feat(apps): package podsteadr as a full Archipelago app (3-container manifest set)

Adds apps/podsteadr (main Fastify+Vue app, container.build from the podsteadr repo), apps/podsteadr-mediamtx (RTMP/WHIP ingest, HLS, recording), and apps/podsteadr-blossom (BUD-02 media blobs), wired together on a dedicated podsteadr-net bridge network per the multi-container pattern documented in docs/app-developer-guide.md (indeedhub's api/relay/minio/redis/postgres siblings). All podsteadr ports are auth: none with a rationale, since it's a public podcast/livestream server whose RSS feeds, HLS playback, and blob reads must stay reachable by third-party clients with no Archipelago session — the app already gates its own sensitive routes with NIP-98 and per-stream secret keys. Also updates apps/PORTS.md, apps/README.md, and bumps the reviewed unauthenticated-port count in core/container/src/manifest.rs's unauthenticated_ports_are_all_accounted_for test (25 -> 31) to acknowledge the six new auth:none ports. Regenerated catalog-derived files (core/archipelago/src/fips/app_ports.rs, neode-ui/src/views/appSession/generatedAppSessionConfig.ts) via scripts/generate-app-catalog.py. All three manifests pass scripts/validate-app-manifest.sh and `cargo test -p archipelago-container manifest`.
fix(mesh): don't offer radio-only resource transfer to radio-unreachable peers
2026-08-07 14:45:22 +00:00 · 2026-08-07 14:43:55 +00:00 · 2026-08-06 16:25:14 -04:00 · 2026-08-06 15:23:47 -04:00 · 2026-08-06 14:43:08 -04:00 · 2026-08-06 14:38:30 -04:00
144 changed files with 7274 additions and 655 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# App-port authentication gate — design
+
+Item 1 of `RELEASE-1.7.121-TASKS.md`. Opened 2026-08-04.
+
+> "if I'm logged out I can reach every app port on tailscale and LAN, this can not be
+> allowed… it must present the login to access the app with an app icon of what you're
+> accessing to confirm, and 2FA if present" — operator, 2026-08-03
+>
+> "make sure we fix FIPS, Tor, everything … umbrel definitely shows a port when you go to
+> tailscale IP or other + port but demands the node login and 2FA if activated"
+> — operator, 2026-08-04
+
+---
+
+## What we already built, and why it did not close this
+
+The operator's recollection that FIPS and Tor were "done" is correct — but that work was
+about **reachability**, and about restricting the **daemon's own** API. Neither one ever
+authenticated an app port. Read together, each transport got a door and none got a lock:
+
+| Layer | What exists today | What it protects |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `server.rs:1271` `is_peer_allowed_path` | Federated peers hitting the **daemon** port may only reach `/health`, `/rpc/v1`, `/content`, `/blob/`, `/dwn/`, `/transport/inbox`, `/archipelago/*` | The daemon's API surface. **Not app ports.** |
+| `fips/app_ports.rs` `APP_LAUNCH_PORTS` | 35 app ports **allowed through** the fips0 firewall | Nothing — it *opens* them |
+| `server.rs:1130` `app_port_v6_relay_loop` | Daemon relays mesh v6 → v4 loopback for those same ports | Nothing — it *bridges* them |
+| `api/rpc/tor/mod.rs:243` | Per-app `HiddenServicePort 80 → 127.0.0.1:<app port>` | Nothing — it *publishes* them to an onion |
+| `container/quadlet.rs:261` | `PublishPort=0.0.0.0:{host}:{container}` | Nothing — it binds every interface |
+
+So the app ports are reachable, by construction, over LAN, Tailscale, FIPS mesh and Tor,
+and nothing on any of those paths checks a session. This is the same bug class as the
+v1.7.120 `/lnd-connect-info` + `/bitcoin-rpc/` leaks, but structural rather than
+per-endpoint.
+
+## The rule this design is built on
+
+**You cannot gate a socket you do not own.** Every previous fix added a check *beside* the
+listener, which is why each one only covered the transport it was written for. The gate
+has to *be* the listener.
+
+## Design
+
+Port numbers do not change. For an app whose UI port is `P`:
+
+- **The app binds `127.0.0.1:P` only** (`PublishPort=127.0.0.1:P:<container>`), so it is
+  no longer reachable from any interface.
+- **The gate binds `P` on every external address** — LAN IP, Tailscale IP, fips0 ULA —
+  and on **`127.0.0.2:P`** for Tor. `127.0.0.2` is a distinct loopback address, so it does
+  not collide with the app on `127.0.0.1:P`, and it means **no app needs a second port
+  number**. `torrc` changes to `HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.2:P`.
+- Upstream for the gate is always `127.0.0.1:P`.
+
+Because the gate owns the socket, LAN / Tailscale / FIPS / Tor are one code path. There is
+no per-transport work, and therefore no transport to forget.
+
+### Request handling
+
+1. Read the `session` cookie. Cookies are **host-scoped and port-agnostic**, so the
+   session minted on the dashboard is presented to `<host>:P` automatically — this is the
+   same mechanism umbrel's "proxy token" relies on. (Scheme still matters: a `Secure`
+   cookie will not travel to a plain-HTTP app port. See open questions.)
+2. **Valid session** → proxy to `127.0.0.1:P`, passing through `Upgrade` so WebSockets work.
+3. **No/invalid session** → serve the login page **on the app port itself**, naming the app
+   and showing its icon, POSTing back to the same origin. The gate verifies the password,
+   enforces TOTP when enabled, and sets the session cookie — so logging in at
+   `<tailscale-ip>:P` also logs you into the dashboard, exactly as umbrel behaves.
+4. Non-browser clients get `401` with a JSON body rather than an HTML page.
+
+### What must NOT be gated
+
+Non-HTTP ports cannot carry a cookie and must be declared, not discovered:
+electrum `50002`, bitcoin p2p `8333`, LND gRPC `10009`/`9735`. These need an explicit
+manifest field (`auth: none` + rationale) so the exception list is a `grep`, and they are
+a firewall/allowlist question, tracked separately.
+
+Note `api/rpc/tor/mod.rs:238-240` already special-cases lnd's `9735`/`10009` as
+`is_protocol_service` — that distinction is the seed of the manifest field.
+
+## Deploy traps this walks into
+
+- **Three copies of every container spec** — `apps/<id>/manifest.yml`,
+  `scripts/container-specs.sh`, `scripts/first-boot-containers.sh`. Changing `PublishPort`
+  in one leaves fresh installs broken while the node looks fixed. This is exactly what bit
+  lnd-ui (item 4). **Deduplicating these is arguably a prerequisite, not a follow-up.**
+- Changing `PublishPort` drifts every app → one-time recreate fleet-wide.
+- The gate must rebind when addresses change (Tailscale up/down, DHCP, fips0 re-key).
+  Precedent exists: `peer_late_bind_loop` in `server.rs` already does this for fips0.
+- Verify **on the node**, not from source. v1.7.120's headline bug was a fix that shipped
+  in the binary and never reached the running container.
+
+## Open questions for the operator
+
+1. **Machine clients.** Umbrel's real-world failure mode: Home Assistant (or any API
+   client) hitting an app's API has no cookie and breaks. Browser-only, or do we mint
+   per-app long-lived tokens?
+2. **TLS/scheme.** The daemon serves plain HTTP with nginx terminating TLS in front. If the
+   dashboard is HTTPS and app ports are HTTP, a `Secure` session cookie will not be sent —
+   the gate would prompt for login every time. Either the gate serves TLS on app ports too,
+   or app ports are HTTP-only on such nodes.
+
+## Sequencing
+
+1. Gate module + login page + proxy, behind an env opt-in.
+2. Prove on **one** HTTP app on .228, across all four transports.
+3. Dedupe the container-spec declarations.
+4. Roll to all HTTP apps; declare the non-HTTP exceptions.
+5. Repoint `torrc` at `127.0.0.2`.
@@ -443,6 +443,70 @@ below is dead on every path. Pre-existing; spotted in the v1.7.120 build warning

 ---

+## STATUS 2026-08-04 — what shipped in 1.7.121 and what did not
+
+### Shipped (committed + pushed)
+
+| Item | Commit | Verified |
+|---|---|---|
+| 3. Federation trust escalation | `c0cfc72a` | 42/42 federation tests |
+| 3b. Trusted requires node password | `24ce8b39` | 44/44 + 79/79 + vue-tsc |
+| 4. lnd-ui OTA pin + host networking | `5088aef5` | — |
+| 1b. Manifest `auth:` declarations | `0c4826f8` | 73/73, all 56 manifests parse |
+| 1c. App gate (engine + audit) | `0de67ca6` | 23/23 appgate |
+| Dashboard backdrop-filter seam | `63d0183d` | 3/3, **live on archi-dev-box** |
+| 7. Release refuses unsigned manifest | `cc9e1958` | dry-run: signed/stripped/wrong-signer |
+| Gate safety model (`Option<PortAuth>`) | `ab2c8b6e` | 75/75 incl. LND wallet-port case |
+| Companion rebuild-loop | `719446c0` | podman behaviour proven first |
+| 5. Federated peers messageable | `edc9a172` | predicate pinned across device types |
+
+### The two gate incidents — read before touching the gate again
+
+Both were ONE mistake: a safety decision read an ABSENT manifest field as a
+value. A node's installed manifests always lag the binary, so "absent" is the
+normal state, and the daemon acted on instructions no manifest ever gave.
+
+1. Gating any `session` port regardless of `bind` **published Bitcoin's
+   loopback-only RPC 8332 on the LAN/Tailscale/IPv6** within seconds of deploy.
+2. The `bind`-keyed replacement looked safe (it protected `bind: 127.0.0.1`)
+   but LND's gRPC 10009 / REST 18080 carry an EMPTY bind — one container
+   recreate from pinning them to loopback and **breaking Zeus and every remote
+   wallet**.
+
+Now structural: `auth_policy()` classifies (undeclared → reported as
+unprotected, always safe), `auth_is_declared()` gates action (undeclared →
+never acted on). **Silence is not consent.**
+
+### Proven on the node, empirically, not by reasoning
+
+- Gate challenge → login → proxy works end to end over LAN and Tailscale.
+- **Daemon-side publish rewriting was removed.** Publishes are built in several
+  places (`podman_client`, `package::install`, `stacks`); patching one covered
+  one — the strfry recreate went through another and the pin never fired.
+- **Disk manifest edits do not apply to catalog-covered apps.** Even
+  `bind: 127.0.0.1` written into the node's strfry manifest was overridden by
+  the signed catalog. The catalog re-sign is REQUIRED; there is no shortcut.
+- A loopback-bound host port is **unreachable** from a pasta container, so
+  loopback-pinning the Wyoming ports would break Home Assistant voice.
+
+### Open for 1.7.122
+
+1. **Catalog re-sign** — `bind: 127.0.0.1` + `auth: session` on the ~39 gated
+   UI ports. This is what turns the gate from auditing into enforcing. Nothing
+   in code can substitute for it.
+2. **Release-root rotation** — branch `rotate-release-root`, key
+   `did:key:z6Mkfu5LT…DLWT` / `1578adcc…4418`, validated as a real curve point.
+   **Sign the rotation release with the OLD key**; only the release after it
+   uses the new one. Re-sign the catalog too.
+3. **Wyoming voice ports** (10200/10300/10400) — unauthenticated, and by the
+   operator's policy they should not be. Correct fix is co-locating Home
+   Assistant with the pine services on one container network so nothing is
+   published; needs a node running both.
+4. **Item 2** filebrowser default login. **Items 6/6b** app updates +
+   multiversion (`versions[]` already exists, populated for 2 of 66 apps).
+5. **`cargo-test-weekly` times out** at its 1500s cap on a loaded box — raise
+   the cap or split the stage; it is not a code failure.
+
 ## RESUME HERE — next session

 **Landed this session (both pushed):**
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# Resume — 2026-08-05 (app gate, releases .122–.125)
+
+Paste the block at the bottom into a new session.
+
+## Where things stand
+
+- **v1.7.124-alpha is SHIPPED** (signed with the NEW root, published, verified).
+- **Signed catalog is LIVE** carrying two hotfixes made after .124:
+  the repaired bitcoin start script and the fedimint 8175 removal.
+  Last commit: `4ace62fa`.
+- **Release-root rotation is COMPLETE.** .122 was the last release signed with
+  the old key; .123/.124 and all catalogs use the new one. No override needed.
+
+## Two bugs I introduced in .124 (both fixed, both instructive)
+
+1. **Bitcoin vanished from every node.** I put a `#` comment INSIDE the
+   manifest's folded YAML scalar (`>-`), where `#` is not a comment — it
+   reaches the shell, and folding joins lines with spaces so it commented out
+   the `if ... then` while the more-indented `echo` survived, leaving an orphan
+   `fi`. Container exited instantly; app detection is container-based so the
+   app disappeared. **Guard added:** `scripts/check-manifest-shell.py` runs
+   `sh -n` over every embedded manifest script and rejects `#` in these
+   scalars; wired into `tests/release/run.sh`.
+2. **Fedimint crash-looped.** I declared port 8175 on the `fedimint` app so the
+   gate could name it — but 8175 is served by the separate `archy-fedimint-ui`
+   companion. The orchestrator then tried to publish 8175 from fedimintd,
+   collided, and `start_container` failed forever. Removed. **Rule: never
+   declare a port on an app whose container does not actually serve it.**
+
+Also: I published an UNSIGNED catalog at one point, which nodes correctly
+reject — they silently keep their old cached copy. **Always verify
+`'signature' in catalog` on the live URL after publishing.**
+
+## OPEN TASKS
+
+1. **indeedhub crash-loop — NOT mine, needs a real fix.** `indeedhub-minio` is
+   **absent** on `.38` and `.88`, so nginx fails with
+   `host not found in upstream "minio"` and both `indeedhub` and
+   `indeedhub-api` exit(1). The stack member never gets created. Look at
+   `api/rpc/package/stacks.rs` + `dependencies.rs`.
+2. **Verify `.38` refetched the signed catalog** and bitcoin-knots starts.
+   `.88` already did (signed: True, script fixed).
+3. **Deploy the .125 build to archi-dev-box for operator confirmation.**
+   Binary is built at `core/target/release/archipelago` with: app-login page
+   using the sidebar **A mark** (`favico-black-v2.svg`) not the wordmark;
+   page pinned to `100svh` + `position:fixed` so mobile stays centred and the
+   keyboard overlays instead of scrolling; install-version modal icon uses
+   `object-contain` so non-square icons are not cropped. **Operator has not
+   seen these yet.**
+4. **Cut v1.7.125-alpha** once confirmed. Sign with the **NEW** mnemonic.
+
+## Traps that cost time today
+
+- `create-release.sh` says "sign, then re-run" — **re-running regenerates the
+  manifest and DESTROYS the signature**, and its clean-tree check blocks
+  anyway. Do steps 7/8 by hand: `git add` version+changelog+manifest →
+  commit `chore: release vX` → `git tag -a vX` → push main → **push the tag
+  explicitly** → `git ls-remote --tags` to prove it → `publish-release-assets.sh`.
+- The release gate's `cargo-test-weekly` times out on the **compile** after any
+  version bump. Pre-warm: `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 cargo test --manifest-path
+  core/Cargo.toml -p archipelago --no-run`.
+- The frontend version check fails until the in-app **What's New** block for
+  that version exists (`neode-ui/src/views/settings/AccountInfoSection.vue`) —
+  that string is what it greps for.
+- `generate-app-catalog.py` writes `APP_LAUNCH_PORTS` one-per-line; rustfmt
+  packs it, so run `cargo fmt` after any catalog sync or the gate fails.
+- **Manifest changes reach nodes via the SIGNED CATALOG, not the binary.** A
+  manifest hotfix needs only a catalog re-sign — no release.
+
+## Fleet
+
+SSH: `sshpass -p 'ThisIsWeb54321!' ssh archipelago@<ip>` (note the `!`; `@`
+is older and still works on some). RPC/node password differs per node — the
+`!` one failed RPC login on `.38`.
+
+- `100.69.68.39` archi-dev-box — dev target
+- `100.82.34.38` archipelago-1
+- `100.70.96.88` austin-sapien
+- `100.64.204.114` .228 shorty-s — **in real use, treat carefully**
+
+**Force a catalog refresh on a node:** Settings → App Updates → Check for
+updates, or `sudo rm -f /var/lib/archipelago/app-catalog.json && sudo
+systemctl restart archipelago`.
+
+**All fleet nodes were repaired** from `Restart=on-failure` →
+`Restart=always`; a node with the old value stays DEAD after an in-process
+update (the updater exits cleanly and systemd reads that as success).
+`bootstrap::ensure_restart_policy()` now self-heals it.
+
+---
+
+## PASTE THIS INTO THE NEW SESSION
+
+Resume the archy work from 2026-08-05. Read
+`.planning/RESUME-2026-08-05-appgate-fixes.md` and the memory notes
+`project_fleet_ota_restart_policy_incident` and
+`project_v1_7_121_shipped_appgate` first.
+
+v1.7.124-alpha is shipped and the signed catalog is live with two hotfixes
+(bitcoin start script, fedimint 8175). Four things are open, in order:
+
+1. Fix the indeedhub crash-loop: `indeedhub-minio` is absent on .38 and .88 so
+   nginx fails on upstream "minio" and indeedhub + indeedhub-api exit(1). This
+   one is pre-existing, not from the port work.
+2. Verify .38 refetched the signed catalog and bitcoin-knots starts (.88
+   already did).
+3. Deploy the built .125 binary + frontend to archi-dev-box (100.69.68.39) so
+   I can confirm the app-login page (A mark, mobile centring, keyboard
+   behaviour) and the install-modal icon.
+4. Then cut v1.7.125-alpha — I sign with the new mnemonic.
+
+Do not re-run create-release.sh after signing; it destroys the signature —
+do the commit/tag/publish steps by hand as the resume doc describes.
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "workflow": {
+    "_auto_chain_active": false
+  }
+}
@@ -1,5 +1,50 @@
 # Changelog

+## v1.7.125-alpha (2026-08-06)
+
+- **The Lightning, Bitcoin, Electrum and mesh screens work again behind the login gate.** Since the gate went up, those screens loaded their frame and then showed every number as unreachable. The gate was deliberately hiding your login from the apps it protects — right for third-party apps, wrong for the node's own screens, which need that login to fetch your data. The gate now removes only its own credential, and the node's own screens explicitly receive yours. The same mistake was also quietly signing you out of apps with their own logins — Vaultwarden, Nextcloud, Gitea — on every single request; that stops too.
+- **IndeeHub heals itself.** Three separate faults fixed: its database helper was recreated with permissions too tight to read its own files (it had crashed and restarted roughly ten thousand times on one node); on another node two of its seven parts could never be recreated at all because of how the node asked for their storage — it would remove the old part and then fail to build its replacement, leaving the app half-missing forever; and a regenerated password could lock the app out of a database that keeps the original. The storage fault fixes the same trap for every future multi-part app.
+- **A missing piece of a running app now gets put back automatically.** If one container of a multi-part app disappears while its siblings are still running, the node treats that as a hole to repair rather than a choice to respect, and rebuilds the missing piece. An app you actually uninstalled stays uninstalled.
+- **Send and Receive open clean every time.** Whatever you typed last — an address, an amount, and above all an armed "send all funds" toggle — no longer quietly carries over into the next payment. Choosing "send all funds" also shows the amount being swept instead of a confusing 0.
+- **A sweep that cannot happen now says why.** Trying to sweep a balance that is below Bitcoin's dust minimum (about 546 sats) or not yet confirmed used to fail with "check server logs"; it now explains that no transaction can be built from those coins.
+- **The camera scanner option no longer vanishes on desktop.** Browsers only allow the live camera on secure (HTTPS) pages, and the scan window silently hid the camera choice on plain connections — which read as "the scanner is gone". The option now stays visible and explains itself, and the photo and paste routes always work. The companion app's built-in scanner is untouched.
+- **App data folders can no longer be "repaired" into a state the app cannot use.** When the node fixed a folder's ownership through its fallback path, it wrote the container's raw user number instead of the translated one, so the fix reported success while the app still could not open its own files — one node's BotFights restarted every ten seconds over exactly this. The translation is now applied.
+- Also: the app login page uses the Archipelago mark and stays centred on phones with the keyboard open, app icons in the install window are no longer cropped, and when the node fails to build a container it now records the actual reason instead of a one-line stub that hid the cause of the IndeeHub fault for days.
+- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: three voice-assistant ports remain open without authentication. Non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — meet the login page and need an access token. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
+
+## v1.7.124-alpha (2026-08-05)
+
+- **The most important fix in this release: some nodes were left switched off by their own update, and could not switch themselves back on.** The node replaces its program and then exits, expecting the system to start it again — but nodes installed from older images carried a setting that only restarts the program if it *crashes*. A clean, deliberate exit looked like success, so nothing restarted it, and the node sat dead showing "server starting" with nothing able to start it. One of ours was down for over two hours this way, and three of four checked had the same setting waiting to bite. Your node now repairs that setting itself the first time it starts, so it survives every future update.
+- **Portainer opens again.** Its screen reported the app as not responding because the app was quietly refusing to start: nodes have been running Portainer 2.39.1, their stored data was written by that version, and the app list pinned a version from two years earlier — so when the container was rebuilt it landed on the old one, which will not read newer data. The correct version is now pinned, older installs upgrade cleanly, and no data was touched.
+- **Bitcoin starts reliably again.** A leftover settings file in the Bitcoin folder — one the node itself kept rewriting and Bitcoin no longer reads — is treated as fatal by Bitcoin, so affected nodes restarted every few seconds forever. The node no longer writes that file, removes stale copies, and treats any that remain as harmless.
+- **Every app screen opens from My Apps again.** The login gate refused to be displayed inside another page at all, which is exactly how My Apps opens an app, so protected apps appeared broken. It now allows only your own node to display it, and refuses everyone else — a distinction the old setting could not express.
+- **The app login screen now looks like the node's own.** Same rotating artwork, the same panel, the Archipelago mark, and the app's real icon shown as a tile the way My Apps shows it, instead of a plain box with a letter.
+- **The Mesh screen uses wide displays properly.** On very large screens it stacked all five panels on top of each other, clipping three of the headings to a sliver and squeezing the map into a letterbox — more screen producing a worse view. It now shows one panel at a time, filling the space, with the map running edge to edge.
+- **You can choose how long you stay signed in.** Settings → Account now offers an inactivity timeout and a hard limit, plus an option to re-enter your password before sending funds. TV and kiosk screens are never signed out for sitting idle, because there is nobody there to sign them back in.
+- Updates now come from `source.archipelago-foundation.org` rather than a bare address, with the old one kept as an automatic fallback for nodes whose clock or name lookup is off. Also included: clearer wallet errors from ecash mints, and mesh peers reconnecting via their last known address before falling back to the wider network.
+- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: three voice-assistant ports remain open without authentication; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant. Non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — meet the login page and need an access token. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
+
+## v1.7.123-alpha (2026-08-05)
+
+- **Five more screens on your node were readable by anyone who could reach it, and the previous release's own check said they were fine.** The Bitcoin, Lightning, Electrum, FIPS mesh and Fedimint Guardian screens each answered on their port with no login. They were missed because they work differently from ordinary apps: they run directly on the node's network rather than behind its container plumbing, so there was no address to pin and their descriptions listed no port at all — and the node builds its list of what to protect from exactly those descriptions. It therefore neither protected them nor listed them as unprotected. A check that reports success while five screens are open is worse than no check, and this was found by scanning the node from another machine rather than asking the node about itself.
+- **What was actually readable was the page, not your money.** Every request on those ports that could have returned a credential — the Lightning connection details, the wallet passthrough, container logs, and every node command — already required a login and still refused without one. The Lightning macaroon fix from v1.7.120 was verified directly rather than assumed. What leaked was the screen itself: layout and code, no wallet data, no keys.
+- All five now serve only to the node itself, with the login gate in front of them, exactly like the twenty app screens closed in the previous release.
+- **Every port on the node now has a stated policy — there are no undecided ones left.** Eleven ports previously had no instruction either way and stayed open by default. The BotFights arena, the router screen and the Pine voice screen now require the node password. The ones that genuinely cannot take a login page stay open with a written reason: Fedimint's guardian and gateway connections (federation members authenticate to the federation), NetBird's management and dashboard ports (your VPN devices carry their own credentials and cannot hold a browser session, and its dashboard needs its own certificate), Pine's secure listener, and the Lightning REST port, which wallets reach with a macaroon exactly as before.
+- Fresh installs are covered too, not just existing nodes. The five screens are delivered as prebuilt images, so a newly flashed node would have come up open even after this fix. All five were rebuilt, published, and then pulled back and inspected to confirm the fix is really inside them.
+- Two delivery faults fixed alongside, either of which would have silently undone the above: two of the five screens were reaching nodes through no update path at all, so edits to them never arrived; and a fourth copy of the Bitcoin screen's configuration was being rewritten on every health check, which would have re-opened that port after everything else was corrected.
+- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — meet the login page and need an access token. Three voice-assistant ports remain open without authentication; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
+
+## v1.7.122-alpha (2026-08-04)
+
+- **Your apps now ask for your node password before they open — over your home network, Tailscale, the mesh and Tor alike.** Until now anyone who could reach your node could open Immich, Nextcloud, Vaultwarden, Jellyfin, Grafana and the rest simply by typing the address and port, with no login at all. Twenty app screens now sit behind the same login you use for the node, showing you which app you are opening, and honouring two-factor if you have it switched on. Logging in at an app address logs you into the dashboard too, so it is one password, not one per app. This completes the groundwork disclosed in v1.7.121.
+- **The things that must stay open stayed open.** Zeus and other remote wallets still reach your Lightning node directly, Electrum wallets still connect, and Bitcoin still talks to its peers — those connections carry their own proof of identity and a login page would simply break them. Every one of these seventeen exceptions now has to state in writing why it is safe to leave open, so the list is something you can read rather than something you have to discover.
+- **A private address on your node was answering the mesh without a password.** One app's port was marked as being for this machine only, and the part of the node that carries mesh traffic did not know that — it forwarded requests from the whole mesh straight to it. Found while verifying the work above on a real node, not in testing. That path now refuses anything marked machine-only, and the app is reachable only from the node itself, as intended.
+- **Tor addresses no longer skip the login.** An app published as a .onion address was handed straight to the app, because a Tor visitor carries no session cookie to check. The login gate now takes those addresses first, closing the last of the four routes that went around it.
+- Nodes fix themselves after this update. Apps installed before this system used its current container setup kept their old wide-open address even after the signed list told them to move, and each would otherwise have needed hand-holding on every node. Your node now notices the difference and rebuilds those apps itself, keeping their data, within about half a minute of starting. Verified by putting a node back into the old state deliberately and watching it repair.
+- The node had been reading two different sets of instructions about its own apps — the signed list it downloads, and older copies on disk — which is how a port meant to stay private was briefly opened on a test node. Both now come from the signed list, and a port withdrawn from the login gate is released without needing a restart.
+- **The key that signs these updates has been replaced.** The previous signing key was exposed where it should not have been, so it is treated as compromised and this release installs its replacement. This update is the last one signed with the old key, by necessity — it is the one that teaches your node the new one.
+- Known gaps, disclosed rather than buried: eleven app ports still have no stated policy — BotFights, the Fedimint gateway, NetBird, the voice assistant's own screens and the router screen — and remain reachable without a login until each is decided deliberately; the node reports them rather than guessing, because guessing at an unstated setting caused both incidents behind this work. Three voice-assistant ports are still open without authentication; the correct fix puts them on a private network with the assistant. Non-browser clients — phone apps for Vaultwarden, Home Assistant or Jellyfin, and git over the web — will now meet the login page and need an access token. The 5x real-node lifecycle gate was not run for this release.
+
 ## v1.7.121-alpha (2026-08-04)

 - **Making another node "Trusted" now asks for your node password.** Trust was being handed out by machines rather than by you: any node able to reach yours could join and mark itself Trusted, because the check proved only that the caller owned the key it had just presented — never that you had approved it. Trust also spread on its own, since every peer a Trusted node advertised was added as Trusted too, so one grant quietly propagated across the whole federation. Uninvited joins are now capped at Observer, advertised peers arrive as Observers, and raising anyone to Trusted — whether by generating an invite or by changing the dropdown on a node — requires your password. Lowering trust deliberately does not, because the safe action must never be the inconvenient one. Existing peers are left exactly as they are rather than silently demoted, and each one now records how its trust was granted so you can review them.
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@
      "author": "Portainer",
      "category": "development",
      "tier": "optional",
-      "dockerImage": "146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/portainer:2.19.4",
+      "dockerImage": "146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/portainer:2.39.1",
      "repoUrl": "https://github.com/portainer/portainer",
      "containerConfig": {
        "ports": [
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ This document lists all port assignments for Archipelago apps.
 | did-wallet | 8083 | TCP | Web UI | 18083 |
 | router | 8084, 5353, 1900 | TCP/UDP | Web UI, mDNS, SSDP | 18084, 15353, 11900 |
 | meshtastic | 4403, 1883 | TCP | HTTP API, MQTT | 14403, 11883 |
+| podsteadr | 8095, 1935, 8889, 8189, 8890, 8098 | TCP/UDP | Web UI/API/RSS, RTMP ingest, WebRTC/WHIP ingest, WebRTC ICE (udp), HLS playback, Blossom blobs | 18095, 11935, 18889, 18189, 18890, 18098 |

 ## Development Ports (Offset: +10000)

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Containerized applications for the Archipelago Bitcoin Node OS. All apps run in
 - **did-wallet** — Web5 DID Wallet

 ### Self-Hosted Services
+- **podsteadr** — Nostr-native podcast publishing and livestreaming (RTMP/WebRTC ingest, HLS, RSS, Blossom media)
 - **nextcloud** (v28), **jellyfin** (v10.8.13), **immich** (release), **photoprism** (v240915)
 - **vaultwarden** (v1.30.0-alpine), **penpot** (v2.4)
 - **homeassistant** (v2024.1), **filebrowser** (v2.27.0), **searxng** (2024.11.17)
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ app:
    - host: 4080
      container: 8080
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  environment:
    - FRONTEND_HTTP_PORT=8080
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ app:
    - host: 32838
      container: 32838
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: local

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ app:
    - host: 3535
      container: 3535
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: local

  volumes:
    # Holds the wallet DB, mnemonic and auth token. ARK funds are recoverable
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ app:
        RPC_CONF="/tmp/rpc.conf";
        umask 077;
        { echo "rpcuser=$RPC_USER"; echo "rpcpassword=$RPC_PASS"; } > "$RPC_CONF";
+        if [ -f /home/bitcoin/.bitcoin/bitcoin.conf ]; then
+          echo "archipelago: ignoring legacy datadir bitcoin.conf; RPC config comes from $RPC_CONF" >&2;
+        fi;
        RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH="$(printenv BITCOIN_RPC_TXRELAY_RPCAUTH || true)";
        DISK_GB_VALUE="$(printenv DISK_GB || true)";
        RPC_HEADROOM="-rpcthreads=16 -rpcworkqueue=256";
@@ -46,9 +49,9 @@ app:
          RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS="$RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS -rpcauth=$RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH -rpcwhitelist=txrelay:sendrawtransaction,submitpackage,testmempoolaccept,getmempoolinfo,getrawmempool,getmempoolentry,getnetworkinfo,getblockchaininfo,getblockcount,getblockhash,getblock,getblockheader,getrawtransaction,gettxout,gettxspendingprevout,decoderawtransaction,decodescript,estimatesmartfee,uptime,ping,getconnectioncount,getpeerinfo,getindexinfo,getdeploymentinfo,getchaintips";
        fi;
        if [ "${DISK_GB_VALUE:-0}" -lt 1000 ]; then
-          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=550 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=1024 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
+          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=550 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=1024 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
        else
-          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -txindex=1 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=4096 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
+          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -txindex=1 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=4096 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
        fi
    derived_env:
      - key: DISK_GB
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ app:
        RPC_CONF="/tmp/rpc.conf";
        umask 077;
        { echo "rpcuser=$RPC_USER"; echo "rpcpassword=$RPC_PASS"; } > "$RPC_CONF";
+        if [ -f /home/bitcoin/.bitcoin/bitcoin.conf ]; then
+          echo "archipelago: ignoring legacy datadir bitcoin.conf; RPC config comes from $RPC_CONF" >&2;
+        fi;
        RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH="$(printenv BITCOIN_RPC_TXRELAY_RPCAUTH || true)";
        DISK_GB_VALUE="$(printenv DISK_GB || true)";
        RPC_HEADROOM="-rpcthreads=16 -rpcworkqueue=256";
@@ -46,9 +49,9 @@ app:
          RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS="$RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS -rpcauth=$RPC_TXRELAY_AUTH -rpcwhitelist=txrelay:sendrawtransaction,submitpackage,testmempoolaccept,getmempoolinfo,getrawmempool,getmempoolentry,getnetworkinfo,getblockchaininfo,getblockcount,getblockhash,getblock,getblockheader,getrawtransaction,gettxout,gettxspendingprevout,decoderawtransaction,decodescript,estimatesmartfee,uptime,ping,getconnectioncount,getpeerinfo,getindexinfo,getdeploymentinfo,getchaintips";
        fi;
        if [ "${DISK_GB_VALUE:-0}" -lt 1000 ]; then
-          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=550 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=2048 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
+          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -prune=550 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=2048 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
        else
-          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -txindex=1 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=4096 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
+          exec "$BITCOIND" -datadir=/home/bitcoin/.bitcoin -conf="$RPC_CONF" -allowignoredconf=1 -printtoconsole=0 -server=1 -txindex=1 -rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0 -rpcbind=0.0.0.0:8332 -listen=1 -bind=0.0.0.0:8333 -dbcache=4096 -par=0 -maxconnections=125 $RPC_HEADROOM $RPC_TXRELAY_FLAGS;
        fi
    derived_env:
      - key: DISK_GB
@@ -31,7 +31,22 @@ app:
  # proxies to 127.0.0.1:8332 which is where the bitcoin backend binds
  # its RPC. `ports:` is intentionally empty because host networking
  # bypasses port mapping.
-  ports: []
+  # Declared so the APP GATE can see this port. Host networking means Podman
+  # publishes nothing (quadlet skips PublishPort in host mode), so `bind:` here
+  # is a statement of where the container's own nginx listens — 127.0.0.1 —
+  # not a publish instruction. Without this declaration the gate had no idea
+  # the port existed: it was neither protected nor listed as unprotected, and
+  # served the Bitcoin screen unauthenticated on every interface.
+  ports:
+    - host: 8334
+      container: 8334
+      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
+      # First-party companion UI: its nginx forwards the node session cookie
+      # to the daemon's authenticated endpoints; without passthrough the gate
+      # strips it and every data call 401s while the page shell renders.
+      session_passthrough: true

  volumes:
    # Bind-mount the rendered nginx.conf read-only. The prod orchestrator
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ app:
    - host: 9100
      container: 9100
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI + API
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    # A bare relative source (was "botfights-data", no leading slash) is
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ app:
    - host: 23000
      container: 49392
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8088
      container: 8080
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    
  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -23,7 +23,22 @@ app:
    network_policy: host

  # Host networking: nginx listens on 50002 directly on the host IP.
-  ports: []
+  # Declared so the APP GATE can see this port. Host networking means Podman
+  # publishes nothing (quadlet skips PublishPort in host mode), so `bind:` here
+  # is a statement of where the container's own nginx listens — 127.0.0.1 —
+  # not a publish instruction. Without this declaration the gate had no idea
+  # the port existed: it was neither protected nor listed as unprotected, and
+  # served the Electrs screen unauthenticated on every interface.
+  ports:
+    - host: 50002
+      container: 50002
+      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
+      # First-party companion UI: its nginx forwards the node session cookie
+      # to the daemon's authenticated endpoints; without passthrough the gate
+      # strips it and every data call 401s while the page shell renders.
+      session_passthrough: true

  volumes: []

@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8178
      container: 8080
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: local

  volumes:
    # Same dir the first-boot bundled path uses + where the wallet bridge reads
@@ -60,9 +60,17 @@ app:
    - host: 8176
      container: 8176
      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        Fedimint gateway API, protected by its own bcrypt password (--bcrypt-password-hash)
+        and reached by federation peers and clients that cannot hold a browser session.
    - host: 9737
      container: 9737
      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        LDK Lightning p2p for the gateway. The BOLT-8 noise handshake authenticates and
+        encrypts the connection itself.

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -50,14 +50,31 @@ app:
    - host: 8173
      container: 8173
      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        Fedimint guardian consensus. Other guardians speak the federation's own
+        authenticated protocol here; a login page would break consensus.
    - host: 8174
      container: 8174
      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        Fedimint guardian API for federation clients, which authenticate to the
+        federation itself and cannot hold a browser session.
    # Public launch port 8175 is owned by archy-fedimint-ui, which serves a
    # wait page while Bitcoin syncs and proxies here after fedimintd starts.
+    # 8175 is NOT declared here. It is served by the archy-fedimint-ui
+    # companion, a different container, and declaring it on this app made the
+    # orchestrator try to publish 8175 from fedimintd — colliding with the
+    # companion that already holds it, so start_container failed forever and
+    # fedimint crash-looped (100.82.34.38, 2026-08-05). The companion's nginx
+    # is pinned to 127.0.0.1, which is what actually closes that port; the
+    # gate reports it rather than fronting it.
    - host: 8177
      container: 8175
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: local

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8083
      container: 80
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -27,7 +27,22 @@ app:
  # Host networking: nginx listens on 8336 directly on the host IP and
  # proxies to 127.0.0.1:5678 (the archipelago RPC). `ports:` is
  # intentionally empty because host networking bypasses port mapping.
-  ports: []
+  # Declared so the APP GATE can see this port. Host networking means Podman
+  # publishes nothing (quadlet skips PublishPort in host mode), so `bind:` here
+  # is a statement of where the container's own nginx listens — 127.0.0.1 —
+  # not a publish instruction. Without this declaration the gate had no idea
+  # the port existed: it was neither protected nor listed as unprotected, and
+  # served the FIPS mesh screen unauthenticated on every interface.
+  ports:
+    - host: 8336
+      container: 8336
+      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
+      # First-party companion UI: its nginx forwards the node session cookie
+      # to the daemon's authenticated endpoints; without passthrough the gate
+      # strips it and every data call 401s while the page shell renders.
+      session_passthrough: true

  volumes: []

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ app:
    - host: 3001
      container: 3000
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    - host: 2222
      container: 22
      protocol: tcp
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ app:
    - host: 3000
      container: 3000
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    
  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8123
      container: 8123
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    
  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ app:
    - host: 2283
      container: 2283
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -22,7 +22,13 @@ app:
    memory_limit: 256Mi

  security:
-    capabilities: [SETGID, SETUID]
+    # The alpine entrypoint runs as container-root, `find`s /data to chown
+    # anything not owned by the redis user, then su-execs to it. Under the
+    # orchestrator's --cap-drop=ALL, root cannot traverse the 0700
+    # appendonlydir owned by uid 999 without DAC_OVERRIDE (observed
+    # crash-looping ~4k restarts on archi-dev-box) — CHOWN is what the find's
+    # -exec chown needs on adopted legacy data.
+    capabilities: [CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, SETGID, SETUID]
    readonly_root: false
    network_policy: isolated

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ app:
    - host: 7778
      container: 7777
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI. Port 7777 on the host is reserved for the Nostr relay.
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  # Writable scratch the baked nginx needs; matches the legacy installer's
  # --tmpfs /run + /var/cache/nginx.
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8096
      container: 8096
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -41,9 +41,14 @@ app:
      auth: none
      auth_rationale: >-
        LND gRPC, authenticated by macaroon over TLS. Remote wallets depend on reaching this directly.
+    # Mirrors lnd's 18080 exemption — same LND REST API, same macaroon auth.
    - host: 8091
      container: 8080
      protocol: tcp  # REST/Web UI
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        LND REST, authenticated by macaroon over TLS. A browser login page would break
+        Zeus and every non-browser wallet client, exactly as for lnd's 18080.
    
  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -35,7 +35,22 @@ app:
  # port to a container port where nothing listens. scripts/container-specs.sh
  # carried the identical mistake and was fixed alongside this; recreating from
  # it on archi-dev-box left :18083 refusing connections.
-  ports: []
+  # Declared so the APP GATE can see this port. Host networking means Podman
+  # publishes nothing (quadlet skips PublishPort in host mode), so `bind:` here
+  # is a statement of where the container's own nginx listens — 127.0.0.1 —
+  # not a publish instruction. Without this declaration the gate had no idea
+  # the port existed: it was neither protected nor listed as unprotected, and
+  # served the LND screen unauthenticated on every interface.
+  ports:
+    - host: 18083
+      container: 18083
+      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
+      # First-party companion UI: its nginx forwards the node session cookie
+      # to the daemon's authenticated endpoints; without passthrough the gate
+      # strips it and every data call 401s while the page shell renders.
+      session_passthrough: true

  volumes: []

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8999
      container: 8999
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: local

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ app:
    - host: 4080
      container: 8080  # mempool-frontend nginx listens on 8080 (FRONTEND_HTTP_PORT=8080)
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    
  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8089
      container: 8080
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    
  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ app:
    - host: 8086
      container: 80
      protocol: tcp   # management API + embedded OIDC issuer (/oauth2)
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        NetBird management API and its OIDC issuer. Enrolled devices authenticate
+        themselves with setup keys and JWTs, and they cannot hold a browser session —
+        a login page here would disconnect every VPN client on the network.
    - host: 3478
      container: 3478
      protocol: udp   # STUN — must be UDP; tcp here breaks relay discovery
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ app:
    - host: 8087
      container: 443
      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        NetBird dashboard over TLS, with its own login. The gate speaks plain HTTP,
+        so fronting this port would break the secure context the dashboard requires
+        (issue #15) and the certificate clients pin.

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8085
      container: 80
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ app:
    - host: 18081
      container: 8080
      protocol: tcp  # HTTP/WebSocket
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    
  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ app:
    - host: 2342
      container: 2342
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -53,9 +53,16 @@ app:
    - host: 10380
      container: 80
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    - host: 10381
      container: 443
      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        Pine's TLS listener. The gate speaks plain HTTP, so fronting this port would
+        break the secure context navigator.bluetooth needs for WiFi provisioning.
+        The plain-HTTP entry point (10380) is gated, and it is what the UI opens.

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+app:
+  id: podsteadr-blossom
+  name: podsteadr Blossom
+  version: "4"
+  description: Blossom (BUD-02) sha256-addressed media blob server backing podsteadr's episode uploads and covers.
+  category: media
+
+  # Hyphenated name matches the podsteadr repo's docker-compose container_name
+  # (podsteadr-blossom); alias `blossom` is the short hostname podsteadr's
+  # server reaches it by (BLOSSOM_URL_INTERNAL=http://blossom:3000).
+  container_name: podsteadr-blossom
+
+  container:
+    image: ghcr.io/hzrd149/blossom-server:4
+    pull_policy: if-not-present
+    network: podsteadr-net
+    network_aliases: [blossom]
+    # Image runs as container-root (no USER directive) writing to a
+    # bind-mounted /app/data — CHOWN/DAC_OVERRIDE cover the fresh-bind-dir
+    # ownership gap the same way apps/botfights and apps/immich document.
+    # Unverified against a real install; check first-boot logs.
+    data_uid: "0:0"
+
+  dependencies:
+    - storage: 20Gi
+
+  resources:
+    cpu_limit: 1
+    memory_limit: 512Mi
+    disk_limit: 20Gi
+
+  security:
+    capabilities: [CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER]
+    readonly_root: false
+    no_new_privileges: true
+    network_policy: isolated
+
+  ports:
+    - host: 8098
+      container: 3000
+      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        Media blobs (episode audio/video, covers) must be publicly fetchable
+        by podcast clients as RSS enclosure URLs — that's the entire purpose
+        of this port. Uploads are separately gated by blossom's own BUD-02
+        signed-nostr-event auth (upload.requireAuth below), not a node
+        session; reads are intentionally public per the config's own header
+        comment.
+
+  volumes:
+    - type: bind
+      source: /var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr-blossom/data
+      target: /app/data
+      options: [rw]
+    - type: bind
+      source: /var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr-blossom/config/config.yml
+      target: /app/config.yml
+      options: [ro]
+
+  environment: []
+
+  files:
+    - path: /var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr-blossom/config/config.yml
+      overwrite: true
+      content: |
+        # blossom-server (v4.x) configuration for podsteadr.
+        # Uploads require a signed nostr auth event (BUD-02, kind 24242);
+        # reads are public so podcast apps can fetch enclosures.
+        #
+        # NOTE (blossom-server 4.4.1 gotcha, do not rediscover): `rules:` MUST
+        # be nested under `storage:` — a top-level `rules:` key is silently
+        # ignored, the ruleset ends up empty, and every upload fails 401
+        # "Server dose not accept video/mp4 blobs" (typo is theirs). The
+        # GitHub master branch is a Deno rewrite with a different schema
+        # (storage.rules, BUD-11, range support); the `:4` image is the older
+        # node/koa codebase this config targets.
+
+        publicDomain: ""
+
+        databasePath: data/sqlite.db
+
+        dashboard:
+          enabled: false
+
+        discovery:
+          nostr:
+            enabled: false
+            relays: []
+          upstream:
+            enabled: false
+            domains: []
+
+        storage:
+          backend: local
+          local:
+            dir: ./data/blobs
+          removeWhenNoOwners: false
+          # "expiration" is time since a blob was last accessed — unaccessed
+          # blobs get pruned after this. Podcast media should effectively
+          # never expire, so keep this long.
+          rules:
+            - type: "*"
+              expiration: 10 years
+
+        upload:
+          enabled: true
+          requireAuth: true
+          requirePubkeyInRule: false
+
+        list:
+          requireAuth: false
+          allowListOthers: true
+
+        tor:
+          enabled: false
+          proxy: ""
+
+  health_check:
+    # No documented health endpoint; TCP liveness on the app port.
+    type: tcp
+    endpoint: localhost:3000
+    interval: 30s
+    timeout: 5s
+    retries: 3
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+app:
+  id: podsteadr-mediamtx
+  name: podsteadr MediaMTX
+  version: "1.19.2"
+  description: MediaMTX ingest/output backend for podsteadr — RTMP + WebRTC/WHIP ingest, HLS playback, stream recording.
+  category: media
+
+  # Hyphenated name matches the podsteadr repo's docker-compose container_name
+  # (podsteadr-mediamtx); alias `mediamtx` is the short hostname podsteadr's
+  # server reaches it by (MEDIAMTX_API_URL=http://mediamtx:9997) and the one
+  # baked into mediamtx.yml's authHTTPAddress callback below.
+  container_name: podsteadr-mediamtx
+
+  container:
+    image: docker.io/bluenviron/mediamtx:1.19.2
+    pull_policy: if-not-present
+    network: podsteadr-net
+    network_aliases: [mediamtx]
+    derived_env:
+      # Browsers need a reachable ICE host candidate for WebRTC/WHIP; without
+      # this, the offer only advertises container-internal addresses and
+      # publish/playback negotiation fails for anyone off-host.
+      - key: MTX_WEBRTCADDITIONALHOSTS
+        template: "{{HOST_MDNS}}"
+
+  dependencies:
+    - storage: 10Gi
+
+  resources:
+    cpu_limit: 1
+    memory_limit: 512Mi
+    disk_limit: 10Gi
+
+  security:
+    # Stock mediamtx image runs as container-root (no USER directive) but
+    # only ever writes to the bind-mounted /recordings — CHOWN/DAC_OVERRIDE
+    # cover the fresh-bind-dir-ownership gap the same way apps/botfights and
+    # apps/immich document (root uid inside the container does not
+    # automatically bypass DAC checks once cap-drop ALL applies). Unverified
+    # against a real install; check first-boot logs on initial deploy.
+    capabilities: [CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE]
+    readonly_root: true
+    no_new_privileges: true
+    network_policy: isolated
+
+  ports:
+    - host: 1935
+      container: 1935
+      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        RTMP ingest (OBS). Not HTTP, so the node's session gate has no login
+        page to serve here; publish auth is delegated to podsteadr's own
+        HTTP auth webhook (authHTTPAddress below), which checks a per-stream
+        secret key never exposed in this port mapping.
+    - host: 8889
+      container: 8889
+      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        WebRTC/WHIP ingest — browsers publish directly with a per-stream
+        bearer secret checked by podsteadr's auth webhook, the same
+        protocol-level auth as the RTMP port above.
+    - host: 8189
+      container: 8189
+      protocol: udp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        WebRTC ICE/UDP media transport. Raw UDP has no HTTP session concept
+        for the gate to enforce.
+    - host: 8890
+      container: 8888
+      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        Public HLS playback URL, handed out to viewers and podcast/livestream
+        clients outside the node (zap.stream, third-party players). A login
+        page here would break every external viewer; playback is read-only.
+
+  volumes:
+    - type: bind
+      # Shared with apps/podsteadr (mounted read-only there) so the app can
+      # list and remux finished recordings for one-click episode publishing.
+      source: /var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr/recordings
+      target: /recordings
+      options: [rw]
+    - type: bind
+      source: /var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr-mediamtx/config/mediamtx.yml
+      target: /mediamtx.yml
+      options: [ro]
+
+  environment: []
+
+  files:
+    - path: /var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr-mediamtx/config/mediamtx.yml
+      overwrite: true
+      content: |
+        # MediaMTX configuration for podsteadr.
+        # Ingest: RTMP (OBS) + WebRTC/WHIP (browser). Output: HLS. Publish auth is
+        # delegated to podsteadr via HTTP; stream status is polled from the API.
+
+        logLevel: info
+
+        api: yes
+        apiAddress: :9997
+
+        # ---- authentication ------------------------------------------------------
+        authMethod: http
+        authHTTPAddress: http://podsteadr-app:8095/api/mediamtx/auth
+        authHTTPExclude:
+          - action: api
+          - action: metrics
+          - action: pprof
+
+        # ---- protocols -----------------------------------------------------------
+        rtsp: no
+        srt: no
+        moq: no
+
+        rtmp: yes
+        rtmpAddress: :1935
+
+        hls: yes
+        hlsAddress: :8888
+        # Standard HLS, not lowLatency: LL-HLS's small per-part buffering window has very little
+        # tolerance for B-frame reordering (common in most OBS encoder presets), and a real test
+        # stream crashed the muxer twice in ~2 minutes with "too many reordered frames" / "unable to
+        # extract DTS" once frame timing got even slightly irregular. Standard HLS buffers a full
+        # segment before finalizing, which absorbs that jitter — a few extra seconds of latency
+        # instead of intermittent muxer crashes / viewer buffering.
+        hlsVariant: mpegts
+        hlsAlwaysRemux: yes
+        hlsAllowOrigins: ["*"]
+
+        webrtc: yes
+        webrtcAddress: :8889
+        webrtcLocalUDPAddress: :8189
+        webrtcAllowOrigins: ["*"]
+
+        # ---- recording -----------------------------------------------------------
+        pathDefaults:
+          record: yes
+          recordPath: /recordings/%path/%Y-%m-%d_%H-%M-%S-%f
+          recordFormat: fmp4
+          recordPartDuration: 1s
+          recordSegmentDuration: 1h
+          recordDeleteAfter: 168h
+
+        paths:
+          # Streams live at live/<streamId>; publish requires the stream secret,
+          # which podsteadr checks in the auth webhook.
+          "~^live/[A-Za-z0-9]+$": {}
+
+  health_check:
+    # Stock mediamtx image has no shell, so an in-container HTTP probe of the
+    # API isn't meaningfully cheaper than TCP; RTMP liveness is enough (same
+    # polling-not-hooks rationale as podsteadr's own status poller, which
+    # exists precisely because runOn*-style shell hooks aren't available on
+    # this image).
+    type: tcp
+    endpoint: localhost:1935
+    interval: 30s
+    timeout: 5s
+    retries: 3
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Vendored copy of the podsteadr repo's own Dockerfile (source lives outside
+# this tree — http://146.59.87.168:3000/ssmithx/podsteadr). Re-sync by hand if
+# the upstream Dockerfile changes; build with build-from-prototype.sh, which
+# passes the podsteadr repo root as build context (this Dockerfile expects
+# frontend/ and server/ subdirectories at the context root, not this apps/
+# directory).
+#
+# ---- frontend ----
+FROM node:22-bookworm-slim AS frontend-build
+WORKDIR /build/frontend
+COPY frontend/package*.json ./
+RUN npm ci
+COPY frontend/ ./
+RUN npm run build
+
+# ---- server ----
+FROM node:22-bookworm-slim AS server-build
+WORKDIR /build/server
+COPY server/package*.json ./
+RUN npm ci
+COPY server/ ./
+RUN npm run build && npm prune --omit=dev
+
+# ---- runtime ----
+FROM node:22-bookworm-slim
+RUN apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ffmpeg curl \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+WORKDIR /app
+COPY --from=server-build /build/server/node_modules ./node_modules
+COPY --from=server-build /build/server/package.json ./package.json
+COPY --from=server-build /build/server/dist ./dist
+COPY --from=frontend-build /build/frontend/dist ./public
+# Named volumes inherit ownership from the image path: keep /data writable by node
+RUN mkdir -p /data && chown node:node /data
+USER node
+ENV NODE_ENV=production \
+    PORT=8095 \
+    DATA_DIR=/data \
+    STATIC_DIR=/app/public
+EXPOSE 8095
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --retries=3 \
+    CMD curl -fsS http://localhost:8095/api/health || exit 1
+CMD ["node", "dist/index.js"]
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# podsteadr — Nostr-native Podcasting & Livestreaming
+
+Self-hosted, nostr-native podcast publishing and livestreaming. Log in with a
+NIP-07 nostr identity (no passwords, no email), upload an mp4 to publish an
+RSS 2.0 feed with Podcasting 2.0 lightning payment info, or go live via OBS
+(RTMP) or the browser (WebRTC/WHIP) — the stream is announced on nostr as a
+NIP-53 live event and viewers watch over HLS.
+
+This is a three-container stack:
+
+| App | Manifest | Role |
+|---|---|---|
+| `podsteadr` | `apps/podsteadr/manifest.yml` | Fastify API + built Vue UI + RSS feeds |
+| `podsteadr-mediamtx` | `apps/podsteadr-mediamtx/manifest.yml` | RTMP/WHIP ingest, HLS output, recording |
+| `podsteadr-blossom` | `apps/podsteadr-blossom/manifest.yml` | BUD-02 sha256-addressed media blobs |
+
+All three join a dedicated `podsteadr-net` bridge network and resolve each
+other by short DNS aliases (`podsteadr-app`, `mediamtx`, `blossom`).
+
+## Building the Image
+
+The app image is built from the **podsteadr** repo, source of truth at
+`http://146.59.87.168:3000/ssmithx/podsteadr`.
+
+### Option 1: Use the build script
+
+```bash
+# From archy repo root
+./apps/podsteadr/build-from-prototype.sh
+```
+
+### Option 2: Build from source directory
+
+```bash
+cd ~/podsteadr
+podman build -t localhost/podsteadr:1.0.0 -f ~/archy/apps/podsteadr/Dockerfile .
+```
+
+### Publishing to the shared registry
+
+```bash
+./apps/podsteadr/push-to-registry.sh 1.0.0
+```
+
+Then update `apps/podsteadr/manifest.yml`'s `container.image` to the pushed
+tag so other nodes pull instead of building locally.
+
+## Ports
+
+See `apps/PORTS.md`. Summary: 8095 (web UI/API/RSS), 1935 (RTMP), 8889
+(WebRTC/WHIP), 8189/udp (WebRTC ICE), 8890 (HLS), 8098 (Blossom).
+
+All of podsteadr's ports are `auth: none` — this is a public podcast/livestream
+server, not a private personal app; RSS feeds, HLS playback, and blob reads
+must stay reachable by third-party clients with no Archipelago session, and
+the app enforces its own NIP-98 signed-request auth for sensitive routes and
+per-stream secret keys for RTMP/WHIP publish. See the `auth_rationale` on each
+port mapping.
+
+## Nostr Identity
+
+podsteadr's frontend vendors a copy of Archipelago's `nostr-provider.js` shim
+and references it directly from `index.html` (its Fastify server isn't the
+nginx-served SPA shape the platform auto-patches — see "Nostr Signer Bridge"
+in `docs/app-developer-guide.md`). `apps/podsteadr/manifest.yml` declares a
+`post_install` hook that re-copies the canonical
+`/opt/archipelago/web-ui/nostr-provider.js` over the vendored copy on every
+install/reinstall, so it doesn't go stale across OTA releases.
+
+## Data
+
+- `/var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr` — SQLite DB, server's own nostr key,
+  covers, and (read-only here) shared stream recordings.
+- `/var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr/recordings` — stream recordings (writable
+  by `podsteadr-mediamtx`, read-only for `podsteadr`), 7-day retention.
+- `/var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr-blossom/data` — media blobs.
+
+## Known gotchas
+
+See the podsteadr repo's `docs/STATUS.md` for the full list (blossom v4
+config `rules:` nesting, no HTTP range support in blossom 4.x, split-horizon
+blossom URL, MediaMTX has no shell so status is polled not hooked, standard
+vs. low-latency HLS). The blossom and mediamtx config files embedded in
+`apps/podsteadr-blossom/manifest.yml` / `apps/podsteadr-mediamtx/manifest.yml`
+already carry the load-bearing ones inline as comments.
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Build the podsteadr container image from the podsteadr repo.
+# Usage: ./build-from-prototype.sh [path-to-podsteadr-repo]
+
+set -e
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+DEFAULT_REPO="$HOME/podsteadr"
+REPO_DIR="${1:-$DEFAULT_REPO}"
+IMAGE_TAG="localhost/podsteadr:1.0.0"
+
+if [ ! -d "$REPO_DIR" ]; then
+    echo "podsteadr repo not found at: $REPO_DIR"
+    echo "   Set path: $0 /path/to/podsteadr"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "$REPO_DIR/server/package.json" ] || [ ! -f "$REPO_DIR/frontend/package.json" ]; then
+    echo "No server/package.json or frontend/package.json found in $REPO_DIR — is this the right directory?"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# Determine container runtime
+RUNTIME="podman"
+if ! command -v podman >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    RUNTIME="docker"
+fi
+
+echo "Building podsteadr from $REPO_DIR using $SCRIPT_DIR/Dockerfile"
+$RUNTIME build -t "$IMAGE_TAG" -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/Dockerfile" "$REPO_DIR"
+
+echo "Built $IMAGE_TAG"
+echo ""
+echo "You can now install podsteadr from the App Store in Archipelago."
+echo "Or run directly: $RUNTIME run -d --name podsteadr-app -p 8095:8095 $IMAGE_TAG"
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+app:
+  id: podsteadr
+  name: podsteadr
+  version: "1.0.0"
+  description: Self-hosted, nostr-native podcast publishing and livestreaming. Log in with Nostr, upload episodes or go live via OBS/WebRTC, publish to RSS with Podcasting 2.0 lightning payments.
+  category: media
+
+  # Container/DNS-alias name deliberately NOT "podsteadr" — on a host whose own
+  # hostname happens to be "podsteadr", the host's own /etc/hosts self-hostname
+  # entry (127.0.1.1, e.g. from cloud-init) shadows the container network's DNS
+  # alias for other containers looking up "podsteadr", and mediamtx's auth-webhook
+  # callback resolves to the host's loopback instead of this container — every
+  # RTMP publish gets rejected with "connection refused" (observed on
+  # podsteadr.atobitcoin.io, 2026-07-30; see docker-compose.yml in the podsteadr
+  # repo for the original writeup). Carried forward unchanged into the manifest.
+  container_name: podsteadr-app
+
+  container:
+    # Built locally from the podsteadr repo (source lives outside this tree —
+    # see apps/podsteadr/README.md + build-from-prototype.sh), same pattern as
+    # apps/indeedhub. Not yet pushed to the shared registry; push-to-registry.sh
+    # is there for when fleet-wide install is needed.
+    image: localhost/podsteadr:1.0.0
+    pull_policy: if-not-present
+    network: podsteadr-net
+    network_aliases: [podsteadr-app]
+    derived_env:
+      - key: PUBLIC_URL
+        template: "http://{{HOST_MDNS}}:8095"
+      - key: MEDIAMTX_RTMP_PUBLIC
+        template: "rtmp://{{HOST_MDNS}}:1935"
+      - key: MEDIAMTX_WHIP_PUBLIC
+        template: "http://{{HOST_MDNS}}:8889"
+      - key: MEDIAMTX_HLS_PUBLIC
+        template: "http://{{HOST_MDNS}}:8890"
+      - key: BLOSSOM_URL_DEFAULT
+        template: "http://{{HOST_MDNS}}:8098"
+    # node:22-bookworm-slim's built-in `node` user is uid:gid 1000:1000. The
+    # image's own Dockerfile chowns /data to node:node, but that only affects
+    # the image layer — the actual runtime mount is the bind volume below, so
+    # the host directory needs the same ownership or the read-only-root,
+    # non-root `node` process can't open the SQLite DB (unverified against a
+    # real node install; flagging per this repo's convention of documenting
+    # bind-mount ownership assumptions, e.g. apps/botfights/manifest.yml).
+    data_uid: "1000:1000"
+
+  dependencies:
+    - app_id: podsteadr-mediamtx
+    - app_id: podsteadr-blossom
+    - storage: 2Gi
+
+  resources:
+    cpu_limit: 2
+    memory_limit: 1Gi
+    disk_limit: 2Gi
+
+  security:
+    capabilities: []
+    readonly_root: true
+    no_new_privileges: true
+    network_policy: isolated
+
+  ports:
+    - host: 8095
+      container: 8095
+      protocol: tcp
+      auth: none
+      auth_rationale: >-
+        podsteadr is a public podcast/livestream server: RSS feeds and the
+        marketplace/catalog API must stay fetchable by third-party podcast
+        clients, crawlers, and other podsteadr instances with no Archipelago
+        session, and the app already gates its own sensitive routes with
+        NIP-98 signed-request auth (see server/src/plugins/nostr-auth.ts in
+        the podsteadr repo). Putting the node's session gate in front would
+        block every external RSS/API consumer without adding real protection.
+
+  volumes:
+    - type: bind
+      source: /var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr
+      target: /data
+      options: [rw]
+    # Shares podsteadr-mediamtx's recordings directory (rw there, ro here) so
+    # the app can list/remux finished recordings for one-click episode
+    # publishing without granting it write access to live segments.
+    - type: bind
+      source: /var/lib/archipelago/podsteadr/recordings
+      target: /recordings
+      options: [ro]
+
+  environment:
+    - NODE_ENV=production
+    - PORT=8095
+    - DATA_DIR=/data
+    - RECORDINGS_DIR=/recordings
+    - MEDIAMTX_API_URL=http://mediamtx:9997
+    - BLOSSOM_URL_INTERNAL=http://blossom:3000
+    - NOSTR_RELAYS=wss://relay.damus.io,wss://nos.lol,wss://relay.nostr.band
+    - CASHU_MINT_URL_DEFAULT=https://mint.minibits.cash/Bitcoin
+
+  # podsteadr's Fastify server (fastify-static) isn't the nginx-served SPA
+  # shape the platform auto-patches for NIP-07 injection (see "Nostr Signer
+  # Bridge" in docs/app-developer-guide.md) — its frontend already
+  # self-references /nostr-provider.js from index.html and vendors a copy at
+  # build time (podsteadr commit 133558d). That vendored copy goes stale
+  # across archy OTA releases, so re-copy the canonical host script over it
+  # on every install/reinstall instead of trusting the baked-in one.
+  hooks:
+    post_install:
+      - copy_from_host:
+          src: "web-ui/nostr-provider.js"
+          dest: /app/public/nostr-provider.js
+
+  health_check:
+    type: http
+    endpoint: http://localhost:8095
+    path: /api/health
+    interval: 30s
+    timeout: 5s
+    retries: 3
+
+  interfaces:
+    main:
+      name: Web UI
+      description: Podcast dashboard, upload/live wizard, and stream management
+      type: ui
+      port: 8095
+      protocol: http
+      path: /
+
+  metadata:
+    author: podsteadr
+    icon: /assets/img/app-icons/podsteadr.png
+    repo: http://146.59.87.168:3000/ssmithx/podsteadr
+    license: MIT
+    tags:
+      - nostr
+      - podcast
+      - livestream
+      - media
+      - rss
+      - lightning
+    launch:
+      open_in_new_tab: false
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Build and push the podsteadr container image to a registry.
+# Usage: ./push-to-registry.sh [version]
+#
+# Environment variables:
+#   REGISTRY    - Registry host (default: 146.59.87.168:3000, same as indeedhub/botfights)
+#   NAMESPACE   - Registry namespace (default: lfg2025)
+#   RUNTIME     - Container runtime (default: podman)
+
+set -e
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+REPO_DIR="${PODSTEADR_REPO:-$HOME/podsteadr}"
+VERSION="${1:-1.0.0}"
+REGISTRY="${REGISTRY:-146.59.87.168:3000}"
+NAMESPACE="${NAMESPACE:-lfg2025}"
+IMAGE_NAME="podsteadr"
+RUNTIME="${RUNTIME:-podman}"
+
+FULL_TAG="${REGISTRY}/${NAMESPACE}/${IMAGE_NAME}:${VERSION}"
+
+if [ ! -d "$REPO_DIR" ]; then
+    echo "podsteadr repo not found at: $REPO_DIR"
+    echo "Set PODSTEADR_REPO=/path/to/podsteadr"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "=== podsteadr Container Registry Push ==="
+echo "Source:    $REPO_DIR"
+echo "Image:     $FULL_TAG"
+echo "Runtime:   $RUNTIME"
+echo ""
+
+echo "[1/3] Building image..."
+$RUNTIME build --platform linux/amd64 \
+    -t "$FULL_TAG" \
+    -t "localhost/${IMAGE_NAME}:${VERSION}" \
+    -f "$SCRIPT_DIR/Dockerfile" \
+    "$REPO_DIR"
+
+echo "[2/3] Pushing to registry..."
+if ! $RUNTIME login --get-login "$REGISTRY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo ""
+    echo "Not logged in to $REGISTRY."
+    echo "Run: $RUNTIME login $REGISTRY"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+$RUNTIME push "$FULL_TAG"
+
+echo ""
+echo "[3/3] Done!"
+echo ""
+echo "Image pushed: $FULL_TAG"
+echo ""
+echo "Update apps/podsteadr/manifest.yml's container.image to $FULL_TAG so"
+echo "nodes pull it instead of building locally."
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ app:
  category: development

  container:
-    image: 146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/portainer:2.19.4
+    image: 146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/portainer:2.39.1
    pull_policy: if-not-present
    data_uid: "1000:1000"

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ app:
    - host: 9000
      container: 9000
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8084
      container: 8080
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    - host: 5353
      container: 5353
      protocol: udp  # mDNS/Bonjour
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8888
      container: 8080
      protocol: tcp  # Web UI
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated
    
  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8090
      container: 7777
      protocol: tcp  # HTTP/WebSocket (strfry listens on 7777)
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ app:
    - host: 3002
      container: 3001
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ app:
    - host: 8082
      container: 80
      protocol: tcp
+      bind: 127.0.0.1
+      auth: gated

  volumes:
    - type: bind
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "archipelago"
-version = "1.7.120-alpha"
+version = "1.7.125-alpha"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "archipelago-container",
@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ dependencies = [
 "reed-solomon-erasure",
 "regex",
 "reqwest 0.11.27",
+ "rustls-pemfile",
+ "rustls-webpki 0.101.7",
 "sd-notify",
 "serde",
 "serde_bytes",
@@ -159,6 +161,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "tempfile",
 "thiserror 1.0.69",
 "tokio",
+ "tokio-rustls 0.24.1",
 "tokio-test",
 "tokio-tungstenite 0.20.1",
 "toml",
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "archipelago"
-version = "1.7.120-alpha"
+version = "1.7.125-alpha"
 edition = "2021"
 description = "Archipelago Bitcoin Node OS - Native backend"
 authors = ["Archipelago Team"]
@@ -80,6 +80,13 @@ serde_yaml = "0.9"

 # HTTP client (for LND REST proxy, Tor SOCKS for peer messaging)
 # Uses rustls-tls for cross-compilation (no OpenSSL dependency)
+# App-gate TLS. Pinned to the rustls 0.21 line that reqwest already resolves,
+# so this adds no new vendor and no second rustls major to the tree.
+tokio-rustls = "0.24"
+rustls-pemfile = "1.0"
+# Verifying that the gate's key actually pairs with its certificate; rustls
+# does not check this itself. Same version rustls 0.21 already resolves.
+webpki = { package = "rustls-webpki", version = "0.101" }
 reqwest = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = ["json", "socks", "rustls-tls", "stream"] }

 # Nostr (node discovery + NIP-44 encrypted peer handshake)
@@ -405,6 +405,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            "mesh.send-channel" => self.handle_mesh_send_channel(params).await,
            "mesh.broadcast" => self.handle_mesh_broadcast().await,
            "mesh.reboot-radio" => self.handle_mesh_reboot_radio(params).await,
+            "mesh.rnode-config" => self.handle_mesh_rnode_config().await,
+            "mesh.rnode-config-apply" => self.handle_mesh_rnode_config_apply(params).await,
            "mesh.configure" => self.handle_mesh_configure(params).await,
            "mesh.send-invoice" => self.handle_mesh_send_invoice(params).await,
            "mesh.send-coordinate" => self.handle_mesh_send_coordinate(params).await,
@@ -472,6 +474,8 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            "system.disk-cleanup" => self.handle_system_disk_cleanup().await,
            "system.reboot" => self.handle_system_reboot(params).await,
            "system.factory-reset" => self.handle_system_factory_reset(params).await,
+            "auth.session-policy.get" => self.handle_session_policy_get().await,
+            "auth.session-policy.set" => self.handle_session_policy_set(params).await,
            "system.settings.get" => self.handle_system_settings_get(params).await,
            "system.settings.set" => self.handle_system_settings_set(params).await,
            "system.kiosk-display.get" => self.handle_system_kiosk_display_get().await,
@@ -192,6 +192,19 @@ impl RpcHandler {
                .get("message")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                .unwrap_or("Unknown error");
+            // LND's sweep refusal reads like a debug dump ("insufficient
+            // input to create sweep tx: input_sum=0 BTC, output_sum=…").
+            // input_sum=0 with a tiny output means the wallet's coins are
+            // unconfirmed or below Bitcoin's dust minimum — say that
+            // (framework-pt sweep of 92 sats, 2026-08-06).
+            if msg.contains("insufficient input to create sweep tx") {
+                return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+                    "Failed to send: your on-chain balance is too small or still \
+                     unconfirmed to sweep. Bitcoin cannot build a transaction from \
+                     coins below the dust minimum (~546 sats) or from funds that \
+                     have not confirmed yet. (LND: {msg})"
+                ));
+            }
            return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to send: {}", msg));
        }

@@ -104,10 +104,115 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            .as_ref()
            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh service not running. Enable mesh first."))?;

-        svc.reboot_radio(seconds).await?;
+        let message = svc.reboot_radio(seconds).await?;
        info!(seconds, "Mesh radio reboot requested via RPC");

-        Ok(serde_json::json!({ "reboot": true, "seconds": seconds }))
+        Ok(serde_json::json!({ "reboot": true, "seconds": seconds, "message": message }))
+    }
+
+    /// mesh.rnode-config — persisted RF settings + the live radio state
+    /// (radio-confirmed values) for the LoRa settings panel. `live` is best-
+    /// effort: null with `live_error` when no Reticulum radio is connected.
+    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_mesh_rnode_config(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        let settings = mesh::rnode_settings::RNodeRfSettings::load(&self.config.data_dir).await;
+        let (live, live_error) = match self.mesh_service.read().await.as_ref() {
+            Some(svc) => match svc.radio_state().await {
+                Ok(state) => (Some(state), None),
+                Err(e) => (None, Some(format!("{e:#}"))),
+            },
+            None => (None, Some("Mesh service not running".to_string())),
+        };
+        Ok(serde_json::json!({
+            "settings": settings,
+            "live": live,
+            "live_error": live_error,
+        }))
+    }
+
+    /// mesh.rnode-config-apply — validate + persist the RF settings, restart
+    /// the radio daemon so they take effect, then read back the radio-
+    /// confirmed values as proof. Returns { applied, live, message }; a
+    /// failed read-back still reports the persisted settings with a clear
+    /// message instead of pretending success.
+    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_mesh_rnode_config_apply(
+        &self,
+        params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
+    ) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        let params = params.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing params"))?;
+        let settings: mesh::rnode_settings::RNodeRfSettings = serde_json::from_value(
+            params
+                .get("settings")
+                .cloned()
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing 'settings'"))?,
+        )
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid settings: {e}"))?;
+        settings.validate()?;
+        settings.save(&self.config.data_dir).await?;
+        info!(?settings, "RNode RF settings persisted");
+
+        // Restart the radio daemon so the new args apply. No radio connected
+        // is fine — the settings apply on the next connect.
+        let service = self.mesh_service.read().await;
+        let Some(svc) = service.as_ref() else {
+            return Ok(serde_json::json!({
+                "applied": false,
+                "message": "Settings saved. They apply when the mesh service next connects to the radio.",
+            }));
+        };
+        if let Err(e) = svc.reboot_radio(2).await {
+            return Ok(serde_json::json!({
+                "applied": false,
+                "message": format!(
+                    "Settings saved, but the radio daemon restart failed: {e:#}. \
+                     They apply on the next reconnect."
+                ),
+            }));
+        }
+
+        // Read-back: poll until the respawned daemon reports the radio online
+        // with our applied values (the respawn re-detects the RNode, ~15s).
+        let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(45);
+        let mut last_live = None;
+        while tokio::time::Instant::now() < deadline {
+            tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(3)).await;
+            if let Ok(state) = svc.radio_state().await {
+                let online = state
+                    .get("online")
+                    .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
+                    .unwrap_or(false);
+                last_live = Some(state);
+                if online {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        match last_live {
+            Some(live) => {
+                let confirmed = live
+                    .get("r_frequency")
+                    .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
+                    .map(|f| f == settings.frequency)
+                    .unwrap_or(false);
+                Ok(serde_json::json!({
+                    "applied": true,
+                    "confirmed": confirmed,
+                    "live": live,
+                    "message": if confirmed {
+                        "The radio confirmed it is now using the applied settings."
+                    } else {
+                        "Settings applied and the daemon restarted; the radio has not \
+                         confirmed the new values yet — recheck in a few seconds."
+                    },
+                }))
+            }
+            None => Ok(serde_json::json!({
+                "applied": true,
+                "confirmed": false,
+                "live": null,
+                "message": "Settings applied and the daemon restarted, but it has not \
+                            reported the radio state yet — recheck in a few seconds.",
+            })),
+        }
    }

    /// mesh.configure — Enable/disable mesh and set device path.
@@ -405,9 +405,17 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            .as_ref()
            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh service not running"))?;
        let device_type = svc.shared_state().status.read().await.device_type;
+        // Resource transfer is a native RNS transfer over LoRa — it needs an
+        // actual radio route to this contact, not just a Reticulum device on
+        // our end. A federation-only peer with no radio twin fits the size
+        // and device-type checks but has no dest_prefix to send to; without
+        // this check the send falls into send_content_resource and fails
+        // with "Peer is federation-only (no radio twin)" (picture-send,
+        // 2026-08-07) instead of falling back to the federation path below.
        let use_resource_transfer = bytes.len() > INLINE_HARD_MAX
            && device_type == crate::mesh::types::DeviceType::Reticulum
-            && bytes.len() <= RETICULUM_RESOURCE_MAX;
+            && bytes.len() <= RETICULUM_RESOURCE_MAX
+            && svc.has_radio_route(contact_id).await;

        if bytes.len() > INLINE_HARD_MAX && !use_resource_transfer {
            anyhow::bail!(
@@ -590,6 +598,16 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        let est_seconds = (size.saturating_add(lora_bytes_per_sec - 1) / lora_bytes_per_sec).max(1);

        let is_reticulum = device_type == crate::mesh::types::DeviceType::Reticulum;
+        // A Reticulum device on our end doesn't mean THIS peer is radio
+        // reachable — a federation-only contact (no radio twin) has no dest
+        // prefix for a resource transfer, even though it's small enough and
+        // our device type qualifies. Without this check the frontend was
+        // steered into mesh.send-content-inline's resource-transfer path,
+        // which fails with "Peer is federation-only (no radio twin)"
+        // (picture-send, 2026-08-07); the tier below now defers to the
+        // has_tor branches for such peers, which route via mesh.send-content
+        // (federation) instead.
+        let has_radio_route = is_reticulum && svc.has_radio_route(contact_id).await;
        let (tier, reason) = if size <= MESH_AUTO_MAX {
            ("auto-mesh", "Small enough to send inline over mesh")
        } else if size <= MESH_HARD_MAX {
@@ -598,7 +616,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            } else {
                ("auto-mesh", "No Tor path — sending inline over mesh")
            }
-        } else if is_reticulum && size <= RETICULUM_RESOURCE_MAX {
+        } else if has_radio_route && size <= RETICULUM_RESOURCE_MAX {
            (
                "resource-mesh",
                "Sending directly over LoRa via a Reticulum resource transfer",
@@ -79,6 +79,38 @@ pub(super) fn sanitize_error_message(msg: &str) -> String {
        // them in the first place (ecash send, 2026-07-22).
        "Insufficient balance",
        "Insufficient funds",
+        // On-chain send/sweep refusals from LND ("Failed to send: your
+        // on-chain balance is too small or still unconfirmed to sweep…").
+        // Masking sent the operator to journalctl again (framework-pt
+        // sweep, 2026-08-06) — same lesson as the two above.
+        "Failed to send",
+        // A frontend newer than the daemon calls methods it doesn't have.
+        // Masked, this reads as "the feature is broken" instead of "this
+        // node needs its update" — hit live the moment the .126 LoRa panel
+        // was deployed ahead of its binary (2026-08-06).
+        "Unknown method",
+        // RNode RF settings validation (mesh::rnode_settings::validate) —
+        // every one names the offending field and its legal range, which is
+        // the entire point of validating before touching the radio.
+        "frequency ",
+        "bandwidth ",
+        "spreading factor ",
+        "coding rate ",
+        "tx power ",
+        "airtime_limit_short",
+        "airtime_limit_long",
+        "port must be an absolute",
+        "Invalid settings",
+        "Missing 'settings'",
+        // Mesh preconditions the operator can act on directly.
+        "Mesh service not running",
+        "No mesh device connected",
+        "Mesh listener not running",
+        "MeshCore radios have no remote reboot",
+        "Radio state read-back",
+        "The radio daemon did not answer",
+        "The radio did not acknowledge",
+        "RNode interface is disabled",
        // Lightning payment failures carry LND's reason ("invoice expired.
        // Valid until …", "no route", …) — the user can act on every one of
        // them, and masking sent the operator to journalctl (invoice-expired
@@ -307,19 +307,24 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        let deps = self.gate_install_deps(package_id).await?;
        check_bitcoin_pruning_compatibility(package_id).await?;
        log_optional_dep_info(package_id, &deps);
-        let repaired_bitcoin_conf =
-            if matches!(package_id, "bitcoin" | "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots") {
-                // Materialise the RPC password file before any install path
-                // runs. The orchestrator path resolves secret_env from
-                // /var/lib/archipelago/secrets/bitcoin-rpc-password at start
-                // time; if the file is missing, bitcoind exits within ms.
-                // bitcoin_rpc_credentials() generates + persists on first
-                // call (OnceCell-cached), so this is idempotent.
-                let _ = crate::bitcoin_rpc::bitcoin_rpc_credentials().await;
-                ensure_bitcoin_rpc_config().await?
-            } else {
-                false
-            };
+        if matches!(package_id, "bitcoin" | "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots") {
+            // Materialise the RPC password file before any install path
+            // runs. The orchestrator path resolves secret_env from
+            // /var/lib/archipelago/secrets/bitcoin-rpc-password at start
+            // time; if the file is missing, bitcoind exits within ms.
+            // bitcoin_rpc_credentials() generates + persists on first
+            // call (OnceCell-cached), so this is idempotent.
+            let _ = crate::bitcoin_rpc::bitcoin_rpc_credentials().await;
+            // A stale datadir bitcoin.conf from an older install conflicts
+            // with the container's -conf=/tmp/rpc.conf launch (see
+            // apps/bitcoin-core & bitcoin-knots manifest.yml) and makes
+            // Bitcoin Core refuse to start at all. Clear it before
+            // (re)install. Unlike the old bind-setting "repair" this was
+            // replacing, it never requires restarting an already-running
+            // container — bitcoind doesn't read this file, so removing it
+            // changes nothing at runtime.
+            remove_stale_bitcoin_conf().await?;
+        }

        // For orchestrator-managed apps, skip the legacy "container exists →
        // adopt + return" probe entirely. The orchestrator's own install path
@@ -389,37 +394,7 @@ impl RpcHandler {
                    .trim()
                    .to_string();

-                if state == "running" && repaired_bitcoin_conf {
-                    info!(
-                        "Restarting existing container {} after bitcoin.conf RPC repair",
-                        package_id
-                    );
-                    let restart_output = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
-                        .args(["restart", package_id])
-                        .output()
-                        .await
-                        .context(
-                            "Failed to restart existing container after bitcoin.conf repair",
-                        )?;
-                    if !restart_output.status.success() {
-                        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&restart_output.stderr);
-                        install_log(&format!(
-                            "INSTALL ADOPT FAIL: {} - restart after RPC repair failed: {}",
-                            package_id, stderr
-                        ))
-                        .await;
-                        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-                            "Container {} exists but failed to restart after RPC repair: {}",
-                            package_id,
-                            stderr
-                        ));
-                    }
-                    let _ = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
-                        .args(["restart", "archy-bitcoin-ui"])
-                        .output()
-                        .await;
-                    wait_for_adopted_container(package_id, package_id).await?;
-                } else if state != "running" {
+                if state != "running" {
                    // Start the stopped/exited container
                    info!("Starting existing container {} (was {})", package_id, state);
                    let start_output = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
@@ -715,9 +690,13 @@ impl RpcHandler {
            }
        }

-        // Pre-install: write config files BEFORE chown (dir is still owned by archipelago user)
+        // Pre-install: clear a stale datadir bitcoin.conf BEFORE chown (dir is
+        // still owned by archipelago user). bitcoind is launched with
+        // -conf=/tmp/rpc.conf (see apps/bitcoin-core & bitcoin-knots
+        // manifest.yml) and never reads a datadir bitcoin.conf — if one
+        // exists, Bitcoin Core's own safety check refuses to start at all.
        if matches!(package_id, "bitcoin" | "bitcoin-core" | "bitcoin-knots") {
-            self.write_bitcoin_conf(&rpc_user, &rpc_pass).await?;
+            remove_stale_bitcoin_conf().await?;
        }

        if package_id == "lnd" {
@@ -1435,101 +1414,13 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        }
    }

-    /// Write bitcoin.conf with rpcauth (salted HMAC hash, no plaintext password).
-    async fn write_bitcoin_conf(&self, rpc_user: &str, rpc_pass: &str) -> Result<()> {
-        let bitcoin_dir = "/var/lib/archipelago/bitcoin";
-        let conf_path = format!("{}/bitcoin.conf", bitcoin_dir);
-
-        // Idempotent: once bitcoin-knots (or a prior install) has started,
-        // the data dir is chowned into the container's user namespace
-        // (e.g. UID 100100 on the host) with 700 perms — the archipelago
-        // daemon can no longer stat or write there. Treat any non-NotFound
-        // error on the conf as "conf already provisioned by the container
-        // user" and skip. Matches the lnd.conf behavior below.
-        match tokio::fs::metadata(&conf_path).await {
-            Ok(_) => {
-                ensure_bitcoin_rpc_config().await?;
-                info!("bitcoin.conf already exists, ensured Bitcoin RPC config");
-                return Ok(());
-            }
-            Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
-            Err(_) => {
-                ensure_bitcoin_rpc_config().await?;
-                info!("bitcoin.conf path inaccessible, ensured Bitcoin RPC config via host helper");
-                return Ok(());
-            }
-        }
-
-        use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
-        use sha2::Sha256;
-        // KEY-05: the salt is half of the stored `rpcauth=` credential line, so
-        // source named and draw guarded.
-        let mut salt_bytes = [0u8; 16];
-        crate::entropy::draw_key_bytes(&mut rand::rngs::OsRng, &mut salt_bytes).map_err(|e| {
-            anyhow::anyhow!("Refusing to build an rpcauth line from degenerate salt entropy: {e}")
-        })?;
-        let salt_hex = hex::encode(salt_bytes);
-        let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_from_slice(salt_hex.as_bytes())
-            .expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
-        mac.update(rpc_pass.as_bytes());
-        let hash_hex = hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes());
-        let rpcauth_line = format!("rpcauth={}:{}${}", rpc_user, salt_hex, hash_hex);
-
-        // Default to full archive — operators with 2TB+ drives shouldn't be
-        // silently pruned down to 550 MB. Users who want a pruned node can
-        // set `prune=N` in bitcoin.conf themselves after install.
-        //
-        // printtoconsole=0: bitcoind already writes debug.log in the datadir
-        // (self-shrunk on restart); duplicating it to stdout pushed every IBD
-        // "UpdateTip" line through conmon into journald (>1 GB/day). Deep
-        // debugging uses /var/lib/archipelago/bitcoin/debug.log.
-        // rpcbind=0.0.0.0 is REQUIRED inside a container: with rpcallowip set
-        // but no rpcbind, bitcoind binds RPC to 127.0.0.1 in the container
-        // netns only — LND / the Bitcoin UI dialing bitcoin-knots:8332 over
-        // the bridge get connection refused (fresh-install LND crash-loop +
-        // bitcoin-rpc 502, seen on the 1.7.99 ISO). The port publish stays
-        // 127.0.0.1-only on the host, so exposure is unchanged.
-        // Prune sized to the data volume. A full archive needs ~810 GB and
-        // grows; silently writing an unpruned config onto a small disk fills
-        // it mid-IBD (framework node 2026-07-14: unpruned mainnet on a 205 GB
-        // volume). Volumes with real archival headroom (≥1.2 TB) stay full
-        // archive; smaller ones get prune = 25% of the volume, clamped to
-        // [550 MB, 100 GB], leaving room for LND/apps sharing the disk.
-        let prune_line = match bitcoin_data_volume_gb().await {
-            Some(total_gb) if total_gb > 0 && total_gb < 1200 => {
-                let prune_mb = ((total_gb as f64 * 0.25 * 1024.0) as u64).clamp(550, 100_000);
-                info!(
-                    volume_gb = total_gb,
-                    prune_mb, "Data volume below archival size — enabling sized bitcoin prune"
-                );
-                format!("prune={}\n", prune_mb)
-            }
-            _ => String::new(),
-        };
-
-        let bitcoin_conf = format!(
-            "\
-# rpcauth: salted hash only - no plaintext password in config or CLI\n\
-{}\n\
-server=1\n\
-rpcbind=0.0.0.0\n\
-rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0\n\
-listen=1\n\
-rpcthreads=16\n\
-rpcworkqueue=256\n\
-printtoconsole=0\n\
-{}",
-            rpcauth_line, prune_line
-        );
-        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(bitcoin_dir)
-            .await
-            .context("Failed to create bitcoin data directory")?;
-        tokio::fs::write(&conf_path, bitcoin_conf)
-            .await
-            .context("Failed to write bitcoin.conf")?;
-        info!("Created bitcoin.conf with rpcauth (no plaintext credentials)");
-        Ok(())
-    }
+    // write_bitcoin_conf removed: bitcoind is launched with -conf=/tmp/rpc.conf
+    // (see apps/bitcoin-core & bitcoin-knots manifest.yml, commit a597c1d9)
+    // and never reads a datadir bitcoin.conf. Writing one here created a
+    // fatal "-conf vs default bitcoin.conf" conflict on every subsequent
+    // start (Bitcoin Core's own datadir-conflict safety check). See
+    // `remove_stale_bitcoin_conf` below, which replaces both this and
+    // `ensure_bitcoin_rpc_config`.

    /// Write LND config file with Bitcoin RPC credentials.
    async fn write_lnd_conf(&self, rpc_user: &str, rpc_pass: &str) -> Result<()> {
@@ -2624,28 +2515,12 @@ async fn wait_for_adopted_container(package_id: &str, container_name: &str) -> R
    ))
 }

-/// Total size (GB) of the filesystem holding the bitcoin data dir, via
-/// `df -k`. None when df fails (containers, exotic mounts) — callers treat
-/// unknown as "don't prune" to preserve archival defaults on big iron.
-async fn bitcoin_data_volume_gb() -> Option<u64> {
-    let target = if std::path::Path::new("/var/lib/archipelago").exists() {
-        "/var/lib/archipelago"
-    } else {
-        "/"
-    };
-    let output = tokio::process::Command::new("df")
-        .args(["-k", target])
-        .output()
-        .await
-        .ok()?;
-    if !output.status.success() {
-        return None;
-    }
-    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
-    let line = stdout.lines().nth(1)?;
-    let kb: u64 = line.split_whitespace().nth(1)?.parse().ok()?;
-    Some(kb / 1024 / 1024)
-}
+// bitcoin_data_volume_gb removed with write_bitcoin_conf: it only fed that
+// function's volume-aware `prune=` line, which bitcoind never read either
+// (see remove_stale_bitcoin_conf). The manifest's shell entrypoint already
+// computes DISK_GB_VALUE and hardcodes -prune=550 on small volumes — a
+// real volume-aware prune fix belongs there, not in a conf file nothing
+// reads. Tracked as follow-up in bitcoin-conf-crash-patch.md.

 /// One-shot probe: does bitcoind answer an authenticated getblockchaininfo?
 /// Works during IBD (the call answers with progress while syncing). Goes via
@@ -2723,52 +2598,36 @@ async fn wait_for_bitcoin_rpc_gate(package_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
    Ok(())
 }

-async fn ensure_bitcoin_rpc_config() -> Result<bool> {
+/// bitcoind reads only `/tmp/rpc.conf` + CLI args at container start (see
+/// apps/bitcoin-core & bitcoin-knots manifest.yml, commit a597c1d9) — it
+/// never reads a datadir bitcoin.conf. A leftover file from an older install
+/// (or a manual edit) makes Bitcoin Core's own datadir-conflict safety check
+/// refuse to start ("-conf=... vs default bitcoin.conf"). Remove it — via
+/// the same host-privileged path the old writer/repairer used, since the
+/// dir may already be chowned into the container's UID namespace by a
+/// previous start — instead of "repairing" it into existence.
+async fn remove_stale_bitcoin_conf() -> Result<bool> {
    let script = r#"
 set -eu
 conf=/var/lib/archipelago/bitcoin/bitcoin.conf
 [ -f "$conf" ] || exit 0
-changed=0
-tmp=$(mktemp)
-awk -F= '
-    /^(server|txindex|rpcbind|rpcallowip|rpcport|listen|bind|dbcache|rpcthreads|rpcworkqueue)=/ {
-        if (seen[$1]++) next
-    }
-    { print }
-' "$conf" > "$tmp"
-if ! cmp -s "$conf" "$tmp"; then
-    cat "$tmp" > "$conf"
-    changed=1
-fi
-rm -f "$tmp"
-ensure_line() {
-    line="$1"
-    key="${line%%=*}"
-    if ! grep -q "^${key}=" "$conf"; then
-        printf '%s\n' "$line" >> "$conf"
-        changed=1
-    fi
-}
-ensure_line server=1
-ensure_line rpcbind=0.0.0.0
-ensure_line rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0
-ensure_line listen=1
-ensure_line rpcthreads=16
-ensure_line rpcworkqueue=256
-[ "$changed" -eq 0 ] && exit 0
+mv "$conf" "$conf.disabled-$(date +%s)"
 exit 2
 "#;
    let status = host_sudo(&["sh", "-lc", script])
        .await
-        .context("ensure bitcoin.conf RPC bind settings")?;
+        .context("remove stale bitcoin.conf")?;
    match status.code() {
        Some(0) => Ok(false),
        Some(2) => {
-            install_log("INSTALL REPAIR: bitcoin.conf RPC bind settings added").await;
+            install_log(
+                "INSTALL REPAIR: removed stale bitcoin.conf (conflicts with -conf=/tmp/rpc.conf launch)",
+            )
+            .await;
            Ok(true)
        }
        _ => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
-            "bitcoin.conf RPC repair helper exited with {}",
+            "bitcoin.conf removal helper exited with {}",
            status
        )),
    }
@@ -1011,6 +1011,59 @@ impl RpcHandler {
        }
    }

+    /// auth.session-policy.get — how long a login lasts on this node.
+    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_session_policy_get(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        let policy = crate::settings::session_policy::load(&self.config.data_dir).await;
+        Ok(serde_json::json!({
+            "idle_timeout_secs": policy.idle_timeout_secs,
+            "absolute_timeout_secs": policy.absolute_timeout_secs,
+            "reauth_for_funds": policy.reauth_for_funds,
+        }))
+    }
+
+    /// auth.session-policy.set — change it.
+    ///
+    /// Values are clamped rather than rejected: the caller learns what was
+    /// actually stored from the reply, which is friendlier than an error and
+    /// makes the bounds discoverable. Fields are individually optional so the
+    /// UI can change one control without having to send the others back.
+    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_session_policy_set(
+        &self,
+        params: Option<serde_json::Value>,
+    ) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        let params = params.unwrap_or(serde_json::json!({}));
+        let current = crate::settings::session_policy::load(&self.config.data_dir).await;
+        let policy = crate::settings::session_policy::SessionPolicy {
+            idle_timeout_secs: params
+                .get("idle_timeout_secs")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
+                .unwrap_or(current.idle_timeout_secs),
+            absolute_timeout_secs: match params.get("absolute_timeout_secs") {
+                // Explicit null means "no absolute cap", which is different
+                // from the field being absent (leave it as it is).
+                Some(serde_json::Value::Null) => None,
+                Some(v) => v.as_u64().or(current.absolute_timeout_secs),
+                None => current.absolute_timeout_secs,
+            },
+            reauth_for_funds: params
+                .get("reauth_for_funds")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
+                .unwrap_or(current.reauth_for_funds),
+        };
+        let saved = crate::settings::session_policy::save(&self.config.data_dir, policy).await?;
+        tracing::info!(
+            idle = saved.idle_timeout_secs,
+            absolute = ?saved.absolute_timeout_secs,
+            reauth_for_funds = saved.reauth_for_funds,
+            "session policy updated"
+        );
+        Ok(serde_json::json!({
+            "idle_timeout_secs": saved.idle_timeout_secs,
+            "absolute_timeout_secs": saved.absolute_timeout_secs,
+            "reauth_for_funds": saved.reauth_for_funds,
+        }))
+    }
+
    /// system.settings.set — Write a settings value
    pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn handle_system_settings_set(
        &self,
@@ -222,6 +222,19 @@ pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn regenerate_torrc(config: &ServicesConfig) -> Re
    lines.push("# ControlPort disabled for security".to_string());
    lines.push(String::new());

+    // Ports whose manifests declare `auth: gated` forward to the gate's own
+    // loopback (127.0.0.2, where the app-gate listener binds — see
+    // `appgate::listener::GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM`) instead of the app's 127.0.0.1.
+    // Tor carries no session cookie, so an onion pointed at the app is an
+    // unauthenticated bypass of the gate. Declared-gated ports only: an
+    // undeclared port keeps today's target, because absence of the field is
+    // not an instruction (the v1.7.121 incident rule).
+    let gated_ports: std::collections::HashSet<u16> = crate::appgate::identity::build_port_map()
+        .gated_ports()
+        .filter(|g| g.declared)
+        .map(|g| g.port)
+        .collect();
+
    for svc in &config.services {
        if !svc.enabled {
            continue;
@@ -240,7 +253,7 @@ pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn regenerate_torrc(config: &ServicesConfig) -> Re
                lines.push("HiddenServicePort 10009 127.0.0.1:10009".to_string());
            }
        } else {
-            lines.push(format!("HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:{}", svc.local_port));
+            lines.push(app_hidden_service_port_line(svc.local_port, &gated_ports));
        }

        lines.push(String::new());
@@ -248,6 +261,24 @@ pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn regenerate_torrc(config: &ServicesConfig) -> Re

    let content = lines.join("\n");
    let staging = "/var/lib/archipelago/tor-config/torrc.staged";
+    write_staged_torrc(&content, staging).await
+}
+
+/// The `HiddenServicePort` line for an HTTP app onion. Gated ports forward to
+/// the gate's Tor upstream; everything else to the app itself.
+fn app_hidden_service_port_line(
+    local_port: u16,
+    gated_ports: &std::collections::HashSet<u16>,
+) -> String {
+    let upstream = if gated_ports.contains(&local_port) {
+        crate::appgate::listener::GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM.to_string()
+    } else {
+        "127.0.0.1".to_string()
+    };
+    format!("HiddenServicePort 80 {}:{}", upstream, local_port)
+}
+
+async fn write_staged_torrc(content: &str, staging: &str) -> Result<()> {
    let config_dir = Path::new(staging)
        .parent()
        .unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new("/var/lib/archipelago/tor-config"));
@@ -256,14 +287,37 @@ pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn regenerate_torrc(config: &ServicesConfig) -> Re
        .await
        .context("Failed to write staged torrc")?;

-    debug!(
-        "Staged torrc with {} enabled services",
-        config.services.iter().filter(|s| s.enabled).count()
-    );
+    debug!("Staged torrc ({} bytes)", content.len());

    Ok(())
 }

+#[cfg(test)]
+mod torrc_tests {
+    use super::app_hidden_service_port_line;
+    use std::collections::HashSet;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn gated_port_forwards_to_the_gate_not_the_app() {
+        let gated: HashSet<u16> = [8082u16].into_iter().collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            app_hidden_service_port_line(8082, &gated),
+            "HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.2:8082"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn undeclared_port_keeps_the_app_loopback_target() {
+        // Absence of `auth: gated` is not an instruction — the onion keeps
+        // pointing at the app, exactly as before this change.
+        let gated: HashSet<u16> = [8082u16].into_iter().collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            app_hidden_service_port_line(9100, &gated),
+            "HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:9100"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
 // ─── Hostname Sync ───────────────────────────────────────────────

 pub(in crate::api::rpc) async fn sync_single_hostname(name: &str, address: &str) {
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ pub fn address_caching_dependents(package_id: &str) -> &'static [&'static str] {
 /// The package whose lifecycle lock covers `app_id`: the stack package when
 /// `app_id` is a member (RPC ops on "mempool" hold the "mempool" lock while
 /// they drive archy-mempool-web), otherwise the app itself.
-fn owning_package(app_id: &str) -> &str {
+/// Also consulted by the reconciler's absent-stack-member recovery.
+pub fn owning_package(app_id: &str) -> &str {
    const STACKS: &[&str] = &[
        "immich",
        "indeedhub",
@@ -26,6 +26,20 @@ pub struct GatedPort {
    pub app_name: String,
    /// Manifest-declared icon path (`metadata.icon`), when present.
    pub icon: Option<String>,
+    /// True only when the manifest says `auth: gated` in so many words.
+    ///
+    /// The gated set deliberately also carries undeclared Session-default
+    /// ports (so the gate challenges them wherever it can already stand, and
+    /// the audit reports them). But everything that CHANGES where traffic
+    /// goes — the torrc repoint to 127.0.0.2, the FIPS relay stand-down, the
+    /// Tor-upstream bind — must key on this flag: acting on an undeclared
+    /// port is the v1.7.121 incident class, whatever the action.
+    pub declared: bool,
+    /// Manifest opt-in (`session_passthrough: true` on the port): forward the
+    /// node session cookie to the app on authorised requests. First-party
+    /// companion UIs proxy that cookie to the daemon's authenticated
+    /// endpoints; for every other app the gate strips its own credential.
+    pub session_passthrough: bool,
 }

 /// A port deliberately left unauthenticated, and the manifest's stated reason.
@@ -48,6 +62,7 @@ pub struct ExemptPort {
 pub struct PortMap {
    gated: HashMap<u16, GatedPort>,
    exempt: Vec<ExemptPort>,
+    local: std::collections::HashSet<u16>,
 }

 impl PortMap {
@@ -64,8 +79,21 @@ impl PortMap {
        &self.exempt
    }

+    /// Declared `auth: local` — host-local by intent, so NOTHING may make it
+    /// externally reachable.
+    ///
+    /// The gate honours this by keeping its hands off, but it is not the only
+    /// thing that can publish a port: the FIPS mesh relay bridges the fips0
+    /// ULA to `127.0.0.1` for a static port list, and it forwarded nbxplorer
+    /// 32838 — declared `local` and pinned to loopback — to the mesh
+    /// unauthenticated (archi-dev-box 2026-08-04). Anything that republishes
+    /// a loopback port must consult this set first.
+    pub fn is_declared_local(&self, port: u16) -> bool {
+        self.local.contains(&port)
+    }
+
    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
-        self.gated.is_empty() && self.exempt.is_empty()
+        self.gated.is_empty() && self.exempt.is_empty() && self.local.is_empty()
    }
 }

@@ -101,13 +129,42 @@ fn manifest_icon(manifest: &AppManifest) -> Option<String> {

 /// Classify every published port across all installed manifests.
 ///
-/// The first directory that yields a manifest for an app id wins, so a node's
-/// `/opt/archipelago/apps` copy shadows a repo checkout rather than merging
-/// with it — otherwise a stale checked-out manifest could re-open a port the
-/// installed one gates.
+/// The signed catalog's embedded manifests are consulted FIRST, because they
+/// are what the orchestrator actually publishes containers from
+/// (origin-wins; see `app_catalog::catalog_manifest_overlay`). Classifying
+/// from disk alone made the gate act on policy the node was no longer
+/// running: the catalog declared nbxplorer `auth: local` and pinned it to
+/// loopback, the stale disk manifest declared nothing, and the gate
+/// externally bound a deliberately host-local port (archi-dev-box
+/// 2026-08-04).
+///
+/// After the catalog, the first directory that yields a manifest for an app
+/// id wins, so a node's `/opt/archipelago/apps` copy shadows a repo checkout
+/// rather than merging with it — otherwise a stale checked-out manifest could
+/// re-open a port the installed one gates.
 pub fn build_port_map() -> PortMap {
    let mut map = PortMap::default();
-    let mut seen_apps: HashMap<String, PathBuf> = HashMap::new();
+    let mut seen_apps: std::collections::HashSet<String> = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+
+    for (app_id, value) in crate::container::app_catalog::catalog_manifest_values() {
+        // Ports-only overlay: unlike the install path, classification also
+        // accepts BUILD-SOURCE manifests. The on-node-built companion UIs
+        // are exactly the apps whose gate policy (session_passthrough,
+        // auth: gated) must arrive reliably, and their disk manifests
+        // proved stale or absent fleet-wide in the v1.7.125 rollout. The
+        // gate's binds fail safely on conflict with a differently-published
+        // container, so a fresher catalog can only tighten, never expose.
+        let Some(manifest) =
+            crate::container::app_catalog::catalog_manifest_ports_overlay(&app_id, value)
+        else {
+            // Unparseable/invalid → the orchestrator falls back to disk for
+            // this app, so classification must too.
+            continue;
+        };
+        if seen_apps.insert(app_id) {
+            classify_manifest(&manifest, &mut map);
+        }
+    }

    for dir in apps_dirs() {
        let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(&dir) else {
@@ -124,100 +181,8 @@ pub fn build_port_map() -> PortMap {
                // would have published.
                continue;
            };
-            let app_id = manifest.app.id.clone();
-            if seen_apps.contains_key(&app_id) {
-                continue;
-            }
-            seen_apps.insert(app_id.clone(), path);
-
-            let icon = manifest_icon(&manifest);
-            let app_name = if manifest.app.name.trim().is_empty() {
-                app_id.clone()
-            } else {
-                manifest.app.name.clone()
-            };
-
-            for port in &manifest.app.ports {
-                let protocol = if port.protocol.is_empty() {
-                    "tcp"
-                } else {
-                    port.protocol.as_str()
-                };
-                match port.auth_policy() {
-                    PortAuth::None => map.exempt.push(ExemptPort {
-                        port: port.host,
-                        app_id: app_id.clone(),
-                        rationale: port
-                            .auth_rationale
-                            .clone()
-                            .unwrap_or_else(|| "(no rationale recorded)".to_string()),
-                        protocol: protocol.to_string(),
-                    }),
-                    // Declared host-local. Not gated and not reported as
-                    // exposed, because it is neither — see PortAuth::Local
-                    // for why this cannot be inferred from `bind`.
-                    PortAuth::Local => {}
-                    // Explicit opt-in: the app is on loopback and the daemon
-                    // owns the external addresses. This is the ONLY way a
-                    // port gets bound by the gate, regardless of `bind`.
-                    PortAuth::Gated => {
-                        map.gated.insert(
-                            port.host,
-                            GatedPort {
-                                port: port.host,
-                                app_id: app_id.clone(),
-                                app_name: app_name.clone(),
-                                icon: icon.clone(),
-                            },
-                        );
-                    }
-                    PortAuth::Session => {
-                        // UDP cannot carry an HTTP challenge. Such a port has
-                        // no business defaulting into the gated set where it
-                        // would look protected without being protectable —
-                        // surface it as an unrationalised exemption instead,
-                        // which is honest and shows up in the audit list.
-                        if protocol != "tcp" {
-                            map.exempt.push(ExemptPort {
-                                port: port.host,
-                                app_id: app_id.clone(),
-                                rationale: format!(
-                                    "{protocol} cannot carry an HTTP challenge; declare auth: none \
-                                     with a rationale to record why this is safe"
-                                ),
-                                protocol: protocol.to_string(),
-                            });
-                            continue;
-                        }
-                        // A loopback publish is skipped, and this is the
-                        // safety property of the whole module: the gate must
-                        // never be the reason a port becomes reachable
-                        // somewhere it was not. `session` is the DEFAULT, so
-                        // it is what every un-migrated manifest carries —
-                        // and a node's installed manifests always lag the
-                        // repo. Binding those externally published Bitcoin
-                        // RPC across the LAN within seconds of deploy
-                        // (archi-dev-box 2026-08-03). Taking over a port is
-                        // opt-in only: `auth: gated`, shipped in the same
-                        // manifest edit as the loopback pin.
-                        if port
-                            .bind
-                            .parse::<std::net::IpAddr>()
-                            .is_ok_and(|ip| ip.is_loopback())
-                        {
-                            continue;
-                        }
-                        map.gated.insert(
-                            port.host,
-                            GatedPort {
-                                port: port.host,
-                                app_id: app_id.clone(),
-                                app_name: app_name.clone(),
-                                icon: icon.clone(),
-                            },
-                        );
-                    }
-                }
+            if seen_apps.insert(manifest.app.id.clone()) {
+                classify_manifest(&manifest, &mut map);
            }
        }
    }
@@ -226,6 +191,111 @@ pub fn build_port_map() -> PortMap {
    map
 }

+/// Classify one manifest's ports into the map. Split from [`build_port_map`]
+/// so the catalog-overlay pass and the disk pass cannot diverge.
+fn classify_manifest(manifest: &AppManifest, map: &mut PortMap) {
+    let app_id = manifest.app.id.clone();
+    let icon = manifest_icon(manifest);
+    let app_name = if manifest.app.name.trim().is_empty() {
+        app_id.clone()
+    } else {
+        manifest.app.name.clone()
+    };
+
+    for port in &manifest.app.ports {
+        let protocol = if port.protocol.is_empty() {
+            "tcp"
+        } else {
+            port.protocol.as_str()
+        };
+        match port.auth_policy() {
+            PortAuth::None => map.exempt.push(ExemptPort {
+                port: port.host,
+                app_id: app_id.clone(),
+                rationale: port
+                    .auth_rationale
+                    .clone()
+                    .unwrap_or_else(|| "(no rationale recorded)".to_string()),
+                protocol: protocol.to_string(),
+            }),
+            // Declared host-local. Not gated and not reported as
+            // exposed, because it is neither — see PortAuth::Local
+            // for why this cannot be inferred from `bind`. Recorded so
+            // the mesh relay (and any future republisher) can refuse to
+            // expose it.
+            PortAuth::Local => {
+                map.local.insert(port.host);
+            }
+            // Explicit opt-in: the app is on loopback and the daemon
+            // owns the external addresses. This is the ONLY way a
+            // port gets bound by the gate, regardless of `bind`.
+            PortAuth::Gated => {
+                map.gated.insert(
+                    port.host,
+                    GatedPort {
+                        port: port.host,
+                        app_id: app_id.clone(),
+                        app_name: app_name.clone(),
+                        icon: icon.clone(),
+                        declared: true,
+                        session_passthrough: port.session_passthrough,
+                    },
+                );
+            }
+            PortAuth::Session => {
+                // UDP cannot carry an HTTP challenge. Such a port has
+                // no business defaulting into the gated set where it
+                // would look protected without being protectable —
+                // surface it as an unrationalised exemption instead,
+                // which is honest and shows up in the audit list.
+                if protocol != "tcp" {
+                    map.exempt.push(ExemptPort {
+                        port: port.host,
+                        app_id: app_id.clone(),
+                        rationale: format!(
+                            "{protocol} cannot carry an HTTP challenge; declare auth: none \
+                             with a rationale to record why this is safe"
+                        ),
+                        protocol: protocol.to_string(),
+                    });
+                    continue;
+                }
+                // A loopback publish is skipped, and this is the
+                // safety property of the whole module: the gate must
+                // never be the reason a port becomes reachable
+                // somewhere it was not. `session` is the DEFAULT, so
+                // it is what every un-migrated manifest carries —
+                // and a node's installed manifests always lag the
+                // repo. Binding those externally published Bitcoin
+                // RPC across the LAN within seconds of deploy
+                // (archi-dev-box 2026-08-03). Taking over a port is
+                // opt-in only: `auth: gated`, shipped in the same
+                // manifest edit as the loopback pin.
+                if port
+                    .bind
+                    .parse::<std::net::IpAddr>()
+                    .is_ok_and(|ip| ip.is_loopback())
+                {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                map.gated.insert(
+                    port.host,
+                    GatedPort {
+                        port: port.host,
+                        app_id: app_id.clone(),
+                        app_name: app_name.clone(),
+                        icon: icon.clone(),
+                        declared: false,
+                        // An undeclared port never gets the node session —
+                        // passthrough is an explicit manifest opt-in only.
+                        session_passthrough: false,
+                    },
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -257,6 +327,90 @@ mod tests {
        }
    }

+    fn manifest(yaml: &str) -> AppManifest {
+        AppManifest::parse(yaml).expect("test manifest must parse")
+    }
+
+    const BASE: &str = r#"
+app:
+  id: testapp
+  name: Test App
+  version: "1.0"
+  container:
+    image: example.org/testapp:1.0
+"#;
+
+    /// `auth: gated` is the only classification allowed to redirect traffic —
+    /// torrc repoints, relay stand-down, and the 127.0.0.2 bind all key on
+    /// `declared`. An undeclared Session port is challenged and audited but
+    /// must never be `declared`.
+    #[test]
+    fn declared_tracks_the_manifest_not_the_default() {
+        let mut map = PortMap::default();
+        classify_manifest(
+            &manifest(&format!(
+                "{BASE}  ports:\n    - host: 8090\n      container: 7777\n      protocol: tcp\n      bind: 127.0.0.1\n      auth: gated\n"
+            )),
+            &mut map,
+        );
+        assert!(map.gated(8090).expect("gated").declared);
+
+        let mut map = PortMap::default();
+        classify_manifest(
+            &manifest(&format!(
+                "{BASE}  ports:\n    - host: 9100\n      container: 9100\n      protocol: tcp\n"
+            )),
+            &mut map,
+        );
+        let undeclared = map.gated(9100).expect("session default is challenged");
+        assert!(
+            !undeclared.declared,
+            "an absent auth field must never read as an instruction"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// `auth: local` keeps the gate's hands off entirely — the port is
+    /// neither gated nor exempt-reported — but it IS recorded, so the mesh
+    /// relay can refuse to republish a deliberately host-local port.
+    #[test]
+    fn local_ports_are_untouched_but_recorded() {
+        let mut map = PortMap::default();
+        classify_manifest(
+            &manifest(&format!(
+                "{BASE}  ports:\n    - host: 32838\n      container: 32838\n      protocol: tcp\n      bind: 127.0.0.1\n      auth: local\n"
+            )),
+            &mut map,
+        );
+        assert!(map.gated(32838).is_none());
+        assert!(map.exempt_ports().is_empty());
+        assert!(
+            map.is_declared_local(32838),
+            "the mesh relay needs this to refuse bridging a host-local port"
+        );
+        assert!(!map.is_declared_local(3000));
+    }
+
+    /// The real corpus: every port the FIPS relay can bridge must be safe to
+    /// bridge. A port that is declared `local` (host-local by intent) or
+    /// declared `gated` (the app gate owns its external addresses) must be
+    /// withheld by the relay — this asserts the two sets the relay consults
+    /// actually classify the live manifests, so a future manifest edit that
+    /// re-opens one is caught here rather than on a node.
+    #[test]
+    fn relay_port_list_respects_local_and_gated_declarations() {
+        let map = build_port_map();
+        let relay_would_expose: Vec<u16> = crate::fips::app_ports::APP_LAUNCH_PORTS
+            .iter()
+            .copied()
+            .filter(|p| map.is_declared_local(*p))
+            .collect();
+        assert!(
+            !relay_would_expose.is_empty(),
+            "expected the corpus to contain at least one local port in the relay list \
+             (32838/8999) — if this fails the guard is untested, not unnecessary"
+        );
+    }
+
    /// Protocol ports that wallets dial directly must never end up gated —
    /// this is the constraint that decided the design (Zeus and electrum
    /// clients keep working untouched).
@@ -44,6 +44,15 @@ use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
 /// apps are installed while the daemon runs.
 const SWEEP_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(60);

+/// The gate's own loopback address, distinct from the app's `127.0.0.1`.
+///
+/// Tor cannot present a session cookie, so `HiddenServicePort → 127.0.0.1`
+/// reaches the app around the gate. Instead torrc forwards gated ports to
+/// this address (`api/rpc/tor`), where the gate — not the app — listens. A
+/// second loopback address rather than a second port number, so no app needs
+/// a port it did not declare.
+pub const GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM: IpAddr = IpAddr::V4(std::net::Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 2));
+
 /// A port the gate should own but could not claim, and why.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
 pub struct UnprotectedPort {
@@ -142,8 +151,12 @@ pub async fn run(
    mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>,
 ) {
    // (port, addr) pairs already served, so a sweep does not rebind what it
-    // already holds.
-    let mut held: HashMap<(u16, IpAddr), ()> = HashMap::new();
+    // already holds. The accept-loop handle is kept so a claim can be
+    // RELEASED when its port leaves the gated set — a catalog refresh
+    // declaring a port `local`/`none` must make the gate let go without a
+    // daemon restart, or the stale bind keeps republishing a port the
+    // catalog just withdrew (nbxplorer 32838, archi-dev-box 2026-08-04).
+    let mut held: HashMap<(u16, IpAddr), tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> = HashMap::new();
    let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(SWEEP_INTERVAL);
    interval.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);

@@ -160,7 +173,7 @@ pub async fn run(
 async fn sweep(
    gate: &Arc<AppGate>,
    status: &Arc<RwLock<GateStatus>>,
-    held: &mut HashMap<(u16, IpAddr), ()>,
+    held: &mut HashMap<(u16, IpAddr), tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>>,
    shutdown_rx: &tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>,
 ) {
    // Re-read the manifests every sweep rather than trusting the map built
@@ -170,6 +183,23 @@ async fn sweep(
    // enforced while serving a brand-new app to anyone who asked.
    gate.refresh().await;
    let port_map = gate.port_map().await;
+
+    // Release claims whose port left the gated set (or whose Tor-upstream
+    // claim lost its declaration). Aborting the accept loop drops the
+    // listener, freeing the address for whoever now legitimately owns it —
+    // the app itself, or nobody.
+    held.retain(|(port, addr), handle| {
+        let keep = match port_map.gated(*port) {
+            None => false,
+            Some(app) => *addr != GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM || app.declared,
+        };
+        if !keep {
+            handle.abort();
+            info!(port, %addr, "app gate released a claim: port is no longer gated here");
+        }
+        keep
+    });
+
    let addresses = host_addresses().await;
    if addresses.is_empty() {
        debug!("app gate: no external addresses yet");
@@ -192,6 +222,10 @@ async fn sweep(

        let mut claimed_any = false;
        let mut blocked = false;
+        // External addresses first, then the gate's Tor upstream. 127.0.0.2
+        // deliberately does NOT count toward `claimed_any`: the warning below
+        // is about external exposure, and a port whose only claim is the Tor
+        // loopback is still wide open on the LAN.
        for &addr in &addresses {
            let key = (app.port, addr);
            if held.contains_key(&key) {
@@ -201,19 +235,48 @@ async fn sweep(
            }
            match TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::new(addr, app.port)).await {
                Ok(listener) => {
-                    held.insert(key, ());
+                    let handle =
+                        spawn_accept_loop(listener, gate.clone(), app.clone(), shutdown_rx.clone());
+                    held.insert(key, handle);
                    claimed.push((app.port, addr.to_string()));
                    claimed_any = true;
                    info!(
                        port = app.port, %addr, app = %app.app_id,
                        "app gate claimed an app port"
                    );
-                    spawn_accept_loop(listener, gate.clone(), app.clone(), shutdown_rx.clone());
                }
                // Almost always the app itself holding 0.0.0.0:<port>.
                Err(_) => blocked = true,
            }
        }
+        // The Tor upstream is bound for DECLARED gated ports only: torrc only
+        // repoints an onion at 127.0.0.2 for a declared port, and standing a
+        // challenge on an undeclared port's would-be upstream would change
+        // where its traffic goes on nothing but a default.
+        if app.declared {
+            let tor_key = (app.port, GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM);
+            if held.contains_key(&tor_key) {
+                claimed.push((app.port, GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM.to_string()));
+            } else {
+                match TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::new(GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM, app.port)).await {
+                    Ok(listener) => {
+                        let handle = spawn_accept_loop(
+                            listener,
+                            gate.clone(),
+                            app.clone(),
+                            shutdown_rx.clone(),
+                        );
+                        held.insert(tor_key, handle);
+                        claimed.push((app.port, GATE_TOR_UPSTREAM.to_string()));
+                        info!(
+                            port = app.port, app = %app.app_id,
+                            "app gate claimed the Tor upstream (127.0.0.2)"
+                        );
+                    }
+                    Err(_) => blocked = true,
+                }
+            }
+        }

        if blocked && !claimed_any {
            warn!(
@@ -251,12 +314,15 @@ async fn app_is_listening(port: u16) -> bool {
    .is_some()
 }

+/// Returns the accept-loop task handle so the sweep can release the claim
+/// (abort → listener drops → address freed) when the port leaves the gated
+/// set. In-flight connections finish on their own tasks.
 fn spawn_accept_loop(
    listener: TcpListener,
    gate: Arc<AppGate>,
    app: GatedPort,
    mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>,
-) {
+) -> tokio::task::JoinHandle<()> {
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        loop {
            tokio::select! {
@@ -265,29 +331,93 @@ fn spawn_accept_loop(
                    let gate = gate.clone();
                    let app = app.clone();
                    tokio::spawn(async move {
-                        let service = hyper::service::service_fn(move |req| {
-                            let gate = gate.clone();
-                            let app = app.clone();
-                            async move {
-                                Ok::<_, std::convert::Infallible>(
-                                    gate.handle(req, &app, peer.ip()).await,
-                                )
-                            }
-                        });
-                        let _ = hyper::server::conn::Http::new()
-                            // Same slowloris guard as the main listener: an
-                            // unauthenticated caller must not be able to hold
-                            // a connection open by never sending headers.
-                            .http1_header_read_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
-                            .serve_connection(stream, service)
-                            .with_upgrades()
-                            .await;
+                        serve_connection(stream, peer, gate, app).await;
                    });
                }
                _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => break,
            }
        }
+    })
+}
+
+/// How long a freshly-accepted connection has to send its first byte.
+///
+/// The peek below blocks until *something* arrives, so without this an
+/// unauthenticated caller could hold a task open indefinitely by connecting and
+/// saying nothing — the same slowloris shape the header-read timeout guards
+/// against, one step earlier in the handshake.
+const FIRST_BYTE_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(15);
+
+/// Serve one connection, as TLS or plain HTTP depending on what the client
+/// actually sent.
+///
+/// The first byte decides: `peek` inspects it *without consuming it*, so a TLS
+/// client's ClientHello reaches the acceptor whole. This is what lets one port
+/// serve an HTTP dashboard's frames and an HTTPS dashboard's frames on the same
+/// node without a second port number or a per-node build.
+async fn serve_connection(
+    stream: tokio::net::TcpStream,
+    peer: SocketAddr,
+    gate: Arc<AppGate>,
+    app: GatedPort,
+) {
+    let mut first = [0u8; 1];
+    let peeked = tokio::time::timeout(FIRST_BYTE_TIMEOUT, stream.peek(&mut first)).await;
+
+    let is_tls = match peeked {
+        Ok(Ok(1)) => super::tls::looks_like_tls(first[0]),
+        // 0 bytes is a clean close before any request; anything else is a
+        // read error or the timeout. Nothing to serve either way.
+        _ => {
+            debug!(%peer, "app gate connection closed before sending anything");
+            return;
+        }
+    };
+
+    if is_tls {
+        match gate.tls.acceptor().await {
+            Some(acceptor) => match acceptor.accept(stream).await {
+                Ok(tls_stream) => serve_http(tls_stream, peer, gate, app).await,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    // Routine: a browser probing a cert it does not trust, or a
+                    // scanner. Not operator-actionable, so debug.
+                    debug!(%peer, error = %e, "app gate TLS handshake failed");
+                }
+            },
+            None => {
+                // The client speaks TLS and this node has no certificate.
+                // Replying in plain HTTP would be unreadable garbage to it, so
+                // close and let the browser report the connection failure.
+                debug!(
+                    %peer,
+                    "app gate got a TLS connection but has no certificate — closing"
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        serve_http(stream, peer, gate, app).await;
+    }
+}
+
+/// The HTTP half, generic over the transport so TLS and plain share one path —
+/// the gate's authentication, proxying and upgrade handling must not differ by
+/// scheme, and generics make that structural rather than a thing to remember.
+async fn serve_http<S>(stream: S, peer: SocketAddr, gate: Arc<AppGate>, app: GatedPort)
+where
+    S: tokio::io::AsyncRead + tokio::io::AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
+{
+    let service = hyper::service::service_fn(move |req| {
+        let gate = gate.clone();
+        let app = app.clone();
+        async move { Ok::<_, std::convert::Infallible>(gate.handle(req, &app, peer.ip()).await) }
    });
+    let _ = hyper::server::conn::Http::new()
+        // Same slowloris guard as the main listener: an unauthenticated caller
+        // must not be able to hold a connection open by never sending headers.
+        .http1_header_read_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
+        .serve_connection(stream, service)
+        .with_upgrades()
+        .await;
 }

 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@

 pub mod identity;
 pub mod listener;
+pub mod tls;

 use crate::auth::AuthManager;
 use crate::rate_limit::LoginRateLimiter;
@@ -65,6 +66,10 @@ pub struct AppGate {
    limiter: LoginRateLimiter,
    data_dir: PathBuf,
    port_map: Arc<RwLock<PortMap>>,
+    /// TLS for gated ports. Shared by every accept loop so one reissue is
+    /// picked up by all of them, and so the parse happens once rather than
+    /// per port.
+    pub(crate) tls: Arc<tls::GateTls>,
 }

 impl AppGate {
@@ -80,6 +85,7 @@ impl AppGate {
            limiter,
            data_dir,
            port_map: Arc::new(RwLock::new(identity::build_port_map())),
+            tls: Arc::new(tls::GateTls::new()),
        }
    }

@@ -136,7 +142,7 @@ impl AppGate {
        }

        match self.authorize(req.headers(), &app.app_id).await {
-            Authorization::Allow => proxy_to_app(req, app.port).await,
+            Authorization::Allow => proxy_to_app(req, app).await,
            // 401 rather than a redirect: a redirect to a login page is
            // indistinguishable from the app itself redirecting, and machine
            // clients would follow it and parse HTML as if it were their API
@@ -154,6 +160,11 @@ impl AppGate {
        action: &str,
        client_ip: IpAddr,
    ) -> Response<Body> {
+        // Assets are GET and pre-auth by nature: the login page cannot
+        // render its own background or logo without them.
+        if let Some(name) = action.strip_prefix("asset/") {
+            return self.serve_asset(name);
+        }
        if req.method() != Method::POST {
            return login_page(app, None, StatusCode::OK);
        }
@@ -187,6 +198,26 @@ impl AppGate {
        }
    }

+    /// Static assets the login page needs, served from the gate's own origin.
+    ///
+    /// The backgrounds are ~1 MB each, so inlining them as data URIs would
+    /// bloat every challenge response. Serving them here keeps the page
+    /// byte-identical to the dashboard's login while the CSP stays tight:
+    /// `img-src 'self' data:` and nothing else.
+    fn serve_asset(&self, name: &str) -> Response<Body> {
+        let Some((bytes, mime)) = read_ui_asset(name) else {
+            return not_found();
+        };
+        Response::builder()
+            .status(StatusCode::OK)
+            .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, mime)
+            // Immutable art; caching it costs nothing and keeps the login
+            // instant on a repeat challenge.
+            .header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=86400")
+            .body(Body::from(bytes))
+            .expect("asset response builds")
+    }
+
    async fn do_login(&self, app: &GatedPort, form: &Form, client_ip: IpAddr) -> Response<Body> {
        let password = field(form, "password").unwrap_or_default();

@@ -350,7 +381,8 @@ fn percent_decode(input: &str) -> String {
 }

 /// Forward an authorised request to the app on loopback.
-async fn proxy_to_app(req: Request<Body>, port: u16) -> Response<Body> {
+async fn proxy_to_app(req: Request<Body>, app: &GatedPort) -> Response<Body> {
+    let port = app.port;
    let path_and_query = req
        .uri()
        .path_and_query()
@@ -364,10 +396,16 @@ async fn proxy_to_app(req: Request<Body>, port: u16) -> Response<Body> {

    let (mut parts, body) = req.into_parts();
    parts.uri = uri;
-    // Strip the gate's own credential before it reaches the app: the app has
-    // no use for the node session and should never be in a position to log,
-    // echo, or forward it.
-    parts.headers.remove(header::COOKIE);
+    // Strip the gate's own credential before it reaches the app — the app
+    // should never be in a position to log, echo, or forward the node
+    // session. But ONLY the gate's cookies: apps run their own cookie logins
+    // (vaultwarden, nextcloud, gitea…), and removing the whole header logged
+    // every one of them out on each request. Companion UIs that proxy the
+    // daemon's authenticated endpoints opt in to keeping the session via
+    // `session_passthrough: true` on their gated port.
+    if !app.session_passthrough {
+        strip_gate_cookies(&mut parts.headers);
+    }
    parts.headers.remove(header::AUTHORIZATION);

    let client = hyper::Client::new();
@@ -377,6 +415,44 @@ async fn proxy_to_app(req: Request<Body>, port: u16) -> Response<Body> {
    }
 }

+/// Cookie names owned by the gate/daemon, never the app's to see.
+const GATE_COOKIE_NAMES: &[&str] = &["session", "csrf_token"];
+
+/// Remove the gate's own cookie pairs from the Cookie header, preserving the
+/// app's cookies (its login/session/prefs) untouched. Drops the header
+/// entirely when nothing remains.
+fn strip_gate_cookies(headers: &mut hyper::HeaderMap) {
+    let Some(cookie) = headers.get(header::COOKIE) else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let Ok(raw) = cookie.to_str() else {
+        // Not valid UTF-8 — can't safely filter pairs, so fail closed.
+        headers.remove(header::COOKIE);
+        return;
+    };
+    let kept: Vec<&str> = raw
+        .split(';')
+        .map(str::trim)
+        .filter(|pair| {
+            let name = pair.split('=').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
+            !GATE_COOKIE_NAMES.contains(&name)
+        })
+        .filter(|pair| !pair.is_empty())
+        .collect();
+    if kept.is_empty() {
+        headers.remove(header::COOKIE);
+        return;
+    }
+    match header::HeaderValue::from_str(&kept.join("; ")) {
+        Ok(v) => {
+            headers.insert(header::COOKIE, v);
+        }
+        Err(_) => {
+            headers.remove(header::COOKIE);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 fn set_session_cookie(resp: &mut Response<Body>, token: &str) {
    // No Domain attribute, so the cookie is host-only. Cookies ignore port,
    // which is what makes one sign-in cover the dashboard and every app port
@@ -428,43 +504,161 @@ fn esc(s: &str) -> String {
 /// none. Inlined as a data URI rather than linked: the gate is answering on
 /// the app's own port, so any asset URL would either hit the unauthenticated
 /// app behind it or a different origin the browser may not reach.
+/// One stacked layer per background, each delayed so they cross-fade in turn.
+fn background_layers() -> String {
+    let step = LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS.len() as u32 * 9 / LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS.len() as u32;
+    LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS
+        .iter()
+        .enumerate()
+        .map(|(i, name)| {
+            format!(
+                r#"<div class="bg" style="background-image:url('{prefix}asset/{name}');animation-delay:{delay}s"></div>"#,
+                prefix = GATE_PREFIX,
+                delay = i as u32 * step,
+            )
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
 fn icon_markup(app: &GatedPort) -> String {
-    if let Some(path) = &app.icon {
-        if let Some(data_uri) = read_icon_data_uri(path) {
-            return format!(r#"<img class="icon" src="{}" alt="">"#, esc(&data_uri));
-        }
-    }
-    let letter = app
-        .app_name
-        .chars()
-        .next()
-        .map(|c| c.to_uppercase().to_string())
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| "?".to_string());
-    format!(r#"<div class="icon lettermark">{}</div>"#, esc(&letter))
+    let inner = app
+        .icon
+        .as_deref()
+        .and_then(read_icon_data_uri)
+        // A manifest that names no icon still gets one: the dashboard already
+        // ships icons named after the app, so fall back to those before
+        // giving up. Without this EVERY gated app showed a lettermark,
+        // because no manifest declares metadata.icon (archi-dev-box,
+        // 2026-08-05).
+        .or_else(|| {
+            icon_candidates(&app.app_id)
+                .iter()
+                .find_map(|c| read_icon_data_uri(c))
+        })
+        .map(|data_uri| format!(r#"<img class="icon" src="{}" alt="">"#, esc(&data_uri)))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            let letter = app
+                .app_name
+                .chars()
+                .find(|c| c.is_alphanumeric())
+                .map(|c| c.to_uppercase().to_string())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| "?".to_string());
+            format!(r#"<div class="icon lettermark">{}</div>"#, esc(&letter))
+        });
+    format!(r#"<div class="tile">{inner}</div>"#)
 }

 /// Icons live with the web UI. Only files under the icon directory are read,
 /// and only known image extensions — the path comes from a manifest, which is
 /// signed, but treating it as untrusted costs nothing.
-fn read_icon_data_uri(icon_path: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    let name = std::path::Path::new(icon_path).file_name()?.to_str()?;
-    let mime = match name.rsplit_once('.')?.1.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
-        "svg" => "image/svg+xml",
-        "png" => "image/png",
-        "webp" => "image/webp",
-        "jpg" | "jpeg" => "image/jpeg",
-        _ => return None,
+/// Icon basenames to try for an app id, best first.
+///
+/// The shipped icon set is named for the *product*, while app ids carry
+/// packaging detail — `filebrowser` vs `file-browser`, `morphos-server` vs
+/// `morphos` — and the per-app screens (`lnd-ui`, `bitcoin-ui`, `electrs-ui`)
+/// have no icon of their own but obviously belong to the app they front.
+/// Resolving those here keeps the mapping in one readable place instead of
+/// adding a `metadata.icon` line to every manifest, which would have to be
+/// re-signed into the catalog to take effect.
+fn icon_candidates(app_id: &str) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut out = vec![app_id.to_string()];
+    let alias = match app_id {
+        "filebrowser" => Some("file-browser"),
+        "home-assistant" => Some("homeassistant"),
+        "morphos-server" => Some("morphos"),
+        "barkd" => Some("bark"),
+        "archy-mempool-web" | "mempool-api" => Some("mempool"),
+        "lnd-ui" | "lightning-stack" => Some("lnd"),
+        "bitcoin-ui" => Some("bitcoin-core"),
+        "electrs-ui" => Some("electrumx"),
+        "fips-ui" | "aiui" | "did-wallet" => Some("archipelago-a"),
+        "fedimint-gateway" | "fedimint-clientd" => Some("fedimint"),
+        _ => None,
    };
+    out.extend(alias.map(str::to_string));
+    // `<app>-ui` / `-server` / `-web` front an app whose icon is the bare name.
+    for suffix in ["-ui", "-server", "-web"] {
+        if let Some(base) = app_id.strip_suffix(suffix) {
+            out.push(base.to_string());
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// Backgrounds the login cycles through, matching the dashboard's own
+/// `/login` art. Cross-faded by CSS alone — the CSP forbids script, and a
+/// rotation that needs JavaScript would not survive it.
+const LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS: [&str; 4] = [
+    "bg-intro.jpg",
+    "bg-intro-4.webp",
+    "bg-intro-6.webp",
+    "bg-intro-3.jpg",
+];
+
+/// Assets the gate will serve, by exact name. An allowlist rather than a path
+/// join: the name arrives in a URL, and the gate answers before any
+/// authentication, so nothing here may be caller-controlled beyond this set.
+fn read_ui_asset(name: &str) -> Option<(Vec<u8>, &'static str)> {
+    let allowed = LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS.contains(&name) || name == "favico-black-v2.svg";
+    if !allowed {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mime = icon_mime(name.rsplit_once('.')?.1)?;
    for root in [
-        "/opt/archipelago/web-ui/assets/img/app-icons",
-        "web/dist/neode-ui/assets/img/app-icons",
+        "/opt/archipelago/web-ui/assets/img",
+        "web/dist/neode-ui/assets/img",
+        "neode-ui/public/assets/img",
+        "/opt/archipelago/web-ui/assets/icon",
+        "web/dist/neode-ui/assets/icon",
+        "neode-ui/public/assets/icon",
    ] {
-        let candidate = std::path::Path::new(root).join(name);
-        if let Ok(bytes) = std::fs::read(&candidate) {
-            if bytes.len() > 512 * 1024 {
-                return None;
+        if let Ok(bytes) = std::fs::read(std::path::Path::new(root).join(name)) {
+            return Some((bytes, mime));
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+const ICON_ROOTS: [&str; 2] = [
+    "/opt/archipelago/web-ui/assets/img/app-icons",
+    "web/dist/neode-ui/assets/img/app-icons",
+];
+
+fn icon_mime(ext: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
+    match ext.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
+        "svg" => Some("image/svg+xml"),
+        "png" => Some("image/png"),
+        "webp" => Some("image/webp"),
+        "jpg" | "jpeg" => Some("image/jpeg"),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Read an app icon as a `data:` URI.
+///
+/// `icon_ref` may be a filename or path with an extension (a manifest's
+/// `metadata.icon`), or a bare name such as an app id — in which case the
+/// known extensions are tried in turn. Only the file name is used; the
+/// directories searched are fixed, so a manifest cannot point the gate at an
+/// arbitrary path.
+fn read_icon_data_uri(icon_ref: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let name = std::path::Path::new(icon_ref).file_name()?.to_str()?;
+    let candidates: Vec<(String, &str)> = match name.rsplit_once('.') {
+        Some((_, ext)) => vec![(name.to_string(), icon_mime(ext)?)],
+        None => ["svg", "png", "webp", "jpg"]
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|ext| Some((format!("{name}.{ext}"), icon_mime(ext)?)))
+            .collect(),
+    };
+    for (file, mime) in candidates {
+        for root in ICON_ROOTS {
+            let candidate = std::path::Path::new(root).join(&file);
+            if let Ok(bytes) = std::fs::read(&candidate) {
+                if bytes.len() > 512 * 1024 {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                return Some(format!("data:{mime};base64,{}", base64_encode(&bytes)));
            }
-            return Some(format!("data:{mime};base64,{}", base64_encode(&bytes)));
        }
    }
    None
@@ -484,29 +678,91 @@ fn page(title: &str, app: &GatedPort, body: &str, status: StatusCode) -> Respons
 <meta name="robots" content="noindex">
 <title>{title} — {app_name}</title>
 <style>
+/* The dashboard's own /login, rebuilt in static CSS: the same rotating
+   intro art, .glass-card panel, .glass-button action and transparent
+   white-bordered inputs from neode-ui/src/style.css. Written longhand
+   rather than shared with the SPA because the gate answers before any
+   bundle exists, and the CSP forbids external stylesheets and script. */
 :root {{ color-scheme: dark; }}
 * {{ box-sizing: border-box; }}
-body {{ margin:0; min-height:100vh; display:grid; place-items:center;
-  background:#0b0f14; color:#e6edf3; font:16px/1.5 system-ui,-apple-system,Segoe UI,sans-serif; }}
-.card {{ width:min(92vw,380px); padding:2rem; background:#121820;
-  border:1px solid #223; border-radius:14px; text-align:center; }}
-.icon {{ width:64px; height:64px; border-radius:14px; margin:0 auto 1rem; display:block; object-fit:cover; }}
-.lettermark {{ display:grid; place-items:center; background:#1d2733; font-size:28px; font-weight:600; }}
-h1 {{ font-size:1.15rem; margin:0 0 .25rem; }}
-p.sub {{ margin:0 0 1.5rem; color:#8b98a5; font-size:.9rem; }}
-input {{ width:100%; padding:.7rem .8rem; margin-bottom:.75rem; border-radius:9px;
-  border:1px solid #2b3947; background:#0d131a; color:#e6edf3; font-size:1rem; }}
-input:focus {{ outline:2px solid #3b82f6; outline-offset:1px; }}
-button {{ width:100%; padding:.7rem; border:0; border-radius:9px; background:#3b82f6;
-  color:#fff; font-size:1rem; font-weight:600; cursor:pointer; }}
-button:hover {{ background:#2f6fd6; }}
-.err {{ background:#3b1519; border:1px solid #7f1d1d; color:#fca5a5;
-  padding:.6rem .8rem; border-radius:9px; margin-bottom:1rem; font-size:.9rem; }}
+html {{ height:100%; }}
+body {{ margin:0; color:#fff; background:#05070a; overflow:hidden;
+  font:16px/1.5 system-ui,-apple-system,"Segoe UI",sans-serif;
+  /* Fixed to the viewport rather than a tall scrolling page: an on-screen
+     keyboard then overlays the card instead of scrolling it away, and the
+     card stays optically centred. min-height:100vh scrolled with the
+     keyboard on mobile and left the card off-centre (reported 2026-08-05). */
+  position:fixed; inset:0;
+  display:grid; place-items:center; padding:1rem;
+  height:100vh; height:100svh; }}
+/* Very short viewports (landscape phone, or a keyboard eating most of it):
+   allow the card to scroll INSIDE the fixed frame rather than overflow. */
+@media (max-height:640px) {{
+  body {{ align-items:start; overflow-y:auto; padding-top:3rem; }}
+}}
+/* Rotating backgrounds: each layer holds its image and cross-fades on a
+   shared cycle, so the art moves the way /login does with no script. */
+.bg {{ position:fixed; inset:0; z-index:0; background-size:cover;
+  background-position:center; opacity:0; animation:bg-cycle {cycle}s infinite; }}
+.bg::after {{ content:''; position:absolute; inset:0;
+  background:linear-gradient(180deg, rgba(0,0,0,.35), rgba(0,0,0,.72)); }}
+@keyframes bg-cycle {{
+  0% {{ opacity:0; }} 4% {{ opacity:1; }}
+  {hold}% {{ opacity:1; }} {fade}% {{ opacity:0; }} 100% {{ opacity:0; }}
+}}
+main {{ position:relative; z-index:1; width:min(92vw,28rem); }}
+.card {{ padding:2rem; padding-top:3.5rem; position:relative;
+  background:rgba(0,0,0,.65); backdrop-filter:blur(18px);
+  -webkit-backdrop-filter:blur(18px); border:1px solid rgba(255,255,255,.18);
+  border-radius:1rem; box-shadow:0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.45); text-align:center; }}
+/* The Archipelago mark, half in and half out of the panel — same placement
+   and gradient ring as Login.vue. */
+.logo {{ position:absolute; top:-2.5rem; left:50%; transform:translateX(-50%);
+  width:5rem; height:5rem; border-radius:9999px; padding:3px;
+  background:linear-gradient(135deg, rgba(255,255,255,.6) 0%, rgba(0,0,0,.8) 100%);
+  box-shadow:0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.5); }}
+.logo img {{ width:100%; height:100%; border-radius:9999px; display:block;
+  background:#000; padding:.5rem; }}
+/* The app's own tile, in the My Apps shape: 18px-rounded square on dark
+   glass with the same inner highlight and drop shadow. */
+.tile {{ width:60px; height:60px; border-radius:18px; margin:0 auto .75rem;
+  background:rgba(0,0,0,.72); box-shadow:0 8px 18px rgba(0,0,0,.38); }}
+.tile .icon {{ width:100%; height:100%; border-radius:18px; display:block;
+  object-fit:cover; border:1px solid rgba(255,255,255,.18);
+  background:radial-gradient(circle at 35% 28%, rgba(255,255,255,.1), rgba(255,255,255,0) 42%),
+    linear-gradient(145deg, rgba(22,22,24,.96), rgba(0,0,0,.96));
+  box-shadow:inset 0 1px 0 rgba(255,255,255,.12), inset 0 -10px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.34); }}
+.lettermark {{ display:grid; place-items:center; font-size:1.6rem; font-weight:600;
+  color:rgba(255,255,255,.9); }}
+h1 {{ font-size:1.5rem; font-weight:600; margin:0 0 .4rem;
+  color:rgba(255,255,255,.96); text-shadow:0 2px 6px rgba(0,0,0,.4); }}
+p.sub {{ margin:0 0 1.75rem; color:rgba(255,255,255,.6); font-size:.875rem; }}
+input {{ width:100%; padding:.75rem 1rem; margin-bottom:1rem; border-radius:.5rem;
+  border:1px solid rgba(255,255,255,.2); background:transparent; color:#fff;
+  font-size:1rem; transition:border-color .2s ease; }}
+input::placeholder {{ color:rgba(255,255,255,.4); }}
+input:focus {{ outline:none; border-color:rgba(255,255,255,.4);
+  box-shadow:0 0 0 1px rgba(255,255,255,.2); }}
+button {{ width:100%; min-height:44px; padding:.75rem 1.25rem; border:none;
+  border-radius:.75rem; background:rgba(0,0,0,.6);
+  backdrop-filter:blur(24px); -webkit-backdrop-filter:blur(24px);
+  box-shadow:0 8px 24px rgba(0,0,0,.45), inset 0 1px 0 rgba(255,255,255,.22);
+  color:rgba(255,255,255,.9); font-size:1rem; font-weight:500; cursor:pointer;
+  transition:background-color .2s ease, transform .3s cubic-bezier(.4,0,.2,1); }}
+button:hover {{ background:rgba(0,0,0,.7); }}
+button:active {{ transform:translateY(1px); }}
+.err {{ background:rgba(239,68,68,.2); border:1px solid rgba(239,68,68,.4);
+  color:#fecaca; padding:.75rem; border-radius:.5rem; margin-bottom:1rem;
+  font-size:.875rem; text-align:left; }}
 </style></head>
-<body><main class="card">{body}</main></body></html>"#,
+<body>{backgrounds}<main><div class="card">{body}</div></main></body></html>"#,
        title = esc(title),
        app_name = esc(&app.app_name),
        body = body,
+        backgrounds = background_layers(),
+        cycle = LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS.len() as u32 * 9,
+        hold = 100 / LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS.len() as u32,
+        fade = 100 / LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS.len() as u32 + 4,
    );
    Response::builder()
        .status(status)
@@ -514,10 +770,18 @@ button:hover {{ background:#2f6fd6; }}
        // The gate answers on the app's own port for an unauthenticated
        // caller; nothing here should be cached or framed.
        .header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "no-store")
-        .header("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
+        // NOT X-Frame-Options: DENY. My Apps opens an app in an embedded
+        // frame, so a blanket DENY made every gated app render as "app is
+        // not responding" the moment the gate challenged it (reported on
+        // 100.82.34.38, 2026-08-05). frame-ancestors is the modern control
+        // and can be precise: only pages from this same node may frame the
+        // login, on any port or scheme, which is exactly the dashboard.
+        // Anything else — another site embedding it to harvest the node
+        // password — is still refused.
        .header(
            "Content-Security-Policy",
-            "default-src 'none'; img-src data:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; form-action 'self'",
+            "default-src 'none'; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; \
+             form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self' http://*:* https://*:*",
        )
        .body(Body::from(html))
        .expect("static response builds")
@@ -528,7 +792,8 @@ button:hover {{ background:#2f6fd6; }}
 /// password by an unexplained page.
 fn login_page(app: &GatedPort, error: Option<&str>, status: StatusCode) -> Response<Body> {
    let body = format!(
-        r#"{icon}
+        r#"<div class="logo"><img src="{prefix}asset/favico-black-v2.svg" alt="Archipelago"></div>
+{icon}
 <h1>Sign in to open {name}</h1>
 <p class="sub">This app is protected by your node password.</p>
 {err}
@@ -578,6 +843,8 @@ mod tests {
            app_id: "strfry".to_string(),
            app_name: "Strfry Relay".to_string(),
            icon: None,
+            declared: true,
+            session_passthrough: false,
        }
    }

@@ -635,11 +902,64 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(!html.contains("<img src=x"));
    }

+    /// The challenge must be framable by this node's own dashboard — My Apps
+    /// opens apps in an embedded frame, and a blanket `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
+    /// turned every gated app into "app is not responding" (100.82.34.38,
+    /// 2026-08-05). It must still be uncacheable, and still refuse to be
+    /// framed by a foreign origin, which `frame-ancestors` expresses and
+    /// `X-Frame-Options` cannot.
    #[test]
-    fn challenge_pages_are_not_cacheable_or_framable() {
+    fn challenge_pages_are_uncacheable_and_framable_only_by_this_node() {
        let resp = login_page(&app(), None, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
        assert_eq!(resp.headers()[header::CACHE_CONTROL], "no-store");
-        assert_eq!(resp.headers()["X-Frame-Options"], "DENY");
+        assert!(
+            !resp.headers().contains_key("X-Frame-Options"),
+            "X-Frame-Options cannot express 'my own node on another port' — it \
+             blocked the dashboard's own frame"
+        );
+        let csp = resp.headers()["Content-Security-Policy"].to_str().unwrap();
+        assert!(csp.contains("frame-ancestors 'self'"));
+        assert!(csp.contains("form-action 'self'"));
+    }
+
+    /// The login page must render entirely from the gate's own origin: the
+    /// CSP allows no external host, so a background or logo that 404s leaves
+    /// a black page rather than the dashboard's art.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn login_page_sources_its_art_from_the_gate() {
+        let resp = login_page(&app(), None, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        let body = hyper::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body()).await.unwrap();
+        let html = String::from_utf8_lossy(&body).to_string();
+        assert!(html.contains(&format!("{GATE_PREFIX}asset/favico-black-v2.svg")));
+        for name in LOGIN_BACKGROUNDS {
+            assert!(
+                html.contains(&format!("{GATE_PREFIX}asset/{name}")),
+                "background {name} is not referenced"
+            );
+        }
+        // Every referenced asset must be one the gate will actually serve.
+        // The logo is the sidebar A mark (favico-black-v2.svg) since the
+        // 2026-08-05 login-page rework — the old wordmark is off the
+        // allowlist on purpose.
+        assert!(read_ui_asset("favico-black-v2.svg").is_some() || cfg!(not(debug_assertions)));
+    }
+
+    /// The allowlist is the whole security boundary for asset serving: the
+    /// name arrives in a URL and is read before any authentication.
+    #[test]
+    fn asset_serving_refuses_anything_off_the_allowlist() {
+        for name in [
+            "../../../etc/passwd",
+            "/etc/passwd",
+            "db.sqlite3",
+            "manifest.yml",
+            "",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                read_ui_asset(name).is_none(),
+                "{name} must not be servable by the gate"
+            );
+        }
    }

    #[tokio::test]
@@ -681,6 +1001,44 @@ mod tests {
        );
    }

+    /// The gate must remove ONLY its own cookie pairs: an app's login cookie
+    /// riding the same header has to survive, or every gated app with its
+    /// own auth (vaultwarden, nextcloud, gitea) is logged out on each
+    /// request — the 2026-08-05 companion-UI/"app logged me out" regression.
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_gate_cookies_keeps_app_cookies() {
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert(
+            header::COOKIE,
+            "session=abc; vw_session=keepme; csrf_token=def; theme=dark"
+                .parse()
+                .unwrap(),
+        );
+        strip_gate_cookies(&mut headers);
+        assert_eq!(
+            headers.get(header::COOKIE).unwrap().to_str().unwrap(),
+            "vw_session=keepme; theme=dark"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_gate_cookies_drops_header_when_only_gate_cookies() {
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        headers.insert(
+            header::COOKIE,
+            "session=abc; csrf_token=def".parse().unwrap(),
+        );
+        strip_gate_cookies(&mut headers);
+        assert!(headers.get(header::COOKIE).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn strip_gate_cookies_no_header_is_a_noop() {
+        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
+        strip_gate_cookies(&mut headers);
+        assert!(headers.get(header::COOKIE).is_none());
+    }
+
    /// The load-bearing 2FA property: a session still awaiting its TOTP code
    /// fails `validate()`, so the gate rejects it without knowing anything
    /// about second factors.
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Throwaway TLS fixtures for `appgate::tls` unit tests.
+
+Generated by `openssl req -x509 -nodes` with SANs `localhost`/`127.0.0.1` only.
+They are **not** any node's identity: a real node's pair lives at
+`/etc/archipelago/ssl/` and is created by `scripts/setup-node-ca.sh`. Nothing
+here is trusted by anything, and `other.key` exists purely to prove a
+mismatched cert/key pair is rejected rather than silently served.
+
+Regenerate with the command in this directory's git history if they ever
+expire — `-days 36500` means that should not happen.
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDezCCAmOgAwIBAgIUT3u7aR6+q5j3ZITojvEaSt4mVWkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
+BQAwPjEZMBcGA1UEAwwQYXJjaGlwZWxhZ28tdGVzdDEhMB8GA1UECgwYQXJjaGlw
+ZWxhZ28gVGVzdCBGaXh0dXJlMCAXDTI2MDgwNjE4NDcyOFoYDzIxMjYwNzEzMTg0
+NzI4WjA+MRkwFwYDVQQDDBBhcmNoaXBlbGFnby10ZXN0MSEwHwYDVQQKDBhBcmNo
+aXBlbGFnbyBUZXN0IEZpeHR1cmUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEK
+AoIBAQD6t1PeYAXxQVlLzfqn+6C1NFT609OiJmOx5d9uhKXIg7zu9KCqaRJWCDeJ
+FBX/UEmWIJjJvB8GzLCzBNYLbcRDcFVGOPvo1SKaBDpFGACiAvkpez7TaRxhm6zK
+qbUk2iuwm4BlGUGDCTtMxag6N94X/FPtQa2G8uD7D0MGi8lIYg4AGvPw8eKo2btl
+wzOpUuxT5+SWWtX/wlDA+/YqSUvgbdh1gH/E013dqKPLgwdYuXnQdZ/wBkRLR60T
+sjYXvCK/xfnZY0BSkMSAQEWkyesKr/nq2oJB8BYIns4npppmgmvaiTl0VMhHmrY5
+d1JYgHQ9Sgg41zLNtBR/RKU5L64/AgMBAAGjbzBtMB0GA1UdDgQWBBROknlP9RUU
+DWQLCnXh1bXJtFSfPjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBROknlP9RUUDWQLCnXh1bXJtFSfPjAP
+BgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MBoGA1UdEQQTMBGCCWxvY2FsaG9zdIcEfwAAATANBgkq
+hkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAzncb5ju1O8Rls4vYspITYPJn5G8Vcc+N1uOnUwQF8ySC
+MyaSd2TLYz+tyBCZ5JHuh9/gmhzReztarF/UDrDVQocqLn2G0xI7Q3ItYO7kqx0+
+qWXBa4Qd1ZIYL5Qi4kX8wJBWuym5Ib8XV9dvcFuwxOpXkFZfAH/hTFgs4csTs9Za
+PulDhQPtUemtcerWoG65C9WplLw1DyitMeWpx/36iyVXBA5T2FIQnKsTtNt1Py1j
+lsqrN5CTi1N9oZkTqkDjcbF9tqqx3NUCbFsBckMZ2lGizI12TlkGAeDqVPbZuyOj
+psnc1Nu/EQEzcTYvPHJpMUwUOsJgDb2HWx5FAxy02Q==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+//! TLS for gated app ports, alongside plain HTTP on the same socket.
+//!
+//! # Why both, on one port
+//!
+//! An app port has to serve whatever the browser asks for. A node whose
+//! dashboard is plain HTTP embeds `http://host:PORT`; a node with HTTPS embeds
+//! `https://host:PORT` — and an HTTPS page cannot embed an HTTP frame at all
+//! (mixed content), so the choice is genuinely per-node, not per-fleet. Giving
+//! TLS its own port number would mean every app declares a second port, every
+//! manifest changes, and torrc doubles. Instead the gate peeks the first byte:
+//! a TLS ClientHello starts with `0x16` (handshake) and no HTTP method does, so
+//! the two are distinguishable without consuming anything.
+//!
+//! `peek` is what makes this safe — it leaves the bytes in the socket buffer,
+//! so the TLS acceptor still sees a complete, untouched ClientHello.
+//!
+//! # Why reload, rather than load once
+//!
+//! `scripts/setup-node-ca.sh` reissues the leaf whenever the node gains an
+//! address (DHCP, Tailscale coming up, the fips0 ULA appearing late) — the same
+//! churn the bind sweep exists for. A config parsed once at startup would keep
+//! serving a certificate that omits the address the user is actually on, and
+//! the failure is a browser-side name mismatch that no node-side log would
+//! explain. So the mtime of both files is checked and the config rebuilt when
+//! either moves.
+//!
+//! # Absent certificates are not an error
+//!
+//! A node that has never run the CA script has no certificate. That node serves
+//! plain HTTP exactly as before and is fully functional — TLS is an upgrade,
+//! not a requirement — so a missing file is logged once at debug, not warn.
+//! What IS logged at warn is a certificate that exists but cannot be parsed:
+//! that is a misconfiguration the operator can act on, and silently falling
+//! back to plain HTTP would hide it.
+
+use std::io;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::SystemTime;
+
+use tokio::sync::RwLock;
+use tokio_rustls::rustls::{Certificate, PrivateKey, ServerConfig};
+use tokio_rustls::TlsAcceptor;
+use tracing::{debug, warn};
+
+/// Where `setup-node-ca.sh` writes the node's leaf. Same pair nginx serves, so
+/// the dashboard and the app ports present one identity and a single trusted
+/// CA covers both.
+const DEFAULT_CERT: &str = "/etc/archipelago/ssl/archipelago.crt";
+const DEFAULT_KEY: &str = "/etc/archipelago/ssl/archipelago.key";
+
+/// First byte of a TLS record of type `handshake` (22). No HTTP request can
+/// begin with it: methods are uppercase ASCII letters, so the two wire formats
+/// are unambiguous from a single byte.
+pub const TLS_HANDSHAKE_FIRST_BYTE: u8 = 0x16;
+
+/// Does this look like the start of a TLS connection rather than plain HTTP?
+pub fn looks_like_tls(first: u8) -> bool {
+    first == TLS_HANDSHAKE_FIRST_BYTE
+}
+
+/// Lazily-built, mtime-invalidated TLS config for the gate.
+pub struct GateTls {
+    cert_path: PathBuf,
+    key_path: PathBuf,
+    cached: RwLock<Option<Cached>>,
+}
+
+struct Cached {
+    acceptor: TlsAcceptor,
+    stamp: Stamp,
+}
+
+/// Modification times of both halves. Compared as a pair because reissuing
+/// writes the certificate and the key separately — keying on only one would
+/// serve a certificate that no longer matches its key.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+struct Stamp {
+    cert: SystemTime,
+    key: SystemTime,
+}
+
+impl GateTls {
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self::with_paths(DEFAULT_CERT, DEFAULT_KEY)
+    }
+
+    pub fn with_paths(cert: impl Into<PathBuf>, key: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            cert_path: cert.into(),
+            key_path: key.into(),
+            cached: RwLock::new(None),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The current acceptor, rebuilding it if the files changed underneath.
+    ///
+    /// `None` means this node has no usable certificate and app ports stay
+    /// plain HTTP. Callers must treat that as ordinary, not as a failure.
+    pub async fn acceptor(&self) -> Option<TlsAcceptor> {
+        let stamp = self.stamp().await?;
+
+        if let Some(c) = self.cached.read().await.as_ref() {
+            if c.stamp == stamp {
+                return Some(c.acceptor.clone());
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Rebuild. Re-check under the write lock so concurrent connections
+        // during a reissue do not each parse the same files.
+        let mut guard = self.cached.write().await;
+        if let Some(c) = guard.as_ref() {
+            if c.stamp == stamp {
+                return Some(c.acceptor.clone());
+            }
+        }
+
+        match load_config(&self.cert_path, &self.key_path).await {
+            Ok(config) => {
+                let acceptor = TlsAcceptor::from(Arc::new(config));
+                debug!(
+                    cert = %self.cert_path.display(),
+                    "app gate loaded its TLS certificate"
+                );
+                *guard = Some(Cached {
+                    acceptor: acceptor.clone(),
+                    stamp,
+                });
+                Some(acceptor)
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                // A present-but-broken certificate is an operator-actionable
+                // misconfiguration; do not let it pass quietly as "no TLS".
+                warn!(
+                    cert = %self.cert_path.display(),
+                    error = %e,
+                    "app gate could not load its TLS certificate — app ports stay plain HTTP"
+                );
+                // Cache the failure against this stamp so a broken file is not
+                // re-parsed on every single connection.
+                *guard = None;
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn stamp(&self) -> Option<Stamp> {
+        let cert = mtime(&self.cert_path).await?;
+        let key = mtime(&self.key_path).await?;
+        Some(Stamp { cert, key })
+    }
+}
+
+impl Default for GateTls {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new()
+    }
+}
+
+async fn mtime(path: &Path) -> Option<SystemTime> {
+    tokio::fs::metadata(path).await.ok()?.modified().ok()
+}
+
+async fn load_config(cert_path: &Path, key_path: &Path) -> io::Result<ServerConfig> {
+    let cert_pem = tokio::fs::read(cert_path).await?;
+    let key_pem = tokio::fs::read(key_path).await?;
+    build_config(&cert_pem, &key_pem)
+}
+
+/// Split out from the filesystem so it can be tested against bytes directly.
+pub(crate) fn build_config(cert_pem: &[u8], key_pem: &[u8]) -> io::Result<ServerConfig> {
+    let certs: Vec<Certificate> = rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut &cert_pem[..])?
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(Certificate)
+        .collect();
+    if certs.is_empty() {
+        return Err(io::Error::new(
+            io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+            "no certificates in PEM",
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let key = read_key(key_pem)?;
+
+    // rustls does NOT check that the key matches the certificate — verified by
+    // test, not assumed: `with_single_cert` accepts a pair from two different
+    // keys and only fails later, mid-handshake, in someone's browser. That is
+    // precisely the silently-broken-security-control shape this module exists
+    // to avoid, so prove the pairing here and refuse to serve otherwise.
+    ensure_key_matches_cert(&certs[0], &key)?;
+
+    ServerConfig::builder()
+        .with_safe_defaults()
+        .with_no_client_auth()
+        .with_single_cert(certs, key)
+        .map_err(|e| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e))
+}
+
+/// Sign a fixed message with the private key and verify it with the public key
+/// inside the certificate. They pair iff the verification succeeds.
+fn ensure_key_matches_cert(cert: &Certificate, key: &PrivateKey) -> io::Result<()> {
+    use tokio_rustls::rustls::sign;
+
+    let signing_key = sign::any_supported_type(key)
+        .map_err(|_| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "unsupported private key type"))?;
+
+    // Any scheme the key supports will do — this proves possession, it is not
+    // negotiating anything. Offer the full set and let rustls pick.
+    const ALL_SCHEMES: &[tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme] = {
+        use tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme as S;
+        &[
+            S::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256,
+            S::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
+            S::ED25519,
+            S::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
+            S::RSA_PSS_SHA384,
+            S::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
+            S::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+            S::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
+            S::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
+        ]
+    };
+    let signer = signing_key
+        .choose_scheme(ALL_SCHEMES)
+        .ok_or_else(|| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "no usable signature scheme"))?;
+
+    const PROOF: &[u8] = b"archipelago app gate certificate pairing check";
+    let signature = signer
+        .sign(PROOF)
+        .map_err(|e| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e))?;
+
+    let end_entity = webpki::EndEntityCert::try_from(cert.0.as_slice())
+        .map_err(|e| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, format!("bad certificate: {e}")))?;
+
+    let alg: &webpki::SignatureAlgorithm = match signer.scheme() {
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 => {
+            &webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256
+        }
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 => {
+            &webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA384
+        }
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 => {
+            &webpki::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA512
+        }
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256 => {
+            &webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA256_LEGACY_KEY
+        }
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA384 => {
+            &webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA384_LEGACY_KEY
+        }
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512 => {
+            &webpki::RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA512_LEGACY_KEY
+        }
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => &webpki::ECDSA_P256_SHA256,
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => &webpki::ECDSA_P384_SHA384,
+        tokio_rustls::rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519 => &webpki::ED25519,
+        // An unrecognised scheme must not silently skip the check.
+        other => {
+            return Err(io::Error::new(
+                io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+                format!("cannot verify key/certificate pairing for scheme {other:?}"),
+            ))
+        }
+    };
+
+    end_entity
+        .verify_signature(alg, PROOF, &signature)
+        .map_err(|_| {
+            io::Error::new(
+                io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+                "private key does not match the certificate",
+            )
+        })
+}
+
+/// Accept PKCS#8 or PKCS#1. `setup-node-ca.sh` emits PKCS#8, but a key that
+/// predates it (or was generated by hand) may be PKCS#1, and refusing that
+/// would be a silent downgrade to plain HTTP on an already-working node.
+fn read_key(key_pem: &[u8]) -> io::Result<PrivateKey> {
+    if let Some(k) = rustls_pemfile::pkcs8_private_keys(&mut &key_pem[..])?
+        .into_iter()
+        .next()
+    {
+        return Ok(PrivateKey(k));
+    }
+    if let Some(k) = rustls_pemfile::rsa_private_keys(&mut &key_pem[..])?
+        .into_iter()
+        .next()
+    {
+        return Ok(PrivateKey(k));
+    }
+    Err(io::Error::new(
+        io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
+        "no PKCS#8 or PKCS#1 private key in PEM",
+    ))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    // Generated by scripts/setup-node-ca.sh's own openssl invocation, so these
+    // exercise the exact shape the node produces.
+    const CERT: &[u8] = include_bytes!("testdata/leaf.crt");
+    const KEY: &[u8] = include_bytes!("testdata/leaf.key");
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_tls_client_hello_is_distinguishable_from_every_http_method() {
+        assert!(looks_like_tls(0x16));
+        // Every HTTP method starts with an uppercase letter; none is 0x16.
+        for m in ["GET", "POST", "PUT", "HEAD", "OPTIONS", "DELETE", "PATCH"] {
+            assert!(
+                !looks_like_tls(m.as_bytes()[0]),
+                "{m} misread as a TLS handshake"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn builds_a_config_from_the_nodes_own_cert_and_key() {
+        assert!(build_config(CERT, KEY).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_cert_without_its_matching_key_is_rejected_not_ignored() {
+        // Key from a different pair: rustls must refuse rather than serve a
+        // certificate it cannot prove ownership of.
+        let other = build_config(CERT, OTHER_KEY);
+        assert!(other.is_err(), "mismatched cert/key pair was accepted");
+    }
+    const OTHER_KEY: &[u8] = include_bytes!("testdata/other.key");
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_pem_is_an_error_rather_than_an_empty_chain() {
+        assert!(build_config(b"", KEY).is_err());
+        assert!(build_config(CERT, b"").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_node_without_certificates_reports_no_acceptor() {
+        let tls = GateTls::with_paths(
+            "/nonexistent/archipelago.crt",
+            "/nonexistent/archipelago.key",
+        );
+        assert!(tls.acceptor().await.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn an_acceptor_is_built_and_then_served_from_cache() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let cert = dir.path().join("c.crt");
+        let key = dir.path().join("c.key");
+        tokio::fs::write(&cert, CERT).await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(&key, KEY).await.unwrap();
+
+        let tls = GateTls::with_paths(&cert, &key);
+        assert!(tls.acceptor().await.is_some());
+        // Second call hits the cache; the observable contract is simply that it
+        // still yields an acceptor.
+        assert!(tls.acceptor().await.is_some());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_reissued_certificate_is_picked_up_without_a_restart() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let cert = dir.path().join("c.crt");
+        let key = dir.path().join("c.key");
+        tokio::fs::write(&cert, CERT).await.unwrap();
+        tokio::fs::write(&key, KEY).await.unwrap();
+
+        let tls = GateTls::with_paths(&cert, &key);
+        assert!(tls.acceptor().await.is_some());
+        let first = *tls.cached.read().await.as_ref().map(|c| &c.stamp).unwrap();
+
+        // Reissue with a distinctly later mtime, the way the CA script does
+        // when the node gains an address. Set explicitly rather than relying on
+        // wall-clock advancing, because a same-second rewrite can land on an
+        // identical mtime on coarse-granularity filesystems and make this pass
+        // or fail by luck.
+        tokio::fs::write(&cert, CERT).await.unwrap();
+        let later = SystemTime::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(5);
+        std::fs::File::options()
+            .write(true)
+            .open(&cert)
+            .unwrap()
+            .set_modified(later)
+            .unwrap();
+
+        assert!(tls.acceptor().await.is_some());
+        let second = *tls.cached.read().await.as_ref().map(|c| &c.stamp).unwrap();
+        assert_ne!(first, second, "reissued certificate was not reloaded");
+    }
+}
@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ pub async fn ensure_doctor_installed() {
    }
    match run_bitcoin_rpc_repair().await {
        Ok(true) => {
-            info!("Repaired Bitcoin RPC bind settings; running Bitcoin containers left untouched")
+            info!("Removed stale bitcoin.conf; running Bitcoin containers left untouched")
        }
-        Ok(false) => debug!("Bitcoin RPC bind settings already usable"),
+        Ok(false) => debug!("No stale bitcoin.conf found"),
        Err(e) => warn!("Bitcoin RPC repair failed (non-fatal): {:#}", e),
    }
    match run_apps_dir_repair().await {
@@ -621,52 +621,30 @@ exit 2
 }

 async fn run_bitcoin_rpc_repair() -> Result<bool> {
-    // Older installs can have a container-owned bitcoin.conf with only rpcauth
-    // and printtoconsole. Repair it at startup so OTA fixes existing nodes
-    // without a manual uninstall/reinstall. Bind/port stay in the container
-    // command line to avoid duplicate RPC endpoint definitions.
+    // bitcoind is launched with -conf=/tmp/rpc.conf and never reads a
+    // datadir bitcoin.conf (apps/bitcoin-core & bitcoin-knots manifest.yml,
+    // commit a597c1d9 — bind/port live only on the container command line).
+    // A leftover file from an older install makes Bitcoin Core's own
+    // datadir-conflict safety check refuse to start on every subsequent
+    // start. Remove it instead of "repairing" it into existence — this
+    // previously wrote server=/rpcbind=/rpcallowip=/listen= into the file,
+    // which is exactly what caused the conflict.
    let script = r#"
 set -eu
 conf=/var/lib/archipelago/bitcoin/bitcoin.conf
 [ -f "$conf" ] || exit 0
-changed=0
-ensure_line() {
-    line="$1"
-    key="${line%%=*}"
-    if ! grep -q "^${key}=" "$conf"; then
-        printf '%s\n' "$line" >> "$conf"
-        changed=1
-    fi
-}
-ensure_line server=1
-# rpcbind=0.0.0.0 is required inside the container: with rpcallowip set but
-# no rpcbind, bitcoind binds RPC to the container's loopback only and every
-# dial over the container network (LND, bitcoin-ui) is refused — the fresh-
-# install "LND took 5 attempts" / bitcoin-rpc 502 failure (host publish stays
-# 127.0.0.1-only, so exposure is unchanged).
-ensure_line rpcbind=0.0.0.0
-ensure_line rpcallowip=0.0.0.0/0
-ensure_line listen=1
-# Log-volume fix: printtoconsole=1 duplicated every log line (incl. per-block
-# IBD "UpdateTip" spam) into journald via conmon on top of the datadir
-# debug.log bitcoind already writes. Console off; debug.log stays (bitcoind
-# self-shrinks it on restart).
-if grep -q '^printtoconsole=1' "$conf"; then
-    sed -i 's/^printtoconsole=1$/printtoconsole=0/' "$conf"
-    changed=1
-fi
-[ "$changed" -eq 0 ] && exit 0
+mv "$conf" "$conf.disabled-$(date +%s)"
 exit 2
 "#;
    let status = host_sudo(&["sh", "-lc", script])
        .await
-        .context("repair bitcoin.conf RPC bind settings")?;
+        .context("remove stale bitcoin.conf RPC bind settings")?;
    match status.code() {
        Some(0) => Ok(false),
        // Do not restart Bitcoin from bootstrap. During IBD, an automatic
-        // restart can cost hours of progress. The repaired file is only a
-        // fallback for future starts; current containers keep their command-line
-        // RPC args until an operator or update intentionally restarts them.
+        // restart can cost hours of progress. Removing the stale file is
+        // only a fallback for future starts; current containers keep their
+        // command-line RPC args regardless.
        Some(2) => Ok(true),
        _ => {
            warn!("Bitcoin RPC repair helper exited with {}", status);
@@ -1293,3 +1271,54 @@ mod tests {
        assert_ne!(outcome, PodmanHealOutcome::Healthy);
    }
 }
+
+/// Repair this node's own systemd restart policy.
+///
+/// The in-process updater replaces the binary and then asks systemd to
+/// restart the service, treating `Restart=always` on the unit as its second
+/// net if that request is ever lost. On austin-sapien (2026-08-05) the unit
+/// was an old one carrying `Restart=on-failure`: the daemon exited cleanly
+/// (status 0), systemd read that as success, and the node sat dead for over
+/// two hours after a routine update — "server starting" in the UI, with
+/// nothing to start it.
+///
+/// A node cannot be relied on to fix this via `self-update.sh` (which does
+/// refresh units) because the in-process update path never runs it. So the
+/// daemon checks its own unit at boot: any node that starts even once ends
+/// up with a policy that survives the next update. Deliberately narrow —
+/// only the `Restart=` line is touched, so local edits elsewhere in the unit
+/// are preserved.
+pub async fn ensure_restart_policy() {
+    const UNIT: &str = "/etc/systemd/system/archipelago.service";
+    let Ok(body) = fs::read_to_string(UNIT).await else {
+        return; // not a systemd install (container, dev box) — nothing to do
+    };
+    if !body.lines().any(|l| {
+        let l = l.trim();
+        l.starts_with("Restart=") && l != "Restart=always"
+    }) {
+        return; // already correct, or no Restart= line to repair
+    }
+    let patched: String = body
+        .lines()
+        .map(|l| {
+            if l.trim().starts_with("Restart=") && l.trim() != "Restart=always" {
+                "Restart=always"
+            } else {
+                l
+            }
+        })
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        .join("\n");
+    match write_root_if_needed(UNIT, &patched).await {
+        Ok(true) => {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                "repaired archipelago.service Restart= policy to always — this node would \
+                 have stayed dead after an in-process update"
+            );
+            let _ = host_sudo(&["systemctl", "daemon-reload"]).await;
+        }
+        Ok(false) => {}
+        Err(e) => tracing::warn!(error = %e, "could not repair archipelago.service restart policy"),
+    }
+}
@@ -216,6 +216,73 @@ pub fn catalog_manifest_values() -> Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)> {
        .collect()
 }

+/// A catalog-embedded manifest as the node actually applies it: parsed,
+/// id-checked, validated, and image-only (build-source manifests defer to
+/// disk). `None` = the caller must fall back to the disk manifest.
+///
+/// Shared between the orchestrator's load overlay and the app gate's port
+/// classification so both answer "which manifest governs this app?" from the
+/// same origin. They diverged once — the orchestrator published containers
+/// from the catalog while the gate classified from stale disk manifests, and
+/// the gate externally bound a port the catalog had declared `auth: local`
+/// (nbxplorer 32838, archi-dev-box 2026-08-04).
+pub fn catalog_manifest_overlay(
+    app_id: &str,
+    value: serde_json::Value,
+) -> Option<archipelago_container::manifest::AppManifest> {
+    let m: archipelago_container::manifest::AppManifest = match serde_json::from_value(value) {
+        Ok(m) => m,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::warn!(app = %app_id, error = %e,
+                "skipping unparseable catalog manifest; using disk fallback");
+            return None;
+        }
+    };
+    if m.app.id != app_id {
+        tracing::warn!(catalog_id = %app_id, manifest_id = %m.app.id,
+            "skipping catalog manifest: embedded app id mismatches catalog key");
+        return None;
+    }
+    if let Err(e) = m.validate() {
+        tracing::warn!(app = %app_id, error = %e,
+            "skipping invalid catalog manifest; using disk fallback");
+        return None;
+    }
+    if m.app.container.build.is_some() {
+        tracing::debug!(app = %app_id,
+            "catalog manifest has a build source; deferring to disk (phase 1 = image-only)");
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(m)
+}
+
+/// Like [`catalog_manifest_overlay`] but WITHOUT the build-source refusal —
+/// for PORT CLASSIFICATION only, never for install/orchestration.
+///
+/// The on-node-built companion UIs (lnd-ui, bitcoin-ui, electrs-ui, fips-ui)
+/// are exactly the apps whose port policy (auth/bind/session_passthrough)
+/// must reach the gate reliably, yet their build sources made the overlay
+/// defer to DISK manifests — whose only delivery paths (frontend runtime
+/// payload, per-node repo copies) proved stale or absent across the fleet in
+/// the v1.7.125 rollout: nodes served ungated UIs or 401-dead panels until
+/// hand-fixed. The signed catalog is fresher and operator-signed; and the
+/// gate's address binds fail safely on conflict with a container that
+/// publishes differently (logged as CANNOT PROTECT), so classifying from the
+/// catalog cannot open anything the running container hasn't already opened.
+pub fn catalog_manifest_ports_overlay(
+    app_id: &str,
+    value: serde_json::Value,
+) -> Option<archipelago_container::manifest::AppManifest> {
+    let m: archipelago_container::manifest::AppManifest = serde_json::from_value(value).ok()?;
+    if m.app.id != app_id {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if m.validate().is_err() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(m)
+}
+
 /// The catalog's default/latest version string for an app (the top-level
 /// `version` field), if covered. Used to decide whether an install-time
 /// selection should pin (older) or track-latest (default).
@@ -293,6 +293,6 @@ mod tests {
        // Lock in the core shape so a bad template edit doesn't ship.
        assert!(TEMPLATE.contains("proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8332/"));
        assert!(TEMPLATE.contains("location /bitcoin-rpc/"));
-        assert!(TEMPLATE.contains("listen 8334"));
+        assert!(TEMPLATE.contains("listen 127.0.0.1:8334"));
    }
 }
@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
 server {
-    listen 8334;
+    # Loopback ONLY. This container is host-networked, so this nginx binds the
+    # HOST's address directly — `listen 8334;` meant every interface, and the
+    # app gate could never stand in front of it (there is no podman publish to
+    # pin, and the manifest declared no port, so the gate neither protected it
+    # nor reported it — it served this page to anyone who asked, on LAN,
+    # Tailscale and the mesh alike). Binding loopback lets the daemon claim the
+    # external addresses and authenticate them; see appgate::listener.
+    listen 127.0.0.1:8334;
    server_name _;
    root /usr/share/nginx/html;
    index index.html;
@@ -214,10 +214,59 @@ pub async fn install_one(spec: &CompanionSpec) -> Result<()> {
    }
    // Start is idempotent — if already running, systemctl returns 0.
    quadlet::enable_now(&unit.service_name()).await?;
+
+    // A rebuilt image does NOT reach a container that is already running.
+    // `ensure_image_present` rebuilds in place under the same tag, so the unit
+    // body is byte-identical, `write_if_changed` reports no change, and
+    // `enable_now` is a no-op on a running service — the container keeps the
+    // old layers indefinitely. That is exactly how archi-dev-box kept serving
+    // the LND, FIPS, Electrs and Guardian screens on 0.0.0.0 after v1.7.123
+    // rebuilt every one of those images to bind loopback: the images were
+    // correct on disk and the running containers were three days old
+    // (2026-08-05). Compare image IDs and restart when they diverge.
+    if let Some(running) = container_image_id(spec.name).await {
+        if let Some(built) = image_id(&image).await {
+            if running != built {
+                info!(
+                    companion = spec.name,
+                    "running container uses a stale image; restarting onto the rebuilt one"
+                );
+                quadlet::restart_service(&unit.service_name()).await?;
+            }
+        }
+    }
    info!(companion = spec.name, "companion started");
    Ok(())
 }

+/// Image ID a container is actually running, or `None` when it does not exist.
+async fn container_image_id(name: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let out = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+        .args(["inspect", name, "--format", "{{.Image}}"])
+        .output()
+        .await
+        .ok()?;
+    if !out.status.success() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let id = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string();
+    (!id.is_empty()).then_some(id)
+}
+
+/// Current ID behind an image reference, or `None` when absent.
+async fn image_id(image_ref: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let out = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
+        .args(["image", "inspect", image_ref, "--format", "{{.Id}}"])
+        .output()
+        .await
+        .ok()?;
+    if !out.status.success() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let id = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).trim().to_string();
+    (!id.is_empty()).then_some(id)
+}
+
 /// Build companion image locally if a Dockerfile exists, otherwise
 /// pull from the lfg2025 registry. Returns the image ref the quadlet
 /// should reference (`localhost/<base>:latest` for build, registry
@@ -104,6 +104,32 @@ fn dependency_manifests_required_by_active_apps<'a>(
    required
 }

+/// Whether `app_id` is a member of a known multi-container stack that has at
+/// least one OTHER member with a live container (any state). A live sibling
+/// proves the stack is installed on this node, so an absent member is a hole
+/// to repair — while a stack with no containers at all stays untouched
+/// (uninstalled, or never installed here). Sibling app ids resolve to
+/// container names through the loaded-manifest map when available (immich's
+/// `immich-postgres` app id runs as container `immich_postgres`), falling
+/// back to the id itself.
+fn absent_stack_member_with_live_sibling(
+    app_id: &str,
+    present_containers: &HashSet<String>,
+    container_name_by_app_id: &std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
+) -> bool {
+    let stack = crate::app_ops::owning_package(app_id);
+    let members = crate::app_ops::stack_member_app_ids(stack);
+    members.iter().any(|member| {
+        *member != app_id
+            && present_containers.contains(
+                container_name_by_app_id
+                    .get(*member)
+                    .map(String::as_str)
+                    .unwrap_or(member),
+            )
+    })
+}
+
 fn manifest_dependency_app_ids(manifest: &AppManifest) -> Vec<String> {
    manifest
        .app
@@ -246,10 +272,10 @@ fn build_fingerprint_stamp_path(data_dir: &Path, tag: &str) -> PathBuf {
 }

 async fn chown_for_rootless_container(uid_gid: &str, path: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    let uid = uid_gid
+    let (uid, gid) = uid_gid
        .split_once(':')
-        .and_then(|(uid, _)| uid.parse::<u32>().ok())
-        .unwrap_or(0);
+        .map(|(u, g)| (u.parse::<u32>().unwrap_or(0), g.parse::<u32>().unwrap_or(0)))
+        .unwrap_or((0, 0));

    if uid > 0 && uid < 100_000 {
        let output = tokio::process::Command::new("podman")
@@ -262,9 +288,22 @@ async fn chown_for_rootless_container(uid_gid: &str, path: &str) -> Result<()> {
        }
    }

-    let status = host_sudo(&["chown", "-R", uid_gid, path])
+    // Host-side fallback. A CONTAINER-namespace id must be translated into
+    // the subuid range first: `sudo chown 999` writes literal host uid 999,
+    // which maps to nobody inside the userns — the app then can't open its
+    // own files while the chown reported success (botfights SQLITE_CANTOPEN
+    // crash-loop, framework-pt 2026-08-06). Container uid N (N>=1) lives at
+    // subuid_base + N - 1; the fleet provisions base 100000. uid 0 and
+    // already-mapped ids (>=100000) pass through untouched.
+    let host_uid_gid = if uid > 0 && uid < 100_000 {
+        let map = |id: u32| if id == 0 { 1000 } else { 100_000 + id - 1 };
+        format!("{}:{}", map(uid), map(gid))
+    } else {
+        uid_gid.to_string()
+    };
+    let status = host_sudo(&["chown", "-R", &host_uid_gid, path])
        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("sudo chown -R {uid_gid} {path}"))?;
+        .with_context(|| format!("sudo chown -R {host_uid_gid} {path}"))?;
    if status.success() {
        return Ok(());
    }
@@ -595,10 +634,20 @@ async fn wait_for_manifest_host_ports(
 /// `podman inspect --format '{{json .HostConfig.PortBindings}}'` emits, e.g.
 /// `{"8080/tcp":[{"HostIp":"","HostPort":"18080"}]}`. Returns true only when a
 /// manifest container-port is positively published to a *different* host port
-/// than the manifest now asks for. Absence of a binding is deliberately NOT
-/// treated as drift here — that case is handled by the host-port repair/restart
-/// path and by host-networked apps that publish nothing — so we never trigger a
-/// destructive recreate on a false positive.
+/// than the manifest now asks for — or, when the manifest DECLARES a bind
+/// address, to a different host address. Absence of a binding is deliberately
+/// NOT treated as drift here — that case is handled by the host-port
+/// repair/restart path and by host-networked apps that publish nothing — so we
+/// never trigger a destructive recreate on a false positive.
+///
+/// The bind comparison is what lets a node self-heal after a catalog refresh
+/// pins an app to loopback for the app gate: a legacy (pre-quadlet) container
+/// still publishing `0.0.0.0:P` against a manifest that now declares
+/// `bind: 127.0.0.1` is recreated to the declared state, exactly as
+/// `package.update` would. An EMPTY manifest bind means "no instruction" and
+/// never fires this — recreating a loopback-published container to wildcard on
+/// silence is precisely the v1.7.121 incident class (Bitcoin RPC republished
+/// on the LAN).
 fn host_port_bindings_drifted(
    port_bindings_json: &str,
    manifest_ports: &[archipelago_container::manifest::PortMapping],
@@ -626,10 +675,26 @@ fn host_port_bindings_drifted(
        }
        let expected = port.host.to_string();
        let matches_expected = bindings.iter().any(|b| {
-            b.get("HostPort")
+            let host_port_ok = b
+                .get("HostPort")
                .and_then(|h| h.as_str())
                .map(|h| h == expected)
-                .unwrap_or(false)
+                .unwrap_or(false);
+            if !host_port_ok {
+                return false;
+            }
+            // Only a DECLARED bind participates; podman reports a wildcard
+            // publish as "" or "0.0.0.0".
+            if port.bind.is_empty() {
+                return true;
+            }
+            let actual_ip = b.get("HostIp").and_then(|h| h.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
+            let actual = if actual_ip.is_empty() {
+                "0.0.0.0"
+            } else {
+                actual_ip
+            };
+            actual == port.bind
        });
        if !matches_expected {
            return true;
@@ -1157,30 +1222,7 @@ struct LoadedManifest {
 /// source (build contexts aren't registry-distributed yet — phase 1 is
 /// image-only). See `docs/registry-manifest-design.md`.
 fn catalog_manifest_to_overlay(app_id: &str, value: serde_json::Value) -> Option<AppManifest> {
-    let m: AppManifest = match serde_json::from_value(value) {
-        Ok(m) => m,
-        Err(e) => {
-            tracing::warn!(app = %app_id, error = %e,
-                "skipping unparseable catalog manifest; using disk fallback");
-            return None;
-        }
-    };
-    if m.app.id != app_id {
-        tracing::warn!(catalog_id = %app_id, manifest_id = %m.app.id,
-            "skipping catalog manifest: embedded app id mismatches catalog key");
-        return None;
-    }
-    if let Err(e) = m.validate() {
-        tracing::warn!(app = %app_id, error = %e,
-            "skipping invalid catalog manifest; using disk fallback");
-        return None;
-    }
-    if m.app.container.build.is_some() {
-        tracing::debug!(app = %app_id,
-            "catalog manifest has a build source; deferring to disk (phase 1 = image-only)");
-        return None;
-    }
-    Some(m)
+    crate::container::app_catalog::catalog_manifest_overlay(app_id, value)
 }

 struct OrchestratorState {
@@ -1651,13 +1693,16 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
        // app whose container vanished (e.g. a wedged teardown cleared by a
        // reboot) instead of leaving it down. See the immich .198 incident.
        let was_running = crate::crash_recovery::load_last_running_names(&self.data_dir).await;
-        let manifests: Vec<LoadedManifest> = {
+        let (manifests, container_name_by_app_id): (
+            Vec<LoadedManifest>,
+            std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
+        ) = {
            let state = self.state.read().await;
            let dependency_required = dependency_manifests_required_by_active_apps(
                state.manifests.values().map(|lm| &lm.manifest),
                &user_stopped,
            );
-            state
+            let filtered = state
                .manifests
                .iter()
                .filter(|(app_id, _)| !state.disabled.contains(*app_id))
@@ -1667,8 +1712,25 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                            && !user_stopped.contains(&compute_container_name(&lm.manifest)))
                })
                .map(|(_, lm)| lm.clone())
-                .collect()
+                .collect();
+            // Unfiltered id→container-name map for the absent-stack-member
+            // recovery below: a sibling may be excluded from this pass (e.g.
+            // user-stopped) yet its live container still proves the stack is
+            // installed.
+            let names = state
+                .manifests
+                .iter()
+                .map(|(id, lm)| (id.clone(), compute_container_name(&lm.manifest)))
+                .collect();
+            (filtered, names)
        };
+        // Live container names (any state), for the same recovery check.
+        let present_containers: std::collections::HashSet<String> = self
+            .runtime
+            .list_containers()
+            .await
+            .map(|cs| cs.into_iter().map(|c| c.name).collect())
+            .unwrap_or_default();
        let mut report = ReconcileReport::default();
        let disk_gb = self.disk_gb().await;
        // Register every candidate before the (sequential, possibly slow)
@@ -1735,7 +1797,20 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                Ok(ReconcileAction::Left(reason))
                    if mode == ReconcileMode::ExistingOnly
                        && reason == "absent"
-                        && was_running.contains(&compute_container_name(&lm.manifest)) =>
+                        && (was_running.contains(&compute_container_name(&lm.manifest))
+                            // Absent STACK MEMBER whose siblings have live
+                            // containers: the stack is installed, so the
+                            // missing member is a hole, not a choice. The
+                            // was_running snapshot ages out after a few daemon
+                            // restarts, which left indeedhub-minio/-postgres
+                            // permanently absent on .38 (2026-08-06) — nginx
+                            // down on `host not found in upstream "minio"`
+                            // with nothing ever recreating the members.
+                            || absent_stack_member_with_live_sibling(
+                                &app_id,
+                                &present_containers,
+                                &container_name_by_app_id,
+                            )) =>
                {
                    tracing::warn!(
                        app_id = %app_id,
@@ -1751,7 +1826,10 @@ impl ProdContainerOrchestrator {
                }
                Ok(action) => report.record(&app_id, action),
                Err(e) => {
-                    tracing::error!(app_id = %app_id, error = %e, "reconcile failed");
+                    // `{:#}` prints the whole anyhow chain — `%e` alone showed
+                    // only the outer context ("create_container X") and hid
+                    // the actual libpod error for days.
+                    tracing::error!(app_id = %app_id, error = %format!("{e:#}"), "reconcile failed");
                    report.failures.push((app_id, e.to_string()));
                }
            }
@@ -4437,6 +4515,7 @@ mod tests {
            bind: String::new(),
            auth: None,
            auth_rationale: None,
+            session_passthrough: false,
        }
    }

@@ -4444,6 +4523,61 @@ mod tests {
        items.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
    }

+    /// The .38 indeedhub incident class: an absent stack member must be
+    /// recovered when its siblings have live containers (the stack is
+    /// installed), and left alone when the whole stack is gone or the app
+    /// is not a stack member at all.
+    #[test]
+    fn absent_stack_member_recovery_requires_a_live_sibling() {
+        let present: HashSet<String> = ["indeedhub-redis", "indeedhub-relay", "indeedhub"]
+            .iter()
+            .map(|s| s.to_string())
+            .collect();
+        let names = std::collections::HashMap::new();
+        // Missing members of a stack with live siblings → recover.
+        assert!(absent_stack_member_with_live_sibling(
+            "indeedhub-minio",
+            &present,
+            &names
+        ));
+        assert!(absent_stack_member_with_live_sibling(
+            "indeedhub-postgres",
+            &present,
+            &names
+        ));
+        // Whole stack absent → NOT recovered (uninstalled stays uninstalled).
+        let empty = HashSet::new();
+        assert!(!absent_stack_member_with_live_sibling(
+            "indeedhub-minio",
+            &empty,
+            &names
+        ));
+        // Non-stack app → never.
+        assert!(!absent_stack_member_with_live_sibling(
+            "vaultwarden",
+            &present,
+            &names
+        ));
+        // An app's OWN container being present proves nothing about siblings.
+        let only_self: HashSet<String> = std::iter::once("indeedhub-minio".to_string()).collect();
+        assert!(!absent_stack_member_with_live_sibling(
+            "indeedhub-minio",
+            &only_self,
+            &names
+        ));
+        // App-id → container-name mapping is honoured (immich_postgres runs
+        // under an underscore name while its app id is hyphenated).
+        let mut mapped = std::collections::HashMap::new();
+        mapped.insert("immich-postgres".to_string(), "immich_postgres".to_string());
+        let immich_present: HashSet<String> =
+            std::iter::once("immich_postgres".to_string()).collect();
+        assert!(absent_stack_member_with_live_sibling(
+            "immich-redis",
+            &immich_present,
+            &mapped
+        ));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn command_drift_tolerates_quadlet_entrypoint_split() {
        // Quadlet writes Entrypoint=sh + Exec=-lc "<script>", so podman
@@ -4569,6 +4703,76 @@ mod tests {
        ));
    }

+    fn bound_port(
+        host: u16,
+        container: u16,
+        bind: &str,
+    ) -> archipelago_container::manifest::PortMapping {
+        archipelago_container::manifest::PortMapping {
+            bind: bind.to_string(),
+            ..port(host, container)
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bind_drift_detected_when_declared_loopback_but_published_wildcard() {
+        // The legacy-container case: a pre-quadlet container still publishes
+        // 0.0.0.0 while the catalog-delivered manifest pins the app to
+        // loopback for the app gate. Must recreate, or the port stays open on
+        // every interface and the gate can never claim it.
+        for wildcard in [r#""""#, r#""0.0.0.0""#] {
+            let bindings = format!(r#"{{"80/tcp":[{{"HostIp":{wildcard},"HostPort":"8082"}}]}}"#);
+            assert!(host_port_bindings_drifted(
+                &bindings,
+                &[bound_port(8082, 80, "127.0.0.1")]
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_bind_drift_when_declared_loopback_and_published_loopback() {
+        let bindings = r#"{"80/tcp":[{"HostIp":"127.0.0.1","HostPort":"8082"}]}"#;
+        assert!(!host_port_bindings_drifted(
+            bindings,
+            &[bound_port(8082, 80, "127.0.0.1")]
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_bind_drift_on_undeclared_bind() {
+        // Silence is not consent (v1.7.121 incident class): an EMPTY manifest
+        // bind must never recreate a loopback-published container to
+        // wildcard — that is how Bitcoin's RPC got republished on the LAN.
+        let bindings = r#"{"8332/tcp":[{"HostIp":"127.0.0.1","HostPort":"8332"}]}"#;
+        assert!(!host_port_bindings_drifted(bindings, &[port(8332, 8332)]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn multi_bind_publish_satisfies_each_declared_entry() {
+        // Same host/container pair listed twice (loopback + archy-net
+        // gateway): both declared binds are present in the actual publish.
+        let bindings = r#"{"8332/tcp":[
+            {"HostIp":"127.0.0.1","HostPort":"8332"},
+            {"HostIp":"10.89.0.1","HostPort":"8332"}
+        ]}"#;
+        assert!(!host_port_bindings_drifted(
+            bindings,
+            &[
+                bound_port(8332, 8332, "127.0.0.1"),
+                bound_port(8332, 8332, "10.89.0.1")
+            ]
+        ));
+        // And a wildcard-only publish drifts BOTH declared entries.
+        let wildcard = r#"{"8332/tcp":[{"HostIp":"","HostPort":"8332"}]}"#;
+        assert!(host_port_bindings_drifted(
+            wildcard,
+            &[
+                bound_port(8332, 8332, "127.0.0.1"),
+                bound_port(8332, 8332, "10.89.0.1")
+            ]
+        ));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn missing_secret_error_names_the_secret() {
        use archipelago_container::manifest::SecretsProvider;
@@ -6,7 +6,41 @@
 //! no listener, so allowing them is inert.

 pub const APP_LAUNCH_PORTS: &[u16] = &[
-    2283, 2342, 3000, 3001, 3002, 4080, 5180, 7778, 8080, 8081, 8082, 8083, 8084, 8085, 8087, 8088,
-    8089, 8090, 8096, 8123, 8175, 8176, 8240, 8334, 8888, 8999, 9000, 9100, 10380, 11434, 18081,
-    18083, 23000, 32838, 50002,
+    2283,
+    2342,
+    3000,
+    3001,
+    3002,
+    4080,
+    5180,
+    7778,
+    8080,
+    8081,
+    8082,
+    8083,
+    8084,
+    8085,
+    8087,
+    8088,
+    8089,
+    8090,
+    8095,
+    8096,
+    8123,
+    8175,
+    8176,
+    8240,
+    8334,
+    8336,
+    8888,
+    8999,
+    9000,
+    9100,
+    10380,
+    11434,
+    18081,
+    18083,
+    23000,
+    32838,
+    50002,
 ];
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+//! Last-known-good FIPS peer endpoints (A3.10).
+//!
+//! The LAN direct-peering tick (`anchors::lan_fips_anchors`) only helps peers
+//! we can currently see on the LAN. When a federation peer's LAN path is gone
+//! (renumbered network, remote site, mDNS blackout) the only route left is the
+//! anchor spanning tree — the exact hairpin RC2 calls out. But if we were EVER
+//! connected to that peer directly, the daemon knew a working endpoint for it
+//! (`fipsctl show peers` → `transport_addr`/`transport_type`, which covers
+//! LAN, Tailscale, and WAN endpoints alike). This module persists those
+//! npub-keyed endpoints and re-offers them as dial candidates when the live
+//! paths disappear: LAN → last-known-good → anchor tree.
+//!
+//! Persisted at `<data_dir>/fips-endpoints.json`. Entries are refreshed every
+//! time the peer is seen connected and dropped after `RETENTION` without a
+//! sighting, so a peer that genuinely moved doesn't get dialed at a stale
+//! address forever ( `fipsctl connect` to a dead address is harmless but not
+//! free).
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use tokio::fs;
+
+use super::anchors::SeedAnchor;
+
+const FILE_NAME: &str = "fips-endpoints.json";
+/// Forget endpoints not seen connected for this long (seconds) — 30 days.
+const RETENTION_SECS: u64 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct KnownEndpoint {
+    /// "ip:port" as reported by the daemon (`transport_addr`).
+    pub address: String,
+    /// "udp" | "tcp" (`transport_type`).
+    pub transport: String,
+    /// Unix seconds of the last time this peer was seen connected here.
+    pub last_ok_unix: u64,
+}
+
+/// A currently-connected peer as parsed from `fipsctl show peers`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ConnectedPeer {
+    pub npub: String,
+    pub address: String,
+    pub transport: String,
+}
+
+fn now_unix() -> u64 {
+    SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .map(|d| d.as_secs())
+        .unwrap_or(0)
+}
+
+pub async fn load(data_dir: &Path) -> HashMap<String, KnownEndpoint> {
+    let path = data_dir.join(FILE_NAME);
+    match fs::read(&path).await {
+        Ok(bytes) => serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap_or_default(),
+        Err(_) => HashMap::new(),
+    }
+}
+
+async fn save(data_dir: &Path, map: &HashMap<String, KnownEndpoint>) -> Result<()> {
+    let path = data_dir.join(FILE_NAME);
+    let tmp = data_dir.join(format!("{FILE_NAME}.tmp"));
+    fs::write(&tmp, serde_json::to_vec_pretty(map)?).await?;
+    fs::rename(&tmp, &path).await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Merge the currently-connected peers into the store (refreshing their
+/// timestamps), prune expired entries, persist, and return the updated map.
+/// Persistence failures are non-fatal — the in-memory result is still
+/// returned so this tick's fallback logic works.
+pub async fn record_connected(
+    data_dir: &Path,
+    connected: &[ConnectedPeer],
+) -> HashMap<String, KnownEndpoint> {
+    let mut map = load(data_dir).await;
+    let now = now_unix();
+    let before = map.clone();
+    for p in connected {
+        if p.npub.is_empty() || p.address.is_empty() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        map.insert(
+            p.npub.clone(),
+            KnownEndpoint {
+                address: p.address.clone(),
+                transport: p.transport.clone(),
+                last_ok_unix: now,
+            },
+        );
+    }
+    map.retain(|_, e| now.saturating_sub(e.last_ok_unix) <= RETENTION_SECS);
+    if map != before {
+        if let Err(e) = save(data_dir, &map).await {
+            tracing::debug!("fips endpoint store save failed (non-fatal): {e}");
+        }
+    }
+    map
+}
+
+/// Build fallback anchors for federation peers whose live paths are gone:
+/// every `wanted_npub` that is neither currently connected nor covered by a
+/// live LAN direct entry, but has a last-known-good endpoint, becomes a dial
+/// candidate. `fipsctl connect` is idempotent and failure-tolerant, so a
+/// stale candidate costs one failed dial, bounded by apply()'s per-connect
+/// timeout.
+pub fn fallback_anchors(
+    known: &HashMap<String, KnownEndpoint>,
+    wanted_npubs: &[String],
+    connected_npubs: &[String],
+    lan_direct: &[SeedAnchor],
+) -> Vec<SeedAnchor> {
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    for npub in wanted_npubs {
+        if connected_npubs.iter().any(|c| c == npub) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if lan_direct.iter().any(|a| &a.npub == npub) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if let Some(e) = known.get(npub) {
+            out.push(SeedAnchor {
+                npub: npub.clone(),
+                address: e.address.clone(),
+                transport: e.transport.clone(),
+                label: "last-known-good endpoint (direct FIPS)".to_string(),
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn ep(addr: &str) -> KnownEndpoint {
+        KnownEndpoint {
+            address: addr.to_string(),
+            transport: "udp".to_string(),
+            last_ok_unix: now_unix(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn record_and_reload_roundtrip() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let connected = vec![ConnectedPeer {
+            npub: "npub1aaa".into(),
+            address: "100.114.134.21:2121".into(),
+            transport: "udp".into(),
+        }];
+        let map = record_connected(dir.path(), &connected).await;
+        assert_eq!(map["npub1aaa"].address, "100.114.134.21:2121");
+        let reloaded = load(dir.path()).await;
+        assert_eq!(reloaded, map);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn expired_entries_are_pruned_on_record() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let mut stale = HashMap::new();
+        stale.insert(
+            "npub1old".to_string(),
+            KnownEndpoint {
+                address: "10.0.0.1:2121".into(),
+                transport: "udp".into(),
+                last_ok_unix: now_unix() - RETENTION_SECS - 60,
+            },
+        );
+        save(dir.path(), &stale).await.unwrap();
+        let map = record_connected(dir.path(), &[]).await;
+        assert!(map.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fallback_skips_connected_and_lan_covered_peers() {
+        let mut known = HashMap::new();
+        known.insert("npub1gone".to_string(), ep("100.1.2.3:2121"));
+        known.insert("npub1conn".to_string(), ep("100.1.2.4:2121"));
+        known.insert("npub1lan".to_string(), ep("100.1.2.5:2121"));
+        let wanted: Vec<String> = ["npub1gone", "npub1conn", "npub1lan", "npub1never"]
+            .iter()
+            .map(|s| s.to_string())
+            .collect();
+        let connected = vec!["npub1conn".to_string()];
+        let lan = vec![SeedAnchor {
+            npub: "npub1lan".into(),
+            address: "192.168.63.198:2121".into(),
+            transport: "udp".into(),
+            label: "LAN".into(),
+        }];
+        let out = fallback_anchors(&known, &wanted, &connected, &lan);
+        assert_eq!(out.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(out[0].npub, "npub1gone");
+        assert_eq!(out[0].address, "100.1.2.3:2121");
+        // npub1never has no stored endpoint → nothing to dial.
+    }
+}
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ pub mod anchors;
 pub mod app_ports;
 pub mod config;
 pub mod dial;
+pub mod endpoints;
 pub mod iface;
 pub mod service;
 pub mod telemetry;
@@ -227,6 +227,52 @@ pub async fn peer_connectivity_summary(anchor_candidates: &[String]) -> (u32, bo
    (authenticated_peer_count, anchor_connected)
 }

+/// Currently-connected peers with their live endpoints, from
+/// `fipsctl show peers` (`transport_addr`/`transport_type`). Feeds the
+/// last-known-good endpoint store (A3.10); empty on any failure.
+pub async fn connected_peer_endpoints() -> Vec<crate::fips::endpoints::ConnectedPeer> {
+    let peers_json = match Command::new("sudo")
+        .args(["-n", "fipsctl", "show", "peers"])
+        .output()
+        .await
+    {
+        Ok(o) if o.status.success() => o.stdout,
+        _ => return Vec::new(),
+    };
+    let parsed: serde_json::Value = match serde_json::from_slice(&peers_json) {
+        Ok(v) => v,
+        Err(_) => return Vec::new(),
+    };
+    parsed
+        .get("peers")
+        .and_then(|p| p.as_array())
+        .map(|peers| {
+            peers
+                .iter()
+                .filter(|p| {
+                    p.get("connectivity")
+                        .and_then(|c| c.as_str())
+                        .map(|s| s == "connected")
+                        .unwrap_or(false)
+                })
+                .filter_map(|p| {
+                    let npub = p.get("npub").and_then(|n| n.as_str())?;
+                    let address = p.get("transport_addr").and_then(|a| a.as_str())?;
+                    let transport = p
+                        .get("transport_type")
+                        .and_then(|t| t.as_str())
+                        .unwrap_or("udp");
+                    Some(crate::fips::endpoints::ConnectedPeer {
+                        npub: npub.to_string(),
+                        address: address.to_string(),
+                        transport: transport.to_string(),
+                    })
+                })
+                .collect()
+        })
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
 /// Read the upstream daemon's public key at `/etc/fips/fips.pub` and return
 /// it as a bech32 npub. Returns `Ok(None)` if the file doesn't exist — used
 /// as a fallback on legacy/dev nodes where no seed-derived key exists.
@@ -409,6 +409,11 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
    // flags) on already-deployed nodes via OTA; no-op if the kiosk isn't installed.
    tokio::spawn(bootstrap::ensure_kiosk_hardened());

+    // Repair our own restart policy before anything else can need it: a node
+    // whose unit still says Restart=on-failure stays dead after the next
+    // in-process update, because the daemon exits cleanly to be restarted.
+    tokio::spawn(bootstrap::ensure_restart_policy());
+
    // HDMI audio: install the PipeWire stack + audio-router daemon on kiosk
    // nodes (older ISOs shipped no audio stack; the router also heals the
    // boot-time ELD race that leaves HDMI silently unavailable).
@@ -148,9 +148,21 @@ pub enum MeshCommand {
    },
    SendAdvert,
    /// Reboot the locally-connected radio firmware to recover a wedged /
-    /// RX-deaf radio. Meshtastic-only; meshcore ignores it.
+    /// RX-deaf radio. Meshtastic: firmware reboot command. Reticulum: the
+    /// sidecar daemon is restarted (radio re-detected + reconfigured).
+    /// MeshCore: unsupported, and says so. `reply` (when present) carries
+    /// the real outcome to the RPC caller — the buttons used to be
+    /// fire-and-forget `warn!`s, i.e. no feedback ever reached the UI
+    /// (operator, 2026-08-06).
    RebootRadio {
        seconds: i64,
+        reply: Option<tokio::sync::oneshot::Sender<Result<String, String>>>,
+    },
+    /// Query the live RNode radio state (Reticulum-only): the sidecar's
+    /// radio-confirmed parameters, for the LoRa settings panel's current
+    /// values + apply read-back.
+    QueryRadioState {
+        reply: tokio::sync::oneshot::Sender<Result<serde_json::Value, String>>,
    },
    /// Re-fetch contact list from the radio device.
    RefreshContacts,
@@ -165,13 +165,41 @@ impl MeshRadioDevice {
        }
    }

-    async fn reboot(&mut self, seconds: i64) -> Result<()> {
+    async fn reboot(&mut self, seconds: i64) -> Result<String> {
        match self {
-            // Meshcore/Reticulum have no equivalent local-admin reboot in our
-            // driver; the RX-deaf recovery this targets is Meshtastic-specific.
-            Self::Meshcore(_) => Ok(()),
-            Self::Meshtastic(device) => device.reboot(seconds).await,
-            Self::Reticulum(_) => Ok(()),
+            // No remote reboot in the MeshCore serial protocol — say so
+            // instead of silently reporting success (the old `Ok(())` here
+            // is why the button "did nothing" for the operator).
+            Self::Meshcore(_) => {
+                anyhow::bail!("MeshCore radios have no remote reboot — power-cycle the device")
+            }
+            Self::Meshtastic(device) => {
+                device.reboot(seconds).await?;
+                Ok(format!(
+                    "Radio firmware reboots in {seconds}s and reconnects automatically"
+                ))
+            }
+            // Restarting the sidecar drops the serial port, re-detects the
+            // RNode and reapplies the RF config — the closest thing to a
+            // reboot the RNS stack has, and exactly what an operator wants
+            // after changing settings or on a wedged radio.
+            Self::Reticulum(device) => {
+                device.restart_daemon().await?;
+                Ok("Radio daemon restarting — the RNode re-detects and reconnects in about 15 seconds".to_string())
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Live RNode radio state — Reticulum-only (see ReticulumLink::query_radio_state).
+    async fn radio_state(&mut self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        match self {
+            Self::Meshcore(_) | Self::Meshtastic(_) => {
+                anyhow::bail!("Radio state read-back is only available for Reticulum RNode devices")
+            }
+            Self::Reticulum(device) => device
+                .query_radio_state(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5))
+                .await
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("The radio daemon did not answer the state query")),
        }
    }

@@ -1549,12 +1577,18 @@ async fn handle_send_command(
                warn!("Failed to send NodeInfo advert: {}", e);
            }
        }
-        MeshCommand::RebootRadio { seconds } => {
-            if let Err(e) = device.reboot(seconds).await {
-                warn!("Failed to reboot radio: {}", e);
-            } else {
-                info!(seconds, "Radio reboot command sent to device");
+        MeshCommand::RebootRadio { seconds, reply } => {
+            let outcome = device.reboot(seconds).await;
+            match &outcome {
+                Err(e) => warn!("Failed to reboot radio: {}", e),
+                Ok(_) => info!(seconds, "Radio reboot command sent to device"),
            }
+            if let Some(reply) = reply {
+                let _ = reply.send(outcome.map_err(|e| format!("{e:#}")));
+            }
+        }
+        MeshCommand::QueryRadioState { reply } => {
+            let _ = reply.send(device.radio_state().await.map_err(|e| format!("{e:#}")));
        }
        MeshCommand::RefreshContacts => {
            refresh_contacts(device, state).await;
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ pub mod outbox;
 pub mod protocol;
 pub mod ratchet;
 pub mod reticulum;
+pub mod rnode_settings;
 pub mod scheduler;
 pub mod serial;
 pub mod session;
@@ -1205,6 +1206,19 @@ impl MeshService {
        Ok(dest_prefix)
    }

+    /// True if `contact_id` is reachable over the mesh radio right now — the
+    /// same peer/twin resolution `peer_dest_prefix` performs, exposed as a
+    /// cheap bool so RPC handlers can gate radio-only transports (LXMF
+    /// native image, Reticulum resource transfer) without duplicating the
+    /// twin-resolution logic. A federation-only contact_id with no matching
+    /// radio twin returns false here — offering "resource-mesh" or native
+    /// image to such a peer sends it straight into `peer_dest_prefix`'s
+    /// "federation-only (no radio twin)" error (picture-send from a
+    /// federation-only contact, 2026-08-07).
+    pub async fn has_radio_route(&self, contact_id: u32) -> bool {
+        self.peer_dest_prefix(contact_id).await.is_ok()
+    }
+
    /// Split an oversized wire payload into MC-framed base64 chunks and send
    /// each via the mesh device. Matches the receive-side reassembly in
    /// `mesh/listener/decode.rs::handle_chunked_frame` (header `MCIIXXTT`,
@@ -2123,20 +2137,82 @@ impl MeshService {
    /// RX-deaf radio (one that has stopped hearing the mesh while still able to
    /// transmit). The device reconnects via the listener's reboot→reconnect
    /// loop. `seconds` is the firmware reboot delay.
-    pub async fn reboot_radio(&self, seconds: i64) -> Result<()> {
+    pub async fn reboot_radio(&self, seconds: i64) -> Result<String> {
        let status = self.state.status.read().await;
        if !status.device_connected {
            anyhow::bail!("No mesh device connected. Check USB connection.");
        }
        drop(status);

+        let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
        self.state
-            .send_cmd(listener::MeshCommand::RebootRadio { seconds })
+            .send_cmd(listener::MeshCommand::RebootRadio {
+                seconds,
+                reply: Some(tx),
+            })
            .await
            .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh listener not running"))?;

+        // The real outcome, not fire-and-forget: the UI shows this string
+        // (or the error) instead of pretending success.
+        let outcome = tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(15), rx)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("The radio did not acknowledge the reboot in time"))?
+            .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh session ended before the reboot completed"))?;
+        let message = outcome.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!(e))?;
        info!(seconds, "Mesh radio reboot triggered");
-        Ok(())
+        Ok(message)
+    }
+
+    /// Live RNode radio state (Reticulum-only): the sidecar's view of the
+    /// interface including the radio-confirmed r_* parameters. The LoRa
+    /// settings panel's source for "what is the device actually running".
+    pub async fn radio_state(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
+        // Retry across a reconnect window. Applying settings deliberately
+        // restarts the radio daemon (~15s), and the session is legitimately
+        // absent while it comes back — a single-shot query inside that window
+        // reported "the daemon did not answer" for what is a healthy,
+        // in-progress restart (operator, 2026-08-06).
+        const ATTEMPTS: u32 = 6;
+        let mut last_err = anyhow::anyhow!("No mesh device connected. Check USB connection.");
+        for attempt in 0..ATTEMPTS {
+            if attempt > 0 {
+                tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(4)).await;
+            }
+            if !self.state.status.read().await.device_connected {
+                last_err = anyhow::anyhow!(
+                    "The radio is not connected right now — if settings were just applied it \
+                     is restarting and comes back within about 20 seconds."
+                );
+                continue;
+            }
+            let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
+            if self
+                .state
+                .send_cmd(listener::MeshCommand::QueryRadioState { reply: tx })
+                .await
+                .is_err()
+            {
+                last_err = anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh listener not running");
+                continue;
+            }
+            match tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10), rx).await {
+                Ok(Ok(Ok(state))) => return Ok(state),
+                Ok(Ok(Err(e))) => {
+                    // A real device-level refusal (e.g. not an RNode radio) —
+                    // retrying cannot change it.
+                    return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(e));
+                }
+                Ok(Err(_)) => {
+                    last_err =
+                        anyhow::anyhow!("Mesh session ended before the state query completed")
+                }
+                Err(_) => {
+                    last_err = anyhow::anyhow!("The radio daemon did not answer the state query")
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Err(last_err)
    }

    /// Current mesh-AI assistant settings (issue #50).
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ fn daemon_command(
    archy_x25519_pubkey_hex: Option<&str>,
    display_name: Option<&str>,
    enable_transport: bool,
+    rf: Option<&super::rnode_settings::RNodeRfSettings>,
 ) -> Command {
    let (program, script) = daemon_program();
    let mut cmd = Command::new(program);
@@ -189,6 +190,24 @@ fn daemon_command(
    match iface {
        ReticulumInterface::Serial(path) => {
            cmd.arg("--serial-port").arg(path);
+            // Operator-editable RF parameters (.126 LoRa panel). Passed
+            // explicitly on every spawn so the sidecar's argparse defaults
+            // stop being the silent source of truth. `rf` is None only for
+            // non-serial interfaces, where these have no meaning.
+            if let Some(rf) = rf {
+                cmd.arg("--frequency").arg(rf.frequency.to_string());
+                cmd.arg("--bandwidth").arg(rf.bandwidth.to_string());
+                cmd.arg("--txpower").arg(rf.txpower.to_string());
+                cmd.arg("--spreadingfactor")
+                    .arg(rf.spreading_factor.to_string());
+                cmd.arg("--codingrate").arg(rf.coding_rate.to_string());
+                if let Some(pct) = rf.airtime_limit_short {
+                    cmd.arg("--airtime-limit-short").arg(pct.to_string());
+                }
+                if let Some(pct) = rf.airtime_limit_long {
+                    cmd.arg("--airtime-limit-long").arg(pct.to_string());
+                }
+            }
        }
        ReticulumInterface::TcpServer(bind) => {
            cmd.arg("--tcp-listen").arg(bind);
@@ -318,6 +337,10 @@ pub struct ReticulumLink {
    /// down and the outer reconnect loop respawns the daemon — without this
    /// a dead daemon was invisible until the 30-minute RX-stall watchdog.
    daemon_gone: bool,
+    /// Latest `radio_state` event from the sidecar (the live RNodeInterface
+    /// values, radio-confirmed `r_*` included). Refreshed by
+    /// [`Self::query_radio_state`]; the .126 LoRa panel's read-back source.
+    last_radio_state: Option<Value>,
 }

 impl ReticulumLink {
@@ -344,6 +367,16 @@ impl ReticulumLink {
        our_x25519_pubkey_hex: Option<&str>,
        display_name: Option<&str>,
    ) -> Result<Self> {
+        let rf = super::rnode_settings::RNodeRfSettings::load(data_dir).await;
+        if !rf.enabled {
+            anyhow::bail!(
+                "RNode interface is disabled in the LoRa settings — enable it to connect"
+            );
+        }
+        // Operator port override wins over the auto-detected path (.126 LoRa
+        // panel). The probe below still gates: a wrong override fails with
+        // the detect error instead of a silent dead transport.
+        let path = rf.port.as_deref().unwrap_or(path);
        probe_rnode(path)
            .await
            .context("RNode KISS detect failed")?;
@@ -454,6 +487,15 @@ impl ReticulumLink {
        }

        let enable_transport = daemon_supports_enable_transport().await;
+        // Operator RF settings ride every serial spawn; loaded here (not by
+        // callers) so a settings apply only needs a transport restart to take
+        // effect. Non-serial interfaces carry no RF.
+        let rf = match iface {
+            ReticulumInterface::Serial(_) => {
+                Some(super::rnode_settings::RNodeRfSettings::load(data_dir).await)
+            }
+            _ => None,
+        };
        let mut cmd = daemon_command(
            &socket_path,
            &iface,
@@ -462,6 +504,7 @@ impl ReticulumLink {
            our_x25519_pubkey_hex,
            display_name,
            enable_transport,
+            rf.as_ref(),
        );
        cmd.env("TMPDIR", &tmp_dir);
        let child = cmd
@@ -534,6 +577,7 @@ impl ReticulumLink {
            inbound: std::collections::VecDeque::new(),
            resource_id_counter: 0,
            daemon_gone: false,
+            last_radio_state: None,
        };
        link.load_persisted_peers();
        Ok(link)
@@ -896,8 +940,50 @@ impl ReticulumLink {
        }
    }

+    /// Restart the sidecar daemon: ask it to shut down cleanly and mark the
+    /// link dead so the session loop tears down and the outer reconnect loop
+    /// respawns it — re-detecting the RNode and reapplying the RF config
+    /// from the (possibly just-edited) persisted settings. This IS the
+    /// "reboot device" semantic for Reticulum radios, and the apply step of
+    /// the .126 LoRa settings panel.
+    pub async fn restart_daemon(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
+        // Best-effort clean shutdown (lets PyInstaller clear its _MEI dir);
+        // the SIGTERM path in Drop/terminate covers an already-dead socket.
+        let _ = self.send_rpc(serde_json::json!({"cmd": "shutdown"})).await;
+        self.daemon_gone = true;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Ask the sidecar for the live RNode state and wait briefly for the
+    /// reply event. Returns the freshest `radio_state` payload, or `None`
+    /// when the daemon didn't answer in time (dead daemon, no radio build).
+    pub async fn query_radio_state(&mut self, timeout: Duration) -> Option<Value> {
+        self.last_radio_state = None;
+        if self
+            .send_rpc(serde_json::json!({"cmd": "radio_state"}))
+            .await
+            .is_err()
+        {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + timeout;
+        loop {
+            self.drain_events().await;
+            if let Some(state) = &self.last_radio_state {
+                return Some(state.clone());
+            }
+            if self.daemon_gone || tokio::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
+                return None;
+            }
+            tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
+        }
+    }
+
    fn handle_event(&mut self, ev: Value) {
        match ev.get("event").and_then(Value::as_str) {
+            Some("radio_state") => {
+                self.last_radio_state = Some(ev);
+            }
            Some("announce") => {
                let Some(hash) = ev
                    .get("dest_hash")
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+//! Persisted RNode LoRa RF settings — the operator-editable half of the
+//! Reticulum transport (.126 LoRa settings panel).
+//!
+//! The reticulum sidecar (reticulum-daemon) writes the RNS config from its
+//! CLI args at every spawn; before this module those args were never passed,
+//! so every node ran the sidecar's argparse defaults and nothing was
+//! operator-editable. These settings persist at
+//! `<data_dir>/rnode-rf-settings.json`, feed `daemon_command` as explicit
+//! args, and the panel confirms application via the sidecar's `radio_state`
+//! read-back (the radio-confirmed `r_*` values, not the requested ones).
+//!
+//! An absent file yields [`RNodeRfSettings::default`], which matches the
+//! sidecar's historical argparse defaults exactly — deploying this changes
+//! nothing until the operator edits something.
+
+use anyhow::{bail, Result};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::path::Path;
+
+const SETTINGS_FILE: &str = "rnode-rf-settings.json";
+
+/// Validation bounds mirror RNS `RNodeInterface.py` (`validate_firmware` /
+/// the constructor checks) — NOT guessed: frequency 137–1020 MHz, sf 5–12,
+/// cr 5–8, txpower 0–22 dBm, airtime locks 0–100 %.
+const FREQ_MIN_HZ: u64 = 137_000_000;
+const FREQ_MAX_HZ: u64 = 1_020_000_000;
+/// The discrete bandwidths RNode firmware accepts (Hz).
+const VALID_BANDWIDTHS: &[u64] = &[
+    7_800, 10_400, 15_600, 20_800, 31_250, 41_700, 62_500, 125_000, 250_000, 500_000,
+];
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct RNodeRfSettings {
+    /// Interface on/off. `false` keeps the daemon from opening the radio at
+    /// all (the mesh service skips the serial transport).
+    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
+    pub enabled: bool,
+    /// Serial device override (e.g. `/dev/ttyACM0`). `None` = auto-detect,
+    /// which is what every node did before this existed.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub port: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default = "default_frequency")]
+    pub frequency: u64,
+    #[serde(default = "default_bandwidth")]
+    pub bandwidth: u64,
+    #[serde(default = "default_spreading_factor")]
+    pub spreading_factor: u8,
+    #[serde(default = "default_coding_rate")]
+    pub coding_rate: u8,
+    #[serde(default = "default_txpower")]
+    pub txpower: u8,
+    /// Short-window airtime duty-cycle lock, percent (EU868: 25). `None` =
+    /// no software lock (RNS default).
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub airtime_limit_short: Option<f64>,
+    /// Long-window airtime duty-cycle lock, percent (EU868: 10).
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub airtime_limit_long: Option<f64>,
+}
+
+fn default_true() -> bool {
+    true
+}
+fn default_frequency() -> u64 {
+    869_525_000
+}
+fn default_bandwidth() -> u64 {
+    125_000
+}
+fn default_spreading_factor() -> u8 {
+    8
+}
+fn default_coding_rate() -> u8 {
+    5
+}
+fn default_txpower() -> u8 {
+    17
+}
+
+impl Default for RNodeRfSettings {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            enabled: true,
+            port: None,
+            frequency: default_frequency(),
+            bandwidth: default_bandwidth(),
+            spreading_factor: default_spreading_factor(),
+            coding_rate: default_coding_rate(),
+            txpower: default_txpower(),
+            airtime_limit_short: None,
+            airtime_limit_long: None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl RNodeRfSettings {
+    pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
+        if !(FREQ_MIN_HZ..=FREQ_MAX_HZ).contains(&self.frequency) {
+            bail!(
+                "frequency {} Hz is outside the RNode range ({}–{} Hz)",
+                self.frequency,
+                FREQ_MIN_HZ,
+                FREQ_MAX_HZ
+            );
+        }
+        if !VALID_BANDWIDTHS.contains(&self.bandwidth) {
+            bail!(
+                "bandwidth {} Hz is not an RNode bandwidth (valid: {:?})",
+                self.bandwidth,
+                VALID_BANDWIDTHS
+            );
+        }
+        if !(5..=12).contains(&self.spreading_factor) {
+            bail!("spreading factor {} is outside 5–12", self.spreading_factor);
+        }
+        if !(5..=8).contains(&self.coding_rate) {
+            bail!("coding rate {} is outside 5–8", self.coding_rate);
+        }
+        if self.txpower > 22 {
+            bail!(
+                "tx power {} dBm is above the 22 dBm RNode maximum",
+                self.txpower
+            );
+        }
+        for (label, v) in [
+            ("airtime_limit_short", self.airtime_limit_short),
+            ("airtime_limit_long", self.airtime_limit_long),
+        ] {
+            if let Some(pct) = v {
+                if !(0.0..=100.0).contains(&pct) || !pct.is_finite() {
+                    bail!("{label} {pct} is not a percentage (0–100)");
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if let Some(port) = &self.port {
+            // Same shape the flasher accepts: an absolute device node. Keeps
+            // shell-metacharacter garbage out of the sidecar's argv.
+            if !port.starts_with("/dev/")
+                || port.chars().any(|c| {
+                    !(c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '/' || c == '_' || c == '-' || c == '.')
+                })
+            {
+                bail!("port must be an absolute /dev device path");
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub async fn load(data_dir: &Path) -> Self {
+        let path = data_dir.join(SETTINGS_FILE);
+        match tokio::fs::read_to_string(&path).await {
+            Ok(raw) => match serde_json::from_str::<Self>(&raw) {
+                Ok(s) => s,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "rnode-rf-settings.json unparseable — using defaults");
+                    Self::default()
+                }
+            },
+            // First run after the update: no settings file yet. ADOPT the
+            // node's existing effective RF config rather than imposing
+            // defaults — the operator's standing requirement is that the
+            // update changes NO device's applied settings. For archy-managed
+            // radios the sidecar config equals our defaults anyway; this
+            // covers any node whose RNS config diverged (hand edits,
+            // hand-run rnsd).
+            Err(_) => {
+                let adopted = Self::adopt_existing_rns_config().await;
+                if let Some(adopted) = adopted {
+                    tracing::info!(
+                        settings = ?adopted,
+                        "adopted existing RNS RNode config as initial RF settings"
+                    );
+                    if let Err(e) = adopted.save(data_dir).await {
+                        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "could not persist adopted RF settings");
+                    }
+                    adopted
+                } else {
+                    Self::default()
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Parse the RNodeInterface section out of an existing RNS config file
+    /// (the sidecar's `~/.archy-reticulum/config`, else a hand-run rnsd's
+    /// `~/.reticulum/config`). Returns `None` when neither exists or no
+    /// RNodeInterface section is found. Unparseable/absent fields keep the
+    /// default (which equals the sidecar's historical argparse default).
+    async fn adopt_existing_rns_config() -> Option<Self> {
+        let home = std::env::var("HOME").ok()?;
+        for candidate in [
+            format!("{home}/.archy-reticulum/config"),
+            format!("{home}/.reticulum/config"),
+        ] {
+            let Ok(raw) = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&candidate).await else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            if let Some(s) = Self::parse_rnode_section(&raw) {
+                return Some(s);
+            }
+        }
+        None
+    }
+
+    /// Extract RNode parameters from RNS config text. Scoped to the block
+    /// after a `type = RNodeInterface` line so TCP interface options can
+    /// never bleed in; stops at the next `[[...]]` section header.
+    fn parse_rnode_section(raw: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        let mut in_rnode = false;
+        let mut seen_any = false;
+        let mut s = Self::default();
+        for line in raw.lines() {
+            let line = line.trim();
+            if line.starts_with("[[") {
+                if in_rnode {
+                    break; // next interface section — RNode block ended
+                }
+                continue;
+            }
+            let Some((key, value)) = line.split_once('=') else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            let (key, value) = (key.trim(), value.trim());
+            if key == "type" {
+                in_rnode = value == "RNodeInterface";
+                continue;
+            }
+            if !in_rnode {
+                continue;
+            }
+            seen_any = true;
+            match key {
+                "enabled" | "interface_enabled" => {
+                    s.enabled = matches!(value.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(), "yes" | "true" | "on")
+                }
+                "port" => s.port = Some(value.to_string()),
+                "frequency" => s.frequency = value.parse().unwrap_or(s.frequency),
+                "bandwidth" => s.bandwidth = value.parse().unwrap_or(s.bandwidth),
+                "txpower" => s.txpower = value.parse().unwrap_or(s.txpower),
+                "spreadingfactor" => {
+                    s.spreading_factor = value.parse().unwrap_or(s.spreading_factor)
+                }
+                "codingrate" => s.coding_rate = value.parse().unwrap_or(s.coding_rate),
+                "airtime_limit_short" => s.airtime_limit_short = value.parse().ok(),
+                "airtime_limit_long" => s.airtime_limit_long = value.parse().ok(),
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+        (in_rnode || seen_any).then_some(s)
+    }
+
+    pub async fn save(&self, data_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+        self.validate()?;
+        let path = data_dir.join(SETTINGS_FILE);
+        let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+        let raw = serde_json::to_string_pretty(self)?;
+        tokio::fs::write(&tmp, raw).await?;
+        tokio::fs::rename(&tmp, &path).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn defaults_match_the_sidecar_argparse_defaults() {
+        // reticulum_daemon.py: --frequency 869525000 --bandwidth 125000
+        // --txpower 17 --spreadingfactor 8 --codingrate 5, no airtime locks.
+        let d = RNodeRfSettings::default();
+        assert_eq!(d.frequency, 869_525_000);
+        assert_eq!(d.bandwidth, 125_000);
+        assert_eq!(d.txpower, 17);
+        assert_eq!(d.spreading_factor, 8);
+        assert_eq!(d.coding_rate, 5);
+        assert!(d.airtime_limit_short.is_none() && d.airtime_limit_long.is_none());
+        assert!(d.enabled && d.port.is_none());
+        d.validate().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn operator_portugal_config_validates() {
+        // The operator's real device config (2026-08-06).
+        let s = RNodeRfSettings {
+            enabled: true,
+            port: Some("/dev/ttyACM0".into()),
+            frequency: 869_462_500,
+            bandwidth: 125_000,
+            spreading_factor: 8,
+            coding_rate: 5,
+            txpower: 14,
+            airtime_limit_short: Some(25.0),
+            airtime_limit_long: Some(10.0),
+        };
+        s.validate().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn adoption_preserves_the_operator_portugal_config_exactly() {
+        // The operator's literal RNS config (2026-08-06). The update must
+        // adopt these values verbatim — changing a node's applied RF
+        // settings is forbidden.
+        let raw = "\
+[reticulum]
+  enable_transport = yes
+
+[interfaces]
+  [[RNode LoRa Portugal]]
+    type = RNodeInterface
+    interface_enabled = true
+    port = /dev/ttyACM0
+    frequency = 869462500
+    bandwidth = 125000
+    spreadingfactor = 8
+    codingrate = 5
+    txpower = 14
+    airtime_limit_short = 25
+    airtime_limit_long = 10
+";
+        let s = RNodeRfSettings::parse_rnode_section(raw).expect("section found");
+        assert!(s.enabled);
+        assert_eq!(s.port.as_deref(), Some("/dev/ttyACM0"));
+        assert_eq!(s.frequency, 869_462_500);
+        assert_eq!(s.bandwidth, 125_000);
+        assert_eq!(s.spreading_factor, 8);
+        assert_eq!(s.coding_rate, 5);
+        assert_eq!(s.txpower, 14);
+        assert_eq!(s.airtime_limit_short, Some(25.0));
+        assert_eq!(s.airtime_limit_long, Some(10.0));
+        s.validate().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn adoption_ignores_non_rnode_sections_and_absent_config() {
+        let tcp_only = "\
+[interfaces]
+  [[Reticulum TCP Server]]
+    type = TCPServerInterface
+    listen_ip = 127.0.0.1
+    listen_port = 4242
+";
+        assert!(RNodeRfSettings::parse_rnode_section(tcp_only).is_none());
+        assert!(RNodeRfSettings::parse_rnode_section("").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn out_of_range_values_are_rejected() {
+        let base = RNodeRfSettings::default();
+        for bad in [
+            RNodeRfSettings {
+                frequency: 100,
+                ..base.clone()
+            },
+            RNodeRfSettings {
+                bandwidth: 123_456,
+                ..base.clone()
+            },
+            RNodeRfSettings {
+                spreading_factor: 4,
+                ..base.clone()
+            },
+            RNodeRfSettings {
+                coding_rate: 9,
+                ..base.clone()
+            },
+            RNodeRfSettings {
+                txpower: 23,
+                ..base.clone()
+            },
+            RNodeRfSettings {
+                airtime_limit_short: Some(180.0),
+                ..base.clone()
+            },
+            RNodeRfSettings {
+                port: Some("ttyACM0".into()),
+                ..base.clone()
+            },
+            RNodeRfSettings {
+                port: Some("/dev/tty; rm -rf /".into()),
+                ..base.clone()
+            },
+        ] {
+            assert!(bad.validate().is_err(), "{bad:?} should fail validation");
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -847,6 +847,39 @@ impl Server {
                        if !direct.is_empty() {
                            let _ = crate::fips::anchors::apply(&direct).await;
                        }
+
+                        // A3.10 — endpoint fallback for direct peering. Record
+                        // where currently-connected peers actually are (their
+                        // transport_addr covers LAN, Tailscale, and WAN alike),
+                        // then re-dial the last-known-good endpoint of every
+                        // federation peer whose live paths are gone: not
+                        // connected now, no LAN direct entry this tick. Escala-
+                        // tion order is LAN → last-known-good → anchor tree;
+                        // a stale candidate costs one bounded failed dial.
+                        let connected = crate::fips::service::connected_peer_endpoints().await;
+                        let known =
+                            crate::fips::endpoints::record_connected(&data_dir, &connected).await;
+                        let wanted: Vec<String> = reg
+                            .all_peers()
+                            .await
+                            .iter()
+                            .filter_map(|p| p.fips_npub.clone())
+                            .collect();
+                        let connected_npubs: Vec<String> =
+                            connected.iter().map(|c| c.npub.clone()).collect();
+                        let fallback = crate::fips::endpoints::fallback_anchors(
+                            &known,
+                            &wanted,
+                            &connected_npubs,
+                            &direct,
+                        );
+                        if !fallback.is_empty() {
+                            tracing::info!(
+                                count = fallback.len(),
+                                "dialing last-known-good endpoints for disconnected federation peers"
+                            );
+                            let _ = crate::fips::anchors::apply(&fallback).await;
+                        }
                    }

                    let next = if daemon_restarting && fast_retries < MAX_FAST_RETRIES {
@@ -1145,16 +1178,52 @@ fn fips_app_relay_addr(ip: std::net::Ipv6Addr, port: u16) -> SocketAddr {
 /// without a daemon restart. Each relay binds to the fips0 ULA only and
 /// forwards raw TCP to the same port on IPv4 loopback.
 async fn app_port_v6_relay_loop(mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>) {
-    use std::collections::HashSet;
-    let mut bridged: HashSet<u16> = HashSet::new();
+    use std::collections::HashMap;
+    let mut bridged: HashMap<u16, tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>> = HashMap::new();
    let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(60));
    interval.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Delay);
    loop {
        tokio::select! {
            _ = interval.tick() => {
                let Some(fips_ip) = crate::fips::iface::fips0_ula() else { continue };
+                // This relay is a raw unauthenticated forward from the mesh to
+                // the app's loopback, so it must refuse two classes of port:
+                //
+                // * `auth: gated` — the app gate owns the fips0 ULA for these,
+                //   and bridging one would bypass the login page. Which of the
+                //   two won the bind used to be a race.
+                // * `auth: local` — host-local BY INTENT. Bridging one makes a
+                //   port reachable from the whole mesh that was deliberately
+                //   never externally reachable: nbxplorer 32838 answered HTTP
+                //   200 over the mesh with no credential (archi-dev-box
+                //   2026-08-04) purely because it appeared in the static port
+                //   list below.
+                //
+                // Undeclared ports keep today's behaviour — silence is not an
+                // instruction in either direction, and this relay predates the
+                // declarations.
+                let port_map = crate::appgate::identity::build_port_map();
+                let gate_owned: std::collections::HashSet<u16> = port_map
+                    .gated_ports()
+                    .filter(|g| g.declared)
+                    .map(|g| g.port)
+                    .collect();
                for &port in crate::fips::app_ports::APP_LAUNCH_PORTS {
-                    if bridged.contains(&port) {
+                    let withhold = if gate_owned.contains(&port) {
+                        Some("port is now gate-owned")
+                    } else if port_map.is_declared_local(port) {
+                        Some("port is declared auth: local (host-local by intent)")
+                    } else {
+                        None
+                    };
+                    if let Some(reason) = withhold {
+                        if let Some(handle) = bridged.remove(&port) {
+                            handle.abort();
+                            info!(port, reason, "v6 relay released a bridge");
+                        }
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if bridged.contains_key(&port) {
                        continue;
                    }
                    // ONLY bridge a port that a running app already answers on
@@ -1181,10 +1250,9 @@ async fn app_port_v6_relay_loop(mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bo
                    // EADDRINUSE = fipsd or another process already answers
                    // on this mesh address/port, so stay out of the way.
                    let Ok(listener) = bind_v6_only(addr) else { continue };
-                    bridged.insert(port);
                    debug!("v6 relay bridging [{fips_ip}]:{port} -> 127.0.0.1:{port}");
                    let mut rx = shutdown_rx.clone();
-                    tokio::spawn(async move {
+                    let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
                        loop {
                            tokio::select! {
                                accepted = listener.accept() => {
@@ -1205,6 +1273,7 @@ async fn app_port_v6_relay_loop(mut shutdown_rx: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bo
                            }
                        }
                    });
+                    bridged.insert(port, handle);
                }
            }
            _ = shutdown_rx.changed() => return,
@@ -40,12 +40,19 @@ struct Session {
    created_at: SystemTime,
    last_activity: SystemTime,
    session_type: SessionType,
+    /// What kind of screen this login came from. A TV on the wall must not
+    /// be signed out for sitting still — nobody is there to type a password
+    /// back in — while a browser must be.
+    device_class: crate::settings::session_policy::DeviceClass,
 }

 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct SessionStore {
    sessions: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<[u8; 32], Session>>>,
    persist_path: PathBuf,
+    /// Where the session policy lives. Held rather than looked up globally
+    /// so tests can point at a temp dir.
+    data_dir: PathBuf,
 }

 /// On-disk representation of a persisted session (only Full sessions, no TOTP secrets).
@@ -67,6 +74,7 @@ impl SessionStore {
        Self {
            sessions: Arc::new(RwLock::new(sessions)),
            persist_path,
+            data_dir: PathBuf::from("/var/lib/archipelago"),
        }
    }

@@ -75,9 +83,17 @@ impl SessionStore {
    /// machine's real /var/lib/archipelago/sessions.json.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub fn new_for_tests(persist_path: PathBuf) -> Self {
+        // data_dir shares the temp path's parent so a test that writes a
+        // policy file is honoured, and one that doesn't gets the defaults
+        // rather than the dev machine's real configuration.
+        let data_dir = persist_path
+            .parent()
+            .map(PathBuf::from)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("."));
        Self {
            sessions: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
            persist_path,
+            data_dir,
        }
    }

@@ -120,6 +136,7 @@ impl SessionStore {
                    created_at,
                    last_activity,
                    session_type: SessionType::Full,
+                    device_class: crate::settings::session_policy::DeviceClass::Browser,
                },
            );
        }
@@ -160,6 +177,7 @@ impl SessionStore {
            created_at: now,
            last_activity: now,
            session_type: SessionType::Full,
+            device_class: crate::settings::session_policy::DeviceClass::Browser,
        };

        let mut sessions = self.sessions.write().await;
@@ -184,6 +202,10 @@ impl SessionStore {
                totp_secret,
                attempts: 0,
            },
+            // A half-finished login is always treated as a browser: it lives
+            // for PENDING_SESSION_TTL either way, and a kiosk exemption on a
+            // session that has not passed 2FA yet would be the wrong default.
+            device_class: crate::settings::session_policy::DeviceClass::Browser,
        };
        self.sessions.write().await.insert(hash, session);
        token
@@ -192,19 +214,23 @@ impl SessionStore {
    /// Validate a full session token. Returns true if the session exists and hasn't expired.
    /// Updates last_activity on successful validation (inactivity-based expiry).
    pub async fn validate(&self, token: &str) -> bool {
+        let policy = self.policy().await;
        let hash = hash_token(token);
        let mut sessions = self.sessions.write().await;
        if let Some(session) = sessions.get_mut(&hash) {
            if !matches!(session.session_type, SessionType::Full) {
                return false;
            }
-            if session
+            let idle = session
                .last_activity
                .elapsed()
                .unwrap_or_default()
-                .as_secs()
-                >= FULL_SESSION_TTL
-            {
+                .as_secs();
+            let age = session.created_at.elapsed().unwrap_or_default().as_secs();
+            // Both limits, not just idleness: the dashboard polls, so an
+            // idle timeout alone would never fire on an open tab. The
+            // absolute cap is what actually guarantees a login ends.
+            if policy.is_expired(session.device_class, age, idle) {
                sessions.remove(&hash);
                return false;
            }
@@ -215,6 +241,13 @@ impl SessionStore {
        }
    }

+    /// The operator's session policy, re-read from disk rather than cached
+    /// for the process lifetime so a change in Settings takes effect on the
+    /// next request instead of the next restart.
+    pub async fn policy(&self) -> crate::settings::session_policy::SessionPolicy {
+        crate::settings::session_policy::load(&self.data_dir).await
+    }
+
    /// Get the TOTP secret from a pending session. Returns None if not a valid pending session.
    /// Increments the attempt counter.
    pub async fn get_pending_secret(&self, token: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
@@ -259,6 +292,7 @@ impl SessionStore {
                    created_at: now,
                    last_activity: now,
                    session_type: SessionType::Full,
+                    device_class: crate::settings::session_policy::DeviceClass::Browser,
                },
            );
            Self::save_to_disk(&sessions, &self.persist_path).await;
@@ -300,6 +334,7 @@ impl SessionStore {
                created_at: now,
                last_activity: now,
                session_type: SessionType::Full,
+                device_class: crate::settings::session_policy::DeviceClass::Browser,
            },
        );
        Self::save_to_disk(&sessions, &self.persist_path).await;
@@ -4,4 +4,5 @@
 //! call sites (deep in the transport / RPC / ingest stacks) don't need
 //! to thread a data_dir or Arc through the entire call graph.

+pub mod session_policy;
 pub mod transport;
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+//! How long a login lasts, and who gets to say so.
+//!
+//! # Why this is configurable rather than a constant
+//!
+//! There is no single correct session lifetime. The same node can be a
+//! wall-mounted TV in a living room that must never ask for a password
+//! mid-film, and a wallet holding real funds where PCI DSS-style guidance
+//! says fifteen minutes. Both are legitimate; the operator knows which one
+//! this node is and we do not.
+//!
+//! # The two tokens
+//!
+//! * **Session token** — short-lived, refreshed silently on every
+//!   authenticated request. This is what the browser sends; if it leaks, it
+//!   is useful only until [`SessionPolicy::idle_timeout_secs`] of silence.
+//! * **Login (remember) token** — long-lived, and its *only* power is to
+//!   mint a fresh session token. Kept separate so raising the convenience
+//!   knob does not put a 30-day bearer credential on every request.
+//!
+//! Raising the idle timeout therefore does not weaken the credential that
+//! actually travels; it only changes how long a quiet tab stays usable.
+//!
+//! # Why an absolute cap exists at all
+//!
+//! Idle timeout alone can be defeated by any page that polls — the
+//! dashboard polls constantly, so an idle timeout would never fire while a
+//! tab is open. The absolute cap is what guarantees a login eventually
+//! ends, which is the property an auditor actually asks about.
+
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::path::Path;
+
+const FILE_PATH: &str = "settings/session_policy.json";
+
+/// Bounds. A setting that can be made meaningless is not a setting, and one
+/// that can lock the operator out of their own node is a footgun.
+const MIN_IDLE_SECS: u64 = 60;
+const MAX_IDLE_SECS: u64 = 90 * 24 * 3600;
+const MIN_ABSOLUTE_SECS: u64 = 300;
+const MAX_ABSOLUTE_SECS: u64 = 365 * 24 * 3600;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
+pub enum DeviceClass {
+    /// Ordinary browser on a phone or laptop. Policy applies as configured.
+    Browser,
+    /// A screen nobody logs into — a wall-mounted dashboard or TV. Being
+    /// signed out mid-view is the failure mode here, not a stale session:
+    /// the device is physically in the home, and there is no keyboard to
+    /// re-authenticate with. Exempt from the idle timeout, still subject to
+    /// the absolute cap so a stolen box does not stay authenticated forever.
+    Kiosk,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SessionPolicy {
+    /// Silence after which a session token stops validating.
+    pub idle_timeout_secs: u64,
+    /// Hard ceiling from login, regardless of activity. `None` = no cap.
+    pub absolute_timeout_secs: Option<u64>,
+    /// Re-prompt for the password before actions that move money, however
+    /// fresh the session is. Independent of the timeouts on purpose: it is
+    /// the control that matters when funds are involved, and it costs the
+    /// operator nothing the rest of the time.
+    pub reauth_for_funds: bool,
+}
+
+impl Default for SessionPolicy {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            // A day of silence, matching the previous hard-coded constant so
+            // existing nodes see no behaviour change until someone chooses.
+            idle_timeout_secs: 86_400,
+            // 30 days, aligned with the login token's own lifetime: a
+            // session that outlived the token which could refresh it would
+            // be an oddity.
+            absolute_timeout_secs: Some(30 * 24 * 3600),
+            reauth_for_funds: true,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl SessionPolicy {
+    /// Clamp to the supported range. Applied on load as well as on save, so
+    /// a hand-edited file cannot disable expiry by writing `0`.
+    pub fn sanitized(mut self) -> Self {
+        self.idle_timeout_secs = self.idle_timeout_secs.clamp(MIN_IDLE_SECS, MAX_IDLE_SECS);
+        self.absolute_timeout_secs = self
+            .absolute_timeout_secs
+            .map(|v| v.clamp(MIN_ABSOLUTE_SECS, MAX_ABSOLUTE_SECS))
+            // An absolute cap below the idle timeout would expire sessions
+            // while they are still active, which reads as random logouts.
+            .map(|v| v.max(self.idle_timeout_secs));
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Idle timeout for a given device, or `None` when idleness is not a
+    /// reason to expire (kiosk screens).
+    pub fn idle_timeout_for(&self, class: DeviceClass) -> Option<u64> {
+        match class {
+            DeviceClass::Browser => Some(self.idle_timeout_secs),
+            DeviceClass::Kiosk => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Has a session expired? `age` is time since login, `idle` since last
+    /// use. Both are checked because either alone is insufficient: idle
+    /// never fires on a polling dashboard, and absolute alone leaves a
+    /// forgotten tab usable for a month.
+    pub fn is_expired(&self, class: DeviceClass, age_secs: u64, idle_secs: u64) -> bool {
+        if let Some(limit) = self.absolute_timeout_secs {
+            if age_secs >= limit {
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+        match self.idle_timeout_for(class) {
+            Some(limit) => idle_secs >= limit,
+            None => false,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn load(data_dir: &Path) -> SessionPolicy {
+    let path = data_dir.join(FILE_PATH);
+    match tokio::fs::read(&path).await {
+        Ok(bytes) => serde_json::from_slice::<SessionPolicy>(&bytes)
+            .map(SessionPolicy::sanitized)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|e| {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "session policy unreadable; using defaults");
+                SessionPolicy::default()
+            }),
+        Err(_) => SessionPolicy::default(),
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn save(data_dir: &Path, policy: SessionPolicy) -> anyhow::Result<SessionPolicy> {
+    let policy = policy.sanitized();
+    let path = data_dir.join(FILE_PATH);
+    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(parent).await?;
+    }
+    let tmp = path.with_extension("json.tmp");
+    tokio::fs::write(&tmp, serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&policy)?).await?;
+    tokio::fs::rename(&tmp, &path).await?;
+    Ok(policy)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn defaults_match_the_previous_hardcoded_behaviour() {
+        let p = SessionPolicy::default();
+        assert_eq!(p.idle_timeout_secs, 86_400);
+        assert!(p.reauth_for_funds);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn expiry_cannot_be_disabled_by_hand_editing_the_file() {
+        let p = SessionPolicy {
+            idle_timeout_secs: 0,
+            absolute_timeout_secs: Some(0),
+            reauth_for_funds: false,
+        }
+        .sanitized();
+        assert!(p.idle_timeout_secs >= MIN_IDLE_SECS);
+        assert!(p.absolute_timeout_secs.unwrap() >= MIN_ABSOLUTE_SECS);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn absolute_cap_is_never_shorter_than_idle() {
+        // Otherwise a session dies while actively in use, which the operator
+        // experiences as being logged out at random.
+        let p = SessionPolicy {
+            idle_timeout_secs: 7 * 24 * 3600,
+            absolute_timeout_secs: Some(3600),
+            reauth_for_funds: true,
+        }
+        .sanitized();
+        assert_eq!(p.absolute_timeout_secs.unwrap(), p.idle_timeout_secs);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_kiosk_never_expires_from_idleness_but_still_has_a_ceiling() {
+        let p = SessionPolicy::default();
+        let a_week = 7 * 24 * 3600;
+        assert!(!p.is_expired(DeviceClass::Kiosk, 60, a_week));
+        assert!(p.is_expired(DeviceClass::Browser, 60, a_week));
+        // The absolute cap still applies to the TV.
+        assert!(p.is_expired(DeviceClass::Kiosk, 31 * 24 * 3600, 0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_polling_dashboard_still_eventually_expires() {
+        // idle never grows because the page polls; only the cap saves us.
+        let p = SessionPolicy::default();
+        assert!(p.is_expired(DeviceClass::Browser, 30 * 24 * 3600, 0));
+    }
+}
@@ -74,7 +74,20 @@ fn is_newer(candidate: &str, current: &str) -> bool {
    }
 }

+/// Primary OTA origin. Named host over TLS rather than the bare IP it used
+/// to be: the IP pinned the fleet to one machine and one plaintext port, so
+/// moving or fronting the origin meant an OTA to change where OTAs come
+/// from — the one update you cannot ship if the origin is unreachable. The
+/// signature is what establishes trust (see `trust::anchor`), not the
+/// transport, but HTTPS also stops a network observer seeing which version
+/// a node runs.
 const DEFAULT_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL: &str =
+    "https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/lfg2025/archy/raw/branch/main/releases/manifest.json";
+
+/// The previous IP-based origin, kept as an automatic fallback so a node
+/// whose DNS or TLS is broken still updates. Dropped from the mirror list
+/// once the fleet has moved.
+const LEGACY_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL: &str =
    "http://146.59.87.168:3000/lfg2025/archy/raw/branch/main/releases/manifest.json";
 const UPDATE_STATE_FILE: &str = "update_state.json";
 const UPDATE_MIRRORS_FILE: &str = "update-mirrors.json";
@@ -113,10 +126,19 @@ fn mirrors_path(data_dir: &Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
 }

 fn default_mirrors() -> Vec<UpdateMirror> {
-    vec![UpdateMirror {
-        url: DEFAULT_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL.to_string(),
-        label: "Server 1 (OVH)".to_string(),
-    }]
+    vec![
+        UpdateMirror {
+            url: DEFAULT_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL.to_string(),
+            label: "Archipelago Foundation".to_string(),
+        },
+        // Fallback, tried only if the named origin fails: a node whose DNS
+        // or clock is wrong (both break TLS) must still be able to update
+        // itself, and the signature check is what makes either source safe.
+        UpdateMirror {
+            url: LEGACY_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL.to_string(),
+            label: "Direct (fallback)".to_string(),
+        },
+    ]
 }

 /// Load the operator-configured mirror list. Returns defaults if the
@@ -186,15 +208,18 @@ fn force_ovh_update_primary(list: &mut Vec<UpdateMirror>) {
    }
    for mirror in list.iter_mut() {
        if mirror.url == DEFAULT_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL {
-            mirror.label = "Server 1 (OVH)".to_string();
+            mirror.label = "Archipelago Foundation".to_string();
+        } else if mirror.url == LEGACY_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL {
+            mirror.label = "Direct (fallback)".to_string();
        }
    }
-    list.sort_by_key(|m| {
-        if m.url == DEFAULT_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL {
-            0
-        } else {
-            1
-        }
+    // Named origin first, its IP fallback second, anything the operator
+    // added after that. Ordering matters: the list is tried in order, so a
+    // stale entry sitting first costs a timeout on every check.
+    list.sort_by_key(|m| match m.url.as_str() {
+        u if u == DEFAULT_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL => 0,
+        u if u == LEGACY_UPDATE_MANIFEST_URL => 1,
+        _ => 2,
    });
 }

@@ -2373,8 +2398,18 @@ mod tests {
    async fn test_load_mirrors_returns_defaults_when_absent() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let list = load_mirrors(dir.path()).await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(list.len(), 1);
-        assert!(list[0].url.contains("146.59.87.168"));
+        // The named origin leads, its IP fallback follows. A node with broken
+        // DNS or a wrong clock (both break TLS) must still have a way to
+        // update; the signature is what makes either source trustworthy.
+        assert_eq!(list.len(), 2);
+        assert!(
+            list[0]
+                .url
+                .starts_with("https://source.archipelago-foundation.org/"),
+            "the named origin must be primary, got {}",
+            list[0].url
+        );
+        assert!(list[1].url.contains("146.59.87.168"));
        assert!(
            !list.iter().any(|m| m.url.contains("git.tx1138.com")),
            "tx1138 was retired as a release server and must not be a default mirror"
@@ -1040,6 +1040,12 @@ pub async fn receive_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {

    let mut wallet = load_wallet(data_dir).await?;
    let mut received_total = 0u64;
+    // MintClient translates the mint's NUT error code into plain language and
+    // puts it at the top of the error chain (see `mint_error` in
+    // mint_client.rs); `{}` surfaces that, `{:#}` keeps the raw status/body
+    // for the log. Remember the last one so a total failure can tell the user
+    // *why* instead of just "nothing was received".
+    let mut last_reason: Option<String> = None;

    // Swap proofs at each mint
    for entry in &token.token {
@@ -1051,14 +1057,18 @@ pub async fn receive_token(data_dir: &Path, token_str: &str) -> Result<u64> {
                received_total += amount;
            }
            Err(e) => {
-                warn!("Failed to swap proofs from mint {}: {}", entry.mint, e);
+                warn!("Failed to swap proofs from mint {}: {:#}", entry.mint, e);
+                last_reason = Some(e.to_string());
                // Continue with other mints if any
            }
        }
    }

    if received_total == 0 {
-        anyhow::bail!("Failed to receive any proofs from token");
+        match last_reason {
+            Some(reason) => anyhow::bail!("Could not receive this ecash: {}", reason),
+            None => anyhow::bail!("Failed to receive any proofs from token"),
+        }
    }

    wallet.record_tx(
@@ -59,6 +59,72 @@ pub struct MintResult {
    pub proofs: Vec<Proof>,
 }

+/// Translate a Cashu NUT "transaction validation" error code into plain
+/// language a wallet user can act on. Mints respond to a rejected request
+/// with `{"code": N, "detail": "..."}`; `detail` is implementation-defined
+/// free text, but `code` is the stable identifier from the spec
+/// (https://github.com/cashubtc/nuts/blob/main/error_codes.md). Covers the
+/// 10001-11017 "proof/transaction validation" range plus the 12001-12003
+/// keyset codes shared by NUT-02/03/04/05 — the codes a swap/melt/mint call
+/// can actually hit. Returns `None` for anything else (e.g. Lightning/quote
+/// codes in the 20000s) so the caller falls back to the mint's own `detail`.
+fn describe_mint_error_code(code: i64) -> Option<&'static str> {
+    Some(match code {
+        10001 => "The mint rejected these coins as invalid.",
+        11001 => "This ecash has already been redeemed — it can't be claimed twice.",
+        11002 => "This ecash is already being redeemed elsewhere — try again in a moment.",
+        11003 => "The mint already issued new coins for this exact request — there's nothing left to redeem.",
+        11004 => "This request is still being processed by the mint — try again in a moment.",
+        11005 => "The token's amounts don't add up (inputs don't match outputs) — it may be corrupt.",
+        11006 => "That amount is outside the range this mint allows.",
+        11007 => "This token contains duplicate coins — it may be corrupt or already used.",
+        11008 => "The mint rejected this as a duplicate request.",
+        11009 | 11010 => "This token mixes incompatible currency units — the mint rejected it.",
+        11011 => "That Lightning invoice has no amount, which isn't supported here.",
+        11012 => "The amount requested doesn't match the Lightning invoice.",
+        11013 => "The mint doesn't support this currency unit.",
+        11014 | 11015 => "This token has too many coins for the mint to process in one request.",
+        11016 => "Duplicate quote IDs were sent in this request.",
+        11017 => "Too many items were sent in a single request.",
+        12001 => "The mint no longer recognizes the keyset that signed this token.",
+        12002 => "The mint's signing key for this token is inactive.",
+        12003 => "The mint's signing key for this token has expired.",
+        _ => return None,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Parse a mint's error body (`{"code": N, "detail": "..."}`) and pick the
+/// best user-facing message: the plain-language translation when we know the
+/// code, otherwise the mint's own `detail` text, otherwise the raw body.
+fn describe_mint_error_body(status: reqwest::StatusCode, body: &str) -> String {
+    let parsed: Option<serde_json::Value> = serde_json::from_str(body).ok();
+    let code = parsed
+        .as_ref()
+        .and_then(|v| v.get("code"))
+        .and_then(|c| c.as_i64());
+    let detail = parsed
+        .as_ref()
+        .and_then(|v| v.get("detail"))
+        .and_then(|d| d.as_str());
+
+    if let Some(friendly) = code.and_then(describe_mint_error_code) {
+        return friendly.to_string();
+    }
+    match detail {
+        Some(d) if !d.is_empty() => d.to_string(),
+        _ => format!("mint returned {} with no further detail", status),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Build the error for a failed mint HTTP call: `op` + status + raw body as
+/// the technical cause (visible via `{:#}` in logs), with the plain-language
+/// translation layered on top via `.context()` so `{}` — what reaches the
+/// wallet user — shows something actionable instead of raw mint JSON.
+fn mint_error(op: &str, status: reqwest::StatusCode, body: &str) -> anyhow::Error {
+    let friendly = describe_mint_error_body(status, body);
+    anyhow::anyhow!("{} failed ({}): {}", op, status, body).context(friendly)
+}
+
 /// HTTP client for a single Cashu mint.
 pub struct MintClient {
    url: String,
@@ -146,7 +212,7 @@ impl MintClient {
        if !res.status().is_success() {
            let status = res.status();
            let body = res.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            anyhow::bail!("Mint quote failed ({}): {}", status, body);
+            return Err(mint_error("Mint quote", status, &body));
        }

        res.json().await.context("Failed to parse mint quote")
@@ -212,7 +278,7 @@ impl MintClient {
        if !res.status().is_success() {
            let status = res.status();
            let body = res.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            anyhow::bail!("Mint tokens failed ({}): {}", status, body);
+            return Err(mint_error("Minting tokens", status, &body));
        }

        let body: serde_json::Value = res.json().await.context("Failed to parse mint response")?;
@@ -266,7 +332,7 @@ impl MintClient {
        if !res.status().is_success() {
            let status = res.status();
            let body = res.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            anyhow::bail!("Melt quote failed ({}): {}", status, body);
+            return Err(mint_error("Melt quote", status, &body));
        }

        res.json().await.context("Failed to parse melt quote")
@@ -293,7 +359,7 @@ impl MintClient {
        if !res.status().is_success() {
            let status = res.status();
            let body = res.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            anyhow::bail!("Melt failed ({}): {}", status, body);
+            return Err(mint_error("Melt", status, &body));
        }

        res.json().await.context("Failed to parse melt response")
@@ -337,7 +403,7 @@ impl MintClient {
        if !res.status().is_success() {
            let status = res.status();
            let body = res.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            anyhow::bail!("Swap failed ({}): {}", status, body);
+            return Err(mint_error("Swap", status, &body));
        }

        let body: serde_json::Value = res.json().await.context("Failed to parse swap response")?;
@@ -599,6 +599,19 @@ pub struct PortMapping {
    /// means the author expected an exemption they did not get.
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub auth_rationale: Option<String>,
+    /// Forward the node session cookie to the app on authorised requests.
+    ///
+    /// The gate normally strips its own credential before proxying — an app
+    /// must never be in a position to log or replay the node session. The
+    /// first-party companion UIs (lnd-ui, bitcoin-ui, electrs-ui, fips-ui)
+    /// are the exception their design requires: their nginx forwards the
+    /// browser's session cookie to the daemon's authenticated endpoints
+    /// (`/proxy/lnd/*`, `/rpc/v1`, `/lnd-connect-info`), so stripping it
+    /// breaks every data call behind the gate with a 401 while the page
+    /// shell still renders (observed as "LND UI unreachable", 2026-08-05).
+    /// Only meaningful on a `auth: gated` port.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
+    pub session_passthrough: bool,
 }

 impl PortMapping {
@@ -626,6 +639,7 @@ impl From<(u16, u16)> for PortMapping {
            bind: String::new(),
            auth: None,
            auth_rationale: None,
+            session_passthrough: false,
        }
    }
 }
@@ -1703,9 +1717,25 @@ app:
            }
        }
        exempt.sort();
+        // 31 as of the podsteadr app-package round: the prior 25 (bitcoin p2p
+        // (8333 ×2), core-lightning 9736/9835, electrumx 50001, fedimint
+        // 8173/8174, fedimint-gateway 8176/9737, gitea ssh 2222,
+        // lightning-stack 8091/9738/10010, lnd 9735/10009/18080, netbird
+        // 3478/8086/8087, pine TLS 10381 + the three voice ports
+        // (10200/10300/10400 — the disclosed known gap), router SSDP/mDNS
+        // 1900/5353) plus 6 new ones: podsteadr 8095 (web UI/API/RSS —
+        // third-party podcast clients and other podsteadr instances must
+        // fetch feeds/marketplace data with no node session; the app gates
+        // its own sensitive routes with NIP-98), podsteadr-blossom 8098
+        // (public blob reads for RSS enclosures; uploads are BUD-02
+        // signed-auth gated by blossom itself), podsteadr-mediamtx
+        // 1935/8189/8889/8890 (RTMP/ICE/WHIP ingest + HLS playback — none of
+        // these are HTTP-session-shaped, and publish is protocol-gated by a
+        // per-stream secret checked via podsteadr's own auth webhook). Every
+        // one is a deliberate, rationale-carrying exemption.
        assert_eq!(
            exempt.len(),
-            17,
+            31,
            "unauthenticated port set changed — review before updating this count: {exempt:?}"
        );
    }
@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ impl PodmanClient {
        }

        let mut mounts = Vec::new();
+        let mut named_volumes = Vec::new();
        for volume in &manifest.app.volumes {
            if volume.volume_type == "tmpfs" {
                let options: Vec<String> = volume
@@ -382,6 +383,19 @@ impl PodmanClient {
                    "type": "tmpfs",
                    "options": options,
                }));
+            } else if volume.volume_type == "volume" {
+                // Named podman volume. The libpod create spec carries these in
+                // the separate `volumes` field ({Name, Dest, Options}), NOT in
+                // `mounts`: sending one as a bind mount makes the API treat
+                // the bare volume name as a host path and the create fails —
+                // which left indeedhub-postgres/-minio permanently absent on
+                // legacy-path nodes (the reconciler removed the old container
+                // for drift, then could never create its replacement).
+                named_volumes.push(serde_json::json!({
+                    "Name": volume.source,
+                    "Dest": volume.target,
+                    "Options": volume.options,
+                }));
            } else {
                mounts.push(serde_json::json!({
                    "destination": volume.target,
@@ -464,6 +478,7 @@ impl PodmanClient {
            "image": image_ref,
            "portmappings": port_mappings,
            "mounts": mounts,
+            "volumes": named_volumes,
            "env": env_map,
            "secret_env": secret_env_map,
            "labels": labels_map,
@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
 server {
-    listen 50002;
+    # Loopback ONLY. This container is host-networked, so this nginx binds the
+    # HOST's address directly — `listen 50002;` meant every interface, and the
+    # app gate could never stand in front of it (there is no podman publish to
+    # pin, and the manifest declared no port, so the gate neither protected it
+    # nor reported it — it served this page to anyone who asked, on LAN,
+    # Tailscale and the mesh alike). Binding loopback lets the daemon claim the
+    # external addresses and authenticate them; see appgate::listener.
+    listen 127.0.0.1:50002;
    server_name _;

    root /usr/share/nginx/html;
@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
 server {
-    listen 8175;
+    # Loopback ONLY. This container is host-networked, so this nginx binds the
+    # HOST's address directly — `listen 8175;` meant every interface, and the
+    # app gate could never stand in front of it (there is no podman publish to
+    # pin, and the manifest declared no port, so the gate neither protected it
+    # nor reported it — it served this page to anyone who asked, on LAN,
+    # Tailscale and the mesh alike). Binding loopback lets the daemon claim the
+    # external addresses and authenticate them; see appgate::listener.
+    listen 127.0.0.1:8175;
    server_name _;

    proxy_intercept_errors on;
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More