-spec): fix the id rule, the Quadlet claim, and the declarative overstatement
Narrative pass over the manifest spec, plus one correction to the guide I committed in |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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ba052736be |
docs(app-developer-guide): describe the security rules the parser actually enforces
Narrative pass. The Security Requirements section described a blocklist where
the code enforces an allow-list, and attributed enforcement to the wrong layer:
- **"Forbidden: mounting system paths /, /etc, /var, /usr, /proc, /sys"** — the
real rule (`manifest.rs:1290-1313`) is the inverse: `volumes[].source` must be
absolute and under `/var/lib/archipelago/`, or a plain named volume, or one of
two reviewed exceptions (`/run/user/1000/podman/podman.sock`, `/var/run/dbus`).
Anything else is a parse error. The old wording also listed `/var` as
forbidden while every app in the repo binds `/var/lib/archipelago/<id>` — a
developer reading it would not know where their own data goes.
- **"enforced by the marketplace/catalog pipeline and the node"** — split by
layer instead. The capability allow-list is parser-enforced (verified against
the 9 entries at `manifest.rs:1089-1099`); `:latest` is NOT — only
`validate-app-manifest.sh` checks it, and a `:latest` manifest still installs.
readonly_root / no_new_privileges / network_policy=isolated are parser
defaults, so omitting them is safe rather than dangerous.
Also:
- `derived_env` documented `HOST_IP`/`HOST_MDNS`/`DISK_GB` "such as"; the set is
closed and includes a fourth, `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}`. Noted that unknown
placeholders pass through verbatim rather than erroring, so a typo silently
ships `{{FOO}}` into the container.
- The networking example hardcoded `bitcoin-knots`; `{{BITCOIN_HOST}}` resolves
to knots or core depending on what's installed.
- Documented the `files[].content` placeholder set, which is a different set
from derived_env and wasn't mentioned at all — notably `{{NETWORK_GATEWAY}}`
(the nginx `resolver` fix for post-restart 502s) and `{{secret:NAME}}`.
- The "check the UI" URL `/app/my-app/` is not a route; it's
`/dashboard/apps/:id` (detail) or `/dashboard/app-session/:appId` (embed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
2ed6c71e0c |
docs(troubleshooting): fix advice that doesn't match the node
Narrative pass over troubleshooting.md against the code. Seven claims were wrong, several of them actively misleading: - **Tor is not a container.** §15/§16 told operators to run `podman ps --filter name=tor` / `podman restart tor` and to read `/var/lib/archipelago/tor/hidden_service/hostname`. Tor is the host's Debian package running as `debian-tor`; Archipelago drives it by staging a torrc and poking `archipelago-tor-helper` (`scripts/tor-helper.sh`, which does `systemctl restart tor`). The hidden-service dir is `hidden_service_archipelago` (suffixed), it's root-owned 0700, and the file a normal user can actually read is the synced copy at `/var/lib/archipelago/tor-hostnames/<service>`. - **The USB installer has no "Repair" mode.** Cited three times as the recovery path. The boot menu has exactly three entries: Install, Install (verbose), Boot from local disk. Replaced with what those entries can actually do, plus the fact that the installer prompts for a disk and requires typing `yes`, so booting it isn't itself destructive. - **`bitcoin-cli -datadir=/data`** — the container's datadir is `/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin` and RPC creds are in a generated `/tmp/rpc.conf`; the documented command could not have authenticated. - **"edit bitcoin.conf to add addnode="** — the entrypoint passes an explicit `-conf` and logs "ignoring legacy datadir bitcoin.conf". Flags come from the manifest (and the signed catalog entry that overrides it). - **"Bitcoin requires 600GB+"** — only above the manifest's 1000 GB threshold; below it the node runs pruned at `-prune=550`. - **`sudo systemctl restart podman`** — apps run under rootless Podman as the `archipelago` user, so that restarts an unrelated root socket. - **"Settings > Network"** — DNS config and disk cleanup are both on the Server page (`/server`), not Settings. Also: header claimed "the 20 most common issues" over 21 sections, and §16 presented Tor as required for peering when it's the last fallback after mesh → LAN → FIPS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
e7d8dfb633 |
docs: correct the "default password123" claim — production nodes have none
The walkthrough told new users to log in with `password123` and said they'd
be "prompted to change this password immediately". Neither is true on a
release build:
- `AuthManager::ensure_default_user` is never called. `main.rs:356-362`
says so explicitly ("Don't auto-create default user — let onboarding flow
handle password setup via auth.setup"), and the function is `#[allow(dead_code)]`.
- The only `password123` login path is `api/rpc/auth.rs:36-46`, which is
`#[cfg(debug_assertions)]` AND `dev_mode` AND only fires *before* setup —
no release binary carries it.
- `Login.vue` calls `auth.isSetup` on mount and renders the "Set Up Your
Node" password-creation form when it returns false. That is the real
first-boot screen, and it is the only `auth.setup` caller in the frontend.
So there is nothing to be "prompted to change" — the user creates the
password themselves, and the doc's version taught them to look for a
default that does not exist.
Fixed in four places:
- user-walkthrough Step 8 rewritten as "Create Your Password"
- troubleshooting's "Default password is password123" solution replaced,
including the warning that deleting user.json does NOT recover a lost
password (the onboarding gate refuses auth.setup on a provisioned node)
- api-reference cURL example uses a placeholder, not the fake default
- 1.8.0 hardening plan's "kill default credentials" item now reflects that
the web half is done and only the SSH defaults still ship
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
e0cc41d31e |
docs(developer-guide): fix stale ISO-builder path and CLAUDE.md label
Verified the project-structure tree against the tree. Two stale entries: - image-recipe/build-auto-installer-iso.sh was the old builder, now under _archived/; the current builder is image-recipe/build-debian-iso.sh (the release workflow drives it via scripts/build-iso-release.sh). Repointed. - CLAUDE.md was labelled "AI development instructions"; it is now the sanitized public contributor guide. Relabelled. Everything else verified: run-tests.sh, first-boot-containers.sh, container.rs, vpn.rs all exist; the add-an-endpoint / add-a-Vue-page tutorials match the current dispatch pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
f55ed6bf45 |
docs(architecture): correct the "apps run as Quadlet units" overstatement
The overview stated apps install as user.slice Quadlet units. Verified against prod_orchestrator.rs: use_quadlet_backends defaults to false, so regular apps install via the raw podman path today; the companion UI containers are the ones that run as Quadlet units (companion.rs owns them), and the Quadlet flip to default for all apps is opt-in/held. Reworded both places (the layer diagram and the App Platform section) to match reality and the container-lifecycle / quadlet-compilation dev docs: the orchestrator owns and self-heals app containers; companion UIs run as Quadlet units, the validated path being flipped to default. Everything else in the doc verified accurate — crate table, module map, data paths, security model, and the note that the four orphan crates still exist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
4155cefdf5 |
docs(security): genericize a node address in the RPC-proxy incident record
BITCOIN-RPC-PROXY-EXPOSURE.md's port claims verify against code (Bitcoin RPC on 127.0.0.1:8332, the bitcoin-ui proxy on 127.0.0.1:8334). But its incident narrative named a specific node's LAN address (192.168.63.240, five times) on a subnet the earlier 192.168.1.x sweep did not cover. Replaced with the RFC 5737 documentation address 192.0.2.240. The incident content — the exposure, the probes, the fix — is unchanged and remains a legitimate public security record. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
dc2d79ce77 |
docs(security): self-contain KEY-05 and PSBT; record the completed entropy migration
Verified the security subsystem's design-doc claims against code:
- KEY-05's foundational claims are accurate: entropy::draw_key_bytes exists,
KeyGenRng is sealed with OsRng as its sole production member, MIN_GUARDED_LEN
is 12, and core/clippy.toml bans rand::random/thread_rng exactly as stated.
- But its per-site table listed every production nonce/key site as disposition
"migrate" (pending), when all of them have since been migrated to
draw_key_bytes(OsRng) — storage_crypto, credentials/store, wallet/bdhke,
mesh/x3dh — and zero rand::random/thread_rng remain in production. Added a
completion note so the doc no longer reads as pending work.
Both KEY-05 and PSBT-SIGNING-ARCHITECTURE referenced
ENTROPY-SEED-AUDIT-2026-07-31.md five times as their evidence base — a doc that
was moved to local-only, so a public reader could not follow it. Reworded all
five to state the audit's findings inline ("the internal entropy audit found
...") without the unresolvable path. No published doc references it now. The
link-checker missed these because they were inline code, not markdown links.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
bcbd4a7032 |
docs(app-developer-guide): add the missing local manifest-validation step
The guide walked a developer from manifest to install but never told them how to validate the manifest locally first — despite scripts/validate-app-manifest.sh existing for exactly that. A developer's first signal that their manifest was wrong would have been an install failure on a node. Adds a "Validate Your Manifest" step at the top of Testing, pointing at the script (recently fixed — it had been rejecting every manifest because it shelled out to a missing ruby). Notes the strict behaviour a new submitter hits, e.g. an unpinned :latest tag is rejected, and that the Rust parser is canonical. Verified: the install RPC example in this guide (id + dockerImage) matches the handler; the cargo test target crate name (archipelago-container) is correct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
8a341de4b5 |
docs(api-reference): fix the one fabricated RPC method
Verified all 144 documented RPC methods against the dispatcher. 143 are live;
one was fabricated: `mesh.discover` (params { timeout_secs? }, returns
{ nodes: MeshNode[] }) does not exist — "mesh discovery" appears only in code
comments as a concept, never as a method. A developer calling it gets "unknown
method".
Replaced with the real peer-listing method `mesh.peers` (no params, returns
{ peers, count }), which the frontend actually uses and which was undocumented.
Also verified: every source path cited across the docs resolves (placeholders
and a correctly-recorded deletion aside), and every documented app-manifest
field exists in the schema (no fabricated fields).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
68e3f61121 |
docs: remove the last private MEMORY references from design docs
Three `MEMORY → <note>` see-also references pointed at the private agent-memory system from public docs (demo-deployment-design.md x2, registry-manifest-design.md x1). Removed. No tracked doc references the memory system now. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
a2efdf7358 |
docs: current-state the bitcoin multi-version design; move its rollout handoff local
bitcoin-multi-version-design.md carried three layers of stale internal content: an 80-line HTML-comment work-tracking block (per-phase status with "UNCOMMITTED on the branch", node numbers, "Next action when resuming", "Decisions still needed from user"); a rendered "Status: design (2026-06-22)" header that was wrong — the feature shipped, all four phases, with the downgrade guard added today; two private `MEMORY →` references; and a node-numbered scheduling note. Now: the comment block is gone, the status reflects reality, the MEMORY references and node numbers are removed, and "verify on a real node" replaced the specific fleet addresses. The design content (source-of-truth decision, phase designs, invariants) is unchanged. Separately, bitcoin-version-bulletproof-rollout.md was an inter-agent rollout handoff — node numbers, branch coordination, "the other agent owns" — not a design or reference doc. Moved to local-only (still on disk, gitignored) like the other handoffs; its two path references (a plan doc and a script comment) are generalized. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
b4e4189407 |
docs: reframe bulletproof-containers as a historical record; scrub internals
This 2026-04 plan has been implemented, but it still read as an active plan
("implementation started"), linked private agent-memory paths, and ended with a
stale "To resume" work block naming fleet nodes, dated fleet state, and the next
file to edit.
- Header now marks it a historical design record and points at
container-lifecycle.md for the current behaviour.
- Removed the two private ~/.claude/.../memory/ references from the header and
the entire "To resume" section (private paths, node numbers, 2026-04-22 fleet
snapshot — none of it belongs in a public design doc).
- Genericized the one remaining node-number reference in the incident narrative.
The valuable content — the six failure modes and the reconciler reasoning that
answered them — is kept intact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
599787690a |
docs: write the three missing app-developer docs (secrets, quadlet, lifecycle)
The open-source plan flagged three references as "the real gaps for app developers", and the docs index named them as not-yet-written. Written now, each from the code rather than stubbed: - secrets.md — generated_secrets/secret_env: the two halves, the four kinds (hex16/hex32/base64/bcrypt) and which files each writes, the idempotent self-healing 0600 materialisation, and the rules a developer must not break (no hardcoded fallbacks, one canonical name, right encoding). From container/secrets.rs and the manifest schema. - quadlet-compilation.md — manifest -> .container unit: the full directive mapping (including Secret= by reference, never value, and Pull=never), where units land (~/.config/containers/systemd, systemctl --user), the render/write/enable/disable lifecycle with write-if-changed, and how to inspect one. From container/quadlet.rs, scoped accurately to the companion-UI path it drives today. - container-lifecycle.md — the level-triggered 30s reconciler: desired state from user-stopped/user-uninstalled/manifest set, the operations table, the self-heal-vs-respect-a-deliberate-stop rule, and migrations-never-destroy-data. From prod_orchestrator.rs and boot_reconciler.rs. Index updated to link all three under App development and the "known gap" note removed. Every link across the docs tree resolves. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
661f3eda25 |
docs: add a grouped documentation index; fix references to now-local-only docs
Two concrete, verifiable documentation gaps from the open-source review: - docs/ had no index. Adds docs/README.md grouping the 60-odd published docs by task — getting started, architecture, app development, design docs, ADRs, security, roadmap — in the bitcoin/bitcoin doc/ style the plan called for. Every link in it resolves (checked). The top-level README now points at it as the front door rather than duplicating the list. - ROADMAP.md and tests/lifecycle/TESTING.md linked docs/multinode-testing-plan.md, which moved to local-only (it is a fleet node inventory, not published). Those references now describe the scope split in prose instead of pointing at a file that is not in the public tree. The index is honest about what is missing: it names the three app-developer docs the plan flagged as gaps (quadlet compilation, container lifecycle, secrets materialisation) as not-yet-written, and points at the authoritative code for each rather than pretending they exist. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
8e814ca06a |
feat(registry): move image and OTA references to the public domain
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m22s
Replaces the registry host across 86 files: 309 references, covering all 40 app manifests, the orchestrator and container crates, the release and catalog scripts, both demo-images workflows, the ISO builder, demo-deploy, and the frontend marketplace data. Verified the domain actually serves the registry before rewriting anything, rather than assuming the web host implies the registry: - TLS verifies clean, HTTP/2 on the web root - an anonymous token grants a manifest fetch (HTTP 200) with no credentials - skopeo inspect --no-creds resolves an image and lists its tags That last check is the one that matters: an outside developer with no account can now pull, which was the functional blocker for publishing at all. Plain-HTTP references become HTTPS in the same pass, so OTA downloads stop crossing the network in the clear. Deliberately NOT rewritten: - The public FIPS anchor on port 8444. It is a functional network endpoint every node dials to bootstrap the mesh — closer to Bitcoin Core's hardcoded seeds than to leaked infrastructure. The domain does resolve to the same host, so it could become a hostname, but that adds a DNS dependency to the path used precisely when things are broken. Worth a deliberate decision, not a side effect of this change. - The companion APK on port 2100. The domain returns 404 for that path, so rewriting it would swap a working URL for a broken one. The Releases page does serve (200), which is where the plan already wants those binaries. - releases/app-catalog.json, releases/manifest.json and release-manifest.json. These carry `signature` and `signed_by`; editing their contents invalidates the signature and the fleet refuses artifacts that fail verification. They were rewritten in a first pass and reverted — they must be regenerated and re-signed through the signing ceremony instead, which needs the mnemonic. So the catalog still advertises the old host until that ceremony runs. Nodes resolve images through the signed catalog, not the on-disk manifests, so this commit alone does not change what a node pulls. Verified: archipelago-container 75/75; every manifest still parses with a top-level app block; no signed artifact modified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
6ba0599639 |
security: remove all infrastructure and internal process material from the repo
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m13s
The repo is source code and guidelines only. Nothing about how Archipelago's own fleet is run, or how the team works, stays in it. Untracked (kept on disk, gitignored) — 250 files: - .planning/ (199) and loop/ — internal development process - fleet operations tooling that targets specific nodes: deploy-to-target, deploy-tailscale, deploy-config-defaults, setup-target-dev, setup-aiui-server, setup-https-dev, debug-frontend, node-profile, fleet-fips-pair/unpair, image-recipe/sync-from-live.sh - image-recipe/INTEGRATION-GUIDE.md and docs/multinode-testing-plan.md, both of which are live-server workflow and fleet node inventories - the Phase 10 on-node verification and evidence records, which cite .planning/ as their evidence base KEY-05-ENTROPY-ENFORCEMENT.md was initially moved out with the other Phase 10 docs and then put back: it is cited as normative rationale from ten places in the codebase, including core/clippy.toml, which bans rand::thread_rng and points at it for the reason. That makes it a guideline, not an internal record. Node names removed from source (48 occurrences across comments, manifests and test fixtures): archi-dev-box, archy-x250*, shorty-s, framework-pt, zaza-optiplex, archi-thinkpad. Comments keep the engineering context and the date, which is what carried the meaning; the machine name did not. Three of those were live test values rather than comments and were replaced with valid stand-ins, not prose: two mDNS hostnames and a mesh peer name. An earlier pass substituted "a test node" into a hostname assertion, producing an invalid hostname; caught and fixed as test-node.local. Wipe mechanism: .local-only/manifest.txt inventories every local-only path and .local-only/wipe.sh deletes them on one confirmation, refusing to touch anything git still tracks. Both are themselves untracked, so the public repo does not carry a map of internal filenames. Verified: cargo check -p archipelago --all-features clean; archipelago-container 75/75 tests pass; appOrigin vitest 7/7; audit-secrets 5/5; every relative link in tracked markdown resolves (0 broken). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
cc00884b98 |
docs: repair links left dangling by the operations-doc removal
Untracking the ops docs broke every reference to them. Repoints or removes those references across README, architecture, ROADMAP, the archive index, lifecycle TESTING, the hardening plan, and the security docs — pointing at the issue tracker where a live task list was meant, and dropping the entry entirely where it only existed to link an internal file. Also fixes two pre-existing broken links found by validating every relative link in the tracked docs: - README linked docs/OPEN_SOURCE_READINESS.md, which never existed (underscores vs hyphens). - reticulum-daemon/README.md linked a local Claude session plan at ../../.claude/plans/enchanted-strolling-rocket.md — outside the repo, and a path that would have shipped publicly pointing at nothing. All relative links in tracked markdown now resolve: 0 broken. audit-secrets.sh still 5/5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
fda7feda60 |
security: untrack operations docs; scrub infra identifiers from public docs
Operations docs move out of git entirely rather than being sanitized. They
stay on disk for local use and are gitignored, so the Phase 6 export (which
takes HEAD) can never carry them. 15 files: the fleet runbook, hotfix
process, node inventories, internal trackers, session handoffs, the key
rotation/signing-posture records, and the open-source plan itself.
For the docs that remain public, infra identifiers are replaced with things
that are better documentation rather than placeholders: curl examples now
use `archipelago.local`, the product's own mDNS name, so a reader can run
them as-is instead of substituting an address that was never theirs.
Deliberately NOT scrubbed, both verified as functional rather than leaked:
- `tx1138.com` is the shipped default block explorer (DEFAULT_TX_EXPLORER in
useTxExplorer.ts, surfaced in WalletSettingsModal). Product behavior.
- `git.tx1138.com` in core/container/{image_policy,registry}.rs is a retired-
registry constant the code matches on to strip stale entries from legacy
node configs. Removing it would break migration for older nodes.
- `192.168.1.254` in bulletproof-containers.md is the LAN gateway in a podman
bug description, and `192.168.1.x` in user-walkthrough.md is already generic.
Whether a personal domain should be the shipped explorer default in a public
product is a separate product question, not a security one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
39eb6b0553 |
docs(open-source): move Phase 0 rotation to a pre-publish gate
Sequencing change per user decision: credential rotation/revocation runs last, immediately before Phase 6, instead of first. Safe under fresh-history publish — the scrub commits never become public — but recorded as a HARD blocking gate on Phase 6, with an explicit rotation sign-off added as a numbered pre-publish step so "scrubbed" cannot be mistaken for "rotated". Also corrects the plan against what execution actually found: - the fleet password was in 8 tracked files, not 7 (3 in .planning/) - both Gitea tokens are already dead (401); only the `ai` password is live - the Framework node's SSH password was rotated out-of-band and is unrecorded, which would block it from receiving the fleet rotation - .planning/ is 199 tracked files of internal agent state — added to Phase 2 as the largest un-triaged internal block still in the tree Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
19082a44f0 |
security: remove node credentials from tracked files (open-source Phase 1)
Demo images / Build & push demo images (push) Failing after 2m28s
Scrubs the fleet SSH/UI password from every tracked file (22 occurrences) and removes inline credentials from the code paths that used them. Docs and trackers keep the surrounding context — these are published under docs/history/ per the open-source plan — with the literals replaced by <FLEET_PW> / <FLEET_PW_ALT> so the "two variants exist" detail survives without the values. Three of the eight files were in .planning/ and were NOT in the plan's enumerated list; the reworked audit-secrets.sh found them. Code changes: - neode-ui/test-openwrt.mjs: node URL and password come from ARCHY_NODE_URL / ARCHY_NODE_PW; the SSH target derives from the URL instead of a hardcoded tailnet IP; exits 2 when unset. - scripts/run-post-install-tests.sh: drops the built-in "testpass123!" default and adds --password-stdin; refuses to run unauthenticated instead of silently trying a known password. --phase1-only still needs no password. - .gitea/workflows/post-install-tests.yml: sshpass with an inline literal replaced by key auth (NODE_SSH_KEY secret); password comes from the NODE_UI_PASSWORD secret and is piped over stdin rather than argv, so it stays out of the node's process list and the job log. Default target IP removed. scripts/audit-secrets.sh now reports 5/5 pass, 0 fail. Note: rotation of the exposed credentials is deliberately deferred to the pre-publish gate and is NOT done by this commit — these values are still live. See Phase 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
e205f2c34a |
docs(security): prove the delivery path on hardware; close window 15
Controlled test on archi-dev-box with operator approval. The daemon was
stopped first so the reconciler could not repair the state before the
re-exposure was confirmed — without a confirmed 200, the later 401 would
be consistent with the state never having been broken at all.
1. stale conf installed + container restarted -> POST /bitcoin-rpc/
returned 200 with a real block height and Allow-Origin: *
2. daemon started 20:00:36, nothing else touched
3. 20:02:19 reconcile rendered the conf and logged the expected warn
line naming bitcoin-ui/archy-bitcoin-ui, then restarted it
4. POST -> 401, Allow-Origin origin-scoped
5. conf byte-identical to the pre-test known-good, container healthy
Both halves are now proven on real hardware: a05956c4's template (the
gate works) and f6b5245b's delivery path (the gate reaches a container
the reconciler had been skipping).
Also records the operator's decision AGAINST credential rotation — no
macaroon, no Bitcoin RPC password — with the trade it accepts stated
plainly, so it is not silently re-litigated later.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
5a21b58f69 |
docs(security): record what actually closed :8334, and what it does not prove
The node is closed and verified 401 with origin-scoped CORS. But an
unrelated bitcoin-ui rebuild at 18:36 cleared the stale conf before the
reconcile fix was deployed at 19:06, so the 401 proves a05956c4's
template and NOT the delivery path
|
||
|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
ba493fb0fc |
docs(security): write up the Bitcoin RPC proxy that stayed open after it was fixed
The half that landed correctly (LND, clean 401) made the half that did not harder to notice, because the first check an operator would run returns a pass. Records the probes, the three-fact root cause, and the pass condition for re-probing a node. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
|
a3283cffb4 |
feat(10-06): enable the entropy lint and supply-chain gates (KEY-05 b/c)
Layer (b) — core/clippy.toml bans rand::random and rand::thread_rng crate-wide, each with a reason naming KEY-05 and pointing at the evidence doc. No CI change was needed: the Rust job already runs `cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings` from core/, so a disallowed_methods hit is already a build failure. --all-targets covers tests deliberately — a fixture keeping the default is a template for the next production call site. Ordering was asserted before the file was written, not after: the residual count of unmigrated call sites is 0, so this cannot turn CI red for other agents on this shared tree. Layer (c) — core/deny.toml makes the rand major split change-detecting: global multiple-versions = "allow", a per-crate deny-multiple-versions for rand, and a dated grandfather skip pinning =0.9.2 exactly. The tree as it stands passes; a third version or a change to either member fails. Both gates were OBSERVED working, not assumed: - Reintroducing one banned call produced the disallowed_methods error with the reason text reaching the developer at the failure point; reverting returned the residual count to 0. - `cargo deny check bans` exits 0 as-is. Removing the grandfather entry made it exit 2 and print both dependency trees, independently confirming F-07's account of where each rand version comes from. Restored, it exits 0 again. Policy (checkpoint Task 5, human-approved): bans-only. The advisories gate is NOT enabled — it fails builds when a new CVE is published against an existing dep with no local change, which on a tree where several agents push continuously would block everyone at an arbitrary hour, with remediation often meaning a bump to an exactly-pinned crypto dependency. No break-glass procedure exists. F-07's advisory half stays OPEN and is recorded as such. cargo-deny is pinned to 0.20.2 and installed from crates.io rather than via EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny-action, because that action exposes no input to pin the tool version — an unpinned supply-chain checker would reintroduce, at the CI layer, the exact "backend fixed by configuration rather than stated" shape this plan exists to remove. crates.io is also the source vetted at the Task 5 legitimacy gate (EmbarkStudios, repo resolves, ~4.79M downloads). RECORDED HONESTLY: layer (b)'s gate is live but not yet EFFECTIVE. The tree carries 42 pre-existing clippy warnings — unused imports, dead code, ~39 style lints — that are already errors under -D warnings, so that CI step cannot pass today for reasons unrelated to KEY-05. Until a dedicated lint-clearing pass lands, a new banned RNG call would be one error among many rather than a distinctive build-stopper. Pre-existing and out of scope; clearing it right before an OTA would be poor sequencing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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a806a658a6 |
docs(10-04): C-3 FAILED — three live nodes share their SSH host keys
Audit checklist item C-3 ("the highest-value check here") is no longer
UNVERIFIED. It failed, and the failure is a live F-03 instance rather than a
theoretical one.
Three distinct fleet nodes — archipelago-1, archy-x250-beta and archipelago —
present byte-identical ECDSA, ED25519 and RSA host key fingerprints. Two of
them (archipelago-1, archy-x250-beta) also present the same TLS certificate,
so they share the TLS private key as well.
Gathered read-only and remotely: ssh-keyscan plus an anonymous TLS handshake.
No node was logged into, nothing was written, nothing was rotated. A weaker
instrument than the checklist's on-node commands, chosen because it needs no
access and therefore covers the reachable fleet rather than two nodes — and it
is sufficient for the FAIL condition, which is any fingerprint appearing twice.
Ruled out the obvious alternative (one machine registered three times on the
tailnet): all three answered live TCP within the same minute, and tailscale
ping resolves them to different physical endpoints on different continents
under different tailnet accounts.
One finding worth more than the count: `archipelago` has a UNIQUE TLS cert
(CN=austin-sapien) and SHARED SSH host keys, because it was renamed and
server.set-name re-mints the cert via regenerate_tls_cert() while touching
nothing else. So TLS uniqueness is not evidence that a node's key material is
per-node — any renamed node gets a unique certificate for free. Checked on TLS
alone, that node would have looked clean. Recorded because it justifies the
audit script reporting the two key classes separately instead of issuing one
node-level verdict.
All three are listed under "shared verdict, deliberately not rotated" with the
reason and the next step. A verification task that remediates is a
verification task that takes a node offline.
Also records what this does NOT establish, each with the evidence still
needed: same-ISO provenance, the script's own verdict on those nodes, that a
rotation preserves the operator's live session on real hardware, that
host_secrets reaches system.stats on a real node, and the four nodes that were
unreachable at scan time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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f2f89b5fe3 |
docs(10-02): record C-6 evidence so far — probe-method correction, 3 transports still open
C-6 is NOT closed by this commit and is not marked verified.
Measured (read-only, on-node):
- loopback and self-LAN-IP: auth.isOnboardingComplete 200 (EXPOSED),
seed.status 401 (session enforcement intact) — no stop-the-plan finding.
- /rpc/ returns 404: nginx's second proxy block is not a second door, so
the unauthenticated surface is reachable through /rpc/v1 only.
NOT measured — needs a second machine: LAN, Tor, FIPS mesh ULA.
NOT performed — the KEY-01 refusal check and the fresh-node onboarding
walkthrough. No node runs 10-01's gate yet: the installed binary was built
at 06:37 and
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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257ca7e6ac |
docs(10-06): classify all 43 defaulted-RNG call sites with file:line evidence (KEY-05, F-10a)
F-10a recorded raw grep counts and deliberately declined to classify them. This resolves that: every one of the 43 matches under core/archipelago/src now carries a production/test verdict (evidenced by its file's `#[cfg(test)] mod tests` line), what the drawn value becomes, whether the degenerate-entropy guard applies, and a disposition. Tally: 41 migrate, 2 comment, 0 allow. No site needed an exemption, so the crate-wide ban will have no holes to audit. Two corrections to F-10a, each derived independently with its evidence line: session.rs is 4 production sites not 16 (mod tests begins :471), and mesh/x3dh.rs:100/:114 are u32 prekey identifiers, not key material -- the X25519 secrets come from crypto::generate_x25519_ephemeral() at :99/:113. The enforcement blast radius is pinned with `cargo metadata` output rather than asserted: models, helpers and js-engine are not workspace members, so the two core/models matches are outside the clippy build graph and are recorded as a stated limitation rather than omitted. Requirement: KEY-05. Supersedes R-13, absorbs R-05 and R-09. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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96dba73a16 |
docs(10-04): record D-06 rotation trigger as detect-report-then-apply
Task 1 of 10-04 is a blocking decision checkpoint, rated one-way: rotating a node's SSH host key invalidates every known_hosts entry for it fleet-wide and the old private key is destroyed by the swap. Chosen: detect-report-then-apply. auto-on-boot would fire simultaneous known_hosts breakage across the fleet during an OTA with no operator holding the new fingerprints, and a rotation that fails partway on a remote node (.228 is at a remote site and in real use) needs physical console access. It also cannot be dev-paired, which contradicts the standing verify-on-the-dev-pair- first policy — by the time it has been observed on the dev pair it has already run everywhere. The cost of the chosen option — exposure persists on any node nobody revisits — is bounded by making the verdict visible in system.stats rather than by automation, and by keeping a list in this document of every node that reported `shared` and was deliberately not rotated. Records what the decision binds: detect-only default, --apply inert without --yes, the boot unit carries no apply path, and --apply --yes refuses on any node whose verdict is not `shared`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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0d513a0ef7 |
docs(10-05): record the Core-wallet fleet census — 4 nodes clear, 6 unchecked (D-07b)
Task 3 of plan 10-05, run by the operator over Tailscale on 2026-08-02 using the read-only procedure in KEY-03-SIGNING-POSTURE.md. No escalation: nothing found. Examined and CLEAR (4): archi-dev-box, shorty-s/.228, archy-x250-beta, archy-x250-pa. On every one there is no wallet named `archipelago` — the deleted handler's default wallet_name — `listwallets` returns only the unnamed default, and that default reports blank=true, keypoolsize=0, txcount=0, balance=0. The only named wallets are Fedimint gatewayd-*. The result holds across two container vintages (bitcoin-knots and bitcoin-core), so it is not four copies of one image behaving identically. Not examined (6), recorded with reasons rather than omitted: framework-pt, archipelago-1, archipelago and archy-dev-pa (SSH permission denied — password rotated/not held), archipelago-5 (timed out during banner exchange), and archy-x250-dev (offline). Password auth was deliberately not attempted: several fleet nodes lock PAM quickly on a wrong password, and locking out an in-use production node is a worse outcome than an incomplete census. The conclusion is stated at the strength the evidence supports — no *examined* node holds a wallet the deleted handler created, and no examined node holds any wallet with keys or funds. It is deliberately NOT generalised to "the fleet is clear" while six nodes are unknown. F-13 is closed by deletion regardless: the code that could create such a wallet is gone from every future build. No key material appeared in any output and `listdescriptors true` was never run. Also corrects the now-stale R-04/F-13 entry in UNIFIED-TASK-TRACKER.md, which still described `handle_bitcoin_init_wallet_from_seed` and a watch-only migration as pending work — that code no longer exists. Marks it done-by- deletion and adds the six unchecked nodes as a standing item, flagged as a natural fold-in for KEY-04's on-node work but tracked independently so it does not vanish if KEY-04 is re-scoped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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262998747e |
feat(10-05): report BIP-32 key origin on lnd.create-psbt, and record the honest signing posture (D-07b/D-09)
With Bitcoin Core's wallet deleted, LND's PSBT round trip is the only external-signer path Archipelago has, and D-09's key-origin protection moves from Core descriptors (of which none remain) to the PSBT itself. Adds `psbt_key_origin_report(&str) -> Result<PsbtKeyOriginReport>` to lnd/wallet.rs, reporting `input_count`, `inputs_with_key_origin` and `all_inputs_have_key_origin`. An input counts as carrying key origin when either its `bip32_derivation` or `tap_key_origins` map is non-empty. A PSBT with zero inputs reports false rather than vacuous truth. Parsed with the already-present `bitcoin` and `base64` crates; no dependency added. `lnd.create-psbt` gains an additive `key_origin` object on its response and a `tracing::warn!` with the counts when key origin is missing, because that is the exact condition under which a hardware signer refuses the PSBT. Computed best-effort: a decode failure degrades to `null`, never to an error, so a user's send cannot fail because an inspection helper could not parse something. `handle_lnd_finalize_psbt` and `handle_lnd_create_raw_tx` (which deliberately auto-signs with LND's hot keys) are untouched. Three tests, with fixtures built programmatically from the `bitcoin` crate rather than pasted as opaque base64: with-derivations, without-derivations, and malformed-is-an-error-not-a-panic. KEY-03-SIGNING-POSTURE.md gains an honest per-step coverage map of the fund -> export -> sign offline -> import -> finalize -> broadcast round trip. Of six steps, only the new inspection has automated coverage; steps 1, 4, 5 and 6 have none, and there is no air-gap transport (no animated QR, no .psbt file exchange) — export/import is copy-paste of base64. Untested paths are named as untested. Records the verdict that decides whether any of this is an air gap: on a default node an external signer CANNOT meaningfully sign a PSBT from `lnd.create-psbt`, because LND holds the keys for every input it selects. Evidence: the PSBT is funded from LND's own wallet; `ensure_wallet_initialized` creates a full key-holding wallet via /v1/initwallet; the generated lnd.conf carries no `remotesigner.*` block; and a search of apps/, scripts/, core/archipelago/src and image-recipe/ for remotesigner/createwatchonly/ nochainbackend returns zero matches. No fleet node is provisioned watch-only. What ships is PSBT transport, not air-gapped custody — the gap is provisioning, not plumbing. Adds the standing honesty statement in its own subsection: Lightning channel, revocation and HTLC keys are NOT air-gappable at all. They must sign in real time to answer counterparty commitments; remote signing relocates them to a hardened host, it does not cool them. Also adds a status banner to PSBT-SIGNING-ARCHITECTURE.md recording that its Phase 1 was superseded by deletion rather than delivered, so §0's "single highest-value change" and §2.1's invariant now read against a code path that no longer exists. Banner only; §5.4's honesty table is byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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9622926868 |
fix(10-05): delete the Bitcoin Core wallet path that duplicated the spending key (F-13, D-07b)
`handle_bitcoin_init_wallet_from_seed` derived the BIP-84 account extended *private* key, stringified it, and imported `wpkh(xprv/0/*)` / `wpkh(xprv/1/*)` into a Bitcoin Core descriptor wallet created with `disable_private_keys=false` and an empty passphrase. That put a second copy of the node's spending key in Core's `wallet.dat`, outside the daemon's Argon2 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 envelope. That duplication into weaker protection was audit finding F-13 (High). Deleted rather than rewritten watch-only (D-07b supersedes D-07/D-07a): - No caller anywhere. Repo-wide search leaves exactly one occurrence of the method name (its own dispatcher registration) and two of the symbol in code (definition + dispatch call); every other hit is prose in docs. - LND is the wallet the product drives. Across neode-ui/src every `bitcoin.*` call is read-only status (getinfo/prune-status/onion); the wallet UI sends via `lnd.sendcoins`. - It never ran on archi-dev-box: no wallet named `archipelago` exists there, and the one loaded wallet reports blank=true, keypoolsize=0, txcount=0. - It was authenticated AND password-gated, so F-13 was key-at-rest duplication, not an exposed endpoint. No migration is performed and none is planned. This removes code, not wallets: nothing on disk is touched, no funds move, no wallet.dat is modified. If a node is ever found holding a wallet this handler created, that is a finding to surface and stop on, not a trigger to auto-migrate. `seed::derive_bitcoin_xprv` loses its only non-test caller and is retained deliberately with `#[allow(dead_code)]` and a stated reason: it keeps its existing test coverage and it is the derivation D-07c's deferred BDK cold vault will need. Records the evidence, the D-08/D-09 consequences and the D-07c deferral in docs/security/KEY-03-SIGNING-POSTURE.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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2efab5f219 |
fix(10-03): unify secret generation to a single producer + self-heal (F-03)
Unify rather than delete. The defect in F-03 was never "a second attempt to
create a key exists" — it was that failure was silent and the completion marker
lied about it. A second attempt is only dangerous when it is an unaudited second
PRODUCER carrying its own idea of success, its own absent retry policy and its
own absent failure record.
Single producer. gen_tls() is now the only code in the ISO build that creates
/etc/archipelago/ssl/archipelago.{key,crt}; gen_ssh() the only code that creates
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*. Two secondary producers are gone:
- the Dockerfile's `openssl req` layer, which baked a keypair the strip layer
deleted moments later in the same build;
- the installer's "ensure SSL cert exists for nginx HTTPS" block, which before
the strip almost never fired and after it would have fired on every install.
Proof is mechanical, not a claim: every executable `openssl req` / `ssh-keygen
-A` invocation in the builder now lives inside the generator heredoc, and the
test suite fails if one appears outside it.
Build-time assertion. The one realistic total failure is a missing generator
binary, which is deterministic — no retry or reboot fixes it. A rootfs RUN layer
now fails the build if openssl or ssh-keygen is missing or non-executable.
openssl and openssh-server are both already in the package list (and
openssh-server hard-depends openssh-client, which ships ssh-keygen), so today
this is cheap insurance; it earns its place the first time someone edits that
list.
Self-heal, never dead-end. Fail-closed governs SERVING; retry governs
RECOVERING, and they are different things. Adds
archipelago-first-boot-secrets.timer (OnBootSec=5min, OnUnitActiveSec=15min),
installed and enabled with a hand-written symlink fallback because chroot
systemctl enable can fail silently. The service's own ConditionPathExists=!
makes every trigger a no-op once the marker exists, so a healthy node pays
nothing. On success the script now restarts consumers that are in `failed` —
try-reload-or-restart is a no-op on a failed unit, so without this a recovered
node would have valid keys on disk and nginx still down.
Never serve a bogus key. gen_tls parses both halves back with `openssl pkey`
and `openssl x509` before the swap, so a truncated or half-written artefact is
never what nginx reads.
Tests: 6 cases, each with an isolated negative control (transcripts in SUMMARY).
- case 4, TLS fails every attempt on a stripped root -> no key from any source.
Control: reintroduce a fallback key creation -> only case 4 red.
- case 5, self-heal: a failed run then a later successful run -> key present,
marker set, failed units restarted. Control: dead-end on a node that already
failed -> only case 5 red.
- case 6, single-producer invariant. Control: reintroduce the installer block
-> only case 6 red, naming the line.
Residual risk, stated plainly: a machine where generation can never succeed
still ends up with no SSH and no TLS. Build-time assertion removes the
deterministic cause, retry plus timer removes the transient ones, so what
remains is genuinely broken hardware — and it says so on the console and in
/var/lib/archipelago/first-boot-secrets.failed rather than quietly serving a
key nobody audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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ff6902dd9d |
docs(10): add independent verification guide for auditors
A guide a third-party security auditor can use to verify Phase 10's claims without trusting our test harness — and that we use ourselves. Every claim carries four parts, all required: the claim stated falsifiably; how to REPRODUCE THE DEFECT on the parent commit; how to verify the fix; and a negative control that must go red on exactly that defect and nothing else. A test passing on both fixed and unfixed code proves nothing, and reproduce-first is the step most often omitted in security theatre. Prefers external checks (curl from another host, tar listing, cross-node file comparison) over our own tests wherever a claim can be checked from outside. Tiered by hardware needed: Tier 0 any checkout, Tier 1 running node, Tier 2 ISO build host, Tier 3 two physical nodes, Tier 4 pre-release gate. Status marked per claim — verifiable now, pending a plan, or hardware-gated — so an unmarked absence is never read as a pass. States what is explicitly NOT claimed (Lightning custody is not air-gappable; no claim against a compromised kernel CSPRNG or supply chain; KEY-05 is structural not exploitable), the known-accepted risks with where each was decided, and carries the C-6 warning that probing with seed.status reports the surface closed while the real door stands open. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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201ef474e7 |
docs(10-03): record C-4 build-host evidence procedure (UNVERIFIED)
Task 3 of 10-03 is a blocking checkpoint: proving the shipped rootfs tar is identity-free needs a real ISO build host with podman/docker and disk for a full rootfs rebuild. This commits the prepared evidence document with the exact command sequence, marked UNVERIFIED, rather than claiming the check passed. The document states the inverted expectation explicitly. The audit's C-4 entry expected SSH host keys and the TLS key to be PRESENT — that described the broken state it was measuring. After the strip layer those must be ABSENT, so the audit's stated expectation is now the failure condition. A future reader comparing the two would otherwise conclude the check regressed. Also records two things the operator would otherwise get wrong: - RECIPE_HASH must be read from the stamp file, not computed from the repo file. build-debian-iso.sh rewrites the builder's relative paths into a temp copy before exec, and the hash covers "$0"; the hashed region has 35 such rewritten expressions plus an absolutised SCRIPT_DIR, so the value is specific to the build host and checkout path. - C-4 is a build-host check only. Two-node key divergence is C-3 and stays separately UNVERIFIED; the note explains why SSH host keys are the sharper signal there than TLS, given the installer's per-install TLS fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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archipelagoandClaude Opus 5
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90ce4bcc46 |
docs(10): correct F-10a's own overstatement — x3dh sites are identifiers, not key material
The F-10a scope correction committed hours earlier asserted semantics its evidence did not support. The KEY-05 planner caught it against the code: - mesh/x3dh.rs:100/:114 are u32 prekey IDENTIFIERS (spk_id, otk_id), not key agreement material. The X25519 secrets come from crypto::generate_x25519_ephemeral() at :99/:113 and were never in scope. - session.rs's 16 raw matches read as 16 production token sites; #[cfg(test)] begins at :470, so it is 4 production + 12 test. - wallet/bdhke.rs is 2 production of 4 (#[cfg(test)] at :143) — and those two ARE genuine key material: generate_secret() :133 and random_blinding_factor() :139. The Medium rating still holds, on narrower grounds: bdhke's two production sites plus storage_crypto.rs:39's AEAD nonce. It no longer rests on x3dh. Struck rather than silently rewritten. F-10 was corrected on the grounds that understatement misleads the next reader; overstatement does the same, and this table managed both within a day. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |